

106TH CONGRESS
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H. CON. RES. 164

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should adhere to a consistent policy with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostile situations.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 27, 1999

Mr. HAYES submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should adhere to a consistent policy with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostile situations.

Whereas since President Clinton took office in 1993, United States Armed Forces have been introduced 19 times into hostile situations;

Whereas members of the United States Armed Forces voluntarily, and without condition, carry out the orders of the President, their Commander-in-Chief;

Whereas American idealism and its imperative for democracy and freedom around the world does not, in all cases, parallel the national interests of the United States;

Whereas in 1992 President Clinton called for a peacekeeping mission into Somalia, deploying approximately 25,800 members of the United States Armed Forces, and this mission ultimately cost 29 American lives and concluded with the withdrawal of such Armed Forces in the midst of civil unrest and political instability;

Whereas in 1994 President Clinton called for a humanitarian mission into Rwanda, deploying approximately 3,600 members of the United States Armed Forces, that concluded with the withdrawal of such Armed Forces in the midst of civil unrest and political instability;

Whereas in 1994 President Clinton called for a mission into Haiti to restore constitutional order, deploying approximately 21,000 members of the United States Armed Forces, and this mission ultimately cost one American life and concluded with the withdrawal of such Armed Forces in the midst of civil unrest and political instability;

Whereas in 1994 President Clinton called for a mission into Bosnia-Herzegovina to suppress Serbian aggression and to eventually ensure implementation of the conditions outlined under a negotiated peace settlement, deploying approximately 16,500 members of the United States Armed Forces, which has resulted in the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina (thus achieving a goal of the Serbians), and which has yet to conclude and will require a long-term United States military presence;

Whereas in 1998 President Clinton called for a mission involving air strikes against Iraq to reinstate inspections of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and degrade Saddam Hussein's ability to produce weapons of mass destruction, using 650 strike and strike support

sorties and expending over 400 cruise missiles, that concluded with the termination of UNSCOM inspections, has emboldened Saddam Hussein, and has strengthened his stranglehold on the Iraqi people;

Whereas the frequency, and, at times, seemingly cavalier use of the United States Armed Forces calls into question the Clinton Administration's policy of military engagement; and

Whereas during the Reagan Administration, the deployment of United States Armed Forces into hostile situations adhered to the "Weinberger Doctrine", the philosophy of then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, which stated clear and consistent objectives prior to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostile situations: Now therefore, be it

1 *Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate*
 2 *concurring)*, That it is the sense of the Congress that the
 3 President should, with respect to the introduction of
 4 United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situa-
 5 tions where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
 6 indicated by the circumstances—

7 (1) adhere to the "Weinberger Doctrine", the
 8 philosophy of former Secretary of Defense Caspar
 9 Weinberger, which states—

10 (A) such introduction of Armed Forces
 11 should take place only if the vital national in-
 12 terests of the United States are in jeopardy;

1 (B) the commitment to introduce the
2 Armed Forces should be framed around clearly
3 defined political and military objectives;

4 (C) prior to such introduction of Armed
5 Forces, there should exist a reasonable assur-
6 ance that the President will have the support of
7 the people of the United States and their elect-
8 ed representative in Congress for such introduc-
9 tion;

10 (D) such introduction of Armed Forces
11 should be a last resort;

12 (E) such introduction of Armed Forces
13 should be done wholeheartedly and in a manner
14 by which the Armed Forces have an over-
15 whelming superiority so that a swift victory is
16 virtually certain; and

17 (F) the President should continually reas-
18 sess and, if necessary, readjust the commitment
19 to introduce the Armed Forces if conditions and
20 objectives invariably change after such introduc-
21 tion; and

22 (2) in addition to adhering to the requirements
23 of the “Weinberger Doctrine” under paragraph (1),
24 should, after the mission of the Armed Forces has
25 been defined and the Armed Forces have been intro-

1 duced, allow senior general officers of the Armed
2 Forces to carry out the mission in an unhindered
3 manner.

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