

110TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# H. RES. 625

Censuring the President and Vice President.

---

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 4, 2007

Mr. HINCHEY (for himself, Ms. BALDWIN, Mr. CAPUANO, Mr. COHEN, Mr. DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. FARR, Mr. FILNER, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. HALL of New York, Mr. HONDA, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. KUCINICH, Ms. LEE, Mrs. MALONEY of New York, Mr. MORAN of Virginia, Mr. PASTOR, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Ms. WATSON, Ms. SHEA-PORTER, and Mr. ROTHMAN) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

---

## RESOLUTION

Censuring the President and Vice President.

1 *Resolved,*

2 **SECTION 1. BASIS FOR CENSURE.**

3 (a) IRAQ'S ALLEGED NUCLEAR PROGRAM.—The  
4 House of Representatives finds the following:

5 (1) In December 2001, the intelligence commu-  
6 nity assessed that Iraq did not appear to have recon-  
7 stituted its nuclear weapons program.

8 (2) The October 2002 National Intelligence Es-  
9 timate assessed that Iraq did not have a nuclear

1        weapon or sufficient material to make one, and that  
2        without sufficient fissile material acquired from  
3        abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a  
4        weapon until 2007 or 2009.

5            (3) On October 6, 2002, the Central Intel-  
6        ligence Agency advised the White House to remove  
7        references to Iraq seeking uranium from Africa from  
8        a Presidential speech, citing weak evidence.

9            (4) In November 2002, the United States Gov-  
10       ernment told the International Atomic Energy Asso-  
11       ciation that “reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure  
12       uranium from Africa are fragmentary at best.”.

13           (5) On March 7, 2003, the Director General of  
14       the International Atomic Energy Association re-  
15       ported to the United Nations Security Council that  
16       inspectors had found “no evidence or plausible indi-  
17       cation of the revival of a nuclear weapons program  
18       in Iraq.”.

19           (6) On March 11, 2003, the Central Intel-  
20       ligence Agency stated that it did not dispute the  
21       International Atomic Energy Association conclusions  
22       that the documents on Iraq’s agreement to buy ura-  
23       nium from Niger were not authentic.

24           (7) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi-  
25       dent Richard B. Cheney overstated the nature and

1 urgency of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein by  
2 making repeated, unqualified assertions about an  
3 Iraqi nuclear program that were not supported by  
4 available intelligence, including—

5 (A) on March 22, 2002, President George  
6 W. Bush stated that “[Saddam] is a dangerous  
7 man who possesses the world’s most dangerous  
8 weapons.”;

9 (B) on August 26, 2002, Vice President  
10 Richard B. Cheney stated that “[m]any of us  
11 are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear  
12 weapons fairly soon.”;

13 (C) on September 8, 2002, Vice President  
14 Richard B. Cheney stated that “[w]e do know,  
15 with absolute certainty, that he is using his pro-  
16 curement system to acquire the equipment he  
17 needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nu-  
18 clear weapon.”;

19 (D) on September 20, 2002, Vice Presi-  
20 dent Richard B. Cheney stated that “we now  
21 have irrefutable evidence that he has once again  
22 set up and reconstituted his program, to take  
23 uranium, to enrich it to sufficiently high grade,  
24 so that it will function as the base material as  
25 a nuclear weapon.”;

1           (E) on October 7, 2002, President George  
2           W. Bush stated that “[f]acing clear evidence of  
3           peril, we cannot wait for the final proof—the  
4           smoking gun—that could come in the form of  
5           a mushroom cloud.”;

6           (F) on December 31, 2002, President  
7           George W. Bush stated that “[w]e don’t know  
8           whether or not [Saddam] has a nuclear weap-  
9           on.”;

10          (G) on January 28, 2003, President  
11          George W. Bush stated that “[t]he British gov-  
12          ernment has learned that Saddam Hussein re-  
13          cently sought significant quantities of uranium  
14          from Africa.”; and

15          (H) on March 16, 2003, Vice President  
16          Richard B. Cheney stated that “[w]e believe  
17          [Hussein] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear  
18          weapons.”.

19          (b) SADDAM’S ALLEGED INTENT TO USE WEAPONS  
20          OF MASS DESTRUCTION.—The House of Representatives  
21          finds the following:

22               (1) The October 2002 National Intelligence Es-  
23               timate assessed that “Baghdad for now appears to  
24               be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist at-  
25               tacks with conventional or CBW against the United

1 States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement  
2 would provide Washington a stronger cause for mak-  
3 ing war” and that “Iraq probably would attempt  
4 clandestine attacks against the United States Home-  
5 land if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened  
6 the survival of the regime were imminent or un-  
7 avoidable, or possibly for revenge.”.

8 (2) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi-  
9 dent Richard B. Cheney made misleading state-  
10 ments, that were not supported by the available in-  
11 telligence, suggesting that Saddam Hussein sought  
12 weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of an  
13 unprovoked, offensive attack, including—

14 (A) on August 26, 2002, Vice President  
15 Richard B. Cheney stated that “... there is no  
16 doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons  
17 of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is  
18 amassing them to use against our friends,  
19 against our allies, and against us.”;

20 (B) on August 26, 2002, Vice President  
21 Richard B. Cheney stated that “[t]hese are not  
22 weapons for the purpose of defending Iraq;  
23 these are offensive weapons for the purpose of  
24 inflicting death on a massive scale, developed so  
25 that Saddam can hold the threat over the head

1 of anyone he chooses, in his own region or be-  
2 yond.”; and

3 (C) on October 2, 2002, President George  
4 W. Bush stated that “On its present course, the  
5 Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency. We  
6 know the treacherous history of the regime. It  
7 has waged a war against its neighbors, it has  
8 sponsored and sheltered terrorists, it has devel-  
9 oped weapons of mass death, it has used them  
10 against innocent men, women and children. We  
11 know the designs of the Iraqi regime.”.

12 (c) SADDAM’S ALLEGED LINKS TO AL QAEDA AND  
13 9/11.—The House of Representatives finds the following:

14 (1) Before the war, the Central Intelligence  
15 Agency assessed that “Saddam has viewed Islamic  
16 extremists operating inside Iraq as a threat, and his  
17 regime since its inception has arrested and executed  
18 members of both Shia and Sunni groups to disrupt  
19 their organizations and limit their influence,” that  
20 “Saddam Hussain and Usama bin Laden are far  
21 from being natural partners,” and that assessments  
22 about Iraqi links to al Qaeda rest on “a body of  
23 fragmented, conflicting reporting from sources of  
24 varying reliability.”.

1           (2) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi-  
2           dent Richard B. Cheney overstated the threat posed  
3           by Saddam Hussein by making unqualified asser-  
4           tions that were not supported by available intel-  
5           ligence linking Saddam Hussein to the September  
6           11, 2001, terrorist attacks and stating that Saddam  
7           Hussein and al Qaeda had a relationship and that  
8           Saddam Hussein would provide al Qaeda with weap-  
9           ons of mass destruction for purposes of an offensive  
10          attack against the United States, including—

11                 (A) on September 25, 2002, President  
12                 George W. Bush stated that “[Y]ou can’t dis-  
13                 tinguish between al Qa’ida and Saddam when  
14                 you talk about the war on terror.”;

15                 (B) on September 26, 2002, President  
16                 George W. Bush stated that “[t]he dangers we  
17                 face will only worsen from month to month and  
18                 from year to year. . . . Each passing day could  
19                 be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives an-  
20                 thrax or VX—nerve gas—or some day a nu-  
21                 clear weapon to a terrorist ally.”;

22                 (C) on October 14, 2002, President George  
23                 W. Bush stated that “[t]his is a man that we  
24                 know has had connections with al Qa’ida. This

1 is a man who, in my judgment, would like to  
2 use al Qa'ida as a forward army.”;

3 (D) on November 7, 2002, President  
4 George W. Bush stated that “[Saddam is] a  
5 threat because he is dealing with al Qaida ...  
6 [A] true threat facing our country is that an al  
7 Qaida-type network trained and armed by Sad-  
8 dam could attack America and not leave one  
9 fingerprint.”;

10 (E) on January 31, 2003, President  
11 George W. Bush stated that “Saddam Hussein  
12 would like nothing more than to use a terrorist  
13 network to attack and to kill and leave no fin-  
14 gerprints behind.”;

15 (F) on March 16, 2003, Vice President  
16 Richard B. Cheney stated that “we also have to  
17 address the question of where might these ter-  
18 rorists acquire weapons of mass destruction,  
19 chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear  
20 weapons? And Saddam Hussein becomes a  
21 prime suspect in that regard because of his past  
22 track record and because we know he has, in  
23 fact, developed these kinds of capabilities,  
24 chemical and biological weapons. We know he’s  
25 used chemical weapons. And we know he’s re-

1           constituted these programs since the Gulf War.  
2           We know he's out trying once again to produce  
3           nuclear weapons and we know that he has a  
4           long-standing relationship with various terrorist  
5           groups, including the al-Qaeda organization.”;

6           (G) on March 17, 2003, President George  
7           W. Bush stated that “The danger is clear:  
8           using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear  
9           weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the ter-  
10          rorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and  
11          kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of in-  
12          nocent people in our country or any other.”;

13          (H) on May 1, 2003, President George W.  
14          Bush stated that “[t]he liberation of Iraq ...  
15          removed an ally of al Qaeda.”;

16          (I) on September 14, 2003, Vice President  
17          Richard B. Cheney stated that “the Iraqi  
18          intelligen[ce] service had a relationship with al  
19          Qaeda that developed throughout the decade of  
20          the 90's. That was clearly official policy.”;

21          (J) on September 14, 2003, Vice President  
22          Richard B. Cheney stated that “[i]f we're suc-  
23          cessful in Iraq ... we will have struck a major  
24          blow right at the heart of the base, if you will,  
25          the geographic base of the terrorists who have

1 had us under assault now for many years, but  
2 most especially on 9/11.”; and

3 (K) on March 21, 2006, President George  
4 W. Bush said at a press conference, “But we  
5 realized on September the 11th, 2001, that kill-  
6 ers could destroy innocent life. And I’m never  
7 going to forget it. And I’m never going to for-  
8 get the vow I made to the American people that  
9 we will do everything in our power to protect  
10 our people. Part of that meant to make sure  
11 that we didn’t allow people to provide safe  
12 haven to an enemy. And that’s why I went into  
13 Iraq.”.

14 (d) INADEQUATE PLANNING AND INSUFFICIENT  
15 TROOP LEVELS.—The House of Representatives finds the  
16 following:

17 (1) The intelligence community judged in Janu-  
18 ary 2003 that “[t]he ouster of Iraqi dictator Sad-  
19 dam Hussayn would pose a variety of significant pol-  
20 icy challenges for whoever assumes responsibility for  
21 governing Iraq” including “political transformation,  
22 controlling internal strife, solving economic and hu-  
23 manitarian challenges, and dealing with persistent  
24 foreign policy and security concerns.”.

1           (2) The intelligence community judged in Janu-  
2           ary 2003 that “a post-Saddam authority would face  
3           a deeply divided society with a significant chance  
4           that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict  
5           with each other unless an occupying force prevented  
6           them from doing so.”.

7           (3) These judgments were delivered to the  
8           White House and Office of the Vice President.

9           (4) Then Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki  
10          testified on February 25, 2003, that “something on  
11          the order of several hundred thousands soldiers”  
12          would be needed to secure Iraq following a success-  
13          ful completion of the war.

14          (5) General Abizaid, then-CENTCOM com-  
15          mander, testified before the Senate Armed Services  
16          Committee on November 15, 2006, that “General  
17          Shinseki was right that a greater international force  
18          contribution, United States force contribution and  
19          Iraqi force contribution should have been available  
20          immediately after major combat operations.”.

21          (6) After President George W. Bush declared  
22          the end of major combat operations in Iraq, there  
23          were insufficient troops to prevent the outbreak of  
24          violence and lawlessness that contributed to the

1 flight of millions of Iraqis and the deaths of tens of  
2 thousands of Iraqis.

3 (7) The Government Accountability Office pro-  
4 vided testimony to the Subcommittee on National  
5 Security and Foreign Affairs, House Committee on  
6 Oversight and Government Reform, on March 22,  
7 2007, that due to insufficient troop levels, United  
8 States forces were unable to secure conventional  
9 weapons stockpiles in Iraq that continue to pose a  
10 threat to American servicemembers.

11 (8) President George W. Bush failed to ensure  
12 that plans were prepared and implemented to ad-  
13 dress the challenges that the intelligence community  
14 predicted would occur after the ouster of Saddam  
15 Hussein, and in particular failed to ensure that  
16 there were sufficient coalition troops in Iraq after  
17 major combat operations ended to maintain security  
18 and secure weapons stockpiles.

19 (e) STRAIN ON MILITARY AND UNDERMINING HOME-  
20 LAND SECURITY.—The House of Representatives finds  
21 the following:

22 (1) Retired Major General John Batiste, former  
23 commander of the First Infantry Division in Iraq,  
24 testified before the House Committee on Inter-  
25 national Relations on June 27, 2007, that “[o]ur

1 Army and Marine Corps are at a breaking point at  
2 a time in history when we need a strong military the  
3 most. The cycle of deployments is staggering. Amer-  
4 ican formations continue to lose a battalion's worth  
5 of dead and wounded every month with little to show  
6 for it. The current recruiting system falls drastically  
7 short of long-term requirements and our all-volun-  
8 teer force can not sustain the current tempo for  
9 much longer. The military is spending over  
10 \$1,000,000,000 a year in incentives in a last ditch  
11 effort to keep the force together. Young officers and  
12 noncommissioned officers are leaving the service at  
13 an alarming rate.”.

14 (2) Extended deployments of 15 months, and  
15 insufficient time to rest and train between deploy-  
16 ments, have undermined the readiness of the Army.

17 (3) The Army National Guard reported as early  
18 as July 2005 that equipment transfers to deploying  
19 units “had largely exhausted its inventory of more  
20 than 220 critical items, including some items useful  
21 to nondeployed units for training and domestic mis-  
22 sions.”.

23 (4) The Government Accountability Office  
24 found, in September 2006, that “[a]mong the items  
25 for which the Army National Guard had shortages

1 of over 80 percent of the authorized inventory were  
2 chemical warfare monitoring and decontamination  
3 equipment and night vision goggles”.

4 (5) President George W. Bush’s policies in Iraq  
5 have undermined homeland security by depleting the  
6 personnel and equipment needed by the National  
7 Guard.

8 (f) INSURGENCY IN “LAST THROES”.—The House of  
9 Representatives finds the following:

10 (1) Multi-National Force-Iraq reports indicate  
11 that the number of attacks on coalition forces has  
12 increased since the beginning of military action.

13 (2) The Government Accountability Office, in  
14 March 2007, reported that attacks using improvised  
15 explosive devices continued to increase between 2005  
16 and July 2006.

17 (3) On June 23, 2005, General John Abizaid,  
18 in his capacity as head of Central Command, testi-  
19 fied before the Senate Armed Services Committee  
20 about the state of the insurgency that “[i]n terms  
21 of comparison from 6 months ago, in terms of for-  
22 eign fighters I believe there are more foreign fighters  
23 coming into Iraq than there were 6 months ago. In  
24 terms of the overall strength of the insurgency, I’d  
25 say it’s about the same as it was.”.

1           (4) President George W. Bush’s Initial Bench-  
2           mark Assessment report from July 12, 2007, states  
3           that “[a]s a result of increased offensive operations,  
4           Coalition and Iraqi Forces have sustained increased  
5           attacks in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, Diyala, and  
6           Salah ad Din.”.

7           (5) Vice President Richard B. Cheney made  
8           misleading statements that the insurgency in Iraq  
9           was in its “last throes,” including—

10                   (A) on May 30, 2005, Vice President Rich-  
11                   ard B. Cheney said, “The level of activity that  
12                   we see today from a military standpoint, I  
13                   think, will clearly decline. I think they’re in the  
14                   last throes, if you will, of the insurgency.”; and

15                   (B) on June 19, 2006, Vice President  
16                   Richard B. Cheney was asked whether he still  
17                   supported the comment he made in 2005, re-  
18                   garding the fact that the insurgency in Iraq  
19                   was in its “last throes,” to which he responded  
20                   “I do.”

21 **SEC. 2. CENSURE BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.**

22           The House of Representatives censures President  
23           George W. Bush and Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
24           for—

1           (1) misleading the American people about the  
2 basis for going to war in Iraq;

3           (2) failing to plan adequately for the war;

4           (3) pursuing policies in Iraq that have strained  
5 our military and undermined our homeland security;  
6 and

7           (4) misleading the American people about the  
8 insurgency in Iraq.

○