

107TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 2478

To promote enhanced non-proliferation cooperation between the United States
and the Russian Federation.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 8, 2002

Ms. LANDRIEU (for herself and Mr. SMITH of Oregon) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To promote enhanced non-proliferation cooperation between
the United States and the Russian Federation.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Nuclear and Terrorism
5 Threat Reduction Act of 2002”.

6 **SEC. 2. ENHANCING THREAT REDUCTION.**

7 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—

8 (1) It is the policy of the United States to work
9 cooperatively with the Russian Federation in order
10 to prevent the diversion of weapons of mass destruc-

1 tion and materials relating thereto, including nu-
2 clear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as
3 the scientific and technical expertise necessary to de-
4 sign and build weapons of mass destruction.

5 (2) With respect to enhancing threat reduction,
6 there should be three primary objectives, as stated
7 in the President's review of 30 different United
8 States-Russia cooperative programs, as follows:

9 (A) To ensure that existing United States
10 cooperative non-proliferation programs with the
11 Russian Federation are focused on priority
12 threat reduction and non-proliferation goals,
13 and are conducted as efficiently and effectively
14 as possible.

15 (B) To examine what new initiatives might
16 be undertaken to further United States threat
17 reduction and non-proliferation goals.

18 (C) To consider organizational and proce-
19 dural changes designed to ensure a consistent
20 and coordinated United States Government ap-
21 proach to cooperative programs with the Rus-
22 sian Federation on the reduction of weapons of
23 mass destruction and prevention of their pro-
24 liferation.

1 (3) The goal of United States programs to as-
2 sist the Russian Federation should be to have them
3 work well, be focused on priority tasks, and be well
4 managed.

5 (4) In order to further cooperative efforts, the
6 following key programs should be expanded:

7 (A) The Department of Energy Material
8 Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A)
9 program to assist the Russian Federation se-
10 cure and consolidate weapons-grade nuclear ma-
11 terial.

12 (B) The Department of Energy Warhead
13 and Fissile Material Transparency Program.

14 (C) The International Science and Tech-
15 nology Center (ISTC).

16 (D) The Redirection of Biotechnical Sci-
17 entists program.

18 (E) The Department of Defense Coopera-
19 tive Threat Reduction project to construct a
20 chemical weapons destruction facility at
21 Shchuch'ye, Russia, to enable its earliest com-
22 pletion at no increased expense.

23 (5) Other programs should be adjusted, re-
24 focused, or reexamined, including—

1 (A) approaches to the current plutonium
2 disposition program in the Russian Federation,
3 in order to make the program less costly and
4 more effective;

5 (B) the project to end production by the
6 Russian Federation of weapons-grade pluto-
7 nium, in order to transfer the project from the
8 Department of Defense to the Department of
9 Energy;

10 (C) consolidation of the Department of En-
11 ergy's Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) with the
12 Initiative for Proliferation Prevention (IPP),
13 with a focus on projects to assist the Russian
14 Federation in reduction of its nuclear warheads
15 complex; and

16 (D) acceleration of the Department of En-
17 ergy's Second Line of Defense program to as-
18 sist the Russian Federation install nuclear de-
19 tection equipment at border posts.

20 (b) INCREASED FUNDING OF CERTAIN KEY PRO-
21 GRAMS.—In order to guarantee that the United States-
22 Russia non-proliferation and threat reduction efforts oper-
23 ate as efficiently as possible, certain key programs should
24 receive additional funding above current levels,
25 including—

1 (1) the United States-Russia Highly Enriched
2 Uranium Purchase Agreement;

3 (2) the Second Line of Defense program;

4 (3) the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention;

5 (4) the Fissile Materials Disposition program;

6 (5) the Redirection of Biotechnical Scientists
7 program;

8 (6) the Department of Energy Material Protec-
9 tion, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program;

10 (7) the International Science and Technology
11 Center; and

12 (8) the Warhead and Fissile Material Trans-
13 parency program.

14 (c) REPORT.—Not later than six months after the
15 date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
16 to Congress a report containing recommendations on how
17 to enhance the implementation of United States-Russia
18 non-proliferation and threat reduction programs, which
19 shall include—

20 (1) recommendations on how to improve and
21 streamline the contracting and procurement prac-
22 tices of those programs; and

23 (2) a listing of impediments to the efficient and
24 effective implementation of those programs.

1 **SEC. 3. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORIES AND DATA EX-**
2 **CHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES**
3 **AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON WEAP-**
4 **ONS-GRADE MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR WEAP-**
5 **ONS.**

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that inventories of
7 weapons-grade material and warheads should be tracked
8 in order, among other things—

9 (1) to make it more likely that the Russian
10 Federation can fully account for its entire inventory
11 of weapons-grade material and assembled weapons;
12 and

13 (2) to make it more likely that the sources of
14 any material or weapons possessed or used by any
15 foreign state or terrorist organization can be identi-
16 fied.

17 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
18 United States to establish jointly with the Russian Fed-
19 eration comprehensive inventories and data exchanges of
20 Russian and United States weapons-grade material and
21 assembled warheads, with particular attention to tactical,
22 or “nonstrategic” warheads, one of the most likely weap-
23 ons a terrorist organization or terrorist state would at-
24 tempt to acquire, and with particular attention focused on
25 weapons that have been removed from deployment.

1 (c) ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVE
2 INVENTORIES.—Notwithstanding any other provision of
3 law, the United States Government shall work with the
4 Russian Federation to develop comprehensive inventories
5 of Russian weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched
6 uranium programs and assembled warheads, with special
7 attention to be focused on tactical warheads and warheads
8 that have been removed from deployment.

9 (d) DATA EXCHANGES.—As part of this process, to
10 the maximum extent practicable, without jeopardizing
11 United States national security interests, the United
12 States is authorized to enter into ongoing data exchanges
13 with the Russian Federation on categories of material and
14 weapons described in subsection (c).

15 (e) REPORT.—Not later than six months after the
16 date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
17 until a comprehensive inventory is created and the infor-
18 mation collected from the inventory exchanged between
19 the governments of the United States and the Russian
20 Federation, the President shall submit to Congress a re-
21 port, in both an unclassified and classified form as nec-
22 essary, describing the progress that has been made toward
23 that objective.

1 **SEC. 4. COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE TRANSITION FROM**
2 **MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD)**
3 **TO MUTUALLY ASSURED SECURITY (MAS).**

4 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—With the end of the
5 Cold War more than a decade ago, with the United States
6 and the Russian Federation fighting together against
7 global terrorism, and with the Presidents of the United
8 States and the Russian Federation agreeing to establish
9 “a new strategic framework to ensure the mutual security
10 of the United States and Russia, and the world commu-
11 nity”, the United States and the Russian Federation
12 should increase significantly their efforts to put dangerous
13 and unnecessary elements of the Cold War to rest.

14 (b) ESTABLISHMENT.—In order to assist with the
15 policy expressed in subsection (a), the President is author-
16 ized to conclude an agreement with the Russian Federa-
17 tion for the establishment of a Joint United States-Russia
18 Commission to Assess the Transition from Mutual As-
19 sured Destruction (MAD) to Mutual Assured Security
20 (MAS) (in this section referred to as the “Commission”).

21 (c) COMPOSITION.—The United States delegation of
22 the Commission shall consist of 13 members appointed by
23 the President, as follows:

24 (1) Three members, after consultation with the
25 Speaker of the House of Representatives.

1 (2) Three members, after consultation with the
2 Majority Leader of the Senate.

3 (3) Two members, after consultation with the
4 Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.

5 (4) Two members, after consultation with the
6 Minority Leader of the Senate.

7 (5) Two members as the President may deter-
8 mine.

9 (d) QUALIFICATIONS.—The United States members
10 of the Commission shall be appointed from among private
11 United States citizens with knowledge and expertise in
12 United States-Russia strategic stability issues.

13 (e) CHAIR.—The chair of the Commission should be
14 chosen by consensus from among the members of the
15 Commission.

16 (f) RUSSIAN COMMISSION.—The President should
17 make every effort to encourage the Government of the
18 Russian Federation to appoint a Russian Federation dele-
19 gation of the Commission that would jointly meet and dis-
20 cuss the issues described in subsection (g).

21 (g) DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION.—The duties of the
22 Commission should include consideration of how—

23 (1) to ensure that the reduction of strategic nu-
24 clear weapons announced by the United States and
25 the Russian Federation in November 2001 take ef-

1 fect in a rapid, safe, verifiable and irreversible man-
2 ner;

3 (2) to preserve and enhance START I moni-
4 toring and verification mechanisms;

5 (3) to develop additional monitoring and
6 verification mechanisms;

7 (4) to preserve the benefits of the unratified
8 START II agreement, especially those measures that
9 affect strategic stability;

10 (5) to ensure the safety of warheads removed
11 from deployment;

12 (6) to safely and verifiably dismantle warheads
13 in excess of the ceiling established by the President
14 Bush at the November 2001 United States-Russia
15 summit;

16 (7) to begin a new high-level dialogue to discuss
17 United States and Russian Federation proposals for
18 a global and theater level missile defense systems;

19 (8) to extend presidential decision-making time
20 as it relates to nuclear weapons operations;

21 (9) to improve Russian-American cooperative
22 efforts to enhance strategic early warning, including
23 but not limited to the Joint Data Exchange Center
24 and the Russian-American Observation Satellite; and

1 (10) to increase cooperation between the United
2 States and the Russian Federation on the programs
3 and activities described in sections 2 and 3.

4 (e) COOPERATION.—In carrying out its duties, the
5 Commission should receive the full and timely cooperation
6 of United States Government officials, including providing
7 the Commission with analyses, briefings, and other infor-
8 mation necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities.

9 (f) REPORT.—The Commission shall, not later than
10 six months after the date of its first meeting, submit to
11 Congress an interim report on its findings and, not later
12 than six months after submission of the interim report,
13 submit to Congress a final report containing its conclu-
14 sions.

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