105TH CONGRESS, 2d Session | SENATE | TREATY DOC. 105–36

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON THE ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC. THESE PROTOCOLS WERE OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 16, 1997, AND SIGNED ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

FEBRUARY 11, 1998.—Protocols were read the first time and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

59–118 WASHINGTON : 1998

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE, *February 11, 1998.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. These Protocols were opened for signature at Brussels on December 16, 1997, and signed on behalf of the United States of America and the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. I request the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of these documents, and transit for the Senate's information the report made to me by the Secretary of State regarding this matter.

The accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will improve the ability of the United States to protect and advance our interests in the transatlantic area. The end of the Cold War changed the nature of the threats to this region, but not the fact that Europe's peace, stability, and well-being are vital to our own national security. The addition of these well-qualified democracies, which have demonstrated their commitment to the values of freedom and the security of the broader region, will help deter potential threats to Europe, deepen the continent's stability, bolster its democratic advances, erase its artificial division, and strengthen an Alliance that has proved its effectiveness during and since the Cold War.

NATO is not the only instrument in our efforts to help build a new and undivided Europe, but it is our most important contributor to peace and security for the region. NATO's steadfastness during the long years of the Cold War, its performance in the mission it has led in Bosnia, the strong interest of a dozen new European democracies in becoming members, and the success of the Alliance's Partnership for Peace program all underscore the continuing vitality of the Alliance and the Treaty that brought it into existence.

NATO's mission in Bosnia is of particular importance. No other multinational institution possessed the military capabilities and political cohesiveness necessary to bring an end to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia—Europe's worst conflict since World War II—and to give the people of that region a chance to build a lasting peace. Our work in Bosnia is not yet complete, but we should be thankful that NATO existed to unite Allies and partners in this determined common effort. Similarly, we should welcome steps such as the Alliance's enlargement that can strengthen its ability to meet future challenges, beginning with NATO's core mission of collective defense and other missions that we and our Allies may choose to pursue.

The three states that NATO now proposes to add as full members will make the Alliance stronger while helping to enlarge Europe's zone of democratic stability. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have been leaders in Central Europe's dramatic transformation over the past decade and already are a part of NATO's community of values. They each played pivotal roles in the overthrow of communist rule and repression, and they each proved equal to the challenge of comprehensive democratic and market reform. Together, they have helped to make Central Europe the continent's most rebust zone of economic growth.

All three of these states will be security producers for the Alliance and not merely security consumers. They have demonstrated this through the accords they have reached with neighboring states, the contributions they have made to the mission of Bosnia, the forces they plan to commit to the Alliance, and the military modernization programs they have already begun and pledge to continue in the years to come at their own expense. These three states will strengthen NATO through the addition of military resources, strategic depth, and the prospect of greater stability in Europe's central region. American troops have worked alongside soldiers from each of these nations in earlier times, in the case of the Poles, dating back to our own Revolutionary War. Our cooperation with the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs has contributed to our security in the past, and our Alliance with them will contribute to our security in the years to come.

The purpose of NATO's enlargement extends beyond the security of these three states, however, and entails a process encompassing more than their admission to the Alliance Accordingly, these first new members should not and will not be the last. No qualified European democracy is ruled out as a future member. The Alliance has agreed to review the process of enlargement at its 1999 summit in Washington. As we prepare for that summit, I look forward to discussing this matter with my fellow NATO leaders. The process of enlargement, combined with the Partnership for Peace program, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and NATO's new charter with Ukraine, signify NATO's commitment to avoid any new division of Europe, and to contribute to its progressive integration.

A democratic Russia is and should be a part of that new Europe. With bipartisan congressional support, my Administration and my predecessor's have worked with our Allies to support political and economic reform in Russia and the other newly independent states and to increase the bonds between them and the rest of Europe. NATO's enlargement and other adaptions are consistent, not at odds, with that policy. NATO has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not threaten Russia and that it seeks closer and more cooperative relations. We and our Allies welcomed the participation of Russian forces in the mission in Bosnia.

NATO most clearly signaled its interest in a constructive relationship through the signing in May 1997 of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. That Act, and the Permanent Joint Council it created, help to ensure that if Russia seeks to build a positive and peaceful future within Europe, NATO will be a full partner in that enterprise. I understand it will require time for the Russian people

to gain a new understanding of NATO. The Russian people, in turn, must understand that an open door policy with regard to the addition of new members is an element of a new NATO. In this way, we will build a new and more stable Europe of which Russian is an integral part.

I therefore propose the ratification of these Protocols with every expectation that we can continue to pursue productive cooperation with the Russian Federation. I am encouraged that President Yeltsin has pledged his government's commitment to additional progress on nuclear and conventional arms control measures. At our summit in Helsinki, for example, we agreed that once START II has entered into force we will begin negotiations on a START III accord that can achieve even deeper cuts in our strategic arsenals. Similarly, Russian's ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention last year demonstrated that cooperation on a range of security matters will continue.

The Protocols of accession that I transmit to you constitute a decision of great consequence, and they involve solemn security commitments. The addition of new states also will entail financial costs. While those costs will be manageable and broadly shared with our current and new Allies, they nonetheless represent a sacrifice by the American people.

Successful ratification of these Protocols demands not only the Senate's advice and consent required by our Constitution, but also the broader, bipartisan support of the American people and their representatives. For that reason, it is encouraging that congressional leaders in both parties and both chambers have long advocated NATO's enlargement. I have endeavored to make the Congress an active partner in this process. I was pleased that a bipartisan group of Senators and Representatives accompanied the U.S. delegation at the NATO summit in Madrid last July. Officials at all levels of my Administration have consulted closely with the relevant committees and with the bipartisan Senate NATO Observer Group. It is my hope that this pattern of consultation and cooperation will ensure that NATO and our broader European policies continue to have the sustained bipartisan support that was so instrumental to their success throughout the decades of the Cold War.

The American people today are the direct beneficiaries of the extraordinary sacrifices made by our fellow citizens in the many theaters of that "long twilight struggle," and in the two world wars that preceded it. Those efforts aimed in large part to create across the breadth of Europe a lasting, democratic peace. The enlargement of NATO represents an indispensable part of today's program to finish building such a peace, and therefore to repay a portion of the debt we owe to those who went before us in the quest for freedom and security.

The rise of new challenges in other regions does not in any way diminish the necessity of consolidating the increased level of security that Europe has attained at such high cost. To the contrary, our policy in Europe, including the Protocols I transmit herewith, can help preserve today's more favorable security environment in the transatlantic area, thus making is possible to focus attention and resources elsewhere while providing us with additional Allies and partners to help share our security burdens.

The century we are now completing has been the bloodiest in all of human history. Its lessons should be clear to us: the wisdom of deterrence, the value of strong Alliances, the potential for overcoming past divisions, and the imperative of America engagement in Europe. The NATO Alliance is one of the most important embodiments of these truths, and it is in the interest of the United States to strengthen this proven institution and adapt it to a new era. The addition of this Alliance of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is an essential part of that program. It will help build a Europe that can be integrated, democratic, free, and at peace for the first time in its history. It can help ensure that we and our Allies and our partner will enjoy greater security and freedom in the century that is about to begin.

I therefore recommend that the Senate give prompt advice and consent to ratification of these historic Protocols.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 9, 1998.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to its transmission to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. These protocols were opened for signature at Brussels on December 16, 1997, and were signed on behalf of the United States of America and the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the NATO Alliance will contribute materially to the national security of the United States. It will advance the efforts we have undertaken with our allies and partners to build an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe, which in turn reduces threats to our own national interests. It will strengthen the stability of a region that helped spawn this century's world wars and the Cold War, which we prosecuted at a cost of trillions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of American lives. It will give us capable new allies willing and able to defend our common interests. It will demonstrate continuing American engagement and leadership in transatlantic affairs.

The addition of these three states to NATO is a central element of our transatlantic strategy. This strategy aims to strengthen the favorable security environment in the region created by the seminal events of the past decade: the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself, the rise in its place of a democratic Russia and other newly independent states, the establishment of market democracies throughout Central Europe, the peaceful reunification of Germany, and the conclusion of agreements to reduce and stabilize conventional and nuclear armaments throughout the region.

These transforming events reduce the likelihood of large-scale aggression in Europe, but also present a host of new challenges and dangers. Threats stemming from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conflicts fueled by ethnic or religious tensions, such as in Bosnia, loom immediately. Over the longer term, Europe could face the possibility of renewed aggression or threats to its interests. Europe's new democracies must be more fully integrated into the transatlantic region's security, economic, and political institutions in order to prevent the erosion of recent democratic gains and the possibility of conflict.

All these require continuing American engagement in the region's security affairs and changes in European and transatlantic security institutions. To this end, we have strengthened the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, opened the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to new members, pursued the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, worked closely with the European Union and urged its enlargement, supported democratic and market reforms in Russia, Ukraine, and the other newly independent states, and pursued initiatives with states in the region, such as the Charter of Partnership signed with the three Baltic states on January 16.

NATO's unique attributes—an unrivaled military capability, an integrated command structure, and a primary focus on the collective defense of its members—require that this Alliance remain the keystone of our involvement in the transatlantic region's security affairs. Those attributes made NATO a principal instrument of our successful effort to defend the territory and values of the North American and European democracies during the Cold War, and made NATO history's most successful Alliance.

Since then, the Alliance has repeatedly demonstrated its continuing utility and competence. NATO's success in stopping the war in Bosnia underscores its military effectiveness. NATO's completion last December of a thorough reform of its command structure, reducing the number of commands from 65 to 20, testifies to the premium it places on operational coherence. The addition of new members from Central Europe, along with other adaptations in the Alliance's operations and command structure, will further strengthen NATO's effectiveness, protect more of Europe from future threats, and bolster the development of a Europe whole and free.

Specifically, the addition of these three democracies to the Alliance will increase the security of the United States in four ways.

First, it will reduce the prospect of threats to Europe's security, such as those we have seen throughout this century, which could harm American interests and potentially involve American forces. Integrating Central European states into NATO will reduce the chances of conflict by ensuring that such states pursue cooperative rather than competitive security policies. It also will help deter potential threats to this region from materializing. These include the dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery. NATO's enlargement can also help address the possibility, although we see it as unlikely, that Russia's democratic transition could fail and that Russia could resume the threatening behavior of the Soviet period. By engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we will give Russia every incentive to deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful integration with the rest of Europe, while foreclosing more destructive alternatives.

Second, adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO will make the Alliance stronger and better able to address Europe's security challenges. These states will add approximately 200,000 troops to the Alliance, a commitment to common values and political goals, and a willingness to contribute to the security of the surrounding region, as they have demonstrated through their contribution of over 1,000 troops to the mission in Bosnia.

The military and strategic assets of these states will improve NATO's ability to carry out what is and will remain its core mission, collective defense, as well as its other missions.

Third, the process of adding new states to NATO bolsters stability and democratic trends in Central Europe. Partly in order to improve their prospects for membership, states in the region have settled border and ethnic disputes with neighboring states, strengthened civilian control of their militaries, and broadened protections for ethnic and religious minorities. Such actions help to prevent conflicts in the region that could adversely affect American security and economic interests.

Fourth, NATO's enlargement, with other elements of our transatlantic strategy, advances European integration and moves the continent beyond its forced division of the past half century. The perpetuation of Europe's Cold War dividing line would be both destabilizing the morally indefensible. To help erase that line, NATO launched the Partnership for Peace program with 27 non-NATO states, opened its doors to new members, inaugurated a constructive relationship with Russia through the NATO-Russian Founding Act, signed a new charter with Ukraine, and created the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

These Protocols propose to add Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO as full members, with all privileges and responsibilities that apply to current allies. The core commitment to these three states will be embodied in the existing text of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, including the central collective defense provision in Article 5, which has proved its reliability across the decades of the Treaty's existence. Article 5 represents our country's solemn commitment to the security of the other allies, but the Treaty reserves to each NATO member, including the United States, decisions about what specific actions to take should a NATO member be attacked, and fully preserves Congress' Constitutional role in decisions regarding the use of force. During the Fall of 1997, NATO's military authorities concluded the Alliance would be able to meet the Article 5 and other security assurances to the new states from their first day of NATO membership.

The decision to enlarge NATO's membership results from intensive analysis of the implications of this initiative and the qualifications of the three states now proposed for admission. At the Brussels summit in January 1994, NATO declared that the Alliance remained open to membership for other European states, and created the Partnership for Peace program in part to help prepare interested states for possible membership. The Alliance's September 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement set out the rationale and process for adding new members. At its Madrid summit in July 1997, the Alliance invited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin the process of accession, and declared its determination to keep the door open for other states interested in joining NATO.

Between September and November of 1997, NATO held four rounds of accession talks in Brussels with Poland, and five each with Hungary and the Czech Republic. These discussions examined in detail the three states' military capabilities, their willingness to contribute forces to NATO activities, and their readiness to accept the political and legal obligations of NATO membership. These dis-

cussions were based in part on Defense Planning Questionnaire response completed by each of the three states; these questionnaires are NATO's standard instrument for obtaining information on the military contributions of member states.

During the accession talks, the three states accepted NATO's broad approach to security and defense, as outlined in its Strategic Concept and subsequent Alliance statements. They confirmed their intention to participate fully in NATO's military structure and collective defense planning and, for the purpose of taking part in the full range of Alliance missions, to commit the bulk of their armed forces to the Alliance. They accepted the need for standardization and interoperability as part of the foundation for multinationality and flexibility. They expressed their readiness to accept the nuclear element of NATO's strategy and policy and the Alliance's nuclear posture. They accepted NATO's restrictions and procedures for the handling of sensitive information. They also recognized and accepted that the Alliance rests upon a commonality of views, based on the principle of consensus in decision making, and expressed a readiness to contribute to attaining such consensus. Finally, they agreed to assume shares of NATO's common-funded budgets that cumulatively constitute slightly over four percent of the total.

On November 10, 12, and 17, 1997, respectively, the Czech Prime Minister, Polish Foreign Minister, and Hungarian Foreign Minister wrote to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to confirm that, on the basis of the completed accession talks, their states desired to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and were willing to accept in full all the obligations and commitments pertaining to their membership. At NATO's Ministerial on December 16 in Brussels, I joined all fifteen other NATO ministers in agreeing to make these states full members, subject to the ratification of member governments.

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the Alliance may add "any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." It was on that basis that the Alliance added Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. The unanimity of NATO leaders in welcoming Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the Alliance reflects the qualifications of each of these states and a confidence that each of them will, in fact, make meaningful contributions to transatlantic security.

Poland's size, location, population, and resources have cast this state in a pivotal role in European security affairs throughout the past two centuries. Its addition to the Alliance will create an important anchor for regional security. Poland has the most significant military resources in Central Europe, and will bring to the Alliance 23 combat brigades, at least eight squadrons of combat aircraft, and modest naval resources. Poland now spends 2.4 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on defense, it has adopted a 15-year plan for military modernization, and the country's strong economic performance during this decade suggests that it will have adequate resources to fund that plan and contribute substantially to Alliance capabilities.

Poland also has a heritage of strong political values consistent with those of the Alliance. Poland was home to Europe's first written constitution, and its officers played important roles in support of the United States during our Revolutionary War. In the 1980s, the resistance of the Polish people to authoritarian rule and their efforts through the Solidarity trade union helped topple Soviet domination of their own state and others in the region. Since 1989, Poland has held two presidential and three parliamentary rounds of elections, the results of which have shown a broad and stable political commitment to tolerant politics, market economics, and an outward looking foreign policy. Poland has resolved a broad range of issues with its neighbors, including accords with Germany, Lithuania, and Ukraine, and contributes a force of nearly 500 to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia, as well as contributing to peacekeeping operations in other regions of the world. Indeed, Poland currently has more soldiers deployed in multinational peacekeeping operations than any other state.

Hungary, as well, already has proved its commitment to NATO's security objectives. Hungary's willingness to offer its base at Taszar to American forces enabled our troops to deploy to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia safely and effectively. This commitment to help bring stability to southeastern Europe has been valuable to the Alliance in this circumstance, and will be in others as well. Hungary has further demonstrated its commitment to NATO's objectives by contributing an engineering battalion to the Bosnia mission. Hungary will bring eight combat brigades and five squadrons of combat aircraft to the Alliance, and has committed to a five year program to increase its defense spending by one-tenth of one percent of Gross Domestic Product for each of the next five years.

Hungary also brings values and a political outlook that fit well with those of the Alliance. The Hungarian people expressed early and courageous opposition to Soviet domination in their 1956 uprising, and played a key role in the dramatic events of 1989. They have held two rounds of presidential and parliamentary elections since then and have pursued constructive policies throughout the region. Hungary's recent treaties with Slovakia and Romania have helped to defuse tensions regarding ethnic Hungarian minorities in those states. In a national referendum in November, 85 percent of Hungarians voting favored their country's membership in the Alliance.

The Czech Republic also will be a strong addition to NATO. A vibrant democracy during the inter-war years, it is today among the most western of the former Warsaw Pact states in both geography and outlook. The Czechs contributed forces to Operation Desert Storm and currently contribute over 600 troops to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. Like Poland and Hungary, the Czech Republic has participated actively in the Partnership for Peace program. The Czechs will contribute 11 combat brigades and six squadrons of combat aircraft to the Alliance. The Czech government recently approved a budget that fully meets its commitment to increase defense spending by one-tenth of one percent of GDP in each of the next three years.

The Czechs have proved their attachment to values shared by the Alliance's member states. Their Velvet Revolution of 1989, like events of the Prague Spring two decades earlier, demonstrated an abiding commitment to democracy, civil society, and the standards of human rights espoused by Vaclav Havel and other Czech leaders. Since then the Czechs have held three rounds of parliamentary elections, separated from Slovakia on peaceful terms, and concluded agreements with Germany settling a range of issues, including those related to treatment of Sudeten Germans during the post-World War II era.

The addition of these three states to the Alliance is part of a strategy to improve not only their security and that of current NATO members, but also all other states of Europe, including the Russian Federation. It is the intent of the United States, and of NATO, to avoid any destabilizing redivision of the European continent, and instead to promote its progressive integration. The Alliance declared at its Madrid summit that it will leave the door open for the addition of other new members in the future, and that it will review this process at its next summit, which will be held in Washington in April 1999. It is encouraging that states that aspire to NATO membership, but have not yet been invited to join the Alliance, nonetheless welcomed the series of enlargement decisions at Madrid, the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and similar steps as beneficial to their own security.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed in May of 1997, has special importance in this regard. The Founding Act opened the way to a new and constructive relationship between the Alliance and Russia. It therefore complements the efforts of individual allies to see a democratic, peaceful Russia integrated into the community of European nations and security structures. To that end, the Founding Act created a new forum, the Permanent Joint Council, which allows NATO and Russia to pursue security issues of mutual interest. The Council first convened at the Ministerial level on September 26 in New York, met among Defense Ministers in Brussels on December 2, and again among Foreign Ministers on December 17. The Founding Act, the Permanent Joint Council, the integration of Russian forces in the mission in Bosnia, and other actions by NATO stand as evidence to the Russian people that the Alliance's enlargement in no way will threaten Russia's security, but rather will enhance it by deepening democratic stability in Europe.

The Founding Act and Permanent Joint Council advance Russia's cooperation with NATO and integration in European affairs, but they also safeguard NATO's freedom of action and the integrity of its decisionmaking. The Founding Act places no restrictions on NATO's ability to respond to the security environment as its own members see fit. Similarly, the Permanent Joint Council has no power to direct or veto actions by the North Atlantic Council, which remains NATO's supreme decisionmaking body. Moreover, all actions within the Permanent Joint Council must proceed by consensus, which provides the United States and each other NATO member with an effective veto over proposed points of discussion or action. The Ministerial meetings of the Permanent Joint Council to date demonstrates that it can be a useful forum for advancing rela-

tions with Russia, and that it will not adversely affect NATO's progress on internal issues such as the Alliance's enlargement.

NATO's enlargement and related adaptations, which will enhance the security of its members and partners, also will entail financial costs to the United States and our allies over the coming years. At the Madrid summit in July 1997, NATO's leaders commissioned a study of the military requirements of the Alliance's enlargement, and of the resource implications of meeting those requirements. The declaration from that summit expressed the confidence of NATO's leaders that "Alliance costs associated with the integration of new members will be manageable and . . . the resources necessary to meet those costs will be provided."

The studies completed by the Alliance this past Fall confirm this view. They estimate that the addition of these three members will require approximately $1.5 billion in expenditures from NATO's common-funded military budgets over the next 10 years. The United States currently provides about one quarter of these common-funded budgets and will continue to do so after the addition of the new states. Thus the additional costs to the United States of adding these three states to the Alliance is estimated to be about $400 million over the next ten years. Adding other states to NATO in the future likely will entail costs as well, although it is not possible to estimate these without knowing which states might be invited and when.

There are other costs to the United States less directly related to NATO's enlargement. Under the Warsaw Initiative, the United States has provided bilateral foreign military financing assistance to Central European states totaling approximately $185 million between fiscal years 1996 and 1998, of which $37.3 million in the current fiscal year is allocated to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In addition, we provide funding to assist partner participation in the Partnership for Peace program and "in the Spirit of Partnership for Peace" exercises and events, which totaled about $80 million from fiscal years 1996 to 1997. The three invited states took full advantage of this assistance to play a major role in the Partnership for Peace program. While all these programs are consistent with the aims of NATO enlargement, they constitute neither direct nor automatic costs of enlargement, and their continuation will relay on future decisions by Congress to provide funds.

There are also costs related to enlargement that will be borne by our new and current allies. With regard to NATO's direct expenditures through its common-funded budgets, our Canadian and European allies will continue to bear about 75 percent of the cost In addition, as noted, the three new states plan on making substantial investments in military modernization and reorganization over the coming years, and have committed to achieve defense spending levels on a par with other NATO members. Several leaders from the region have noted that their countries likely would need to spend more on military modernization if they were left outside the Alliance.

Current allies will also continue to make investments through their national military budgets to help ensure that an enlarged NATO can carry out its missions. In particular, NATO's military authorities have stressed the need for improved lift, logistics, and

other power projection capabilities, and many current allies are undertaking modernization efforts in these areas. For example, France is restructuring its armed forces to be more mobile and easily deployable, and is establishing a Rapid Action Force designed for rapid response in both European and overseas contingencies. Already, Britain provides NATO's only rapidly-deployable corps headquarters committed to NATO, and British forces are the backbone of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps. Germany is standing up a Rapid Reaction Force of some 53,000 fully-equipped troops from its Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, NATO's recent decisions to develop Combined Joint Task Force capabilities and a European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance will enable European allies to play a larger role and to bear additional burdens.

The decision to pursue the enlargement of NATO has reflected, in our country, a unique process of bipartisan cooperation across the two political branches of government. Both the Senate and House have considered the question of adding new members to the Alliance in some depth over the past three years. In July 1996, the House approved the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act by a bipartisan majority of 353 to 65, and the Senate adopted a similar resolution by a margin of 81 to 16. During the course of 1997, four Senate committees held ten hearings on the strategic, military, diplomatic, and budgetary implications of this initiative.

In addition, on April 22, 1997, the Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the Senate created the Senate NATO Observer Group, comprised of 28 Senators from both political parties, to work with the Administration of the process of NATO enlargement. During the past year, senior administration officials met with the members and staff of this Group in classified sessions over a dozen times, briefed them on military and political issues related to NATO's enlargement, provided a range of classified documents and periodic issue summaries, and consulted them in advance on key questions, such as which states to support for admission to the Alliance. Four members of this Group, along with four members of the House of Representatives, attended the NATO summit in Madrid last July as members of the United States delegation, and participated directly in its proceedings.

This unprecedented process of consultation has helped ensure a thorough and bipartisan examination of the full range of issues at stake in NATO's enlargement. It has helped to inform decision-making within the executive branch. It also has helped to ensure that the voice of the American public plays a role in this set of decisions that will so vitally affect their own lives and those of their children.

The Protocols to the Treaty of 1949 for each of the three states are identical in structure and composed of three Articles. Article I provides that once the Protocol has entered into force, the Secretary General of NATO shall extend an invitation to the named state to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, and that, in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, the state shall become a party to the Treaty on the date it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. Article II provides that the Protocol shall enter into force when each of the

parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance of the Protocol. Article III provides for the equal authenticity of the English and French texts, and for deposit of the Protocol in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, the depository state for North Atlantic Treaty purposes.

The addition of these three states to the Alliance, along with the other elements of our transatlantic strategy, will enable NATO to help accomplish for Europe's east what it has accomplished for Europe's west over the past half century. It will safeguard our own country's vital interests in Europe's well-being, and help ensure that aggression, conflict, and repression do not once again visit that continent as they have too often, and at terrible cost, throughout our lifetimes. I therefore convey these protocols to you with high expectations that their ratification will further strengthen the peace and security of the transatlantic region well into the approaching century.

Respectfully submitted,

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT.

PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ON THE ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

* * *

PROTOCOLE AU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
SUR L'ACCESSION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE POLOGNE

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949,

Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Republic of Poland to that Treaty,

Agree as follows :

Article I

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Republic of Poland an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, the Republic of Poland shall become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America.

Article II

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

Article III

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

In witness whereof,
the undersigned plenipotentiaries
have signed the present Protocol.

En foi de quoi,
les plénipotentiaires désignés ci-dessous
ont signé le présent Protocole.

Signed at Brussels on
the 16th day of December 1997.

Signé à Bruxelles
le 16 décembre 1997.

For the Kingdom of Belgium:
Pour le Royaume de Belgique:

For Canada:
Pour le Canada:

For the Kingdom of Denmark:
Pour le Royaume du Danemark:

For the French Republic:
Pour la République française:

For the Federal Republic of Germany:
Pour la République fédérale d'Allemagne:

For the Hellenic Republic:
Pour la République hellénique:

For the Republic of Iceland:
Pour la République d'Islande:

For the Italian Republic:
Pour la République italienne:

For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:
Pour le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg:

For the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
Pour le Royaume des Pays-Bas:

For the Kingdom of Norway:
Pour le Royaume de Norvège:

For the Portuguese Republic:
Pour la République portugaise:

For the Kingdom of Spain:
Pour le Royaume d'Espagne:

For the Republic of Turkey:
Pour la République de la Turquie:

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
Pour le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord:

For the United States of America:
Pour les Etats-Unis d'Amérique:

PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ON THE ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY

* * *

PROTOCOLE AU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
SUR L'ACCESSION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE HONGRIE

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949,

Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Republic of Hungary to that Treaty,

Agree as follows :

Article I

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Republic of Hungary an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, the Republic of Hungary shall become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America.

Article II

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

Article III

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

In witness whereof,
the undersigned plenipotentiaries
have signed the present Protocol.

En foi de quoi,
les plénipotentiaires désignés ci-dessous
ont signé le présent Protocole.

Signed at Brussels on
the 16th day of December 1997.

Signé à Bruxelles
le 16 décembre 1997.

For the Kingdom of Belgium:
Pour le Royaume de Belgique:

For Canada:
Pour le Canada:

For the Kingdom of Denmark:
Pour le Royaume du Danemark:

For the French Republic:
Pour la République française:

For the Federal Republic of Germany:
Pour la République fédérale d'Allemagne:

For the Hellenic Republic:
Pour la République hellénique:

For the Republic of Iceland:
Pour la République d'Islande:

For the Italian Republic:
Pour la République italienne:

For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:
Pour le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg:

For the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
Pour le Royaume des Pays-Bas:

For the Kingdom of Norway:
Pour le Royaume de Norvège:

For the Portuguese Republic:
Pour la République portugaise:

For the Kingdom of Spain:
Pour le Royaume d'Espagne:

For the Republic of Turkey:
Pour la République de la Turquie:

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
Pour le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord:

For the United States of America:
Pour les Etats-Unis d'Amérique:

PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ON THE ACCESSION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC

* * *

PROTOCOLE AU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
SUR L'ACCESSION DE LA REPUBLIQUE TCHEQUE

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949,

Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Czech Republic to that Treaty,

Agree as follows :

Article I

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Czech Republic an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, the Czech Republic shall become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America.

Article II

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

Article III

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

In witness whereof,
the undersigned plenipotentiaries
have signed the present Protocol.

En foi de quoi,
les plénipotentiaires désignés ci-dessous
ont signé le présent Protocole.

Signed at Brussels on
the 16th day of December 1997.

Signé à Bruxelles
le 16 décembre 1997.

For the Kingdom of Belgium:
Pour le Royaume de Belgique:

For Canada:
Pour le Canada:

For the Kingdom of Denmark:
Pour le Royaume du Danemark:

For the French Republic:
Pour la République française:

For the Federal Republic of Germany:
Pour la République fédérale d'Allemagne:

For the Hellenic Republic:
Pour la République hellénique:

For the Republic of Iceland:
Pour la République d'Islande:

For the Italian Republic:
Pour la République italienne:

For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:
Pour le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg:

For the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
Pour le Royaume des Pays-Bas:

For the Kingdom of Norway:
Pour le Royaume de Norvège:

For the Portuguese Republic:
Pour la République portugaise:

For the Kingdom of Spain:
Pour le Royaume d'Espagne:

For the Republic of Turkey:
Pour la République de la Turquie:

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
Pour le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord:

For the United States of America:
Pour les Etats-Unis d'Amérique: