

107<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
2<sup>D</sup> SESSION

# H. RES. 468

Affirming the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), supporting continued United States participation in NATO, ensuring that the enlargement of NATO proceeds in a manner consistent with United States interests, and for other purposes.

---

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 27, 2002

Mr. GALLEGLY (for himself, Mr. BEREUTER, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. COX) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

---

## RESOLUTION

Affirming the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), supporting continued United States participation in NATO, ensuring that the enlargement of NATO proceeds in a manner consistent with United States interests, and for other purposes.

1       *Resolved,*

2       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

3           This resolution may be cited as the “Transatlantic  
4 Security and NATO Enhancement Resolution of 2002”.

5       **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

6           The House of Representatives makes the following  
7 findings:

1           (1) Since 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-  
2           nization (NATO) has played an essential role in  
3           guaranteeing the security, freedom, and prosperity  
4           of the United States and its partners in the Alliance.

5           (2) NATO, founded on the principles of democ-  
6           racy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, has  
7           proved to be an indispensable instrument for forging  
8           a trans-Atlantic community of nations working to-  
9           gether to safeguard the freedom and common herit-  
10          age of its peoples and promoting stability in the  
11          North Atlantic area.

12          (3) NATO is the only institution that promotes  
13          a uniquely transatlantic perspective and approach to  
14          issues concerning the security of North America and  
15          Europe and remains the only multilateral security  
16          organization demonstrably capable of conducting ef-  
17          fective military operations and preserving security  
18          and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region.

19          (4) The security, freedom, and prosperity of the  
20          United States remain linked to the security of the  
21          countries of Europe.

22          (5) NATO remains the most visible and signifi-  
23          cant embodiment of United States engagement in  
24          Europe and therefore membership in NATO remains

1 a vital national security interest of the United  
2 States.

3 (6) NATO enhances the security of the United  
4 States by providing an integrated military structure  
5 and a framework for consultations on political and  
6 security concerns of members which could impact  
7 the Alliance.

8 (7) The security of NATO member countries is  
9 inseparably linked to that of the whole of Europe,  
10 and the consolidation and strengthening of demo-  
11 cratic and free societies on the entire continent is of  
12 direct and material importance to the NATO Alli-  
13 ance and its partners.

14 (8) The sustained commitment of the member  
15 countries of NATO to a mutual defense has been a  
16 major contributing factor in the democratic trans-  
17 formation of Central and Eastern Europe.

18 (9) Members of the Alliance can and should  
19 play a critical role in addressing the security chal-  
20 lenges of the post-Cold War era and in creating the  
21 stable environment needed for Central and Eastern  
22 Europe to successfully complete political and eco-  
23 nomic transformation.

24 (10) NATO should remain the core security or-  
25 ganization of the evolving Euro-Atlantic architecture

1 in which all countries enjoy the same freedom, co-  
2 operation, and security.

3 (11) NATO's military force structure, defense  
4 planning, command structures, and force goals must  
5 be sufficient for the collective self-defense of its  
6 members, and should be capable of projecting power  
7 when the security of a NATO member is threatened,  
8 and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing  
9 partners among NATO members to defend common  
10 values and interests.

11 (12) NATO must act to address new post-Cold  
12 War risks emerging from outside the treaty area in  
13 the interests of preserving peace and security in the  
14 Euro-Atlantic area, including—

15 (A) risks from rogue states and non-state  
16 actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chem-  
17 ical weapons and their means of delivery;

18 (B) transnational terrorism and disruption  
19 of the flow of vital resources; and

20 (C) conflicts outside the treaty area stem-  
21 ming from unresolved historical disputes and  
22 the actions of undemocratic governments and  
23 sub-state actors who reject the peaceful settle-  
24 ment of disputes.

1           (13) All NATO members should commit to im-  
2           proving their respective defense capabilities so that  
3           NATO can project power decisively and sustain op-  
4           erations over distance and time.

5           (14) The requirements to provide collective de-  
6           fense, to project power, and to sustain operations  
7           dictate that European NATO members possess mili-  
8           tary capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long  
9           distances, sustain operations for extended periods of  
10          time, and operate jointly with the United States in  
11          high-intensity conflicts.

12          (15) NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative,  
13          which is intended to improve the defense capabilities  
14          of the European Allies, particularly the deployability,  
15          mobility, sustainability, and interoperability of Alli-  
16          ance forces, must continue to be pursued by all  
17          members of the Alliance in order to develop balanced  
18          capabilities.

19          (16) With a few exceptions, European members  
20          of NATO have been deficient in maintaining re-  
21          quired military capabilities and providing defense  
22          spending at levels adequate to meet these capability  
23          shortfalls. Failure of the European NATO members  
24          to achieve the goals established through the Defense

1 Capabilities Initiative could weaken support for the  
2 Alliance in the United States over the long term.

3 (17) Members of the Alliance must also recog-  
4 nize that the campaign against new and emerging  
5 threats to the security of the Alliance requires other  
6 non-military capabilities and efforts to be effective.  
7 Thus, the need to enhance intelligence-sharing and  
8 cooperation, both bilaterally between Alliance mem-  
9 bers and partners and within the Alliance collec-  
10 tively, the facilitation of enhanced coordination  
11 among Alliance member's law enforcement agencies,  
12 and improved police and judicial cooperation and in-  
13 formation exchanges are critical to the overall effort.

14 (18) NATO has embarked upon an historic mis-  
15 sion to share its benefits and patterns of consulta-  
16 tion and cooperation with other nations in the Euro-  
17 Atlantic area through both enlargement and active  
18 partnership.

19 (19) NATO has enlarged its membership on  
20 four different occasions since 1949.

21 (20) The NATO summit meeting to be held in  
22 the fall of 2002 in Prague will provide an historic  
23 opportunity to chart a course for NATO in the new  
24 millennium by reaffirming the importance of NATO  
25 to the collective security of the Euro-Atlantic region,

1 by addressing new threats, developing new capabili-  
2 ties, and by extending invitations to additional coun-  
3 tries of Europe to become members of the Alliance.

4 (21) The governments of NATO member coun-  
5 tries have stated that enlargement of the Alliance is  
6 a further step toward the Alliance's basic goal of en-  
7 hancing security and extending stability throughout  
8 the Euro-Atlantic region.

9 (22) The enlargement process of NATO helps  
10 to avert conflict, because the very prospect of mem-  
11 bership serves as an incentive for aspiring members  
12 to resolve disputes with their neighbors and to push  
13 ahead with reform and democratization.

14 (23) The Partnership for Peace, created in  
15 1994 under United States leadership, has fostered  
16 cooperation between NATO and the countries of  
17 Central and Eastern Europe, and offers a path to  
18 future membership in the Alliance.

19 (24) At the Washington Summit of the NATO  
20 Alliance in April 1999, the NATO heads of state  
21 and government issued a communique declaring  
22 "[we] pledge that NATO will continue to welcome  
23 new members in a position to further the principles  
24 of the [North Atlantic] Treaty and contribute to  
25 peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area".

1           (25) In 1999 NATO launched a Membership  
2           Action Plan designed to help interested Partnership  
3           for Peace countries prepare for membership by offer-  
4           ing advice and assistance on programs and member-  
5           ship-related issues.

6           (26) The Membership Action Plan establishes  
7           certain political, economic, social, and military-re-  
8           lated goals that aspiring candidate nations are ex-  
9           pected to meet, including the peaceful resolution of  
10          territorial disputes, respect for democratic proce-  
11          dures and the rule of law, human rights, democratic  
12          control of the military and other military reforms,  
13          and a commitment to stability and well-being  
14          through economic liberty and social justice.

15          (27) In May 2000 in Vilnius, Lithuania, nine  
16          nations of Europe issued a statement (later joined  
17          by a tenth) declaring that their countries will co-  
18          operate in jointly seeking NATO membership in the  
19          next round of NATO enlargement and since then  
20          have taken concrete steps to demonstrate this com-  
21          mitment, including their participation in Partnership  
22          for Peace activities and their commitment to the  
23          concept of the Membership Action Plan.

24          (28) On June 15, 2001, in a speech in Warsaw,  
25          Poland, President George W. Bush stated “[all] of

1 Europe's new democracies, from the Baltic to the  
2 Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the  
3 same chance for security and freedom—and the  
4 same chance to join the institutions of Europe”.

5 (29) The enlargement of the NATO Alliance to  
6 include as full and equal members additional democ-  
7 racies in Europe will serve to reinforce stability and  
8 security in Europe by fostering their integration into  
9 the structures which have created and sustained  
10 peace in Europe since 1945.

11 (30) As new members of NATO assume the re-  
12 sponsibilities of Alliance membership, the costs of  
13 maintaining stability in Europe will be shared more  
14 widely. The concurrent assumption of greater re-  
15 sponsibility and development of greater capabilities  
16 by new members of NATO will further reinforce  
17 burdensharing.

18 (31) The membership of the Czech Republic,  
19 Hungary, and Poland has strengthened NATO's  
20 ability to perform the full range of NATO missions  
21 by providing bases, airfields, and transit rights for  
22 NATO forces during Operation Allied Force in the  
23 Balkans, by their contributions of military forces to  
24 NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and by their  
25 support for Operation Enduring Freedom.

1           (32) The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Po-  
2 land, due to their similar recent history, have bol-  
3 stered NATO's capability to integrate former com-  
4 munist nations into a community of democracies and  
5 have served as mentors to other countries that as-  
6 pire to join NATO.

7           (33) In supporting NATO enlargement all can-  
8 didate countries must be fully aware of the costs and  
9 responsibilities of NATO membership, including the  
10 obligation set forth in Article X of the North Atlan-  
11 tic Treaty that new members be able to contribute  
12 to the security of the North Atlantic area, and fur-  
13 ther to ensure that all countries admitted to NATO  
14 are capable of assuming those costs and responsibil-  
15 ities.

16           (34) For those candidate countries that receive  
17 an invitation to join NATO at the Prague Summit,  
18 the process of joining NATO does not end with the  
19 invitation but rather with meeting the full respon-  
20 sibilities of a NATO member, including the comple-  
21 tion of issues identified by the Membership Action  
22 Plan, which will continue beyond Prague.

23           (35) In considering the enlargement of NATO  
24 at Prague and in issuing invitations to the candidate  
25 countries who have made significant progress toward

1 achieving their objectives in the Membership Action  
2 Plan established by NATO, there is a recognition  
3 that each country invited to join NATO should ac-  
4 cede on a common date but before the date on which  
5 the next announced NATO summit is to take place.

6 (36) The countries that will be invited to begin  
7 accession negotiations with NATO at the NATO  
8 summit in Prague should not be the last such coun-  
9 tries invited to join NATO and there should be a  
10 continuing process and progress toward the admis-  
11 sion of additional democracies in Europe beyond  
12 2002 depending on the degree to which those coun-  
13 tries meet the criteria set forth in NATO's Member-  
14 ship Action Plan.

15 (37) The process of NATO enlargement entails  
16 the consensus agreement of the governments of all  
17 19 NATO member countries and ratification in ac-  
18 cordance with their constitutional procedures.

19 **SEC. 3. COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE RUSSIAN**  
20 **FEDERATION.**

21 The House of Representatives makes the following  
22 findings:

23 (1) The admission into the North Atlantic  
24 Treaty Organization (NATO) of new members from  
25 countries in Eastern and Central Europe, such as

1 the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, will not  
2 threaten any other country.

3 (2) Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has  
4 attached particular importance to the development  
5 of constructive and cooperative relations with the  
6 Russian Federation in order to overcome remaining  
7 vestiges of confrontation and competition in order to  
8 strengthen mutual trust and cooperation between  
9 NATO and the Russian Federation.

10 (3) In 1994, building on previous efforts at co-  
11 operation, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace  
12 Program, further enhancing the emerging NATO-  
13 Russian Federation dialogue.

14 (4) On May 27, 1997, in an expression of  
15 strong commitment to work together to build a last-  
16 ing and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area,  
17 the heads of state and government of NATO and the  
18 Russian Federation signed the ground-breaking  
19 “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation  
20 and Security Between NATO and the Russian Fed-  
21 eration”.

22 (5) On March 18, 1998, the Russian Federa-  
23 tion formally established its mission to NATO and  
24 appointed a senior military representative to facili-

1       tate military and defense-related cooperation be-  
2       tween NATO and the Russian Federation.

3               (6) Since 1998, NATO and the Russian Fed-  
4       eration have worked cooperatively with each other in  
5       the Balkans and elsewhere setting the stage for the  
6       ability of an enlarged NATO to continue the cooper-  
7       ative spirit embodied in the Founding Act.

8               (7) On May 28, 2002, in an historic step to-  
9       ward the Alliance's long-standing goal of building a  
10      secure, cooperative, and democratic Euro-Atlantic  
11      area, NATO took the decisive and substantial step  
12      of deepening the NATO-Russian Federation rela-  
13      tionship by establishing the new NATO-Russia  
14      Council.

15 **SEC. 4. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.**

16       The House of Representatives declares the following  
17      to be the policy of the United States:

18               (1) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
19      (NATO) should remain the primary institution  
20      through which European and North American allies  
21      address security issues of transatlantic concern.

22               (2) The member states of NATO should reaf-  
23      firm, at the Prague Summit in the fall of 2002, the  
24      continued importance of NATO, renew their commit-  
25      ment to strengthen the transatlantic partnership, re-

1       inforce unity within NATO, maintain a vigorous ca-  
2       pability to carry out collective defense, and har-  
3       monize security policies and strategies for trans-  
4       atlantic affairs.

5               (3) At the Prague Summit, the Alliance, while  
6       maintaining collective defense as its core function,  
7       should as a fundamental Alliance task, continue to  
8       strengthen national and collective capacities to re-  
9       spond to new threats wherever such threats occur,  
10      including from abroad.

11              (4) The Alliance, in addition to the strategic  
12      concept adopted by the Allies at the summit meeting  
13      held in Washington in 1999, must recognize the  
14      need to develop new capabilities, and agree to con-  
15      sider acting upon the threats posed by the prolifera-  
16      tion of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism  
17      by intensifying consultations among political and  
18      military leaders, and by developing comprehensive  
19      capabilities to counter these threats to the inter-  
20      national community.

21              (5) The Alliance should make clear commit-  
22      ments to remedy shortfalls in areas such as logistics,  
23      strategic airlift, command and control, modern  
24      strike capabilities, adequate shared intelligence, and  
25      the other requirements identified by NATO's De-

1 fense Capabilities Initiative necessary to provide the  
2 ability to carry out the full range of NATO's mis-  
3 sions.

4 (6) The Alliance must ensure a more equitable  
5 sharing of contributions to the NATO common  
6 budgets and to overall national defense expenditures  
7 and capability-building.

8 (7) The President, the Secretary of State, and  
9 the Secretary of Defense should fully use their of-  
10 fices to encourage the NATO allies to commit the  
11 resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to  
12 rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain op-  
13 erations for extended periods of time, and operate  
14 jointly with the United States in high intensity con-  
15 flicts, thus making such NATO allies more effective  
16 partners.

17 (8) The member states of NATO should com-  
18 mit to enhanced intelligence-sharing, law enforce-  
19 ment, police, and judicial cooperation, and expanded  
20 information exchanges within and among Alliance  
21 members in order to meet the challenges of new and  
22 emerging threats.

23 **SEC. 5. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERA-**  
24 **TION.**

25 It is the sense of the House of Representatives that—

1           (1) while maintaining its essential and inherent  
2 right to make its own decisions, the North Atlantic  
3 Treaty Organization (NATO) should seek to  
4 strengthen its relations with the Russian Federation  
5 as an essential partner in building long-term peace  
6 in Europe, and to that end, the new NATO-Russia  
7 Council, in which member states and the Russian  
8 Federation will work as equal partners on mutually-  
9 agreed matters, should be welcomed and supported;

10           (2) while retaining its primary commitment to  
11 collective defense, NATO enlargement should be car-  
12 ried out in such a manner as to underscore to the  
13 Russian Federation that NATO enlargement will en-  
14 hance the security of all countries in Europe, includ-  
15 ing the Russian Federation; and

16           (3) in seeking to demonstrate NATO's defen-  
17 sive and security-enhancing intentions to the Rus-  
18 sian Federation, it is essential that neither funda-  
19 mental United States security interests in Europe  
20 nor the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a  
21 defensive alliance be jeopardized.

22 **SEC. 6. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NATO ENLARGEMENT**  
23 **AND DESIGNATION OF COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE**  
24 **FOR NATO.**

25 It is the sense of the House of Representatives that—

1           (1) at the Summit to be held in Prague in the  
2 fall of 2002, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
3 (NATO) should extend invitations for accession ne-  
4 gotiations to any appropriate candidate country that  
5 meets the objectives and targets for NATO member-  
6 ship as outlined in the Membership Action Plan  
7 process established by NATO in 1999, including—

8           (A) a commitment to the basic principles  
9 and values set out in the Washington Treaty;

10           (B) the capability to contribute to collec-  
11 tive defense and the Alliance’s full range of mis-  
12 sions; and

13           (C) a firm commitment to contribute to  
14 stability and security, especially in regions of  
15 crisis and conflict, and to be willing and able to  
16 assume the responsibilities of NATO member-  
17 ship;

18           (2) the candidate countries of Albania, Bul-  
19 garia, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the  
20 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania,  
21 Slovakia, and Slovenia should be commended on the  
22 significant progress such countries have made thus  
23 far in political and economic liberty and military re-  
24 form necessary for meeting the objectives for pro-

1        spective members of NATO as set out in their own  
2        Membership Action Plans;

3            (3) each candidate country, despite recognized  
4        Membership Action Plan deficiencies requiring fur-  
5        ther refinement, could in its own way contribute to  
6        stability, freedom, and peace in Europe as a whole,  
7        as many of such countries have done thus far in the  
8        Balkans and in Afghanistan, and would make a  
9        positive contribution toward furthering the goals of  
10       NATO should it become a NATO member country;

11           (4) having made significant progress in reform-  
12        ing their societies and their military forces, and hav-  
13        ing developed reasonable, affordable, and sustainable  
14        plans to be able to work within the Alliance struc-  
15        ture and to contribute positively to the collective de-  
16        fense of the Alliance and other NATO missions, the  
17        most qualified candidate countries, as recommended  
18        by the Committee on International Relations of the  
19        House of Representatives, should be invited to begin  
20        the accession process to join the Alliance at the  
21        Prague summit;

22           (5) with respect to candidate countries invited  
23        to join NATO, such countries should accede on a  
24        common date before the next announced NATO  
25        summit is to take place;

1           (6) after the Prague summit those candidate  
2 countries invited to join the Alliance should continue  
3 to participate in the Membership Action Plan until  
4 accession, and the accession process should take into  
5 account work conducted under the Membership Ac-  
6 tion Plan; and

7           (7) the process of NATO enlargement should  
8 continue beyond the inclusion of such candidate  
9 countries invited to join NATO at Prague, to include  
10 those candidate countries not so invited at Prague  
11 as well as other democratic European countries  
12 which may express interest in joining the Alliance,  
13 and which agree to utilize the Membership Action  
14 Plan to facilitate such NATO enlargement.

○