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S. RES. 175

Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States policy toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in light of the Alliance's April 1999 Washington Summit and the conflict in Kosovo.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

AUGUST 5, 1999

Mr. ROTH (for himself and Mr. LUGAR) submitted the following resolution;
which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States policy toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in light of the Alliance's April 1999 Washington Summit and the conflict in Kosovo.

Whereas NATO, the only military alliance with both real defense capabilities and a transatlantic membership, has successfully defended the territory and interests of its members over the last 50 years, prevailed in the Cold War, and continues to make a vital contribution to the promotion and protection of freedom, democracy, stability, and peace throughout, Europe;

Whereas NATO enhances the security of the United States by embedding European states in a process of cooperative security planning, by preventing the destabilizing re-

nationalization of European military policies, and by ensuring an ongoing and direct leadership role for the United States in European security affairs;

Whereas the March 12, 1999, accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO has strengthened the Alliance, and is an important step toward a Europe that is truly whole, undivided, free, and at peace;

Whereas extending NATO membership to other qualified European democracies will also strengthen NATO, enhance security and stability, deter potential aggressors, and thereby advance the interests of the United States and its NATO allies;

Whereas the enlargement of NATO, a defensive alliance, threatens no nation and reinforces peace and stability in Europe, and provides benefits to all nations;

Whereas article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area” is eligible to be granted NATO membership;

Whereas Congress has repeatedly endorsed the enlargement of NATO with bipartisan majorities;

Whereas the selection of new members should depend on NATO’s strategic interests, potential threats to security and stability, and actions taken by prospective members to complete the transition to democracy and to harmonize policies with the political, economic, and military guidelines established by the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement;

Whereas the members of NATO face new threats, including conflict in Europe stemming from historic, ethnic, and re-

ligious enmities, the potential for the reemergence of a hegemonic power confronting Europe, rogue states and nonstate actors possessing weapons of mass destruction, and threats to the wider interests of the NATO members (including the disruption of the flow of vital resources);

Whereas NATO military force structure, defense planning, command structures, and force goals must be sufficient for the collective self-defense of its members, but also capable of projecting power when the security of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing partners among NATO members;

Whereas this will require that NATO members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high-intensity conflicts;

Whereas NATO's military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999 highlighted the glaring short-comings of European allies in command, control, communication, and intelligence resources; combat aircraft; and munitions, particularly precision-guided munitions; and the overall imbalance between United States and European defense capabilities;

Whereas this imbalance in United States and European defense capabilities undercuts the Alliance's goal of equitable transatlantic burden-sharing;

Whereas NATO is the only institution that promotes a uniquely transatlantic perspective and approach to issues concerning the interests and security of North America and Europe;

Whereas NATO has undertaken great effort to facilitate the emergence of a European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance, including the identification of NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander as the commander of operations led by the Western European Union (WEU); the creation of a NATO Headquarters for WEU-led operations; the establishment of close linkages between NATO and the WEU, including planning, exercises, and regular consultations; and a framework for the release and return of Alliance assets and capabilities;

Whereas on June 3, 1999, the European Union, in the course of its Cologne Summit, agreed to absorb the functions and structures of the Western European Union, including its command structures and military forces, and established within it the post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy;

Whereas the member States of the European Union at the Cologne Summit pledged to reinforce their capabilities in intelligence, strategic transport, and command and control; and

Whereas the European Union's decisions at its June 3, 1999 Cologne summit indicate a new determination of European states to develop a European Security and Defense Identity featuring strengthened defense capabilities to address regional conflicts and crisis management: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved,*

2 **SECTION 1. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.**

3 (a) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—The Senate—

4 (1) regards the political independence and territorial integrity of the emerging democracies in Cen-

5 torial integrity of the emerging democracies in Cen-

1 tral and Eastern Europe as vital to European peace
2 and security and, thus, to the interests of the United
3 States;

4 (2) endorses the commitment of the North At-
5 lantic Council that NATO will remain open to the
6 accession of further members in accordance with Ar-
7 ticle 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

8 (3) endorses the Alliance's decision to imple-
9 ment the Membership Action Plan as a means to
10 further enhance the readiness of those European de-
11 mocracies seeking NATO membership to bear the
12 responsibilities and burdens of membership;

13 (4) believes all NATO members should commit
14 to improving their respective defense capabilities so
15 that NATO can project power decisively within and
16 outside NATO borders in a manner that achieves
17 transatlantic parity in power projection capabilities
18 and facilitates equitable burdensharing among
19 NATO members; and

20 (5) endorses NATO's decision to launch the De-
21 fense Capabilities Initiative, intended to improve the
22 defense capabilities of the European Allies, particu-
23 larly the deployability, mobility, sustainability, and
24 interoperability of these European forces.

1 (b) FURTHER SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is further
2 the sense of the Senate that—

3 (1) the North Atlantic Council should pace, not
4 pause, the process of NATO enlargement by extend-
5 ing an invitation of membership to those states able
6 to meet the guidelines established by the 1995
7 NATO Study on Enlargement and should do so on
8 a country-by-country basis;

9 (2) the North Atlantic Council in the course of
10 its December 1999 Ministerial meeting should ini-
11 tiate a formal review of all pending applications for
12 NATO membership in order to establish the degree
13 to which such applications conform to the guidelines
14 for membership established by the 1995 NATO
15 Study on Enlargement;

16 (3) the results of this formal review should be
17 presented to the membership of the North Atlantic
18 Council in May 2000 with recommendations con-
19 cerning enlargement;

20 (4) NATO should assess potential applicants
21 for NATO membership on a continual basis;

22 (5) the President, the Secretary of State, and
23 the Secretary of Defense should fully use their of-
24 fices to encourage the NATO allies of the United
25 States to commit the resources necessary to upgrade

1 their capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long
2 distances, sustain operations for extended periods of
3 time, and operate jointly with the United States in
4 high-intensity conflicts, thus making them effective
5 partners of the United States in supporting mutual
6 interests;

7 (6) improved European military capabilities,
8 not new institutions, are the key to a vibrant and
9 more influential European Security and Defense
10 Identity within NATO;

11 (7) NATO should be the primary institution
12 through which European and North American allies
13 address security issues of transatlantic concern;

14 (8) the European Union must implement its
15 Cologne Summit decisions concerning its Common
16 Foreign and Security Policy in a manner that will
17 ensure that non-WEU NATO allies, including Can-
18 ada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Ice-
19 land, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United
20 States, will not be discriminated against, but will be
21 fully involved when the European Union addresses
22 issues affecting their security interests;

23 (9) the European Union's implementation of
24 the Cologne summit decisions should not promote a
25 strategic perspective on transatlantic security issues

1 that conflicts with that promoted by the North At-
2 lantic Treaty Organization;

3 (10) the European Union's implementation of
4 its Cologne summit decisions should not promote un-
5 necessary duplication of the resources and capabili-
6 ties provided by NATO; and

7 (11) the European Union's implementation of
8 its Cologne summit decisions should not promote a
9 decline in the military resources that European allies
10 contribute to NATO, but should instead promote the
11 complete fulfillment of their respective force commit-
12 ments to the Alliance.

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