

**DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: THE NEW GENERATION
OF AFRICAN LEADERS**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
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DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: THE NEW GENERATION OF AFRICAN LEADERS

THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 1998

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m. In room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Ashcroft, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Ashcroft and Feingold.

Senator ASHCROFT. The committee will come to order.

It is my pleasure to convene this hearing on Democracy in Africa: The New Generation of African Leaders. This is specifically an opportunity to focus on these leaders and their policies to either promote or hinder political reform. "That to secure these rights," wrote Jefferson, "governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

It may seem odd for some to hear the Declaration read in the context of a hearing on Africa. For those who hear mostly of violence, bloodshed, and war in reference to Africa, the principles of the Declaration might seem inapplicable and alien to that troubled continent. Yet, to millions of Africans who long to know freedom's embrace, the principles of the Declaration are a constant source of hope and a focus of faith and devotion.

Now some analysts have argued that Africa is not ready for self-government, that Africa is too poorly educated, too ethnically divided, and too economically poor. Upon hearing those arguments, I cannot help but think of the harrowing journeys and long lines millions of Africans endure just to exercise their franchise.

Casting ballots alone, however, does not a democracy make. Many of Africa's leaders have subverted the process of reform to maintain their own hold on power. These leaders question the feasibility of African democracy and then set about proving their own predictions by inciting inter-ethnic violence, silencing the press, or robbing their countries.

But there are also signs of hope. Economic growth appears to be taking hold in certain countries. South Africa continues to be an example of what can be achieved when political leadership is committed to reconciliation.

The rise of a new generation of African leaders is generally viewed as a positive development in Africa. Usually comprised of President Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Vice President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, President Yoweri

Museveni of Uganda, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, and President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, the new generation is best characterized by the pursuit of African solutions for African problems—a greater independence from the West and a less corrupt administration of their countries.

To varying degrees, the administration views these leaders as playing a central role in bringing prosperity to Africa.

In her recent trip to Africa, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that:

Africa's best new leaders have brought a new spirit of hope and accomplishment to their countries and that spirit is sweeping across the continent. They know the greatest authority any leader can claim is the consent of the governed. They are as diverse as the continent itself. But they share a common vision of empowerment—for all their citizens, for their Nations, and for their continent.

While Secretary Albright is to be applauded for her efforts to increase U.S. engagement in Africa, such effusive statements do not correspond to the political realities in the countries of these new leaders. Without more cautious pronouncements from senior administration officials, I fear we will wake up in several years and find a new generation of African leaders has become an old generation of African strong men.

These leaders have done much for their countries, but all preside over *de facto* one-party States which do not allow for self-government and have not established mechanisms for the peaceful transfer of power. Political oppression, serious violations of civil liberties, and a restricted press are all elements of life in these countries.

These leaders certainly have replaced some of the most corrupt and brutal governments in Africa. But their commitment to genuine political reform and governmental institution building still must be proven.

The position of the United States in defense of democracy is less clear when we reverse course and promise to aid the Democratic Republic of Congo after President Kabila has suppressed opposition groups and undermined the U.N. investigation of human rights atrocities. The position of the United States is less clear when Angola helps topple the democratically elected Government of the Republic of Congo without so much as a U.S. sponsored U.N. resolution in condemnation.

Neither the United States nor Africa is served by declaring countries success stories before their time. I urge the President in his upcoming trip to Africa to clarify U.S. policy toward these new leaders who have an opportunity, a unique opportunity, to consolidate political reform and set their countries on the path to genuine stability.

It is my pleasure now to call upon Hon. Susan E. Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to provide testimony.

I am delighted to welcome you to the committee again, Secretary Rice, and thank you for your willingness to participate. I look forward to your contribution.

Thank you. Secretary Rice.

STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN E. RICE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. RICE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

With your permission, I would like to summarize my statement and include it in its entirety in the record.

I would like to thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee again on the issue of Democracy in Africa. It has been only a few short months since I appeared before the subcommittee to outline my vision for a new U.S. policy toward Africa, if confirmed as Assistant Secretary.

From the very outset, under President Clinton's leadership, we have been steadfast in our pursuit of an aggressive policy in support of democracy, political freedom, and human rights on the African continent.

This is a pivotal time in both African and American history. Our relationship with the continent is being recast from one of indifference or dependency to one of genuine partnership based on mutual respect and mutual interest.

There is a new interest in individual freedom and a movement away from repressive, one-party systems. It is with this new generation of Africans that we seek a dynamic, long-term partnership for the 21st Century.

This partnership is being nurtured by the ascendance of democracy and representative governance in Africa. Democracy has taken root in many places on the continent, although not with the intensity of the pace that some in the United States might wish.

Africa's democratic march has been neither linear nor monolithic, but it has registered significant headway.

In 1989, there were only five African countries that could be described as democracies. Today, more than 20 countries have governments resulting from elections generally deemed free and fair by international observers.

We can be proud of United States efforts to advance African democracy and support free electoral processes. Since 1989, with Congress' support, we have invested more than \$400 million to spark, institutionalize, and then sustain democratic reform in Africa. Yet elections are only a match to light the democratic flame, a flame that can go out easily if not well attended to.

Thus, the U.S. Government has programs in some 46 African countries to consolidate and sustain the gains won through the ballot box. Moreover, we have put promotion of democracy and respect for human rights at the very top of our public and private agendas with our African counterparts.

In Uganda, we have urged genuine political pluralism and systems that incorporate a wider spectrum of political beliefs.

In Kenya, we have worked with international financial institutions and other donors to make assistance contingent upon stronger anti-corruption measures. We have also pressed repeatedly for an inclusive process of constitutional reform, to correct shortcomings in Kenya's democratic framework.

In Zambia, the United States has made plain that political detainees, including Kenneth Kaunda, must be swiftly tried in a fair and open process or released. We have also pressed repeatedly for the lifting of the state of emergency.

United States' efforts to bolster respect for human rights across the continent include support for legal reform, improving adminis-

tration of justice, and increasing citizens' access to legal counsel and due process.

We are also working actively to empower African women, key decision makers in this and the next century.

In crafting our overall assistance strategy, we take a country to country approach. Indeed, each nation on the continent is unique in its history, diversity, and culture. Many African countries are on a path to participatory democracy. However, some are on a rocky one and there have been significant setbacks along this route.

Realizing that achieving full freedom is a continuous process, we must stay actively engaged, even in flawed, imperfect democracies. Countries struggling against long odds to restore peace, stability, and prosperity after years of repression need and deserve our encouragement, even for small steps in the right direction.

Wherever possible, we should keep the lines of communication open to press for genuine and sustainable democracy and respect for human rights.

In Central Africa, especially, war, genocide, political and economic disarray, and resultant refugee flows have destroyed social cohesion, weakened the rule of law, and led to massive human rights abuses. In this context, we believe support for the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo is essential, even as the record of the Congolese Government is mixed and sometimes worrisome.

We remain deeply concerned by President Kabila's detention of opposition leader Tshisekedi, the detention and harassment of journalists, and by the trial of civilians before military tribunals.

Nevertheless, our efforts must be directed at achieving a successful transition to a post-Mobutu era in which respect for human rights, democracy, and prosperity are assured.

In addition, we will continue to press hard and loudly for a full accounting of human rights violations in the Congo and the rest of the Great Lakes region.

Where repression is endemic, we will meet it with a tough and sure response. Last year, we imposed sweeping new economic sanctions on Sudan, because of its continued sponsorship of international terrorism and its human rights abuses, including slavery and religious persecution.

In Nigeria, we hold General Abacha to his promise to undertake a genuine transition to civilian rule this year and to establish a level playing field by allowing free political activity, providing for an open press, and ending political detention.

Let me state clearly and unequivocally, Mr. Chairman, that an electoral victory by any military candidate in the forthcoming Presidential elections in Nigeria would be unacceptable. Nigeria needs and deserves a real transition to democracy and civilian rule.

As democratization and respect for human rights is dependent upon and closely linked to conflict resolution, so, too, is economic growth and development necessary to sustain African political stability.

As part of our overall efforts to lift the democratic tide in Africa, we support Africa's long overdue integration into the global economy. Thus we are pleased that the African Growth and Opportunity Act, passed just yesterday by the House of Representatives, is an important step forward in this effort.

We commend Senator Lugar and other co-sponsors for their visionary leadership on this issue, and we hope the Senate will be able to pass this landmark legislation as soon as possible.

We also hope the Senate will take another important step to brighten Africa's prospects in the 21st century and consider the speedy and favorable ratification of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification.

This is an issue of particular importance to the African continent and especially to the drought prone Sahelian region.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying that next week, President Clinton, as you know, will embark on an historic six nation mission to the African continent, visiting Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, Botswana and Senegal. At the very top of his agenda will be promoting a partnership with Africa for the 21st century, a partnership founded on a common commitment to democratic principles and universal respect for human rights.

The President will announce concrete steps to help the Great Lakes region succeed in its transition to peace and security as well as new initiatives to promote and sustain democracy.

Although President Clinton's visit is a milestone in U.S.-Africa relations, it must not be viewed as the terminus. We must and we will continue our long-term efforts to help Africans build a brighter future, not out of altruism alone but out of a clear-minded understanding of our mutual interest in working together to achieve peace, democracy, and prosperity.

But let me be very plain: We will never retreat from our steadfast support for democratization and universal standards of human rights in Africa. The breadth and depth of our democracy programs and our diplomacy, starting at the beginning of this administration, are testimony to our enduring commitment to these principles.

Although Africans will definitely determine their own destiny, the U.S. cannot afford to be a passive bystander in their struggles, achievements, and regressions. We need to promote policies that foster a level playing field, policies based on partnership, not paternalism, and on democratic aspirations, not past failures.

I look forward to working closely with you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of this subcommittee as we seek stronger and more productive ties between the United States and our African partners.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Rice follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUSAN E. RICE

Good afternoon. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to testify before your distinguished Subcommittee on the issue of democracy in Africa. It has only been a few short months since I appeared before this Subcommittee to outline my vision for a new U.S. policy towards Africa if confirmed as Assistant Secretary. From the very outset, under President Clinton's leadership, we have been steadfast in our pursuit of an aggressive policy in support of democracy, political freedom and human rights on the African continent.

This is a pivotal time in both African and U.S. history. Our relationship with the Continent is being recast from one of indifference or dependency to one of genuine partnership based on mutual respect and mutual interest. The Africa of today is no longer the one of televised images of famine, war, and genocide that poured into our living rooms over the past decade. Those images are misleading. They are only part of a much greater story—a story of change that South Africa's Deputy President Thabo Mbeki has called an "African Renaissance." There is now an inspired deter-

mination—a new mind set if you will—among the Continent’s citizens to move from exclusive to inclusive societies, from dependence to self-reliance, and from poverty to prosperity. Africans from all walks of life—scholars, teachers and crafts people—are finding strength in unity, dignity in debate, and a desire to work for the rights and opportunities they have long been denied. From strong women entrepreneurs in Ghana, to Congolese civic leaders who have persevered despite 30 years of Mobutuism, there is a new interest in individual freedom and a movement away from repressive one-party systems. It is with this new generation of Africans that we seek a dynamic long-term partnership for the 21st century.

This new partnership is being nurtured by the ascendance of democracy and representative governance in Africa. Democracy has taken root in many places on the Continent, although, not with the intensity or pace some in the United States might wish. Africa’s democratic march has been neither linear nor monolithic, but it has registered significant headway. In 1989, there were only five African countries that could be described as democracies: today more than 20 countries have governments resulting from elections deemed generally free and fair by international observers. If the 1980’s were the time of gripping war, devastating famine, apartheid and despotism—the 1990’s are more a time of opening, of healing, and of slow but pulsing progress.

In this decade, we have witnessed the dramatic end of apartheid in South Africa. We saw the conclusion of protracted wars in the Horn of Africa and the end of deadly strife in Mozambique, Liberia and, we hope, in Angola. In West Africa, Benin embraced multi-party democracy and established a vibrant legislature. Mali moved from confrontation to consensus-building as the means of bridging differences rooted in the past. Ghana formulated a viable constitution and conducted free and fair national elections. Ethiopia transitioned from war and years of Marxist government to a system of government that is a work in progress, but a far cry from the days of the Derg. Indeed, democratic institutions—however fragile and imperfect—form the basis for governance in most nations in Sub-Saharan Africa.

We can be proud of U.S. efforts to advance African democracy and support free electoral processes. Since 1989, we have invested more than \$400 million to spark, institutionalize and then sustain democratic reform. In South Africa, the U.S. government provided substantial assistance to the new Government of National Unity. In Ghana, we trained 4,500 electoral observers and helped with a comprehensive voter registration effort for the 1996 national and then 1997 local elections. We provided electoral assistance to Mozambique—training 52,400 election officers and 32,000 political party poll watchers and deploying them to over 7,000 voting locations. We provided Zambians assistance with elections in 1994, supported Tanzanians in their first multiparty contest in 1995, and aided Ugandans with the establishment of a Constitutional Assembly. Proving that democracy has a firm and growing hold in Southern Africa, we returned to assist Namibia with its second-round of democratic national elections in 1994.

Yet elections are only a match to light the democratic flame—a flame that can easily go out if not tended. Thus, the U.S. government has programs in 46 African countries to consolidate and sustain the gains won through the ballot box. In post election Malawi, for example, we provided training and assistance to strengthen the parliament, modernize the judiciary and enhance the election commission. Since then, Malawi’s parliament has passed constitutional safeguards on human rights and enacted anti-corruption legislation. In post-apartheid South Africa, we have supported the drafting of a progressive new constitution and have assisted the remarkable Truth and Reconciliation Commission process. To deal with threats to its young democracy, we are also helping South African law enforcement authorities fight rising crime in the country’s growing cities.

To be clear, we have gone well past the point of merely funding national elections. We are providing support to build strong institutions and vibrant civil societies. In Kenya, we support a wide range of pro-democracy groups that press for institutionalized constitutional reform. We also sponsor regional programs to consolidate democratic norms and increase networking and human rights advocacy across Southern Africa. In Rwanda, we provided equipment to the Rwandan Association of Journalists to strengthen the media’s independence and role in civil society. To foster a viable legislative branch, we have provided training and simultaneous translation equipment to Rwanda’s nascent parliament. In Ethiopia—a country synonymous with famine just a decade ago—this Administration has supported not only elections, but decentralization, civil service reform and constitutional drafting.

Moreover, we have put promotion of democracy and respect for human rights at the very top of our public and private agendas with our African counterparts. We constantly engage African leaders on issues of political reform and good governance, on the need for effective anti-corruption efforts, and on the critical importance of

the rule of law and a predictable regulatory environment. In Uganda, we have urged genuine political pluralism and systems that incorporate a wider spectrum of political beliefs. In Kenya, we have worked with international financial institutions and other donors to make assistance contingent upon stronger anti-corruption measures. We also have pressed repeatedly for an inclusive process of constitutional reform to correct short-comings in Kenya's democratic framework. In Zambia, the U.S. has made plain that political detainees—including Kenneth Kaunda—must be swiftly tried in a fair and open process or released. We have pressed repeatedly for the lifting of the State of Emergency.

The United States' efforts to bolster respect for human rights across the Continent include support for legal reform, improving administration justice, and increasing citizens' access to legal counsel and due process. In this area, we are plowing new ground. The United States has strongly supported the International War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda and human rights field monitors in Rwanda and Burundi. In Liberia, U.S. assistance helped launch the new Liberian Human Rights Center, and this year it will fund that Center's outreach programs country-wide. In Uganda, we support the Ugandan Law Reform Commission, which is compiling all existing statutes and regulations to allow access to legal information for all Ugandans.

We are working actively to empower African women—key decision makers in this and the next century. U.S. supported-NGOs provide legal assistance and advice to women in Tanzania; and in Mali, where we fund civic and voter education programs, we will expand women's rights training programs nation-wide. In Botswana, we have supported grassroots NGOs that ensure human rights protection for women, children and minorities. We work with the Malawian and the Namibian women's caucuses to help them represent the needs of women by reviewing legislation for gender sensitivity, forging cooperation across party lines, and launching human rights awareness campaigns focused on the rights of women and children in the region.

In crafting our overall assistance strategy, we take a country-to-country approach. Indeed, each nation on the Continent is unique in its history, diversity and culture. Many African countries are on a path to participatory democracy—however, some are on a rocky one and there have been significant setbacks along this route. Nascent democracies in Sierra Leone and Congo-Brazzaville were toppled in violent take-overs. Political competition and freedom of the press have been stifled in many African nations. The Democratic Republic of the Congo will continue to suffer from the effects of armed conflict and decades of internal repression for years to come.

Realizing that achieving full freedom is a continuous process, we must stay actively engaged even in flawed, imperfect democracies. Countries struggling against long-odds to restore peace, stability and prosperity after years of repression need and deserve our encouragement for even small steps in the right direction. Wherever possible, we should keep the lines of communication open to press for genuine and sustainable democracy and respect for human rights.

In Central Africa especially, war, genocide, political and economic disarray, and resultant refugee flows have destroyed social cohesion, weakened the rule of law, and led to massive human rights abuses. During Secretary Albright's recent visit to Africa, she announced the launching of a Great Lakes Justice Initiative—an effort designed to assist the states of the region to strengthen justice and respect for the rule of law, so as to help break the cycle of violence and impunity. We will be working actively and in partnership with the governments in the region in developing this initiative. The Secretary also pressed publicly and privately for concrete steps to ease ethnic tensions, ensure inclusive government and stop human rights abuses. She stressed the importance of the huge centrally-located African nation of Congo to regional security and emphasized our support for the Congolese people who suffered so much under the misrule of Mobutu.

We believe support for the people of Congo is essential even as the record of the Congolese government is mixed and sometimes worrisome. We remain deeply concerned by President Kabila's detention of opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, the detention and harassment of journalists, and by the trial of civilians before military tribunals. Working with the friends of Congo and bilaterally, our efforts must be directed at achieving a successful transition to a post-Mobutu era in which respect for human rights, democracy and prosperity are assured. In addition, we will continue to press hard and loudly for a full accounting of human rights violations in the Congo and the rest of the Great Lakes Region. We must nurture latent democratic processes, promote economic growth, and foster reconciliation throughout the region.

Where repression is endemic, we will meet it with a tough and sure response. Late last year, we imposed sweeping new economic sanctions against the government of Sudan because of its continued sponsorship of international terrorism and

its human rights abuses, including slavery and religious persecution. In Nigeria, we hold General Abacha to his promise to undertake a genuine transition to civilian rule this year and to establish a level playing field by allowing free political activity, providing for an open press and ending political detention. Let me state clearly and unequivocally to you today that an electoral victory by any military candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections would be unacceptable. Nigeria needs and deserves a real transition to democracy and civilian rule.

Throughout Africa, the Administration complements its hands-on support for grassroots democracy by helping African countries prevent, resolve and recover from conflict. U.S. leadership and resources were instrumental in bringing an end to the wars in Mozambique and Angola. Our diplomats are actively engaged in Burundi to help forge a peaceful resolution to the persistent conflict there. We have provided more than \$90 million to the West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, in order to bring peace to Liberia, and we are the largest investor in developing the OAU's Conflict Management Center. In addition, we have launched an African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to enhance the capacity of African nations to respond to humanitarian crises and peacekeeping challenges.

As democratization and respect for human rights is dependent upon, and closely linked to, conflict resolution so too is economic growth and development necessary to sustain African political stability. Thus, as part of our overall efforts to lift the democratic tide in Africa, we support Africa's long-overdue integration into the global economy. Trade, investment, assistance and debt relief will nurture Africa's budding democracies and help relieve the endemic poverty that plagues Africa—poverty that spurs unrest and insecurity. Through President Clinton's Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity and legislation now pending before Congress—the African Growth and Opportunity Act—we are committed to helping countries that undertake dynamic economic reforms reap the additional benefits of increased access to U.S. markets. We are pleased that the African Growth and Opportunity Act passed the House yesterday. We commend Senator Lugar and other co-sponsors for their leadership on this issue and hope the Senate will be able to pass this legislation as soon as possible.

We also hope the Senate will take another important step to help brighten Africa's prospects in the 21st century—the ratification of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. This is an issue of particular importance to the African continent, and especially to the drought-prone Sahelian region.

Next week, President Clinton will embark on an historic six-nation mission to the African continent—visiting Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, Botswana and Senegal. At the top of his agenda will be promoting a partnership with Africa for the 21st century—a partnership founded on a common commitment to democratic principles and universal respect for human rights. The President will announce concrete steps to help the Great Lakes Region succeed in its transition to peace and stability, as well as new initiatives to promote and sustain democracy. Although President Clinton's visit is a milestone in U.S.-Africa relations, it must not be viewed as an end-zone. We must and we will continue our long-term efforts to help Africans build a brighter future—not out of altruism alone—but out of a clear-minded understanding of our mutual interest in working together to achieve peace, democracy and prosperity.

Mr. Chairman, let me be very plain: we will never retreat from our steadfast support for democratization and universal standards of human rights in Africa. The breadth and depth of our democracy programs and diplomacy starting at the beginning of this administration are testimony to our enduring commitment to these principles. Although Africans will determine their own destiny, the U.S. cannot afford to be a passive bystander in their struggles, achievements and regressions. We need to create policies that foster a level playing field—policies based on partnership, not paternalism, and on democratic aspirations, not past failures. I look forward to working closely and constructively with you and other members of this Subcommittee as we seek stronger and more productive ties between the United States and its African partners. Thank you.

Senator ASHCROFT. Thank you, Secretary Rice.

If you would be available to answer a few questions, I would be grateful.

Dr. RICE. As always.

Senator ASHCROFT. Thank you.

How important a factor are these new leaders from Uganda, Rwanda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo

for the administration as U.S. Africa policy is being formulated? What role do they have with respect to U.S. policy in Africa? Do they have a role of influence outside their own borders?

Dr. RICE. Mr. Chairman, let me begin by saying that I think the term "new leaders" has taken on several connotations that are not what we intended when we used that term.

When we talk about "new leaders," we mean a group of individuals as diverse as President Konare of Mali, President Mkapa of Tanzania, and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, among others.

We are pointing to individuals who are committed to finding new solutions to problems in Africa, who have a vision for Africa that is inclusive, that is forward looking, that is self-reliant, in which the citizens of their countries enjoy prosperity, are not burdened by corruption, and have an opportunity to express their will freely and in an environment where their basic human rights will be respected.

Now as for the countries you pointed to, some of them have visionary, relatively new leaders, and we have worked closely with them on issues of mutual interest. We see them as playing an important role in several respects.

Let me mention in particular in this regard Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia, President Isaias of Eritrea, and President Museveni of Uganda. These leaders have come together with a vision for not only Eastern and Central Africa, but the continent as a whole, that we largely support. It is a vision of self reliance, of sustained economic growth and prosperity, and of a sustainable form of democracy that takes into account the particular histories of individual countries but does not compromise on fundamental principles of respect for human rights.

But they come from countries that have emerged from conflict, conflicts that have been deadly and, in many cases, long-lasting. Their progress thus far has been laudable, but the results are not perfect. We think in many respects there is a long way to go in a number of countries in Africa when it comes to democracy as we know it and respect for human rights. But we think it is important that, where there is positive progress and the proper motivation, the United States step in to try to accelerate the achievement of lasting democracy and respect for human rights.

Senator ASHCROFT. When you say you take into account individual histories, what factors in the history of a country are considered in terms of affecting what kind of expectation, is held for democratic reform in that country? Would you give some examples of that.

Dr. RICE. Let me take an extreme example but an important one—and that is Rwanda—which has suffered recurrent genocide over many years but, most recently, obviously, the tragic genocide of 1994. That is a country that has been torn asunder by ethnic violence, by long-standing economic competition, and by a history of colonialism which, in fact, has been very pernicious in that particular context.

In that light, while we certainly insist upon the need for respect for human rights and for an inclusive political system, it is hard to imagine that an overnight transformation to a multiparty de-

mocracy will be sustainable and can happen without great bloodshed.

So we think it is very important that Rwanda, as well as other countries, move in that direction; but they have to do so in a way that takes account of their particular histories and experiences so that the democracy that emerges ultimately can be sustained.

Senator ASHCROFT. In which areas are the new leaders likely to cooperate with each other and in which areas are their policy objectives likely to diverge?

Dr. RICE. I think the area of greatest convergence is probably in the security realm, particularly if you are talking about those new leaders in the Central and East African region. There they have come together to try to counter a common threat from the Government of Sudan, which has exported terrorism not only far afield abroad but also most directly in the neighboring countries.

As you know, they are cooperating in an effort to try to bring about change in the government in Sudan.

They also came together when they perceived the common threat that Mobutu's Zaire posed. While we had urged and would much have preferred a negotiated solution to the conflict in Zaire, the leaders of the region determined that it was in their mutual interest to try to end the security threats posed by the refugee camps in Eastern Zaire and to bring a halt to Mobutu's 30 years of destabilizing his neighbors.

Their interests may diverge when it comes to the path they take to democratization and to the degree that they are able to achieve in the near-term what we would call full and universal respect for human rights.

Let me just finally say that another area of convergence is, I think, a mutual aspiration for economic prosperity, a relative commitment to end corruption, and a desire to form economic partnerships and regional integration that might sustain otherwise fairly fragile economies in a regional cooperative fashion and bring prosperity to their people.

Senator ASHCROFT. I want to thank you for taking your time, Secretary Rice, to come and make a presentation to the committee.

The Senate is in the midst of a vote. It is my habit to vote with the Senate during the time interval allowed. So I beg the indulgence and tolerance of those of you who are interested individuals who have come here and those who have come to make presentations.

It is my decision now to recess the subcommittee for about 15 minutes while I go and vote in accordance with my responsibilities.

[Recess]

Senator ASHCROFT. It is my pleasure to reconvene the subcommittee meeting and to thank you all for your patience during this time when you were required to stay so that I might have the opportunity to vote.

It is my pleasure now to call upon the Senator from Wisconsin, Senator Feingold, for either remarks or questions, whatever he chooses.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for not being able to be here at the beginning. We have four or five dif-

ferent things going on at once, as so often happens here, and I apologize.

I thank Secretary Rice for waiting for a while so that I could ask her some questions. I will make a statement later.

One thing I wanted to ask you, Madam Secretary, is how does the administration assess the record of African leaders, in particular, in holding their militaries accountable for observing international humanitarian law and, in general, how can this country encourage civilian control of the military in some of these key African countries?

Dr. RICE. Senator, I think the record of African governments in that regard is mixed. Those that are on the path to democracy and respect for human rights have generally done a fairly good job. Even in some countries where the leadership of the country may have come to power by military means, there is a fair degree of control of the military.

But this is a persistent problem in a number of places; and there are a number of countries, as you well know, where civilian control of the military is weak, at best.

In my opinion, one of the best things that we can do in this regard is to continue our efforts to help professionalize African militaries, particularly through IMET programs and particularly through expanded IMET, which is targeted at human rights training and training of a responsible officer corps that is responsible to civilian control.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

I would now like to ask a few questions about the President's upcoming trip to Africa. I am delighted. This is something that I have mentioned at many hearings over the years and was extremely pleased to see the Secretary of State make the effort and spend substantial time in Africa.

I guess you have outlined some of the goals of the trip. But I would like to ask you about some of the details if you are able to discuss them.

To what extent is the President planning to meet with non-governmental voices, such as opposition leaders, journalists, women's groups, and the like?

Dr. RICE. To the extent possible in what, as you can imagine, is a very tight schedule, he will try to make opportunity to do just that. We expect that in at least one location he will have a meeting with civil society leaders from, we hope, a variety of countries in Africa to talk about their experiences, to hear their concerns, and to show that the United States is committed to the promotion and sustainment of civil society.

In various countries he will also have the opportunity to see some opposition leaders. Some of that will be in the context of larger meetings or in social contexts. He may also have a meeting here and there with individual opposition leaders. That has been an important consideration in putting together the trip and, to the greatest extent possible, we have tried to factor that in.

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate that.

How will the President respond to the inevitable questions he will get about our Nigeria policy?

Dr. RICE. Senator, as you well know, we have been in a long, drawn-out process of looking at our Nigeria policy. That process I hope will soon be coming to a conclusion. It certainly has accelerated in the last several weeks.

As I said in my opening statement, we will hold Nigeria and General Abacha to his own stated commitment to effect a transition to civilian democratic rule this year. Were he not to do that, and were a military candidate of any stripe to emerge victorious from that election, we would consider that unacceptable. Obviously, as we finalize our policy review, we will be looking very much forward to consultations with you, the Chairman, and others about that policy and seek your guidance.

But soon thereafter we want to begin the process of talking to key allies and partners in Africa to consider what steps we might take in response to various possible outcomes in Nigeria.

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate hearing that. Let me respectfully suggest that perhaps the President, when he is in Africa, could express some of the points that you just made, if that is something you could suggest to him that he do.

Which African heads of State will join the President at the regional summit in Uganda? What is the rationale in picking which leaders would be involved?

Dr. RICE. I think the final list of participants has not been finally determined. But there will be leaders from East and Central Africa. I can name a few if that is useful, but I do not want to leave you with the impression that it is a finite set, necessarily.

At this point we expect Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia to be there, obviously President Museveni, President Mkapa, President Moi of Kenya, President Bizimungu of Rwanda, and President Kabila of former Zaire, now Congo.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

With regard to the role of Reverend Jesse Jackson as a Special Envoy for Democracy and Governance in Africa, could you say a little bit about his role in helping to shape U.S. Africa policy and how do you think his efforts have gone?

Dr. RICE. Reverend Jackson is playing a unique, but very valuable role. His role focuses on the democracy side of our policy, which is a very fundamental element of the overall policy toward Africa. He has a limited amount of time (60 days per calendar year) by government regulation that he can spend on Africa policy in his informal status.

So we are trying to use his time in a targeted and effective fashion.

He has, for the most part, been used as a trouble shooter. He has been dispatched twice to Kenya, once to the Democratic Republic of Congo, where his mission was to primarily underscore that our interest in the Congo was not in any particular leader or any government but in the long-term transformation of that country. Therefore, he met with a broad variety of opposition leaders as well as with civil society. Unfortunately, he did not have the opportunity to meet with President Kabila, which had been his intention.

He has also spent time in Liberia and Zambia.

I hope and expect that he will make similar missions in the future, both when there are troubles on the horizon that fall into the

category of democratization, where he may be able to lend the voice and weight of the U.S. Government, but also where there are opportunities.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me be clear that I am enthusiastic about his involvement in this. I think he can contribute a great deal.

Mr. Chairman, I have just one more question following on that about the incident you alluded to in Congo where, as I understand it, the last minute there was a decision by President Kabila not to meet with Reverend Jackson.

Does this represent a rift in our United States-Congo relations? As I understand it, it had something to do with Reverend Jackson's meeting with opposition leader Étienne Tshisekedi. Does this threaten at all Reverend Jackson's ability to perform his duties in other countries?

Dr. RICE. I would not say it represents a rift, and I certainly do not think it affects his ability to perform his duties in other countries.

I think it was an unfortunate decision by the Government of Congo to decide at the last minute not to see Reverend Jackson. We don't know precisely why they made that decision, although there are some indications that it may have been out of pique that he had met with opposition leaders prior to meeting with the President.

We think that was a missed opportunity and an unfortunate incident. It is reflective of a pattern of behavior that is a little bit erratic and sometimes worrisome, as I said in my testimony.

But, having said that, I think our challenge with respect to the Congo is much broader than President Kabila or any individual leader or party. It is a huge country in the heart of Africa whose future will affect the fate of all of Central and Southern Africa.

So our interest is in trying to intersect with this window of opportunity, this post-Mobutu era, and to try, as best we can, with others in the international community in the region to encourage the Congo to achieve its potential, to ultimately achieve democracy, full respect for human rights, and economic prosperity.

If we succeed, the benefits for all of Africa are substantial. If Congo fails, the ramifications for the region could be dire.

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate your comments about Congo. Let me just be absolutely clear. I think President Kabila should have met with Reverend Jackson, and this was not a good reason not to meet with him. I don't want anybody to interpret my remarks as a criticism of Reverend Jackson. I am pleased that he attempted to meet with President Kabila.

Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

Senator ASHCROFT. Let me thank the Assistant Secretary for coming and for spending the time that she did. Also, thank you for waiting while it was necessary for us to be absent in order to vote.

We thank you for your cooperation with the subcommittee and look forward to working with you further.

Dr. RICE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

RESPONSE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICE TO A FURTHER QUESTION FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BROWNBACK

Question. What is this administration's plan to engage in a constructive dialogue to promote free and fair elections this August in Nigeria?

Answer. The upcoming election is an opportunity for Nigeria to advance democracy in Africa and take a large step toward realizing its vast potential for leadership on the continent.

We have publicly and privately let Nigerian officials know the criteria we believe necessary for a free and fair election: release of political prisoners, a contest open to all legitimate candidates, parties allowed to organize and select viable candidates, candidates and parties free to campaign throughout the country, the press free to report on the process without fear of harassment or suppression, and equal access to state-owned media by all candidates.

We are concerned about the direction the transition appears to be taking. If steps are not taken to create more political space, we believe the transition will not lead to a credible civilian government and the realization of Nigeria's potential for enormous good on the continent.

Senator ASHCROFT. It is now my pleasure to call upon the next panel of witnesses: Dr. George Ayittey, Associate Professor at American University; Dr. Pauline Baker, President of the Fund for Peace; Mr. Salih Booker, Senior Fellow for Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Dr. David Gordon, Senior Fellow at the Overseas Development Council.

Dr. George B. N. Ayittey is Associate Professor of Economics at the American University and President of the Free Africa Foundation, Washington, DC.

Dr. Ayittey, I am honored that you would be here to make a presentation to the subcommittee. I welcome your contribution. If you can, try to limit your opening remarks to about five minutes. We have 65 minutes in which to complete this hearing and at some time I think the Ranking Member of the subcommittee wants to make a statement of his own.

With that in mind, I welcome you and thank you for your willingness to help us. We look forward to hearing your remarks and asking you questions.

STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY AND PRESIDENT OF THE FREE AFRICA FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC.

Dr. AYITTEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a longer prepared statement, but I would hope to summarize it within the timeframe that you indicated.

I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify before this Subcommittee on Africa. As I understand it, the purpose of this hearing is to determine the prospects for democracy and of the new leaders, the new African leaders, and how the U.S. should interact and help them. Specifically, the new leaders comprise the following: Presidents Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, and Laurent Kabila of the Congo.

Mr. Chairman, these leaders share certain characteristics. They all have a military background and they have all successfully waged recently a guerrilla campaign to remove corrupt and tyrannical regimes from power. They have inherited shattered economies, collapsed infrastructure, and, therefore, they are in the process of rebuilding their countries.

We all know about the 1994 Rwanda massacre in which more than 700,000 Tutsis were slaughtered. Paul Kagame faces a very formidable task of healing ethnic wounds in Rwanda and also rebuilding the country.

Senator ASHCROFT. Doctor, would you please bring the microphone closer to you so that we can all hear.

I am not sure about the audience. Can you hear him in the back of the room?

I see that they are having trouble. They would like to hear you. I am sorry that I did not ask you to do this sooner. So please project your voice right into the microphone.

Dr. AYITTEY. OK.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo before a collapse in October, 1996, after 32 years of misrule by the late Mobutu Sese Seko, there, too, we have had government structures which have collapsed, the infrastructure has crumbled, roads have completely disintegrated, and there is a formidable task of also rebuilding this country.

Now there is also a similar situation that we have in Ethiopia and also in Eritrea. These new leaders need all the help that they can get. I believe that the U.S. should help them in whatever way it can.

I am heartened to note that the Clinton administration is paying more attention to Africa, especially the Central African region, because after a period of abandonment and benign neglect, as an African, it seems to me that the administration is now placing Africa on the front burner.

Since 1995, the White House has held a series of high level conferences on Africa and sent senior administration officials on various African tours. The former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, was in Africa in 1996 to promote the African Crisis Response Initiative. This was also followed by the First Lady, Hillary Clinton, and Chelsea visiting Africa in 1997. Also this was followed by Madeleine Albright who was in Africa last October. Of course, we know that this month President Clinton will be going to Africa.

Also, this week, yesterday, the Congress passed the African Growth and Employment Initiative Act.

Mr. Chairman, there are bound to be differences of opinion in regard to how best the U.S. can help Africa. I am sure you have heard some lament in some quarters that the U.S. is not doing enough to help Africa or that the help must be coupled with some substantial debt cancellation.

In my opinion, however, the issue is not so much whether the U.S. should help Africa or not. I think, rather, what the issue is is helping Africa effectively.

This is because since 1990, more than \$400 billion in various Western aid and credits have been pumped into Africa with very negligible results. Somalia is a case in point where in 1993, it cost the international community \$3.5 billion in a humanitarian mission. Somalia represents a case where quite often the U.S. wades into a complex African situation without understanding the causes of the crisis and then withdraws when the going gets tough.

Nor is the issue whether there are any success stories in Africa. There are. But these success stories are few.

Economically, the continent of Africa is making some very, very painful progress. Politically, we find some serious setbacks in the democratization process.

Right now, we have had the number of democracies in Africa increase from 4 in 1990 to a figure like 15 today. These series of races occurred, some of them occurred last year, when democratically elected governments in Congo and also in Sierra Leone were removed by military soldiers.

Clearly, more needs to be done to help Africa, the new leaders in Africa, in their efforts to democratize Africa. But I believe that consistency in substance should be the overarching tenets of U.S. efforts to promote democracy.

It is true that the Clinton administration is doing far more than its predecessor governments. But the objectives right now are muddled and the signals that we are getting from the administration are confusing.

You may remember that after Madeleine Albright returned from Africa there was some talk among the administration officials that Africa needs stability and not democracy. Also very disturbing was the administration's response to the recent setbacks in the African democratization process, which has been muted and rather disappointing. The administration's policy on Nigeria seems to be in total disarray, although today we heard from the Assistant Secretary of State, Susan Rice, that there might be a new policy in the offing.

Mr. Chairman, the issue is not so much what the policy should be but, rather, the approach to African problems and efforts to promote democracy.

When I hear the term "new leaders," it sort of conjures up some eerie reminiscences to the cold war, because the mistake that was made during that particular period was to emphasize, to place so much faith in the leadership rather than in institutions.

I believe that there ought to be a shift. It is not so much what these new leaders say or what they profess their commitments to be but, rather, the institutions.

Mr. Chairman, let me say that we cannot build democracy in Africa without having in place the supporting institutions. These supporting institutions are not that many. There are only five of them. If I may relate them to you: first we need to have an independent judiciary in Africa. That independent judiciary is the only institution which can effectively insure that we have rule of law in Africa.

We also need to have an independent media. We also need to have an independent central bank, and we also need to have a neutral and professional armed forces or security forces.

Now if you look across Africa, in the cases of the recent implosions in Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, all these countries blew up under military regimes simply because the military has not been a professional force in Africa. In fact, they have been the most destabilizing force in Africa.

I would like also to point out to you that there is one solution to all these crises in Africa. All these countries have been blowing up simply because of one particular factor and that factor is power. Power in Africa is the root cause of all these implosions.

The reason is that political power in Africa has become the passport to great personal wealth. Almost all the richest people in Africa are heads of State and ministers. Therefore, when you talk about government in Africa, government is not what you and I understand it as here in the West. Government, as you and I understand it, does not exist in many parts of Africa. What you have in many African countries is a Mafia State and that is government which has been hijacked by gangsters. They use the instruments of government power to enrich themselves and exclude everybody else.

Therefore, the problem that we have in many African countries is the practice of politics of exclusion.

Now those who have been excluded from power have two options which are to rise up and overthrow the ruling elites or to secede. These have been the seeds of instability in Africa.

Mr. Chairman, we have a solution in Africa and that solution has been tried and worked successfully in Benin and South Africa. That solution is called a Sovereign National Conference.

This is what the South Africans, the blacks and whites in South Africa, were able to do to have a democratic dispensation for their country. It also worked in Benin. And, therefore, to conclude my testimony, I will urge you that in the future it is not what the new leaders tell us but, rather, the institutions that they establish in Africa. These institutions, we know what they are—the Sovereign National Conference, an independent judiciary, an independent media, a professional and neutral force. This is what I believe U.S. aid should be tied to.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Ayittey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, PH.D.¹

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this Subcommittee on Africa. As I understand it, the purpose of this hearing is to determine the prospects for democracy under the current generation of “new African leaders” and how the U.S. should interact with and help them. Specifically, these new leaders comprise, though not exclusively, of the following: Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire.

Common Characteristics

These “new leaders” share certain common characteristics. They all have a military background. Impatient and angry at the appalling social misery, reckless economic mismanagement and flagrant injustices in their countries, they all assumed political power after waging a successful guerrilla campaign to oust corrupt and tyrannical regimes. They inherited shattered economies, fragmented societies and states that have nearly disintegrated. Upon their shoulders rests the formidable task of rebuilding collapsed infrastructure, restoring basic essential social services, healing social wounds, repaying huge foreign debts and promoting economic development—all at the same time with an empty treasury.

Consider Rwanda, for example. Paul Kagame took over in 1994 a country that had been torn asunder by ethnic bloodletting. In an orgy of violence and genocide, about 700,000 Tutsis were slaughtered in April 1994. Paul Kagame faces the difficult task of bringing to justice the Hutu extremists who participated in the Rwandan genocide at a time when the judiciary system had been destroyed. More than

¹ The author, a native of Ghana, is an Associate Professor of Economics at The American University and president of The Free Africa Foundation, both in Washington. He is the author of *Indigenous African Institutions* (1991), *Africa Betrayed*, which won the 1993 H. L. Mencken Award for “Best Book,” and *Africa In Chaos*, which was published this year.

80 percent of Rwandan judges have been killed, or fled into exile. Over 100,000 Hutu extremists languish in jail, awaiting trial and the pace of prosecution has been excruciatingly slow. Deep ethnic mistrust pervades Rwandan society. The country is still in turmoil. Ethnic tension and warfare flare up occasionally, claiming tens of innocent victims. Ethnic wounds must be healed, confiscated Tutsi property returned, infrastructure rebuilt and the country's development efforts restarted by the new government of Paul Kagame.

The Democratic Republic of The Congo (Formerly Zaire)

Before it imploded in October 1996, the fictional state of Zaire was already in an advanced stage of decay after 32 years of arrant kleptocratic rule by the late and former president Mobutu Sese Seko. Government structures had collapsed, infrastructure had crumbled, paved roads had been reduced to cratered cartways. Hospitals lacked basic medical supplies; electricity and water supplies were sporadic at best. Civil servants and soldiers had gone for months without pay. Hyperinflation raged at 23,000 percent a year. The Zairean currency was worthless. A new bank note of 5 million zaire, introduced in January 1993, was worth only 3 U.S. cents. The late and former president, Mobutu Sese Seko, who was long backed by Western powers, plundered the treasury to amass a personal fortune worth \$10 billion at one point.

President Laurent Kabila faces the herculean task of rebuilding this shattered country and at the same time honor the repayment obligations on the country's \$9 billion foreign debt. The new leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda face similar tasks of rebuilding shattered societies and collapsed economies, while at the same time promoting ethnic reconciliation and establishing democratic rule. President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda has brought peace and stability to his country and has embarked on a credible economic liberalization program. Only time will tell if these reforms are sustainable. Nevertheless, the new leaders need all the help they can get and the U.S. should assist them in any way it can in their efforts to rebuild their countries.

Increasing U.S. Attention To Africa

I am heartened to note that the Clinton Administration is paying increasing attention to Africa, especially the Central African region. After a period of abandonment or benign neglect, the Clinton Administration is placing Africa on the front burner. Since 1995, the White House has held a series of high-level conferences on Africa and sent senior administration officials on various African tours. In September 1996, former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, toured five African nations to promote the new U.S.-supported African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). This was to comprise 10,000 to 25,000 troops, which would be deployed to intervene in serious crises—cases of insurrection, genocide or civil strife to avert a Rwanda-like conflagration in crisis-laden African countries, such as Burundi, where an estimated 150,000 Burundians have perished in ethnic warfare since 1993.

First Lady Hillary Clinton and Chelsea followed with a visit to Africa in February 1997 and in October, seven African countries were toured by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. This month (March), President Clinton, will be visiting Africa for the first time. He will hold a regional summit of the leaders of central African nations in Uganda. Then this week, Congress will pass the administration's "Africa Growth and Investment Opportunity In Africa: The End of Dependency Act."

The new Africa initiative seeks "to create a transition path from development assistance to economic self-sufficiency for sub-Saharan African countries." The Bill will authorize a one time appropriation of \$150 million for an equity fund and \$500 million for an infrastructure fund beginning in 1998. These funds will be used to mobilize private savings from developed economies for equity investment in Africa; stimulate the growth of securities markets in Africa; improve access to third party equity and management advice for Africa's small and medium-sized firms. The infrastructure funds are intended to help improve the operations of telecommunications, roads, railways and power plants in Africa. These improvements, it was hoped, would help attract U.S. investors to potentially profitable projects in Africa. At the June 1997 G-7 Summit conference in Denver, President Clinton sought to sell this program to other donor countries.

A Critical Assessment of U.S. Efforts To Promote Democracy In Africa

Mr. Chairman, there are bound to be differences of opinion regarding how best the U.S. can help Africa. I am sure you will hear lament in some quarters that the U.S. is not doing enough to help Africa and that any help must be coupled with debt cancellation. In my opinion, however, the issue is not so much whether Africa should or should not be helped; rather, it is helping Africa effectively. More than \$400 billion in aid and various credits have been pumped into Africa since 1960 but

the results have been negligible. The 1993 humanitarian mission into Somalia is a case in point. It cost the international community more than \$3.5 billion, a large part of which was borne by the U.S., not to mention the lives of 18 U.S. Rangers who perished needlessly during that mission. Eventually, that mission had to be abandoned and Somalia today is still in a state of anarchy.

Nor is the issue whether there aren't any success stories in Africa; there are but they are few: Botswana, Eritrea, Guinea, Mauritius, and Uganda apart from South Africa. Neither is it the absence of any hopeful signs in Africa. The continent of Africa is making progress but it has been painfully slow. In 1996, for example, Africa's gross domestic product did register a 5 percent rate of growth. Although this rate was expected to drop back to 3.4 percent for 1997, some estimates project a 4.7% rate of growth for 1998. They are all higher than the 2 percent growth rate of the early 1990s but subtract an average population growth rate of 3 percent and that leaves miserly rates of growth of less than 2 percent in GDP per capita. These rates are woefully insufficient to reduce Africa's average poverty rates, which are among the highest in the world. In fact, a recent report from the International Labor Organization estimates that in Sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of the population living in poverty will increase to over 50% by the year 2000.

Politically, the democratization process in Africa has suffered some serious setbacks. The number of African democracies increased from 4 in 1990 to 15 in 1995 and then dropped to the now 13 (Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde Islands, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles Islands, South Africa and Zambia). Wily despots learned new tricks to beat back the democratic challenge in such countries as Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Togo, Zimbabwe and others. They wrote the rules of the game, manipulated the transition process and rigged elections to return themselves to power.

Serious reverses occurred in 1997 when reactionary forces overthrew democratically-elected governments in Sierra Leone and Congo-Brazzaville, the latter with French support. (France and the French oil company, Elf Aquitaine provided \$150 million to the forces of General Denis Sassou-Nguesso to overthrow President Pascal Lissouba).

Clearly, more needs to be done to help the new leaders of Africa but in these efforts consistency and substance should be the over-arching tenets of U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Africa. Although the Clinton administration is doing far more than its predecessor administrations, the objectives are muddled, the signals are confusing and the policies vacillatory. In fact, the U.S.'s record in promoting democracy in Africa has been bleak.

After spending tens of millions of U.S. taxpayers' money on African democratization, the administration appeared to be retreating last year. Although Madeleine Albright pledged \$40 million in new aid for democratic reforms during her trip, some U.S. officials were saying Africa needed stability before democracy and that the continent lacked a "democratic culture." Fortunately, the administration now appears to be back on track promoting democracy and we hope it will stay on track.

More disturbing, the administration's response to recent setbacks in the African democratization process has been muted and disappointing. The Clinton administration did little but wink at manifest cases of fraud and "conflicts of interest," where incumbents manipulated electoral rules to return themselves to power. Nor did the Clinton administration respond vigorously to the outrageous rape of democracy in Congo-Brazzaville. Worse, the administration's own policies toward Nigeria, the most populous black African nation in the region, is in total disarray.

Nigeria's crass attempts at "hide-and-peek bazooka" democracy by its ever-competent military thugs have placed the country in a perpetual state of transition to democratic rule. Four of the five parties approved by General Sani Abacha's regime, have all adopted him as their presidential candidate in the forthcoming August elections. Nobody has seen Nigeria's constitution; yet it is being amended by the Abacha regime to guide the transition process. On March 3, pro-Abacha rallies were held in Abuja but when the Coalition For A United Nigeria planned a pro-democracy, anti-Abacha rallies in Lagos, police declared them "illegal." Imagine.

Limited sanctions were imposed against Nigeria following the brutal hanging of human rights activist, Ken Saro Wiwa, and 8 other Ogoni activists in November 1995. But aggressive lobbying efforts by agents of the Abacha regime have succeeded in eviscerating the administration's initiatives toward Nigeria.

According to Randall Echolls, a spokesman of the jailed political leader, Moshood Abiola, the Abacha regime spent almost \$5 million in 1996 on P-R campaigns to spruce up its shattered image. Several of the PR agents are black Americans. For example, Johnny Ford organized the World Conference of Mayors in Abuja in December last year, which was attended by Washington D.C.'s mayor, Marion Barry. While it is true that President Clinton will not be stopping over in Nigeria, nothing

prevents Nigeria's brutal military dictator from attending the region summit in Uganda where President Clinton will deliver a speech.

At issue here is not so much the policy but the **approach**. It must send clear signals. It must be stripped of symbolism; lives are at stake in Africa. It must avoid the blunders of the past. Furthermore, it should support African initiatives or "home-grown" African solutions. After all, Africans problems must be solved by Africans. The U.S. can help but it cannot supplant the efforts Africans themselves are making.

U.S. Blunders In The Past

During the Cold War, the geopolitical and strategic importance of Africa attracted the attention of the superpowers. With its rich supply of minerals and its large potential market for foreign goods, Africa became a terrain on which the Western and Soviet blocs and other foreign powers competed for access, power, and influence, often by playing one country against another. African leaders also benefited enormously from the Cold War game. They touted their ideological importance to both sides and played one superpower against the other to extract maximum concessions and aid. The continent thus became a theater of superpower rivalry, intrigues, and blunders.

Nigeria, for example, which was regarded as a substantial prize because of its size and mineral wealth, became the object of intense superpower competition. The East met West in 1988 in the hangars of Makurdi Air Base in central Nigeria. As *The Washington Post* (23 July, 1994) reported: "Soviet military advisers hovered around two dozen MiG-21 fighter jets supplied by Moscow to Nigeria's long-serving military government. British advisers watched over 15 Jaguar fighter-bombers sold to balance the Soviet supplies. Americans ferried supplies for nine C-130 transport planes. Czechs tended approximately two dozen L-39 jet trainers they had sold. Italians carried spare parts for eight G-222 aircraft" (A1).

Seduced by the charisma and the verbiage of Third World despots, the West provided them with substantial military and economic aid. "In the past, we have had, for national security reasons, to consort with dictators," admitted former U.S. Ambassador Smith Hempstone (*The Washington Post*, 6 May, 1993, A7). But the heavy Western investment in these tyrants, who often were blatantly corrupt and brutally repressive, invariably drew the ire of the people of the Third World. The subsequent overthrow of these dictators often unleashed a wave of intense anti-American or anti-Western sentiment. Tensions rose even further when these corrupt ex-leaders almost always managed to escape to the West with their booty.

Similarly, the West often obliged and supported pro-capitalist African dictators, despite their hideously repressive and neo Communist regimes. For geopolitical, economic, and other reasons, the West propped up tyrants in Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, and Zaire, as Cold War allies to the detriment of democratic movements. To check the spread of Marxism in Africa, the United States, in particular, sought and nurtured alliances with "pro-West" regimes in Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, and Zaire and with guerrilla groups (UNITA in Angola). Substantial American investment poured into these countries and military support was covertly supplied to UNITA. At the same time, the U.S. government attempted to woo socialist/Marxist regimes in Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher confirmed that "During the long Cold War period, America's policies toward Africa were often determined not by how they affected Africa, but by what advantage they brought to Washington or Moscow" (*The Economist*, 29 May, 1993, 46).

After the Cold War, Western foreign policy objectives were overhauled. Greater emphasis was placed on promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, better governance, transparency, and accountability, among others. In May 1990, for example, the U.S. Congress and the White House reshaped the U.S. foreign aid program in light of global political changes and reordered priorities. President George Bush sought new flexibility to boost aid to emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, Panama, and Nicaragua. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Herman J. Cohen announced in May 1990 that, along with economic adjustment and the observance of human rights, democratization would soon be included as the third prerequisite for U.S. development aid. Shortly after the establishment of the policy of tying bilateral aid to political conditions such as the World Bank, the U.S. Congress called to do the same for multilateral aid.

But beyond the rhetoric, nothing much changed underneath the surface. It was "business as usual." Old friends remained old friends. The reformist winds of change that blew across Africa in the early 1990s subsided rather quickly. The West stood by and watched as wily autocrats honed their skills to beat back the democratic challenge. Africa's democratization experience in the 1990s has been marked by

vapid Western pronouncements, truculent duplicity, and scurrilous abandonment. When the going got tough, the West cut and ran.

Although virtually all Western governments made lofty statements about the virtues of democracy, they did little to aid and establish it in Africa. There have been more than 170 changes of government in Africa since 1960, but one would be hard pressed to name five countries that the West successfully democratized from 1970 to 1990. The record since 1990 has been dismal. Pro-democracy forces in Benin, Cape Verde Islands, Zambia, Malawi and other newly democratized African countries received little help from Western governments. Nor have democratic forces in Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya for that matter.

On 29 December 1992, Kenya held its first multiparty elections in 26 years. Every indication pointed to a fraudulent outcome. Opposition parties were given barely two months to campaign. In his campaign speeches Moi, who has earned a reputation for political thuggery, vowed that he would crush his opponents "like rats." On 9 December, candidates or their agents were required to hand in their papers in person. "Nearly 50 opposition activists were barred from doing so, by various means. They met illegal roadblocks, papers were snatched from their grasp, some were kidnaped. No KANU candidate met such obstructions" (*The Economist*, 26 December, 1992, 52). Opposition candidates and their supporters were harassed, voter registration rolls were manipulated, opposition rallies were restricted, and the state media was biased in favor of the ruling party. Moi handily "won" the elections, although disunity among Kenya's opposition parties played a role. Yet, U.S. response to this massive electoral outrage in Kenya was meek.

To be sure, Western governments cannot dictate the type of democracy that will be suitable for the African people themselves. But the West can indicate what it will not accept: democratic malfeasance (manipulation and control of the transition process by one side) or unlevel political playing fields (opposition parties denied access to the state media and stripped of state resources).

Democracy is not dictated or imposed. It is a *participatory exercise*. In South Africa, all the various political parties and anti-apartheid organizations gathered together in a Convention for a Democratic South Africa to create a new society for their country. But in Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Togo, and many other African countries, incumbent governments drew up the transition programs by themselves without the participation of political parties, which were banned.

If Western governments will not help the pro-democracy groups, they should at the very least be fair, neutral, and consistent. In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) received funds and materiel from Western governments. Similarly in Poland, Solidarity received substantial assistance from Western governments. So why not help the Lech Walesas and Mandelas of the rest of Africa? But rather sadly, Western aid to African pro-democracy forces or civil society has been appalling and virtually non-existent. Further, the standard applied to Kenya and Nigeria should be the same one applied to Ghana and Togo. Unfortunately, official Western approach to democratization in Africa has been marked by blatant inconsistencies and double speak.

This record makes me skeptical of the Clinton administration's efforts to promote democracy under Africa's new leaders.

Understanding Africa's Problems

The U.S. can help Africa if only it understands Africa's problems. Else, it will continue to repeat its 1993 Somalia blunder. One word, power, explains why Africa is in its current state of chaos, carnage, never-ending cycles of civil wars, violence, and collapsing economies. The struggle for power, its monopolization by one individual or group, and the subsequent refusal to relinquish or share it.

The competition for political power has always been ferocious because, in Africa, politics offers the passport to fabulous wealth. "Government," as it is understood in the West does not exist in many African countries. What exists is a "mafia state"—a government hijacked by a phalanx of gangsters, crooks and vagabonds. This cabal of criminals use the machinery of government to perpetuate themselves in power and to enrich themselves, their cronies, relatives and tribesmen. All others are excluded ("the politics of exclusion"). The richest persons in Africa are heads of state and ministers. Often, the chief bandit is the head of state himself.

Those who capture the state transform it into their own personal property, never wanting to give up power. It is this adamant refusal of African despots or the ruling elites to relinquish or share political power that lies at the root of all of Africa's civil wars. In fact, the destruction of an African country, regardless of the professed ideology of its government or foreign patron, always always begins with some dispute over the electoral process. The blockage of the democratic process or the refusal to hold elections plunged Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, and Sudan

into civil war. The manipulation of the electoral process by hardliners destroyed Rwanda (1993), and Sierra Leone (1992). The subversion of the electoral process in Liberia (1985) eventually set off a civil war in 1989 and instigated civil strife in Cameroon (1991), Congo (1992), Togo (1992) and Kenya (1992). Finally, the annulment of electoral results by the military started Algeria's civil war (1992) and plunged Nigeria into political turmoil (1993).

Government, therefore, is totally divorced from the people in many African countries. Therefore, Western governments must always make a distinction between African governments or leaders and the African people. The two are not necessarily synonymous since the leaders do not represent the people. The expression, "The U.S. is helping Africans reform their economies," is very misleading. Who is being helped: the leaders or the people? This distinction is often not made by the Clinton Administration in its moves to show concern for and grapple with the Africa's economic crisis.

The first attempt was a June 27, 1994 White House gathering "to raise the profile of Africa," "express solidarity with its people," and proclaimed a new mantra: "true partnership with African leadership." It turned out to be a public relations fluff with little substance. In attendance was a preponderance of apologists and representatives of failed African governments. Ten years earlier, a White House conference on the Soviet Union would have drawn its speakers and guests from the exiled Russian dissident community. There were no exiled African dissidents at 27 June 1994 White House Conference on Africa.

On 17 June 1997, White House called another conference on Africa for President Clinton to announce his new policy toward Africa. Again, no exiled African dissident was invited. At that gathering, President Clinton's painted overly optimistic portrait of "a dynamic new Africa making dramatic strides toward democracy and prosperity" (*The Washington Post*, 18 June 1997, A1 8). Such a portrait is more apt to breed cynicism. There have been no such "dramatic strides" but rather "baby steps."

As desirable as the ouster of Mobutu of Zaire, Mengistu of Ethiopia and Habryimana of Rwanda might be, the U.S. and the international community need to be extremely wary of enthusiastically embracing people who shoot their way to power in Africa. Such active and open support for a rebel insurgency poses a serious setback to the democratization process in Africa. It sends a dangerous signal and delivers a destabilizing jolt to a continent already reeling from wanton brutality, chaos and carnage. Other insurgencies would be encouraged. Indeed, this was precisely the case in Sierra Leone, where the band of military goons led by Captain Paul Koroma overthrew the democratically-elected government of Tejan Kabbah, who has been restored to power, and Congo (Brazzaville), where the civilian government of Pascal Lissouba was overthrown by General Sassou Nguesso; both in 1997.

More importantly, Africa's postcolonial experience with rebel leaders has been ghastly and trenchantly disconcerting, hardly inspiring confidence and hope. Most of the rebel leaders, who set out to remove tyrants from power, often turned out to be crocodile liberators, who left wanton carnage and human debris in their wake. They preached "democracy" but were themselves closet dictators, exhibiting the same tyrannical tendencies they so loudly denounce in the despots they replaced. And hitched to their movement was a cacophonous assortment of quack revolutionaries, vampire elites and intellectual hyenas. Even before they removed the despot, they squabbled among themselves over ministerial posts and government appointments.

Africa's liberation struggle has been a truculent tale of one betrayal after another. Are these "new leaders" simply new wine in an old bottle? There is a popular saying among Africans, which goes like this: "They all come and do the same thing all over again." A sense of *deja vu* pervades the African community.

The Solution

There is a simple indigenously African solution to all these crises. When a crisis erupts in an African village, the chief and the elders would summon a village meeting—similar to New England's town hall meetings. There, the issue was debated by the people until a consensus was reached. Once a decision was taken, all, including the chief, were required to abide by it.

In recent years, this indigenous African tradition was revived and reconstituted as "sovereign national conferences" and used to ordain a democratic dispensation for Benin, Cape Verde Islands, Congo, Malawi, Mali, Zambia and South Africa. Benin's 9-day "national conference" began on Feb 19, 1990, with 488 delegates, representing various political, religious, trade union, and other groups encompassing the broad spectrum of Beninois society. The conference, whose chairman was Father Isidore de Souza, held "sovereign power" with its decisions binding on all, including the gov-

ernment. It stripped President Matthieu Kerekou of power, scheduled multiparty elections and ended 17 years of autocratic Marxist rule.

South Africa used exactly the same vehicle to make that arduous but peaceful transition to a multi-racial democratic society. The Convention For A Democratic South Africa (CODESA) began deliberations in July, 1991, with 228 delegates drawn from about 25 political parties and various anti-apartheid groups. CODESA was "sovereign" and strove to reach a "working consensus" on an interim constitution. It set a date for the March 1994 elections and established the composition of a transitional government to rule until then.

By contrast, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Niger, Zimbabwe and several African countries refused to hold national conferences. The electoral process was blatantly manipulated and rigged to return despots to power.

Consider Niger, for example, where a military thug, General Ibrahim Bare Mainassara, seized power in a Jan 27 1996 coup. Under intense pressure from both the domestic and the international community, Gen. Mainassara held presidential elections on July 6, 1996, which he himself contested. Opposition parties were given less than two months to campaign. When early results showed that he was losing, Mainassara sacked and replaced the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) with his own appointees, placed his opponents under guard in their own houses and cut off their phone lines. A ban on public gatherings in Niamey was imposed on July 9 and security forces were deployed at candidates' homes and opposition party offices. The floodlit *Palais des Sports*, where the results were centralized was guarded by an armored car and heavy machine guns mounted on pickup trucks. Two radio stations were stopped from broadcasting and all of the country's international phone lines were shut down. After the Supreme Court, with bazookas pointed at its building, declared Mainassara the "winner," the opposition candidates were released.

Other African countries, such as Nigeria, Togo and Zaire, held these conferences but so devilishly manipulated them to render them utterly useless. Togo's 1992 national conference went nowhere. Nigeria's 5-year transition program, started by former dictator, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida in 1985, was s-t-r-e-t-c-h-e-d with frequent interruptions, devious maneuvers and broken promises. For 8 years, Babangida went through political contortions and dribbles (hence the name "Maradona" after Brazilian soccer star), constantly shifting the goal posts, reneging on four occasions to return the country to civilian rule and finally annulling the June 12, 1993 elections, which were the most free and fair in Nigeria's history, and throwing the winner, Chief Moshood Abiola, into jail.

Babangida's charade was immediately followed by General Sani Abacha's scam transition, replete with suffocating chicanery, manipulation and acrobatics. The June 1995 Constitutional Conference turned out to be a wicked fraud. Above all, the Constitutional Conference was not sovereign.

It must be made clear it is not the new leaders who must determine the democratic future of their respective countries. This issue, as well as when and how to hold elections, are decided at a sovereign national conference. This is the vehicle which was successfully used to democratize Benin and South Africa. Moreover, it is an indigenous African institution.

Recommendations

To conclude this testimony, Mr. Chairman, let me say that helping Africa really doesn't take much, using a better approach that understands Africa's problems. During the Cold War, the U.S. invested heavily in the anti-communist rhetoric of Africa's strongmen. Even today, there is still heavy emphasis on "leaders," as in "the new leaders of Africa." This should be de-emphasized and the focus placed on institutions.

You cannot establish democracy in Africa without having in place the supporting institutions. In fact, the real causes of the Africa's economic decline and chronic instability are the absence of a few key institutions: an independent central bank, an independent judiciary, an independent media, a professional and neutral security forces (military and police), and a sovereign national conference—the mechanism for peaceful resolution of conflicts and transfer of political power. The absence of these critical institutions has banished the rule of law, respect for property rights, security of persons and property, social, political, and economic stability from much of Africa. As a result, corruption is rampant, commercial and personal property is arbitrarily seized by drunken soldiers, dissidents frequently "disappear" and senseless civil wars rage for years on end. Throw in crumbling infrastructure and that creates an environment that deters even African investors, so why would Americans want to invest in such a place? This environment cannot be cleaned up by the United States but by Africans themselves.

We may preach all we want about “accountability,” “transparency,” “combating corruption,” and so on. But all these would not mean a thing until we have in place an independent judiciary to enforce rule of law and an independent media to expose criminal wrongdoing. Quite often, Western governments and donor agencies talk through their hats. They pontificate *ad nauseam* about “middle class,” “civil society,” and “democracy”—as if these emerge out of thin air. They place the emphasis on the outcome, with little or no focus on the institutions and processes that are necessary to achieve those desirable outcomes. They have watched silently as brutalities were heaped on civil society—the wellspring of reform and change and have done next to nothing to assist or fund the activities of indigenous African non-governmental organizations or helped nurture civil society.

All experts agree that civil society would put the brakes on tyrannical excesses of African regimes. But for civil society to perform its watchdog role, as well as to instigate change, two key institutions are critical: freedom of expression and freedom of association. But since independence there has been a systematic strangulation of freedom of expression in Africa. The state monopolized the information media and turned it into propaganda organ for the party elite. Anyone not in the government's party was necessarily a dissident, and any newspaper editor or journalist who published the slightest criticism of an insignificant government policy was branded a “contra” and jailed or killed, including journalists who for years had praised government measures. Even newspapers that have lavished praises on the government were closed for carrying an occasional critique.

After the collapse of communism in 1989, a brief gust “of change” swept across Africa. In a number of countries, long-standing autocrats were toppled. Free and independent newspapers sprouted and flourished but, by 1995, had begun to suffer a series of setbacks. According to New York-based Freedom House, of Africa's 54 countries, only seven have a free press. Of the 20 countries throughout the world where the press is most shackled, nine are in Africa: Algeria, Burundi, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire. Countries in the “not-free” category include Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, and Tunisia (*The African Observer* 6–19 June 1996, 25).

Kakuna Kerina, program coordinator for sub-Saharan Africa for the Committee to Protect Journalists, a New York-based group, sent a letter in 1996 to the OAU reminding it that injudicious detention, censorship, and intimidation of journalists work against the public's right to information and the right to hold and express opinions and ideas. Both rights are guaranteed under Article 19 of the U.N. Charter and Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, to which most African countries are signatories. Kerina pointed to Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Zambia, Angola, Kenya, Liberia, and Cameroon as nations where the press is severely restricted.

Most bewildering, said Kerina, is the fact that press and general freedoms are most restricted in those African countries that multiparty democracies. The strangulation of the press in the post cold War period has been most evident in West Africa, where “at least 12 journalists have been detained in Ivory Coast, The Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Nigeria in the past month. Since 1994, West African governments have seized dozens of magazines and newspapers, deported journalists, and closed independent radio stations in Cameroon, Togo, The Gambia, Mali and Gabon” (*The Washington Times*, 6 April 1995, A15).

Due to the explosion in the number of satellite dishes, electronic communications (fax machines, the internet, e-mail, etc.), much more information is now available in Africa. The new technology has severely hindered the ability of African dictators to control the flow of information and keep their people in the dark. In their desperate attempts to retain control, defamation or libel suits and murder have become the choice tactics of corrupt regimes. “At least 30 libel suits have been filed against the independent press by leading members of the government in what is seen largely as an attempt to stifle freedom of expression,” said Kwesi Pratt, Jr. president of the Private Newspaper Publishers Association of Ghana (Free Press, 20 December–2 January 1997).

In Angola, BBC reporter Gustavo Costa was slapped with a defamation suit in June 1994 by oil minister Albna Affis after filing stories about government corruption. On 18 January 1995 Ricardo de Melo, the editor of the Luanda-based *Impartial Fax*, was killed for writing stories about official corruption.

In Cameroon, Emmanuel Noubissie Ngankam, director of the independent Dikalo was given a one-year suspended sentence, fined CFA 5 million (\$8,800), and ordered to pay CFA 15 million in damages after publishing an article alleging that the former minister of public works and transportation had expropriated property in the capital Yaounde. Also in Cameroon, staff at two other newspapers, *La Nouvelle Ex-*

pression and *Galaxie*, were sued for defamation by Augustin Frederick Kodock, state planning and regional development minister, over newspaper articles alleging that the minister's private secretary had embezzled large sums of money. Then "the Cameroonian newspaper which reported President Biya's marriage to a 24-year-old has been suspended by the government. When Perspectives-Hebdo ran the story on March 17, 1994, police quickly seized all available copies. Joseph-Marie Besseri, the publisher, said the official reason for the ban was failure to show the edition to censors before distribution, as the law requires. He denies the charge" (*African News Weekly*, 8 April 1994, 5).

Similarly in Sudan, journalists must register with a state-appointed press council or risk jail terms and fines. According to *The African Observer* (8–21 August 1995), "So far, more than 596 journalists have done so. However, 37 were rejected on the grounds that they were inexperienced. Some of the rejects are graduates of journalism schools, others hold masters degrees in social studies. Those rejected were given a second chance. They were made to sit an examination in mid-July, but only 19 of the 37 passed the exam, which tested their knowledge of the achievements of el Bashir's government." (21)

In a dramatic testimony before the House Africa and International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee in January 1996, Larry Diamond, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in California, made this observation:

Historically, Nigeria has had the most vibrant and pluralistic civil society in Africa (with the possible exception of South Africa.) One of the most tragic consequences of military rule has been the decimation of and degradation of this sector as well. Interest groups, such as the labor movement, the professional associations, and women's organizations have been infiltrated, corrupted, and subverted by the authoritarian state. Those that would not bend have been relentlessly hounded and repressed. The most independent publications have suffered prolonged closures and more subtle forms of state pressure, such as cutting off access to newsprint at affordable cost. Human rights groups have suffered constant surveillance, harassment, intimidation, and repeated arrest. Several leading human rights figures are now in jail. The decimation of civil society not only handicaps the campaign for a transition to democracy, it also weakens the infrastructure that could help to develop and sustain that democracy after transition (Congressional Records, January 1996).

There has been no letup in the brutal clamp down of "dissident" activity. Beginning in 1994, Nigeria's military government closed three publishing houses—effectively shutting nearly 20 publications—for 14 months. Security agents also have arrested more than 40 journalists, detaining some for several days (*The Washington Post*, 7 April 1996, A18). The repression forced Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka to flee his own native Nigeria after instances such as the following:

Armed security forces descended on a book launching at Nkpulu Oraoorukwo Town Hall, firing tear gas at citizens and causing pandemonium. The object of their ire was the book, entitled *My Ordeal—A Prison Memoir of a Student Activist*, written by Christian Akani, Campaign for Democracy chairman in River State. It expresses the hardships of Nigeria and the treatment meted out to those who express displeasure with the country's policies. The security operatives who came to the launching claimed that the organizers did not obtain security clearance for such activities (*African News Weekly*, 18 November 1994, 4).

The officers fired tear gas into the crowd, which hastily dispersed, then seized copies of the book and arrested the author who was taken to an undisclosed location. Imagine. So when Shi'ite Muslims in Zaria (Nigeria) went on a demonstration in October 1996, "they carried coffins in case security agents opened fire on them during the procession."

The barbaric crackdown on political dissent and journalists has had an unintended effect of boosting urban crime. With the police going after political activists, Nigerian armed robbers have been having a field day, raiding one house after another with impunity. "No day passes without a robbery here or there. It is so common now as the police have focused their attention on just quelling political demonstrations to the detriment of curbing crime," said Lanre Olorunsogo, a tenant in Onike, a Lagos suburb (*African Observer*, 23 August–5 September 1994, 4). How can civil society emerge under these circumstances?

The other right vital for the sustenance of civil society—freedom of association—has progressively been squelched in postcolonial Africa. In many countries, gatherings of more than persons required official sanction or they can be broken up by thugs or gun-toting zombies. In Cameroon, police disrupted a meeting of the opposi-

tion Union for Change on 19 August 1993, and arrested and detained the party's administrative secretary, Francois Evembe, over an article published on 9 August 1993 entitled "The problem is the Man that Resides at Etouidi [government house]" (*Index on Censorship*, October 1993, 42).

In Nigeria, clearance must be obtained from a paranoid military government to hold even a seminar or conference, because such a gathering might pose a threat to state security. Consider these events as reported by *Index on Censorship* (March, 1993, 38):

On November 27, 1992, more than 250 police and state security forces disrupted a vigil for democracy in Lagos organized by the Civil Liberties Organization. Police subsequently visited vigil organizers Peter Eriose and Imogeo Ewhuba and threatened them with arrest if they continued their pro-democracy activities. Eriose went into hiding.

On December 1, 1992, 500 security agents prevented members of the Campaign for Democracy (CD) from holding a meeting at the Nigeria Union of Journalists in Lagos. The same day, several people on a pro-democracy march in Kano State were arrested, including Dr. Wada Abubakar, former deputy governor of Kano State, Onuana Ammani, former president of the Social Democratic Party, and Wada Waziri, a former union leader.

On December 2, 1992, police and security agents took over the senate chambers at the former National Assembly Complex where the Civil Liberties Organization was planning a seminar on "Women and Taxation in Nigeria." The seminar was rescheduled for 15 December, but previously granted permission was withdrawn the evening before and police refused participants entry to the premises.

On March 19, 1996, Government agents blocked the U.S. Ambassador, Walter Carrington, from a conference organized by the American Studies Association of Nigeria in the northern city of Kaduna. The organization often sponsors forums on a wide range of topics. Security agents turned Carrington and several embassy staffers away from the conference and then broke up the gathering (*The Washington Post* 20 March 1997, A14). In September 1997, pro-democracy and human rights groups held a reception in honor of U.S. Ambassador, Walter Carrington, who was leaving Nigeria. "Security agents broke down the gate at the house where the reception was being held. After entering the residence, they drew their guns and broke up the gathering" (*The Washington Post*, 3 October 1997, A9).

On 7 July 1997 Kenyan opposition politicians and human rights activists organized protests to push the government of Daniel arap Moi, in power for 19 years, to reform electoral and other laws that are viewed as oppressive. The government's response was swift and ferocious. Riot police and elite paramilitary General Service Unit officers charged into the protest rallies, firing tear gas and live rounds. Eleven people were killed and dozens were injured.

Riot police even charged into Nairobi's All Saints Cathedral where about 100 people were praying. They lobbed a tear gas canister that landed near the altar and beat bloody numerous parishioners. "We were in the middle of the service when they broke in, fired tear gas into the house of God. This is Kenyan justice for you. Even in God's house they beat innocent protesters," said Rev. Peter Njoka (*The Washington Times*, 8 July 1997, A11). "These are the actions of fellows who are really primitive," said Mike Kibaki of the Democratic Party, whom police clubbed on the shoulders while he was in the cathedral (*The Washington Post* 8 July 1997, A8).

Moi and ruling party leaders claim that the opposition parties seek to foment violence and are too disorganized and divided to rule the country effectively. "How can we tell the people what we are offering if we cannot meet," asked Kimani Kangethe, a political activist who helped organize the Nairobi protests. "Moi does not want to reason," Kangethe said (*The Washington Post*, 8 July 1997, A8).

On 11 May 1995 over 80,000 Ghanaians, exercising their constitutional right, marched through the principal streets of Accra, the capital, to protest the high cost of living. Article 21, Section 1(e), of Ghana's 1992 constitution states: "All persons shall have the right to freedom of assembly including freedom to take part in processions and demonstrations." "We are protesting because we are hungry," said Kojo Dan, an accountant. "We are not against the Government. We are civil servants." But the government unleashed its paramilitary organ—the Association for the Defense of the Revolution, ACDR—whose members fired on the peaceful demonstrators, killing four and seriously injuring about 20. (*The Ghanaian Chronicle*, 17 May 1995, 3).

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, instead of persuading, cajoling, bribing or jaw-boning African autocrats to reform their abominable political systems, the focus should be shifted from "leaders" to "institutions." It is not the professed "commitment" of the

new leaders that should draw U.S. financial assistance. Rather, it is the convocation of a sovereign national conference, the establishment of an independent central bank, an independent judiciary, an independent media, a professional and neutral security forces (military and police) that should be the basis of U.S. relationship with the "new leaders"—and indeed all—the leaders of Africa. Because it is these very institutions the African people need to come up with their own solutions to their problems.

Mr. Chairman, I can assure you that the establishment of these few institutions would ensure that a great majority of Africa's incessant problems would be resolved and the continent placed on a fast-growth track. Guaranteed.

Thank you.

Senator ASHCROFT. Thank you very much. I very much appreciate your remarks.

I think we will withhold questions until we have had the opportunity to hear Dr. Baker. Then I believe I will call on the Senator from Wisconsin to make his remarks and ask any questions he may want of the panel while he still has the opportunity to be with the subcommittee.

So, Dr. Baker, if you can, please summarize. As you know, I am not going to be very strict about the time limit, but I would appreciate your observation of the sensitivities of the subcommittee.

STATEMENT OF DR. PAULINE BAKER, PRESIDENT, THE FUND FOR PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC.

Dr. BAKER. I will certainly try to observe your suggestion.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Feingold, I want to thank you both for giving me this opportunity to testify today.

Can you hear me all right?

Senator ASHCROFT. We can hear you better.

How is the audience doing in the back? Can you hear her?

Dr. BAKER. All right. I will pull the microphone closer. Thank you.

It is a particular honor for me to testify here today because, as you may know, I used to be a professional staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and was Staff Director of the Africa Subcommittee. So I really do appreciate the role you play and I applaud you for this hearing.

I have a longer statement. I am going to be brief and go through it fairly quickly. I will just touch on the highlights. So I would appreciate it if the full statement could be placed in the record.

Senator ASHCROFT. Without objection, any statements by any of the witnesses that they choose to submit will be included in the record.

Thank you.

Dr. BAKER. Thank you.

When I was here at the committee—and I won't tell you how many years ago that was—we were asking the same sorts of questions that you are raising today of the first generation of post independence leaders in Africa. Who are these leaders? What are their priorities? How effective will they be in really promoting genuine political and economic development?

While it was not clear at the outset, I think it is fair to say that there is general agreement today that that first generation failed. Some were well motivated, but few really fulfilled the promise of African independence.

I will not go through the litany of woes in the past, but I think it is a good starting point; because it does present some indications of whether or not, as I think Professor Ayittey very eloquently said, we should put so much stock in leaders as opposed to institutions and processes.

In the 1990's, however, there are some encouraging signs of change. In fact, some people have even been talking about an African renaissance, a term which captures this idea of a second independence or a rebirth.

I think Nelson Mandela and the remarkable transition in South Africa embodies that hope. But also there has been a lot of progress in Southern Africa as a whole, and I think to that extent the term may apply.

There are other encouraging signs as well. The butchers of Africa, such as Idi Amin and Mengistu, have left the scene. There has been some progress in democratization, multi-party elections, market oriented economic changes, *et cetera*.

These positive images of Africa, though, in my view have been somewhat overblown. Particularly, I think this concept of the new generation of leaders is indicative of that.

The term refers, as I think it was indicated earlier, to a small network of East and Central African leaders whose support of democratization is weak or nonexistent. Nor are they as often portrayed as inclusive of all elements of their society as many have suggested.

This portrait of this new leadership was summed up in an article in "Foreign Affairs" recently by Dan Connell and Frank Smyth. They portrayed them as a young vanguard of determined nationalists.

Nationalists they may be. But they are more representative in my view of the overall fluidity and instability of African politics than democratization, which is by no means a stable or enduring process in Africa yet.

For example, we frequently point to the fact that there have been several elections in Africa, and that is true. But the quality of elections has eroded. Political transitions often mock democracy; and I think Senator Feingold suggested this in his comments about Nigeria, the continent's most populous country, where the political transition has really been a sham.

In some cases, the elections have been successful; but there has been backsliding on democratization, such as in Zambia, or total breakdowns, if not backsliding, as in Sierra Leone.

So we have to look very closely at this thesis of a new generation of leaders. Are they saviors of Africa or are they simply a new group of strong men who will be a new authoritarian group?

My principal concern in this sort of uncritical embrace of them is that we are, in fact, embracing a new generation of strong men in the name of postcold war stability and economic reform, just as we have pumped up the old generation in the name of cold war stability and anti communism.

If so, we could be nurturing the kind of crony capitalism in Africa that is undermining Asia and encouraging a replay of the pattern of personal rule that has dogged the continent for decades.

Now I do want to stress here that I do think the administration deserves praise for raising the salience of Africa. I do think that they are trying to recast the relationship of the United States with Africa. In that sense, they have to listen to leaders of Africa.

Admitting our failure to not respond to the genocide in Rwanda is another good step. The African Trade and Opportunity legislation is a good step. The visits to Africa from Hillary Clinton to the Secretary of State to the President are very, very good and are long overdue.

We also have to recognize that, I think, as Assistant Secretary of State Susan Rice said, things are not easy. Recovering from genocide is not easy.

Nonetheless, my concern is that we are tolerating human rights abuses and calling nondemocratic leaders democratic simply because they apply favorable economic policies. If so, we are inviting another round of disillusionment, as we had with the first generation of African leaders.

These African leaders, as I said before, came to power through force of arms. They are not inclusive. They are ethnically allied or related, and they represent a very close network of allies.

They are united not so much by common values but by common enemies, and I think they are going to continue to do that.

There are two problems with this new axis of power in Africa. First, they tend to establish a standard of behavior that defies international norms of human rights. We know that Congo and Rwanda still stand accused of many human rights violations and, unless these are addressed, even though we are addressing other issues, it is going to continue to fuel the cauldrons of ethnic conflict and we are not going to break the cycle of impunity.

Second—and this is a new development—the leaders openly defy the international norm of noninterference in the internal affairs of other States.

Now there has been, of course, a long history of interference in the internal affairs of other States, with many States supporting rebels across borders. Of course, the world breathed a sign of relief when people like Mobutu left the scene, even if it required external intervention.

But what we are seeing now is that armies are openly crossing borders to topple regimes. The question here is what are the limits to this military intervention. What country will be next on the list?

Is this the sort of international behavior that we really want to encourage in Africa?

It is not just these five leaders that we have been talking about. Angola, as was mentioned, was very pivotal to the change in Zaire. Nigeria is leading the ECOWAS peacekeeping operation in Liberia and Sierra Leone but has also operated elsewhere in the region in ways that defy international standards.

So what is the U.S. to do if these are the threats to Africa? I will be very brief and run through them very quickly.

First, I think we have to consistently reiterate our commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights and deal promptly and directly with the difficult problem areas. This includes not just Central Africa but the hard cases like Nigeria as well.

Second, the U.S. should act before the worst happens. We talk a lot about preventive diplomacy. We say we are sorry that we did not act earlier in Rwanda. But if there is genocidal violence in Rwanda or Burundi again, I don't think we are any better prepared for that eventuality now than we had been in the past.

Third, we must begin to address the institutional needs of State building in Africa along with democratization. This means more than pressing for elections. It means aiding in the rebuilding of the essential institutions, including a professional system of justice, the police, a civil service, and even a professionalized army.

Fourth, we should not fall into old habits of raising false hopes. We tend to over promise and under deliver in Africa. We preach democracy and human rights and then not follow through or, worse, gloss over the deficiencies when they are apparent. We regret that we have not acted sooner but then do nothing concrete to prevent another genocide in Central Africa.

Maybe the President's trip in Africa will be a step forward, particularly with the summit, in order to rectify some of these deficiencies.

In conclusion, let me just say that I think the President's trip to Africa really is a good opportunity to address some of these problems. I hope that he tells it like it is in Africa and that he addresses these deeper issues.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Baker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PAULINE H. BAKER¹

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the prospects for democracy in Africa and the role the so-called "new generation of leaders." It is a special honor to be here because I was a professional staff member for this committee some years ago. At that time, we were asking the same kind of questions of the first post-independence generation: Who are the leaders of Africa? What are their priorities? How effective will they be in promoting genuine political and economic development?

While it was not clear at the outset, there is general agreement today that the post independent leaders were a disappointment. Some were well motivated, but few fulfilled the promise of African independence. There has been some progress, for instance in education, and much political experimentation in the nearly four decades of independence. However, Africa has stagnated economically and its state institutions have decayed. Vast amounts of government revenue were squandered in white elephant projects or ended up in leaders' private overseas bank accounts.

Some countries lapsed into military rule, others into single-party or one-man dictatorships. Consequently, the majority of the African population is worse off today than they were at independence.

In the 1990s, however, there are encouraging signs of change. Some have even argued that the continent is on the threshold of an "African renaissance," a term which captures the idea of a "rebirth" or "a second independence." The remarkable transition in South Africa and the inspiring model of Nelson Mandela embodies this hope. So does the progress made in ending conflicts in southern Africa. If the peace accord in Angola holds, southern Africa will be without war for the first time in its post-colonial history.

There are other encouraging trends as well. The butchers of Africa, such as Uganda's Idi Amin or Ethiopia's Mengistu, have left the scene. Some African countries have registered impressive economic growth rates. Several nations have moved in the direction of democratization, holding sovereign national conferences, an innovative mode of political transition, which resulted in changes in parts of Francophone Africa. Since 1990, multiparty elections have been conducted in more than thirty countries. In addition, the ideological battles are over. Market-oriented reforms have

¹The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of The Fund for Peace or its projects.

been adopted in most countries and hundreds of state-owned corporations have been privatized.

However, these positive images of Africa are not always what they seem. The portrayal of a "new generation of leaders" represents, in my view, one of the distortions. Oddly, the term does not refer to Nelson Mandela or other popularly elected leaders, nor to the impressive way that civil society has pressed for democracy. Rather the term refers to a small network of east and central African leaders whose support of democratization is weak or non-existent. Yet, they are seen by many, including the Clinton Administration, as representing a set of rulers who are introducing a degree of accountability and egalitarianism that will end the African legacy of chaos and despotism.

As summarized in a recent article by Dan Connell and Frank Smyth,² these leaders are a young vanguard of determined nationalists. They include Eritrea's Isaias Afwerki, Ethiopia's Meles Zenawi, Rwanda's Paul Kagame, and Uganda's Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. Lately, Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) has been added to the group.

Nationalists they may be. However, they are more representative of the overall fluidity and instability of African politics than democratization, which is by no means a stable and enduring process in Africa. This can be seen in several trends. For example, while the frequency of elections has increased, the quality of elections has eroded. Political transitions often mock democracy, following the form but not the substance of change. Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, annulled elections in 1993 and the military regime has jailed or driven into exile political opponents, journalists, and human rights advocates. Its political transition, which promises a return to civilian rule in October 1998, is a sham. Even where political transitions have been successful, there has been backsliding, such as in Zambia, or breakdowns, such as in Sierra Leone.

Generalizations can be deceptive and one must look closely at what is actually occurring on the ground. This is especially true of the "new generation" thesis. On the surface, these leaders appear as the new saviors of Africa, poised to lead the continent out of authoritarianism and chaos. On deeper examination, they act like the kind of authoritarians they are purported to oppose, except that they are more concerned with economic development and preach self-discipline.

My concern is that we are embracing a new generation of strong men in the name of post-Cold War stability and economic reform just as we propped up the old generation in the name of Cold War stability and anti-communism. If so, we could be nurturing the kind of crony capitalism in Africa that is undermining Asia and encouraging a replay of the pattern of personal rule that has dogged the continent for decades.

The Administration deserves praise for raising the salience of Africa. In many ways, they are breaking new ground by trying to redefine the US relationship with the continent. Admitting our failure to respond to the genocide in Rwanda is a good starting point. The African Trade and Opportunity legislation is a further small step in that direction. Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and President Clinton are bringing more attention to the continent by traveling there. This is long overdue. However, while some parts of Africa may be on the mend, and the Administration is right to support it, the continent as a whole is not yet ripe for renaissance.

Naturally, we must understand that many of the new leaders are rebuilding shattered societies. It is not easy to recover from genocide, reverse decades of dictatorship, and patch together collapsed states. In calling for democratization, I am not calling for instant democracy. Building institutions takes time. Security issues often come first. There are few trained personnel to work with and scarce resources to reconstruct economies. Nonetheless, tolerating human rights abuses and calling non-democratic leaders democratic simply because they apply favorable economic policies merely invites another round of disillusionment.

Who are these new leaders? These four or five leaders (out of a continent of 48 states) have ambitions to remake the continent in their image. They came to power, and largely are staying in power, through force of arms. They run de facto single party or no party states that tolerate little opposition. They are ethically related or allied. Both Ethiopia's Meles and Eritrea's Isaias are Tigrean. Uganda's Museveni, the oldest of the group who came to power in 1986, is a member of a minority ethnic group but he came to power with the assistance of Rwandan Tutsis who had fled Hutu domination. With Museveni's aid, these same Tutsis drove out extremist Hutus in Rwanda who perpetrated the 1994 genocide. In turn, they backed the in-

²Dan Connell and Frank Smyth, "Africa's New Bloc," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1998, 80-94.

stallation of Laurent Kabila in the Congo. Thus, these new leaders represent a close-knit network of military allies dominated largely by the Tigreans and the Tutsis.

These men came to power by joining forces to eliminate their opponents. Often, this was done with understandable justification—to overthrow Mengistu in Ethiopia, to remove Mobutu in Zaire, and to stop genocide in Rwanda. But we should recognize that common enemies, not common values, unite them. While they do not always agree, they have a common strategic vision of the continent and their assertive role in it. After Zaire, their next target seems to be Sudan, which supports rebel groups in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. Thus, there is a convergence of interests between the US and the alliance formed around Khartoum.

However, there are many problems with this new axis of power. First, the alliance has established a standard of behavior that defies international norms of human rights. Accusations of severe human rights abuses plague Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular, both of which have been resistant to international inspection and monitors. This merely fuels the cauldrons of ethnic animosity and suspicion as the cycle of impunity continues. Second, these leaders openly defy the international norm of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. True, the world heaved a sign of relief when Mengistu and Mobutu were driven from power, and neighboring states in Africa have supported rebel activities for decades. What is disturbing is that armies are openly crossing borders to topple regimes. What are the limits to this military intervention? What country will be next on the list? Is this the sort of international behavior that we want to encourage?

Looking broadly at Africa, we may already be seeing the consequences of this trend. It is not a new era of accountability and egalitarianism that is emerging but an era of home grown hegemonic power. Angola, for example, was a pivotal actor in the overthrow of Mobutu and now, after years of war with UNITA, has one of the most battle-hardened armies in Africa. Nigeria, despite its own internal political crisis, has led the West African organization of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) to end the civil conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Neither Angola nor Nigeria is a stable democracy. Neither is checked by continental or extra-continental powers. Thus, we may be witnessing a second scramble for Africa, this time by Africans themselves.

If so, what should the US do? First, the US must reiterate its commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights, and deal promptly and directly with the difficult problem areas. That means meeting with opposition leaders; encouraging more pluralism and open debate; pressing for more political inclusion; developing civil society; supporting a free press; and refusing to support fraudulent elections and phony political transitions. If we promote democracy within states, we will be promoting peace among states. Second, the US should act before the worse happens. We waited in Rwanda in 1994 and are now saying we are sorry we did not act sooner, when we could have supported a UN intervention to stop the genocide. In similar fashion, we are waiting as the crisis grows in Nigeria. We may likewise regret that delay down the road. We talk a lot about preventive diplomacy, but do little to act on it.

Third, we must begin to address the institutional needs of state building along with democratization. This means more than pressing for elections. It means aiding in the rebuilding of essential state institutions, including a professional system of justice, police, and civil service. Where appropriate, it could even mean helping to professionalize African armies so that they are disciplined and restricted in their missions to defending their own borders and doing civic action projects, such as building roads, bridges, and schools. We could assist Rwanda in rebuilding its courts, jails, and corrections service, provided it agrees to provide access to human rights organizations. Similar reciprocal relationships could be developed with the leaders of the Congo, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, all of whom say that they are committed to instilling accountability. Let us build upon that sentiment and test it.

Fourth, let us not fall into old habits of raising false hopes. We tend to over promise and under deliver in Africa. We preach democracy and human rights and then not follow through or, worse, gloss over the deficiencies when they are apparent. We regret that we had not acted sooner to prevent genocide but do nothing to prevent it from happening again. If Rwanda or Burundi descends into genocidal violence again, is the US any better prepared to stop it?

Finally, the president's trip to Africa this month represents a genuine opportunity to place the US-African relationship on a new footing, based on a non-patronizing attitude. To accomplish this, however, the President must fulfill the promise of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to "tell it like it is." I sincerely hope that he does.

Senator ASHCROFT. Thank you, Dr. Baker.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate hearing two of the witnesses. I regret that I can only make a statement at this point and cannot hear from the other two. I confess on the record that I am not always genuinely disappointed when I have to leave a hearing. But never is that true of the chairman, who is the chairman of two of my subcommittees.

This is a very special hearing to me, and I really appreciate the opportunity to say a few words about it.

This is an important time in U.S. policy toward Africa. We are in between the visit of the Secretary of State and the visit of the President. These visits, as both of you have said so far, signal what I believe is a serious commitment to the African continent.

In addition, I would also like to note for the record that our hearing today comes just less than 24 hours after the House of Representatives has debated and passed the historic Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. This is another positive sign of Africa getting the attention it really, really needs to get.

This legislation represents an important effort by our colleagues in the House to introduce a new paradigm in their approach of the U.S. Congress to Africa and I commend them for their efforts. I have not reviewed all of the legislation. I do have some concerns about it. But the fact is, at least on the floor of the House, there was a bill with regard to this part of the world and that happens all too infrequently.

In the context of these events, this hearing takes on more significance. The topic of democracy in Africa allows us to review the progress of democracy across the continent since the end of the World War and it allows us to take a look at what has happened with respect to U.S. policy during that time.

The subtopic, which you both talked about, the new generation of African leaders, puts sort of an added twist to the subject. Many people have been using this term. You have both gone over it with regard to the new leaders, some of the new leaders in Africa. They are, by some, held up as model leaders who have overcome great odds to achieve relative success in their countries.

But in my view, and I think it is fair to say in the view of the first two witnesses, these leaders have exhibited only moderate commitments to democratization and human rights. In particular, there has been little institutionalization of structures that would foster an environment in which democracy and human rights can flourish. I think this threatens the sustainability of any of the positive moves that may have been achieved.

Because, Mr. Chairman, I am not convinced that the three, four, or five leaders that are generally referred to as the "new generation of African leaders" truly represent the best that Africa has to offer in terms of democracy, I think we should heed the advice of Dr. Ayittey who gave a good focus from the historical point of view of the danger of looking at Africa and its future with regard to these individuals rather than institutions. I think that is a terribly important remark so that we do not fall into that trap again.

True, they have made important contributions to the continent. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I think one of the most interesting con-

versations I have had in the 5½ years as a member of this committee is just talking with President Museveni about his concepts of political parties, how it is different than the Western view, how we cannot assume simply because we have a particular kind of party system that this is the right system for any African country.

So there are interesting concepts there. It is true that the countries have undergone impressive economic growth. It is true that they have managed to establish a level of security for their citizens that is essential in the region. These are significant. But I do not think that U.S. foreign policy in Africa should emphasize these accomplishments without also recognizing the important accomplishments made elsewhere.

So, for me, the question is how do we sort of decide whether or not this kind of approach is working. I think that the emphasis on institutions and independent judiciary and the like is a more instructive one.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I just want to return for a second to the issue of Nigeria, the continent's largest country. This is really going to be a test of whether this is really a new era of democratization or whether we are going to continue to go backward in one of the absolutely key countries.

Again, I am glad Assistant Secretary Rice was here. I am glad to hear that progress is being made on formulating this Nigeria policy. It has been a long time in coming and I really would hope it could be in as reasonable and final form as possible before the President leaves on his trip so that when he is asked questions, which he will be asked, about Nigeria, he is able to speak to the problems that exist with regard to democratization in Nigeria.

I thank the chair again very much for letting me interrupt this panel.

Senator ASHCROFT. I am grateful to the Senator from Wisconsin for his interest. I join him in his commendation of the administration and the Congress for expressing a focus on Africa, which I think is important and perhaps overdue.

So thank you very much for helping.

I now would call on Mr. Salih Booker, who is a Senior Fellow for Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations here in Washington, DC.

Mr. Booker, I want to thank you for coming to the subcommittee. We have about 38 minutes left. Certainly do not take over half of it.

If you can limit yourself, it will give us time to have a discussion. Mr. Booker.

STATEMENT OF SALIH BOOKER, SENIOR FELLOW FOR AFRICA STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BOOKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for extending an invitation for me to testify before the subcommittee today.

I would like to note at the onset that the Council on Foreign Relations does not take an institutional stand on any foreign affairs issue, and I am solely responsible for this statement.

Mr. Chairman, you are, no doubt, familiar with the trend within the current discourse on Africa which argues that there is a nas-

cent renaissance occurring on the continent. My colleagues here today have commented on this as well.

This outlook points to very real changes that have occurred across the enormous length and breadth of the continent since the dawn of this decade in the areas of conflict resolution, economic growth and reform, political change and, indeed, democratization.

These accomplishments are impressive: The end of conflicts throughout Southern Africa, Ethiopia, and more recently in Liberia, to name a few; the achievement of aggregate growth rates of roughly five percent for three years running, and mostly multiparty Presidential elections in over two-thirds of the Nations in Africa, many of whom have now conducted such contests twice during this new era, as well as a large number of other national elections for parliaments, local and regional legislators, mayors, *et cetera*.

So in America, long-time supporters of Africa proclaim that the glass is now half full, while the continent's committed detractors seize upon the tragedies afflicting a handful of traumatized States and declare that the glass is half empty.

Mr. Chairman, I accept that they are both looking at the same glass. When I see a renaissance in Africa, I recognize that it is fragile. Where I see chaos still in Africa, I recognize that there is hope for rebirth.

Africa's tenuous renewal is largely self generated; and to succeed, however, the 53 sovereign countries of this continent of nearly 800 million people will require supportive policies from the international community, especially the industrialized countries, and particularly the United States.

Today's hearing on the eve of President Clinton's historic first visit to Africa seeks to assess the prospects for democracy in Africa, specifically focusing on the so-called "new generation of leaders" in five Eastern and Central African States.

I will try to be brief and to the point. But I do want to point out that we are focusing on essentially 5 leaders and 5 countries out of a total of 53 and out of an enormous continent; and that they are, perhaps, reflective of the important changes in their particular subregions, but that there are momentous changes occurring throughout the rest of the continent.

Much has been written and said about this so-called new generation of leaders in the countries we are focusing on today, the five that have been named and mentioned already (Isaias, Meles, Museveni, Kagame, and Kabila).

The treatment of this theme is often superficial; because the history of each country, the experience of each individual leader, and the movements that produced them are unique. But with the exception of Laurent Kabila, they do, however, share several important characteristics which I will, at the risk of a similar superficial generalization, list as follows.

Each has come to power following a long period of armed struggle carried out by disciplined and organized political movement that forged generally collective decision making practices. They have been criticized here today for coming to power through armed struggle, through the gun, so to speak. But we have to bear in mind that, indeed, they had no choice in these particular cases; and in each case they overthrew corrupt, dictatorial regimes.

The four of them are each considered hard working, serious, and dedicated to ensuring that their governments resist the corruption that became the cancer of post colonial African States. They are also younger and generally more educated than the previous generation. They strive to promote increasingly self reliant development strategies. They remain capable military strategists and have demonstrated a will and capacity to act collectively to further national security interests, as evidenced by their roles in the overthrow of the genocidal Rwandan Government and the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko in the former Zaire.

They are allied in their opposition to the military junta and National Islamic Front government in Sudan and in their support for the Sudanese People's Liberation Army and the National Democratic Alliance of Sudan, of which the SPLA is a partner.

Internally, they are each promoting development strategies that acknowledge the importance of developing an indigenous private sector, attracting foreign investment, and increasing their trading relations with their regional neighbors and the global community more broadly.

This is often referred to as their "shift from Marx to markets."

They are committed to a vision of increasing regional cooperation and economic integration in their immediate region and, ultimately, they have a pan-African vision for the entire continent.

They are experimenting with different forms of governance which are not only aimed at maintaining themselves in power but also at providing avenues for political and economic development within stable national political systems, unthreatened by sectarian, ethnic, or communal violence.

I would argue that they recognize the dangers of economic, social, and political exclusion to their own rule and to their own dream of transformation.

I mentioned that I would not list Laurent Kabila in this category of the new leaders, this group of five. I think Laurent Kabila is more of a "Rip Van Winkle" figure, who was recently awakened and carried to the capital in Kinshasa from which he now rules. To some degree, he is still looking around for Tito, Mao, and others in trying to come to grips with the modern era.

I think also in his particular case there is an opportunity for the United States to work hard to ensure that the transition that is supposed to be taking place in Congo is successful. I think if that happens, indeed we may find that Laurent Kabila is a transitional figure.

Mr. Chairman, I and other analysts have often referred to the other new leaders, new generation leaders, as "soldier princes." This is to denote their military backgrounds but also their noble intentions and, perhaps more subtly, to suggest their imperial tendency in the style of their governments and their regional visions.

The question posed today is: "Are they just another form of strong man?" "Are they simply a more enlightened or more pro-capitalist version of the African big-men rulers of yesterday?"

I think Dr. Baker and others have pointed out some of the arguments suggesting that they are simply a new generation of big-men.

I, however, believe that I would disagree, though I am critical of their lack of political inclusion. But I think engaging this new leadership to promote mutual security, economic, and political interests in Africa, while a gamble, I think it is a gamble worth taking in Eastern and Central Africa right now—again, with the exception of Laurent Kabila.

I think we need to consider the realities of the regions and appreciate that these leaders are pursuing a program for economic transformation and the promotion of security that we, the United States, share. We need not and should not embrace individuals. But we can invest in the processes to achieve transformation that these governments are promoting. Indeed, we can help build the independent institutions that Professor Ayittey referred to.

We cannot and should not abandon our support for democratic change and we should invest in those areas that we can.

These governments have a long-term vision. But they are not sure that the United States does. They don't know if the United States considers our interests in Africa, our economic interests, our security interests, or our political interests as vital U.S. national interests that will keep us engaged over the long run and prepared to commit the level of resources needed to insure that these transformations succeed.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, let me just argue that we need to continue to invest development resources, promote trade and investment, and offer support for debt reduction and supportive programs with the international financial institutions for these very countries as part of a partnership that clearly includes democratization as an equal objective to those of promoting economic development and security.

But the scale of our commitment is likely to affect the depth of our influence. I think this is a fundamental point that I would like to leave with the subcommittee today; that is, our engagement with these new leaders in Eastern and Central Africa, in particular, is perhaps the best hope for supporting this transformation that may occur in those two subregions. But we have to demonstrate that our commitment is a long-term commitment and if we really want to exercise influence over the democratization process, then we have to be prepared to demonstrate that we will commit the resources and that we consider our interests vital enough that we will remain engaged over the long haul.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ASHCROFT. Thank you very much, Mr. Booker.

Dr. David Gordon is a Senior Fellow of the Overseas Development Council here in Washington, DC.

I am pleased to introduce you now at this time, Dr. Gordon. When you are finished, we will have an opportunity for discussion, answering questions, and maybe even discussion between panel members to help us clarify views that have been expressed. Dr. Gordon.

**STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID F. GORDON, SENIOR FELLOW,
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC**

Dr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you and the subcommittee for holding this hearing today and in particular for inviting me to testify.

The views that I express today are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of my colleagues at the Overseas Development Council. They grow out of work that I have been undertaking with Professor Joel Barkan of the University of Iowa.

Africa is in the midst of profound change and America's opportunity to affect these transitions and promote democracy and development has never been better. While Africa remains in some ways a continent in crisis, it is also the site of major new experiments in governance, peace building, and free market reform.

It is important, however, to stress that democratization is a long-term project in Africa, as it has been everywhere. African countries that have embarked upon democracy are generally in the early stages of the process. They are not yet consolidated democracies.

There is a new generation emerging all over Africa that is committed to a new vision for the continent and its place in the world. This emerging cadre of African leaders, be they in government, in the private sector, or in other sections of civil society, eschew ideology and grand visions and are oriented toward pragmatism and problem solving.

When foreign policy pundits talk about the new leaders of Africa, they are really talking about a sub-group of this larger phenomenon. I want to associate myself with Salih's comments about the importance of the larger phenomenon. But these individuals in Central Africa and the Horn of Africa are important as well.

Attention is focused on these five because of the assertive attitude they have taken to the outside world and their willingness to engage forcefully in regional affairs. Some hail them as the new saviors of the continent; others condemn them as little more than modernized versions of Africa's traditional autocrats.

I discount both of these views and believe that a more nuanced understanding of the new leaders should inform U.S. Africa policy.

For these new leaders, the struggle is not against neocolonialism or imperialism but against tribalism and corruption. All are committed to sweeping away the failures of the past.

Their experiences in liberating their countries from the control of the Mengistus and Amins of Africa has given the new leaders a great deal of confidence, often slipping into hubris. But a central characteristic of these new leaders is their belief in the responsibility of Africans to solve their own problems.

The new leaders also share a skepticism toward the outside world, a view shaped by the failure of the international community to sustain effective responses in both Somalia and especially in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

But there is also considerable variation among these leaders.

First of all, the so-called new leaders of Africa are not all that new. Museveni has been in office for more than a decade; Meles and Isaias are approaching seven years; and, while Kabila is new in power, I agree with Salih that he represents a political style that harks back to earlier generations of African leaders.

While all are pragmatic and have given up what was an earlier commitment to Marxism, only Museveni has really delivered a comprehensive set of market driven economic reforms.

On the dimension of political stability, only Isaias governs a truly stable country with a broad-based political regime. While Meles and Museveni have brought peace to their countries, they have not yet won legitimacy in large sections of their population.

Kagame dominates a country which remains at war, while Kabila has yet to reestablish a national political system for the Congo, and who knows if he has either the capacity or the will?

While none are democrats in our sense of the term, democratization has proceeded in varying paces in several of the countries. Free and fair elections have been held in Uganda to return Museveni to power and elect a parliament. Elections in Ethiopia have not been fully free, while Eritrea, for all practical purposes, is a one party State, albeit an apparently popular one.

At the center of the debate about democracy in U.S. Africa policy is the question of what approach the United States should take toward the new leaders.

I believe that we should be broadly encouraging and supportive of the new leaders. While these individuals are not as morally compelling as Nelson Mandela, they do bring a new courage, energy, and honesty to the African scene. But at the same time, we must keep our eyes open and treat them as mature partners, calling them to account when they err, but in a manner that is mindful that we do not have a monopoly on wisdom.

We need to be particularly concerned that the political scene in all of these countries remains dominated by individuals rather than institutions. The new leaders rule over regimes that are brittle, and thus, vulnerable. They are likely to evolve either into more inclusive polities or slip back into the authoritarianism of the eighties and before.

Such a return to authoritarianism with its attendant loss of legitimacy risks State collapse and civil war, and that is why it is important for the United States to maintain a focus on democracy as a goal of its policy and diplomacy in these States.

That is also why democratization is in the self-interest of these leaders.

We must be careful to not lose sight of these realities where other foreign policy goals are at stake. While it is in our interest to work closely with Ethiopia and Uganda to deal with Sudan, the viability of such a policy is at risk as long as neither Meles nor Museveni preside over inclusive and stable polities.

Similarly, in the Great Lakes, downplaying democratization in Rwanda and Congo risks putting the United States in a position of uncritical support of narrowly based regimes that will not bring stability to these countries.

The choice between democracy promotion on the one hand and a concern for regional stability on the other is, Mr. Chairman, a false one. The U.S. can and must pursue both. The new leaders seek mature relations with us, not the paternalism of the past. We should take the same approach to them.

Will Meles or Museveni not join with the United States to contain the Sudan because the U.S. continues to urge further democra-

tization in these countries? Of course not. They are not doing it to please us. They are doing it because it is in their own interests.

How can the U.S. translate these concerns into an effective policy vis-a-vis the new leaders?

Consider the particular case of U.S. policy toward Uganda. Some argue that the United States should not push Museveni to deepen the democratization process. What I am suggesting is that, while broadly cooperating with and supporting the Museveni Government, the U.S. should maintain a significant dialog and program focused on the need to deepen the democratization process in order to sustain Uganda's remarkable progress.

Issues to be addressed might include strengthening the rule of law and transparency and accountability of government, making decentralization, a policy commitment of that government, meaningful, and insuring that electoral competition exists no matter what the political party framework the country adopts.

Can such a policy work? In looking at how to approach the new leaders in the Great Lakes and the Horn, U.S. policy makers need to review their experience in dealing with a similar figure in West Africa, Ghana's Jerry Rawlings.

In the late 1980's, Rawlings, who had come to power through a military coup, undertook a tough economic reform program with the support of the IMF and the World Bank. The U.S. strongly supported this effort but continued to engage the Rawlings regime on the need to move to a more open and broad-based political system.

In the early 1990's, Rawlings established a multi-party system. But the first elections failed to win the legitimacy of large segments of the population. In response, the United States, while continuing its support of Rawlings' government, engaged with the Ghanaian opposition to explore means of bringing them back into the political process. This led to a very large effort to improve the electoral machinery in Ghana.

Ghana's second elections were held in 1996; and, while the outcome was quite similar to the first, this time they gained broad legitimacy and have led to the active participation of the opposition in parliament and a broad and open political debate in the country about a wide range of issues.

By having a steady policy of engagement with a dynamic new leader but not losing sight of the importance of political reform and democratization to sustain economic policy reforms and growth, the U.S. has played a positive role in Ghana's evolution.

Many of today's new leaders in the Great Lakes and the Horn have political views similar to those of Rawlings seven or eight years ago. We should shape an approach to them that learns from our successful experiences in Ghana.

In two weeks, Mr. Chairman, President Clinton will have the opportunity to directly engage many of Africa's new leaders. The President will be carrying a message of partnership and of the need for more mature relations based on mutual self-interest.

Central to this partnership should be and I believe will be a continuing commitment to the principle of democracy and active promotion of democratization.

The arrival of Africa's new leaders represents an historic opportunity for the continent. Africa's cycles of despair can be broken.

But it will require a commitment to vision, engagement, and pragmatism by our leaders in the promotion of democracy in Africa.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gordon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID F. GORDON

I want to thank Chairman Ashcroft, Senator Feingold, and other members of the subcommittee for inviting me to testify today on the topic of African democracy and the new leadership which is emerging in many states in Africa. The views that I express this afternoon are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of my colleagues at the Overseas Development Council or its Board of Directors. They grow out of work that I have been undertaking with Professor Joel Barkan of the University of Iowa and the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Events on the ground in Africa and new political initiatives in this country are reshaping U.S.-Africa relations and creating new possibilities for more productive engagement. Africa is in the midst of profound change, and America's opportunity to affect these transitions and promote democracy and development has perhaps never been better. The timing of these hearings is propitious, on the eve of the most extensive Presidential visit to Africa ever and amidst congressional debate over the most important piece of legislation pertaining to Africa in many years, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. I commend the subcommittee for showing foresight to open hearings on these matters, so we might more fully understand how to embrace these new opportunities to promote U.S. interests in African democracy, political stability, and economic self-reliance.

The tidal wave of change which swept over Europe at the end of the Cold War seven years ago rippled across Africa as well. While the transformation has not been as sudden or dramatic as in Europe, the changes have been equally profound. Long-suppressed political energies have been released and old alliances have been reordered. Several longstanding civil conflicts have been resolved. In some countries, new forms of conflict have been released. But, perhaps most importantly, a new style of leadership has emerged. This new generation of leaders is more independent, more assertive, unfettered by the blinders of Cold War ideology, and pragmatically committed to economic and political reform. While changes are evident across virtually the entire continent, they are most striking and challenging in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes States—although I should hasten to add that by "the Great Lakes States," I refer to the likes of Uganda and Rwanda and not Vermont.

The African Balance Sheet

To many, the budding of democracy and economic rebirth in Africa has gone unnoticed: through the eyes of the media, images of political and economic trends on the African continent are overwhelmingly negative. War, famine and chaos appear to be the order of the day. The collapse of the Mobutu regime in Zaire, the toppling of the elected president in the neighboring Republic of Congo, continued ethnic conflict and tension in Rwanda and Burundi, the overthrow of a recently elected government in Sierra Leone, and deadly political strife in Kenya all made their way into the headlines last year.

But the media ignore much of the current reality in Africa. Good things are happening in Africa in addition to the not so good; and not in isolated instances. On the whole, Africa is better off, both economically and politically, than it was at the end of the Cold War, when the U.S. began earnest effort to promote economic and political reform. The continent is no longer an unvarigated wasteland of kleptocratic regimes, turmoil, and economic stagnation. While we cannot ignore the persistence of failed states such as Somalia, nor oppressive authoritarian rule as in Nigeria and the Sudan, nor continual ethnic conflict and political unrest in parts of Central Africa, all African countries must not be lumped together and pronounced disasters.

There are now "many Africas." Indeed, the defining characteristic of contemporary Africa is the increasing differentiation among states. While Africa remains, in some ways, a continent in crisis, it is also the site of major new experiments in governance, peace-building and free market reform.

Since 1990, more than three dozen African states have conducted multi-party elections, reflecting significant political liberalization and democratization across the continent. While elections are the most visible manifestations of democratization, equally important are significant improvements in the rule of law, civil liberties—particularly the strengthening of civil society and the reemergence of a free press—and a decline in human rights abuses. It is important, however, to stress that democratization is a long-term project in Africa, as it has been every where. African

countries that have embarked upon democracy are generally in the early stages of democratization—the transition from authoritarian rule. Many have what might be called “hybrid” regimes, which combine democratic and non-democratic elements. They are not yet consolidated democracies.

Despite continuing conflicts, especially in Central Africa, a recent study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found that there is in fact less conflict on the continent today than in the last years of the Cold War. South Africa, Mozambique, Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Namibia and hopefully even Liberia are among the countries having resolved deadly conflicts.

Aggregate economic growth rates for Africa in the past three years are more than double those of the previous decade, and no longer lag dramatically behind the rest of the developing world. Trade and investment in Africa is growing rapidly after an almost continuous decline since the early 1970s. The IMF estimates that foreign private capital investment in Africa, which had all but dried up in the 1980s, grew to nearly \$10 billion per year in 1996. And Africa's social indicators show that progress is not confined to small privileged elites. Average life expectancy has increased from 40 to 50 in the past generation while literacy rates have doubled to over 50 percent.

Perhaps most importantly, there is a new generation emerging all over Africa that is committed to a new vision of the continent and its place in the world. This emerging cadre of African leaders—be they in government, the private sector or other sections of civil society have been heavily influenced by the technological revolution and the global trends towards democratic governance and market-based, private sector focused economic policies. They eschew ideology and grand visions, and are oriented towards pragmatism and problem solving. Many have spent a good deal of time overseas, most often in the West, and seek to translate effectively the benefits of global technology and culture into their local idioms.

Africa's "New Leaders"

Who are these “new leaders?” If one includes the leaders of all African countries that have experienced a change of government or regime since 1990, the list of “New Leaders” would number over thirty, and include such dissimilar individuals as Charles Taylor of Liberia, Nigeria's Sani Abacha, Zambian Frederick Chiluba and South Africa's Nelson Mandela, leaders with little in common in terms of their personal agendas or visions for their countries or for Africa.

A different definition of “New Leaders” focuses on the broad generational change described above. And when foreign policy pundits talk about “the new leaders of Africa” they tend to focus on four or five individuals who rule in Central Africa or the Horn: Meles Zanawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame of Rwanda and (perhaps) Laurent Kabila of the Congo.

Attention has focused on these five because of the assertive attitude they have taken towards the outside world and their willingness to engage forcefully in regional affairs, such as the overthrow of President Mobutu of Zaire. Some hail them as the new saviors of Africa; others condemn them as little more than a modernized version of Africa's traditional autocratic “big men.”

I discount both of these views, and believe that a more nuanced understanding of these “New Leaders” must inform U.S. Africa policy.

What really sets this group apart is not their “newness” or what they are for, but what they are against. For these “New Leaders” the struggle is not against neo-colonialism or imperialism, but against tribalism and corruption. They have inherited nations devastated by corrupt, statist autocrats who wrecked their economies and impoverished the citizenry. All are committed to sweeping away the failures of the past including the political class associated with these failures in their respective countries.

Their experience in liberating their countries from the control of the Mengistus and Amins of Africa has given the “New Leaders” a great deal of confidence, often slipping into hubris. These leaders share a powerful confidence in their own judgments and do not take advice easily. A central characteristic of these “New Leaders” is their belief in the responsibility of Africans to solve their own problems. All desire to assert African control of the continent's destiny, and all reject a deferential attitude toward outsiders and the advice they proffer. While Africa's leaders have traditionally sought more aid, the “New Leaders” are more concerned about aid dependence, and pride themselves on projects completed without foreign assistance.

The “New Leaders” also share a skepticism towards the outside world, a view shaped by the failure of the international community to support them in their fights against the *ancien régimes* as well as its inability to sustain effective responses in both Somalia and, especially, in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. This has led the “New Leaders” to strike out on their own, an attitude most vividly demonstrated

by their willingness to respond to regional security issues—violating the heretofore sacrosanct OAU doctrine of African non-intervention in their neighbors' affairs.

The conventional wisdom about the new leaders is that all have embraced economic reform, re-established political stability and reduced human rights abuses, but resisted multiparty democracy, and that this strategy has achieved dramatic results. As such, they deserve, and indeed have received, the support of the international community because they are truly committed to putting their own houses in order.

But on closer inspection, one also finds considerable variation among the chosen five. First of all, the so-called "new" leaders of Africa are not all new. Museveni has been in office for more than a decade; Meles and Isaias are approaching seven years. While Kabila is new in power, he represents a political style that harks back to earlier generations of African leaders.

In respect to economic reform and the establishment of a strong free market economy, while all are pragmatic and have given up most of what was an earlier commitment to Marxism, only Museveni has really delivered a comprehensive set of economic reforms. The others, while they reject the old-state run economic model, retain the tendency to distrust the capitalists. The "New Leaders" do appear to all subscribe to the notion that economic development precedes democracy, and reject the view that democratization and development are mutually supportive processes that occur at roughly the same time.

On the dimension of political stability, only Isaias governs a truly stable country with a broad based political regime. While Meles, Isaias and Museveni have brought peace to their countries, they have not yet won legitimacy in large sections of the population. Kagame rules a country which remains at war, while Kabila has yet to re-establish a national political system for the Congo, and there are serious doubts whether he has the inclination to do so.

On the dimension of managing ethnic conflict, their approaches also vary. Ethiopia is committed to ethnic-based decentralization; while Uganda has established decentralized structures of governance to counter ethnic conflict. But in both cases it remains to be seen whether a meaningful devolution of power will be made to sub-national units of government. Isaias does not face serious ethnic issues while Kagame and Kabila are yet to undertake earnest efforts to deal with the difficult ethnic issues in Rwanda and the Congo.

The "New Leaders" also have very different attitudes towards democracy. While none are "democrats" in our sense of the term, democratization has proceeded in varying paces in several of the countries. Free and fair elections have been held in Uganda to return Museveni to power and elect a new parliament. Elections in Ethiopia have not been fully free, while Eritrea is for all practical purposes a one party state, albeit a popular one. In Rwanda and Congo, the ruling regimes have made verbal commitments to democratic elections, but political circumstances do not seem to be moving in that direction.

Democratization and U.S. Africa Policy

The mixed record of democratization in Africa and the emergence of regimes led by individuals who appear to be committed to effective governance and real economic development, but not necessarily Western-style democracy, has led some analysts and foreign policy makers to question the wisdom of democracy and democracy promotion as core themes of U.S. Africa policy. The skepticism about prospects for democracy and democracy promotion is being generated by a curious convergence of perspectives between those who continue to view Africa as a continent of economic stagnation and war, and those who are inclined to gloss over the less-promising details of the African reality.

It is a skepticism that is also part of a broader intellectual disenchantment with the so-called "third wave" of democratization as represented by Robert D. Kaplan's recent *Atlantic Monthly* article entitled "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" and Fareed Zakaria's "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," in the December, 1997, issue of *Foreign Affairs*. These critics of democracy selectively seize on the downside manifestations of democratization and conclude that American support for democratization has made things worse rather than better, and therefore is not in the U.S. interest.

The critics of U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Africa base their argument on a combination of four assumptions:

First, that the social and economic conditions in Africa are not propitious for the sustainability of democracy; and that economic development is a precondition for democratization on the continent. In Kaplan's words, "democracy emerges successfully only as a capstone to other social and economic achievements."

Second, that economic development and the reconstitution of failed states—the preconditions for democracy—are advanced most rapidly by a period of enlightened authoritarian rule. A 1997 *Time* article described Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni as the Lee Kuan Yew of Africa, highlighting the fact that President Lee brought prosperity to Singapore through a combination of effective economic policies and autocratic politics and suggesting that Museveni was doing the same. Museveni himself has argued that his "no-party" model is more attuned to African realities than is multi-party democracy.

Third, that aggressive promotion of democracy runs at cross-purposes with other, more important foreign policy goals, especially in Central Africa. These goals include the establishment of stable and effective governments; strengthening regional security arrangements, especially among the "frontline states" bordering Sudan; preventing the re-emergence of genocide; and more effectively integrating Africa into the global economy.

Fourth, that democracy promotion is an exercise of forcing Western values on Africa, a form of cultural imperialism that is both self-defeating (What is the point of holding an election if all that happens is one ethnic-based regime replaces another?) and is rejected by the "New Leaders" who are committed to finding their own forms of democracy.

To what extent does such skepticism shape U.S. Africa policy? To what extent should it?

Although Secretary Albright and other Administration officials have reiterated their support for democratization in Africa, questions persist about the status of democracy in U.S. Africa policy. In particular, human rights and pro-democracy groups have continued to criticize the Clinton Administration, especially in regard to the Great Lakes region, and believe that the Administration's new activism regarding Africa will lead to economic and strategic considerations that effectively crowd out a concern with democracy and human rights. During Albright's December trip to Africa, her frequent statements on the need for the United States to "listen more and talk less" was widely interpreted in the media, both in Africa and in the United States, as marking a step back from the active support for democracy that has been a hallmark of U.S. Africa policy since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

I believe that the new skepticism about democracy in Africa and the four assumptions on which it is based are unwarranted and reflect a distorted understanding of the African experience.

Is successful economic development a precondition for democracy? In Africa, the return to economic growth has been inextricably linked to political reform. Most, albeit not all, of the countries that are now experiencing positive rates of economic growth are countries that have embarked on democratic transitions, or where there has been genuine political liberalization. This is not surprising given the failure of authoritarian rule to have a positive developmental impact for most of Africa's independence period. It has been asserted many times that economic reform and democratization cannot occur simultaneously, but that is precisely what has been happening all across the continent. Moreover, those countries which have made the strongest commitment to democracy and the rule of law—Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa and Ghana—have been among the most successful in attracting foreign direct investment to their non-mineral sectors.

Is "enlightened authoritarianism," in the image of Lee Kuan Yew, the path for progress in Africa? Uganda in fact represents a more complicated case than superficial comparisons reveal. Uganda's sustained economic growth rate of seven to nine percent in recent years cannot be attributed to enlightened authoritarianism. While President Yoweri Museveni has encouraged the comparisons between himself and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, the analogy is stretched. Museveni's "movement" based government does not lend itself neatly to the authoritarian label. Uganda has one of the freest presses in Africa. Dissent is permitted to a much greater extent than in Singapore. Despite the lack of a multi-party system, Uganda under Museveni has experienced a substantial measure of political liberalization matching that of most African countries under more formal multi-party rule.

But the presumed link between—good economic performance and the rise of enlightened authoritarian rule really falls apart when one looks at which African countries are at the forefront of economic growth. The countries with the highest aggregate growth rates over the long-term are Botswana and Mauritius, two countries with the longest record of democratic rule. More recently, positive growth rates have returned to Benin, Ghana, Mozambique, and South Africa, countries where the resurgence of democracy has been the strongest. Indeed, the link between relatively good economic performance and democracy in Africa goes back decades. From independence through the 1970s, those relatively open and politically competitive Afri-

can countries—Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, the Gambia and Kenya—were among the continent's best long-term economic performers.

Does promoting democracy endanger more important U.S. security interests in Africa? Because neither economic development nor political stability are likely to occur in Africa without accountable and inclusive government, democratization, and particularly democratic consolidation, is a critical component of viable governance. The United States should therefore not back away from this process, but continue to nurture it. We must be careful not to lose sight of this reality where other foreign policy goals are at stake. This is particularly true in central Africa where the U.S. seeks to contain the Sudan, bring peace to the Great Lakes, and support the reconstruction of the Congo. While it is in our interest to work closely with Ethiopia and Uganda to deal with Sudan, the viability of such a policy is at risk so long as neither Meles nor Museveni preside over inclusive and stable polities. Similarly, in the Great Lakes, downplaying democratization in Rwanda and Congo risks putting the U.S. in a position of uncritical support of narrowly-based regimes that will not bring stability to these countries.

The choice between democracy promotion on the one hand, and a concern for regional stability on the other, is largely a false one. The U.S. can and should pursue both. This will no doubt create some tensions, but there is no reason to believe that promotion of democracy will undermine the bilateral relationship with the "New Leaders" or compromise other foreign policy goals. The "New Leaders" seek mature relations with the U.S., not the paternalism of the past. We should take the same approach towards them. Will Meles or Museveni not join with the US to contain the Sudan because the U.S. continues to urge further democratization in their countries? Of course not. They aren't doing it to please us, but because it is in their own interests. Will the vigorous promotion of democracy in these countries make life more complicated for our ambassadors there? Probably, but articulating the complexity and rationale for U.S. policy is what professional diplomats are paid to do.

Is democracy a Western, alien value, unsuited to African soil? In Africa, as elsewhere where democratization has been most vigorously resisted, the argument that democracy is an alien value is often merely a justification for the continuation of authoritarian rule. Indeed, this rhetoric harks back to the initial rejection of liberal democracy and the search for "African democracy" by the early architects of one-party rule during the 1960s such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania. Those who argue that democratization in Africa is an alien imposition forget that the current demand for democracy across the continent has come primarily from within by those who challenged incumbent authoritarian regimes in the streets (e.g. in Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Zaire). External actors played only a supportive role in the initiation of Africa's recent political evolution.

If allowed to determine U.S. Africa policy, skepticism towards democracy and democratization will result in outcomes that are in neither the U.S. nor Africa's interest. In particular, stepping away from a commitment to democracy in Africa will lead the United States back to a Cold War-like policy of supporting regimes out of short-term tactical considerations. Such a policy will undermine Africa's democratic forces, and result in less rather than more progress on political consolidation, conflict-resolution and economic development. Having become serious about democratization since the end of the Cold War, are we to retreat from this goal just when the policy of its promotion is bearing fruit? I submit that the answer should be an emphatic "no."

The failure to stay the course in respect to democracy promotion also risks abandoning those individuals and groups that have fought hard to bring democracy to their countries, people who have often pursued their quest with tangible support, both technical and diplomatic, from the United States. This will undermine the credibility of past and current policies in such countries as Kenya where we have worked hard to nurture a democratic transition in the face of a hostile regime, but where much progress in the form of a vibrant civil society and the beginning of constitutional reform, has nonetheless been made. It may also generate a backlash against the U.S. and other Western governments from Africa's democrats.

Dealing With the "New Leaders"

At the center of the debate about democracy in U.S. Africa policy is the question of what approach the U.S. should take towards the "New Leaders" in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. Following her trip to Africa, critical editorials in both *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* took Secretary Albright to task for too tight an embrace of these regimes and their leaders.

I believe that we should be broadly encouraging and supportive of the "New Leaders." While these individuals are not as morally compelling as Nelson Mandela, they

do bring a new courage, a new energy and a new honesty to the African scene. But at the same time, we must keep our eyes open and treat them as mature partners, calling them to account when they err, but in a manner that is mindful that we do not have a monopoly on wisdom.

We need to be particularly concerned that the political scene in all of these countries remains dominated by individuals rather than institutions. Continued restrictions on civil society combined with limitations on multipartyism will make real accountability ultimately impossible. The "New Leaders" rule over regimes that are brittle and thus vulnerable. They are likely to evolve either into more inclusive—and more democratic—polities or slip back into the forms of authoritarian rule that characterized Africa throughout the 1980s. And such a return to authoritarianism with its attendant loss of legitimacy risks state collapse and civil war. That is why it is important for the United States to maintain a focus on democracy as a goal of its policy and diplomacy in these states. That is also why democratization is in the self-interest of those in power.

Consider these realities in the states of the Great Lakes and the Horn, which are high priorities for the Clinton Administration:

In Uganda, with the northern third of his country fertile ground for rebellions his army finds difficult to control, Museveni must find a way to incorporate the people of the region into the national polity in the same way he earlier reached out to the Baganda to consolidate his regime in the south. After nearly twelve years in power, he must also build institutions that will facilitate a smooth transfer of power to a successor.

In Ethiopia, Meles must likewise craft appropriate mechanisms—perhaps via that country's nascent federal structures—to bring the currently-alienated Amhara and Oromo (the country's two largest ethnic groups) back into the political process if long-term stability is to be established.

In Rwanda, the prospects for stability turn on whether the Tutsi-based minority regime led by Kagame can deal with the Hutu majority politically rather than militarily. The rural areas are now nearly 95 percent Hutu, a context that makes successful counterinsurgency operations almost impossible without an effective political component. This may ultimately require the negotiated partition of Rwanda into designated regions for each ethnic group. But the continued reliance on a primarily military option by the minority regime will result in more carnage and perhaps even its collapse.

Similarly in the Congo, Laurent Kabila may have filled a vacuum at the center, but his regime must reach an accommodation with regional political elites who command extensive followings in Kivu, Kasai and Katanga, or become the victim of its own hubris.

The bottom line is that in none of these cases is stability or prosperity likely to be realized on a long-term basis without the establishment of more liberal and inclusive polities in which a diversity of interests bargain, share, and possibly alternate power with each another.

How can the United States translate these concerns into an effective policy *vis-à-vis* the "New Leaders?" Consider the particular case of U.S. policy toward Uganda. Some argue that the U.S. should not push Museveni to deepen the democratization process, either because authoritarianism is just what Uganda needs, or because Museveni has already put Uganda on the path toward democracy, albeit one that differs from the Western model. What I am suggesting is that, while broadly cooperating with and supporting the Museveni regime, the U.S. should maintain a significant dialogue and program about the need to deepen the democratization process in Uganda in order to sustain that country's remarkable progress. Issues to be addressed might include: strengthening the rule of law and transparency and accountability of government, making decentralization meaningful, and ensuring electoral competition no matter what political framework the country adopts.

Can such a policy work? In looking at how to approach the "New Leaders" in the Great Lakes and the Horn, U.S. policy-makers need to review their experience in dealing with a similar figure in West Africa, Ghana's Jerry Rawlings. In the late 1980s, Rawlings, who had come to power through a military coup, undertook a tough economic reform program with support of the IMF and the World Bank. The U.S. strongly supported this effort, but continued to engage the Rawlings regime with the need to move to a more open and broad-based political system, echoing the views of Ghana's strongly democratic middle class.

In the early 1990s, Rawlings established a multi-party system, but the first elections, held in 1992, failed to win the legitimacy of large segments of the population. In response, the U.S., while continuing its support of the Rawlings government, engaged with the Ghanaian opposition to explore means of bringing them back into the political process. This led a very large and multi-year effort by USAID to im-

prove the electoral machinery in Ghana. Ghana's second elections were held in 1996. While the outcome was quite similar to the first, this time they gained broad legitimacy and have led to the active participation of the opposition in parliament and a broad and open political debate about a wide range of issues.

By having a steady policy of engagement with a dynamic new leader, but not losing sight of the importance of political reform and democratization to sustain economic policy reforms and growth, the U.S. played a positive role in Ghana's evolution. Many of today's "New Leaders" in the Great Lakes and the Horn have political views similar to Rawlings' seven or eight years ago. We should shape an approach to them that learns from our successful experiences in Ghana.

In both in the Clinton Administration and in the Congress, there is a new and welcome engagement with Africa. In two weeks, President Clinton will embark on an extended trip to Africa in which he will have the opportunity to directly engage many of Africa's "New Leaders." The President will be carrying a message of partnership and of the need for more mature relations based on mutual self-interest. Central to this partnership should be, and I believe will be, a continuing commitment to the principle of democracy and active promotion of democratization.

Sustaining this dimension of U.S. foreign policy is critical at the very time when democracy is an increasingly established fact in parts of the continent, and the potential of its emergence elsewhere is greater than ever before. The arrival of Africa's "New Leaders" represents an historic opportunity for the continent. Africa's cycles of despair can be broken. But it will require a commitment to vision, engagement and pragmatism by our leaders in the promotion of democracy in Africa.

Senator ASHCROFT. We thank each of you for coming. I am grateful to you.

Dr. Baker, I think it was your testimony before the subcommittee that raised questions about the quality of some of the elections. That raises an issue for me.

It seems to me that we are trying to figure out to what degree improved democratization is authentic and to what degree it might be just a facade—whether or not we are dealing with strong men in sheep's clothing, so to speak, who have learned to be slick enough to have the form of democracy if not the substance thereof.

Could you comment on that? Is it your view that inadequacies in reform have been overlooked in the effort to satiate the demand for genuine democratic change?

Dr. BAKER. Yes, I would be happy to.

I think that we have tended, first of all, to stress elections too much, sometimes, in Africa, to the exclusion of really looking at them. We have made some very bad mistakes.

In the case of Liberia, for example, in previous administrations, we had sanctified what was clearly a bad election in Liberia, which was the beginning of the collapse of the Liberian State. When you get a government that goes through the form but not the substance of legitimization, you are not helping the country at all.

We have gotten more of those today. There have been a lot of elections which have been flawed. We have international monitors who come out and say well, "they are reasonably free and fair" rather than that "they are free and fair."

I think that is an adequate characterization of some elections and it is not so bad to say that if you have the long view that democratization is a process and sometimes has to be looked at as a staged process.

But we should not just look at elections. We should really look at the birth of civil society, which I think is the really good news in Africa recently, and the pressures from below.

For example, to get back to elections, when there are genuine elections in Africa, one of the most encouraging things for me is

that there have enormously high turnouts in Africa, extraordinary turnouts, with people coming from the rural areas, standing in the hot tropical sun, sometimes for days, to be able to cast their votes.

To me, that shows that there is a real demand for participation.

I think we should stress elections as a vital step, but not the only step, for transition regimes. As we discussed before, I think when you have hijacked electoral processes, as in Nigeria, you deepen a crisis. There is where you are going to have to go back to some form of electoral process to put things right.

Senator ASHCROFT. Mr. Booker, you said that we needed to demonstrate a long-term commitment, that we need to show that we are prepared to stay there and that we need to commit the level of resources to insure success.

Do you imply by that the ultimate success of Africa is in the hands of the United States and its resources and not in the hands of Africans?

Do you also imply that there is no behavior on the part of individuals in Africa that should cause us to disengage? Dr. Gordon also used the term "engagement."

I guess what I am struggling with is if, to insure the level of resources, to insure success, that sounds to me like a blank check. It does not seem to be related, necessarily, to the development, say, of institutions, as Dr. Ayittey called for.

Would you clarify that. Frankly, as others of you want to chime in, please do so.

Mr. BOOKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If I could briefly comment on the last question of the quality of elections, because I think it is critical, an American writer once had a title called "Hunting is not those heads on the wall." I think that is a critical problem in Africa, that it is the process leading up to the elections, as opposed to the actual "shoot" itself.

We are experiencing that now in Nigeria and we recently experienced it in Kenya, where one could safely predict the outcome of the elections because the process leading up to it, the year ahead of the election, was so skewed, the environment so constrained for any real political competition to occur that the conclusion was a foregone conclusion.

The holdover despots that still do exist in Africa have learned this game very well. That is one of the real problems with promoting democratization, insuring that the process leading up to elections does allow for a real competition.

On the specific question you addressed to me, I do not intend to suggest that Africa's future rests with the United States' commitment of resources or a long-term diplomatic commitment, or any other country's. It truly does rest with Africans themselves and that is one of the encouraging features of at least four of these new leaders, as they are called.

I do, however, believe that our relationship with this new generation and our ability to influence the course of events and their commitment to democratization will very much be affected by our willingness to demonstrate the depth of our commitment, and part of that will have to do with the resources that we commit, whether it is development cooperation, whether that funding is spent to help strengthen and reform judiciaries, whether it is spent to help

establish a new electoral commission. Our simply calling for democratization, our simply criticizing human rights abuses when they occur without also engaging in a proactive and constructive effort to help these very poor and struggling countries to make progress I think is just cynical.

In particular, these new leaders—and the reason I raise this is because I think they are uncertain about the United States. They are really uncertain about our commitment to democratization.

We have a new Africa policy team. You heard from Dr. Susan Rice today. We have a new Africa policy emerging. There is the economic piece, the trade and investment initiative. There is the security piece, the African Crisis Response Force for training armed forces to deal with peacekeeping efforts. But when it comes to democratization, there is not necessarily a new initiative or a new framework that really clearly articulates what is U.S. democratization policy in Africa.

Instead, what we have is a special envoy, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, who has had mixed reviews on his two trips. Fortunately, the second trip received much better reviews in terms of demonstrating a commitment to democratic forces in Africa.

But his is a part-time assignment. I think the administration is beginning to try to articulate a more coherent democracy policy. Part of it is investing in elections. Part of it is investing in second wave activities, like strengthening independent institutions. But part of it has to remain in the traditional domain of public and private diplomacy and the application of pressure, particularly in egregious cases—for example, I would think like Nigeria.

Senator ASHCROFT. Dr. Gordon, did you have a comment?

Dr. GORDON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say that I think the elections in Africa are going in both directions. I think both incumbents are learning a bit about electoral manipulation. But even in countries where elections are not perfect, you have very large turnout, you have a growing capacity of independent electoral commissions. The recent elections in Kenya, which were hardly perfect elections, showed an enormous effort by Kenyan civil society at electoral monitoring that I think is laying the basis for that country's transition to democracy.

So I do not agree with the characterization of electoral processes in Africa as going in a negative direction.

I did not mean to suggest for one moment that the evolution of Africa is going to be primarily determined by the United States nor that we should engage everywhere in Africa and have a blank check. *Au contraire*.

I think that we cannot expect to find easy situations in which we face an environment that is one-sided. We are going to be dealing with grey areas. These hybrid regimes have elements of democracy and elements of authoritarianism. We have to be willing to engage in those kinds of circumstances, and, in particular, we have to look at whether a situation is improving or whether it is getting worse.

I think we should be more selective in our distribution of foreign aid. I think that we should not give any African government a blank check on U.S. foreign aid. U.S. foreign aid should depend upon performance, both in terms of economic policy and in terms of good governance.

But I do think that the United States has an enormous opportunity. It has enormous respect in Africa. Africans are looking at the United States as a model. They are looking at the United States for support. I think that our engagement in both democratization and economic reform in Africa in the 1990's has had important results, even though we have not, frankly, spent a lot of money in doing it.

Senator ASHCROFT. Dr. Ayittey, I was very pleased to hear your focus on institutions rather than on individuals. It seems to me that even when we think we have democratic reform we have to wait for a transition to find out if we really have it.

It occurs to me that the jury is still out on South Africa to see whether or not the transition can be made there successfully, although I think all of us are encouraged when we see things moving in the right direction.

You mentioned the need for an independent judicial system, the need for a professional military, the need for elections, the need for a free press and a number of institutions. There is probably another one there that I do not recollect at the moment.

Do you think our discussion has inordinately focused on elections to the detriment of these other institutions? Would you give us a few minutes, as we close this hearing, to relate these other institutions to the stability, and the democratization of these African Nations?

Dr. AYITTEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The reason why I focused on the institutions is because there is one fact which we must face. This is, number one, we must distinguish between African leaders and the African people. The two are not necessarily synonymous.

There are many leaders in Africa who do not represent their people. I think Americans would be angry or would be resentful if they had somebody who was speaking on their behalf whom they did not choose.

We have these cases in many African countries. Therefore, we must always distinguish between leaders and people.

The second fact, point, which I like to make is that the U.S. cannot solve Africa's problems for Africa. Africans ultimately bear the responsibility of solving their own problems. The U.S. can help. But it cannot supplant the efforts Africans themselves are making.

Now for us to be able to come to grips with our problems, we need to have an enforce in which we can freely speak and expose our problems, discuss our problems, and find solutions to them. For this, you need to have some basic freedoms—freedom of expression, freedom of thought, freedom to publish. Therefore you need to have a free media.

We have not had this in many parts of Africa in the post colonial period because the State has been monopolized by the State. We have very few independent newspapers.

As a matter of fact, Nigeria is a typical example. If you publish something which an African Government does not like, pof, you are dead. You need an independent judiciary also to enforce the rule of law. In many parts of Africa, what you have is lawlessness. You cannot invest in these countries because your property and even your personal safety cannot be guaranteed.

We also talk about civil society. For civil society to work, we need to have certain basic freedoms—freedom of association, for example, and also freedom of expression. We don't have that.

So when American officials talk about helping Africa, talk about civil so you, for example, they do not have a civil society in Africa in the past 30 years. American aid has not gone to the indigenous African organizations, we need civil society to help them do their jobs.

If you take, let's say, the processes of elections, for example, in recent years of course we have had elections. But the rules were written by the incumbents. The electoral commission was chosen by the incumbent. The playing field was not level. Again, the State media only gave media coverage to the incumbent.

The political playing field was not level. You could not protest against this or even take this matter to court because the judiciary was all in the government's pocket. Therefore, all that we are asking is for some basic minimum institutions.

I have been to the World Bank. I have been to USAID. I have told the World Bank that look, you are in Africa trying to promote economic reform. You are trying to persuade African Governments to sell off State-owned enterprises. Well, the media is a State-owned enterprise and it ought to be the first critical institution to be placed on the auction block to be sold.

If African governments will not sell off the media, if Moi will not sell off the media, the television and so forth, don't give him aid.

I think we need to tie the U.S. aid to the establishment of these various institutions because they will help us Africans to look for and find solutions to our own problems.

Senator ASHCROFT. I thank you very much for those comments.

I want to express my appreciation to all of the participants at the hearing today. We have held the hearing in the midst of votes in the Senate. Again, my presence is required on the Senate floor.

Democracy is not too fragile to survive, in my judgment. Democracy is ultimately survivable. It is tyranny and oppression that have been responsible for violence and bloodshed in Africa and they continue to plague not only Africa but other parts of the world.

When implemented prudently, I think democracy in Africa has been a stabilizing force that has eased social tension and has given disparate groups a voice in governance. But that has been all too infrequent.

The potential of the new leaders may be promising. But I think each missed opportunity sends a chill up and down our spines and leads us to suspect that Africa is heading down the road of oppression from the past rather than the road of opportunity and progress of the future.

I think we need to implement policies which encourage Africa to chart a course of genuine political and economic reform in the future.

I want to indicate to you my gratitude for your participation in the hearing. You have offered, I think, to present more complete materials than the oral remarks you have made. The subcommittee record will remain open.

If there are submissions, I would like to indicate that the record will remain open until March 19 at 5 p.m. If there are things that

you did not get a chance to say in response to inquiries or you feel like we did not understand properly what you said or you need to repeat things which we may have missed, I would invite you to submit those.

With that in mind, I appreciate your willingness to come and share your expertise with us. I am grateful for it. The subcommittee is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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