

106<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
2<sup>D</sup> SESSION

# S. 2492

To expand and enhance United States efforts in the Russian nuclear complex to expedite the containment of nuclear expertise that presents a proliferation threat, and for other purposes.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 1, 2000

Mr. DOMENICI introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

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## A BILL

To expand and enhance United States efforts in the Russian nuclear complex to expedite the containment of nuclear expertise that presents a proliferation threat, and for other purposes.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4       This Act may be cited as the “Nuclear Weapons  
5       Complex Conversion Act of 2000”.

6       **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7       Congress makes the following findings:

1           (1) The Russian nuclear weapons complex is  
2 still at its Cold War size. Little information about  
3 this complex is shared, and 10 of its most sensitive  
4 cities remain closed. These cities house 750,000 peo-  
5 ple and employ approximately 150,000 people in nu-  
6 clear military facilities. Although the Russian Fed-  
7 eration Ministry of Atomic Energy has announced  
8 the need to significantly downsize its workforce, per-  
9 haps by as much as 50 percent, it has been very  
10 slow in accomplishing this goal. Information on the  
11 extent of any progress is very closely held. The  
12 major impediments to downsizing have been eco-  
13 nomic and social conditions in Russia.

14           (2) The United States, on the other hand, has  
15 significantly downsized its nuclear weapons complex  
16 in an open and transparent manner. As a result, an  
17 enormous asymmetry now exists between the United  
18 States and Russia in nuclear weapon production ca-  
19 pacities and in transparency of such capacities. It is  
20 in the national security interest of the United States  
21 to assist the Russian Federation in accomplishing  
22 significant reductions in its nuclear military complex  
23 and in helping it to protect its nuclear weapons, nu-  
24 clear materials, and nuclear secrets during such re-  
25 ductions. Such assistance will accomplish critical

1 nonproliferation objectives and provide essential sup-  
2 port towards future arms reduction agreements.  
3 Without a significant, transparent reduction in nu-  
4 clear weapons production capacity, the Russian Fed-  
5 eration's ability to quickly reconstitute its arsenal  
6 remains inconsistent with current and contemplated  
7 arms control agreements.

8 (3) Several current programs address portions  
9 of the downsizing and nuclear security concerns. The  
10 Nuclear Cities Initiative was established to assist  
11 Russia in creating job opportunities for employees  
12 who are not required to support realistic Russian  
13 nuclear security requirements. Its focus has been on  
14 creating commercial ventures that can provide self-  
15 sustaining jobs in three of the closed cities. The cur-  
16 rent scope and funding of the program are not com-  
17 mensurate with the scale of the threats to the  
18 United States sought to be addressed by the pro-  
19 gram.

20 (4) To effectively address threats to United  
21 States national security interests, progress with re-  
22 spect to the nuclear cities must be expanded and ac-  
23 celerated. The Nuclear Cities Initiative has laid the  
24 groundwork for an immediate increase in investment  
25 and potential for immediate risk reduction in the cit-

1 ies of Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Seversk, which house  
2 four key Russian nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the  
3 Nuclear Cities Initiative has made considerable  
4 progress with the limited funding available. How-  
5 ever, to gain sufficient advocacy for additional sup-  
6 port, the program must demonstrate—

7 (A) rapid progress in conversion and re-  
8 structuring; and

9 (B) an ability for the United States to  
10 track progress against verifiable milestones that  
11 support a Russian nuclear complex consistent  
12 with their future national security require-  
13 ments.

14 (5) Reductions in the nuclear weapons-grade  
15 material stocks in the United States and Russia en-  
16 hance prospects for future arms control agreements  
17 and reduce concerns that these materials could lead  
18 to proliferation risks. Confidence in both nations will  
19 be enhanced by knowledge of the extent of each na-  
20 tion's stockpiles of weapons-grade materials. The  
21 United States already makes this information public.

22 (6) Many current programs contribute to the  
23 goals stated herein. However, the lack of pro-  
24 grammatic coordination within and among United  
25 States Government agencies impedes the capability

1 of the United States to make rapid progress. A for-  
2 mal single point of coordination is essential to en-  
3 sure that all United States programs directed at co-  
4 operative threat reduction, nuclear materials reduc-  
5 tion and protection, and the downsizing, trans-  
6 parency, and nonproliferation of the nuclear weap-  
7 ons complex effectively mitigate the risks inherent in  
8 the Russian Federation's military complex.

9 (7) Specialists in the United States and the  
10 former Soviet Union trained in nonproliferation  
11 studies can significantly assist in the downsizing  
12 process while minimizing the threat presented by po-  
13 tential proliferation of weapons materials or exper-  
14 tise.

15 **SEC. 3. EXPANSION AND ENHANCEMENT OF NUCLEAR CIT-**  
16 **IES INITIATIVE.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Energy shall, in  
18 accordance with the provisions of this section, take appro-  
19 priate actions to expand and enhance the activities under  
20 the Nuclear Cities Initiative in order to—

- 21 (1) assist the Russian Federation in the  
22 downsizing of the Russian Nuclear Complex; and  
23 (2) coordinate the downsizing of the Russian  
24 Nuclear Complex under the Initiative with other  
25 United States nonproliferation programs.

1 (b) ENHANCED USE OF MINATOM TECHNOLOGY  
2 AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SERVICES.—In car-  
3 rying out actions under this section, the Secretary shall  
4 facilitate the enhanced use of the technology, and the re-  
5 search and development services, of the Russia Ministry  
6 of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) by—

7 (1) fostering the commercialization of peaceful,  
8 non-threatening advanced technologies of the Min-  
9 istry through the development of projects to com-  
10 mercialize research and development services for in-  
11 dustry and industrial entities; and

12 (2) authorizing the Department of Energy, and  
13 encouraging other departments and agencies of the  
14 United States Government, to utilize such research  
15 and development services for activities appropriate  
16 to the mission of the Department, and such depart-  
17 ments and agencies, including activities relating to—

18 (A) remediation of the environmental con-  
19 sequences of United States nuclear weapons ac-  
20 tivities and Russian nuclear weapons activities;

21 (B) nonproliferation (including the detec-  
22 tion and identification of weapons of mass de-  
23 struction and verification of treaty compliance);

24 (C) global energy and environmental mat-  
25 ters; and

1 (D) basic scientific research.

2 (c) ACCELERATION OF NUCLEAR CITIES INITIA-  
3 TIVE.—(1) In carrying out actions under this section, the  
4 Secretary shall accelerate the Nuclear Cities Initiative by  
5 implementing, as soon as practicable after the date of the  
6 enactment of this Act, programs at the nuclear cities re-  
7 ferred to in paragraph (2) in order to convert significant  
8 portions of the activities carried out at such nuclear cities  
9 from military activities to civilian activities.

10 (2) The nuclear cities referred to in this paragraph  
11 are the following:

12 (A) Zarechnyy (Penza–19).

13 (B) Sarov (Arzamas–16 and Avangard).

14 (C) Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk–70).

15 (D) Seversk (Tomsk–7).

16 (3) Before implementing a program under paragraph  
17 (1), the Secretary shall establish appropriate, measurable  
18 milestones for the first year of the program.

19 (d) PLAN FOR RESTRUCTURING THE RUSSIAN NU-  
20 CLEAR COMPLEX.—(1) The President, acting through the  
21 Secretary of Energy, is urged to enter into negotiations  
22 with the Russian Federation for purposes of the develop-  
23 ment by the Russian Federation of a plan to restructure  
24 the Russian Nuclear Complex in order to meet changes  
25 in the national security requirements of Russia by 2010.

1       (2) The plan under paragraph (1) should include the  
2 following:

3           (A) Mechanisms to achieve a nuclear weapons  
4 production capacity in Russia that is consistent with  
5 the obligations of Russia under current and future  
6 arms control agreements.

7           (B) Mechanisms to increase transparency re-  
8 garding nuclear weapons production processes and  
9 nuclear materials inventories in Russia to the levels  
10 of transparency for such matters in the United  
11 States, including the participation of Department of  
12 Energy officials with expertise in transparency of  
13 such matters.

14           (C) Measurable milestones that will permit the  
15 United States and the Russian Federation to mon-  
16 itor progress under the plan.

17       (e) ENCOURAGEMENT OF CAREERS IN NON-  
18 PROLIFERATION.—(1) In carrying out actions under this  
19 section, the Secretary shall carry out a program to encour-  
20 age students in the United States and in the Russian Fed-  
21 eration to pursue a career in an area relating to non-  
22 proliferation.

23       (2) Of the amounts available under subsection (f),  
24 \$2,000,000 shall be available for purposes of the program  
25 required under paragraph (1).

1 (f) FUNDING FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001.—There is  
2 hereby authorized to be appropriated for the Department  
3 of Energy for fiscal year 2001, \$50,000,000 for purposes  
4 of the Nuclear Cities Initiative, including activities under  
5 this section.

6 (g) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING FUNDING FOR  
7 FISCAL YEARS AFTER FISCAL YEAR 2001.—It is the  
8 sense of Congress that the availability of funds for the  
9 Nuclear Cities Initiative in fiscal years after fiscal year  
10 2001 should be contingent upon—

11 (1) demonstrable progress in the programs car-  
12 ried out under subsection (c), as determined utilizing  
13 the milestones required under paragraph (3) of that  
14 subsection; and

15 (2) the development and implementation of the  
16 plan required by subsection (d).

17 **SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF**  
18 **A NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR NON-**  
19 **PROLIFERATION MATTERS.**

20 It is the sense of Congress that—

21 (1) there should be a National Coordinator for  
22 Nonproliferation Matters to coordinate—

23 (A) the Nuclear Cities Initiative;

24 (B) the Initiatives for Proliferation Preven-  
25 tion program;

1 (C) the Cooperative Threat Reduction pro-  
2 grams;

3 (D) the materials protection, control, and  
4 accounting programs; and

5 (E) the International Science and Tech-  
6 nology Center; and

7 (2) the position of National Coordinator for  
8 Nonproliferation Matters should be similar, regard-  
9 ing nonproliferation matters, to the position filled by  
10 designation of the President under section 1441(a)  
11 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruc-  
12 tion Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public Law 104–201;  
13 110 Stat. 2727; 50 U.S.C. 2351(a)).

14 **SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.**

15 In this Act:

16 (1) NUCLEAR CITY.—The term “nuclear city”  
17 means any of the closed nuclear cities within the  
18 complex of the Russia Ministry of Atomic Energy  
19 (MINATOM) as follows:

20 (A) Sarov (Arzamas–16 and Avangard).

21 (B) Zarechnyy (Penza–19).

22 (C) Novoural’sk (Sverdlovsk–44).

23 (D) Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk–45).

24 (E) Ozersk (Chelyabinsk–65).

25 (F) Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk–70).

1 (G) Trehgornyy (Zlatoust–36).

2 (H) Seversk (Tomsk–7).

3 (I) Zhelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk–26).

4 (I) Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk–45).

5 (2) RUSSIAN NUCLEAR COMPLEX.—The term  
6 “Russian Nuclear Complex” refers to all of the nu-  
7 clear cities.

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