

110TH CONGRESS
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H. RES. 1268

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that United States foreign assistance is a critical instrument for achieving our national security goals and that modernizing United States foreign assistance should become a national priority.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 11, 2008

Ms. MCCOLLUM of Minnesota (for herself, Mr. TIERNEY, Mr. SHAYS, Mr. WOLF, Mr. PLATTS, Mr. FARR, Mr. JACKSON of Illinois, Mr. HONDA, Mr. LYNCH, Mr. LAHOOD, and Mr. CARSON) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that United States foreign assistance is a critical instrument for achieving our national security goals and that modernizing United States foreign assistance should become a national priority.

Whereas foreign assistance has been an essential component of United States national security strategy and a powerful demonstration of America's national values since the end of World War II;

Whereas 60 years ago, in April of 1948, Congress committed resources in support of the Marshall Plan, channeling \$115,000,000,000 in economic aid and technical assist-

ance to 16 European countries and initiating America's first major international foreign assistance initiative, yielding one of the greatest achievements of the 20th century;

Whereas over the last three generations, the commitment of the United States to humanitarian crisis interventions, long-term development activities, postconflict reconstruction, and military and economic support has saved millions of lives, built a bulwark against the spread of communism, and defined America's global leadership through its commitment to democracy, good governance, economic growth, and the global fight against disease, hunger, and poverty;

Whereas United States foreign assistance is an investment in global security, stability, and prosperity, and is a critical instrument of American power, prestige, and influence in the world, which confers tangible, long-term benefits to American citizens in the form of reduced national security threats, expanded economic opportunities, and the fulfillment of America's moral obligations to "champion aspirations for human dignity", as stated in the 2006 National Security Strategy;

Whereas according to the 2007/2008 United Nations Human Development Report, 2,600,000,000 people, or 40 percent of the world's population, live on less than two dollars a day, and often confront hunger, disease, and misery;

Whereas the 9/11 Commission Report states, "In the post-9/11 world, threats are defined more by the fault lines within societies than by the territorial boundaries between them [and] [f]rom terrorism to global disease or

environmental degradation, the challenges have become transnational rather than international”;

Whereas the Administration asserted in the 2006 National Security Strategy that “development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies”;

Whereas the 2006 National Security Strategy declared, “Helping the world’s poor is a strategic priority and a moral imperative”, and the United States must “assist the world’s poor citizens and least developed nations and help integrate them into the global economy”;

Whereas the Commission on Weak States and United States National Security, a bipartisan panel of 30 former government officials, senior business leaders, academics, and nongovernmental organization representatives, recognized in 2004 that “[W]eak and failed states matter to American security, American values, and the prospects for global economic growth upon which the American economy depends”;

Whereas the Commission on Weak States and United States National Security also found that “the security challenge [weak and failed states] present cannot be met through security means alone, [and] the roots of this challenge—the long-term hope for its resolution—lie in development, broadly understood as progress toward stable, accountable national institutions that can meet citizens’ needs and take full part in the workings of the international community”;

Whereas the bipartisan Commission on Smart Power, convened by the Center for Strategic and International Stud-

ies (CSIS), concluded in 2007 that “American leaders ought to commit to global development because it reinforces basic American values, contributes to peace, justice, and prosperity, and improves the way we are viewed around the world”;

Whereas the Commission on Smart Power further found that “Investing in development contributes to American security at home by promoting stability abroad”;

Whereas the current United States foreign assistance programs, structures, and assumptions, which were developed during the Cold War and evolved over six decades, are in need of modernization to effectively confront current and future foreign policy and national security challenges;

Whereas Congress mandated the bipartisan HELP Commission, which spent nearly 2 years conducting extensive overseas travel to interview aid recipients and assess aid programs in the field and interviewing the world’s foremost experts on United States foreign assistance, including current and former Secretaries of State, leaders of United States Government agencies involved with foreign assistance, international experts, scholars, contractors, nongovernmental organization officials, and businesses, and studied previous reform efforts and reports, which tellingly found “not one person appeared before [the] Commission to defend the status quo”;

Whereas the bipartisan Brookings-CSIS Task Force for Transforming Foreign Assistance in the 21st Century analyzed the fragmented state of the United States foreign assistance infrastructure, noting there are “more than 50 separate United States Government units involved in aid delivery, [resulting in] duplication and dis-

array”, and further cited that this “current cacophony of actors within the United States Government undermines American leadership internationally”;

Whereas the Brookings-CSIS Task Force called for the United States Government to “rationalize agencies and clarify [agency] missions”;

Whereas the Commission on Smart Power called upon the next President to “address three vital development issues in the brief window of opportunity that exists at the beginning of any new administration: elevating the development mission within the United States Government; developing a more unified approach to our aid; and developing locally-supported and measurable delivery systems”;

Whereas the 2006 National Security Strategy declares, “Improving the way we use foreign assistance will make it more effective in strengthening responsible governments, responding to suffering, and improving people’s lives”;

Whereas Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recognized the urgent need to modernize United States foreign assistance by introducing the “F process” reforms as part of the Department’s “transformational diplomacy” initiative in January 2006;

Whereas Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on November 26, 2007, “One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more—these,

along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success”;

Whereas Secretary Gates also noted the “need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development”;

Whereas the need to modernize United States foreign assistance is reinforced by the efforts of rising global powers, such as China, to utilize foreign aid to advance their own national interests in strategic areas of the world; and

Whereas the comprehensive modernization of United States foreign assistance will require a renewed partnership between Congress and the executive branch to meet the challenges of the 21st century: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) supports the comprehensive modernization
3 of the United States foreign assistance apparatus to
4 effectively meet 21st century global challenges, such
5 as terrorism, poverty, pandemic disease, climate
6 change, energy security, failed or failing states, food
7 insecurity, a lack of or slow economic growth, and
8 population and migration issues;

9 (2) affirms defense, diplomacy, and develop-
10 ment are the three essential components to ensure
11 United States national security, as stated in the
12 President’s 2002 National Security Strategy, and
13 that each component is an essential, independent,

1 and mutually reinforcing element of a comprehen-
2 sive, effective, and long-term United States national
3 security strategy;

4 (3) affirms that foreign assistance in the form
5 of long-term development activities, humanitarian
6 crisis response, postconflict reconstruction, and eco-
7 nomic and military support is an indispensable in-
8 strument of United States power, and a key deter-
9 minant of our standing in the world that should be
10 used to translate our moral beliefs and national in-
11 terests into practical actions by—

12 (A) mitigating threats to national and
13 global security;

14 (B) supporting the efforts of citizens of
15 any country to pursue political freedom while
16 building capable, effective, and democratic
17 states; and

18 (C) reducing global poverty by increasing
19 economic opportunity and improving quality of
20 life;

21 (4) affirms that a modernization of United
22 States foreign assistance should embody the con-
23 sensus recommendations of the United States na-
24 tional security community, congressionally mandated

1 commissions, development experts, and independent
2 research organizations, which include—

3 (A) aligning foreign assistance policies, op-
4 erations, budgets, and statutory authorities;

5 (B) matching sufficient resources to a
6 clear set of objectives shared by the executive
7 branch and Congress;

8 (C) strengthening civilian operational capa-
9 bilities and expanding the cadre of skilled and
10 trained international development professionals
11 inside the Government;

12 (D) reducing the number of agencies re-
13 sponsible for development and restructuring for-
14 eign assistance activities to—

15 (i) elevate global development to a
16 standing alongside defense and diplomacy
17 to emphasize its importance;

18 (ii) enable the United States to articu-
19 late and promote a strategic and coherent
20 approach to global development and the
21 utilization of our foreign assistance tools;

22 (iii) provide Congress with the means
23 for ensuring accountability; and

24 (iv) facilitate strong partnerships with
25 the many American private, faith-based,

1 and nongovernmental organizations that
2 are increasingly engaged in addressing de-
3 velopment challenges;

4 (E) measuring results through strength-
5 ened monitoring and evaluation systems and by
6 publicly reporting the impact of our investments
7 against their intended objectives;

8 (F) strengthening the commitment of re-
9 cipient governments and other partners to poli-
10 cies that ensure fiscal accountability, establish
11 monitoring and benchmarks for aid, reduce cor-
12 ruption, increase local capacity, respect human
13 rights, and promote political and economic free-
14 dom; and

15 (G) applying internationally recognized
16 principles of aid effectiveness, which include—

17 (i) the harmonization of policies and
18 practices with other donors and leveraging
19 investments through collaboration with
20 other countries;

21 (ii) the alignment with national prior-
22 ities of host governments in well-governed
23 countries;

1 (iii) the lowering of transaction costs
2 for both the United States and recipient
3 governments; and

4 (iv) policy and programmatic trans-
5 parency to benefit both the American pub-
6 lic and the intended beneficiaries;

7 (5) supports the creation of a strategy to mod-
8 ernize foreign assistance in accordance with the
9 widely recognized principles enumerated in this reso-
10 lution and affirms modernization should be a pri-
11 ority for both Congress and the Administration; and

12 (6) calls for a renewed partnership between
13 Congress and the Administration to define a com-
14 mon vision of the role and management of United
15 States foreign assistance that provides the President
16 with the flexibility needed to act in a quickly chang-
17 ing world, while ensuring input and oversight by
18 Congress.

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