

105<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
2<sup>D</sup> SESSION

# H. CON. RES. 340

Expressing the sense of the Congress that Iraq is in unacceptable and material breach of its international obligations, that the United States should insist on the removal, destruction, or otherwise rendering harmless of Iraq's programs for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, and that the United States should fully support the right of inspectors with the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq to unfettered and unannounced inspections of suspected weapons facilities.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 8, 1998

Mr. DELAY (for himself, Mr. ROHRBACHER, Mr. HEFLEY, Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania, Mr. FORBES, Mr. BACHUS, Mr. ADERHOLT, Mr. GIBBONS, Mr. TALENT, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma, Mr. MILLER of Florida, Mr. HAYWORTH, Mr. CRANE, Mr. SALMON, Mr. JENKINS, and Mr. PETERSON of Pennsylvania) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

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## CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress that Iraq is in unacceptable and material breach of its international obligations, that the United States should insist on the removal, destruction, or otherwise rendering harmless of Iraq's programs for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, and that the United States should fully support the right of inspectors with the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq to unfettered and unannounced inspections of suspected weapons facilities.

Whereas hostilities in Operation Desert Storm ended on February 28, 1991, and the conditions governing the ceasefire were specified in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 686 (March 2, 1991) and 687 (April 3, 1991);

Whereas Security Council Resolution 687 requires that international economic sanctions remain in place until Iraq discloses and destroys its programs for weapons of mass destruction and commits unconditionally never to resume such programs;

Whereas Resolution 687 established the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) to uncover all aspects of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and tasked the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to locate and remove or destroy all nuclear weapons systems, subsystems, or material from Iraq;

Whereas Security Council Resolution 715, adopted on October 11, 1991, empowered UNSCOM to maintain a long-term monitoring program designed to ensure that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs are dismantled and not restarted;

Whereas Iraq has consistently fought to hide the full extent of its weapons programs and has systematically made false declarations to the Security Council and to UNSCOM regarding those programs, and has systematically obstructed weapons inspections for 7 years;

Whereas on April 10, 1995, UNSCOM reported to the Security Council that Iraq had concealed its biological weapons program and failed to account for 17 tons of biologi-

cal weapons material, and the Security Council subsequently renewed sanctions against Iraq;

Whereas on July 1, 1995, Iraq admitted to a full-scale biological weapons program, but denied incorporating biological agents into weapons and subsequently threatened to end cooperation with UNSCOM, and the Security Council subsequently renewed sanctions against Iraq;

Whereas in December 1996, Iraq prevented UNSCOM from removing 130 Scud missile engines from Iraq, and the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement deploring Iraq's refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM;

Whereas the Security Council has repeatedly demanded that Iraq end its obstruction of UNSCOM, including in Resolutions 1060 (June 12, 1996), 1115 (June 21, 1996), 1134 (October 23, 1997), and 1137 (November 12, 1997);

Whereas on January 16, 1998, an UNSCOM team led by American Scott Ritter was withdrawn from Iraq after being barred for 3 days by Iraq from conducting inspections, resulting in the issuance of a Security Council Presidential Statement deploring Iraq's decision to bar the team as a clear violation of all applicable resolutions;

Whereas despite a clear agreement between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan to grant access to all sites and fully cooperate with UNSCOM, and the adoption on March 2, 1998, of Security Council Resolution 1154, warning that any violation of the agreement with Annan would have the "severest consequences" for Iraq, Iraq has continued to actively conceal weapons and weapons programs, provide

misinformation, and otherwise deny UNSCOM inspectors access to suspected weapons facilities;

Whereas President Clinton warned at that time that if Saddam Hussein defied the UNSCOM inspectors “and we fail to act . . . he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. And some day, some way, I guarantee you he’ll use the arsenal.”;

Whereas United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also stated at the time that if Saddam Hussein “reneges on this deal, there will be no question that force is the only way to go”;

Whereas on June 24, 1998, UNSCOM Director Richard Butler presented information to the United Nations Security Council indicating clearly that traces of the nerve agent VX had been discovered by UNSCOM in Iraqi missile warheads and that Iraq, contrary to information provided by Iraq to UNSCOM, had incorporated VX into weapons;

Whereas the Iraqi Government has since admitted making 3.9 tons of VX while continuing to deny ever incorporating any into a weapon;

Whereas on August 5, 1998, the Iraqi Government said it would halt cooperation with most inspections until the United Nations Security Council eliminated the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after it invaded Kuwait in 1990;

Whereas on August 26, 1998, UNSCOM inspection team leader Scott Ritter resigned his post citing “interference and manipulation usually coming from the highest levels of the [Clinton] Administration’s national security team”

that undermined UNSCOM's ability to inspect suspected weapons facilities;

Whereas Mr. Ritter testified before Congress that interference from the United States and the United Kingdom has given the appearance that UNSCOM is conducting unhindered weapons inspections when in fact such inspections are not occurring;

Whereas Mr. Ritter also testified that it would take Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein only 6 months to reconstitute his chemical weapons capability and the ballistic missiles to deliver them;

Whereas Mr. Ritter also noted that the appearance of arms control is more dangerous than no arms control at all;

Whereas reports in the news media cite Mr. Ritter as telling the Washington Institute for Near East Policy that Iraq has 3 "technologically complete" nuclear bombs that only lack the fissile material to make them operational;

Whereas the Security Council voted on September 9, 1998, to suspend any further periodic reviews of the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War;

Whereas the United States spends billions of dollars each year to enforce United Nations sanctions on Iraq; and

Whereas Iraq's continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threaten vital United States interests and international peace and security, and make a mockery of the sacrifices made during the Gulf War: Now, therefore, be it

1        *Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate*  
2 *concurring)*, That it is the sense of the Congress that Iraq

1 is in material and unacceptable breach of its international  
2 obligations, and therefore—

3           (1) the President is urged to take appropriate  
4           action, in accordance with the Constitution and laws  
5           of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance  
6           with its international obligations;

7           (2) the President should insist on the removal,  
8           destruction, or rendering harmless of Iraq's pro-  
9           grams for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons;

10           (3) the President should fully support the right  
11           of inspectors of the United Nations Special Commis-  
12           sion on Iraq to unfettered and unannounced inspec-  
13           tions of suspected weapons facilities; and

14           (4) the President should not renege on past  
15           warnings, issued by the President, the Secretary of  
16           State, and the Secretary of Defense, that the United  
17           States is committed to using military force, if nec-  
18           essary, to punish Iraq for interfering with or ob-  
19           structing UNSCOM's weapons inspections.

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