

ASSESSING THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE WEST

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERTERRORISM
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND
SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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ASSESSING THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE WEST

THURSDAY, AUGUST 21, 2003

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:40 a.m., Clark County Commission Offices, 500 South Grand Central Parkway, Las Vegas, Nevada. Hon. James Gibbons [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Gibbons and Shadegg.

Also present: Representatives Berkley and Porter.

Mr. GIBBONS. Good morning, everybody. I'm Congressman Jim Gibbons, the Second Congressional District of Nevada, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism for the Committee on Homeland Security.

To my right is Representative John Shadegg from Arizona. We're welcoming him. He's the chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response for Homeland Security.

We'd like to welcome all of you here today. Today is a hearing on intelligence and homeland security needs of the West. As a result, we directed ourselves to have it in Las Vegas as a perfect place to have this hearing.

Before I begin my opening remarks, I would like to invite our two other Congressmen, if they are in the room, to join at the dais. And it should be noted that these two Congressmen from Nevada, Jon Porter from the Third District and Shelley Berkley from the First District here in Las Vegas will be invited to join us on the dais, making any opening statements they want, and but they will not be able to ask questions simply because they're not members of the committee.

I'd like to ask unanimous consent from the committee for that. Without objection, when they arrive, they will be invited to sit at the dais.

Right now I'd like to turn the mike over to my colleague from Arizona for any motions that he may have at the beginning.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Chairman, the only request I would make would be an unanimous consent request that the statement of Mr. Frank Navarrete, the Arizona director of Homeland Security be included in the record.

As you know, Mr. Navarrete was supposed to be here today to testify before us. Unfortunately, because of an ongoing situation in Arizona with the gasoline shortage, it was impacted just yesterday

by some developments affecting the gas pipeline coming to Arizona from California.

Mr. Navarrete is not able to be here, so I would request that his testimony, his statement, be included in the record.

Mr. GIBBONS. Without objection, so ordered.

[The statement of Mr. Navarrete follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK F. NAVARRETE, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY TO THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,

I am Frank Navarrete, Director of Arizona's Office of Homeland Security and Director of the Arizona Division of Emergency Management.

I would like to begin by thanking Congressman John Shadegg for the invitation to present testimony here today, and to thank Congressman Jim Gibbons as well for this opportunity.

Homeland Security is a high priority for the Governor of Arizona, Janet Napolitano, and that has naturally benefited homeland security efforts in the state. Arizona was one of the first states to develop a homeland security strategy. I traveled to Washington, D.C. this spring to personally deliver copies of the "Securing Arizona" plan to our congressional delegation. My office provides monthly updates to keep our federal delegation apprised of activities and progress in homeland security in Arizona. Governor Napolitano created the Office of Homeland Security to embrace homeland security needs and provide direction and control. Additionally, she created the Homeland Security Coordinating Council to provide broad representation for input in homeland security long-range planning. Regionalization and partnerships are recognized as integral elements to ensuring protection and safety for citizens in every reach of the state. A couple of months ago, we became the first state in the nation to put a statewide fire service mutual aid plan in place. In short, the importance the Governor places on homeland security provides high profile for strategy development and problem-resolution. Due to a significant deficit in the state's budget however, funding for homeland security is tight.

So we have the will and ability to assess needs and vulnerabilities in our state, and are therefore able to develop a strategy. As the federal government develops its long-term strategy, Arizona will work to align the state strategy to embrace the principals and guidance provided in the federal strategy.

Strategic planning, vulnerability and equipment assessments show us where our shortfalls are, however we are currently in a position where the gap between needs and funding is wide.

Some of our homeland security needs have been satisfied through funding streams from federal government agencies including DOJ, ODP, and CDC. For that, we would like to express our sincere appreciation.

As you know, updated vulnerability assessments are currently being conducted for the ODP's 2004 Homeland Security Grant Program. In Arizona, we have utilized a Domestic Preparedness Terrorism Task Force, co-chaired by myself, as Director of the Division of Emergency Management, and by the Director of the Department of Public Safety. Stakeholders such as local government, first responders, tribal representatives and private stakeholders, sit on that task force. They make recommendations on spending strategy to an Executive Council. The Council works with the Office of Homeland Security to determine how the grant money will be allocated. The money is allocated to the counties, whose local emergency planning committees determine local distribution. I would like to note here that, in conducting these assessments we recognize and are taking steps to identify various potential threats or vulnerabilities that lie across our border in Mexico and include them in the assessments.

In Arizona, we face many of the same challenges as other states:

- 1 We have vulnerabilities, like areas of higher population
- 2 We have a need for additional funding:
 - Prevention of a terrorism event is the number one homeland security priority of Governor Napolitano and in the "Securing Arizona" strategy plan
 - WMD equipment for first responders
 - The medical community is in need of additional equipment and training to deal with potential bioterrorism threats. Additionally, efforts are underway to develop a tracking and reporting mechanism for disease surveillance

- Interoperability problems are widespread and include the additional challenge of a lack of radio coverage in many parts of the state
 - The Arizona Department of Health Services chairs a bi-national bioterrorism committee which closely dovetails the Arizona Office of Homeland Security
- 3 Information-sharing between different levels of government and among different agencies has improved since September 11th, however emergency managers, first responders and state agencies with homeland security-related missions continue to share concerns about the availability of current intelligence information.
- We appreciate and utilize information provided by the Department of Homeland Security. We continually combine federal intelligence and threat information with our own state and local input, analyze the information, identify pockets of vulnerability, and set forth prudent awareness and security steps for those threatened areas.
- T2We have unique challenges in Arizona as well:
- 1 We are a border state. We share 370 miles of border with Mexico. This includes 8 Ports of Entry.
- A great deal of the border is located in rural areas and has a high incidence of illegal immigrant traffic.
 - Local governments, like counties and tribal communities expend time and personnel resources coping with problems associated with the illegal immigration traffic, such as hospitalization and deaths, crime and additional law enforcement costs, and littering and property damage.
- Bi-national visit programs—there is a great demand to meet the visitation needs of workers who travel back and forth across the border, tourists, and also provide a timely flow of commercial traffic, especially during harvest season, when produce must be transported quickly from one place to another. This is a federal policy issue with significant local impact. I appreciate the concept of improved security and in improved visit programs.
- Interoperability and communication problems are vitally in need of equipment so that we are able to communicate with our federal partners and Mexican colleagues across the border in Mexico. In November, the Arizona Division of Emergency Management will conduct a bi-national WMD exercise in Nogales, which will employ the critical response elements of planning, response, interoperability, and radio communications.
- 4 Tourism brings 29.5 million people to the state each year (Arizona's population from 2000 census is 5.2 million). Arizona ranks 18 among the 50 states for domestic tourism:
- The Grand Canyon, with over 5 million visitors annually
 - Glen Canyon Dam/Lake Powell
 - Conferences and conventions that place large numbers of people generally into the downtown area of Phoenix
 - High profile events:
 - Phoenix is one of a handful of cities nationwide that entertains the "Big Four" in the world of sports—football, baseball, basketball and hockey
 - Other premier sporting events, including the NASCAR and Indy Car racing circuits and the World Series
- 5 Agriculture in the state, and agricultural products that flow through Arizona from other states and from Mexico. Of concern is the spread of disease or bioterrorism attack.
- 6 Areas of low population with vulnerable infrastructure like the Mexican border, dams, utilities, bridges and underground power, telephone and fuel lines that are located in rural desert or mountainous terrain.
- Clearly, our current experience with the rupture of a major gasoline line in the Tucson area illustrates the disruptions that can result from a terrorist attack on such an easily accessible target. The current event is in its third week, and has resulted in gasoline shortages in Maricopa County and gasoline price increases that have spread across our borders into other states.
 - We note with interest and concern the electrical grid events that resulted in massive blackouts on the East Coast. Having dealt with a similar problem with our Western United States electrical grid in the late 90's, we appreciate the importance of the hardening of critical infrastructure.
- 7 Hoover Dam and more dams downstream

8 Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in the country and second largest in the world, and located 50 miles from downtown Phoenix

To meet some of the challenges we face, we have identified “model” programs. As an example, we are working with our partners in the 4 corners area—New Mexico, Utah and Colorado, to resolve radio interoperability problems. We are working on technical solutions along the border to aid in the slowing of the illegal immigration flow and overall security improvements. And we have entered in to discussions with other border states, including Texas, New Mexico, and California for inter-state interoperability solutions.

In summary, we are actively pursuing enhancements to our homeland security program in Arizona. We developed a statewide strategy plan to provide guidance and intend to build on the process by developing a multi-year homeland security plan; the Governor created the Office of Homeland Security to lead homeland security efforts and seated a coordinating council; and state, local, federal and tribal partners and members of private industry are working closely together. I share Governor Napolitano’s philosophy that our objective is to create an environment where homeland security is imbedded into our day-to-day business of governance.

We are working hard to do our part, appreciate your federal support, and hope that, together, we will make our homeland more secure and provide for the health and safety of the citizens of Arizona.

I thank you for allowing me to participate in this hearing.

Mr. GIBBONS. As we might advise the people in the audience here today, this is a committee hearing. It is being recorded, and it is not what you might otherwise be familiar with as a townhall meeting. This is a committee hearing that is part of the congressional process. We take recorded testimony. And as a result, it is included in the congressional record.

At this point in time, I’ll begin with our opening remarks. And I would begin by saying that homeland security issues still remain a top priority and a major focus for America today.

The events of September 11th, of course, raise new public policy issues affecting every level of government service and private business.

The United States depends on citizens to be vigilant. It depends on State and local government and private businesses to assess critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and work with Federal organizations in support of national and collaborative partnerships.

It depends on businesses to take the necessary steps to protect their facilities and their patrons, and it depends on thousands of trained personnel to work with communities across the country to security our water and power supplies and their distributions systems to secure our transportation systems and to ensure preparedness of expert medical care when needed.

Facing this first real crisis, it’s first real crisis, since it began operations earlier this year, and the Department of Homeland Security viewed the massive power outage in the northeast United States this past week as a test of their ability to respond to a crisis.

While there were no casualties, no terrorists, and we are thankful for that, and no chemical or biological weapons, the Department of Homeland Security was able to assist in the response.

After receiving word of the outage last Thursday, within hours, the Department assembled crisis action teams in preparation to coordinate the Federal response and the Department’s communication network and was assessing its ability to serve as an information clearinghouse, tracking the blackouts impact for local authorities.

The State and local authorities shouldered most of the load in responding to the outage, but the Department of Homeland Security emergency response teams stood ready to deploy.

Again last week, the contingent of Southern Nevadans attended a Federal Emergency Management Agency exercise in Maryland to test Las Vegas' long-term hazardous emergency operations plan. The City of Las Vegas received praise for its response during the mock disaster and passed the course at the Emergency Management Institute.

Multi-levels exercises such as this are key to discovering an emergency response plan's shortcomings and ingrain the importance of mutual support.

This week Nevada is currently taking part in a Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense co-sponsored bio-terrorism exercise. This joint Federal, State, and local exercise determined promise is testing our readiness and our ability to respond to a local terrorist attack.

The exercise is being conducted by the newly created U.S. Northern Command in conjunction with the State of Nevada's Governor's Office and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Nevada National Guard, and a number of local first responder organizations.

The exercise is taking place at Logandale, Nevada, and involves upwards of 5,000 local, State, and Federal participants and exemplifies the cooperative nature of operations in protecting our homeland.

The primary purpose of this hearing today, entitled "Addressing the Security Needs of the West," is to focus on the issues that cut across government and industry sectors and ensure a cohesive approach to achieving continuity in delivering critical infrastructure and information sharing services in the Western United States and then in making sure that is in place and effective.

It is my pleasure to introduce two members of the distinguished panel, when we get to those, the first panel, which will be Colonel, retired, with the United States Marine Corps, William Parrish, Assistant Secretary for information analysis for Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Larry Todd, Director of Security, Safety, Law Enforcement, Bureau of Reclamation; and Colonel, retired from the Nevada Army National Guard, Jerry Bussell, who is the special advisor to the Governor of the State of Nevada for homeland security.

The second panel we will have today is Mr. David Shepherd, head of security for the Venetian Resort; Mr. Randy Walker, Aviation Director for Clark County Department of Aviation; Dr. Dale Carrison, Emergency Department Director, University of Nevada Las Vegas Medical Center; and Deputy Chief Bill Conger, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department.

I want to thank all of you for coming, and I will turn the mike over now to my colleague from Arizona, the chairman, as I said, of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Subcommittee, Mr. John Shadegg.

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And it is a privilege for me to be here. I want to express my appreciation for your holding this important hearing. It is, of course, as a congressman from Arizona, important to me that we, in fact,

assess the security needs of the West. And I think this hearing will produce some important information on that topic.

As I already mentioned, Frank Navarrete, the State of Arizona, Director of Homeland Security, unfortunately, had to cancel his appearance today, but his statement is in the record. I wish he could be here; however, there are issues that require his attention immediately in Arizona.

These issues, I think, are very, very important to all of us in the West. Oftentimes when we see these crises, and when I interact with my colleagues in the U.S. Congress, they think of the homeland security threat as being something unique to the East Coast or perhaps to the East and West Coasts, and they forget the intermountain west. And so I'm very appreciative of your holding the hearing today.

Col. Parrish, I want to thank you for coming to the West and getting a chance to view our unique security issues and give us your testimony and perhaps firsthand some of the challenges we face.

I appreciate all the witness that are here today, particularly the Bureau of Reclamation. I will tell you that in extensive conversations with Chairman Chris Cox of the Homeland Security Committee, Select Homeland Security Committee in the House, we have looked at the issue of whether or not homeland security funds are being properly allocated under the current formula.

And sometimes you hear colleagues say, "Well, it shouldn't be done on a population basis. It shouldn't be done on the current formula basis. It ought to be done on a different formula."

I'd like to chime into those discussions and point out that while perhaps the greatest need for the resources may be in our huge population centers like New York or Los Angeles or other major cities, I have some deep concerns about the Bureau of Reclamation facilities and the fact that they are indeed, I think, fairly vulnerable and were they to become the targets of a terrorist attack, the devastation could be vast and far more than I think the country appreciates. So I'm looking forward to your testimony.

Clearly, Mr. Chairman, the success of our anti-terrorist efforts depend a lot on intelligence and your efforts in the intelligence arena.

They also depend upon open lines of communication. One of the most common complaints I get when I am out here in the West talking with local law enforcement officials or other first responders is the issue of information flow.

And it is critically important that information flow from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, the CIA, TTEC, all the Federal offices involved to the State and local personnel so that they have an operational knowledge of what is going on, and that the information flow in the opposite direction. And I know since that this is kind of the first time in our Nation's history when we are confronting the sharing of highly classified national security information with State and local first responders, we're struggling through that process. But I want to stress how important it is.

And so I hope that at least the one thing that comes out of this hearing is improving the lines of communication and a development of relationships.

The Chairman has already mentioned that I chair the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response for the Homeland Security Select Committee in the House. I want to make it clear that my focus, while making sure that we have the resources to engage in response once an attack occurs, my primary focus on that subject is on preparedness.

I believe the American people expect us to be forward looking, to look out into the world to see where the attack is coming from and stop it before it occurs.

It is all well and good that we be in good position to take care of the attack once it has occurred, but I want to point out that at least from my perspective, terrorist attacks are different than hurricanes, perhaps different than floods and other types of emergencies that our Nation can face.

I know of nothing we can do to stop a hurricane. I know of nothing we can do to stop a flood. And, yet, I know of things we can do to stop terrorist attacks, and I think the American people expect that out of us, and I know that Chairman Cox feels that way as well.

One point I want to make. I have been involved throughout my congressional career in focusing on the Colorado River, the dams on the Colorado River, and my interest in preserving them. There are those who would like to take down for, example, Glen Canyon Dam. I spent some time opposing those efforts.

But I would point out we have just had this energy crisis on the East Coast, which has cost us electricity. I have just returned from Iraq where the absence of reliable electricity is disrupting that society rather severely.

Glen Canyon Dam has a capacity of 1.2, 1.3 kilowatts; Hoover Dam right here just miles from us a little over one million kilowatts. Those are the second and third largest dams that the Bureau of Reclamation has a responsibility for. Davis Dam and Parker Dam have 251,00 kilowatts and 120,000 kilowatts each. Those are critical work resources to this Nation. Indeed, during the California energy crisis of 2001, it was power from those dams that enabled us not to have any more severe consequences than we did.

The last issue I just want to mention in my opening statement is a perennial issue for those of us in the Southwest, and that is the porous nature of our Arizona-Mexico border.

And I hope, Mr. Parrish, at some point you'll get down there and be able to see it. It is wide open. You can fly over it. There are vast stretches where there is not even three-strand barbed wire fence. I think that is a clear security issue for this Nation.

So I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to the testimony and again thank you for holding this important hearing.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Shadegg.

Mr. GIBBONS. We'll turn now to our two colleagues who are guests on this committee for any remarks that they may have.

I'll turn to my left to Ms. Berkley from the First District for her remarks.

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to thank Ranking Members Jim Turner and Ms. McCarthy for inviting me to this hearing on assessing the security needs of the West. The security needs of our Nation must be addressed

in a bipartisan basis, and that's why I am particularly delighted that Congressman Gibbons has invited me to speak with you today.

I believe this is an important and timely hearing, and I welcome my colleagues on the committee to my home town and my congressional district to discuss vital concerns about protecting western communities such as Las Vegas from the continuing threat of terrorism.

Additionally, I would like to recognize my fellow panel members. I have had the distinct pleasure of knowing them and working with them for quite a while on this and other issues. And I know that their leadership IS needed to manage and ensure the protection of Southern Nevada.

September 11th woke our Nation to the fact that we have enemies ready and willing to take dramatic and unconventional action against the United States. As we meet here today, it is very likely that terrorists are meeting somewhere in the world planning another attack on our Nation.

In the fall of 2001, that attack was against New York City and Washington, D.C. The next attack could very well be against a community in the West.

Federal, State, and local emergency officials across the West recognize this and are working to prevent and prepare for such an occurrence.

Our Nation's first responders are on the front line of homeland security. Local preparedness must be a top priority. Our first responders must be involved in every step of the process and be afforded the flexibility to meet community-specific needs.

A major concern in Southern Nevada is the availability and distribution of funding resources for homeland security. Local officials and first responders know best what their community needs are.

States and localities should not find themselves in the position of having to implement numerous Federal mandates without the funding resources needed to support these mandates.

However, Congress and the Executive Branch continue to place expensive requirements on State and local agencies to meet Federal homeland security goals without providing the necessary funding. Among these burdens are: Transit security measures, border protection, safeguarding air cargo, port security, the protection of chemical facilities, and perhaps most importantly, funding of our first responders.

This is of particular concern at a time when the states are facing their greatest financial crisis since World War II. It will continue to be my priority in Congress to ensure that states and local communities are provided greater resources to address their security needs. Homeland security must be given more than lip service in Washington, D.C. It must be a fully funded national priority.

An issue specific to Las Vegas and other tourism-based areas is how tourists and visitors will be accounted for in the homeland security funding formulas. Local officials and emergency response personnel must devise security plans to protect not only the 1.5 million residents, but also 36 million visitors who travel to Southern Nevada annually.

After September 11th, I held a roundtable discussion with Southern Nevada's first responders to assess their needs. After this

meeting, I sent a letter to the President and to Secretary Ridge urging them to devise a funding formula that would address the needs of tourist communities.

I was very pleased that on July 30th of this year, a provision proposed by Senator Reid and Senator Ensign was approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee with jurisdiction over homeland security funding. This important resolution changes the homeland security funding formula to take tourism into account. I was pleased that the Senate recognized the impact tourism has on the ability of many communities to adequately prepare for and prevent terrorism.

As this important provision moves to conference, I hope that the two bodies can agree that the impact tourism has on many communities greatly affects their ability to prepare for and respond to threats.

However, we need to do more to help these communities. Factoring tourism into the funding formulas is important, but we must ensure that actual funds get to the responders protecting these communities.

On a busy weekend there may be upwards of an additional 300,000 people in Las Vegas. The population of the community increases substantially and the responsibility of local emergency responders increases along with it. Las Vegas officials must be able to address the security needs of their residents as well as the added burden of thousands of visitors. Therefore, the resources available to these emergency responders must take into account these added responsibilities.

Another homeland security issue that affects Nevada and the West is protection of Hoover Dam. Hoover Dam provides water to Arizona, California, and Nevada and supplies power to the Western states.

A breach at the Dam would be a catastrophic event that would affect millions of Americans. As the Federal Government assesses the needs of the West, officials must evaluate the possible risks related to the Dam and ensure that resources and information are available should there be such an occurrence.

Yucca Mountain and the proposed shipment and storage of nuclear waste to our State Poses one of the West's most serious security threats. I have introduced legislation requiring a comprehensive analysis of the Yucca project's safety and vulnerability to terrorist attacks and the development of a Federal emergency plan, including one specifically for airborne attacks, to defend the site.

Under my legislation, the analysis and defense plan would cover the site, transportation routes and shipping casks, waste storage containers, and personnel working for the project, among other items.

Instead of making the United States safer, the proposed Yucca Mountain project and the shipment of 77,000 tons of nuclear waste across our roads and railways provides terrorists a target that could cause massive economic and civilian casualties.

Before we start transporting nuclear waste across the country and before we spend another dime on this project, we better know what we're going on to address the possibility of terrorism and how we're going to do it.

Since September 11th, we have continued to hear and read of the efforts of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden to develop a radioactive “dirty bomb” or other means of nuclear attack on the United States.

It is naive to believe that thousands of shipments of nuclear waste and the storage of spent fuel in a single, massive facility without adequate safeguards would not be a target of opportunity to these mass murderers.

I am concerned about the waste at every stage of its transfer. Waste would be vulnerable to attack during packaging, shipment, temporary storage, repackaging, and finally in a single national repository. It must be realized that the nuclear waste will be stored above-ground for a significant period of time before it is actually placed in the repository.

There will be hundreds of shipments of waste across our country each year. A single truck bomb, or private plane used as a weapon, could release radioactive waste that could endanger lives, pollute the environment, and cost millions in economic damages.

Just last week it was revealed that the Department of Energy secretly shipped nuclear waste from New York to Idaho without informing officials and first responders in the communities along the route. The Yucca Mountain project poses far too great a risk to accept blind assurances from the Department of Energy and the nuclear industry that every precaution is being taken to prevent a terrorist attack and to prepare communities that would be affected.

The Federal Government has a duty to assess the risk of this misguided plan, not just to protect Nevada and our neighbors in the West, but for the well-being of our Nation.

Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. I am looking forward to the testimonies of my fellow panel members and further discussion on homeland security needs of the West.

[The information follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM H. PARRISH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION DIRECTORATE

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members. I am delighted to appear before you today here in Las Vegas, Nevada to discuss The Department of Homeland Security’s role in securing the West.

I am currently the Acting Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis in the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP). Prior to assuming this position on July 3rd of this year, I was the Senior DHS representative to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). In this capacity I served in a senior leadership position as the Associate Director for Homeland Security. My tenure in US Customs as the Executive Director of Anti-terrorism provided the opportunity to gain an appreciation for the criticality of information sharing and the necessity for recognition and understanding of individual agencies’ capabilities in the fight against terrorism.

The Department of Homeland security is focused on a clear mission: to prevent terrorist attacks, reduce our vulnerability to an attack, and minimize loss of life and speed recovery should one occur. Further, the Department’s mission includes reducing the opportunity for terrorists to exploit failures of critical infrastructure caused by natural disasters or other unplanned emergency circumstances (e.g., vulnerabilities arising from failures in water supply, dams, bridges, or power grids). In this mission, the Department of Homeland Security is not alone. We are actively working with our Federal partners, State and Local governments and the private sector. Our strategy for protecting the country is a national strategy for a reason,

as Secretary Ridge has stated on numerous occasions, “When our hometowns are secure, our homeland will be secure.” That is not merely rhetoric, but a fundamental principle of the nation’s homeland security effort. Everyone is a partner in the effort. As you all know, 85 percent of our nation’s critical infrastructure is owned or operated by private enterprise. This includes systems such as telecommunications, banking and finance, energy and transportation. The private sector also is a key source of new ideas and innovative technologies that will provide tools in the fight against terrorism.

We must be aggressive in connecting and staying connected with our partners to provide an extraordinary and unprecedented exchange of information. This information must be actionable by local law enforcement and first responders, but must also empower the average citizen to do his part in assisting with securing our homeland.

We can never guarantee that we are free from the possibility of terrorist attacks, but we can say this: Today, the American people are more secure and better prepared than ever before.

I say that because we are more aware of the threat of terrorism, and more vigilant about confronting it. We share more information with the people who need it, including our state and local partners and the private sector. And they share with us. Ensuring homeland security requires a nation-wide cooperative effort.

We’ve moved rapidly to map and protect our critical infrastructure, such as power plants and financial systems; seal our borders from terrorists and suspicious cargo; and prevent and prepare for attacks involving weapons of mass destruction.

The terrorist networks we seek to eliminate, in large measure, plot and train overseas. They recruit new members in democratic countries. They launder their money through international banks. They communicate through the same networks used for global commerce, and travel the same busy ports. That’s why we’re providing added layers of security that push our borders outward, making our seaports, airports and borders the last line of defense, not the first. Taken together, these measures help us achieve the mission of homeland security.

The Department of Homeland Security’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate plays an important part in the mission of homeland security by: (1) providing the full range of intelligence support to senior DHS leadership; (2) Mapping, with Infrastructure Protection (IP), terrorist threats to the homeland against our assessed vulnerabilities in order to drive our efforts to protect against terrorist attacks; (3) conducting independent analyses and assessments of terrorist threats, including competitive analysis, tailored analysis, and “red teaming”; (4) integrating the work of all DHS components as well as managing the collection and processing of information into usable and actionable information from DHS’ intelligence components; and disseminating time sensitive alerts and advisories to federal, state, local governments and private sector infrastructure owners and operators.

IAIP has robust, comprehensive, and independent access to information relevant to homeland security—raw and processed—collected domestically and abroad. Accessing the information and intelligence from this mosaic of programs and systems of federal, state and local agencies supports our mission to analyze data and take action to protect against terrorist attacks directed at the U.S. homeland. Our Information Analysis (IA) office has the ability to conduct its own analysis and to leverage the information of the FBI, the CIA, TTIC and the remainder of the Intelligence Community and federal government, plus state and local law enforcement and private sector entities, to protect the homeland.

Central to the success of the DHS mission is the close working relationship between “IA” and “IP” to ensure that threat information is correlated with critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and protective programs. This threat and vulnerability information can then be used to recommend preventive and protective measures.

In addition to the unique IA-IP partnership; the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) serves as a focal point for the Nation’s efforts to protect our homeland. The HSOC is a 24 x 7 x 365 days a year center comprising members from more than 13 federal agencies from the Intelligence Community, Law Enforcement Agencies, emergency preparedness organizations and other entities focused on infrastructure protection. Given the information provided from the parent organizations of these entities, and the all-source data provided by other DHS partners, information and intelligence relating to threats to the homeland are analyzed from multiple arenas. This all-source data-fusion performed at IAIP allows products to be tailored to address a specific threat that assist DHS constituents in prioritizing resource allocations in the enhancement of their security posture that supports their efforts in countering potential terrorist acts.

IAIP is the central information center of DHS' efforts to coordinate the protection of U.S. homeland security. As such, IA supports DHS' law enforcement components through timely and integrated analytical support. For example:

- In coordinating with Customs and Border Protection, which process more than 1.1 million passengers arriving daily at our Nation's airports and seaports, and inspects more than 57,006 trucks and containers, 580 vessels, 2,459 aircraft, 323,622 vehicles, and arrest over 2,500 illegal alien border crossers and smugglers daily. IA has immediate access to valuable information regarding potential terrorist activities that further enhances our ability to develop threat plot lines - connecting the dots.
- In coordinating with immigration and Custom Enforcement, which investigates cases involving alien smuggling, terrorist financial dealings and other crimes associated with terrorist operations, IA analyses and assessments ensure the ability to identify potential trends of terrorist related activity.
- In coordinating with the Transportation Security Administration, which screens approximately 1.5 million passengers every day before they board commercial aircraft, IA assists in determining individuals to be entered on Watch lists.

IA ensures that homeland security products derived from the fusing of disparate types of information are shared with Federal, State, and Local governments, as well as the private sector. Additionally, IA coordinates with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in publishing combined DHS-FBI Intelligence Bulletins.

IAIP is building a strong team of professionals and assigning dedicated and knowledgeable individuals in key liaison positions within our partnering agencies. This will further enhance the timely access to critical information that when placed in the hands of the dedicated and competent members of DHS serving at our borders, airports, seaports across America, will increase our ability to detect, prevent and deny terrorists the opportunity to plot a strike against our Homeland. With the continued support of Congress, I am confident that IAIP and our partners in the war against terrorism can succeed in meeting the challenges presented before us.

The Department of Homeland Security is the second largest department in our Government. In our first six months we have made progress in numerous areas, but we are just at the beginning of this comprehensive effort to protect our Nation from terrorism. While much has been accomplished, there is much more work to be done. We must stay focused and engaged in this effort so that we can meet the challenges of this critical time in our Nation's history.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have at this time.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much. We'll turn now to the newest member of the Nevada delegation, who we are all pleased and proud to work with, Mr. Jon Porter from the Third Congressional District.

Mr. Porter, welcome to the committee. You have five minutes to make your opening statement.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you very much, Congressman Gibbons, for your leadership and to my colleague from Arizona, Mr. Shadegg. We appreciate your help and assistance. And of course to the panel and all those first responders in the audience today—fire, police, highway patrol, Federal agencies, we appreciate your input. And trust me, we want to hear what you have to say.

The events of September 11th, of course, changed forever the way that this country considers its safety. Threats we did not think were serious or that we failed to recognize have become far too real to ignore any longer.

Thanks to the leadership of the President and farsighted members, such as the panel here today, we now have a Homeland Security Department to coordinate responses to the immense challenges of guarding against terrorist attacks and this committee to oversee that department and point out where more effort is needed.

Las Vegas and all the other communities here, including the County of Clark, have a special challenge since that day of September 11th. We depend upon the free flow of tourists into our community, yet we cannot afford any threats to our air transport system. We depend on critical infrastructure for our very existence, but cannot afford to be over dependent on any single response plan or resource for meeting threats to that infrastructure.

Southern Nevada turns a friendly smile to the world, but cannot forget that there are men and women who would take advantage of us and threaten our community and our families.

Since my election to Congress, I have worked with Mr. Gibbons and, of course, my colleagues here on the panel, Director Randy Walker, who is here today, Rosemary, and to many others, Jerry Bussell, friend for years, to help improve our ability to protect ourselves and to prepare Nevada in case of a disaster.

The Nevada delegation is working to ensure that our massive population is taken into account when funds are distributed to cities by population.

Having chatted with Metro, and I think Stan Olsen is here today, Stan, we're hearing your words. Where at one time we can have a population of 250,000 to 300,000 or more at a given time, in reality, this is an emergency that can impact millions of people.

We must have adequate funding to ensure that our first responders continue to be able to ensure the safety of all residents and the visitors of our county, aid to communities must be proportional to the population and the threat.

We must also work towards ensuring the safety of our power grid and energy generators. The recent blackouts in the Northeast show, once again, how important the Hoover Dam and the transmission lines are to Southern Nevada and to the whole West Coast, from agriculture, irrigation, to power. We have to ensure that Hoover Dam and other critical infrastructures are physically safe and also that our infrastructure is safe from the electronic attack that could take place or interfere with water, power throughout the community.

Having met with many local government leaders, city managers, a grave concern for our communities is the technology. Imagine for a moment an individual sitting in a hotel room or in a tent or in a home somewhere around the world with a laptop computer that could break into our technology and literally bring our communities to a halt.

Working with Mrs. Berkley, we were able to make sure that McCarran Airport is reimbursed for funds it's put up for security improvement. And we want to do more. We were able to convince Transportation Security Administration to revoke some of the draconian cuts that is proposed for McCarran. Randy and Rosemary, we appreciate everything you're doing.

As I mentioned, we are working with Metropolitan Police Department. Another major concern for Nevada and the rest of county is uniform communication system. I can remember being at ground zero in 1988 shortly after the explosion in Henderson, the PepCon line, communication was a challenge. Of course, our heroes in the fire and rescue and police did a yeoman's job. But I remember that day in 1988, we were talking about having a uniform communica-

tion system so our different levels of emergency personnel could respond accordingly. We have yet to meet that challenge.

In the coming months, we'll be working together to make sure that more resources are available for our communities and to ensure that Southern Nevada is prepared for the challenges our Nation may face.

I want to thank, of course, all the witnesses and appreciate everyone for being here today, and I'm looking forward to working together as we accomplish this main goal.

Thank you all very much.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Porter.

Mr. GIBBONS. Before we begin with our first panel, there's a few housekeeping items that need to take place.

First, I need to advise the panelists here that we try to restrict our opening remarks to five minutes or thereabout. No one is going to stop you if you go over, but we would like to proceed timely so that both panels will have an opportunity to be heard and for the panel here to ask question of each of the members there.

So with that stated, let me say that each of your written statements in full will be submitted in its entirety for the records. So if you want to summarize your remarks, that is fine as well.

Also, to the audience, for those people here, the record is going to remain open for a period of 14 days so that any comment or comments that you want to submit for the record will be allowed. You can send those to us at the committee in Washington, D.C. They will be entered into the record.

That being said, let me also now turn to our first panel. Welcome each of you. This is a very distinguished moment for all of us here, and I am sure that it is for you, to appear before a United States Congress committee and have an opportunity to have your voices heard.

Mr. GIBBONS. I will begin with Mr.—Colonel Parrish and his remarks.

Mr. Parrish, welcome. We're happy to have you, and the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM H. PARRISH

Mr. PARRISH. Thank you very much, sir. And good morning, Chairman, and Congressman Shadegg and Congresswoman Berkeley, and Congressman Porter. I am delighted to be here and honored before you this morning.

Before I begin, I would like to express on behalf of the Department, sir, we appreciate, Congressman Gibbons, your tireless and dedicated efforts in this fight against terrorism, your recognition of how important the efforts of the Department is in securing a safe nature. We appreciate that.

This hearing is also very important to the Department of Homeland Security because it affords me the opportunity to get out of Washington and get out in America, and, unfortunately, I just don't have enough time to spend in this great city for a few more days, or I think literally I could walk the streets and the lobbies of the hotels and probably talk to at least one person in every section of this great country and hear firsthand about their views on how the scorecard is for the Department of Homeland Security.

But I think it's safe to say that the people I have talked to, I think, without question, that the leadership of Congress and the Administration, our President, in developing without and creating the Department of Homeland Security was certainly the right step to take for this Nation.

I am the acting assistant secretary for Information Analysis of the Information Analysis Infrastructure Protection Directorate. I assumed that position on the 3rd of July.

Prior to that, I was assigned as the Senior Department of Homeland Security representative to the newly created Terrorist Threat Integration Center, where I served in a key leadership position known as the Associate Director for Homeland Security.

Prior to that, I stood up for the Office of Anti-terrorism with the U.S. Customs Service right after 9-11. During my tenure at Customs is really when I became aware of the fact of that the importance and the critical pieces in this war against terrorism had to be information sharing amongst agencies.

And I will submit that I like to see that the glass is half full. And I'm not sure if it was cultural issues or a lack of willingness to share information as much as a full understanding and appreciation for what another agency could do with that information if they had it.

I continue to strive for that same type of approach now that I am at the inner-agency level, if you will, and not operating just within the confines of a single organization. And I'll refer to that a little bit later on.

Within the Department of Homeland Security, we have the operational organization, as I've mentioned, such as Customs, and now the integration with Customs and Border Protection. We have agencies that have access to a wealth of information that assist in connecting the dots, if you will, of terrorist activities or potential terrorist activities in this country.

When you look at the borders, and as Congressman Shadegg indicated, the southwest border there and the vastness of it, certainly, I know it is a priority within the Custom-Border Protection with the Secretary of how we address that situation.

But when on a daily basis, we have over 1 million passengers coming across our borders, either through the air or across the land, or by sea entering our country—over 57,000 trucks coming across our borders and containers, with 580 vessels arriving at our seaports on a daily basis, 2,500 aircraft coming into the United States and over 323,000 vehicles entering our country, stop and think for a moment, though. The Customs inspectors and the border patrol agents have the ability as they access potential information because of their unlimited search authorities at those borders, the ability to acquire information that could be a key piece, a missing dot, if you will, in a major FBI case trying to formulate and see if we have a potential terrorist plot.

We have the same with our Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau, again, where they're working and investigating cases on alien smuggling operations, financial operations, and other crimes that may be associated with terrorist operations.

The Transportation Security Administration postured at the airports processing 1.5 million passengers daily, again, another set of

eyes and ears, if you will, out there looking at what's moving through our country.

But to further enhance this process of correlating the information from other agencies, we have within the information analysis and the infrastructure protection directive, the homeland security operations center, which we man 24 hours per day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. And in reference, Chairman Gibbons, to last week's blackout was a major active player in the immediate processing of information to be able to advise key leadership of the country what was happening with the northeast corridor during that blackout period.

Additionally, within that center, we have approximately 15 different Federal agencies represented. In my experience, any time you bring different agencies sitting down in a room together next to each, a tremendous amount is learned about the capabilities and what each agency brings to the fight.

I'm proud to say each morning between 9:00 and 9:30, the director of the operations center huddles all those agencies, and each one reports on the major activities of their agencies what they're getting from the operations center, another step in the information sharing process, which is so critical.

As these reports are received into the operations center, they may be coming, again, from our supportive agencies. They may be coming from State and local authorities, and even the private sector, suspicious activity reports.

These reports are then processed with the information analysis director, the people under my staff. We analyze this information. We coordinate it with other agencies in order to identify if there is any possible correlation with terrorists' nexus to these reports that are coming in.

For example, a report of suspicious person videotaping the entrance to a nuclear power facility at one location and perhaps two days later at another site in another State, a similar vehicle is also observed.

How is this correlated to see if, in fact, we have now a presurveillance operation in place?

This is the type of information that we look to bring into the operations center at our department so we can conduct this in-depth assessment, independent assessment and an analysis of what we're dealing with.

I'm confident that the process and procedures that we are continuing to build upon, though, that I have described here, are in full compliance with the legislature that had been passed by you, by the Congress, in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

Specifically, though, regarding, on the success, the most recent successes of the FBI and CIA, who should very well be commended on those great Americans, what they are doing, we have succeeded in arresting some very key members of al-Qaeda over the past 12 months. I think you have been hearing about some of the reporting and the information that we are learning.

What we are seeing is that the organization al-Qaeda singles out targets whose destruction may have symbolic resonance, strike a blow to U.S. power and prestigious impacts, causing mass casualties and generate economic shockwaves throughout the country,

and, of course, us being the center of the world, if you will, a global economic impact.

Further, the concept of multiple and simultaneous attacks are part of this modus operandi, as we observed here in the U.S. on September 11th and other attacks overseas. And although we have learned of their focus on these type of targets, specific intelligence is not always present. It's a very daunting and very challenging process of trying to acquire that type of specific intelligence.

However, it's important to ensure that our State and local partners as well as the private sector entities are aware of the terrorist focus on such high value targets. Many such examples are present here in the West.

As you know from previous reporting, in our major metropolitan areas, such as Washington, New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, we have numerous facilities that offer this type of high value targets. We have learned from detaining debriefings that al-Qaeda is interested in a range of facilities from transportation, infrastructure nodes to apartment buildings and tall buildings.

Some domestic targets may include symbolic structures, particularly the White House, the Capitol, and other Federal buildings here in the West. Symbolic icons might include tall buildings and other high profile landmarks. Headquarters for major corporations and financial centers would achieve their intent of disruptions of our economy.

The energy sector including the U.S. nuclear facilities, petroleum, tank farms, and refinery facilities are also target lists for al-Qaeda.

The railway, the mass transit systems, and things such as bridges and tunnels also have been reported as potential for al-Qaeda. The dams and water systems have also been addressed in some of the debriefings. Public venues, we can no longer conduct a large scale public event without having a detailed, well rehearsed security plan in advance.

And, finally, aviation remains a target since September 11th operation of al-Qaeda's greatest success and one that their masterminds consider worth repeating.

Late last month, the Department issued a threat advisory warning of a potential hijacking end of summer plot in the U.S. and abroad.

I would like to say here, going back to the last year, when Congressman Shadegg had asked me to do an independent assessment, I will tell you I was a holdout in the intelligence community on that report. Secretary Ridge has an undaunting, challenging task of making that announcement to the American people.

As we understand the limited resources of the states and private sectors to expend their resources to enhance security, securities, it is my responsibility to ensure that I am picking up every rock, every piece of raw material and analyzing it to the greatest extent possible so that I can look the Secretary in the eye and say, "I agree that this is a credible threat that needs to go out."

I delayed the process probably for 24 hours because I had to be convinced, and I will tell you I was convinced in the end based on the intelligence report that I reviewed.

But I just want to share that with the panel that we in the Department of Homeland Security are very sensitive to the State, local, and private sector on how they need to prepare for it. I think the focus of our Homeland Security advisory bulletins and information bulletins when we put those out, we try to put something out that says, "Here is a threat, but yet here are protective measures that you may consider to employ as we address this threat."

We want to do more to help our partners. And when I say "our partners," I mean the State and local Americans that are out there that are doing such a tremendous job. They are a wealth of information for us as well in being able to provide information that can help us connect the dots.

I'd like to just close here, then, and just to say that our robust and comprehensive independent assessment, we are continuing to refine that. It's not a push-pull system yet. We are still pulling for information.

As I said before to the committee, "Parrish has not been told no yet when he's asked for a piece of key intelligence," and the day that Parrish is told no, you will be the first to know, sir.

We are just at the beginning, though. We have a long ways to go in this processing. Hearings such as yours today provides each of us, though, an opportunity to learn and look back at where we have come as a Nation since that dark day in our history on September 11th.

We need to recognize that thanks to you and to your staffs and our Federal agencies, including all law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the dedicated State and local authorities in the private sector, and the American people in general have risen to the challenge of the new enemy threat, the new enemy threatening our security.

The coordinated efforts of all of us, sharing, in a key part sharing the challenges and responsibilities together, we have made a difference, and our Nation has not suffered another attack. We must not become tired or grow weary. The dedication and commitment must continue, and above all, continuous prayers for the safety and security of this great Nation.

Thank you, sir, for this hearing and the opportunity. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Secretary Parrish. And I do apologize. I should have said Secretary Parrish when I introduced you earlier. That was my mistake.

Your testimony and statement is very enlightening, very helpful to the community, and I am sure the public was listening to it as well.

Right now we'll turn now to Mr. Larry Todd. Welcome, and the floor is yours, Mr. Todd.

STATEMENT OF MR. LARRY TODD, DIRECTOR, SECURITY, SAFETY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Mr. TODD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be here today to provide this report on what the Bureau of Reclamation is doing to address the security needs of its water and power facilities in the Western United States.

My name is Larry Todd. I am the Director of Security, Safety, and Law Enforcement for the Bureau of Reclamation.

Reclamation is responsible for over 350 major dams and reservoirs and 58 power plants in the West. In carrying out this responsibility, the security and safety of the public, and our employees and the facilities is our highest priority.

Reclamation has had a long-standing and effective safety program for public and employee safety, as well as dam safety. However, our efforts in establishing a separate security program only began in 1995. At the time, we hired a security officer, complete security reviewed, established work levels, and began hardening our facilities. Reclamation thus had various security measures and response plans in place prior to September 11th. Those measures were instrumental in our ability to respond quickly and effectively to the events of that tragic day.

Since 9–11, Reclamation has significantly improved its security efforts by implementing long-term security programs. Key elements of the program include establishing a security, safety, and law enforcement office; conducting vulnerability risk assessments at all major dams and facilities; contracting for a top-down security programs review by outside experts; implementing Reclamation's new law enforcement authority and implementing various informational and personnel security measures and polices.

Currently, we have designated 280 facilities that are being assessed by the end of 2005. This past year we have assessed and implemented security measures on 55 of those most critical facilities, and 12 Reclamation Visitor Centers.

On these facilities, we have implemented well over 50 percent of the accepted recommendations. We have developed personnel security, designating for background checks when necessary for both employees and contractors who access facilities.

We have instituted an information policy to more closely control sensitive information about facilities. And we have staffed the security and law enforcement functions with in-house expertise as well as experts recruited from other agencies. We have also created secure office space to effectively deal with classified and control documents and have established a secure communications systems.

We are progressing very well in established a secure security program with Reclamation. For example, with Hoover Dam, we have made several security-related enhancements since 9–11. First, we have enhanced our relationship on security matters with the Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, including Clark County, Las Vegas Metro Police and the National Park Service. We also maintain a close working relationship with the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Division of Criminal Intelligence, and its Nevada counterpart in sharing relevant intelligence information.

Second, we have increased the number of law enforcement officers and security guards on site. We then enhanced checkpoints on both the Nevada and Arizona side and added lighting and electronic monitoring surveillance devices at selected sites.

Third, we have limited traffic across the Dam to passenger vehicles, vans that are easily inspected, and short-haul trucks with permits. All vehicles are subject to random checks. The long-haul

trucks are being re-routed around the Dam through US 95 and Interstate 40.

Fourth, we have added physical security upgrades and modified visitor tours.

In conclusion, I believe that Reclamation has made considerable progress to date in ensuring our dams and other facilities are much more secure today than they were on September 11th.

However, we recognize that a great deal of work still needs to be done as more risk assessments are completed and new vulnerabilities and threats are discovered. Reclamation remains fully committed to the safety and security of the public, our employees, and our water and power facilities which provide these vital resources to so much of the West.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks, and I am ready to address any questions the committee may have.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Todd. We appreciate your statement and your comments here as well. They have been very helpful to us.

[The statement of Mr. Todd follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. LARRY L. TODD

My name is Larry L. Todd. I am Director of Security, Safety and Law Enforcement for the Bureau of Reclamation. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here today to provide this report on what the Bureau of Reclamation is doing to address the security needs of its water and power facilities in the Western United States. Reclamation is responsible for over 350 major dams (including 58 power plants) and reservoirs in the West, and the security and safety of the public, our employees, and our facilities is our highest priority.

Reclamation has a long-standing and effective safety program for public and employee safety, as well as in dam safety. However, our efforts in establishing a separate security program only began in 1995. At that time, we first established the position of Security Officer, performed initial vulnerability assessments at five of our dams, and formalized the emergency action plans exercise program. In subsequent years, we continued to perform more in-house vulnerability assessments at key facilities, developed a data base on resulting recommendations for improving security, and implemented site security improvements. These improvements consisted of measures such as ensuring access doors and gates were locked, improving lighting of key areas, and increasing employee security awareness. We also developed continuity of operations plans for all our major offices and developed threat response measures for 4 different alert levels. Reclamation worked closely with other Federal water and power resource agencies through the Interagency Forum on Infrastructure Protection in developing risk assessment tools and sharing technologies, and also participated in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force to share intelligence information. The coming of the new millennium and the concern over Y2K issues raised our awareness of electronic security. These events resulted in Reclamation contracting with the United States Department of Energy's Sandia National Laboratories for an IT Security assessment.

Reclamation had various security measures and response plans in place prior to September 11, 2001 (9-11). Those measures were instrumental in our ability to respond quickly and effectively to the events of that tragic day. On 9-11, we immediately implemented high alert levels and threat response measures commensurate with those levels. This program included closing all visitor centers and halting all tours, posting Department of the Interior and State law enforcement officers at major dams on a 24/7 basis, increasing security patrols at all our facilities, and shutting down our web site to review it for sensitive information and to protect potentially sensitive information during the review process. Reclamation's response activities were closely coordinated within the Department of the Interior, which provided law enforcement assistance. This was necessary since, at that time, Reclamation did not yet have its own law enforcement authority. We began working with the new White House Office of Homeland Security and other Federal infrastructure agencies to share information on potential threats and on response measures being

taken. There were no interruptions in any of our water or power deliveries as a result of the events of 9–11.

In the months following 9–11, Reclamation developed and provided guidance to our regional and area offices on critical considerations such as: addressing chemical, biological, and radiological attacks; ensuring that necessary emergency management actions are taken; protecting and safeguarding information and records; and providing for tourism security, particularly as it relates to international visitors.

Reclamation’s four-level threat-response measures were revised to match the five-color-level alert system established by the Office of Homeland Security. Under these measures, there are specific security steps to be taken at each facility, depending on the type of facility it is, for each of the national threat levels. There are also exact procedures in place for ensuring that, in transitioning from one alert level to the next, certain tasks are met, such as: timely communicating the transition; ensuring that all necessary measures are implemented in a timely manner; and transmitting situation reports to keep management informed of changing conditions. These procedures have been tested and successfully applied on several transitions to date.

In addition to these short-term responses, Reclamation recognized the need to develop a comprehensive long-term security response plan. Key elements of the long term response plan that were developed include: establishing a Security, Safety and Law Enforcement Office; conducting vulnerability and risk assessments at all dams and major facilities; contracting for a top-down security program review by outside experts; implementing Reclamation’s new law enforcement authority in Public Law 107–69, and implementing various informational and personnel security measures and policies.

In 2002, Reclamation Commissioner John W. Keys, III established the Office of Security, Safety and Law Enforcement, and appointed me as the Director reporting directly to the Commissioner. The Office is located in Denver, Colorado and it includes the previously existing occupational safety and health, dam safety, emergency management, and security functions, as well as Reclamation’s new law enforcement function. We have staffed the security and law enforcement functions with in-house expertise and with experts recruited from other agencies. We also created secure office space to effectively deal with classified and controlled documents, and have established secure communication systems.

To facilitate the potential re-opening of the 12 major visitor centers at Reclamation facilities, we contracted with Sandia National Laboratories to conduct security risk assessments at our visitor centers. Following implementation of the recommended security improvements—which included posting armed guards at visitor centers and on tours, screening visitors, and limiting tour routes—visitor centers were re-opened to the public and tours were re-initiated.

Under Reclamation’s Safety of Dams program, we have 252 “high and significant hazard” dams, which are facilities where failure could cause loss of life or significant economic damage. Reclamation committed to conducting vulnerability and risk assessments at all those facilities, as well as at 28 other critical facilities, such as power plants, pumping plants, and canals. Using carefully defined key factors to rate each facility, we prioritized all 280 facilities to be assessed. In 2002, Reclamation contracted with security experts at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, and five other private security firms, to have our 55 most critical facilities assessed for risk, vulnerability and security. Those assessments were completed in 2002. The recommendations resulting from those assessments were analyzed by Reclamation’s security experts with assistance from experts from the Corps of Engineers and Sandia National Laboratories. These recommendations were then presented to management for development of a final decision document for implementing the accepted recommendations to enhance security procedures and fortify the facilities. Approximately 54% of the nearly 1,400 recommendations resulting from the first 55 risk assessment reports have been implemented to date, and many others are in the process of being implemented. Risk assessments are being initiated in fiscal year 2003 at an additional 101 facilities; the remaining facilities will be assessed in fiscal year 2004.

For example, at Hoover Dam we have made several security related enhancements since 9–11. First, we have enhanced our relationship on security matters with the Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, including Clark County, Las Vegas Metro Police and the National Park Service. We also maintain a close working relationship with the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Division of Criminal Intelligence and its Nevada counterpart in sharing relevant intelligence information. Second, we have increased the numbers of Law Enforcement Officers and Security

Guards on site, enhanced checkpoints on both the Nevada and Arizona side with lighting and barrier gates, and added lighting and electronic monitoring and surveillance devices at select sites. Third, we have limited traffic across the Dam to passenger vehicles, vans that are easily inspected, and short-haul trucks with permits. All vehicles are subject to random checks. Long-haul trucks are being re-routed via US 95 and Interstate 40. Fourth, we have added physical security upgrades and modified the visitor tour.

A top-down review of Reclamation's security program was conducted by Sandia National Laboratories in 2002 and included members of the Interagency Forum for Infrastructure Protection. The purpose of the review was two-fold: (1) to evaluate the current organization, policies, and processes of Reclamation's security program by reviewing numerous security documents and interviewing all levels of Reclamation and Interior personnel, and (2) to make recommendations for a mature, sustainable security program. The final report was presented to Reclamation's senior management in June 2003 and they are currently considering the review's findings and recommendations.

Until the enactment of Public Law 107-69 on November 12, 2001, Reclamation had no law enforcement authority. Public Law 107-69 provided Reclamation with the authority to enforce Federal laws on Reclamation projects and lands and to contract for law enforcement services with other Federal, state, Tribal, or local law enforcement agencies. Following enactment, Reclamation published regulations on public conduct on Reclamation lands and at Reclamation facilities, and on the use of non-Interior law enforcement officers to enforce Federal laws on Reclamation lands. (It should be noted, however, that at Hoover Dam, Reclamation has long had authority under different statutes and regulations to maintain an armed police force.)

Since 9-11, in the area of personnel security, we have put in place a policy requiring background checks of our employees and contractors. This includes identifying additional positions needing security clearances. We have also implemented a policy on restricting and protecting security-sensitive information and have installed perimeter security around our information technology systems.

In fiscal year 2002, Reclamation received \$30.2 million in supplemental appropriations for our security and counter-terrorism efforts. That funding was used primarily for guards and surveillance, studies and risk assessments, law enforcement and interim security equipment. In fiscal year 2003, our \$28.4 million appropriation for site security/anti-terrorism was increased by \$25 million through a supplemental appropriation, for a total of \$53.4 million. Those funds are being used for guards and surveillance, including those needed to maintain our continuing heightened state of alert at all our facilities; for additional risk assessments at key facilities; for further implementation of our law enforcement program; for law enforcement and security equipment; and for hardening our facilities through the implementation of recommendations in the completed vulnerability risk assessments.

In conclusion, I believe Reclamation has made considerable progress to date in ensuring our dams and other facilities are more secure today than they were on September 11, 2001. However, we recognize that a great deal of work still needs to be done as more risk assessments are completed, more recommendations are accepted for implementation, and new vulnerabilities and new threats are discovered. Reclamation remains fully committed to the safety and security of the public, our employees, and our water and power facilities which provide these vital resources to much of the West.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks and I stand ready to address any questions the Committee may have.

Mr. GIBBONS. We turn now to my good friend, Mr. Bussell, Colonel, retired, now the head of this State's Department of Homeland Security for Nevada.

Jerry, welcome.

**STATEMENT OF COLONEL JERRY BUSSELL, SPECIAL ADVISOR
TO THE GOVERNOR, NEVADA HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE**

Colonel BUSSELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, as you can see in my written statement, I plan to address five areas—funding, communication

interoperability, critical infrastructure, homeland advisory system, and Nevada's need for a civil support team.

I'd like to deviate from that just a little bit. Congressman Berkeley's statement so cleared walked right down my funding list, I think it would be repetitive that I go over those things again. I would just like to jump over and talk about communication interoperability.

But before I go there, there's a couple of things that I would add in the areas of vulnerability in the funding. Las Vegas has 18 of the 20 largest hotels in the United States, and they are located on our 2.1 mile Las Vegas Strip. Understanding that the Las Vegas Strip is not actually in Las Vegas, it is in the unincorporated greater Clark County, that 11 of those largest hotels are right next to McCarran Airport, which is the seventh busiest airport.

At any one time, 24/7, 365, the Las Vegas Strip has more people than Fort Lauderdale, Florida, or Salt Lake City, Utah. If that is not a vulnerability, Mr. Chairman, I don't know what is.

Moving on, in the areas of communication interoperability, should an incident occur, it's important that first responders have the ability to talk with each other. I think that is a pretty commonly accepted statement, one of the fireman would be able to talk with the policeman and both to be able to talk to the first medical responder. In a perfect world, wouldn't it be nice if every policeman and fireman and medical responder could talk to each other anywhere and everywhere.

However, at this time we do not live in a perfect world. We live in a world that is at war. But we do need to build a system where a first responder's leadership or the first responder leader could talk. The incident commander could have a full chain of communication abilities, not just for voice, communications for the computer, and maybe even the future, the video. An instant commander would need the ability to talk not only to the firemen, the policemen, or the emergency medical responders, but, for example, he may need to talk or she may need to talk to Department of Transportation, the water company, the power company, schools, or those other first responders that we don't normally think of, some people like our civil support team, Hazmat teams, the National Guard, maybe the directors of the different securities or the security directors of our different hotels, not to include the number of Federal agencies, whether it be the FBI, ATF, DEA, ICE, and on and on and on.

Nevada is probably no more unique in the areas of communication interoperability than many other states. Since there is no perfect system available, we are looking at a number of options, but there's a clear problem. With Nevada's current shortfall, it is going to be almost impossible to completely fund even a partial system without help.

That completes my initial formal remarks, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Bussell.

[The statement of Colonel Bussell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JERRY BUSSELL

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to have this opportunity to testify. You have been provided a copy of my written testimony for the record.

In my written testimony, I will address five areas: funding, communications interoperability, critical infrastructure, homeland security advisory system, and Nevada's need for a Civil Support Team.

Due to time constraints this morning, I will only formally discuss funding.

FUNDING

As you are aware, I have been critical of the Department of Homeland Security's funding formula for some time. As I understand it, current Homeland Security formulas are based on three criteria: the 2000 Census, critical infrastructure and vulnerability assessments. Before I proceed, I must state, I was personally disappointed that Las Vegas was not included in the fiscal year 1903 Supplemental Budget Grant given directly to 30 cities.

We can all agree, Las Vegas is a unique city in itself, but the Las Vegas Valley is even more unique. The majority of people think the Las Vegas Strip is in Las Vegas. Most of it is actually in the unincorporated area of Clark County. The greater Las Vegas Valley includes the cities of Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, Boulder City, Henderson and unincorporated Clark County, where most of the Las Vegas Strip and the cities of Jean and Primm, Nevada are located.

If you merely look at the population of Las Vegas as shown in the 2000 Census, one receives an incorrect picture. The 1.7 million population of the Las Vegas Valley is significantly greater than the 400,000 population of the City of Las Vegas. The figures used by the Department of Homeland Security must not have included the 1.7 million Las Vegas Valley residents.

To receive a clear picture of our needs, one must look at the 1.7 million Las Vegas Valley residents; then include the 40 million plus tourists.

In the vulnerability area, Las Vegas has 18 of the 20 largest hotels in the United States, located on a 2.1 mile strip. It includes the first 11 largest hotels. Right next to the Las Vegas strip is McCarran International Airport, which is the 7th busiest airport in the United States.

To put it another way. Our tourist population on the Las Vegas Strip, on any given night, exceeds the population of Ft. Lauderdale, Florida or Salt Lake City, Utah.

Now I want to talk about critical infrastructure. Without going into significant detail, there are a number of critical infrastructure and key assets located in the Las Vegas Valley. Most prominent is Hoover Dam. Hoover Dam not only supplies water for most of the southwestern United States, it is a major source of electric power.

Why these unique factors were not considered in the Department of Homeland Security's funding equations seems strange.

It is my understanding there is a Senate Bill, that has passed Committee, addressing some of these funding inequities. I am asking for your support in changing the Department of Homeland Security's funding formula.

Funding to protect the citizens of this great country should not be based on their street address—but on where they are should an incident occur.

COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY

Should an incident occur, it is important that first responders have the ability to talk with each other. One would want the firemen to be able to talk with a policeman, and both to be able to talk to a first medical responder. In a perfect world, it would be desirable for every policeman, fireman and emergency medical responder to be able to talk with each other. However, at this time, we do not live in a perfect world. To build the system where every first responder could talk with each other is probably not practical and may be cost prohibitive.

Nonetheless, we must have a system where first responder leadership can communicate with one another. Where an Incident Commander has a full range of communications ability—not just voice (radio) communications - but computer and maybe in the future, video. An Incident Commander needs to be able to communicate with a number of organizations. For example, the Nevada Department of Transportation, the water company, the power company, schools, and other special response units like the National Guard, Civil Support Teams, HAZMAT teams, or the directors of security at our major hotels. I have not included federal agencies like the FBI, ATE, DEA, ICE, and on and on.

With Nevada's unique needs and no perfect system readily available, we are looking at a number of communication options. With the state's current funding shortfalls,

it is going to be almost impossible to fund even a partial system without federal help.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

With the recent multiple power outages in the Northeastern United States, critical infrastructure is on the forefront. Everyone knows that water, power, banking/finance, and transportation are vitally important to the United States.

Critical infrastructure, to me, is reliability and availability-based. To assure reliability and availability, we must protect our critical infrastructure. To protect the critical Infrastructure, a meaningful vulnerability assessment is necessary—a vulnerability assessment based on a national standard.

Yet there is no national plan clearly defining roles and responsibilities of critical Infrastructure protection in either the public or private sectors. There are no objectives, milestones, or time frames leading to achievable performance measures.

Over 80% of our nation's critical infrastructure is in the private sector, however, they are operating in a vacuum. There is no immediate method of notification of threat or any way to give our critical infrastructure specific, actionable Information on a timely basis.

We ask our private entities to perform vulnerability analysis and correction using their own resources. There must be some way to help private and semi-private entities with public funding. It could be in the form of specialty tools, training, training aids, standardized vulnerability assessments or tax incentives.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS

Nevada does not have a Civil Support Team. Nevada's Adjutant General, Major General Giles Vanderhoof, lists the need for a Civil Support Team as his number one unit priority. I certainly agree with the Adjutant General based on my recent observations during DP-03 where a clear need for such a team was evident.

Mr. Chairman, I know you have personally been working on this project for several years, but I cannot emphasize any stronger how important this critical asset is for Nevada.

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM

The Homeland Security Advisory System is vague, difficult to explain, and lacks public confidence. The color-code system initiated by the Department of Homeland Security in March of 2002 has not worked well. It does not define what states, cities, businesses or Individuals should do at a particular color code level. It clearly does not explain what should happen when the color code changes—either up or down.

I would like to recommend several methods to improve the color code system, including Issuing specific warnings to targeted regions or facilities. I would further recommend that certain protective measures for specific states and cities be channeled regionally If they do not affect the entire country.

Changes to the Homeland Security Advisory and Color Code System should be Initiated Immediately.

Public confidence is at stake.

Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify today.

Mr. GIBBONS. We'll turn now to questions from the committee.

And let me begin by thanking each of you once again for taking time out of your busy day to come here before the committee and provide us your testimony.

My question would first go to Mr. Parrish. Just on a generality, Mr. Parrish, and knowing the fact that I was one of the architects of the language which created the Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security, what is your assessment after one and a half years of the Department's capabilities? Where are we?

We have got a massive new organization, second largest department in the United States Federal Government. We merged more than 100 separate agencies together in a colossal effort to address the issue of homeland security and issues that are pertinent to that.

What is your assessment of the functionality? How is it doing after one and a half years? Is this a toddler that is up and walking? Is it ready to run? Is able to talk? Where are we in that?

Mr. PARRISH. Sir, it's a very timely question. Yesterday morning I was at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard speaking to the national—international security manager's course, which, as you know, has a significant audience of tremendous leadership from around the Federal Government as well as international equal.

The point that I made in there to a similar question was comparing us to the Department of Defense, we're the second largest—if you look at the Department of Defense since 1947, actually when we demonstrate our successes in the war in Iraq in 1991, we kind of got it right, from 1947 to 1991.

The Department of the Homeland Security is coming on up its six months anniversary. It's pulling together those agencies and bringing each one to the table to be able to make sure that we are having the interoperability, as Jerry indicated, remains a process that we'll continue to work on very closely and very diligently.

I think what we are finding is the success is that now the Federal Government and interagency because of our change in liaison programs, as I said earlier in opening remarks, having people from those agencies present is really assisting in that.

I think when we look back at some of the initiatives that our organization brought to us within the department, it continued to build on those. I look at the Customs programs and what they are doing on the borders to enhance the security screening there, the outreach of the container security initiative overseas. If you look at that, the department is engaging heavily with those organizations to make sure that we have this defensive depth and later strategy, if you will, of trying to bring together the best practices, the best capabilities of all the agencies to be able to detect and prevent a terrorist activity, detect as far out as possible to prevent any type of activities here in the United States.

I think the area that we need to move faster on, and I have made notes to myself on this, is hearing from State and local and the private sector because the wealth of information out there is what we need to hear from them and also that we need to make sure that we are getting to them.

I think the Homeland Security advisory bulletins and information bulletins that we have been putting out, we've been getting good feedback from that.

An example of that, I think, is showing now that other agencies recognize the importance of the department and what we are trying to do and serve the American people in the private sector. Because immediately after the attacks of Al Kot on May 11th, at that time, I was the associate director in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. When I got to work that morning at six o'clock and began looking at the very sensitive national security type intelligence information that was coming out from those reports, I immediately contacted then the assistant secretary Paul Redmond back at the Department at Homeland Security who was the information analysis secretary, assistant secretary.

And I said, "Paul," I said, "Start working on protective measures because we have seen some new tactics and techniques employed by al-Qaeda in this attack. I will work the terror line with the CIA and get this information downgraded so that we get it out in the hands of State, local, and private sector." So talking to hotels and industries and chemical facilities and those things.

And to the credit of the interagency process, by the end of the day, we had out on the street a document which we have gotten remarks that it not only quickly described what happened in Al Kot, a breakdown of the three compounds and the tactics and techniques employed by al-Qaeda, but we had protective measures that would help the states and locals be able to prioritize what they were looking at and trying to support the expenditures of limited resources.

So I think that is an example of how the Federal Government recognized the mission of the department in conveying this type of information. So I think we are moving the ball forward. We have got a long ways to go, but I think right now we are making great strides in making that happen.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Secretary, many people in the audience here time and time again hear about our security warning status and the levels of security, whether it is yellow today, orange tomorrow, or red, and wonder how we get to each one of those.

Whether or not, we are vertically integrating the intelligence, as you have already talked about, down to our law enforcement first responders that allow for the average citizen out here to feel safe, that someone knows about the information, that someone knows about the criticality of this intelligence, that is on our local first responder's list that can assess that because the average public would never be able to say, "Well, what does the orange threat mean to me? I'm going from my home out to Lake Mead, for example, am I at risk?" They will never know that.

How is that vertical integration going and what are your responses to those people who will probably come later to say that they don't feel they are getting enough information?

I guess my final part of that long detailed question is how is the reverse of that information flowing? Are you getting critical information from first responders who are by far and away our best intelligence source? When a policeman stops an individual that is on a suspect list, does that information go up vertically quick enough? How is the two-way flow of that information going.

Mr. PARRISH. Sir, if I could start, kind of work backwards a little bit, but on that last question, the flow of information coming in, you remember Operation Liberty Shield, as this Nation began to commence hostilities in Iraq, I was presented the great opportunity on Friday afternoon, the 28th of February, the day before the department stood up to develop Operation Liberty Shield and bring it to the White House by four o'clock Monday afternoon. It was a very long weekend, as you might imagine, but to the credit of the government, we had 25 Federal agencies working diligently throughout that weekend to develop the protective measures that we employed in Liberty Shield to include the active support there of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Department of Interior, and each agency had their protective measures.

Once we initiated and commenced Liberty Shield, the operations center received a report one night from a local police department up around the oil facilities outside of Philadelphia. As you go up the Delaware River, you see some oil facilities. They picked up two individuals that apparently had been surveilling those oil facilities.

At the same time the Coast Guard came in with their report. We had a foreign flag oil tanker in the Delaware River getting ready to bring its oil. We ran the manifest on the crew. The captain of the vessel was an Iraqi. The senior first engineer was an Iraqi, and 15 Pakistani crew members.

Was there a correlation here to what was going on? In the end, no, but we didn't take any chances. We removed the captain of the vessel. We brought on a Coast Guard crew to drive the vessel up to offload that, and the another two individuals were turned over to the JTTF in Philadelphia for further questioning.

It's that type of information flow that was coming into the operations center and exchange of information. So the eyes and ears that are out there in the streets of America are front line defenders are critical to get that information in.

The process of going to change the national threat level is a tremendous effort, as you might imagine, because Secretary Ridge takes great, great concern over this.

I have had the privilege and the opportunity to be with him in the last three times that we have made that decision. What we are trying to do right now in the homeland security advisory system is to go back and take a look at that.

Is it practical to say that the entire country orange, when yet the intelligence we are looking at may only be focusing on a threat to the chemical facility or it may only be focusing in an area around the northeast?

But we have to be very careful, though, that we don't convey that, and then the rest of the country says, "Well, drop my pack. It's not—I don't have to worry about it."

So we are trying to look really close at how we can go back and take a look at the homeland security advisory system in that regard.

I think we have to do better in working with our State and local authorities in being able to help them understand that. As many may think, there is this great fountain of top-secret SCI, sensitive intelligence sitting there in Washington, and it's not getting handed down.

I wish there was because I would be fighting everyday to make sure it was getting downgraded.

But, you know, to our successes now and the people that we have picked up, that's the good news. Now we may be not quite getting as much of the information we had gleaned before. But I think it's important to recognize getting the system explained to the State and locals.

An initiative that I have under—the program known as risk-net, which is a regional information sharing system. We have a pilot program we're kicking off this month, and right now we are going to target just nuclear power facilities. But in risk-net now, we'll have the nuclear facilities be able to report to us any suspicious activities, and we're initiating this in six states.

I want to build on this as quickly as possible so that we can use risk-net for this dialogue that will go back and forth between our operations center, getting information out to the State and local. Risk-net covers, I want to say, it's about 65 State and local authorities around the country. I want to be able to have a website there so we can put up the daily homeland security intelligence summary which will be at law enforcement sensitive or official-use only level.

And the second piece that I want to do, and you have heard talk about Parrish's concept of the hybrid analyst. In this war we have, we need to create an individual who is looking at the operational environment as well as the intelligence, who understands the Department of Homeland Security's operational environment. This fusion will be built around some of our subordinate agency people that are coming in, agents, inspectors, and that type, we'll have some analysts, and we will create this hybrid.

We also now are working with emergency defense preparedness. We're reviewing a program of instruction that we're going out to State and locals on intelligence analyst training. I want to be able to prioritize where we are going to send that, and I want to be able to regionalize it so that we have, for example, a course that may come out here to Nevada, and we bring in analysts from the western region. So when they graduate from this course, and I'm not sure exactly whether it's going to be one week or two weeks, they will then have a counterpart over in California or down in Arizona and say, "Have you seen this? We just pulled this guy over, and we found in part of his documents here a hotel receipt from Arizona. Do you know anything about this?" And this type of information sharing.

The next step to that is I want to bring these analysts into our fusion cell in Washington where they would spend two weeks. They would see then the type of information that we are getting in there, and I think it would be a better appreciation of exactly how this is all processed.

So I think that we are moving forward in getting that information out as quickly as possible. That is my number one priority in working with the sensitive intelligence that comes out and getting it downgraded into the hands of the State and the locals as quickly as possible. We have to get it down to those operators in the field because they will be the ones that either going to prevent, detect or deny terrorists from conducting an operation here in the United States.

Mr. GIBBONS. Secretary Parrish, I have a number of other questions for you, but I know that the other members of this panel, Mr. Shadegg, would like to also engage you in some questions, and I don't want to take up the whole time. So I'll ask Mr. Shadegg for questions.

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I have questions for each of you, so I'm going to ask you to be as brief as you can in your responses.

Mr. Parrish, I want to thank you for your testimony before the committee previously and for your testimony here today. I find in very informative and helpful. I think I expressed the last time you testified the admiration I have for the incredible challenge we have given the department, to try to stand up a department of this size

and scope and to try to get all these diverse and disparate agencies working together in a common effort, I think, is a daunting task. As you pointed out, you are barely six months into it, and, yet, I think the statement you make in your testimony that the Nation is, in fact, safer now was accurate. And I think it can be safer still.

But I have great admiration for the task that Secretary Ridge is doing with trying to pull all this together, especially, I spent some time in law enforcement myself, the years I was in the Attorney General's office dealing the disparate interests of all the law enforcement agencies in Arizona and trying to get them to pull together rather than be at war with each other was a significant challenge. I can't imagine trying to do it nationwide.

I want to ask you a few specific questions directly from your earlier testimony. There is a statement in your testimony that says, "Our Information Analysis Office," which is what had, "has the ability to conduct its own analysis of the security information you get." I'm very pleased to hear that. As you know, the statute requires you to be able to do that.

Can you give me here today an idea of how many people are engaged in that task at this time and whether there is yet room to grow in that area?

Mr. PARRISH. Yes, sir. We are still somewhere right around about the 55 people. Again, that's analysts as well as the liaison from the other agencies. We are looking to grow. As you know, we are moving into a larger facility. The time line on that may be slipping a little bit, but we are pushing very quickly to do that because once we do, we'll be able to bring in the other individuals.

When you look across the Department of Homeland Security and at the other intelligence organizations that exist, there are a number of analysts in there. It could be in excess of 800 across the other departments. We are going now to look at that and making sure we don't have duplication of effort. In fact, maybe some of those analysts may need to be migrated into the Information Analysis Office, which will increase our capabilities.

Mr. SHADEGG. I guess the second question, and the only other one I have for you this morning, and that is in your prepared statement says, "We share more information with people who need it including our State and local partners." Could you briefly summarize for the committee precisely how you share that information with State and local officials?

And I'll warn you in advance, I'm going to ask Mr. Bussell how he sees that working.

Mr. PARRISH. Right now what we're pushing out is the information bulletins and the advisory bulletins. We coordinate with the FBI when they put out their weekly intel summaries, that goes out every Wednesday, and also when they put out an advisory through the NLETS system.

The success, I think, on the advisory bulletins and information has been being able to engage members of the intelligence community and getting a tear line. A tear line, as you know, is getting a sensitive or highly classified piece of intelligence tear line that will make it unclassified or at the secret level.

Sometimes I have been only able to get it to the secret level. But we do have now within our states the Homeland Security advisors

having that classification and being able to get that piece of intelligence.

And then, of course, on the official-use only, we do that. Suicide bomber vests, again, Marines over took that one facility in Bagdad. Photographs I saw of the suicide leather vests, and these types of things, I went to DIA immediately. That afternoon we had photographs made, and we put out an advisory so that every State and local would be to see exactly if they pulled somebody over and opened the trunk and found these, they would know exactly what they're looking at.

I want to be able to do better than that. I want electronically—I want a web page so that they can each day pull up.

The other piece of that is the best practices. Let's learn how some of the great American State and locals are out there effecting their jobs, conducting their jobs, and paste that on this web page. This is how it was done in Arizona, this was how it was done in Nevada, and let other states learn from that.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Bussell, it's your chance to say what's working and what could be improved.

Colonel BUSSELL. Mr. Chairman and Congressman Shadegg, thank you very much.

Let me start out by saying that this individual homeland security advisor organization, Homeland Security directors are different in every State. Saying that, I'm a homeland security advisor with one person. However, I have the same responsibilities maybe a larger State would have a number of people.

The intelligence information that is coming down is in its very embryotic stages. There is no question about that. Mr. Secretary, it's clearly on the right steps. I can say with absolute confidence if we needed to know something, some actionable, absolutely certain intelligence, there would be no question in my mind that I have would it immediately, and I could go straight to the Governor.

However, we do need to take some real looks at how we are handling this. As an example, if you send something down and it just comes through normal routine procedures, I may or may not be able to get that. Where I get most of my intelligence is from the folks in the back of this room every single day. They have a spot report that comes up from Clark County, comes up from the JTTF down here, from Washoe County, and it goes in.

I'll be very candid with the group, the committee. I look there first now. Now, leading to that if something is really happening, we can talk. And I have been very critical of the current system. The Homeland Security advisory system, I have been vocal, very vocal. And as Mr. Secretary said, we are changing it. I have been vocal about the intelligence system. I hope that answers your question, sir.

Mr. SHADEGG. Yes, it does. It helps give us some information on how it's flowing at this earlier stage.

Mr. Todd, let me conclude the questioning with you. I read your written statement and was impressed at the steps that the Bureau of Reclamation has taken to try to upgrade its security and its analysis of its exposure in the time since 9-11.

But I did not read in there anything that suggested to me that you have done an analysis of kind of a worst case scenario. As a

Westerner and native of Arizona, it randomly goes through my mind exactly what would happen if you successfully blew up Hoover Dam? Exactly what would happen if you successfully brought down Glen Canyon Dam?

And I guess my question of you is in addition to assessing how vulnerable your facilities are, have you yet contemplated to perform an analysis of kind of a "What if" scenario if, in fact, your security measures fail, and one of those facilities was breached?

Mr. TODD. The answer is yes, we have, Congressman. There's two ways that we have looked at this.

The first way is that we have a very high expert safety dam program where we understand what the extent of these dams will do, and that consequence analysis goes right into our vulnerability analysis that we have completed for each of these dams.

And so with the consequences on the one hand, the threats that we know about on the other, and then the potential in the middle, we look at that with the analysis of the assessment. From that, we make decisions about how far to go with instituting and implementing the security measures.

For instance, on Glen Canyon and on Hoover, we had Defense Threat Reduction Agency do the assessment. We looked at that information and then looked at our dam safety consequences information and made sure those were talking to each other before we made the decision.

Mr. SHADEGG. And all of that information has been made available to the private contractors who have also looked at your security measures?

Mr. TODD. I'm—

Mr. SHADEGG. There was some reference to private contractors that have looked at it, and, also, I think, the National Laboratories at Sandia?

Mr. TODD. The Sandia has done a couple of different things. The private contractors we had looked at a number of sites. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency looked at national critical structures. We had 50 other sites that prior contractors looked at. All of those went through a security advisory team meeting to really look at the consequences and how we would put in our security measures. On that panel sat a Sandia member. As well as Sandia also looked at top-down review for our overall umbrella security program. So there were two top-down focuses that were provided us.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Chairman, I'm well over the five minutes. I appreciate your indulgence.

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, I think simply because there's just the two of us here that we can engage in extended question and answer without offending anybody else.

Mr. SHADEGG. Unfortunately, I have obligations, and so I'm going to have to conclude at this point. So I'll leave it to you.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Shadegg, thank you—

Mr. SHADEGG. So you can ask questions.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you for your presence and thanks for your time here.

Let me continue with this. And I want to go back to Mr. Bussell and ask him a question about the State of Nevada. We have heard

criticisms sometimes in the media that the Federal Government is not giving any Homeland Security dollars to the State of Nevada.

What is your comment with regard to being on the receiving end of those dollars if you are not getting any and how many dollars or how much money has been sent to the State of Nevada in the course of time for homeland security problems?

Colonel BUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is a very interesting question, and sometimes one wonders where does the money come from. So the money I'll be talking about this morning it is in two breaks. It's at the fiscal year 2003 phase I—.

Mr. GIBBONS. That's fiscal year 1903 for these people who don't know what fiscal year 2003 means.

Colonel BUSSELL. Yes, sir. It was \$6.77 million that arrived in Nevada April of 2003. And for record, I will be putting these notes later on, Mr. Chairman. That was \$6.7 million followed in July by \$17.9 million for a total for 27, almost—I'm sorry—25, almost \$25 million. Nevada received that and in the process of passing it on down and basically the 80/20, with 80 down to the first responders.

Mr. Frank Circusa, the director of the Department of Emergency Management is the administrative agent and actually handles the operational part of disbursing the money through a homeland security committee that is in the process of being changed. It will be based on recent State legislature Assembly Bill 441. We're in the process of forming a homeland security commission, and certainly that will be a top priority.

But back to your question, sir. We have received that money. It is here, and we're in the process of getting it out to the first responders.

Mr. GIBBONS. So just this year alone, you've gotten nearly \$25 million into the State of Nevada for the homeland security efforts.

How is that money apportioned between cities, counties, and states? You said it was 80/20, but 80 percent going to first responders.

Colonel BUSSELL. Yes, sir. 80 percent going out through an interesting system. We use the LEPC system in the State of Nevada. It was in place way before I came on the station. LEPC is an local emergency planning committee. The group gets together, and then there are 17 LEPCs because there's 17 counties in the State of Nevada. They get together and decide what their priorities are. The LEPC arranges their horizontal priorities into a vertical priority.

They come to the Homeland Security Committee subcommittee, present their priorities by LEPC, by county. That is then taken into a vertical and presented to the Homeland Security Committee for final review, and it's passed out in that process.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Todd, let me you ask when you talk about 24/7 security at a lot of our dams and other infrastructures that you're responsible for, you indicated in your testimony that both Department of—Bureau of Reclamation and State security, how is that breakdown cost arrived at?

Mr. TODD. Well, many of our dams, we have our own security guards contracted for, and, specifically, at Hoover we have a police department. We also contract for armed guards.

We have also contracted with the local sheriff department, and sometimes local PDs, and certainly we contracted with the Na-

tional Park Service for rangers to watch our dams. After 9–11, we certainly did that for quite a while.

Mr. GIBBONS. To summarize, if you have a responsibility and you have contracted it out to either the State, the county, or locality metropolitan police, you pay them to do the security on your facilities?

Mr. TODD. That's correct if we have a contract, that's correct.

Mr. GIBBONS. And includes the State if it were the National Guard?

Mr. TODD. We don't go with the National Guard. There's some authorities that prohibit Federal funding of the National Guard in that kind of situation. But we do certainly with the State patrols, and we have that on a number of sites.

Mr. GIBBONS. Okay. There is a number of other questions. Mr. Parrish, Secretary Parrish, there are those of us in Nevada who are very, very concerned with the Yucca Mountain. There is no doubt about it. To those of us here, it's not something that we look forward at all.

And my question would be with our concerns—and I, for one, as a scientist, have concerns just about the structures that there are for the security of the material incitsu, let alone any kind of an act that might jeopardize that.

My greater concern is that of the transportation of the material from nuclear power plants across this country to Yucca Mountain. I know of no studies that have been done to look at either the structural—infrastructure risks that are there.

How do you assure communities, states across this country that that material coming through there is not going to be the subject of a terrorist attack with devastating consequences?

Mr. PARRISH. Sir, the Department of Energy, and I really can't speak for them, but I think they have a program, as you know, in the movement of special assets, but I think maybe a blueprint for what we need to build upon in this process as we look as the movement of these type of hazardous materials and waste that are moved across the United States. Energy will have the lead in this area, but, again, working very closely with the Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as well as the Department of Transportation.

Our infrastructure protection director is heavily involved with these other agencies in assessing this. I think you raised a good point about the study that has been looked at, and I will go back and try to see if we have either something in progress or, if not, an area that we probably should move to.

But each of agencies in varying degrees have a certain responsibility. And, again, as Department of Homeland Security is now up and running, we would certainly have a major role in making sure that event of the coordination is being done with most of these agencies when we start talking about moving any significant amounts of hazardous materials, such as nuclear waste across the country.

So I have the specifics, and perhaps when I'm back in Washington, I can sit down with you and we can get a little bit more detail. But at this point in time, based on my phone calls and talk-

ing to our infrastructure protection director, they are engaged with the Department of Energy at this time. Under Secretary Laguti and I, in fact, we meet with the National Regulatory commission, I believe it is, next week, and one of these will be the topic of discussion.

Mr. GIBBONS. Let me say that your department will be well into which all of this intelligence information is poured. You will have the responsibility to ferret it out, digest, and analyze potential risk and threats that would be made to that. I see that as an overwhelming problem because of the vulnerability. We have already talked about porousness of our borders, the porousness of infrastructures, rail systems, highway systems, bridges, rivers for this material is—I mean it's incalculable how large that problem could be for you. I'm very concerned about it. I look forward to talking to you further to get your information.

Mr. TODD, let me ask you one final question as well with regards to water supplies, Hoover—Lake Mead provides an enormous quantity of water, a reservoir, but it's always a reservoir from which communities are served water, especially the Las Vegas community and Clark County, and community downstream from Lake Mead.

What steps have you taken or the Bureau of Reclamation taken to assure that these critical water sources are safe for our communities with regard to some type of chemical or biological agent that might be used to contaminate those waters?

Mr. TODD. Well, early on, we put out some memos and guidance to field staff on being watchful and understanding what the chemical biological kind of attacks may be. We have more to do in that area, but certainly we have the guidance there for the field people to really be aware of what may happen.

Mr. GIBBONS. Are you coordinating those investigations with other agencies to share that information, say, for example, with Homeland Security who might know of information that could relate to that?

Mr. TODD. Yes, we are. We have a lot of coordination with Homeland Security at the Washington level and then also our local offices are coordinating with the local first responders and so forth.

We have a program where we do environmental—not environmental—emergency preparedness work. We do table top function exercises and so forth. Those exercises many times include that kind of work where we may have a truck affecting the carrying of the chemical that is affecting the reservoir, and so how would we deal with that on an emergency basis.

So those exercises are ongoing continually, and we work right along with first responders on those kinds of things.

Mr. GIBBONS. Knowing the size of Las Vegas, I cannot imagine being able to just turn the tap off if there were a problem with the water supply out here at Lake Mead. And it's something I'm sure that the community here is very concerned about, and I would look forward to spending time with you to discuss the issue further to make sure that we have reached a satisfactory answer to the question about the security of that water system for Las Vegas.

Mr. TODD. I'd be happy to.

Mr. GIBBONS. Gentlemen, we have to go to the second panel here. We have taken a great deal of your time, and the committee is

grateful for your presence and your testimony. We would like to excuse the panel with thanks from me personally and from the committee.

We will take a 5-minute break, and when we come back, we will call up our second panel for the committee.

Gentlemen, thank you very much. We'll take a 5-minute break.

[Brief recess.]

Mr. GIBBONS. The Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism will come back to order.

At this point in time, we would like to call our second panel, and that will include Mr. David Shepherd, head of security at the Venetian Resort; Mr. Randy Walker, aviation director of Clark County Department of Aviation; Dr. Dale Carrison—am I pronouncing your name correctly, Doctor?

Dr. CARRISON. Yes.

Mr. GIBBONS. Emergency Department Medical Director, UMC Trauma Center; and Deputy Chief Bill Conger, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department.

Gentlemen, we want to welcome you here. Just as you heard from the previous witnesses, we try to limit our opening remarks to 5 minutes, but we will include your complete and full and written testimony for the record.

And simply because I'm the only person here doesn't mean that it isn't important what you say because all of these hearings are recorded. We have a process whereby the record will reflect what you say and it will be reviewed after this subcommittee returns to Washington, D.C.

With that in mind, I'll just proceed from left to right, my left, my right, or your left, or your right to your left, whichever, but I'll start with Mr. Shepherd, head of security for the Venetian Resort, for your opening remarks.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Shepherd, welcome. We're happy to have you before the committee.

**STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID SHEPHERD, HEAD OF SECURITY,
VENTIAN RESORT**

Mr. SHEPHERD. Good morning.

Mr. GIBBONS. And you have to push the red button so that you can be heard.

Mr. SHEPHERD. Good morning. I would like to thank Congressman Jim Gibbons for the opportunity to speak before this prestigious panel assembled today. It is truly an honor and pleasure to be here.

I am a blend of both the private and public sectors. I retired from the FBI after 24 years of service in 1999 and began my career in the private sector immediately thereafter. As a supervisory special agent with the FBI, I participated in counterterrorism matters with SWAT, Team Leader, and as the Coordinator for this program.

For nearly 16 years, I dealt with terrorism matters at the Nevada Test Site, Tonopah Missile Range and Hoover Dam. I trained with Delta Force, Army Rangers, Special Forces and Navy Seals, and, of course, the security forces from each of these special sites. I further participated in intelligence gathering, with the Office of

Threat Assessment, U.S. Department of Energy and participated in numerous nuclear exercises through the United States.

In the private sector, I am the Executive Director of Security for the Venetian Resort Hotel Casino in Las Vegas. The Venetian is the third largest hotel in the world with over 7 million square feet of space, 4,049 suites, and has an average daily visitor rate of 80,000 guests per day, which is four times the average American city.

I have attempted to extract from both sectors the best of each world in the protection of the property. The tourist/entertainment/gaming industry presents its own challenges, because if I create an airport style of visible protection and security precautions, the guests will go across the street to another property. If the city receives too many threats, the guests will stay at home.

Security in the customer service industry is a delicate balance and froth with challenges at every turn. Most people sitting here today have no idea what it takes to operate a security department in today's marketplace. I would like to shed some light on our challenges and outline some of the great lengths security must envision to ensure the safety of our guests and property.

As the security director, I must be concerned with civil liability issues, criminal activities, and terrorism, plus the threat of SARS or other diseases that our world travelers might bring to the property.

During the height of the worldwide SARS scare, the Venetian hosted the JCK Jewelry Show, a show where over 35,000 conventioners participated, over 1,500 exhibit booths displaying jewelry products throughout the property. Included in the booths, 1,500 booths, were 110 booths from China and 40 booths from Canada.

The Venetian maintained contact with the CDC and Clark County Health District concerning possible courses of action to take in the event that one of our conventioners displayed signs of SARS. Fortunately, no cases were reported, but we planned for the worst, just as we are required to do for each key security issue.

The security directors of today face greater challenges than ever before, and we must be forward-thinking each and every day, because our greatest concern is the safety of our guests, first and foremost.

Today's directors cannot rely on successes of the past or the tools and equipment of the past or the training used in the past. Technical advances coupled with a trained, alert staff can speak volumes, when the lives of thousands rest in their hands.

If you haven't prepared or anticipated each threat, the fear of failure and disaster are the end results. The repercussions of a failed security defense can have lingering effects for years to come. We do plan and must plan for every contingency to ensure the safety of our guests and team members.

The security directors of today must anticipate the source of each threat or situation and then establish policies and procedures to meet the threat head on under the principles of "Total Prevention" and/or "Damage Limitation." In "Total Prevention," the department must stop every conceivable plan of attack. Not one attack or plan can be successful. Each attempt must be crushed without the slightest bit of damage or loss of life.

In "Damage Limitation," the department must limit the loss of life and the spread of further damage. Each minute that we fail to act could have deadly effects on those caught in harm's way.

Many of the thousands of survivors in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon owe their lives to the foresight and training of those dedicated security and safety professionals who anticipated the threat. The casino security directors in Las Vegas have planned and are working together to anticipate each threat.

In Vietnam, we did what is called, "looking at both sides of the wire." We look at the property from the angle of protection and from the angle of penetration. What holes do they see in our defenses? How would they approach the property? Can we turn a weak point into a strength?

A good friend of mine once said, "Being forewarned is being forearmed." If we know what they can do and have done, then we can plan accordingly.

A security plan begins with research. Each day I review intelligence reports from around the world, but not just from one source. Several sources, documents and agencies are contacted before I start my day. I want to know what happened in the world yesterday and today. I want to know what the latest trick or tactic they tried. I want to listen to minutest shred of data or perceived concept, then say, "What if they tried the same thing here?"

Under the same concept, at the Nevada Test Site, we did what is called, "What ifs." What if the enemy did this or did that? Are we prepared to defeat, defend, and neutralize the aggressors? That is how we plan. Not for just one key event, but multi-events, threats and attacks.

As an example of our foresight, the Venetian has analyzed the threats and implemented 84 changes to the property to ensure the safety of our guests and team members, just during the first year following September 11th. That number has now topped over 100 improvements or modifications to our security measures.

Recently in Indonesia, a taxi, dropping off a guest in the portiere of a hotel, exploded, killing 13 people and wounding over 100. We modified our procedures in accepting taxis on property. We innovate, adapt and overcome any threat that is presented to us.

In SWAT we stated, "We are only as strong as our weakest link." How do you ensure the preventive measures and concepts are firmly entrenched into your property on every level? Training. Training for what? Training for everything.

In security we don't need to know the political motivation or the reason why the person is doing such a horrific act. We need to know the physical actions and their tactics. In football, no team goes straight to the Super Bowl without first practicing, creating defensive and offensive plays, and scouting out the other team. In security we must do the same. We establish plans, obtain intelligence, implement the preventive measures and train.

After September 11th, I received more calls than Allied Van Lines has movers. Every suspicious person or situation was reported. People broke the mold. They didn't say, "That's not my job," or "I don't want to get involved." They became part of the security department. The size of my department isn't the number of officers

I have on my staff, but it should be everyone that walks in that property.

We cannot afford to become complacent as the al-Qaeda training manual has indicated. We continuously train our front line staff to be vigilant and recognize suspicious persons or situations.

Ask your staff this one question, "Do you feel safe?" If they don't feel safe, then the directive of each security director and corporate officer is to reverse this sense of insecurity without question.

In conclusion, Mel Gibson played Benjamin Martin in the movie, "The Patriot." He said, "This war will not be fought, not on the frontier, not on some distant battlefield, but amongst us, among our homes. Our children will learn of it with their own eyes."

Isn't that what happened on September 11th?

In the field of casino security, the casino chiefs' association has brought together security chiefs to develop training programs, opened lines of communication between multiple agencies and raised the level of security in Las Vegas. We cannot afford to become complacent as the al-Qaeda training manual has indicated just because nothing has happened in the United States since September 11th and the terrorist acts have occurred in foreign lands. We are working together daily to ensure the safety of our guests and employees, but not on just one property. All casinos are part of the protection equation. They will never take away our freedom or our way of life.

Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Shepherd follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID SHEPHERD

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become complacent as the Al Qaeda training manual has indicated. We continuously train our front line staff to be vigilant and recognize suspicious persons or situations. Ask your staff this one question, "Do you feel safe?" If they don't feel safe, then the directive of each security director and corporate officer is to reverse this sense of insecurity without question.

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Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Shepherd. Your testimony was excellent as we anticipated. And it reminded me of something that I wanted to do at the beginning of this second panel, if I may take a moment of just personal privilege.

I want to recognize and thank all the members out here in the audience who belong to our first responders, whether they're fire, police, Metro, Highway Patrol, you did a wonderful job just 48 hours ago responding to the floods that were here in Las Vegas. The footage that we watched on the television were just heroic of your efforts.

So on behalf of, not just Congress, but myself and I think a lot of Nevadans, we all want to say thank you to you personally for the efforts that you've done.

This is part of our Homeland Security. You are a big part of it, and we want you to know that we appreciate your efforts.

Mr. GIBBONS. With that being said, let me now turn to Mr. Randy Walker for your opening statements. Mr. Walker, welcome, and the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF MR. RANDY WALKER, DIRECTOR, CLARK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of Clark County and the Clark County Department of Aviation, I thank you for this invitation to address the security needs of Las Vegas McCarran International Airport.

On September 11th, 2001, almost two years ago, the aviation industry suffered a devastating blow, as we all know. As airplanes were forced down onto airfields around the Nation and all air travel was suspended for days, the problems facing our industry changed in an instant.

You may recall that prior to 9-11, we were faced with unprecedented passenger traffic, which created significant strains on the Nation's aviation infrastructure. Before 9-11, our focus was on more runways, airspace efficiency enhancements and a passenger's bill of rights.

Almost overnight, our concerns shifted to the survival of the Nation's airlines and the major security enhancements necessary to assure the traveling public it was safe to fly again. We applaud Congress for responding in record time by enacting Federal legisla-

tion which imposed sweeping security obligations and requirements on all airports and airlines.

A new Federal agency, the Transportation Security Administration (or TSA), was created, and a new Federal security screening workforce began to assume the security related responsibilities previously borne by the airlines.

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act required the TSA to install Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) at 429 commercial airports to screen all checked baggage by December 31, 2002. In addition, TSA and its industry partners were given deadlines for enhanced screening of passengers, checked luggage, and cargo shipments.

In retrospect, we all knew it would be difficult, if not impossible, for TSA to meet this deadline at 100 percent of the Nation's commercial airports. According to the Department of Transportation Inspector General, as of July 6, 2002, a little over a year ago, six months before the screening deadline, there were only 215 EDS machines and 273 Explosive Trace Detection machines in use at 59 airports.

Consequently, TSA would have had to purchase and install 1,000 EDS machines and 5,600 EDT machines at airports in just five months, approximately one machine every 37 minutes between July and December 31st to fulfill the 100 percent explosive detection mandate.

Even if manufacturers could produce that many machines, TSA would have been required to hire and train enough baggage screeners to operate the EDS and ETD machines. TSA would have needed to recruit, hire, and train approximately 21,600 screeners to operate these machines.

Again, according to the DOT Inspector General, by July of last year, the TSA had hired and trained only 215 baggage screeners. Consequently, the agency was given the impossible task to recruit, hire and properly train approximately 21,400 screeners over five months, approximately one screener every four minutes.

With encouragement from the airports, including McCarran International Airport, Congress responded by providing the TSA needed flexibility to meet the statutory deadlines imposed, particularly at unique airports like McCarran.

These requirements have posed a significant burden on airports everywhere; however, I dare say, with the exception of New York and Washington, D.C., no one has felt the adverse impact more than we have Las Vegas and at McCarran.

From a high of 3.4 million passengers in the month of August 2001, passenger traffic at McCarran fell 37 percent almost overnight. Our hotel occupancy plummeted during the fall of 2002 as cancellations reflected the somber and apprehensive mood of the Nation. This, combined with the fear of flying, kept many of our tourists away from Las Vegas. Thousands of hotel workers lost jobs. At McCarran, most of the planned capacity expansion projects were shelved and our focus shifted immediately to meeting the enhanced security requirements imposed by the Federal law.

Interesting enough, air traffic to Las Vegas was really the first to begin to recover in the Nation. By Christmas of 2001, we began to see a return of some of the lost passenger volume. While our

numbers during 2002 failed to match our record highs of the previous year, they grew gradually from the post 9–11 traffic levels, while traffic at most other airports continued to decline or at best remained flat.

However, with the return of our passengers came a host of new challenges. Long lines and extensive delays sprung up at the security points in the airport as a result of the required enhanced passenger processing and security screening. This problem was exacerbated by the layoffs of airline employees by many of the carriers serving McCarran as they struggled to survive financially.

I am sure I do not need to remind you, Mr. Chairman, of the endless lines that stretched out the doors and onto McCarran's roadways, because I know you experienced them personally, and I know you stood in the lines as well, or the hour it took to pass through the security checkpoints.

Immediately this highlighted another security threat that I don't think people have thought about. Such long lines give terrorists an alternative and attractive target, thereby creating an unacceptable increased security risk at airports.

In addition to the security risks, we feared that tourists whose travel is discretionary would choose to avoid screening delays and business travelers might not choose to endure the hassle of traveling to Las Vegas if the delay problems were not rapidly solved.

McCarran is unique among the Nation's airports when you consider that we handle approximately 36 million passengers who use our airport each year; 82 percent of McCarran's passengers are tourists or conventioners who are vital to the continued economic well being of Southern Nevada.

Las Vegas is the second leading airport in the Nation for origination and destination passengers. This means that we handle more passengers through the security screening than any other airport in the world except for Los Angeles. Las Vegas handles an average of 50,000 departing passengers per day. These passengers bring with them approximately 60,000 bags per day that need to be checked, which means we must screen more luggage than most of the Nation's larger airports.

On our weekly peak days of Thursday or Sunday, when tourists coming and from leaving Las Vegas, we screen over 65,000 passengers.

Like most airports, Las Vegas McCarran was not designed with adequate space in the ticket lobby or bag makeup rooms for the installation of large numbers of screening machines, which are now required by the TSA. Shoehorning such equipment into the existing space just to meet an arbitrary deadline would have led to inefficiencies, delays, and economic burdens and even security-related problems, with masses of people cramped into a small area.

McCarran's analysis has shown that under one development scenario, proposed by the TSA early in 2002, passengers checking baggage would have waited up to four hours in line to check their bags. Clearly unacceptable from a security and from customer service standpoint.

Giving TSA more flexibility to work with a few selected airports like McCarran on how to efficiently install in-line ESD and ETD luggage screening machines helped prevent further economic dis-

ruption to the airline industry and tourism following 9–11 and also allowed us to meet the security goals that Congress had established for airports.

McCarran has moved aggressively and was one of the first airports in the Nation to be given approval to commence construction of the In-line baggage screening system at our main terminal. This in-line system will change the passenger ticket counter experience to almost a pre-9–11 experience for the customer.

Luggage checked at the ticket counter will be directed to the TSA through a complex system of conveyor belts and screening machines. TSA employees will screen each bag for dangerous materials before the bag is returned to an airline for processing. This system will cost approximately \$125 million dollars to install and is scheduled to be operational by December 31, 2004. In fact, the first two notes of this six-note system are under construction as we speak.

Recently, we faced an additional challenge when the TSA announced plans to reduce the number of passenger screeners assigned to our airport. Upon our investigation of the methodology used by TSA to make personnel and equipment allocations among the Nation's airports, we found several major flaws:

TSA's staffing formula was not based on the number of passengers that require security screening, but rather upon the number of checkpoint screening lanes that an airport may have.

TSA screeners were assigned to match the number of screening lanes at an airport regardless of the need. If an airport had more physical space for lanes, they would get more staff regardless of the number of passengers using those lanes.

TSA's own formula underestimated staffing needs at McCarran. Their initial proposal was for 528 screeners, and our calculations showed that the average passenger wait time at the screening checkpoint would have been 41 minutes under that plan, well in excess of the 10-minute commitment provided by the Federal Government initially.

Our analysis shows by adding one staff member per shift per checkpoint lane, we could reduce the average passenger wait to 13 minutes. And this would bring the total staffing requirements from TSA to 630.

We are moving aggressively at McCarran to add more security checkpoint lanes. On June 6, 2002, we added three new screening lanes to serve Concourses C and D. We are about to begin construction on a project to extend the screening areas over baggage claim so that we can install six more screening lanes. However, this will require an additional TSA staffing to fully man and operate them.

We want to thank Congress for recognizing in the recently approved FAA Reauthorization Conference report that allocation of TSA personnel and equipment based exclusively upon lanes or hubbing passengers was not the right approach. We gratefully thank our congressional delegation for their support in this effort. We now believe that the TSA has a greater appreciation of the security problems, especially at McCarran and is moving to address them.

Our local Federal Security Director is an essential member of our McCarran team and has proven to be an excellent partner in addressing these problems.

We still have a long way to go, however. Last month, for example, we enjoyed the fifth busiest month in the history of the airport. In July, just this last month, we processed more passengers than we did July 2001.

We have resumed the expansion of the “D” satellite concourse. We anticipate that as soon as three years from now, depending on traffic flow, we could begin construction of another Unit Terminal along Russell Road in front of “D” gates. This will necessitate new in-line baggage screening equipment and additional screening checkpoints for passengers who will use that terminal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to review the significant security-related challenges we faced at McCarran. Our success is of vital importance for the continued recovery and expansion of Las Vegas’ economy, and I’m sure you know that very well, and we appreciate your assistance. I express our appreciation for your previous help and previous help of our congressional delegation on these issues. I am thanking you in advance for the help I know that you will give us in the future.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Walker. As a frequent flyer into and out of Las Vegas, I can attest to everything you have said in your comments. I can understand and appreciate your efforts to make it better.

[The statement of Mr. Walker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. RANDALL WALKER

Chairman Gibbons and Members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for this invitation to address the security needs of Las Vegas McCarran International Airport.

On September 11th, 2001 almost two years ago, the aviation industry suffered a devastating blow. As airplanes were forced down onto airfields around the nation and all air travel was suspended for days, the problems facing our industry changed in an instant. You may recall that prior to 9–11, we were faced with unprecedented passenger traffic, which created significant strains on the nation’s aviation infrastructure. Before 9–11, our focus was on more runways, airspace efficiency enhancements and a passenger’s bill of rights.

Almost overnight, our concerns shifted to the survival of the nation’s airlines and the major security enhancements necessary to assure the traveling public it was safe to fly again. We applaud Congress for responding in record time by enacting federal legislation which imposed sweeping security obligations and requirements on all airports and airlines. A new federal agency, the Transportation Security Administration (or TSA), was created and a new federal security screening workforce began to assume the security related responsibilities previously borne by the airlines. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act required the TSA to install Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) at 429 commercial airports to screen all checked baggage by December 31, 2002. In addition, TSA and its industry partners were given deadlines for enhanced screening of passengers, checked luggage and cargo shipments.

In retrospect, we all knew it would be difficult—if not impossible—for TSA to meet this deadline at 100 percent of the nation’s commercial airports. According to the Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspector General as of July 6-six months before the screening deadline—there were only 215 EDS machines and 273 Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) machines in use at 59 airports. Consequently, TSA would have had to purchase and install approximately 1,000 EDS machines and 5,600 EDT machines at airports in just five months—approximately one machine every 37 minutes between July and December 31 to fulfill the 100% explosive detection mandate. Even if manufacturers could produce that many machines, TSA would have been required to hire and train enough baggage screeners to operate the EDS

and EID machines. TSA would have needed to recruit, hire and train approximately 21,600 screeners to operate these machines. Again, according to the DOT Inspector General, by July of last year the TSA had hired and trained only 215 baggage screeners. Consequently, the agency was given the impossible task to recruit, hire and properly train approximately 21,400 screeners over five months—approximately one screener every 4 minutes.

With encouragement from the airports, including McCarran, Congress responded by providing the TSA needed flexibility to meet the statutory deadlines imposed—particularly at unique airports like McCarran.

These requirements have posed a significant burden on airports everywhere; however, I dare say no city with the exception of New York and Washington D.C. felt the adverse impacts of 9–11 more than Las Vegas. From a high of 3.4 million passengers in the month of August 2001, passenger traffic at McCarran fell 37% percent almost overnight. Our hotel occupancy plummeted during the fall of 2002 as cancellations reflected the somber and apprehensive mood of the nation. This, combined with the fear of flying, kept many of our tourists away from Las Vegas. Thousands of hotel workers lost jobs. At McCarran, most of the planned capacity expansion projects were shelved and our focus shifted immediately to meeting the enhanced security requirements imposed by federal law.

Interestingly enough, air traffic to Las Vegas was really the first to begin to recover. By Christmas of 2001, we began to see a return of some of the lost passenger volume. While our numbers during 2002 failed to match the record highs of the previous year, they grew gradually from the post 9–11 traffic levels, while traffic at most other airports continued to decline or at best remained flat.

However, with the return of our passengers came a host of new challenges. Long lines and extensive delays sprung up at the security points in the airport as a result of the required enhanced passenger processing and security screening. This problem was exacerbated by the layoffs of airline employees by many of the carriers serving McCarran as they struggled to survive financially. I am sure I do not need to remind you, Mr. Chairman, of the endless lines that stretched out the doors and onto McCarran's roadways, or the hours it took to pass through the security checkpoints. Immediately this highlighted another threat. Such long lines give terrorists an alternative and attractive target, thereby creating an unacceptable increased security risk. In addition, we feared that tourists whose travel is discretionary would choose to avoid screening delays and business travelers might not choose to endure the hassle of traveling to Las Vegas if the delay problems were not rapidly solved.

McCarran is unique among the nation's airports when you consider that:

- There are more than 36 million passengers who use our airport each year.
- 82% of McCarran's passengers are tourists or conventioners who are vital to the continued economic well being of Southern Nevada.
- Las Vegas is the second leading airport in the nation for origination and destination passengers. This means that we handle more passengers through security screening than any other airport except for LAX.
- Las Vegas handles an average of 50,000 departing passengers per day. These passengers bring approximately 60,000 bags per day, which means we must screen more luggage than most of the nation's larger airports.
- On our weekly peak days of Thursday or Sunday (when tourists come in and out for the weekend) we screen over 65,000 passengers.
- Like most airports, Las Vegas McCarran was not designed with adequate space in the ticket lobby or bag makeup rooms for the installation of large numbers of the screening machines, which are now required by the TSA.
- Shoehorning such equipment into the existing space just to meet an arbitrary deadline would have led to inefficiencies, delays, and economic burdens on our air carriers and potentially to our tourism based economy.
- McCarran's analysis has shown that under one deployment scenario, proposed by the TSA early in 2002, passengers checking baggage could be waiting in line for four hours.

Giving TSA more flexibility to work with a few selected airports like McCarran on how to efficiently install inline EDS and EID luggage screening machines helped prevent further economic disruption to the airline industry and tourism following 9/11.

McCarran has moved aggressively and was one of the first airports in the nation to be given approval to commence construction of the In Line baggage screening system at our main terminal. This in-line system will change the passenger ticket counter experience to almost a pre-9–11 experience. Luggage checked at the ticket counter will be directed to the TSA through a complex system of conveyor belts and screening machines. TSA employees will screen each bag for dangerous materials

before the bag is returned to an airline. This system will cost approximately \$125 million dollars to install and is scheduled to be operational by December 31, 2004.

Recently, we faced an additional challenge when the TSA announced plans to reduce the number of passenger screeners assigned to our airport. Upon our investigation of the methodology used by TSA to make personnel and equipment allocations among the nations airports, we found several major flaws:

- TSA's staffing formula was not based upon the number of passengers that require security screening but rather upon the number of checkpoint screening lanes an airport may have.
- TSA screeners were assigned to match the number of screening lanes at an airport regardless of the need. If an airport had more physical space for lanes, they would get more staff regardless of the number of passengers using those lanes.
- TSA's own formula underestimated staffing needs at McCarran (the actual calculation was not correct!)
- With TSA's initial proposal for 528 screeners, the average passenger wait time would have been 41-minutes at McCarran, well in excess of the 10-minute commitment made by the federal government.

Our analysis shows by adding one staff member per shift per checkpoint lane we could reduce the average passenger wait time to 13 minutes. By adding one more person to each lane, total TSA staffing requirement would be 630 based on existing lanes.

We are moving aggressively at McCarran to add more screening checkpoints lanes. On June 6, 2002 we added three (3) new screening lanes serving Concourses C and D. We are about to begin construction on a project to extend the screening areas over baggage claim so we can install 6 more screening lanes. However, this will require an additional TSA staffing to fully man and operate them.

We want to thank Congress for recognizing in the recently approved FAA Reauthorization Conference report that allocation of TSA personnel and equipment based exclusively upon lanes or hubbing passengers was the not the right approach. We now believe that the TSA has a greater appreciation of the security problems, especially at McCarran and is moving to address them. Our local Federal Security Director is a member of our McCarran team and has proven to be an excellent partner in addressing these problems.

We still have a long way to go however. Last month, for example, we enjoyed the fifth busiest month in our history. We have resumed the expansion of the "D" satellite concourse and we anticipate that as soon as 3 years from now we could begin construction of another Unit Terminal on Russell Road in front the "D" gates. This will necessitate new inline baggage screening equipment and additional screening checkpoints for passengers who will use that terminal.

Thank you for allowing me to review the significant security related challenges we have faced and are facing at McCarran International Airport. Our success is of vital importance to the continued recovery and expansion of Las Vegas' tourist dependent economy while maintaining a high level of safety. Along with providing the highest level of safety and security, we strive to maintain an exceptional customer service environment. We certainly are appreciative of the recent revision to the allocation of Homeland Security funds that now includes tourist numbers in the formula which was accomplished by our Nevada delegation. We recognize our vital role as the gateway to the most exciting city in the world. We are truly the first impression and last look of every air passenger to Las Vegas.

I want to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for helping to ensure that every air passenger to Las Vegas enjoys a safe, secure and hassle-free experience.

Mr. GIBBONS. We turn now to Dr. Carrison. Welcome, the floor is yours. We look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF DR. DALE CARRISON, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT MEDICAL DIRECTOR, UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, TRAUMA CENTER

Dr. CARRISON. Thank you, Congressman Gibbons, it's a privilege to be here. I appreciate you having us here, and I think it is extremely important.

You have my document for submission in the record. I will address some issues in that and make some extemporaneous comments based on what I heard here today.

I am proud to represent University Medical Center, the only public hospital in Southern Nevada and the only level-one trauma center in the State of Nevada. We have been fortunate that we've had incidents with regards to weapons of mass destruction that occurred at our hospital, and we have learned from those.

The first two incidents were prior to September 11th. We had an incident when an anthrax exposure came into the hospital. At that time we had post-incident debriefing, which involved essentially the emergency department, the agency that brought the alleged victim of anthrax infection in. We learned from that. It was not what I would call an ideal debriefing.

We had a second incident in the community where there was a sarin gas threat of a person who had taken over a facility and threatened that they had sarin gas. We were able to respond to that with the help of Nellis Air Force Base. We were able to obtain the medications that would have been necessary to address this had there, in fact, been sarin gas.

We had a much better post-incident debriefing on that incident. We were able to establish some policies and procedures that would assist us if that occurred in the future.

But I think at that point reality had not really set in. Reality set in as of 9-11. Since 9-11, we had an incident where an individual in the community manufactured some lysine and injected himself. That incident after 9-11 showed the hospital and community really had their heart in finding out what we could do to prevent casualties from these weapons of mass destruction similar to this biological chemical radiological.

That incident, we had 20 agencies, 50 people. The post-incident debriefing was outstanding. We went back to the hospital. Since that time, that gave us new life. After 9-11, of course, we started like everyone else to look at our systems and see what could be prepared better. We reviewed our policies and procedures, modified them. We have a committee, a WMD committee. We established an incident command. We have enhanced our security capabilities. We expanded the staff training just so that people know what these agents are and what their effects on. With ignorance, you can't have that because people become terrified.

Our nursing, clerical, from the janitors to the clerks, everyone involved in the hospital, we've attempted to educate them on weapons of mass destruction, particularly biological that we would see in a hospital so everybody understands and that there is no mystery and they understand that it is a disease.

With that, we expanded that decontamination plan. And just so I better address the EMS system so that the committee understands that I am EMS friendly. I'm a former deputy sheriff, Orange County, Southern California. I'm a former special agent of the FBI, and the current medical director for Clark County Fire Department, Medical Director for Mercy Air Helicopter, which provides the emergency helicopter services in the county, Medical Director for Lake Mead National Recreational Area, and I'm an active responder with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department as a

tactical position for the SWAT team. So I am EMS friendly and I have been a responder and I am a responder.

Communications are extremely important. We have enhanced our internal communications. And as you respond, it's as you train. We have increased our training. I don't think it's enough yet, but we're working on that. Training takes resources as everything associated with this does.

We have done a much better job of coordinating with local communities and working with the Clark County Health Department, the LEPC, Clark County Public Safety Coordination Team, the FBI, and local law enforcement terrorism. We have good communication with that now.

Mr. Shepherd brought up a point that it's only as good as the weakest link. I have concerns that as a director of an emergency department and responsible for two other emergency departments in the community that we may be the weak link.

Without allocation resources to the EMS community, first responders to law enforcement, I think we need to remember that the last link in that chain is the hospital. Without that link, our best efforts of first responders will bear no fruit. We won't save people. We won't be able to treat their injuries. It won't happen.

And no offense to anyone, but the allocation of resources to the State of Nevada as the public hospital in Southern Nevada, University Medical Center for my WMD program, I received zero. Zip. Nothing. We want to be a link in that chain, but we want to be a strong link. We don't want to be the weak link.

As everything, everyone wants, everyone wants more resources so they can do a better job at being prepared. I understand that. I understand the allocation and limitation of resources, but I would point out once again, that what we have are patients. Those people who are victims of a weapons of mass destruction event are going to the hospitals. They're going to come to us for treatment.

We have—the Clark County Fire Department Hazmat is outstanding. They would be at an incident. What does my Hazmat do for decontamination at the hospital? I have the ability to decontaminate two people at a time. Past Federal rules indicate that the decontamination area should be within the walls of the hospital. We know now that is a great mistake. The last thing you want in a hospital emergency department is to bring a contaminated person within those walls because then you will set down the only patient emergency system that you have because the whole place would be contaminated, and that would be the end of that link in the chain.

Extremely important to remember the hospital—extremely important that we remember our patients and our mission to our patients, and if we are not included in that first responder as the emergency responder that the patients are going to come to.

The other part we don't address, you can't think of how many people are going to get in their cars when they think they've been exposed, and we saw this with the anthrax. We had people bringing letters into the emergency department that had a white powder. We have to address that from a security standpoint. We have to address that multiple people showing up that we can't allow into the emergency department from both a security point and from a

decontamination point, so that the safety of those people who are providing the patient care is ensured.

We also have to remember that because we have an incident of this sort, the other things that occur in our community are not going to stop. We are going to continue to have motor vehicle crashes. We are going to continue to have people with heart attacks. We are going to continue to have people that have respiratory illnesses that require emergent intervention. I can go on with that list of things.

I can tell you that the system right now is stressed to the max. And if we had an incident, it could break that system.

That was one consideration given for having a mobile hospital, something that we could set up immediately to provide the care for those people who may be contaminated and provide them a safe environment and a safe environment for those persons who are taking care of them.

In closing, I appreciate, again. Being here. I will tell you that we are committed to staying ever vigilant in our efforts and to the best of our ability to respond to any disaster in our community.

Thank you.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Doctor. You have brought some new information to light here with this committee and have raised a number of questions even in my mind that I'll talk to you about in a minute.

[The statement of Dr. Carrison follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DALE CARRISON

HOSPITAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT, ENHANCEMENTS AND PLANNING

As the only public hospital in Southern Nevada, University Medical Center of Southern Nevada (UMC) has been actively involved in emergency response planning for a number of years. After the tragic events of September 11, UMC initiated a number of analyses to help ensure its readiness to respond to a man-made or natural disaster. In particular, UMC conducted a hazardous vulnerability assessment to identify the range of hazards to which UMC could be called upon to respond. As a result of these analyses, UMC has identified some specific areas on which immediate efforts could be focused, given existing resources, to help increase UMC's readiness to respond in the event of a disaster in our community. Additional emergency response enhancement opportunities have also been identified for possible future implementation in the event that additional resources become available.

The following is a list of the emergency response enhancements that have been implemented since September 11:

- 1) Review and revision of emergency response policies and procedures.
- 2) Formation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) committee.
- 3) Establishment of an Incident Command System (ICS).
- 4) Enhancement of security capabilities.
 - a) Traditional personal safety and site security.
 - b) "Medical" safety, contamination prevention.
 - c) Coordination with local law enforcement agencies.
- 5) Expansion of staff training on clinical and operational emergency response.
- 6) Establishment of decontamination plan.
- 7) Establishment of clinical resource library.
- 8) Enhancement of internal and external communications equipment and systems.
- 9) Expansion of in-house disaster planning drills.
- 10) Coordination with all local emergency response agencies and participation in emergency response drills.
 - a) Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)
 - b) Clark County Public Safety Coordination Team
 - c) Clark County Health District Incident Response
 - d) FBI and Local Law Enforcement Terrorism Coordination

With the implementation of these immediate enhancements, UMC has increased its readiness to respond in the event of a disaster in our community. In addition, UMC has identified other enhancement opportunities in the areas of equipment, supplies, capacity, planning and coordination that it is working to develop with existing and/or potential future resources. The following is a sample of the additional enhancements that have been identified for future emergency readiness:

- 1) Enhance internal and external communication systems and technology.
- 2) Acquire additional personal protective equipment and supplies.
- 3) Increase emergency patient decontamination capacity.
- 4) Increase emergency patient isolation capacity.
- 5) Enhance security-related technology.
- 6) Enhance training and education.
- 7) Acquire additional clinical equipment.
- 8) Enhance ICS capabilities.
- 9) Acquire "mobile hospital" MASH-style capabilities.
- 10) Enhance coordination with local, state and federal agencies to help institute a uniform leadership policy in Southern Nevada.
- 11) Initiate coordination with FEMA regarding emergency pharmaceutical distribution.

Since September 11, a great deal of effort has been devoted to helping ensure UMC's readiness to respond to any type of disaster, man-made or natural. As a result of our initial assessments, we have identified a number of immediate and long-term opportunities to enhance our ability to respond. While we have learned a great deal and instituted some successful enhancements, we realize that we have some future enhancements that would further increase our response capabilities, and potentially new challenges that may arise. It is with this in mind that we are committed to staying ever vigilant in our efforts to do the best of our ability to be ready to respond to any disaster in our community.

Mr. GIBBONS. Now, I'll turn it over to Mr. Bill Conger for your comment. Bill, welcome, and the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF MR. BILL CONGER, DEPUTY CHIEF, LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

Mr. CONGER. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to speak this morning. I'm substituting for Sheriff Young because he is unable to be with us today.

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department is the eleventh largest police department in the country with 4,300 employees and jurisdictional responsibility of 7,800 square miles.

We are responsible for all of unincorporated Clark County, which includes the Strip corridor, McCarran Airport, the sixth or seven busiest, depending on who you talk to, Nellis Air Force Base, Hoover Dam, portions of the Nevada Test Site, and all other outlying areas, including the population centers of Laughlin and Primm.

Our jurisdiction also includes the City of Las Vegas. Most of the entertainment industry in Southern Nevada and approximately 1.2 million of the county's 1.6 million population and most of the 35 million visitors that visit our community each year are also our responsibility.

Our local response community has long recognized the need for a regional approach to preparedness and response to any eventuality that could occur.

This valley has a longstanding history of major events from the MGM/Hilton fires in the early 1980s, the PepCon explosion, and the yearly preparation for New Year's Eve, which is second only to New York in size and scope. These major events have created a viable emergency management community that has been in full swing for many years.

The preparedness/response piece of the puzzle is a focus that is vital to the future of our community, but it is only a part of the total picture, especially in areas that are totally reliant on tourism, as we are, and the economic impact that its loss would incur. Because, without a doubt, our most important economy and a significant portion of the state's economy is based on discretionary spending from tourism and the entertainment industry. Any impact on those dollars would have a staggering effect both on the local economy and the State.

When I speak about our community, I am speaking regionally, which includes the cities of Henderson, North Las Vegas, Boulder City, and Mesquite, because all the local governments recognize the impact of an event anywhere in this valley.

This brings me to the focus of the Metropolitan Police Department in the fight against terrorism. Prevention of an act in our community is the most important issue we deal with on a daily basis. The fact that the economic life of our community is dependent on the discretionary dollars makes us vulnerable to those who would make our community unsafe for visitors. To put it bluntly, people won't vacation where they don't feel safe. Even the threat of an event could have a substantial impact.

The national strategy includes the prevention of an act as a significant portion of its effort. Prevention from our perspective is twofold:

Number one, the open and overt aspect of the policing function including partnerships within both the public and private sector and educating people on what to look for and where they can go with the information. We have created a preparedness document for the citizens of Clark County called "H.A.N.D.S.S." and partnered with the Sprint Telephone Company to get it printed in the phone book essentially got it out to 1.3 million copies in the local community. This gave citizens instructions on how to prepare for any disaster.

We have created a Homeland Security Bureau and activated a hotline for citizens to call to report suspicious activity. All leads that come in on that hotline are investigated and either verified and passed on to the JTFF or defunked with no further investigation necessary. Open source information is collected daily, analyzed, and disseminated to both law enforcement and the public/private sector, especially if the information is a potential challenge for that particular group or industry.

Communications operability and interoperability are significant issues that not only affect our community, but most other jurisdictions as well. Prevention of an act and the coordinated response to an act are linked to the ability for police and the rest of the first response community to communicate with each other.

It is important to talk with other agencies and jurisdictions, but also a major challenge facing us currently is the inability for police officers to talk to each other inside buildings and in certain areas of town.

The second side of prevention has to do with the covert aspect of what we as a police agency do with our Federal partners. After 9-11, our department moved very quickly to get security clearances for officers involved in the JTTF. Key administrative personnel

were also given clearances in order to make decisions based on national security for determination of whether a mobilization may be necessary to prevent an event.

Covert operations have long been a vital aspect of the police function. In today's environment with the potential for individuals to destroy the safety and security of our community, covert operations with Federal partnerships are necessary to protect our tourist lifeblood.

I am reticent to discuss whether we are a target or vulnerable to terrorism in an open forum, but I know the local and Federal partnerships that have been created have gone a long way in ensuring the creation of an inhospitable environment for those who would cause our community harm.

I want to thank you for giving the Metropolitan Police Department the opportunity to share our views on the vital mission of homeland security as it relates to Clark County and the southwest region.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Conger.
[The statement of Mr. Conger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. BILL CONGER

Mr. Gibbons, members of Congress, my name is Bill Conger. am a Deputy Chief with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department substituting for Sheriff Young who is unable to be with us today.

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department is the eleventh largest police department in the country with 4,300 employees and jurisdictional responsibility of approximately 7,800 square miles. We are responsible for all of unincorporated Clark County which includes Congressional Hearing, August 21, 2003 Testimony of Deputy Chief Bill Conger Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department the Strip corridor, McCarran Airport (the sixth busiest airport in the nation), Nellis Air Force Base, Hoover Dam, portions of the Nevada Test Site, and all other outlying areas of the county, such as Laughlin and Primm. Our jurisdiction also includes the city of Las Vegas. Most of the entertainment industry in Southern Nevada and approximately 1.2 million of the county's 1.6 million population and most of the 35 million visitors that visit our community yearly are also our responsibility.

Our local response community has long recognized the need for a regional approach to preparedness and response to any eventuality that could occur.

This valley has a long-standing history of response to major events from the MGM/Hilton fires in the early 1980's, the PepCon explosion, and the yearly preparation for New Year's eve which is second only to New York City in size. These major events have created a viable emergency management community that has been in full swing for several years.

The preparedness/response piece of this puzzle is a focus that is vital to the future of our community, but it is only a part of the total picture, especially in areas that are totally reliant on tourism and the economic impact its loss would incur. Because, without doubt, our most important economy and a significant portion of the state's economy is based on discretionary spending from the tourism, entertainment industry. Any impact on those dollars would have a staggering effect on both the local economy and the state.

When I speak about our community, I am speaking regionally, which includes the cities of Henderson, North Las Vegas, Boulder City, and Mesquite, because all the local governments recognize the impact of an event anywhere in this valley.

This brings me to the focus of the Metropolitan Police Department in the fight against terrorism. Prevention of an act in our community is the most important issue we deal with on a daily basis. The fact that the economic life of our community is dependent on discretionary dollars makes us vulnerable to those that would make our community unsafe for visitors. To put it bluntly, people won't vacation where they don't feel safe. The threat of an event could have a substantial impact.

The national strategy includes the prevention of the act and is a significant portion of our effort. Prevention from our perspective is twofold:

1. The open aspect of the policing function including partnerships within both the public and private sector and educating people on what to look for and where they can go with the information. We have created a preparedness document for the citizens of Clark County called "H.A.N.D.S.S." and partnered with Sprint Telephone to get it printed in the phone book. This gave citizens instructions on how to prepare for a disaster.

We have created a Homeland Security Bureau and activated a hotline for citizens to call to report suspicious activity. All leads that come into our office are investigated and either verified and passed on to the JTTF or debunked with no further investigation necessary. Open source information is collected daily, analyzed, and disseminated to both law enforcement and the public/private sector, especially if the information is a potential challenge for that particular group or industry.

Communications operability and interoperability are significant issues that not only affect our community, but most other jurisdictions as well. Prevention of an act and the coordinated response to an act are linked to the ability for police and the rest of the first response community to communicate with each other. It is important to talk to other agencies and jurisdictions, but a major challenge facing us currently is the inability of police officers to talk to each other inside buildings and in certain areas of town.

2. The second side of prevention has to do with the covert aspect of what we as a police agency do with our federal partners. After 9-11, our department moved very quickly to get security clearances for officers involved in the JTTF. Key administrative personnel were also given security clearances in order to make decisions based on national security for determination of whether a mobilization may be necessary to prevent an event.

Covert operations have long been a vital aspect of the police function. In today's environment with the potential for individuals to destroy the safety and security of our community, covert operations with federal partnerships are necessary to protect our tourist lifeblood. I am reticent to discuss whether we are a target of terrorism in an open forum, but I know the local and federal partnerships that have been created have gone a long way in ensuring the creation of an inhospitable environment for those that would cause our community harm.

I want to thank you for giving the Metropolitan Police Department the opportunity to share our views on the vital mission of Homeland Security as it relates to Clark County and the southwest region.

Mr. GIBBONS. And to each of you, I'm sure you can tell by the tenor of your statements to the records that all is not quite as rosy as you might have heard from those people on the higher echelon in homeland security. That's one of reasons why we are here in this hearing is to have the differences, the gaps, the weakness of this chain, as Mr. Shepherd said, brought to light so that we in Congress can have an idea on how better to help you do your job.

Let me begin by asking Mr. Conger—I know that your position, you have a great deal of day-to-day contact with the soldier who is down there in the trenches doing the battle on the streets fighting crime, drugs, and terrorism.

Do you feel that your officers are as prepared as they can be to recognize needed indexes of terrorists and tactics of terrorism to be able to report back to you, which then can be shared vertically that information? Are they trained to look at those issues?

Mr. CONGER. I'm going to answer that this way, sir. We still have a long way to go. We have a department of 4,300 and we also have a large jurisdiction, and it doesn't just include our employees being prepared. It includes the first response community, the entire—requires the help of the citizens of Clark County, and it is our goal to get everybody prepared and everybody up to the level that they need to be, that if they see something suspicious, they can give us that information knowing that we are going to take care of it.

Are we there yet? No.

Are we as prepared as any community in the United States to respond to any eventuality? Yes, with some caveats, and those caveats being we have to overcome a person's innate fear of the word "weapon of mass destruction," of the word "it's radiologic," or of the word, "it's biologic." And we need to be able to create an environment that the first responders and the citizens don't go into a panic when those issues raise their head.

I was the incident commander on the lycine incident in Clark County. The call that I received at two o'clock in the morning was, "Chief, we have a lycine exposure, we have two emergency rooms closed, we have several officers exposed," et cetera. It brought this community to the forefront on the response aspect of this very quickly.

Did we make mistakes? Yes.

Are we going to do it better next time. And as Dr. Carrison talked about, working as a partnership is what is most important to this community. In that lycine incident after about three hours, we knew that it was a horrible public relations nightmare for this community. So we needed to get that information out as fast as we could that this was not a terrorist event, it was an individual act.

Did I answer your question, sir?

Mr. GIBBONS. Very well.

Mr. CONGER. Thank you.

Mr. GIBBONS. And it's nice to know that you're making a difference and that we are better prepared today than we were yesterday for events that reflect terrorism. As you indicated, prevention is the number one goal. Being a first responder says that somehow we didn't bat 1000. We are now responding to something. And, unfortunately, there's no luxury of batting 1000 in this world. You have to do the best you can. Unfortunately, you are not in baseball. If you're batting even 500 in baseball, you would be paid millions and millions of dollars. But if you're batting 500 in defending this country, defending the citizens, you're basically at risk for being criticized.

And what I want to say is that I hope our police forces, our Metro and first responders, aren't handcuffed by risk aversion considerations. In other words, there's so many political and sociological forces that drive us today that we are risk averse. We're afraid of being sued. Unfortunately, sometimes that can have a dramatic effect on how we view the overall picture.

It's something that I don't know how to address, and perhaps you can address it as you work through these issues, but it's something that does concern me.

Thank you for your comments. They have been great, and I really appreciate it.

Dr. Carrison, is UMC part of the overall county picture that goes to the State, as we heard Jerry Bussell talk about earlier, to decide how that in the last three or four months \$25 million that have come to the State and shared 20 percent to the State, 80 percent to counties and cities, are you part of that decision process? Are you involved in that?

I'm concerned if you say you get zero, and we understand the risks you just described.

Dr. CARRISON. I'm concerned also because that's the first time I've heard those figures. I'd have to defer that to acting CEO, Mike Walsh is here. I can tell you as the director of the emergency department and actively involved in medical staff and medical executive committee of the hospital, no.

Mr. GIBBONS. You've never heard of—

Dr. CARRISON. Never heard of the process and having been involved.

Mr. GIBBONS. That means that there's somehow a breakdown in the communication on the county side because the counties are involved, obviously from the county perspective, we were told there are 17 representatives, one for each county, as to the body that makes the decisions about how this money is to be allocated, resources provided is going to be divided up.

Dr. CARRISON. The one thing that someone might say is we are a county-supported hospital. If that's the only county hospital, we're court of last resort for those people who don't have resources to go elsewhere for good medical care or for any medical care.

Mr. GIBBONS. And you are probably going to be the court of first response when it comes to finding something biological or other attack that comes in because you have to treat individuals that are to be—

Dr. CARRISON. Individual—

Mr. GIBBONS. Treat—

Dr. CARRISON. And the teaching hospital, we have those resources with regard to what some of the research that is being done, number one trauma center, we are talking about explosive type injuries.

Mr. GIBBONS. Perhaps you could do me a favor because I realize that is a Federal level we're talking about on this committee, but this is an issue for county officials and county hospital, if you talk to the county and find out what the answer is to that question and respond back to me. I would like to know just for my own satisfaction. I'm sure there's a lot people out there that would like to know why the county is—major hospital, the county hospital in this community gets zero dollars out of that first responder money.

Dr. CARRISON. I understand that. I think we also have to consider—I don't want be cavalier on this or give the wrong impression, but I think we have to consider that we have a hospital that was losing lots of money since 9-11 because of the number of indigents or patients without resources increased dramatically. We required increased subsidy from the county. We are receiving a subsidy from the county, and the county manager, Mr. Wiley, is—I've worked with him, I spoke with him. He's done an excellent job. Mr. Walsh is stepping in as the acting CEO, and his staff are doing an excellent job addressing our shortfalls and they've reduced that. But that may be a consideration in the funds.

But, again, that's operating costs versus costs that we are looking at to give us the equipment necessary to be that link in the first responder chain if we have a WMD incident.

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, in any event, if you can find an answer in that determination and share that with us, we would be very interested. Because I'm sure it is not a unique problem to Las Vegas.

I think this has got widespread problematic concerns and much broader applications than just what you indicated.

Dr. CARRISON. Even if I were to say a comment for all hospitals and particular emergency departments and emergency personnel, physicians that staff those hospitals, it is a problem throughout the United States, and, again, we're establishing an excellent infrastructure from the Federal level going down to the State level and then into the county levels, but the problem is the hospital is still there. In some areas it's only private hospitals that have that, but they are still going to be the ones that take care of our citizens and our patients, then they cannot be overlooked because the system will break if that happens.

Mr. GIBBONS. I think people for all good reasons anticipate that the hospital will be there and capable of taking care of any illness that they have because you have done a great job in the past, and you've always been there for them, you will always be there in future, and we may be making an assumption that shouldn't be made.

Dr. CARRISON. I believe it is an assumption that absolutely should not be made. Because in most places of the United States now, if you look at the emergency visits and how they have increased and the number of hospitals that have closed, the system is really stretched to the max right now. If something happened, major incident in any number of places, the hospitals are going to be completely overwhelmed, completely overstressed. And, you know, we need part of that allocation of resources and with particularly the training and the knowledge that go with that to be able to be that final link in the chain.

Mr. GIBBONS. I have a number of questions that I've love to engage with you in, including some ideas about how you create a list of doctors and health care providers from around the State that can respond and how do we get that coordinated and how do we work on an emergency list that is—

Dr. CARRISON. What's actually doing a decent job on that is association with FEMA through the fire department and the FEMA. We have done much with local coordination with them, because, as you know or probably know, with the event of a chemical biological incident, we have to depend on FEMA because the medical resources with regard to pharmaceuticals in our community would be overwhelming without FEMA bringing those in. So that coordination is going on. There are physicians associated with that.

I think that part of it is much better than it was, but, unfortunately, I still see people having meetings. I was able to be included on the planning session for operation determined promise, but the physician that is there today is there with Clark County Health District. I think we have to remember, again, I hate to be redundant, but we still have to remember that the role the hospitals play in that first responder situation.

Mr. GIBBONS. And I think that's part of the whole process of this determined promise exercise that is going through right now out in Mesquite or Logandale about health care issues.

Doctor, let me go over to Mr. Walker and ask him a question because I know that aviation is absolutely unique. It's unique in its whole character. There is no industry that is like it from the stand-

point of how it provides the basis for an economy such as Las Vegas.

I know that many times Congress does things in an effort to bring about some assurances to the public that we are taking steps to ensure their safety. Of course, the December 31st deadline for 100 percent baggage screening, 100 percent passenger screening that was required by us oftentimes didn't consider the reality that those machines hadn't been built and couldn't be built by December 31st.

My question would be to you: Knowing the strategies of a layered defense and knowing the risk that airports have throughout the Nation, not necessarily Las Vegas, but all airports throughout, where should the first layer of security be at an airport?

Should it be before they ever get to the grounds of the airport? Should it be on the airport premises? Should it be in the ticketing and baggage screening area? Where should that first layer be?

Mr. WALKER. Our goal is the Federal intelligence and the local intelligence will sniff out any plots and prevent them.

Mr. GIBBONS. That is my goal as well, too, and it's something I'm working on.

Mr. WALKER. But if that doesn't happen, then I've heard—we've gone through at one time—when we talked about whole masses of people in the terminal, somebody had the brilliant idea that we can't let anybody come to the terminal. We better have a processing center away from the airport that doesn't blow up.

But the question was then you have to build holding buildings somewhere else and have all the people standing there, and that's the building they'll blow up. So at some point in time, you have to understand that you can have a lot of people come somewhere, you're going to have a lot of people.

So I think given the way the airport operates, the way that the bags and the people are being screened, at the airport, I think, is the right location. And then we set up a lot of layers in there, a lot of them we don't tell everybody what they are in order to enhance them.

There are airports—one of the things we've done, of course, is put a lot of cameras in the security checkpoints to record everything. If an incident happens, we have very—it's all digital. We have very instantaneous information about what happened at the checkpoint.

We've also put in a lot of automatic doors that are tied to the checkpoints, so if the emergency button is pushed, basically seal off sections of the airport so that two things happen. One is whoever has penetrated the security inappropriately can't get too far into the system. And, secondly, if there becomes a situation where we have to empty the terminal, we only have to empty part of a terminal instead of the full terminal, which enhances our customer service. So we are looking at all of those kind of things to help secure it.

I think the biggest area that I would be concerned about as the director of an aviation system that I don't think Congress has spent enough time addressing, and that is the whole noncommercial aviation, the whole general aviation.

You know, we have close to 500,000 operations in McCarran annually. About 32 percent of those are not commercial aircraft. Some of those aircraft are very large. There are Boeing business jets which are as large as 737. And we have G-5s and other significant sized airplanes that come in and out of our airport that go through very little security. We don't know where they come from when they get here. We don't know what kind of security they have had at the other side.

And the whole security at that side of the field is much less than it is at the passenger side, yet, those airplanes are fairly large. And if someone were able to take command of one of those airplanes and get full control of it, I think we could have a serious problem. So I think that needs to be looked at in the future.

General aviation at small airports is also a concern, but those aircraft tend to be a little smaller. So if I were looking at the biggest threat, I would look at larger airports and the type of business aircraft that come in in the larger size. But I think that is a concern from my perspective.

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, I know that your concern that you just alluded to, the private sector aircraft, has been one which the Federal Government has looked at with regard to security of many of the nuclear power plants because there was a theoretical prospect that some private aircraft loaded with some type of explosive would be used to crash into a nuclear power plant causing an enormous disaster. So that's an issue that they are looking into on the Federal level right now.

Mr. WALKER. When we talk about general aviation, most people think of small private planes, but general aviation actually includes anything from a Boeing business jet, which is very large, down to a single engine propeller airplane. So I think maybe there has to be some categories of different sizes of aircraft and what kind of security you might have based on the potential threat to the size of an aircraft being posed if it were taken over by people with some ill intent.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Shepherd, I'm sorry we left you to the last. You provided your testimony first. It was enlightening to say the least. I heard Mr. Conger talking about H.A.N.D.S.S. program, H-A-N-D-S-S, sharing of information or creating and establishing an informational net is provided in telephone books.

Do hotels like the Venetian give information like that to their tourists when they arrive?

Mr. SHEPHERD. Pretty much when they ask. We try to have more of appearance of security they'll see when they come in with the armed checkpoints as they come on the property, where the officers will meet them when they come in. That's how we end up doing it most of the time.

Mr. GIBBONS. From your experience, I'm sure the Venetian is much like any other infrastructure sensitive industry, whether it's the power and gas company, whether it's the communications, whether it's a hotel, motel, or whether it's trucking industry.

When you do your risk assessment for vulnerabilities inside your structure, do you work with the local police, local fire departments when you look at that and made some coordinated effort with them

to determine what the best recourse would be for an incident that occurred in your hotel?

Mr. SHEPHERD. Sir, that's correct. We use all kinds of different sources, whether it be law enforcement, private vendors, or threat assessment people, as well as people on our staff that are from other countries as well. We look at it from all sides again trying to stop any threat, whether it be a terrorism threat.

Our emergency command center, for an example, we have set up in three different way. We set it up for terrorism, we set it up for life safety, and we also set it for a natural disaster be it an earthquake.

Mr. GIBBONS. Finally, Mr. Congers, my last question, because we are out of time, we were required to vacate this room by one o'clock, and it's little after, the program that I just talked about that you created that you put in the phone books for advising tourists, is that shared outside of the Clark County? Is it shared in other counties in the State of Nevada, other communities? Is it shared nationally or internationally? It seems like it is a creative program that you made and one which has a great deal of merit to it.

Mr. CONGER. Actually the genesis of the project was from the FEMA preparedness handbooks that had been around for a long time. After 9-11, people became very cognizant of potential danger and potential manmade disaster and started calling and asking questions, "What do we do? How do we do it? Who do we notify? Where do we go? What happens if we have an event? Do we shelter in place? Do we evacuate?" That type of stuff.

We had a very creative person on our department that came forward with this during Sheriff Keller's tenure last year, and we carried it forward, partnered with Sprint Telephone, including 1.3 million phone books.

We have disseminated this to all major cities and major cities chiefs association. The Sheriff, when he goes to those, he disseminates H.A.N.D.S.S. handbook, and he also disseminates a disk.

The challenge that we had initially was not producing the document, it was getting it disseminated. That's where the actual costs are involved with the document. It was going to cost the department 600 to 800 to a million dollars to get it produced and distributed to people.

When Sprint Telephone came forward and offered that it went in the phone book, and it was minimal, we were able to provide for essentially everybody in the community. If we send a document to each address in the phone book or—excuse me—each address on the mailing list, the MGM Hotel would get one, the Venetian Hotel would get one, et cetera. By doing it in the phone book, each phone, each room in every hotel room in Las Vegas has a phone book, and they have access to that.

The biggest challenge we have now is getting the information to the tourists that that is there, "If we have an incident, look in the book. It's in the first part of the January phone book." And we intend to carry forward with this and get it further into the communities as we go forward.

Mr. GIBBONS. Gentlemen, I know that we have run out of time. And there's many, many questions that I have just sitting here on

my mind wishing to ask you, but we are out of time. I want to thank you for your patience. I want to thank you for your presence and your testimony here today.

If you wouldn't mind, just as with any other members of the previous panel, we oftentimes will write questions and submit them to you, if you wouldn't mind giving us an answer to some of those questions. Maybe the questions will be generated out of the testimony that you have presented to us today.

We would appreciate it if you would respond to our questions so that we can add that information to the congressional hearing today.

With that, I want to thank you again. I want to thank the audience for being out there as patient as they have been, and let them know that they also can submit a statement that will be included in the record if they so choose. That has to be submitted to us within 14 days of this hearing. So if you are of a mind to do that and want to add your thoughts to the congressional record on this hearing, please remember the time lines and that it has to be sent to us at the congressional committee which is in Washington, D.C. for Homeland Security.

With that, I'm going to close this hearing and excuse our panels for today. Thank you very much again. And this hearing is now closed.

[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned.]

