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S. RES. 208

Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States policy toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, in light of the Alliance's April 1999 Washington Summit and the European Union's June 1999 Cologne Summit.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 28, 1999

Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. KYL, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. SMITH of Oregon, Mr. LIEBERMAN, and Mr. HELMS) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States policy toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, in light of the Alliance's April 1999 Washington Summit and the European Union's June 1999 Cologne Summit.

Whereas NATO is the only military alliance with both real defense capabilities and a transatlantic membership;

Whereas NATO is the only institution that promotes a uniquely transatlantic perspective and approach to issues concerning the security of North America and Europe;

Whereas NATO's military force structure, defense planning, command structures, and force goals must be sufficient

for the collective self-defense of its members, capable of projecting power when the security of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing partners among NATO members to defend common values and interests;

Whereas these requirements dictate that European NATO members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high-intensity conflicts;

Whereas NATO's military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999 highlighted (1) the significant shortcomings of European allies in command, control, communication, and intelligence resources; combat aircraft; precision-guided munitions; airlift; deployability; and logistics; and (2) the overall imbalance between United States and European defense capabilities;

Whereas this imbalance in United States and European NATO defense capabilities undercuts the Alliance's goal of equitable transatlantic burden-sharing;

Whereas NATO has undertaken great efforts to facilitate the emergence of a stronger European pillar within NATO through the European Security and Defense Identity, including the identification of NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander as the commander of operations led by the Western European Union (WEU); the creation of a NATO Headquarters for WEU-led operations; and the establishment of close linkages between NATO and the WEU, including planning, exercises, and regular consultations;

Whereas in promulgating NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative Alliance members committed themselves to improving their respective forces in five areas: (1) effective engagement; (2) deployability and mobility; (3) sustainability and logistics; (4) survivability; and (5) command, control and communications.

Whereas on June 3, 1999, the European Union, in the course of its Cologne Summit, agreed to absorb the functions and structures of the Western European Union, including its command structures and military forces, and established within it the post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy; and

Whereas the European Union's decisions at its June 3, 1999 Cologne Summit indicate a new determination of its member states to develop a European Security and Defense Identity with strengthened defense capabilities to address regional conflicts and crisis management: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved,*

2 **SECTION 1. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.**

3 (a) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—The Senate—

4 (1) believes NATO should remain the primary
5 institution through which European and North
6 American allies address security issues of trans-
7 atlantic concern;

8 (2) believes all NATO members should commit
9 to improving their respective defense capabilities so
10 that NATO can project power decisively with equi-
11 table burden-sharing;

1 (3) endorses NATO's decision to launch the De-
2 fense Capabilities Initiative, which is intended to im-
3 prove the defense capabilities of the European Allies,
4 particularly the deployability, mobility, sustain-
5 ability, and interoperability of these European
6 forces;

7 (4) acknowledges the resolve of the European
8 Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so
9 that it can take decisions and approve military ac-
10 tion where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged;
11 and

12 (5) calls upon the member states of NATO and
13 the European Union to promulgate together during
14 their respective meetings, ministerials, and summits
15 in the course of 1999 principles that will strengthen
16 the transatlantic partnership, reinforce unity within
17 NATO, and harmonize their roles in transatlantic
18 affairs.

19 (b) FURTHER SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is further
20 the sense of the Senate that—

21 (1) on matters of trans-Atlantic concern the
22 European Union should make clear that it would un-
23 dertake an autonomous mission through its Euro-
24 pean Security and Defense Identity only after the
25 North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been offered

1 the opportunity to undertake that mission but had
2 referred it to the European Union for action;

3 (2) improved European military capabilities,
4 not new institutions outside of the Alliance, are the
5 key to a vibrant and more influential European Se-
6 curity and Defense Identity within NATO;

7 (3) failure of the European allies of the United
8 States to achieve the goals established through the
9 Defense Capabilities Initiative would weaken support
10 for the Alliance in the United States;

11 (4) the President, the Secretary of State, and
12 the Secretary of Defense should fully use their of-
13 fices to encourage the NATO allies of the United
14 States to commit the resources necessary to upgrade
15 their capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long
16 distances, sustain operations for extended periods of
17 time, and operate jointly with the United States in
18 high-intensity conflicts, thus making them effective
19 partners of the United States in supporting mutual
20 interests;

21 (5) the European Union must implement its
22 Cologne Summit decisions concerning its Common
23 Foreign and Security Policy in a manner that will
24 ensure that non-WEU NATO allies, including Can-
25 ada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Ice-

1 land, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United
2 States, will not be discriminated against, but will be
3 fully involved when the European Union addresses
4 issues affecting their security interests;

5 (6) the European Union's implementation of
6 the Cologne Summit decisions should not promote a
7 strategic perspective on transatlantic security issues
8 that conflicts with that promoted by the North At-
9 lantic Treaty Organization;

10 (7) the European Union's implementation of its
11 Cologne Summit decisions should not promote un-
12 necessary duplication of the resources and capabili-
13 ties provided by NATO; and

14 (8) the European Union's implementation of its
15 Cologne Summit decisions should not promote a de-
16 cline in the military resources that European allies
17 contribute to NATO, but should instead promote the
18 complete fulfillment of their respective force commit-
19 ments to the Alliance.

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