

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1460

To commend the members of the United States Armed Forces on their performance and bravery in Iraq, to repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 107–243), to require the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a plan for the phased redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq, to establish a Coordinator for Iraq Stabilization, and to place conditions on the obligation of funds to the Government of Iraq based on the achievement of benchmarks established by Iraq and the United States.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 9, 2007

Mrs. TAUSCHER (for herself, Mr. SMITH of Washington, Ms. HARMAN, Mr. DAVIS of Alabama, and Mr. CROWLEY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

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achievement of benchmarks established by Iraq and the United States.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Change the Course
5 in Iraq Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

7 It is the sense of Congress that—

8 (1) members of the United States Armed
9 Forces have shown great valor and courage in Iraq
10 in the performance of their duties; and

11 (2) the sacrifice of the members of the Armed
12 Forces and the sacrifice of their families are recog-
13 nized and appreciated.

14 **SEC. 3. REPEAL OF PUBLIC LAW 107-243.**

15 The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
16 Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243) is hereby
17 repealed.

18 **SEC. 4. REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED**
19 **FORCES FROM IRAQ.**

20 (a) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than 60 days after
21 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
22 Defense shall submit to the congressional defense commit-
23 tees a plan for the phased redeployment of United States
24 Armed Forces from Iraq.

1 (b) REQUIREMENTS.—The plan required by sub-
2 section (a) shall limit the presence of the Armed Forces
3 in Iraq to the following missions:

4 (1) Defeating Al-Qaeda and other foreign ter-
5 rorists.

6 (2) Training Iraqi security forces.

7 (3) Protecting United States forces.

8 **SEC. 5. DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE FOR STABILITY IN IRAQ**
9 **AND THE REGION.**

10 It is the sense of Congress that the United States
11 should increase its diplomatic efforts with the Government
12 of Iraq to help stabilize Iraq and the region.

13 **SEC. 6. COORDINATOR FOR IRAQ STABILIZATION.**

14 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 30 days after
15 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
16 appoint a Coordinator for Iraq Stabilization (hereinafter
17 in this section referred to as the “Coordinator”).

18 (b) DUTIES.—The Coordinator shall have a robust
19 mandate to develop and coordinate United States initia-
20 tives with respect to Iraq, and shall report regularly to
21 the President and the Secretary of State.

22 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—In carrying out the du-
23 ties specified in subsection (b), Congress strongly urges
24 the Coordinator to pursue efforts with the Government of
25 Iraq to include the following:

1 (1) Supporting the unity and territorial integ-
2 rity of Iraq.

3 (2) Preventing destabilizing actions and inter-
4 ventions by Iraq's neighbors.

5 (3) Securing Iraq's borders, including the use
6 of joint patrols with neighboring countries.

7 (4) Preventing the expansion of the instability
8 and conflict beyond Iraq's borders.

9 (5) Promoting economic assistance, commerce,
10 trade, political support, and if possible, military as-
11 sistance for the Iraqi Government from non-neigh-
12 boring Muslim nations.

13 (6) Energizing countries to support national po-
14 litical reconciliation in Iraq.

15 (7) Validating Iraq's legitimacy by resuming
16 diplomatic relations, where appropriate, and reestab-
17 lishing embassies in Baghdad.

18 (8) Assisting Iraq in establishing active working
19 embassies in key capitals in the region.

20 (9) Helping Iraq reach a mutually acceptable
21 agreement on Kirkuk.

22 (10) Assisting the Iraqi Government in achiev-
23 ing certain security, political, and economic mile-
24 stones, including national reconciliation, equitable

1 distribution of oil revenues, and the dismantling of
2 militias.

3 (11) Supporting the holding of a conference or
4 meeting in Baghdad of the League of Arab League
5 States or the Organization of the Islamic Conference
6 both to assist the Iraqi Government in promoting
7 national reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish the
8 diplomatic presence of such organizations in Iraq.

9 (12) Creating an Iraq International Support
10 Group consisting of all countries that border Iraq as
11 well as other key countries in the region and the
12 world. The five permanent members of the United
13 Nations Security Council and the European Union
14 should also be members. The Support Group should
15 develop specific approaches to neighboring countries
16 to take into account the interests, perspectives, and
17 potential contributions such countries can make.

18 **SEC. 7. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT**

19 **OF IRAQ.**

20 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
21 ings:

22 (1) The Iraq Study Group Report advised,
23 “Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not
24 solve the fundamental cause of violence in Iraq,
25 which is the absence of national reconciliation . . .

1 Past experience indicates that the violence would
2 simply rekindle as soon as U.S. forces are moved.”.

3 (2) The goal of United States policy in Iraq, as
4 stated by President George W. Bush, is an Iraq that
5 can “govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself”.

6 (3) In accordance with Recommendation 21 of
7 the Iraq Study Group Report, if the Iraqi Govern-
8 ment does not make substantial progress toward the
9 achievement of milestones on national reconciliation,
10 security, and governance, the United States should
11 reduce its political, military, or economic support for
12 the Iraqi Government. There must be consequences
13 if Iraq does not perform.

14 (4) In a November 2006 Department of De-
15 fense report to Congress regarding the status of se-
16 curity in Iraq, 91 of 118 battalions, 30 of 36 bri-
17 gades, and six of ten divisions were in the lead when
18 conducting operations, with the United States in
19 supporting roles. The Iraqi Ground Forces Com-
20 mand had command and control of two of the ten
21 Iraqi Army divisions and only two of Iraq’s 18 prov-
22 inces were in Provincial Iraqi Control, operating
23 independently of Coalition forces. Thus, there is an
24 urgent, near-term need for putting a time-table on
25 when Iraqi forces need to be trained, equipped, and

1 in the lead of security operations, tied to conditional
2 funding, which may give the Iraqi Government the
3 incentive it needs to take control of its security.

4 (5) The Iraq Study Group’s recommendations
5 for Iraq’s goals for national reconciliation, security,
6 and governance include—

7 (A) the reintegration of Baathists and
8 Arab nationalists into the government;

9 (B) disarming, demobilizing, and reinte-
10 grating militia members into civilian society;

11 (C) the accruing of oil revenues to the cen-
12 tral government to be shared on the basis of
13 population; and

14 (D) amending the Iraq Constitution.

15 (6) The Iraq Study Group estimated the United
16 States has appropriated \$34 billion to support the
17 reconstruction of Iraq, of which \$21 billion has been
18 appropriated for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
19 Fund.

20 (7) As part of the comprehensive strategy sup-
21 ported by the Iraq Study Group, the United States
22 should embark on a “robust diplomatic effort to es-
23 tablish an international support structure intended
24 to stabilize Iraq and ease tensions in other countries
25 of the region”.

1 (8) In his address to the Nation on the Iraq
2 War on January 10, 2007, President Bush stated
3 America would hold the Government of Iraq to the
4 benchmarks it has announced—the Iraqi Govern-
5 ment plans to take responsibility for security in all
6 of Iraq’s provinces by November 2007, Iraq will pass
7 legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis, the
8 Iraqi Government will spend \$10 billion of its own
9 money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects
10 that will create new jobs, Iraqis plan to hold provin-
11 cial elections later in 2007, and the Iraqi Govern-
12 ment will reform de-Baathification laws and estab-
13 lish a fair process for considering amendments to
14 the Iraq Constitution.

15 (9) In the State of the Union Address on Janu-
16 ary 23, 2007, President Bush stated “Iraq’s leaders
17 know that our commitment is not open-ended. They
18 have promised to deploy more of their own troops to
19 secure Baghdad, and they must do so. They have
20 pledged that they will confront violent radicals of
21 any faction or political party. And they need to fol-
22 low through and lift needless restrictions on Iraqi
23 and coalition forces, so these troops can achieve
24 their mission of bringing security to all of the people
25 of Baghdad. Iraq’s leaders have committed them-

1 selves to a series of benchmarks to achieve reconcili-
2 ation—to share oil revenues among all of Iraq’s citi-
3 zens, to put the wealth of Iraq into the rebuilding
4 of Iraq, to allow more Iraqis to re-enter their na-
5 tion’s civic life, to hold local elections, and to take
6 responsibility for security in every Iraqi province.”.

7 (b) LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on December 31,
9 2007, assistance described in paragraph (2) may be
10 provided to the Government of Iraq only if the
11 President certifies to the congressional defense com-
12 mittees that—

13 (A) the Iraqi Government has approved
14 laws to—

15 (i) reintegrate Baathists and Arab na-
16 tionalists into the government;

17 (ii) disarm, demobilize, and re-
18 integrate militia members into civilian soci-
19 ety; and

20 (iii) provide for the accruing of oil
21 revenues to the central government to be
22 shared on the basis of population;

23 (B) the Iraqi Government has amended the
24 Iraq Constitution as appropriate to guarantee
25 the rights of all Iraqi citizens;

1 (C) the Iraqi Government is making sig-
2 nificant progress to control its security forces,
3 including significant progress to ensure that the
4 security forces are able to take the lead in secu-
5 rity operations; and

6 (D) each of Iraq's provinces is under the
7 control of provincial Iraqi governmental au-
8 thorities.

9 (2) ASSISTANCE DESCRIBED.—Assistance re-
10 ferred to in paragraph (1) is assistance provided
11 under any provision of law for the Iraqi security
12 forces or for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq.

13 **SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.**

14 As used in this Act:

15 (1) ARMED FORCES.—The term “Armed
16 Forces” has the meaning given the term in section
17 101(a)(4) of title 10, United States Code.

18 (2) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES.—
19 The term “congressional defense committees”
20 means—

21 (A) the Committee on Armed Services and
22 the Committee on Appropriations of the House
23 of Representatives; and

1 (B) the Committee on Armed Services and
2 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

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