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To address security risks posed by global climate change, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 19, 2007

Mr. MARKEY (for himself, Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland, Mr. LARSON of Connecticut, Ms. ESHOO, Ms. SOLIS, Mr. HALL of New York, Mr. McDERMOTT, and Mr. OLVER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To address security risks posed by global climate change,
and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Global Climate Change
5 Security Oversight Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

1 (1) According to the National Oceanic and At-
2 mospheric Administration, in 2007 the average an-
3 nual temperature in the United States and around
4 the global is approximately 1.0 degree Fahrenheit
5 warmer than at the start of the 20th century, and
6 the rate of warming has accelerated during the past
7 30 years, increasing globally since the mid-1970s.
8 The fourth assessment report of the Intergovern-
9 mental Panel on Climate Change has predicted that
10 the Earth will warm 0.72 degrees Fahrenheit during
11 the next 2 decades with current emission trends.

12 (2) The annual national security strategy report
13 submitted pursuant to section 108 of the National
14 Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a) for 2006
15 states that the United States faces new security
16 challenges, including “environmental destruction,
17 whether caused by human behavior or cataclysmic
18 mega-disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earth-
19 quakes, or tsunamis. Problems of this scope may
20 overwhelm the capacity of local authorities to re-
21 spond, and may even overtax national militaries, re-
22 quiring a larger international response. These chal-
23 lenges are not traditional national security concerns,
24 such as the conflict of arms or ideologies. But if left
25 unaddressed they can threaten national security.”.

1 (3) According to the fourth assessment report
2 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
3 average temperature increases of between 2 and 4
4 degrees Celsius over preindustrial levels are pro-
5 jected to cause the sea level to rise by between 2 and
6 4 meters by 2100 due to melting of the Greenland
7 and Antarctic ice sheets.

8 (4) In 2007, more than 200,000,000 people live
9 in coastal floodplains around the world and
10 2,000,000 square kilometers of land and an esti-
11 mated \$1,000,000,000,000 worth of assets are less
12 than a 1-meter elevation above sea level.

13 (5) An estimated 1,700,000,000 people in the
14 world live in areas where water is scarce and in 25
15 years that population is projected to increase to
16 5,400,000,000. Climate change will impact the
17 hydrological cycle and change the location, time of
18 year, and intensity of water availability.

19 (6) The report of the World Health Organiza-
20 tion entitled “The World Health Report 2002: Re-
21 ducing Risks and Promoting Healthy Life” states
22 that “Effects of climate change on human health
23 can be expected to be mediated through complex
24 interactions of physical, ecological, and social fac-
25 tors. These effects will undoubtedly have a greater

1 impact on societies or individuals with scarce re-
2 sources, where technologies are lacking, and where
3 infrastructure and institutions (such as the health
4 sector) are least able to adapt.”.

5 (7) Environmental changes relating to global
6 climate change represent a potentially significant
7 threat multiplier for instability around the world as
8 changing precipitation patterns may exacerbate com-
9 petition and conflict over agricultural, vegetative,
10 and water resources and displace people, thus in-
11 creasing hunger and poverty and causing increased
12 pressure on fragile countries.

13 (8) The strategic, social, political, and economic
14 consequences of global climate change are likely to
15 have a greater adverse effect on less developed coun-
16 tries with fewer resources and infrastructures that
17 are less able to adjust to new economic and social
18 pressures, and where the margin for governance and
19 survival is thin.

20 (9) The consequences of global climate change
21 represent a clear and present danger to the security
22 and economy of the United States.

23 (10) A failure to recognize, plan for, and miti-
24 gate the strategic, social, political, and economic ef-
25 fects of a changing climate will have an adverse im-

1 pact on the national security interests of the United
2 States.

3 **SEC. 3. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON GLOBAL**
4 **CLIMATE CHANGE.**

5 (a) REQUIREMENT FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
6 ESTIMATE.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in para-
8 graph (2), not later than 270 days after the date of
9 enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
10 telligence shall submit to Congress a National Intel-
11 ligence Estimate on the anticipated geopolitical ef-
12 fects of global climate change and the implications
13 of such effects on the national security of the United
14 States.

15 (2) NOTICE REGARDING SUBMITTAL.—If the
16 Director of National Intelligence determines that the
17 National Intelligence Estimate required by para-
18 graph (1) cannot be submitted by the date set out
19 in that paragraph, the Director shall notify Congress
20 and provide—

21 (A) the reasons that the National Intel-
22 ligence Estimate cannot be submitted by such
23 date; and

24 (B) an estimated date for the submittal of
25 the National Intelligence Estimate.

1 (b) CONTENT.—The Director of National Intelligence
2 shall prepare the National Intelligence Estimate required
3 by this section using the mid-range projections of the
4 fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel
5 on Climate Change—

6 (1) to assess the political, social, agricultural,
7 and economic risks during the 30-year period begin-
8 ning on the date of enactment of this Act posed by
9 global climate change for countries or regions that
10 are—

11 (A) of strategic economic or military im-
12 portance to the United States and at risk of
13 significant impact due to global climate change;
14 or

15 (B) at significant risk of large-scale hu-
16 manitarian suffering with cross-border implica-
17 tions as predicted on the basis of the assess-
18 ments;

19 (2) to assess other risks posed by global climate
20 change, including increased conflict over resources or
21 between ethnic groups, within countries or
22 transnationally, increased displacement or forced mi-
23 grations of vulnerable populations due to inundation
24 or other causes, increased food insecurity, and in-

1 creased risks to human health from infectious dis-
2 ease;

3 (3) to assess the capabilities of the countries or
4 regions described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of
5 paragraph (1) to respond to adverse impacts caused
6 by global climate change;

7 (4) to assess the strategic challenges and oppor-
8 tunities posed to the United States by the risks de-
9 scribed in paragraph (1);

10 (5) to assess the security implications and op-
11 portunities for the United States economy of engag-
12 ing, or failing to engage successfully, with other
13 leading and emerging major contributors of green-
14 house gas emissions in efforts to reduce emissions
15 and adopt mitigation and adaptation strategies, in-
16 cluding transitioning from reliance upon finite fossil
17 fuels such as imported petroleum and natural gas to
18 clean domestic renewable energy sources; and

19 (6) to make recommendations for further as-
20 sessments of security consequences of global climate
21 change that would improve national security plan-
22 ning.

23 (c) COORDINATION.—In preparing the National In-
24 telligence Estimate under this section, the Director of Na-
25 tional Intelligence shall consult with representatives of the

1 scientific community, including atmospheric and climate
2 studies, security studies, conflict studies, economic assess-
3 ments, and environmental security studies, the Secretaries
4 of Defense, State, Treasury, Commerce, Energy, Agri-
5 culture, and Transportation, the Federal Reserve Board,
6 and the United States Trade Representative, the Adminis-
7 trator of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
8 Administration, the Administrator of the National Aero-
9 nautics and Space Administration, the Administrator of
10 the Environmental Protection Agency, and, if appropriate,
11 multilateral institutions and allies of the United States
12 that have conducted significant research on global climate
13 change.

14 (d) FORM.—The National Intelligence Estimate re-
15 quired by this section shall be submitted in unclassified
16 form, to the extent consistent with the protection of intel-
17 ligence sources and methods, and include unclassified key
18 judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate. Such
19 National Intelligence Estimate may include a classified
20 annex.

21 **SEC. 4. RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTI-**
22 **MATE.**

23 (a) REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.—Not
24 later than 270 days after the date that the National Intel-
25 ligence Estimate required by section 3 is submitted to

1 Congress, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the the
2 Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
3 Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
4 ligence of the United States House of Representatives and
5 Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
6 Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
7 United States Senate a report on—

8 (1) the projected impact on the military instal-
9 lations and capabilities of the United States of the
10 effects of global climate change as assessed in the
11 National Intelligence Estimate;

12 (2) the projected impact on United States mili-
13 tary operations of the effects of global climate
14 change described in the National Intelligence Esti-
15 mate; and

16 (3) recommended research and analysis needed
17 to further assess the impacts on the military of glob-
18 al climate change.

19 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEXT QUADREN-
20 NIAL DEFENSE REVIEW.—It is the sense of Congress that
21 the Secretary of Defense should address the findings of
22 the National Intelligence Estimate required by section 3
23 regarding the impact of global climate change and poten-
24 tial implications of such impact on the Armed Forces and

1 for the size, composition, and capabilities of Armed Forces
2 in the next Quadrennial Defense Review.

3 (c) REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE.—Not
4 later than 270 days after the date that the National Intel-
5 ligence Estimate required by section 3 is submitted to
6 Congress, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Com-
7 mittee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Af-
8 fairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
9 of the United States House of Representatives and the
10 Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign
11 Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
12 United States Senate a report that addresses—

13 (1) the potential for large migration flows in
14 countries of strategic interest or humanitarian con-
15 cern as a response to changes in climate and the im-
16 plications for United States security interests; and

17 (2) the potential for diplomatic opportunities
18 and challenges facing United States policy makers
19 as a result of social, economic, or political responses
20 of groups or nations to global changing climate.

21 **SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF RESEARCH.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense is au-
23 thorized to carry out research on the impacts of global
24 climate change on military operations, doctrine, organiza-
25 tion, training, material, logistics, personnel, and facilities

1 and the actions needed to address those impacts. Such re-
2 search may include—

3 (1) the use of war gaming and other analytical
4 exercises;

5 (2) analysis of the implications for United
6 States defense capabilities of large-scale Arctic sea-
7 ice melt and broader changes in Arctic climate;

8 (3) analysis of the implications for United
9 States defense capabilities of abrupt climate change;

10 (4) analysis of the implications of the findings
11 derived from the National Intelligence Estimate re-
12 quired in section 3 Act for United States defense ca-
13 pabilities;

14 (5) analysis of the strategic implications for
15 United States defense capabilities of direct physical
16 threats to the United States posed by extreme
17 weather events such as hurricanes; and

18 (6) analysis of the existing policies of the De-
19 partment of Defense to assess the adequacy of the
20 Department's protections against climate risks to
21 United States capabilities and military interests in
22 foreign countries.

23 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 2 years after the date
24 that the National Intelligence Estimate required by sec-
25 tion 3 is submitted to Congress, the Secretary of Defense

1 shall submit to Congress a report on the results of the
2 research, war games, and other activities carried out pur-
3 suant to subsection (a).

4 **SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

5 There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as
6 may be necessary to carry out this Act.

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