

**HEARING ON THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS  
OF THE HOUSE AND THE EVACUATION OF  
MAY 11, 2005**

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**HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
**COMMITTEE ON HOUSE  
ADMINISTRATION**  
**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**  
**ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS**  
FIRST SESSION

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Hearing Held in Washington, DC, June 9, 2005  
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**THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 2005**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:44 a.m., in room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Robert W. Ney (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Ney, Ehlers, Doolittle, Millender-McDonald and Lofgren.

Staff Present: Paul Vinovich, Staff Director; David Duncan, Deputy Staff Director; Bryan Dorsey, Professional Staff Member; Alec Hoppes, Professional Staff Member; George Shevlin, Minority Staff Director; Sterling Spriggs, Minority Director of Technology; Michael Harrison, Minority Professional Staff Member; and Matt Pinkus, Minority Professional Staff Member.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee will come to order. We are running about 12 minutes late due to the Rayburn fire this morning, and it took a little bit longer to set up the television here in Longworth.

The Committee is meeting to examine emergency preparedness in the House and the evacuation of May 11, 2005. And we can talk about the Rayburn evacuation this morning, too. I happened to have been at my desk this morning at 5:10 in the morning. I had decided to get an early start so I could beat the 8:30 rush; and, of course, I ended up talking with Congressman McNulty and Congressman Hayworth in front of Longworth at 5:37 a.m. this morning. But I think we can look back over today at some point in time and find a few things that went right or wrong this morning.

I would like to welcome everyone here today to the Committee's oversight hearing on the security and emergency preparedness efforts in the House of Representatives. In our first panel, we will hear from people responsible for life safety here. They are three people who are no strangers to anyone on our campus. We have Bill Livingood, our House Sergeant at Arms; Terrance, we call him Terry, Chief Terry Gainer, Chief of the Capitol Police; and our House Chief Administrative Officer Jay Eagen. Welcome to all three.

Our second panel will consist of individuals with expertise in emergency preparedness, threat assessment, evacuation procedures, and movement of large crowds.

Before we really get started with the hearing, I want to say a few things about the recent evacuation on May 11. In the event of a threat from an incoming aircraft, the police have mere minutes to assess the nature of the threat, make the decision to evacuate and, if they do decide to evacuate, get everyone out and away from the buildings quickly and safely. There is little or no margin for error. And I think that, overall, the United States Capitol Police did a superb job of evacuating the tens of thousands of people from the Capitol and the House and Senate office buildings in a quick and efficient manner.

And I also want to give credit to all the staff, visitors, and Members of the House, who did a wonderful job of evacuating in what was perceived to be a true emergency situation leaving. In fact, I was talking with Congressman McNulty today about how well it went in the sense that individuals were not hurt, and that people returned in a safe and efficient manner so we could resume the work of Congress. Overall, I think it went quite well.

Remember September 11, 2001, and the relatively ad hoc way these buildings were emptied. The bravery and professionalism of the Capitol Police on September 11th was exemplary, but it was clear to everybody that there was a real need to revamp and improve our preparedness training communication procedures. I can still recall quite clearly Jay Eagen had gotten a group together, and got one of his famous boards where he puts things up and down the categories—I say this flatteringly, as he is a very detailed person. And it was a combination of, at that time, Leader Gephardt, Speaker Hastert, the staffs, Appropriations, House Administration, Sergeant at Arms, the chief of police. Everybody under the sun that had a part of this gathered together because we faced a whole different world than we ever had to think about before.

And so the witnesses on the first panel and the organizations they lead have worked tirelessly since 9/11 to make these improvements, and we have come a long way. The Capitol Police are highly dedicated, highly trained, first responders.

At the direction of this Committee, the Chief and the Capitol Police Board have worked to ensure effective and redundant command-and-control functions. They have drilled countless threat scenarios and conducted quarterly drills of the House's evacuation plans. The Department has worked closely with other local and Federal agencies to share intelligence information, to monitor air and vehicular traffic, and to coordinate security for large events such as the Presidential inauguration. This coordinated information sharing is in direct response to the threat environment we live in, and is crucial to our preparedness efforts.

The Committee has authorized deployment of a multilayered emergency communication system that is controlled by the CAO and Capitol Police, and utilizes e-mail, telephone, and portable annunciator announcements in addition to our audible evacuation alarms. These systems provide us with important capabilities to communicate with Members, staff, and visitors during emergencies.

The hearing today will provide an opportunity, I believe—this is why we are here—for the Committee to examine past and current efforts to improve the House's emergency preparedness, but also to

provide an opportunity to identify areas in need of further improvement.

Our second panel will offer insight into technologies and best practices for emergency preparedness, and suggestions on how to apply these technologies and best practices to help us achieve our collective responsibility for life, safety of visitors, Members and staff.

Again, I want to recognize and thank all those who work day and night to make this campus safe. We all hope that our emergency plans never need to be implemented, but this Committee takes its oversight responsibility very seriously, and we wish to ensure that our plans and systems are adequate to respond to any emergency. I want to thank the members of this Committee, both sides of the aisle, and the staff, both sides of the aisle, for the countless hours they have put in especially since 9/11 up until today.

I did also want to mention that due to the nature of today's subject matter, I found it appropriate to conduct the first part of the hearing in open format. If questions are asked by Members of the panelists that you feel are sensitive, I don't want to just rush off into an executive type of session; we can defer that until later. I want to keep as much of this open to the public. I think the public and the media would understand there are certain parts we don't want to discuss because it jeopardizes their safety as well as the visitors and the staff to the Capitol. So I would ask for your understanding and cooperation when that point in time comes.

Further, I would ask Members and witnesses to be mindful in the first portion of our hearing to reserve any comments or questions with respect to any specific process or procedure which may involve sensitive law enforcement information. We will discuss that in a closed part of our hearing.

And let me just conclude by saying that my boss, Speaker Hastert and his staff, have said it, if not once, 100 times, that there has to be security and safety, but the building has to remain open to the public. Since 9/11 he has done that, working at that time, of course, with Leader Gephardt and now Leader Pelosi, and that has been the objective of the Speaker, and it has been carried out. But that doesn't mean it is not done without a lot of work.

Right before I move on to our Ranking Member, I do want to say this, too. Another reason for the hearing today, too, is there has been questions raised. The emergency instructions that we received, were those carried out, was the trigger pulled in the right way on those instructions. In other words, the plane was small, could have bounced off the Dome, we all heard those things. And I think those things, frankly, need to be addressed as they have been raised in the media.

And, with that, I will yield to the Ranking Member and welcome her here today.

Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, let me echo what you said about the quick response of all of those who were involved in May 11. I tell you, that date, 11, seems to be sticking with us for some reason; 9/11, May 11. But indeed we want to applaud our Chief, Chief Gainer, Sergeant at Arms Livingood for their expedience in which they evacuated the staff. There are some things, of course—and Members as well and

others, tourists and all who were here. So I echo those sentiments of the Chairman.

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this hearing.

I would like to also thank again Chief Gainer and Assistant Chief Rohan as well as Sergeant at Arms Livingood for this morning. It seems like they are getting up now earlier than ever before to tackle those things that are just so prevalent among us in this environment. And so the work that you did in Rayburn, I applaud you. I got an early call this morning from my staff, and they thought they were going to be late coming in to work, and I had to tell them they are due right on in now. So it was great. But thank you so much for the work that you all have done, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing.

I certainly believe that we need to conduct an after-action review of events surrounding the May 11, 2005, evacuation of the Capitol complex. Numerous public comments and private ones from many of our House colleagues, from our staffs, and from others have made it clear that we need to examine thoroughly what happened all around this Hill and the complex when that unknown light aircraft intruded into the restricted airspace over Washington with unknown intentions. I am sure that many things went right, and we know that, during this incident. I am also sure that there are many things that we can improve upon in the event of a future such urgency. But let us hope that there is no such urgency ever, but let us also resolve to learn from this experience as we discharge our responsibilities in this committee.

It is important to note that this committee has no jurisdiction over the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Aviation Administration, or any other department or agency that Congress may have entrusted with the duty to defend the skies over Washington, including the Capitol. That duty, which belongs to the executive branch, is within the jurisdiction of other committees. We are here to evaluate the emergency response to the agencies under our jurisdiction, including the Capitol Police, the Library of Congress, and, of course, the House itself.

And along those lines, Mr. Chairman, I am disappointed that neither the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Operation nor any of their subordinates were able to appear and share the benefits of this insight since the insight of that particular person, that personnel, since this work goes to the essence of what this hearing is all about. So, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully suggest that we should have another hearing, even a field hearing if necessary, to have the committee review the OEPPPO's important work.

In addition to that, Mr. Chairman, as you talked about the oversight very seriously that we have, I want to reference a letter of November 18, 2004, before I became the Ranking Member, that talked about the responsibilities of this committee with reference to receiving and considering all legislative proposals pertaining to the Capitol Police and Police Board, and would like to again reiterate what that letter said, though my signature was not on it; that that is our jurisdiction and oversight, and that requests for legislative provisions fall within our panel of jurisdiction. Certainly those

provisions are our responsibility and must be submitted for our consideration, and I just wanted to note that for the record.

The rules of the House of Representatives require that committee meetings be open to the public, but permit panels to close their meetings when sensitive matters will be discussed, and only then by a recorded vote is stuff taken in private. While I am generally reluctant to supporting conducting the people's business outside of the public's view, in this case I go along with my Chairman, and I believe it is within the purview of this committee that, given the sensitivity of the nature of the information, that therefore I support a motion to close this hearing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady, and I do want to stress that we will only do that if necessary. We are going to try to keep as much open. I appreciate the gentlelady for her support.

The gentleman from California. Do you have a statement.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. I have no opening statement. I look forward to hearing the witnesses' statements, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And we will go right to the panel.

I just did want to mention, because I had a note here on my Blackberry, that an issue—I have not read the full article, but a Homeland Security official confirmed that Secretary Chertoff has launched a review of the Cessna incident because that deals with us, what happened here with the evacuation, characterizing this as a fairly routine effort to examine what can be improved next time. And one of the issues being explored is whether the evacuation should have been called in the first place. Of course, that deals with the decision to evacuate as opposed to the evacuation itself. We had absolutely no choice but to respond. I want to make that clear for the record. But, again, they go into some situations about people standing out, or whether that plane could have crashed into the Dome without any problems. So I just thought I would mention that, as it was in the report.

And with that we will start with the Sergeant at Arms Livingood.

**STATEMENTS OF WILSON LIVINGOOD, SERGEANT AT ARMS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; TERRANCE GAINER, CHIEF, U.S. CAPITOL POLICE; AND JAMES M. EAGEN, III, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**STATEMENT OF WILSON LIVINGOOD**

Mr. LIVINGOOD. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Millender-McDonald and members of the committee. I am honored to appear before you today to discuss our progress in emergency preparedness since September 11, 2001.

Before I begin, I want to take a moment to thank the members of the committee for your ongoing support of our emergency planning efforts and security as well as the support that you have shown time after time for the men and women of the U.S. Capitol Police. It is both valued and appreciated by all.

I would like to start by just mentioning this morning, this early morning, we had a small fire in the roof area of the Rayburn House Office Building.

The CHAIRMAN. I would note, outside 2438, my office.

Mr. LIVINGOOD. I would like to thank the D.C. Fire Department and the U.S. Capitol Police for their quick professional response and actions taken. It was outstanding.

You may recall that 1 year ago this afternoon during preparations for the lying-in-state ceremony for President Reagan, the presence of an unidentified aircraft inside the flight restricted zone led the Capitol Police command staff to order the evacuation of the entire Capitol complex. This incident was our first full-campus evacuation since September 11th, 2001. On May 11, 2005, it was again necessary to evacuate the Capitol complex because of an aircraft.

These events, though 11 months apart, are not rare. Several statistics from the TSA, Transportation Security Administration, regarding aircraft incursions in the national capital region lend some valuable perspective. Since January 2003, there have been over 50 penetrations of actual prohibited space, the area that includes the Capitol and the White House. In some of the further areas there have been a lot more. But I wanted to mention particularly the area surrounding the Capitol and the White House.

Just a few years ago the very idea of an airplane being used in an attack here in the United States on the Capitol or elsewhere was something one read about in the pages of a Tom Clancy novel. Sadly, this is no longer true. To people around the world, the Capitol, perhaps more than any other building, represents the United States of America and the democratic principles at the heart of our form of elected government. Yet it is this very symbolism that makes the Capitol and Congress such tempting targets for those who wish to strike a blow against our form of government.

Since September 11, 2001, I, along with those sitting beside me at this table, as well as our colleagues on the Senate side, have been diligently involved in both the risk assessment and risk management necessitated by this new threat environment. Our goals have been to plan and to prepare, refine our procedures, and investigate every possible method to best manage the potential threats.

We have made considerable progress and continue to make considerable progress. Areas we have already focused on include improved coordination of security efforts between the House and the Senate. An example is the Emergency Measures Task Force. This joint group composed of representatives from all essential offices involved in emergency planning and the Capitol Police meet bi-weekly.

Threat and vulnerability assessments have been made of the Capitol complex. Several studies have been completed or are under way. A thorough threat assessment of the entire complex completed by an outside contractor was done with the assistance of Federal law enforcement experts. We have commissioned an independent review of the evacuation planning for the Capitol and all House office buildings. That is just completed. A study is under way examining the consequences of an aircraft hitting the Capitol or an office building, and whether we should shelter in place or evacuate. We feel that there are a lot of experts out there that have comments either way, and that we are not structural engineers, and that we need a thorough review of that before we make a determination

what our policies will be instead of shooting from the hip or off the top of our head. So we have a commission to study which will consist of evacuation experts and structural engineers and aircraft people that know certain aspects of the airplanes.

A study is ongoing to review the evacuation procedures when we are outside the building. What do we do when we go outside the buildings? A study is on to see what our policy will be.

We have been testing and improving the alarms, annunciators, and have a new public address system started which will be completed at the end of this year. We have created an individual office emergency coordinator for each Member office, committee, and support office. We have continued office emergency coordinator training, covering evacuation procedures and the use of quick hoods. We have developed an evacuation and shelter-in-place procedure. We have deployed over 20,000 quick hoods along with ongoing training for Members and staff. We have established decontamination procedures. We have had enhancements to our chem-biological response capability. We have had enhancements to explosive protection and response. We have developed a program for Member briefing centers as well as contingency planning for continuity of government.

However, the complexity of the security situation we encounter on Capitol Hill requires us to move forward. The security of the Capitol complex is difficult because the interdependency of buildings, the enormous number of visitors to the campus, the openness of the institution, and the changing nature of Congress and staff. In addition, the density of the development around the Capitol and the variety of emergency situations that may arise adds to the complexity.

The national importance of the Capitol Hill complex demands an effective and comprehensive security approach to ensure success. Emergency management, including preparedness, response, and recovery of all essential functions, are a vital component of a comprehensive program to ensure Capitol complex and the campus security. We are addressing all these components with the development of a proposed emergency management architect to ensure agency coordination and a computer-aided evacuation modeling that will enable us to test, evaluate, and monitor evacuation performance.

Mr. CHAIRMAN, I would like to submit the rest of my testimony for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. LIVINGOOD. I thank you again for taking the time to focus on this vital issue of emergency preparedness. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have at any time.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank the Sergeant-at-Arms for your testimony.

[The information follows:]

**Testimony of  
Wilson Livingood  
Sergeant at Arms  
Before the  
Committee on House Administration  
United States House of Representatives**

June 9, 2005

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today to discuss our progress in emergency preparedness since September 11, 2001. Before I begin I want to take a moment to thank the members of the committee for your ongoing support of our emergency planning efforts, as well as your support of the men and women of the U.S. Capitol Police – it is both valued and appreciated.

You may recall that one year ago this afternoon, during preparations for the lying in state ceremony for President Reagan, the presence of an unidentified aircraft inside the Flight Restricted Zone led the Capitol Police command staff to order the evacuation of the entire Capitol complex. This incident was our first full-campus evacuation since September 11, 2001. On May 11, 2005, it was again necessary to evacuate the Capitol complex because of an aircraft.

These events, though eleven months apart, are not rare. Several statistics from the TSA regarding aircraft incursions in the National Capitol Region lend some valuable perspective. Since January 2003, there have been over 3,000 airspace incursions in the Capitol region; over 140 of these have been penetrations of the extended Flight Restricted Zone; with 50 penetrations of actual prohibited airspace – which includes the area over the Capitol and White House.

Just a few years ago, the very idea of an airplane being used in an attack on the Capitol was something one read about in the pages of a Tom Clancy novel. Sadly, this is no longer true. To people around the world, the Capitol – perhaps more than any other building – represents the United States of America and the democratic principles at the heart of our form of elected of government. Yet, it is this very symbolism that makes the Capitol and Congress such tempting targets for those who would wish to strike a blow against our form of government.

Since September 11, 2001, I along with those sitting beside me at this table, as well as our colleagues on the Senate-side, have been diligently involved in both the risk assessment and risk management necessitated by this new threat environment. Our goals have been to plan and to prepare, refine our procedures and investigate every possible method to best manage the potential threats.

We have made considerable progress. Areas we have already focused on include:

- Improved coordination of security efforts between House and Senate. An example is the Emergency Measures Task Force. This joint group composed of representatives from all essential offices involved in emergency planning and the Capitol Police, meets bi-weekly.
- Threat and vulnerability assessments of the complex. Several studies have been completed or are underway:
  - A thorough threat assessment of the entire complex completed by an outside contractor with the assistance of law enforcement experts.
  - Commissioned an independent review of the evacuation planning for the Capitol and all House Office Buildings.
  - A study is underway examining the consequences of an aircraft hitting the Capitol or an office building, and whether we should shelter in place or evacuate.
  - A study is ongoing to review the evacuation procedures when we are outside the building.
- Testing and improvement of alarms, annunciators, and a public address system.

- Creation of individual Office Emergency Coordinators for each Member office, committee, and support office.
- Continued OEC training covering evacuation procedures and the use of the quickhoods.
- Development of evacuation and shelter-in-place procedures.
- Deployment of over 20,000 quickhoods, along with ongoing training for Members and staff.
- Establishment of mass decontamination procedures.
- Enhancements to our chemical-biological response capability.
- Enhancements to explosive protection and response.
- Development of a program for Member briefing centers, as well as contingency planning for continuity of government.

However, the complexity of the security situation we encounter on Capitol Hill requires us to always move forward. The security of the Capitol complex is difficult because of the interdependency of buildings, the enormous number of visitors to the campus, the “openness” of the institution, and the changing nature of Congress and staff. In addition, the density of development around the Capitol, and the variety of emergency situations that might arise, adds to the complexity.

The national importance of the Capitol Hill complex demands an effective and comprehensive security approach to ensure success. Emergency management, including preparedness, response, and recovery of essential functions, are all vital components of a comprehensive program to ensure Capitol Campus security.

We are addressing all of these components with the development of a proposed Emergency Management Architecture to ensure agency coordination; and a Computer-Aided Evacuation Modeling that will enable us to test, evaluate, and monitor evacuation performance.

Let me briefly summarize each of these related efforts.

In March 2005, the Capitol Police Board commissioned a study to review the overall emergency management structure of House and Senate organizations. Among the recommendations made in this study are the following:

- Affirm Capitol Police authority to serve as the lead organization for all Capitol complex life safety planning and incident response functions.
- Allow Capitol Police to promote a common, Hill-wide emergency management implementation.
- Retain continuity planning in House and Senate organizations.
- Create a Joint Bipartisan Leadership Continuity Board. This group would strengthen the strategic planning aspects of the continuity and emergency planning decision making.
- Create a Joint Continuity Executive Team. This group, comprised of all of the continuity stakeholders, would relay guidance back to the organizations and work to develop continuity plans where a joint response or coordination is needed.
- Conduct periodic Capitol complex-wide emergency exercises.

The second level in our efforts is the development of Computer-Aided Evacuation Modeling. The System will enable security officials to test and evaluate changes in processing procedures and routings, building design and layout options, and evacuation options. When the System is in place, we will be able to test and evaluate virtually any change in infrastructure, operations, security procedures, advanced technology, or first response. We will be able to coordinate emergency response and jointly understand evacuation options with all involved Federal and District emergency response agencies.

We are confident that this combination of initiatives will enable us to better understand risks, test and evaluate appropriate responses, plan and train in advance of events, and ensure that communications and coordination among responsible agencies will be appropriate to the tasks to which we have been assigned.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you again for taking the time to focus on the vital issue of emergency preparedness. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. And we will move on to Mr. Eagen, the CAO of the House.

**STATEMENT OF JAMES M. EAGEN III**

Mr. EAGEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Millender-McDonald, Mr. Doolittle. I am honored to be here with Mr. Livingood and Chief Gainer.

It never fails to strike me that in a situation like today or what we faced on May 11, that as we are quickly exiting the buildings, the Capitol Police are still standing by their posts as we pass by, ushering us out of the building. And I for one would like to thank the Chief and his troops for their support in those kinds of circumstances.

The CAO's role relative to the Capitol Police and the Sergeant at Arms is more of a secondary and supporting role. Two elements that I would like to overview for you today: First, how did we support the incident on May 11? And, secondly, what is the broader business continuity and disaster recovery program that the CAO is undertaking on behalf of the House?

With regard to May 11, our primary roles were two functions: one, to send additional communication messages to the House campus about the event; and, secondly, to work with our child care center to evacuate the children that reside in the House Child Care Center. We received notification of the air con red condition from the Capitol Police command center at 12:04 p.m. on May 11, and at 12:06 p.m. our emergency communication center sent out a House alert message. To be clear, that House alert message is not the annunciators, it is not the sirens in the buildings. Those are issued directly by the Capitol Police command center. Our messages are secondary messages that go out simultaneously to an all-campus e-mail, to Blackberry, and to text messaging for those cell phone devices that support that kind of communication.

After the incident had resolved itself, we then sent a closing message out, and in this case that occurred at 12:42 p.m. on May 11.

Our second action on May 11 was with regard to the House Child Care Center. When the notification goes out with regard to the sirens and the annunciators, we have a methodology where the children are moved from the center to two buses that have been acquired by the House, and they are taken off campus to predetermined relocation centers. In this particular situation, the threat resolved itself so quickly that the children did not have to go all the way to the location, but were called back once the threat had been stood down and came back to campus. I thought that it was a very successful relocation for our children in that no one was hurt, and we were able to notify the parents through multiple communications methods of where their children were going and that they were safe.

I would now like to move on to the second aspect of the CAO's work, and that is a broader characterization of disaster recovery and business continuity. We have had a very broad program that was established in the wake of 9/11 and anthrax in the House in 2001. It was broken basically into four components: communications, continuity of operations, technology capabilities, and mail, secure mail and digital mail.

In the area of communications, we have adopted an anywhere, anytime philosophy that relies on in-depth communications capabilities to try to reach Members wherever they are at whatever time they need to be reached, and to create methods for Members and staff to be able to communicate with one another. In that regard, we established the emergency communications center, which is up 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and primarily uses this House alert system with the earlier capabilities that I referenced. We also can use the House floor paging notification methodology to reach Members in certain circumstances. We have a dialogic phone calling service that we can do under certain circumstances, and we have distributed government emergency telephone systems, GETS, cards that allow Members and certain key staff to use the public phone grid in a special emergency situation if the phone grid is overtaxed.

We have also established some significant remote access capabilities for the House campus, meaning that if we were to lose access to these buildings, we have established dial-in and broadband connections that will allow up to 5,000 simultaneous users to come back into the House campus using laptops and home computers to keep contact with their computer systems here in the House.

In the area of continuity of operations, we have established an overall House emergency operations plan that is documented and drilled and exercised and practiced so that our people know how to use it if such a circumstance dictates.

With regard to technology, our primary accomplishment has been the creation of an alternative computer facility. Prior to 9/11 and anthrax, the House had a single point of failure in that all of our major computer assets were located in one building here on the House campus. That was known to be a weakness, and we have since, working with the Senate and other legislative branch agencies, constructed a new facility, fitted it out with equipment, staffed it, and are now standing up various kinds of enhanced redundancy capabilities to protect the House data and computing systems capabilities.

We have also established additional voice and data capabilities. For example, in a circumstance where the House were to be evacuated for an extended period of time, we can literally with the flick of a switch transfer all of the incoming phone calls from the Washington campus to the district office phone numbers of the Members so that they can continue operations.

We have also established two mobile capabilities, a mobile broadcast capability where we now have a van and a supporting truck that can follow the House and broadcast the House's proceedings wherever the House determines it needs to do business. That can be done with a satellite linkup so that we can connect to C-SPAN or other network interests that want to receive the House proceedings over the air.

We also have acquired two mobile communications trucks that, between them, are able to support 1,000 laptop computers and 1,000 telephones so that the business operations of the House can be supported at alternative locations.

Finally, in the area of mail, we have had to reinvent the entire House mail system since 9/11 and anthrax. At that time the mail

system was conducted on campus in a House office building. After the anthrax experience, we determined that it was no longer viable to have that kind of a security-threatened operation within the House buildings. We have acquired an off-campus mail facility, and the Postal Service has stood up an irradiation methodology to attempt to cleanse the mail. We do additional testing and screening of the mail to make sure that either real or hoax-type threats are not reaching the Members' offices to distract the business of the House of Representatives.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today, and I am happy to answer any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you for your testimony.  
[The information follows:]

The Honorable James M. Eagen III  
Chief Administrative Officer  
June 9, 2005

Statement before the Committee on House Administration

Chairman Ney, Ranking Member Millender-McDonald and Members of the Committee, I appreciate having this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the events of May 11, 2005.

As part of this joint effort today, I will be focusing on the current roles and responsibilities of the Office of the Chief Administrative Officer as they relate to emergency communications and notifications for the House Community. In addition, I will provide an overview of the Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (BC/DR) Program.

During the early afternoon of May 11, 2005 the United States Capitol Police (USCP) initiated an evacuation of the Capitol Complex, when the level of AIRCON Red was reached. All House and Senate Office Buildings, as well as the Capitol Building, were evacuated.

Shortly after, at approximately 12:04 pm, the CAO's Emergency Communications Center (ECC) was notified of the AIRCON Red situation, and assisted per established procedures, in relaying secondary notification messages through email, blackberry, and cellular text messages to quickly get the word out across the House campus. The ECC sent out the first secondary notification at 12:06 pm, and then evacuated the Ford House Office Building and established a remote location to continue their operation.

The ECC remained in contact with the USCP command center until the situation was cleared around 12:42 pm, when the all clear message was communicated to Members, staff and visitors.

In addition to the ECC capabilities, the CAO was able to safely and effectively evacuate the House Child Care Center, while keeping the parents informed as to the status of their children.

I would like to commend the efforts of the Emergency Communications Center and the Child Care Center team, who acted and performed to the best of their abilities during this event.

As stated earlier, I will now provide a summary of CAO's Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Program.

The events of 9/11 and the subsequent October 2001 anthrax event prompted an examination of the House's capabilities to respond to such events. Through this analysis several key gap areas were identified that required improvements. These areas were:

- **Communications** – improvements in capabilities to provide information to Members and Staff during and after an event as well as capabilities to ensure Members and Staff can continue to communicate if dislocated
- **Continuity of Operations** – establishment of facilities and supporting plans and processes to ensure that the House can continue to perform Legislative business under a variety of scenarios where normal capabilities are disrupted
- **Technology Capabilities** – improvements in the redundancy and hardening of technology capabilities such that single points of failure are mitigated and failover capabilities are in place
- **Secure Mail** – A study was conducted to consider cost savings that might come from converging paper mail and digital mail operations. The study points to a potential for \$2,000,000 in savings and the vendor proposals to support convergence are currently under review.
- **Digital Mail** – pursue concepts and technologies of digitizing First Class letters and flats to reduce vulnerabilities to the House and associated facilities when processing mail

The CAO-established BC/DR Program is comprised of approximately 20 specific projects to address these gap areas.

Example efforts include:

#### **Communications**

- "Anytime, Anywhere" communications in-depth strategy. This includes:
  - 24 hour a day/7 day a week Emergency Communications Center
  - House Alert Capability that can provide notifications to email, blackberry devices (as of 4/2005 – 5000 devices in use in House) and cell phones
  - House Floor Pager notifications
  - Dialogic Voice Notification capability
  - Distribution of Government Emergency Telephone System (GETS) cards to all Members
- Remote Access Capabilities – supporting Member and Staff access to the House's data network if displaced to District Offices or home. Currently supports 350 dial-in and 5000 broadband (DSL or cable modem) simultaneous connections.

#### **Continuity of Operations**

- Establishment of the House Emergency Operations Plan with a designated emergency management structure and clear disaster recovery support processes. Includes establishment of emergency coordination facilities and

support from the Office of Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Operations and House Recovery Operations (HRO) Teams

- Development of extensive written procedures to support disaster recovery that are regularly verified and tested through coordinated House-wide exercises

### **Technology**

- Alternate Computing Facility (ACF)
  - Established Alternate Computing Facility (ACF) which is a “warm” failover site for the House’s Ford Data Center
  - ACF includes redundant systems for email, web sites, Legislative Systems and other House-wide services as well as capabilities to support Member, Committee and institutional support offices
- Voice and Data Communications
  - Added redundancy for on-campus data and voice networks to ensure no single points of failure
  - Added capabilities to re-route campus voice services and District Office data network services
- Mobile Broadcast Communications
  - To provide the House Recording Studio the ability to broadcast coverage of House proceedings during any emergency from a fully equipped broadcast truck with satellite uplink capability
- Mobile Communications
  - To provide off-site/mobile communications deployment (emergency and non-emergency) and assured communications capabilities for House Members and key staffers. We have two vehicles, each of which can support 500 phones and 500 laptop computers.

### **Secure/Digital Mail**

- Secure mail included the re-location and reinvention from an on-campus, limited mail security approach, to an off-campus, broad-based security capability that guards against threats against the Washington, D.C. House campus. The House has recently contracted with Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab to re-construct the off-site facility to obtain efficiencies and improve processes.
- Digital mail, pilot phase I was initiated in 2002, and pilot phase II followed in 2004; a total of 30 offices participated. The pilot is currently holding at the phase II state, pending the award of the convergence contract. Once the contract is awarded, the next phase is for a total of 75 participating offices.

Overall, the CAO BC/DR Program is a broad approach to enhance the operational resilience of the House’s critical business functions, under any and all conditions, regardless of the environment.

At this time, I am pleased to respond to answer any questions you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Chief Gainer.

**STATEMENT OF TERRANCE GAINER**

Chief GAINER. Yes. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Madam Ranking Member. I appreciate the opportunity to address you today. And I apologize for not having my blouse and coat and tie on, but I morphed right from that last incident to this one; I didn't have a chance to really catch my breath.

I would ask leave to submit my entire testimony, and would just like to hit a few highlights in context of what we were doing since 9/11. And when I use the word "we" in there, it really means so many of the people, two of whom are sitting with me here today, as well as this committee and others, especially the Architect of the Capitol, who have worked hard to provide the necessary security enhancements.

With the installation of bollards around much of the Capitol complex, we have been able to remove a large amount of unsightly concrete barrier material that was very important to the protection of what we are doing here. We have installed new, improved and more aesthetic security and vehicle barriers. In locations where we have found vulnerabilities, we installed temporary vehicle barriers until permanent units can replace them.

We continue to enhance the many physical barriers that provide visible evidence of our commitment to keeping the Capitol complex secure, but behind these visible measures are numerous other security measures that are less obvious. The entire Capitol complex has undergone an infusion of technology improvements, enhancements, and new implementation of state-of-the-art security to deter, detect, and delay unlawful acts using a risk analysis process to determine appropriate application. These technologies, which are workforce multipliers, allow us to monitor the campus and control access to facilities with greater efficiency and effectiveness.

Our technologies provide greater safety and assurance for the Capitol complex through the use of improved X-ray machines, magnetometers, technologies to scan all incoming material shipments in an off-site location, monitors, sensors, panic button alarms in the Members' offices, intrusion alarms systems, emergency notification systems, and measures to detect covert listening devices.

We have enhanced our explosive detection capability with an expansion of explosive detection technology and an increase in the number of dog teams employed throughout this complex.

Our ability to observe and detect potential threats has been enhanced through expanded closed-circuit television and building perimeter intrusion alarm systems.

We have reduced the potential for vehicle-borne explosive devices entering the complex through an integrated system of observers, road barriers, and the use of random vehicle inspections at key intersections.

We have increased the safety and security of our employees as they arrive and depart each workday with emergency call boxes in garages and parking lots.

In partnership with the House Chief Administrative Officer's emergency communications, we have enhanced our ability to pro-

vide important instructions and messages to Members, staff, and visitors. We are currently installing a public address system in the public spaces of congressional office buildings with coverage extended to the evacuation assembly areas. Other enhancements have been identified and are being implemented each day.

But beyond this, beyond the joint planning with congressional entities, Capitol Police also work closely with different groups within the national capital region to ensure that regional emergency planners consider and include the unique perspective and requirements of the congressional community and regional planning in this different branch of government.

The Joint Federal Committee hosted by the Department of Homeland Security and Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments represent just two key planning groups where Capitol Police are active participants. Our establishment of the Capitol Police of the Office of Plans, Operations and Homeland Security, approved by this committee, has brought together the police command and communications, our special events and emergency management functions under one umbrella organization to coordinate and supervise the preparation for and response to emergencies and large-scale events. We know there is more work to do in this area.

The establishment of our Hazardous Material Response Team, HMRT, provides Capitol Police with a specialized unit prepared to deal with chemical, biological, or radiological incidents occurring anywhere within this Capitol complex, and it is the envy of most agencies throughout the United States. We have highly trained elements that deal with explosives, armed intruders, unruly crowds, disturbed individuals, and individuals who make threats.

We at the Capitol Police look forward to continuing to safeguard Congress, its staff, and its visitors to the Capitol complex during these challenging times. We look forward to working with the Congress and particularly this committee in improving our operations again, which we know each day, even based on the incident today, we learn something new from this. And we are anxious for your questions and to hear what some of our contemporaries from the private sector have to say. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

Statement of  
Terrance W. Gainer  
Chief of Police, United States Capitol Police  
Before the  
Committee on House Administration  
U.S. House of Representatives

June 9, 2005

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee on House Administration today.

The world is a very different place than it was prior to September 11, 2001, and the evolution of world events and security threats against the United States have driven increased Capitol complex security. It is a difficult job to maintain a legislative complex open to the public, while at the same time ensuring the safety of the Congress, its staff and visitors against increased dangers. The news media provides daily testimony of the terrorist acts and political agendas of extremist groups. The fight against terrorism led by the United States and its coalition partners continues. We know through intelligence reports that terrorists have stated their intent to strike another blow on America, and we also know that the Capitol and all it stands for is clearly one of their targets. We must not let that fact slip from our minds as we continue further – albeit safely – away from September 11, 2001. As the foremost symbol of democracy, the Congress, its Members, employees, visitors, as well as public buildings and operations are a highly visible target for individuals and organizations intent on causing harm to the United States and disrupting the legislative operations of our government. Law enforcement professionals genuinely believe it really is not a question of if – rather a question of when we could expect a strike. We are the first line of defense and we take our jobs seriously as we put our lives on the line each day that we come to work. In today's environment, the Capitol

Police walk a fine line – maintaining the tradition of open government that we revere and demand, while providing the maximum degree of safety and security. On several occasions in the past, the national threat level has been elevated in response to the potential for domestic terrorist activity. We have mirrored this response with our own Capitol-specific threat levels. Indeed, the Capitol – much like the White House – is both a working building and a monument, and therefore currently remains at an elevated threat level. It is clear from our history that the Capitol is a tempting target for terrorists and those who seek to disrupt the democratic process or strike a symbolic blow against the United States. We also know that terrorists choose targets based on certain criteria, such as symbolism, mass casualties, and high likelihood of success. It is our responsibility to take every prudent precaution that we can to remove the terrorists' likelihood of success with regard to the Capitol, the Congressional office buildings, and for those who work and visit within the Capitol complex.

The Capitol complex is different from what you knew prior to September 11, 2001, but we have worked very hard to provide necessary security enhancements without creating the appearance of building a fortress. With the installation of bollards around much of the Capitol complex, we have been able to remove a large amount of unsightly concrete barrier material. We installed new, improved and more aesthetic security and vehicle barricades. In locations where we found vulnerability, we installed temporary vehicle barriers until permanent units can replace them. We continue to enhance the many physical barriers that provide visible evidence of our commitment to keeping the Capitol complex secure. Behind these visible measures are numerous other security measures that are not so obvious. The entire Capitol Complex has undergone an infusion

of technological improvements, enhancements and new implementations of state-of-the-art security to deter, detect, and delay unlawful acts using a risk-analysis process to determine appropriate application. These technologies, workforce multipliers, allow us to monitor the campus, and control access to facilities with greater efficiency and effectiveness. Other technologies provide greater safety and assurance for the Capitol complex through the use of improved x-ray machines, magnetometers, technologies to scan all incoming material shipments in an off-site location, monitors, sensors, panic button alarms in Member offices, intrusion alarm systems, emergency notification systems, and measures to detect covert listening devices. We have enhanced our explosive detection capability with an expansion of explosive detection technology and an increase in the number dog teams employed throughout the complex. A renovated Command Center hosts the newest technology to give police decision-makers substantially improved situational awareness and the ability to better command and control operational police units throughout the Capitol complex. Our ability to observe and detect potential threats has been enhanced through expanded closed circuit television coverage and building perimeter intrusion alarm systems. We have reduced the potential for vehicle borne explosive devices entering the complex through an integrated system of observers, road barriers and the use of random vehicle inspections at key intersections. We have increased the safety and security of our employees as they arrive and depart each workday with emergency call boxes in garages and parking lots. In a partnership with the House Chief Administrative Officer's Emergency Communications, we have enhanced our ability to provide important instructions and messages to Members, Staff and visitors. We are currently installing a public address system in the public spaces of

Congressional Office Buildings with coverage extended to the evacuation assembly areas. Other enhancements are being identified and implemented each day.

We have established and continue to maintain a superb working relationship with the House Sergeant at Arms, federal, state and local experts to improve current procedures and investigate and incorporate emerging best emergency management practices in plans for the Congressional Community. Capitol Police participate in training exercises, drills, and operational planning to refine the Congressional Community's ability to respond to emergencies and continue operating during a crisis. Joint efforts, combining the talents of Capitol Police, the Sergeant at Arms staff, and other professionals resulted in escape hood and evacuation training for Members of Congress and staff. Plans for the continuity of operations of the House, including relocation of Members to Briefing Centers and alternate Chamber sites have been jointly planned and exercised. We continue to explore opportunities to improve operations and procedures by working with professionals throughout the community. The participation of the Sergeant at Arms and Congressional entities in the Emergency Measures Task Force, hosted by Capitol Police, helps to focus the attention of complex-wide emergency managers on critical problems throughout the Capitol complex.

Beyond joint planning within Congressional entities, Capitol Police also work closely with different groups within the National Capitol Region to insure that regional emergency planners consider and include the unique perspective and requirements of the Congressional Community in regional planning. The Joint Federal Committee, hosted by the Department of Homeland Security and the Metropolitan Washington Council of

Governments represent just two key planning groups where Capitol Police actively participates.

Beyond the technology, physical barriers, emergency planning, training, coordination throughout the Capitol complex and National Capitol Region, the Capitol Police have increased their prevention and response capabilities. The establishment of an Office of Plans, Operations and Homeland Security has brought together the police command and communications, special events and emergency management functions under one umbrella organization to coordinate and supervise the preparation for and response to emergencies and large-scale special events. The establishment of a Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT) provides Capitol Police with a specialized unit prepared to deal with any chemical, biological, or radiological incident occurring anywhere within the Capitol complex. We have other highly trained elements that deal with explosives, armed intruders, unruly crowds, disturbed individuals, and individuals who make threats. These specialized units are backed-up by a tremendously talented, motivated and engaged group of professional police officers who take great heart in protecting this Congress.

As Chief of the Capitol Police, I take great pride in the many years of service this Department has provided to the Congress. Building on that legacy, we at the Capitol Police look forward to continuing to safeguard the Congress, its staff and visitors to the Capitol complex during these challenging times. And we look forward to working with the Congress and particularly this Committee.

I thank you for your time and am ready to take any questions you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank all three of you for your testimony. I am going to ask a few questions, and I am going to go to the other two Members, and then we can do a second round. One thing that just popped into my mind while all of you were testifying is the feasibility of evacuating the CVC when it is fully operational. The evacuation might apply to a couple thousand people.

Chief GAINER. One of the things we began—

The CHAIRMAN. Assuming it was in full operation.

Chief GAINER. And one of the things we did after the first evacuation during President Reagan's funeral was to turn to a lot of professionals, pilots, engineers, university types to see what the best practice was. And frankly, Mr. Chairman, the jury is out on that. And there is a lot of unknown information about not only the size of the plane could do, but what might be in that plane. So, frankly, it might be a little bit too early to determine what that is.

And I know that, because we have sat and met with the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, and I have met personally with the Secretary of Homeland Security where we talked about the size of the plane and what it might do. And we need to do more of those, have more of those conversations.

But we do know this: We have done a lot of studies about the effects that different-sized aircraft have on the various buildings on this campus, and at the moment, at least at the moment, based on the type of information we have on the aircraft, our recommendation if it happened 5 minutes from now would be to evacuate most of the buildings.

The CHAIRMAN. So, with what we know now about the Cessna, you still would have evacuated the buildings?

Chief GAINER. We would. Now, there are a couple of buildings we have identified that get a little bit more remote, whether there are some on the Senate side that are occupied by a lot of staff members or some further away on from these core buildings on Independence and Constitution. But since there are so many unknowns about what could be in the plane, that is one of the key things.

You know, a Cessna 150 as we had loaded with C4 would do substantially more damage than a Cessna 150 that was low on gas and nearly empty. And those are the unknowns we don't have.

The CHAIRMAN. I am told that panel 2 will have some people that can answer some questions on what was or was not in the plane. But I was just thinking with the CVC that you might have a two-fold type of evacuation. If a large plane was headed towards the Dome, you would want to get the people out of there because of a potential jet fuel explosion, but you may not want to get people out from underground in the Visitor's Center, for example.

I think it is worth mentioning that we didn't used to have these types of incidents, and all of a sudden we had to create a system, including the digital mail and everything that Jay Eagen spoke about. It is remarkable how many changes occurred. With 9/11 we had to immediately set up the laptops. We we went down to GAO, as I recall. Everybody did such a fine job in a terrible crunch, and we are more prepared now.

At one point in time, if we had some type of situation suspicious on these floors, we used to have to evacuate entire floors; now you Blackberry and say "Stay away from this room." So it has been re-

fined along the way here on the Hill. I would assume that you would take a good look at that process, because when the CVC is in operation, there may be times you don't want people to leave the CVC, but you want them to leave the Capitol, or vice versa.

Chief GAINER. Yes. And one thing on the plane size, if I can, is its maneuverability. The upside of a small plane is at least there is initial perception how little damage it can do. The downside of a small plane is its maneuverability. So one of the totality of the circumstances we would be looking at with an incoming aircraft is its flight path towards the Capitol. A smaller plane, if it is coming in from the westbound, which seems to be the conventional wisdom with the Mall, it would be much easier for the small plane to counteract what we are doing. Obviously, with a larger plane, as even what we saw with the Pentagon, it is much more difficult to maneuver. So it would really depend on the size, the speed, and the direction from which the plane was coming.

The CHAIRMAN. If it was a small plane, it still could have the crop duster effect if it could distribute chemicals onto crowds of people. This concerns me.

I think the gentelady pointed out something about the executive branch. Again, I have no doubt in my mind that we made the right decision to evacuate given the information we had at the time from Homeland Security. You all made the right decision 150 percent to do that. But I still think Homeland Security needs to evaluate small planes, large planes, potential items in them, and then decide whether or not to evacuate.

And within their jurisdiction, frankly, is the communication with the District of Columbia. I am very sensitive to Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton. I know you have made great strides in communicating. There were some questions at one point in time about communication, and I know you have a working group and coordinate with the District of Columbia. The controversy arose about the rest of Washington being evacuated, which is frankly not our responsibility here on the Hill. It is the responsibility and the coordination of Homeland Security, I believe, and metro D.C. But from Capitol Hill's point of view, I believe that we have coordinated a lot and have improved that coordination with the District of Columbia.

Chief GAINER. Mr. Chairman, would you mind if I at least comment on the chemical spray again, because I know there is a lot in the press about that. One of the things that go into us making the decision is what we know from an intelligence perspective. And you know as Chairman of this committee that we have people dispersed throughout the Federal system getting intel. And so in weighing what might be in a plane, not knowing, is whether we believe that terrorists have the ability to deliver chemical or biological in a weapons fashion. So, I mean, there are a lot of possibilities. A plane could be loaded with C4, or it could be loaded with a chemical. But intel tells us that the ability of our adversaries to do that and deliver it is low in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. I had a question for the Sergeant at Arms. You said a study is under way examining the consequence of an aircraft hitting the Capitol or an office building, and whether we should

shelter in place or evacuate. Is that being done by Homeland Security?

Mr. LIVINGOOD. No, sir. That is being done by some contractors that we have hired and one of the national labs.

The CHAIRMAN. And I believe Homeland Security has said publicly I that they are also looking at this type of thing—a plane hitting a building. Would there be coordination between us and them in sharing the results?

Mr. LIVINGOOD. There will be. We have already discussed that with the Deputy Secretary. The only thing, they are not coming out here and going through all our buildings from a structural standpoint. I think they are concentrating more on the bigger picture, where we are concerned with our buildings here in the Capitol complex strictly, and we are doing a thorough analysis to include the Dome, as you say, and the House buildings and the Senate buildings.

The CHAIRMAN. We focus on the Dome, but there is the possibility that it could crash into the buildings, in the complex too.

Mr. LIVINGOOD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I work with a lot of groups that are concerned with persons that have a form of a disability, and we did have phone calls from some of the groups saying that persons who had disabilities were having trouble getting out of the building during the evacuation. And I think that the Capitol Hill Police have requested information regarding employees with disabilities, and requested that offices report if you have disabled individuals. The OEPPPO recently requested updates of any such information on behalf of the Capitol Hill Police. Have you acquired this information? What do you do with it? And the second thing I wanted to ask is, do you know cases? I would try to track down Members when they have situations where a person with disabilities is having trouble getting out of the building.

Chief GAINER. Our House division, Mr. Chairman, does have a list of the disabled staffers and their room numbers, and during evacuation units are dispatched to conduct sweeps of the hallways. The House side is a little bit further behind than the Senate side in having backup power to elevators that would facilitate that. But the Architect of the Capitol is working feverishly at doing that.

So, we do have the names. We anticipate that the elevator situation will be resolved shortly. This week, again, as a result of our May 11, we are sitting down with some of the advocacy groups for the disabled and the handicapped to get their perspective on how we can handle these situations better. So it is an ongoing, evolving process.

Mr. LIVINGOOD. Once they finish these backup power for elevators, which we hope will be done very quickly, we will then put the information out to the offices, and someone from the office—we are going to recommend a buddy system—take them down to the elevator, the designated elevator, and they will be able to evacuate.

The CHAIRMAN. We had a staffer here during 9/11 that was blind. That was a relatively easy situation to take care of because people walked with him, he brought his guide dog, and it was fine. But people who are in wheelchairs, for example, would have a real

difficult time. But I was told there were some people that could not get out. Is that correct?

Chief GAINER. We do know that there were some problems with that.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are working quickly, I assume, on that?

I have one other question I want to ask, and it is about debris in the hallways. The hallways in these complexes are becoming full of everything. There are boards representing noble causes, don't get me wrong, but they are all over the hallways. There are electronic devices, computer screens, deficits, boards honoring people again. And they are good causes. I am not quibbling with what the deficit is or whether it should be reduced, but there are all of these things all over the hallways.

This morning we had a smoke situation which, because of the cord that caught on fire out in the hallway, passed the fourth floor. If you have smoke and you have to get down, are you going to run into these things? Are they going to fall over? Hundreds of people could be running up and down these hallways. Is anybody taking a look at that for an emergency situation?

Mr. EAGEN. Mr. Chairman, there has been a working group that was established that has submitted a proposal for policies for the House hallways that is pending before this Committee. It was submitted about 2 weeks ago, and it has also been submitted to the House Office Building Commission jointly. We are hoping that the Committee will be able to review that and that the House Office Building Commission would be able to review it and establish those kinds of procedures. There are some challenging aspects to that knowledge, but there has been a policy recommended to the House for consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. And as you say, the officers stayed in the buildings. They kept trying to move people out of these buildings. And if you have these hallways packed with thousands of people, and there are couches and everything else under the sun in these hallways, and boards and everything that are out there, I assume that has to be a real safety problem. Somebody could fall on one of these, be impaled by them in rush.

Mr. EHLERS. Would the gentleman yield? I was appalled my first day in the Congress to see the amount of stuff in the hallways. I have never worked in a place where, if you wanted something moved, you put it out in the hallway and put a sign on it that says "Remove," or if you need extra space, you put a sign out saying "Do not remove." It looks like a junkyard many times.

We have made efforts in this committee to get rid of that, and it is far better than it used to be, but it is still incredible. Desks, chairs, lamps just perched out there. In a normal establishment, when you have something to get rid of, you call the appropriate people, they come and pick it up and take it away. Here we just dump it in the hallway. Maybe there are 3 or 4 days before it is gone.

And I hope that you incorporate it. The Chairman has made that issue with me back in 1994 or 1995, as soon as he got on this committee, and I totally agree with him. It is incomprehensible and should not be allowed. People simply cannot put stuff in hallways. They are not storage spaces.

Mr. EAGEN. Basically, Mr. Ehlers, the proposed policy does exactly that. It would deny placement of trash, furniture, et cetera, in the hallways. It is not 100 percent comprehensive, in all candor, I will tell you, because in certain circumstances such as hearing room use where receptions are held in these rooms with a great deal of frequency, there is not storage capacity to move all that furniture on a regular basis and in a rapid manner. So it does make some limited exceptions for temporary storage. But, generally, the current practice that you have referenced of other items being put in there for pickup and so forth would be no longer acceptable if those policies are approved.

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to move on to a couple questions, again, and then we will move on to other Members. But I did want to ask how we are double-checking (the audible alarms) during the day of the emergency. For example, Congressman McNulty today was standing talking to me, and he had his annunciator in his hand, but it had not gone off. When I heard the alarm, I was out of the building, and then some of the people that came after that were doing some cleaning of the building told me that they heard this is not a drill. But when the alarm went off this morning, I just heard the alarm and followed. But later on they told me the voice came on and said this is not a drill.

But the day of that emergency on May 11, what about the audible alarms? How do we double-check, because Members will come up and some will say, "Yes, my alarm went off, and some will say no." Do we have a system where we could find out from Members' offices what really worked and what didn't?

Chief GAINER. We do have a system. We test the annunciators in each building on a monthly basis. We had talked about doing that more frequently, and most of us would like to, frankly, do it more frequently, but we balance that between the disruption that comes with the office.

But what happens, for instance, in those monthly exercises, a message that will be sent over the e-mail system that there is going to be a test at such and such time; and if you don't hear the message, then through the Internet and e-mail system you can respond back to the monitoring office what your problem was. And then we do have a contractor that comes in and works with the Member's office about what the particular problem is. And the failure rates have actually been low, and generally they have been because the device is moved. These devices are set up to work in certain spots in the office, and given the activity in the office and the movement of paper and desks, we generally see that the problem is that either it has been moved, it has been unplugged, or that portable device has not been resealed properly.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from California.

Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your questions, because the question of disability was one that I had. And certainly I do appreciate your continuing to provide the leadership and trying to resolve those issues because it is important not only for the few Members in wheelchairs and others, but those who are coming to see us and staffers, blind and/or hard of hearing and other types of handicaps. Excuse me for saying "handicaps." Disabilities. We should be cognizant of that.

And also the notion of those things in the hallway, I tell you, it certainly does look like a junkyard. Something of this magnitude, being the most deliberative body in the country, and you come to our hallways, and you have storage stuff all out into the hallways saying “Do not take” or “Take” and it seems like there are a couple of days before those things are taken. And that is—not only doesn’t look good, the aesthetics are not good, but we are talking about the safety of this, especially in terms of any evacuation.

Mr. Livingood, you spoke about since 2003 there have been 50 incidents surrounding the Capitol and the White House on issues such as May 11, and even more, a greater number, I suppose, outside of the perimeters. You say you coordinate with the House and Senate oftentimes on ensuring that your plans are all in place. But what about the city buildings?

Getting back to Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton, and the city was concerned that they did not hear anything about the evacuation given May 11th. Are we—and that is within the 17 mile radius; am I correct? Then are you—or why aren’t we, or are we, coordinating with the city with reference to the plans as well?

Mr. LIVINGOOD. We have had discussions with the city on that. And I will let the Chief—he is the one that had the discussions recently.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Of course.

Chief GAINER. As you know, Chief Ramsey and I go back a long way. We first came on the Chicago Police Department in 1968, so we have been together a long time.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Talking about a buddy system. I tell you.

Chief GAINER. What we have done since May 11, in addition to some of the things we had done before that, is agreed to share the Blackberry information immediately with some specific members of his command staff. And they also are going to detail one of their officers to our command center in addition to some of the jointness we have at the National Capital Region Coordination Center or at Homeland Security. So we have really tripled the system of simultaneous notifications.

And Chief Ramsey and I, we have always communicated since I have been over here on Blackberries. We might talk two or three times a day. And so we have built at his command center, and our command center he has an individual. We are also in the midst of installing a ring-down phone in our command center to additionally give the police department more command information.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. And is this post-5/11 or pre-5/11?

Chief GAINER. Two of those things are—Blackberries were pre-5/11. The ring-down phone and the individual stationed in ours is post-5/11. Although, during any anticipated event, for instance, the State of the Union, the funeral, the inauguration, we will have people in each other’s command center, but on a day-to-day basis this is new.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. That is good. And whomever needs to answer to this. Mr. Livingood spoke of it, that there are studies that have been done, I suppose, with reference to inside of the building and ensuring that everything, I guess, along the protocol is taken care of in terms of evacuating folks. But what about a

study outside the building? And people really just seem to not have been able to discern where to go and what to do. And so what about a study and plans that have been put in place for that?

Mr. LIVINGOOD. There is a group after May 11—there was a group formed by the Capitol Police that are looking into the recommendations for particularly air evacuation, what would be our procedures, and the outside security surrounding our evacuations.

Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Okay. Fine.

Chief GAINER. May I add just a little bit to that? It is part of the committee's direction and Mr. Livingood's, as well as the Senate Sergeant at Arms, to be very specific, what would we do this afternoon if this came up while we are doing all this studying? Chief Rohan, who heads operations, the Assistant Chief, along with his inspectors and deputy chiefs, instantly after that incident instituted a plan where officers will be repositioned by intersections.

So there are a lot of simultaneous things going on, as you might expect. As we evacuate the buildings and go through the buildings looking for people, as soon as their core mission is done in the building and the building is secure and empty, then each officer is going to a pre-positioned place around the Capitol complex and remains there, number one, to be available to maintain the security.

Now, when we abandon these buildings, we still have to keep them secure because it could be a trick by terrorists. So the officers are all going to pre-positioned positions, and I think as we work through better messaging and that the people understand better where they need to go, but I hope one of the things we will hear from the experts from the private sector is the need to exercise a lot more.

The Capitol complex has been just outstanding, especially since the anthrax and ricin days, about suspicious packages and how we react, but we haven't been very willing to do mass exercises and practices so that everybody really understands where they go under what set of circumstances. Now, the balance of that, obviously, it is disruptive to Congress and the committees and what is going on. But we all know from our earlier days the value of practicing fire drills, and we are pretty good with the fire drills, but we have certainly not spent enough time on emptying the Chambers or other buildings in real-life situations.

Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Well, it seems to me with this new-found environment we are in that that should become a more frequent occurrence than not.

It seems to me that with our needing evacuation experts and structural engineers, would we not have maybe someone on staff whose of this ilk? Or is that too expensive, Mr. Chairman?

I do not know, but it seems to me like, at this juncture now, we need to have some of those folks who are talking with us on a daily basis. Maybe they are; maybe they are not, but structural engineers, it would seem to me like we should have someone on staff or a couple of those folks on staff. And perhaps that might not be the thing to do, but it certainly seems to me if you have to go outside and talk to these folks, maybe some of these folks should be on board.

Mr. LIVINGOOD. The Architect has, I am sure, one or two people in that category.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Okay.

Mr. LIVINGOOD. But they are assisting and working with—and they have been outstanding—AOC has been really helpful to the outside group looking at this. So it is a combination.

Mr. GAINER. And we do have a very, very active security services division under the direction of Bob Greeley, who is one of the nationwide experts on security systems and building construction now. So he brings a wealth of information that he gained with years at the State Department in building their buildings, especially the embassies. So we do have a lot of in-house experts, but we are not hesitant about turning to the university systems, the Department of Defense, ATF, academicians and others to learn more and to verify that we are going in the right direction.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. One thing for sure, you three, and four with the assistant chief, are absolutely professionals. You do a yeoman's job, but such as what we do here, we still need these professionals behind us, too, as a backup and conduit.

A couple more questions, Mr. Chairman, on this first round. One, Mr. Eagen, you spoke of the fact that our children at the child care centers are quickly bussed out. How soon do those buses come to get these youngsters out?

Mr. EAGEN. The bus is actually located right on campus, about 50 yards from the entrance of the daycare facility. So they have to, in the case of the infants, we actually take their rolling beds and roll them down the sidewalks. And so it is just a matter of the time to get them out of the building, onto the buses, start them up and drive away.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. What about the House pages?

Mr. EAGEN. They have a similar capability. The pages are under the Clerk of the House as opposed to the CAO, but they also have a transportation vehicle as well.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. And with reference to the Supreme Court and all of these other places, I know the employee union at the Library of Congress has asked for a Compliance Office review of the Library's emergency evacuation procedures. Is that something that is either being put in place or will be put in place.

Mr. GAINER. I do not know that I can speak directly to that particular review, but I can say this: As you know, the acting chief of the Library police is one of our inspectors, and we have been working with the Deputy Librarian to sync their operational procedures and ours in their training, and a lot has been done.

The Deputy Librarian of Congress has asked me next week to go to his senior staff meeting and address some of their issues. So things have substantially improved in our relationship with the Library of Congress in the way we are moving, notwithstanding how the merger may or may not go. But their training and communications, similarity of exercises, how we react, are very much in sync.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. And the Supreme Court, which all of us are in the same radius?

Mr. GAINER. Of course, they are a separate department, but again, we do work very closely with the Supreme Court police and the Government Printing Office police to try to mirror each other's procedures.

As to an air threat, several senior members of the Marshal's Office in the Supreme Court as well as the police department are linked to our telephone system. So when one of these air threats comes on, we bring in all the key players from these different organizations and get on a telephone conference call so we know what is going on with each other.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. And the last one. We are told that during the time of this evacuation, Blackberrys and phone lines were saturated during this moment, and Verizon was at a 70 percent, Cingular was at a 50 to 75 percent load. What steps are we taking again, Mr. Eagen, with reference to communication, given the fact that we thought getting Blackberrys and all of this after 9/11 would suffice in terms of communication, and now we see that that too has been bogged down?

Mr. EAGEN. Well, exactly. You described the circumstances quite accurately. One thing I would emphasize, in a circumstance like what we faced on May 11, the Blackberrys and cell phones or others are considered a secondary communication mechanism. The primary communications are the annunciators and the sirens in the buildings that direct people to leave the buildings.

The cell phones, the Blackberrys, those kinds of messages are supplementary and intended to be directed towards recovery as a supporting device.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Of course, Members were quite concerned, given the fact that they were not able to use a lot of their Blackberrys or cell phones because they were inside of the Capitol, and of course they do not use it on the House floor, we will reiterate that. But I am saying that they still were trying to communicate with staff back in the office and that type of thing.

Mr. EAGEN. That is exactly correct. When we first started making a House commitment to the Blackberry devices as an emergency solution, we recognized that at some point in the not-too-distant future, as that solution became more popular, we were potentially facing the same circumstance that has happened with cell phones. And that is that, during a circumstance where there is high use, the public grid can become overwhelmed. The statistics that you referenced are exactly what happened on May 11.

Normally, during that hour, Verizon, for example, has a 99 percent call success rate. For that particular hour, they were down to 70 percent. We have had discussions with Verizon, with Cingular, with Nextel as to whether there are capabilities for them to enhance their provision of services in this particular cell grid, and they are exploring that for us.

I think it bears witness to the need for communications in-depth, which is our strategy. So the new system we have stood up, called House Alert, allows us to send simultaneously multiple messages to multiple kinds of devices. And depending on the situation we are facing, we are going to encounter different circumstances.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. I suppose.

Mr. EAGEN. What is very helpful to us and a place where the committee can potentially be of help is where the Sergeant of Arms sends a solicitation to all Members of the House at the beginning of each Congress and asks them to give us multiple contact numbers, phone numbers, email addresses, cell phones, et cetera, et

cetera. That is what we use to populate this system. As of this point, we are missing about a fifth of the Members because we have not gotten a response.

We cannot reach out to the Members if we do not get the information. So anything that you can do to help encourage your colleagues to provide that information, it will be treated confidentially, which is always a concern.

Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. This committee is hearing you very clearly on that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I would note if we can be of help, because in the past, we had a payroll situation one time when Mr. Larson was ranking member. We had, I think, four people on a different type of payroll. The system was changing, but we were able to actually go through the staff of House Administration on a bipartisan basis and talk to them and get them to convert to the system.

So if you do run into a situation like that, if we can be of help on outreach, we will be more than happy to do that.

Mr. Ehlers.

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be brief. I think we have covered much of this in detail, but just a few points.

First of all, just on behalf of my staff, I want to communicate something they have communicated before and is still a problem: Trying to get out of the south area in Longworth is very, very difficult. The southeast entrance, you have the metal detectors there blocking the way, and there is a tremendous jam. And my staff is on the seventh floor. By the time they get down, they usually cannot get below the second floor because of the press of people on the stairways just trying to get out. And of course, there is no southwest exit from this building. So my staff has taken to going to the north end and then coming back. They are actually approaching the danger rather than getting away from it.

At the very least, if we can, in an emergency evacuation like that, have your officers move the metal detectors somewhere else and get them out of the way so people can flow out of the building, it would be good. Because it is a bad situation.

You might also be able to put for some people to exit via the truck bays; although that is not a good route. But I do not know if you, Mr. Eagen, could develop some sort of device, folding steps, that could be put in there so people could zoom out that way. But it is a major problem in Longworth. That is on behalf of my staff.

In terms of what happened on May 11, perhaps it is the scientist in me, but I spent most of my time during the evacuation analyzing how it was going, and there are some things that were very good. We evacuated the Capitol very quickly. I thought that went extremely well.

I also commend your officers. In previous evacuations, they have been basically standing there and pointing. This time, every one of them, "get moving, get moving, get moving." They were really pressing people on and hurrying them on, and I think that was tremendously helpful. Because people, once they get out, tend to start looking around to see—looking for friends, looking in the air for airplanes, et cetera, and your officers did a good job of keeping them moving.

Mr. GAINER. Thank you.

Mr. EHLERS. Perhaps a little too good, because I went to the assigned spot for my staff—I wanted to be with them and make sure everyone was okay—and could not find them. And I found one staff member, and she said, Well, the officers told us to keep moving and keep moving on further down. So none of my staff was at their assigned point. So you will have to work that out as to whether we are supposed to stop there or keep going.

The communication, I think there was a problem in two ways: First of all, communication with your officers. I was surprised how little they knew. And I noticed people starting to move back into the buildings, and I kept asking people, do we have an all clear? I asked the officers, do we have an all clear? We do not know. But they did not stop the people from moving back into the buildings. Nothing on the Blackberry. It took well over half an hour before we got an all clear on the Blackberry, and by then, most of the people were already back in the buildings.

I asked people when they were moving, how do you know it is okay? And most of them said they were listening to the radio or they had gotten a phone call from a relative or they had seen it on TV. And that is ironic. We have this great communication system for you to communicate with your officers, and they did not know what was going on, and the TV reporters did. They had reported it was a small airplane they had turned around.

By the time we got the all clear, I think the airplane had already landed in Frederick. So, clearly, there has to be an improvement in that situation. And also sending out the all clear on the Blackberrys. I do not think the congestion lasted over half an hour, and you must have known at some point earlier than that that there was no further danger and that we could return to our offices or to the floor.

Mr. Chairman, that is all I have to add to it. I can talk longer, if you like.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Just taking care of business here.

Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentlelady from California.

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my apologies for being late. I was at a simply riveting hearing on patent law in the Judiciary Committee that I could not leave, but I think it is important that we are having this hearing. And I am hopeful that we will do lots more of this.

One of the reasons why I was eager to accept this assignment when Nancy Pelosi asked me to do it was this kind of emergency services issue.

I spent 14 years in local government before I was in Congress, and we organized in California, really thinking about earthquakes, not terrorism, but a lot of the steps that you do are the same. And we ended up actually in our county government making sure that close to 20 percent of our employees went through a week-long training of how to do CPR, all of the emergency services. And it actually not only helped us in government, but it was translated into kind of an emergency service force in the community. We had county employees that saved people's lives in libraries when some-

body dropped and the like. So I am hopeful, and I am sure the Chairman is very interested as well, how we can do a better job preparing for emergencies.

I would just like to say, when the evacuation began—I chair the California Democratic delegation—and we were just sitting down for our weekly meeting in the Capitol. And our new colleague, Doris Matsui, said, What is that noise? And I am glad she has great hearing because it was an officer shouting, “get out,” and we did.

And I am mindful that, as we were exiting the building, the officers stayed behind. They were there putting our safety ahead of their own. And I think all of us, you know, we have suggestions and helpful comments about how we can always do better, but I think, if it has not already been said, our gratitude to the officers for their service to us cannot be said often enough. So I want to do that again. Thank you so much.

Mr. GAINER. We will relay that to them.

Ms. LOFGREN. And to all of your troops.

Having said that, there are a few things I think we can do better, and it has already been touched upon. Communication is so important, and I think we really need to take a look at the Blackberry system.

My Blackberry worked, but as I was out on the street, a lot of Members' Blackberrys did not work. And the information that I got on my Blackberry was very limited; you know, the nature of the emergency. And I think information can change how you behave.

I was not in the Longworth Building, obviously, but I got feedback after the fact from people who were that they could not get out of the building because of the congestion in the stairway. Someone I know who was visiting a member said it took them forever to get down the stairway, and his colleague was waiting for him. He took the elevator.

Well, if it is a fire, you do not want to take the elevator. But if it is a small plane, there is no reason not to take the elevator. So the more we can provide information, the better off we will be. And it seems to me, if Blackberry cannot upgrade their system, we need to look at some other system that can get the information, whether it is the announcement through our beepers, by moving some of that announcement off the campus itself, I do not know. But I think together we need to explore that issue.

And the other thing that I think we can do better on, in addition to the quality of the information, is the timeliness of the enunciator system. I think it is great that we have put that in place, but my staff is on the first floor of the Cannon Building. As with the last evacuation, they discovered there was an evacuation when they looked out the window and saw a lot of people running by. So they figured something was up, and it was only afterwards the enunciators went off. So I think the timeliness of that as well as the amplitude of the information is something we could look at and improve.

I sent a memo to the Chairman outlining some of the issues that I thought might be explored, and one may be sensitive, but I know we do drills. But we generally do drills when the Members of Congress are gone. And that is probably because the Members of Con-

gress do not want to be drilled, and I understand that. But I think it is important that we subject ourselves to a drill, because that is more of a real-time situation. And even if it is inconvenient for the Members or some of our colleagues grumble, that we ought to just do that, and that is my personal opinion. And, really, we ought to look at it as supporting the guys and gals on the first line. If we are not willing to be discombobulated to that extent, how can we ask your officers to be brave on into the future?

So those would be my comments, and my thanks also, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And I would note the memo you gave me. Other Members have also sent in memos, and we wanted to wait for this hearing so we could receive as many answers back as possible. And some of the issues you raised were definitely raised also by some other Members.

Mr. Doolittle.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join with the others in commending our three House officers here and the people under them for what they are trying to do.

We are making improvements as we go on. Maybe you have addressed some of this, but I think for the most part you probably know more keenly than we do what the shortcomings were and where the areas of improvement lie. What were they?

Mr. GAINER. From the police perspective, just as to the evacuation itself, it is the communication issue. The continued communication issue.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. You mean communication with us?

Mr. GAINER. Yes.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Okay.

Mr. GAINER. Actually, the information we were getting from Homeland Security and others was the best that was available. And then each entity, whether it is the District of Columbia or the White House or us now have that information, and we have to act according to our policies and our procedures and what is particularly going on in our buildings.

So I think we had all that we could have, and the Homeland Security and the military continued to improve that in the radar picture. So that is advancing. And that is how we handled the information and how we put that out.

One of the things that we did not talk about is, we just do not go from standing still to evacuating. There is a whole series of things going on—for instance, in an air-con situation, we are tracking the speed, the direction, the altitude of the plane—that we are continually kind of ratcheting up what we are having our people do in preparation for a final evacuation.

We have found out that, on May 11, we were not as precise and sharp as we should have been with Mr. Eagen's office, and we have already met and rectified that. We were better than we were before, and there are some ongoing things, but we will be better tomorrow afternoon on that.

It was nearly, I will not say disastrous, but the reentry was very clumsy. One of the things you mentioned were people seeing on TV. In order to reenter the building, we have to reposition ourselves to get back into the building. Close all those doors that have been

opened when the alarm sounds. And what was uncrisp at the time was the precise graduated reentry as we graduated to leave. And we have sharpened those already. But we need to drill it with both the Members and the community what it means to get you the information that the threat is over but you cannot quite get in the building, and that is where the confusion was on this.

Clearly, the information about the plane, the intruding plane being turned and heading north was coming out quicker than our ability to get people back into position. So what you will see as we drill this with you and explain through the committees and others, that we would like to get you the information that the threat is over and now let us get ready to get back into the building. And it will probably take 10 or 15 minutes to pull our officers back from the perimeters to get back into position at the doors and re-arm the doors. And that is something we had not drilled in practice. That was not very good.

One of the other things we picked up not only during the Reagan funeral but reinforced during this one is most of our officers have the radios so that you and they can hear them. If you will see our dignitary protection people and others, they have the radio going to the ear. We have reevaluated that, and what we are going to move towards is, you will not be able to hear the radios publicly getting information because the sounds and sights and codes mean different things to all of us, and we do not want to confuse people. So there will be a little more silence.

Based on the very good suggestion of Mr. Eagen, we have designated a tactical communications officer. So as soon as this happens, there is an individual whose sole job is to get information out to all the stakeholders so they have nice-to-know information, need-to-know information, action information. And that went into effect this morning.

Now, we were moving towards that, but we had to kind of goose the program and get this thing going a little quicker.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Is that someone the three of you select?

Mr. GAINER. It is someone in our shop.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. In the Capitol police?

Mr. GAINER. Yes, it is. But, again, that is just an individual who uses technology and messaging formatting. Much has been developed on the House side, in Mr. Eagen's office, and he is in the midst, his staff, of showing us how to use the equipment, how we can get quicker messages out, and that has been a very ongoing joint effort.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Do any of the rest of you want to add to Chief Gainer's commentary on what you identified as the shortcomings, areas where improvements were needed?

Mr. LIVINGOOD. Well, we met right after the air evacuation, the next day, and then we met a second time, and then we met this last Monday.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. By "we," you mean the three of you?

Mr. LIVINGOOD. And the Capitol police and other officials and others from the Senate, et al. And we did lessons learned, and the major ones were the ones the Chief just mentioned, the communications.

As he said, the big advantage that will change is having one person dedicated in the Capitol Police Command Center to push out information, to promulgate information. And that will be a huge improvement.

Just to answer one other question. Sometimes people have said they did not hear the annunciator. The sequence in an evacuation, when you evacuate the building, not shelter in place but evacuate the building, will be the alarm going off first. That is the first thing. Everyone should leave when they hear the alarm. Sometimes you will be gone before you hear the annunciator because that takes another minute or so to get out over the airwaves, where the alarm you just pull.

And coming on line will be a PA system that should go right after the alarm is pulled throughout all the public spaces in the buildings. So we will have a three-tiered besides the Blackberry. And that is something we have been working on and came to fruition or was brought to our attention as lessons learned after this last one. But we had been moving towards that.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. I was on the House floor, as I think all the Members were. I think we were having a vote right then. And just by coincidence, the Speaker happened to be near me, and somebody said, his security said, "get down." it was like somebody might be in the Chamber with a gun or something. So we crouched down behind the seats. The Speaker, too. And then the next thing we knew, it was "get out," but I never heard any alarms. Do we have these enunciators or alarms in the House Chamber?

Mr. LIVINGOOD. No, there are none in the House Chamber per se, and that is the function of, and we have just finished a drill and gone over procedures in the last week of the Speaker or the Chair to announce.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. So there will not be, but the Chair will announce when one of these things happens?

Mr. LIVINGOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Eagen, anything you want to add, any shortcomings or lessons learned or areas of improvement?

Mr. EAGEN. I would echo the Chief's references on communications. Our objective all along has been to establish a capability that would have the Police Command Center have the direct tools to communicate to the House employee force, because they have the best knowledge about the circumstance, and we have been working towards that.

I think the tactical communicator role that the Chief identified is absolutely crucial. Our vision has been to have a triple redundancy of that capability, even though if a circumstance occurred where the command center could not send out messages, that we would still have our emergency communication center as a backup, and then even third, beyond that, we are working towards having a triple redundancy at our alternative computer facility.

There are certainly limitations with the Blackberrys. You have it correct. Just so you understand, when we send an all-campus email out via the Blackberrys, the system alone takes 7 minutes to cycle through 10,000 messages—then you encounter whatever is happening on the public grid—that those messages are going out. And now, in the world the House is in, it is multiple public pro-

viders, Verizon, Cingular, Nextel. When we first stood up the Blackberrys, we were using one vendor, and they had a data base solution that was very new and had limited usage, and it was very efficient. But what we discovered, with the Members particularly, was that that was not necessarily the best solution back in their districts, and they started to migrate to other providers. And we recognized that we had to stand up a capability that could reach them multiple ways.

So the key for us, as I mentioned earlier, is having those multiple contacts. The simple problem may have been with one particular Member that we did not have their email address. Some Members do not use a House account as their primary email address; they use another provider. And if we do not have that email address, we cannot send it to their Blackberry.

So the answer to what you alluded to could be multiple problems. Blackberrys are not perfect. I think today was a better example of where the Blackberry can be effective. I myself have gotten I think seven messages so far today. But that happened before the crunch of the business day. It was while most people were away from the campus, and it allowed us to send multiple kinds of information sources in a secondary kind of situation, not when the emergency is happening right there on the spot.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Well, Mr. Eagen, when you send out a big blanket message like that, do you try to use Members' pin numbers if you have them? Or is it all only or primarily their email addresses?

Mr. EAGEN. We will use whatever we are provided. The House alert system can take multiple iterations of addresses for each individual.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Well, does that 7-minute thing for cycling through, would that be 7 minutes if you used pins instead of email addresses?

Mr. EAGEN. That is 7 minutes for the entire address list that we send to.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. So that would be irrelevant then whether it was a pin or email address it was going to. That is just the limitation, technically.

Well, my time is up, but I do want to ask this question: Verizon has had and I think still has an advantage that nobody else has because we cannot get the other antennas in. Has that situation been rectified?

Mr. EAGEN. Actually, that has already been resolved.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. It has.

Mr. EAGEN. Within the House office buildings, we completed a project that the committee sponsored in December to install multiple vendor repeating antennas, so that all the providers now have similar access to the House buildings.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Good. So that is all in place?

Mr. EAGEN. Yes.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. As of December, or more recently than that?

Mr. EAGEN. December.

Ms. LOFGREN. Would the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman and gentlelady will yield, just on that point. There were a lot of security issues to be worked out on that. In fact, it probably took three years, if I recall right. It

transcended Mr. Thomas' chairmanship and also mine, but there was only one provider. And how it started, a Member would go down, and they would be walking through the tunnel, and they would see another Member and say, how does your cell phone work? Well, what provider is that? Well, that is Verizon. Well, in fairness to all the other people that have telephones, we might all want to switch to that one.

But it was a process of the antenna system. And the Sergeant of Arms and Mr. Eagen, security-wise, also worked that out so that whole thing could eventually take place. So everybody has an equal footing on antennas.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Good.

The CHAIRMAN. The Gentledady from California.

Ms. LOFGREN. I appreciate the gentleman yielding. I think the questions are excellent ones, and it stimulated one in my mind. As you know, I come from Silicon Valley and there is all kinds of technology out there that we may or may not know about here.

Have we sort of posted the issue for the tech world to address, that we have an overwhelmed system and we need a way to be able to, in emergency situations, communicate and see who has a solution for us?

Mr. EAGEN. Similar to the answer that Mr. Livingood gave, we have no hesitancy going out to the experts in the world and seeking best practices. So, absolutely, we seek that kind of input and are open to new technologies and new solutions.

The challenge of the House, quite candidly, is we have, for the most part, a decentralized business model. So deploying some of these things and getting everybody to adopt them is often the biggest part of the challenge. If a Member or a staffer is not willing to carry a device of some kind, then we cannot communicate with them.

Ms. LOFGREN. Then you are going to be doing, hey you. But most people are actually carrying devices at this point.

Mr. EAGEN. But not everyone.

Mr. GAINER. May I add one of the other areas that we are looking at that needs improvement is where we evacuate to, and we have to reexamine that. But, still, part of that goes back to the human element. All of the technology and good communication without the practice of the humans is very difficult.

We have talked to a lot of adult educators, and in some of these incidents, whether it is a big plane or small plane, we may have a tendency to say, you know what, probably the Capitol is more a target than the Ford building; probably the Capitol is more a target than Postal Square. But what the adult educators have shown us, and because we do not practice too much, is whether we can get different groups of people to do different things. And there is an awful lot of self-evacuation that goes on up here.

So under some circumstances, it might be good to say let's evacuate the Capitol and everybody in the Ford building stay in place, or everybody in the Cannon and the Rayburn. And what happens, they are watching TV, listening to different things, and they see one group leave and the next group wants to leave.

Again, the best example of that most recently—is when there was a bus fire in the 3rd Street tunnel by the Ford building. We

were in perfect consult with the emergency management agency of the City, which we are also very linked to, and the Police Department and the Fire Department about what was going on. But then some people, when they saw the smoke, and it makes people nervous, and there were some explosions from that fire, then people start evacuating and it starts kind of a contagious hysteria; why aren't I learning something, why aren't you telling me? And then, as we put out that information, then the community comes back and says, you are giving me too much information; why do I want to know what is going on in the 3rd Street tunnel? So we are still in a push and pull on that.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. I would just observe on the two occasions like we have, Members are supposed to go to one place; and staff people and the other buildings, they have their places they are supposed to go. I was with a staff member so I intentionally did not go to where the Members are supposed to go. I went with him. I was going to go with the rest of my staff.

Well, our primary meeting place, the police told us you cannot go there; you have to keep going beyond that. So, then, we do not have a primary meeting place. The backup meeting place, they were also told to go beyond, and so this thing of the meeting places has not quite worked out.

We also are told to have those quick hoods, have them in a bag and one person takes charge of those. But if you do not have your meeting places worked out, then you are not going to have the quick hoods. I must say, I do not have a lot of faith in the quick hoods anyway, but that is one of the types of security that is being provided. But it is not really working out because, in these two situations we have had, you do not have that meeting place like we are supposed to have because we have been directed not to go there.

Mr. GAINER. We are going to work on that with the House Sergeant of Arms and others to clarify that.

Mr. LIVINGOOD. That is being worked on as of a couple of weeks ago.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. I know I am over. I will say this last thing.

It was kind of ironic this morning. I did not read my Blackberry as I left the House this morning to see what was on it. And I should not do this, I know, but driving along I noticed in the car that I had a bunch of messages, and I had not cleared out the messages from yesterday. So without reading the messages, I just thought, you know, typically this is about something, some suspicious substance, and it is always resolved. And so I just deleted everything.

Mr. GAINER. Ouch.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Then I heard on the radio that there was a problem with the Rayburn Building. Are you concerned about—I almost think this issue of too much information, but we get so many of these things. It is like Proposition 65 in California when you walk into the grocery store. There is a warning there on the door that says: This premise may contain substances that are known to cause cancer in humans. Well, I have concluded virtually everything causes cancer, so I am not going to worry about it anymore. I am going to go into that store fearlessly.

And it is the kind of thing with these Blackberry messages, we get so many of them, and they are all—virtually all, except for today—without meaning. So how do we deal with that? Because I tend to just write off, frankly, when I get some emergency announcement. I tend to sort of discount it, and I think that might be a real factor in other people's thinking as well.

The CHAIRMAN. The House officers will not answer this, but I can. We have a course teaching Members to read their emergency enunciators.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Well, I read them all until today.

Mr. EAGEN. The problem is when we start sending those messages, we do not know what the outcome is. I think the Chief referred to it. We often feel damned if we do, damned if we do not. Because if we do not communicate, then people are saying, how come you did not tell us? And if we do, and it turns out to be nothing, people are like, why are you bothering us?

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Okay.

Ms. LOFGREN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Sure.

Ms. LOFGREN. Because I saved my notice from May 11th on my Blackberry. I know that is obsessive, but this is what it said: "this is a message from the U.S. Capitol Police. An evacuation has been ordered for the entire campus. Remain calm and move in a safe manner to the exits. If nearby, grab go-kits and personal belongings on the way out. Close doors behind you but do not lock. Avoid using elevators," I do not know why that would be the case. "Proceed immediately to your designated assembly area. Check in with your office of emergency coordinator at the assembly area. Do not respond to the email."

Well, I think that there is some missing information I think we are addressing already, which is what is this event about. And as it turns out, I actually twisted my knee, and I went over to the physician. You know, Congress is full of middle-aged, out-of-shape people, and there were a lot of Members who were there seeking medical assistance.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Speak for yourself.

Ms. LOFGREN. I am speaking of myself, as a matter of fact. So I think more information would be a very helpful thing. And I understand what you are saying, John, but if you have enough information, you can make some judgments about what to do as well. I do not want to beat a dead horse, because I think that point has been made, and now I will erase this message.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have any other questions, we can ask them, but I have a couple more questions I want to submit for the record. It is about the PA system we have been working on.

I heard it in the Senate yesterday when I was over there. It is very loud, but they come over and say, "This occurred on the first floor, near room 104; now, it is over with." They do that. They still send out a Blackberry notice, but they do that too. And I thought that was interesting yesterday when I heard it.

I will follow up with this later, because my main questions were answered today about the airplane, things you are going to look at in the future, and a couple of the alarms that did not go off. I think we need to double-check that.

Let me conclude with two things. And I want to give credit where it is due to all of you. The Speaker and Ted Van Der Meid, his staff, and I know Bernie Ramos from the Leader's Office and myself, and the gentlelady and Members have been insistent upon tours—letting the public come into this building. I give credit to all the people I named that are insistent on having tours. I know the House is bearing a lot of that load. I understand that.

People are coming in the House and going out of the House, and of course, it is the People's House, but I think you have done a good job in training, working with the officers. Because, obviously, tours were taken care of that day, too. I had a couple of tourists that stopped by our office afterwards and said it was a good evacuation. All of you did a great job evacuating the tourists, including the staff-led tourists. This way, tours remain open in this building, and I think that is so important. But the education component you have done and continue to do with these officers I think is critical.

I will yield to the gentlelady shortly. In regard to Mr. Doolittle's comments regarding the confusion on the floor, before the alarms went off, I heard two ladies screaming up in the gallery; they were running and screaming. I think they heard somebody say, "Incoming plane." When they went out, two things were knocked over, two or three things out there, and it sounded like gunfire down the hallway, and somebody said, "There's a gun."

So the first reaction, before the alarm came on, based upon what I heard on the floor as I was back voting, was "There is a gun." We heard two cracks and two ladies screaming.

And as Paul Harvey says in the rest of the story—I will tell you that the gentlelady from California quickly said, "We must protect Mr. Doolittle", and jumped in front of him."

The gentlelady from California.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Oh, gosh.

The CHAIRMAN. The rest of that is a true story. The Doolittle part is not.

Proceed.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. What a chairman we have here, eh? I am telling you.

Getting back to Mr. Doolittle's issue on the reentry procedures, I am happy you are trying to crystalize those procedures. I also take note of the fact that the Senate recessed after that, whereas we came back in. Is that something that perhaps should be looked at? Or do they then break off and do their own thing returning back or what?

Mr. LIVINGOOD. I think that is a question up to each respective body. There is no problem as far as the House was concerned with us coming back in to session, given there was provided enough time to set up the security with the Capitol police.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. But it seems to me like they, too, need to crystalize the reentry procedures as well.

Mr. GAINER. It does, from the police perspective, given the methodology of the House and the Senate create a little bit more problems to us. So that each body wants different information in a different format. So that is just a little more pressure on us. We can handle that, but with the limited radio channels, you are directing the Capitol division to do one thing, the Senate division to do an-

other thing, and the House to do another thing, and we are trying to pump out all this different information. It does make more of an opportunity for us to do either real well or not do so well.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. I can understand the challenges are with us, and certainly, each time we have these types of events, the challenges do come and new challenges arise.

Mr. Eagen, we talked about the antennas that you have put in, but that only increases the coverage inside of the building, whereas Verizon has these cell sites that they can also communicate outside the building. Will we ever get to the point where those other cell phone services will perhaps have the cell sites?

Mr. EAGEN. I need to check into that for you. I would think we should be getting towards that. Outside the campus, that is a commercial decision on the part of each of the vendors as to what their cell coverage is. But I can certainly look into that for you and get back to you.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. I would like to, because it also helps those of us that are having either the Verizon phones or the Cingular phones, and that may be something we can talk about along with the Chairman.

The other thing, gentlemen, and you have been quite patient, but do we have adequate exits? Or are we looking at that, adequate exits for the number of people, again, and the design of the building? If this is something that you are contemplating, then we can accept that for now. But doors that perhaps can open just for these types of occurrences or that type of thing perhaps as we look into this. If we can look into particular doors that will open when this happens. Again, these are challenges that we are facing, so we need to look at that even if we perhaps have not.

Mr. GAINER. Well, a couple of things, ma'am, and it is a great point, and we struggle a lot with that. Probably the quick answer is the stairwell size and the exit doors are inadequate for the number of people we have here, but we are dealing with the size and shape of the buildings we have.

One of the things that our experts are doing is developing a computer model that will help better gauge the flow of folks out. But people up here are experienced enough to know that that is an issue.

Some of the experts we brought in from Texas A&M even after President Reagan's funeral, in some of their preliminary information, really started to say, Gee, you have to have more staircases, you have to make them wider, things that just are not going to happen. So we then went to the computer modeling, and we are going to have to drill on how we are going to have to work with the tools and time and the size and shape of the building.

As to the doors, again, the Architect of the Capitol and others have worked very hard with us to alarm them in such a way that people cannot get in them when they should not and are able to open when they must, and that is pretty consistent with almost all the doors.

Now, I think your point about exiting, or maybe it was Mr. Ehlers, about exiting out of some of the other bay doors, I think that deserves looking at. I am just not real familiar with that. But when the alarms go off, all the locks go off all the doors and people

are allowed to exit. That is what I referenced that, when we reenter, we have to go back and resecure all those.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Interesting. Interesting.

The last thing that I will ask you I suppose this morning is, do you recommend lighted directional signs, signage that will give directions? Is there anything we can again look at that automatically lights up and says "this way," "go in this direction"? And it certainly would be good for those who are disabled as well to read signage that will tell them to exit or whatever.

Mr. GAINER. From an emergency perspective, we think signage and lighting and strips along the floor would be the best, the absolute best thing. We have been troubled by the fact it is difficult to even identify what stairwell you are in, if you were stuck in a stairwell and wanted to call, to ascertain what floor you are on and what stairwell. So there has been a lot of conversation about that.

So I think the balance is the historic preservation of the building and what is available. Our Office of Emergency Plans is working with the Architect and will make suggestions to both Sergeant of Arms and to the committees that that is an area that definitely needs to be improved.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. You guys have done just an extraordinary job, and have done one today being with us.

And, Mr. Chairman, the Office of Emergency Planning, Preparedness, and Operations, there is more of a reason we need to talk with them because of some of the things we have shared with these gentlemen, and I thank you so much.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions? I want to thank so much the three individuals for being here today, for all you do keeping the complex safe. I look forward to some of the determinations you get on any afterthoughts on this whole evacuation, any thoughts of improvement, and again, I think a lot of things went right. And, again, I am looking forward to thoughts you find after the analysis of the large plane versus the small and what the content may be.

I just want to thank all three of you for the wonderful job you do, and thank the Members for all their patience. And with that, we will move on to the second panel.

Mr. GAINER. Thank you for your support.

Mr. LIVINGOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ms. Millender-McDonald. We thank you for your support and your suggestions and help, all of you.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Thank you. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank this second panel.

**STATEMENTS OF JACK L. JOHNSON, JR., MANAGING DIRECTOR, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, WASHINGTON FEDERAL PRACTICE; THOMAS L. KENNEDY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, PROTECTION SERVICES, VANCE; COLIN PETER COXALL, QPM, LL.B., CONSULTANT, SECURITY STRATEGY, CAPITALSYMONDS GROUP LTD.; KEITH STILL, PH.D., FOUNDER AND CEO, CROWD DYNAMICS LTD.**

The CHAIRMAN. I think we have a very fascinating second panel. We are fortunate to have with us Mr. Jack Johnson from PricewaterhouseCoopers. Mr. Johnson is the Managing Director of PricewaterhouseCoopers Washington Federal Practice. He was

Chief Security Officer of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security from December 2003 to February 2005. He was Deputy Assistant Director of the Office of Homeland Security, United States Secret Service, and Special Agent in Charge, Forensic Services Division, and Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Intelligence Division, and on and on and on. And that is our first panelist.

The second is Mr. Thomas L. Kennedy, Senior Vice President, Protection Services, and that is for Vance. Mr. Kennedy is a resourceful and team-oriented senior executive with three decades of progressive experience with the United States Department of Justice, Department of State, and private industry. He is internationally recognized for his organizational development skills and his extensive experience in physical security, executive protection training, asset protection and information technology security. He is widely recognized through a broad network of security, government and law enforcement contacts in the United States and international venues. I want to thank Mr. Kennedy for being here.

The third witness is Mr. Colin Coxall, from Capita-Symonds, and he has ventured a long way to be with us here today. He has been awarded the Queen's Police Medal for Distinguished Service, Senior Command Course, Bramshill, Wolfson College, University of Cambridge, King's College, University of London, Honours Degree in Law. And present position is consultant, Security Strategy, Capita-Symonds Group Ltd. And that is from 1998 to date. He was Commissioner of Police in Bermuda from 1995 to 1998. He has been the Deputy Commissioner, City of London Police; Acting Commissioner, City of London Police; Home Office, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Grade; and about three more pages of very incredible references. And we want to again welcome you to the United States; we appreciate your expertise.

The last witness is Dr. Keith Still from Crowd Dynamics Ltd. And Dr. Still is the founder and CEO of Crowd Dynamics Ltd., an international consulting business which advises on crowd dynamics during normal and emergency situations. Their current projects include the development of a myriad and assortment of tools and techniques used around the world for modelling crowd dynamics. He also lectures at Easingwold, the U.K. Cabinet Office, and the Emergency Planning College, where he runs workshops to teach safety considerations to the industry. He has recently advised on crowd safety considerations for the Jamarat Bridge in Saudi Arabia, the world's largest crowd dynamics problem.

And we want to welcome you again for coming so far across the seas to be here.

And with that, we will start with Mr. Jack Johnson.

#### **STATEMENT OF JACK L. JOHNSON, JR.**

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Madam Ranking Member, members of the Committee on House administration. Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to address your committee today on this extremely important topic.

The events of Wednesday, May 11, 2005, clearly demonstrate the atmosphere that law enforcement, first responders and emergency

preparedness officials operate in following the events of September 11, 2001. In this instance, an errant plane, piloted by individuals who had simply lost their way and did not realize the ramifications of their wayward travel, caused a chain of events that resulted in the evacuation of the Capitol and of the key structures in the restricted flight area.

Although the pilot's activity has since been determined to be a benign threat, the actions of the law enforcement and emergency preparedness officials in this case demonstrate in the clearest sense their ability to respond to these types of situations.

I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to specifically commend the actions of the U.S. Capitol Police under the command of Chief Terry Gainer for their professionalism and decisiveness under these circumstances.

I have been in the law enforcement, intelligence and security fields for over 30 years, many of these years right here in the Washington, D.C., area, and have seen firsthand the transition and professionalization of the Capitol Police. I can think of no other law enforcement organization that has so revolutionized its personnel and mission to meet the challenges they face everyday.

This transition, although already under way prior to the events of 9/11, has taken on a greater sense of urgency for this organization since that time, and in many respects, it has now set the standard that other law enforcement organizations seek to emulate. Quite simply: They get it.

The role of an emergency management architecture in this type of scenario, to evacuate the Capitol area and, if necessary, ensure the continuity of our Nation's legislative process, is truly daunting. It is not one that can be approached in a haphazard or unorganized manner, but instead must be a proactive and orchestrated process that interacts with over 4,500 Members of Congress and their staffs, each with individual evacuation plans.

This process also necessarily involves other key components, such as the Capitol Police themselves, the Sergeant of Arms; Office of Administration; Office of Emergency Preparedness; and the Architect of the Capitol; Thomas Kennedy, Vance International, Inc.; Jack Johnson, Jr., Price Waterhouse Coopers; Mr. Colin Coxall, C-O-X-A-L-L, Capita-Symonds Group, Ltd.; Dr. G. Keith Still, Crowd Dynamics, Ltd.

Mr. JOHNSON. Together all of these entities have made great strides to ensure that the necessary elements of a comprehensive evacuation plan have been formulated and implemented for all of the respective stakeholders.

Despite this remarkable progress, there are, in my opinion, but a few more pieces of this evacuation mosaic, if you will, to add before it is truly a comprehensive and enterprised program that is able to meet all of the needs of this esteemed body.

My first recommendation is that there be one overarching organization that is responsible for the evacuation program of the Capitol. It is my understanding that this function currently is a collective responsibility of several entities. My experience is that whenever this type of critical function is shared, particularly by several components, there is always the possibility of differences in prior-

ities, miscommunication, and problems with the proverbial handoff especially during a crisis.

My suggestion is that one organization be named as the responsible authority for this program, with the other components serving as an executive board to provide assistance and input. This enterprise organization should have the ability to leverage resources and technology, and the authority to institute policies and best practices to all of the stakeholders. Additionally, this organization would also mandate minimum requirements for all evacuation plans, to include critical areas such as building exit locations, evacuation routes, assembly and rally points, emergency coordinators, and training requirements. There must also be a requirement to conduct regular unannounced evacuation drills to familiarize employees and identify any impediments.

Second, it is incumbent upon this overarching authority that it view the evacuation plans in a collective fashion. Once you have ensured that the individual evacuation plans have been implemented and tested, it is imperative that a consolidated and comprehensive testing methodology be instituted. The philosophy of this organization must be that it prepare for the worst and hope for the best. It must be assumed that, when the next evacuation occurs, both Houses of Congress will be in session, it will be a peak tourism time in Washington, and that significant delegations with a variety of physical challenges will be visiting their Representatives.

Fortunately, there have been significant advances in the simulation modeling technology associated with evacuation planning that can be of tremendous assistance in this regard. This technology, coupled with a risk management methodology, is capable of projecting virtually limitless types of evacuation scenarios and validating both individual and enterprised evacuation plans.

As I have indicated, all the components involved in the evacuation planning process of the Capitol should be lauded for their efforts and accomplishments. As evidenced by this hearing, the Members of Congress themselves and in particular this committee should also be commended for the critical importance that they place on this issue. All too often emergency preparedness planning and the ensuing law enforcement responses are minimized due to their being viewed as inconvenient and intrusive. It is refreshing to see that this is not the case of the United States Capitol. The attention that this body places on this matter goes a long way to instilling public trust, and the American people should feel reassured that the critical issue of the potential continuity of our Nation's legislative process is receiving the appropriate scrutiny.

This concludes my opening statement. I look forward to answering any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

**Testimony of  
Jack L. Johnson, Jr.  
To the  
Committee on House Administration  
United States House of Representatives  
On the  
Emergency Preparedness of the House and the  
Evacuation of May 11, 2005**

Chairman Ney and distinguished members of the Committee on House Administration, thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to address your committee today on this extremely important topic.

The events of Wednesday, May 11, 2005, clearly demonstrate the atmosphere that law enforcement, first responder, and emergency preparedness officials operate in following the events of September 11, 2001. In this instance, an errant plane, piloted by individuals who had quite simply "lost their way", and did not realize the ramifications of their wayward travel, caused a chain of events that resulted in the evacuation of the Capitol and other key structures in the restricted flight area. Although the pilot's activity has since been determined to be a benign threat, the actions of the law enforcement and emergency preparedness officials in this case demonstrate in the clearest sense their ability to respond to these types of situations. I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to specifically commend the actions of the U.S. Capitol Police, under the command of Chief Terry Gainer, for their professionalism and decisiveness under these circumstances. I have been in the law enforcement, intelligence and security field for over thirty years; many of those years right here in the metropolitan Washington area, and have seen first hand the transition and professionalization of the Capitol Police. I can think of no other law enforcement organization that has so revolutionized its personnel and mission to meet the challenges that they face every day. This transition, although already underway prior to the events of 9/11, has taken on a greater sense of urgency for this organization since that time, and in many respects, it has now set the standard that other law enforcement organizations seek to emulate. Quite simply – they get it.

The role of an Emergency Management Architecture in this type of scenario, to evacuate the Capitol area and if necessary, ensure the continuity of our nation's legislative process, is truly daunting. It is not one that can be approached in a haphazard and unorganized manner, but instead must be a proactive and orchestrated process that interacts with over 4500 members of

Congress and their staffs, with individual evacuation plans. This process also necessarily involves other key components such as the U.S. Capitol Police, the Sergeant at Arms, Office of Administration, Office of Emergency Preparedness and the Architect of the Capitol. Together, all of these entities have made great strides to ensure that the necessary elements of a comprehensive evacuation plan have been formulated and implemented for all of the respective stakeholders. Despite this remarkable progress, there are, in my opinion, but a few more pieces of this "evacuation mosaic" if you will, to add before it is truly a comprehensive and enterprise program that is able to meet all of the needs of this esteemed body.

My first recommendation is that there is one over-arching organization that is responsible for the evacuation program at the Capitol. My understanding is that currently this function is a collective responsibility of several entities. My experience is that whenever this type of critical function is shared, particularly by several components; there is always the possibility of differences in priorities, miscommunication, and problems with the proverbial "hand-off" during a crisis. My suggestion is that one organization be named as the responsible authority for this program, with the other components serving as an executive board to provide assistance and input. This enterprise organization should have the ability to leverage resources and technology and the authority to institute policies and best practices to all of the stakeholders. Additionally, this organization would also mandate minimum requirements for all evacuation plans, to include critical areas such as building exit locations, evacuation routes, assembly and rally points, emergency coordinators, and training requirements. There must also be a requirement to conduct regular, unannounced evacuation drills to familiarize employees and identify any impediments.

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As I have indicated, all of the components involved in the evacuation planning process at the Capitol should be lauded for their efforts and accomplishments. As evidenced by this hearing, the Members of Congress themselves, and in particular this committee, should also be commended for the critical importance that they place on this issue. All too often, emergency preparedness planning, and the ensuing law enforcement responses are minimized due to their being viewed as inconvenient and intrusive. It is refreshing to see that this is not the case at the United States Capitol. The attention that this body places on this matter goes a long way to instilling public trust and the American people should feel reassured that the critical issue of the potential continuity of our nation's legislative process is receiving the appropriate scrutiny.

This concludes my opening statement. I look forward to answering any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Still.

**STATEMENT OF G. KEITH STILL**

Mr. STILL. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Ney, Congresswoman Millender-McDonald, and members of the committee, for your invitation to be here today. My name, as you have just stated, is Dr. Keith Still. I am the president and founder of a company called Crowd Dynamics. We are part of the Capita Symonds Group, a 2 billion parent turnover company in the U.K., and we are dedicated to the study and analysis of crowd behavior.

Crowd dynamics is the study of how and where crowds form and move in places of public assembly during normal and emergency situations, and we have for the last 15 years been leading the world in both the simulation of crowds and the understanding of behavioral-basis safety. Our company has provided consultancy services to dozens of the largest municipalities throughout the world with a specific focus towards the safe and efficient management of people in times of evacuation. We have advised on terrorist-related issues such as the safety and security of the Sydney Olympics, crowd issues relating to smallpox epidemics and immunization in Holland, and the safety and security for the U.K. Labor Party conferences for the last 2 years. We have also advised on major religious gatherings such as the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia.

Our technology assesses the relative probability of certain behaviors within large crowds during adverse conditions, such as emergency evacuations, in order to design safer environments or apply the appropriate management in evacuation strategy. We base these predictions using a variety of algorithms to take into account physical conditions of the venue in question, the purpose of the crowds gathering, the relative nature of how human beings behave in certain mass conditions. But while much of the effort has proven to be enormously useful, our studies reveal that the successful evacuation depends greatly on preparation, planning, and, most of all, training.

We have developed a series of workshop materials and courses at the U.K. Cabinet Office Emergency Planning College, and for the last 7 years we have worked with multiagency authorities such as the police, fire officers, ambulance, first responders, emergency planners, business continuity planners, building control officers, safety and security personnel at multibuilding, multisite venues.

For this reason, a great deal of our company's effort has been focused on building simple-to-use documentation and procedures, training programs from municipalities and site owners in the event an evacuation should become necessary.

Our experience has indicated that next to the proper crowd management planning techniques, training and preparation of employees and safety managers is the single greatest return of investment for the crowd's safety in the event of an emergency evacuation. Forewarned is forearmed.

In summary, our techniques and technologies have assisted numerous government-level clients in assisting potential emergency scenarios involving events from 500 people up to 3 million people; from organizing my local fireworks display in my village to the fa-

cility planning, integrated management, and design changes of an over \$1 billion project of a bridge in Saudi Arabia.

Our studies and technologies have led the way to providing public and private managers with critical solutions for large-scale crowd management while ensuring safety for all those involved in the events.

And, lastly, our experience has shown that, when faced with emergency evacuation, those entities who have planned and trained for such eventualities have far greater success in the fulfillment of getting people to safety than those who do not train for those eventualities.

Our experience and recommendations are as varied as our clients. Yet, within the science of crowd dynamics, it is ultimately about people and behavioral-basis safety.

And I was interested to hear the comments earlier about how people are being complacent about the information coming across Blackberries, about the junk that has been accumulated in the corridors, about the security exits blocking exit routes in the southeast of the building, about overreaction to certain information. We are doing a series of workshops in Las Vegas after the MGM stampede where a table fell over and somebody thought it was gunfire, and a stampede ensued. Particularly, the things about signage, way-finding, location, these are areas that we have specialized in over the years.

You may not be able to predict the behavior of any single individual; however, the behavior of certain masses have certain characteristics and variables that are very predictable specifically relating to incidents that give rise to personal injury. When properly controlled, these variables can be reduced and used as tools for prediction and management of crowd safety.

I know of no other company using simulations and situations such as the Hodge, where 3 million lives depended on the mathematics of crowds. In these types of situations, I had no margin for error.

We model environments such as the U.K. Financial district, using sophisticated computer simulations to develop simple solutions to complex problems. The key is in implementing a practical and useful strategy for a multibuilding site, providing the appropriate training and education programs and the information and communication infrastructure to ensure crowd safety during emergency. We have delivered this already at our financial district.

Adequate planning and preparation have proven to be the key factors in reducing levels of risk and increasing personal security. Nothing replaces preparedness in moments of mass evacuation.

At this time I would be happy to discuss these and any other topics related to crowd dynamics and questions you may have. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Still follows:]

*\* Embargoed Until Released  
By The House Committee on Administration*

**STATEMENT OF:**

**DR. G. KEITH STILL  
CROWD DYNAMICS  
CAPITA SYMONDS GROUP, LTD**

**BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATION**

**June 9, 2005**

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the House Committee on Administration. My name is Dr. Keith Still and I am President of Crowd Dynamics, a Capita Symonds Group, Ltd company.

My testimony today will focus chiefly on our large body of work in the development of methodologies to secure the safe and effective evacuation of public buildings and facilities as well as the management and movement of large crowds under difficult and complex circumstances and conditions.

### **The Methodology**

The collection of tools and strategies that we will be discussing is today is collectively known as "Crowd Dynamics." The Crowd Dynamics technique is presently a key part of the curriculum of the United Kingdom's Emergency Planning College which is a core component of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat of the Cabinet Office. Since 1989, it has been the United Kingdom's centre of excellence for running seminars, workshops and courses on an inter-agency basis in the areas of crisis management and emergency planning to over 6000 public safety and emergency service planners each year

While extremely valuable for public safety providers, it is important to note that crowd safety is primarily a 'management responsibility' and as such requires the application of the best practices of both health and safety management. For those managers who oversee both public and private facilities, organize events, or simply manage places that attract large crowds, they must have a health and safety management system, which both anticipates monitors and controls potential crowding risks.

Because venues, both fixed and transient, are large and complex spaces, the management of crowds contained within those venues requires extraordinary integration and communication. Communications and co-ordination between those responsible for the overall operation and those managing crowds face to face must be constant. Effective teamwork depends on senior managers providing a positive and pro-active safety culture so that staff at all levels are aware of the importance of crowd safety. In particular, the team needs:

- Clear roles and responsibilities;
- Written arrangements for the regular analysis, planning, inspection, operation and review of crowd safety systems;
- Adequate training.

The day-to-day management of crowds carries with it great responsibility. Preventing the unexpected from becoming a disaster depends on good management systems and experience. Between them, members of the crowd safety team should:

- Research the type of visitor they expect and anticipate likely crowd behavior;
- If it is available, collate and assess information about the health and safety record of previous events at the venue;

- Conduct a risk assessment to decide the adequacy of arrangements in place to control crowds and change them if necessary;
- Inspect the venue and review crowd safety arrangements at regular intervals;
- Set targets for crowd management (for example, if queues extend past a particular point, open another service point);
- Liaise with outside organizations such as police and the emergency services.

**Risk Assessment:**

When assessing the risks to crowd safety in a venue, both physical and behavioral factors need to be considered. The layout of the venue, design of circulation routes, and the design and location of emergency facilities can have a fundamental influence on crowd behavior.

For example, small entrances or a limited number of turnstiles may control crowd flow into cramped areas, but may result in dangerous build-ups on the other side of the turnstiles in an emergency. Barriers can direct crowd flows and the shrewd location of desirable facilities can help spread visitors more evenly. It may not always be possible to change the layout to enhance safety, but it should always be considered as an option. Likewise, familiarity may place a role in crowd dynamics.

Visitors familiar with a venue are more likely to use known routes to favorite viewing-points or attractions and may persist in doing this, even if the routes are closed. Those who do not know a venue may block routes while deciding which way to go and well-placed signs and information about attractions can help them decide quickly. In an emergency people often leave by the way they know best, even if it appears more dangerous. However, proper communications is vital.

Our studies show that clear signposts and simple, audible public address messages are crucial in crowd management and evacuation. Poor communications can lead to people stopping, moving against the flow of the crowd, blocking passages or making frequent and distracting demands on staff for directions. Visitors without information, or given contradictory information, can become frustrated and aggressive. These types of situations can be averted with proper implementation of technology and communications when properly planned and managed.

**Crowd Types and Dynamics**

Different types of crowds behave in different ways. Shoppers in a crowded mall each with their own interests, make up a different type of crowd than spectators at a large sports stadium. Therefore, it is important to know the age-range and social mix of visitors to accurately anticipate probable behavior and make appropriate management decisions regarding crowd management.

Individuals within a crowd usually behave in a rational and goal-orientated manner. For example, someone whose aim is to watch an event or celebrity may climb onto a roof or to the top of scaffold poles to get a better view, despite the danger. Other spectators with a similar aim may follow, leading to more people on the roof and the possibility of collapse and injury. A risk assessment should pick up the

likelihood of this happening and enable adequate measures to be taken before the event.

Crowd Dynamics addresses this type of situation and provides planners with the tools to study how people move and interact with others and their surroundings. It takes into account such factors as:

- Pedestrian & Crowd Movement – how much space do people occupy? How does the crowd affect how people walk?
- Human Factors – how do people behave and respond to information or the conditions around them
- Spatial Analysis – how does the layout of a location influence movement?
- Queuing – why do queues build up? What are the consequences of safety?

Crowd Dynamics can be also be applied to any place where people assemble or move. It is relevant to multi-venue public spaces such as airports, maritime ports, a central business district, city-centers, government centers. Crowd dynamics are also important for specialized sites such as stadiums, arenas, transit and railroad stations, events large and small, marches, religious festivals, and super-events such as the Olympics where public and private sector managers must work together to provide for the safe management of large numbers of people.


By way of comparison, the United States Capital Complex is roughly similar to London's Canary Wharf. Canary Wharf -- one of Europe's most vibrant, dynamic business districts. It extends over 86 acres with over 6 million sq. feet of office and retail space, and contains over 55,000 people workers.

In the case of Canary Wharf, managers and planners needed a tool to provide a common basis for occupant management of the Canary Wharf estate. They needed tools to develop compatible responses to various security and safety related threats and provide solutions to potential incidents.


While the Canary Wharf estate currently has 60,000 staff employed in the development, a robust tool capable of dealing with crowds of over 100,000 has been developed in conjunction with the Wharfs major business tenants. Primary activity associated with the planning of the evacuation strategy for this facility included:

- Site audit to identify evacuation routes, capacities, and local hazards
- Modeling of evacuation capacity and demand
- Plans for mass and partial directed evacuations

Employee and management training are key elements for success in any program dealing with crowd dynamics. Adequate training of employees is crucial for the successful evacuation of any large scale crowd in a confined area or space. This was particularly true on the Canary Wharf project where crowd communication spread across a large area was critical in time of emergency.



Crowd Dynamics supported this need by developing procedures known as KORDON and KORUS, Evacuation Planning and Operations tools and training tools to help all employees familiarize themselves with evacuation routes off the facility and beyond.



In summary, all of these technologies are important elements in the successful measures taken on by the government of the UK in dealing with eventualities in times of emergency or response to terrorism.

As a leading provider of highly sophisticated solutions to large area security and crowd management, Crowd Management and Capita Symonds, has advised several world municipalities. We have provided technical and consulting solutions for public and private organizations and facilities. From the Sydney Olympics, to Wembley Stadium, to the millions each year who travel to the Hajj pilgrimage at Mecca, our models and experience have taught us that proper and focused crowd management is indeed possible.

**Post 9-11 Application:**

Since September 11, <sup>th</sup> evacuation planning has become a central consideration for many organizations. Our evacuation strategies group has developed leading-edge methodologies and tools to help organizations plan for the new threats and implement the new responses needed.

Specifically, Crowd Dynamics uses expertise and mathematical models and simulations to analyse crowd issues and venue design. For existing environments such as the United States Capital Complex, the approach begins with observation and analysis of the traffic flow and crowd levels during various seasons and conditions. Once that data is collected, specific models or simulations would be selected to determine the best possible, most cost-effective approach in providing secure and safe evacuation of the complex in time of emergency.

In conclusion, it is important to remember that safe and orderly crowd management is achieved only through careful planning and study. Crowd modelling is essential and critical in any venue where public safety and evacuation must be addressed. Crowd Dynamics is pleased to have been the provider of these solutions worldwide and we are happy to take any questions you may have on our technologies and models at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coxall.

**STATEMENT OF COLIN COXALL**

Mr. COXALL. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you and Congresswoman Millender-McDonald and members of the committee for this opportunity to testify this morning. I have a few brief opening remarks as well as a written statement which I have submitted to you which is slightly more comprehensive and would take longer than I have, of course, at this moment to deliver.

For over 25 years, the British Government and its citizens struggled with the very real crisis of violence and IRA terrorism within our home borders. The threat to Britain's homeland security was played out almost nightly as news of bomb blasts and other acts of terrorism continued to threaten our national security and our nation's commerce. This included three massive truck bombs in the city of London, where I eventually ended up as chief officer of police, and attempts to assassinate our Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and a further attempt to assassinate our Prime Minister John Major and the Cabinet.

In response to these enormous threats against our security, the home office and London police authorities asked Capita Symonds, who I now represent, to assist them in developing a unified set of security measures capable of identifying, stopping, and preventing terrorist attacks before they even had a chance to reach its intended target. The policy of our government was not to fortify the capital, it was to use intelligence and to use technology to protect the capital. In essence, we were challenged to devise a system that would capitalize on technology, protect the citizens of London well in advance of a terrorist event.

Remarkably, the challenge gave way to perhaps one of the greatest security and surveillance systems in operation in the world today. Through the use of several sophisticated technologies, Capita Symonds and the City of London Police designed and deployed a perimeter security system unequaled in terrorism prevention. Our solution practically eradicated major acts of violence from occurring within the city of London area, which was an amazing feat, and was accomplished with hard work and overwhelming public support, huge support from the community in relation to the technology we installed.

In addition, this system and its success has directly contributed to substantial reduction of violent crimes within our metro area and prevented countless other crimes before they could be perpetrated. This remarkable achievement is made possible by the integration and collection of crucial vehicle intelligence data, and communicating that data in near real time directly to the police officers on the ground. This crucially important vehicle information is analyzed and communicated back to the officers in 4 seconds, having searched on databases of many millions of records.

In short, our systems of vehicle identification and intelligence collection have become the backbone of our antiterrorist prevention systems in London. The subsequent sharing of that information has provided the British police with the tools and technology necessary to aggressively monitor and thwart potential terrorist threats before they ever become a reality.

Our ring of steel, as it is now being called and has been commonly called throughout the world, now protects the City of London's political government and financial sectors with up-to-the-second surveillance data to hundreds of law enforcement officers on the ground. These vehicle surveillance systems are now used extensively throughout the United Kingdom. Our technologies and solutions have preserved the way Londoners live and how our security forces protect our citizens.

I hope throughout forums such as this our experience in Great Britain can begin to provide useful insights as to how similar levels of security can be attained here in the United States. I thank you for your time, and I am very happy, of course, to answer any questions you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Coxall follows:]

*\* Embargoed Until Released  
By The House Committee on Administration*

**STATEMENT OF :**

**MR. COLIN COXALL  
STRATEGIC SECURITY OFFICER  
CAPITA SYMONDS, LTD**

**BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATION**

**June 9, 2005**

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for this opportunity to appear before the House Committee on Administration. My name is Colin Coxall and I am the Strategic Security Advisor of Capita Symonds Group, Ltd, a London based security technology and investment firm. We are pleased to appear today to present evidence relating some of the methods used in Great Britain to counter the threat of terrorism and major crime in our cities.

The Committee may wish to be reminded that for many years the United Kingdom has faced the reality of a sustained attack from terrorists of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). For over 20 years, the UK faced horrifying attacks and bombings, including a direct and major bombing attack on our democratically elected Government. You may also recall, that one of those bombing attacks took place whilst our Government was meeting in a hotel conference centre at the Grand Hotel in Brighton; resulting in death and serious injury of some of our political leaders. Worse still, the attack was aimed at assassinating our Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher.

Later there was a mortar bombing attack on Downing Street whilst our Government was meeting. Massive damage was caused to Government buildings in the vicinity, which could so easily have resulted in the assassination of our Prime Minister John Major and our Government.

In 1993 the IRA terrorists directed their attack on the City of London, which is the financial centre of our Capital. Over the period of approximately one year three 2-½ ton truck bombs were placed by the IRA into the centre of the City causing death, injury and great damage to buildings and our financial Capitals business infrastructure.

This sustained level of terrorist bombing by the IRA caused deep concern to our Government and the Police as its continuance would have caused great damage to the financial future of our nation.

### **Response to Threat**

In recognition of the significant threat to the business district of London, and the premier financial centre in Europe, a robust response was required. The response was multifaceted and comprised the following key elements:

- Strengthening threat analysis to reinforce intelligence led approach to policing
- Strengthening communications across agencies
- Providing technological systems that support intelligence gathering
- Provision of cordoned zone to restrict vehicles entry to sensitive areas
- Installation of real time alert systems comprising
  - Closed Circuit TV (CCTV)
  - Automatic Licence Plate Recognition systems (ALPR)
  - Fast track communications with central databases
- Deployment of police staff at checkpoints
- Training of staff at control centre to deal with threat and consequences
- Contingency plans for full scale alert that may arise from information from technological systems deployed.

- Focus on continuing development of systems, linkage with wider database systems, and growing the areas covered by the technology.

The premise that prevention is a better cure is central to the approach the UK government and its agencies took when dealing with the threat to London and consequently the wider UK economy. The acquisition and rapid dissemination of intelligence gathered from multiple and varied sources was vital when coupled with an appropriate response plan.

Having analysed the threat, it was clear that local quality intelligence was required concerning vehicles that could pose a danger to the City of London community. Vehicles were deemed the major threat due to their ability to carry large volumes of high explosives that could, upon detonation, devastate a large area of the city. Detecting vehicles, which through their association with other crimes or individuals associated with major crime and terrorism, was central to the containing the threat.


#### **The Solution**

The immediate response in the City of London was to deploy a sophisticated vehicle tracking system that could identify vehicles in real time and alert officers located in the control room as to a possible terrorist threat. The system was to be based on Automatic Licence Plate Recognition (ALPR) with high speed links to local and remote databases.


The key benefit this solution could offer was the near instantaneous identification of a vehicle through the automatic recognition of a vehicle licence plate that, in turn, delivered specific information concerning that vehicle to police officers. This type of solution enables authorities to assess what type of response needs to be made such as apprehension, isolation of the vehicle, or evacuation of the area or other appropriate response.

#### **The System**

The system comprises a series of cameras deployed around a cordoned area of the City of London. The identification of the area to be cordoned off was based on a number of factors, not least of which were the location of key institutions and iconic buildings that needed protection. The area comprises approximately 1.0 square mile into which 11 entry points were established and 13 exit points.



At each entry point the highway layout was amended to force vehicles to slow down and allow Police officers to interview occupants if necessary. At each of these locations a series of high performance cameras were deployed along with specialist lighting. The cameras systems allowed a clear view to be obtained of each vehicle and its occupants.



The cameras are linked to the Force headquarters and control room via a dedicated resilient fibre optic network to minimise any downtime or possibility of sabotage. The information and images transmitted by the cameras are used to read the licence plate using an automated process. The index number is then matched on the Police National Computer. Should a match occur, specific information is delivered to the police control room. This may include:

- Make and colour of vehicle
- Owner
- Links with crime
- Other intelligence concerning the vehicle that could be of a highly sensitive nature.

This information is available to Officers in **less than 4 seconds** from the vehicle passing the camera. In addition a match process takes place on local databases within the City of London where known vehicles linked with terrorists are recorded.

The screenshot shows a software interface for a 'PNC Unread Matched Notification'. The main content area displays the license plate 'N981 PHV' in a large font. To the right of the license plate, there are fields for 'Alarm to be sent' and 'Time'. Below this, there are several rows of input fields: 'Case', 'Location', 'Passed at', 'Make', 'Model', 'Colour', and 'Body Type'. A large text area below these fields contains the text 'THIS RECORD FOR CASE AMER'. At the bottom of the window, there are fields for 'Acknowledged by' and 'At Time', and a 'Print' button.

### Other Benefits

Extensive reporting facilities are provided and enable vehicle trend logging, violation logging, and system performance monitoring. Each of these enable and promote effective management, bringing further benefits such as improved police efficiency and the greater ability to monitor and identify criminals and possible terrorists. Other features include:

- Multi-camera input.
- Multiple database matching.
- Rapid end to end performance with remote databases.
- Instant data retrieval for up to 365 days.

- Full database interrogation tools.
- Full system diagnosis and event logging.
- Automatic backup facility.
- Police National Computer connectivity.
- Manages mobile ANPR systems.
- Automatic Data Housekeeping.
- Plate patch presentation.
- Remote pager notification

### **Outcomes**

The system provides a highly valuable tool to those charged with protecting the City of London from further terrorist attack. Indeed since its deployment no further terrorist attacks have taken place in the City of London. Other benefits have been a measurable reduction in major crime and an increase in detection of major and minor crimes.

Further terrorist attacks have taken place in London, but outside the City of London. A major event took place in Canary Wharf, the second financial district in London. Following this event, a similar system was deployed around this second area. Again, no further incidents have occurred.

Such has been the success of the system that an ALPR system implemented for the London Congestion Charge, comprising of some 300 cameras, now covers the centre of London and provides further information for the Police Services in London.

The underlying objective of the UK police service is to deny criminals the use of the roads. ALPR has a major part in meeting that objective. Since the implementation of the City of London Police System there have been significant developments and expansion in the use of ALPR across the UK.

Capita Symonds has supported the UK police service on the deployment of technologies to assist with policing ports of entry into the UK, and has an ongoing commission to provide technical support at all UK ports and airports. The systems at ports have a fundamental impact on national security and on the success factor of inter-networking between systems. This now forms a major part of our work.

Capita Symonds has also supported the UK government in the strategic development and deployment of the technology beyond the initial charter. This significant piece of work has established a robust framework against which all police forces in England and Wales must build their own strategies.

Throughout the period 2002/03 the Home Office led a project to deliver an ALPR capability to every force in England and Wales. This project (Spectrum) provided an infrastructure that would enable centralised ALPR data management and

the opportunity for data exchange in a secure and timely manner. Since its commissioning, Spectrum has significantly raised the profile of ALPR in the UK and it has clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of the technology. Independent trials and analysis have proven that the arrest rate of an ALPR enabled officer is 10 times that of his non-enabled counterpart.

## Mobile ANPR

CAPITA SYMONDS




4.2 results | people | solutions | products | success | performance

Following completion of the trial, the UK government is now wholly committed to the widespread deployment of ALPR and allied technologies. Such deployment will be in accordance with the UK National ALPR Standards, as developed by Capita Symonds. This document sets the technical, managerial and operational objectives and criteria for ALPR procurement. It is against the requirements set out in this document that all police owned ALPR assets must comply.

Since 1998 Capita Symonds has been providing technical support and project management to the UK Home Office under the National ALPR Data Centre (NADC). This presents represents both a significant undertaking and commitment by the UK Government. The system is currently being developed from its current pilot status to a production environment. The NADC will deliver the following:

- National facility to store up to 50 million reads per day
- National user access
- National repository for vehicles of interest
- Enhanced data mining analysis capability
- Total secure environment



It is proposed that every ALPR reader deployed by the UK Police Service will provide a real-time data feed to the NADC. Authorised users will have the ability to post vehicles of interest on NADC. In the event that such a vehicle of interest is read anywhere across the UK, then the 'hit' information will be delivered to one or more users within 3 – 4 seconds. On a national basis, police users will have the ability to search NADC for post-incident analysis.


NADC may be used by a variety of law enforcement agencies, each with its own objectives for system success. The overall success factor of the system will depend on maintaining the integrity of each stakeholder's data and interest. Capita Symonds has focussed on ensuring that the installed technology will alert the 'Centre' in the event that 2 or more stakeholders declare an interest in the same vehicle.

Beyond March 2006, it is anticipated that there will be significant system expansion to accommodate additional data feeds with feature rich functionality and integration with other police intelligence systems.

Capita Symonds also provides technical consultancy and related services to the UK Home Office Police Standards Unit on new and emerging technologies, where these are thought to enhance the overall objectives for ALPR. An example of this is the concept of e-Plates which encompass an electronic chip buried in the fabric of a licence plate. The chip emits a pulse every two milliseconds containing the vehicle identification number. This development is a significant step forward for monitoring UK motorcycles. E-plates are seen as a complimentary technology to ALPR and not a replacement for it.

Our work with Home Office has also addressed the integration of ALPR with CCTV imaging, with the objective of identification and recognition of vehicle make model and colour and obtaining images of driver and front seat passengers. Such integration has resulted in establishing fully digital solutions that will form the basis

of data exchange across the UK in the future. An example of such a user interface is included in the series of screen shots below, as deployed at certain classified locations.




This system allows the full image sequence of any vehicle of interest (or any vehicle that has been read) to be instantly replayed with any ALPR hit data. This system is a major technological advancement over previous systems as it allows full portability and remote accessibility of data. When the NADC infrastructure is established in 2006, it will be able to integrate with the video streams discussed above. In principle, any vehicle of interest that has previously been read and contains a digital image sequence associated with it, will be viewable by any authorised user nationwide. Ultimately, NADC will be the means by which this is achieved.

In summary, the UK leads the way in its use of technology to combat homeland terrorism. Capita Symonds is proud to have provided the strategic vision and solutions that allow UK Police service to meet its stated objectives of providing the very highest protection to its citizens.

The effectiveness of ALPR is now without question. However, the technology is only as effective as the intelligence sources that sit behind it. The UK has adopted the approach of 'joined up' intelligence and data sharing which has allowed the law enforcement community to deliver the highest value from its investment. The ethos underlying the deployment of ALPR in the UK is to deliver the right information to the right people, at the right time, and to deny criminals and terrorists the use of the roads.

Strategic Vision

CAPITA SYMONDS



The CHAIRMAN. Our last witness is Mr. Tom Kennedy.

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS L. KENNEDY**

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, Madam Ranking Member, members of the Committee on House Administration, on behalf of Vance, I would also like to thank you for allowing us to participate in this valuable hearing.

The way business is transacted and how government operates and how national defense is conducted have changed since 9/11. Additional world events have challenged us to prepare to manage previously unthinkable situations that may threaten an organization's and our government's future. Today's threats require the creation of an ongoing interactive process that serves to assure the continuation of an organization's or the government's core activities before, during, and, most importantly, after a major crisis event.

Security today is an extraordinarily difficult challenge that requires coordinated and focused effort. This new challenge goes beyond the mere emergency response plan or disaster management activities that we have previously employed. We must act to reduce our vulnerabilities before they can be exploited to damage our Nation's critical infrastructures and ensure that, if attempted, destructions are infrequent, minimal in duration, manageable, and cause the least possible damage and loss of life.

It is no longer enough to draft a response plan that anticipates naturally or accidentally caused disaster emergency scenarios. Plans must be developed to address possible intentional catastrophic events to include evacuation plans of large numbers of people, such as the U.S. Capitol evacuation plan. However, a plethora of scientific studies and procedures to confirm the anecdotal assumptions of effectiveness of such plans does not exist.

I have not had an opportunity to examine the evacuation plan, nor have I been privy to post-May 11 assessments of its execution; therefore, my comments will be focused on industry standards used to examine the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency evacuations and response to disasters, and my personal observations based on 35 years of experience, and public information available to me. My comments are limited to the evacuation. Information technology security, business impact analysis, and continuity of operations are not addressed.

Large-scale evacuations in the United States have historically been effective, successfully saved lives, and reduced the number of injuries associated with the hazard addressed. The U.S. Capitol plan, I believe, is no exception.

Your overall evaluation of your emergency evacuation response operations should include approximately six components and their subcomponents: the direction and control, the notification and warning, traffic movement and control, sheltering, reentry, and training.

The direction and control includes the evacuation decisionmaking process. Is the decision to evacuate made by a single individual or two or more individuals involved in the decisionmaking process? Are they armed with criteria to make that decision? Has different evaluation criteria been developed for various threats?

The command, control, and coordination process. An overwhelming factor contributing to evacuation effectiveness is a high level of coordination and cooperation among the various elements resulting from an effective command structure. That is, the command structure is well understood, participants work well together, and emergency coordinators are empowered to make decisions. Is the command structure well understood? Who is empowered to make those decisions?

Emergency communications, as we have already discussed, are an important factor; emergency response activities, also. Two-way radios are the predominant method of emergency communication; however, radio communications issues are always reported in numerous cases. This usually involves that radios are not on the same frequency or reception issues. Multiple forms of emergency communications such as cell phones and pagers and e-mails, which have previously been discussed, are generally used, which often compensates for radio failures. It should be noted, as you are aware, that jammed cell phone networks occur during emergencies.

Are the emergency response personnel mobilized and notified in sufficient time to complete the evacuation? Evacuation time estimates and modeling can be used to provide a tool for preplanning as well as protective action decisionmaking. It identifies potential challenges to efficient evacuation. Are evacuation time estimates developed?

And your notification and warning. Multiple methods of notification are most efficient, as I have seen from previous testimony, which are deployed. These methods usually involve sirens, telephones, radio, public address systems, office-to-office notification. Multiple methods of notification should be used.

Shadow evacuations, which haven't been discussed. Are people evacuating outside of the designated evacuated area? They should have no significant impact on the traffic or the congregate care center capacity or on the efficiency of the evacuation in general. However, public awareness of a hazard, knowledge of part of the evacuation procedures, and especially of altering methods may contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of the evacuation.

Also, as previously discussed, are both vehicular and personnel movement carefully controlled? Are the evacuees directed where to go as they exit the structures? Are public emergency centers used? Who decides on the return and in what order should be discussed.

Training and exercises contribute to the effectiveness of evacuations. The most successful plans generally have been tested in full-scale field exercises. This may or may not be feasible to the U.S. Capitol, in which case incremental testing would be advised. This is perhaps one area your committee should examine and review.

Cooperation from evacuees is repeatedly cited as contributing to safe, efficient, and effective evacuations. Conversely, individual behavior is attributed to less efficient evacuation. Specifically, individuals taking nonsanctioned actions, usually trying to help out, are common issues reported as evacuation challenges. This reverts to the training and exercises.

Shadow evacuations, as I previously stated, are defined as evacuations by persons outside of the officially declared evacuation zone. If appropriate, have shadow evacuations been considered?

Finally, advanced statistical methods, including regression and correlation analysis, can be used to scientifically analyze and identify key factors contributing to your evacuation efficiency.

A system should be considered to be devised by which all personnel can be accounted for quickly after the evacuation. This system can range from a simple telephone tree or taking advantage of new technologies which addresses this issue.

When time is a major consideration, as in the case with evacuations associated with air assaults, new and innovative ways to evacuate handicapped persons should be explored.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, based on information publicly available, and considering whether issues were encountered in decisionmaking, emergency communications, notification of response personnel and local officials, citizen action, traffic movement and control. And reentry, it appears that the May 11 evacuation proceeded efficiently and effectively in terms of evacuee health and safety, security, and issues related to coordination, decisionmaking, and emergency response.

Thank you for your time, Mr. Chairman. And at this time I would welcome any questions the committee may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]

**COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION**

**Hearing on the Emergency Preparedness of the House and the  
Evacuation of May 11, 2005**

Statement of Vance  
Presented by: Thomas L. Kennedy  
Senior Vice-President  
June 9, 2005

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee on House Administration; on behalf of Vance I would like to thank you for allowing us to participate in the hearing on the Emergency Preparedness of the House and the Evacuation of May 11, 2005.

The way business is transacted, how the government operates and how national defense is conducted have changed since 911. Additional world events have challenged us to prepare to manage previously unthinkable situations that may threaten an organization's and our government's future. Today's threats require the creation of an on-going, interactive process that serves to assure the continuation of an organization's or the government's core activities before, during, and most importantly, after a major crisis event.

Security today is an extraordinarily difficult challenge that requires a coordinated and focused effort. This new challenge goes beyond the mere emergency response plan or disaster management activities that we previously employed. We must act to reduce our vulnerabilities before they can be exploited to damage our Nation's critical infrastructures and ensure that, if attempted, disruptions are infrequent, minimal in duration, manageable, and cause the least possible damage and loss of life. It is no longer enough to draft a response plan that anticipates naturally, or accidentally, caused disaster or emergency scenarios. Plans must be developed to address possible intentional catastrophic events to include evacuation plans of large numbers of people, such as the U.S. Capital Evacuation Plan. However, a plethora of scientific studies and procedures to confirm the anecdotal assumptions of effectiveness of such plans does not exist.

I have not had the opportunity to examine the evacuation plan nor have I been privy to post May 11<sup>th</sup> assessments of its execution. Therefore, my comments will be focused on industry standards used to examine the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency evacuations in response to disasters and my personal observations based on public information.

Large-scale evacuations in the United States, have historically been effective, successfully saved lives, and reduced the number of injuries associated with the hazard addressed. The U.S. Capital plan, I believe, is no exception.

Overall evaluation of emergency evacuation response operations should include the following six components and associated subcomponents:

Direction and control,  
Notification and warning,  
Traffic movement and control,  
Sheltering, and  
Re-entry  
Training

**Direction and control includes:**

- The evacuation decision-making process. Is the decision to evacuate made by a single individual or are two or more individuals involved in the decision-making process? Are they armed with criteria to make that decision?
- The command, control, and coordination process. An overwhelming factor contributing to evacuation effectiveness is a high level of coordination and cooperation among the various elements resulting from an effective command structure. That is, the command structure is well understood, participants work well together, and emergency coordinators are empowered to make decisions. Is the command structure well understood? Who is the empowered to make decisions?
- The emergency communications; and emergency response activities. Two-Way Radios are the predominant method of emergency communications. However, radio communication issues are reported in many cases. This usually involves radios that were not on the same frequency or reception issues. Multiple forms of emergency communication, such as cell phones and pagers, are generally used

which often compensates for radio failures. It should be noted that jammed cell phone networks occur during emergencies.

- Are the emergency response personnel mobilized/notified in sufficient time to complete the evacuation? Evacuation Time Estimates are used to provide a tool for preplanning as well as protective action decision making. It identifies potential challenges to efficient evacuation. Are evacuation time estimates developed?

**Notification and Warning**

Multiple methods of notification are most efficient. These methods usually involve sirens, telephone, radio, public address (PA) systems, and office-to-office notification. Are multiple methods of notification utilized?

Shadow evacuations (people evacuating outside of the designated evacuation area), should have no significant impact on traffic or congregate care center capacity or on the efficiency of the evacuation, in general. However, public awareness of a hazard, knowledge of part of the evacuation procedures, and especially of alerting methods may contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of your evacuation.

**Traffic Movement and Control**

Are both vehicular and personnel movement carefully controlled? Are evacuees directed where to go as they exit structures?

**Congregate Care Centers**

Are public emergency shelters or congregate care centers included in the plan?

**Re-Entry**

Who decides when to return? In what order, etc.

**Training**

Training and exercises contribute to the effectiveness of evacuations. The most successful plans generally have been tested in a full-scale field exercise. This may not be feasible at the U.S. Capital, in which case incremental

testing would be advised. This is perhaps one area your committee should examine and review.

**Other Factors**

Cooperation from evacuees is repeatedly cited as contributing to safe, efficient, and effective evacuations. Conversely, individual misbehavior is attributed to less efficient evacuations. Specifically, individuals taking non-sanctioned actions are common issues reported as evacuation challenges. This reverts to training and exercises.

Shadow evacuations, as previously stated, are defined as evacuations by persons outside of any officially declared evacuation zone. If appropriate, have shadow evacuations been considered?

Advanced statistical methods, including regression and correlation analyses, can be used to scientifically analyze and identify key factors contributing to evacuation efficiency. The regression analyses for example, can identify that familiarity with your alerting methods or that the type of notification significantly contributed to the success of the evacuation. In addition, the analyses can identify factors that were statistically significant for a less efficient evacuation: i.e. number of injuries caused by the evacuation, people spontaneously evacuating before being told to do so, people refusing to evacuate, and vandalism.

A system should be considered to be devised by which all personnel can be accounted for quickly after the evacuation. This system can range from a simple telephone tree or taking advantage of new technologies which addresses this issue.

Finally, when time is a major consideration as is the case with evacuations associated with air assaults new and innovative ways to evacuate handicapped persons should be explored.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, based on information publicly available and considering whether issues were encountered in: decision-making, emergency communications, notification of response personnel and local officials, citizen action, traffic movement and control, and re-entry, it appears that the May 11<sup>th</sup> evacuation proceeded efficiently and effectively in terms of evacuee health and safety, security, and issues related to coordination, decision-making, and emergency response.

Mr. Chairman, at this time I welcome any questions the committee may have.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the witnesses. We had our internal discussions today, but it is helpful that you are outside the box. You are with companies, and so you can give us another perspective. I appreciate your comments about the evacuation here.

Let me get your thoughts about one issue that has been debated a little bit in the media. It deals with Homeland Security analysis of planes, their contents, and whether or not we should evacuate based upon our analysis of the contents. Does anybody have any thoughts on how to account for some of the potential dilemmas that small planes present? Do they have something dangerous in them; should people be moved in or outside? Does anybody have any thoughts on the plane issue?

Mr. KENNEDY. I think the chief of police addressed it to some degree. Various scenarios have to be addressed. As I said in my comments, criteria should be developed for these scenarios. Decisions should be made as to which one they are in; go down your checklists efficiently and quickly to make your decision. A small aircraft can be as dangerous, if not more dangerous, at times as a large aircraft depending on what is on board. And you may not have the luxury to try to figure out what is there. However, you do have the luxury to get experts to evaluate what is the worst thing I could do to you with a small aircraft, and what, of course, is the least thing I could do to you.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is fair. I heard some people say that the plane would have just bounced off the Dome like a ping pong ball. Well, we don't know that until it is analyzed and we have assessed all the variables, including, the types of chemicals or explosives that the plane could be carrying. So I am happy to hear you say that. But I also think it should be looked at.

I have a question, unless somebody wants to comment on the plane. My question relates to people, crowds, and their behavior. You dealt with Canary Wharf. You dealt with the Haj and the massive number of people over there. In those situations, was there any industry best practices on persons with disabilities and taking that into account in any of the situations either of you gentlemen have dealt with? And, of course, the other two gentlemen too.

Mr. STILL. Yes. For the Haj specifically, the mobility-impaired have special procedures which are dealt with with the security forces. For Canary Wharf, again, special procedures are set up. There is an institute in the U.K. At Belfast University which specializes in looking at evacuation procedures.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is that in the U.K.?

Mr. STILL. Belfast University, for a—Professor Jim Shields set up the FireCert Group across there. They have a lot of experience in looking at this issue of how best to evacuate people with mobility impairment. And this includes sighted, hearing deficiencies. We did some work with the Special Olympics, which are for the—I forget the politically correct phrase—for people with learning difficulties, how to deal with the Olympic events there that were to be held in Ireland. So we have a lot of experience in looking at these particular types of issues, yes.

On the plane. If you just look at a basic threat matrix, you have the one threat of a plane full of explosives causing some damage, but you have got multiple threats of damage on the streets to the

personnel, to the people, from chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear fallout. So on a basic threat matrix, you could look at the probability functions there of what could be in this aircraft and which is the safest policy, stay put or evacuate. So there is a way of looking at that type of problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coxall, do you have anything?

Mr. COXALL. The only thing I could add to that as a former chief of police is the fact that you are constantly—and I listened towards your chief who was saying—which I totally agreed with—you are constantly set with the situation do you evacuate into danger, or do you keep people within the building? And we certainly found when we had the truck bombs going into the city of London, and we had many suspected bombs, of course, many, many more than were, in fact, real devices, frequently the option was to get people to the back of the building or down into the basement of the building and then secure the area until your security services could establish whether there was a real bomb or not.

The CHAIRMAN. I know we have a vote coming, so I want to go on to other Members so everybody can at least get a question or two in.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all so much for your expertise. I tell you, there is just so much here to try to synthesize and bring forward.

Mr. Kennedy, since you were the last one, we will start you off first. And in your position as overseer of asset protection and information technology, we have heard in recent reports of lost backup tapes with sensitive data that has become a focal point for data protection. Would you recommend encryption of data tapes prior to off-site storage?

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, the short answer is absolutely. There is a longer, more complicated answer on better ways of storage and backup; however, anything that can be encrypted in this day and age should be. Also, the transportation of that material has to be changed. The methodology I saw in that particular issue, while efficient, was not securely effective.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. And so I suppose, given that it would be more of an elongated answer than what you have given us, those problems that are associated with that would be also elongated in terms of your answer?

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, in that particular one, Madam Chairman—

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Madam Chairman. That is good.

Mr. KENNEDY. I am sorry.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Thank you so much, Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. KENNEDY. You are quite welcome.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentlelady yield?

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Yes.

Mr. KENNEDY. In that particular situation, I have worked on backup tapes and information in a classified, highly classified environment, and we chose to actually have shadow backups and duplication of effort ongoing simultaneously, which then precluded the necessity to actually make a backup tape and carry it someplace. You could destroy what you had on-site; you already had your backup where it needed to be. Or you then had to use a very secure

methodology of transporting that information to the secondary location. All information should be encrypted and secured.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. And speaking about shadow evaluation, I think I noted that when you were talking. What do you do in terms of those other buildings outside of the chemical and others?

Mr. KENNEDY. In the case of the Capitol, I haven't had the opportunity to actually surveil the area. You need to take a look at whether or not there are businesses, residences, other people in the area that, because of the volumes of people coming out of this area off the campus, thousands, 35,000 people, what effect will they have on them? Someone had commented, I think one of my colleagues, on people beginning to evacuate before they should; they think they hear a gunshot, or you wind up with a panic. That is a situation. Some information, not all information, if it is going to affect those areas, you are going into those areas, those people need to be alerted in some way, shape, or form that 35,000 people are coming their way; otherwise, you could have a panic if this area has that situation.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. It is amazing you would say that, because just last night one of the businesses that I went into spoke about the evacuation and how they just had a barrage of people just coming into their place, and it was so overflowing because—and they didn't know what to do because these folks didn't know where to go, and so they just came to this place and just housed themselves there. And so—

Mr. KENNEDY. You certainly don't want those people wandering back toward where you are evacuating from either.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. The other thing that we are looking at, given the two-way radio communication units that you spoke about certainly would be good for the disabled persons, and should our annunciation—annunciators provide two-way communication systems given this 5/11?

Mr. KENNEDY. Increased security always increases or almost always increases inconveniences. That has to be weighed. For instance, if I were to tell you I could give you a beeper or a pager, and if it beeps, just evacuate, to carry that with your Blackberry, carry that with your cell phone, carry that with an access control card that I would like to have you to have also so I could immediately put you in a database when you walk outside the building, now you have four or five things. We have to carefully evaluate how we are going to do this, what would be effective, and then what is the probability of you carrying these things.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. It is amazing. You think about these things, but you do not think about its impact or ramifications given that.

Mr. Jackson, you spoke about an overarching authority that should be put in place whereby one organization then, I guess, synthesizes all of this and disseminates that out. And I am so happy to see the Sergeant at Arms and the Capitol Police and the assistant chief both here. How effective is that? And I think I can kind of answer that, but I need to have you mention that.

And you spoke about drills. How often should we have that?

And you spoke about testing. That is a nuance, it is a whole new phenomenon that I have not heard. So can you expound on that?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, Madam Ranking Member. Certainly anytime you have a situation that requires an evacuation, no small feat, no small decision to be made, you need to have one, as I indicated in my remarks, overarching authority. And the key word in there is the authority, someone that has the information that enables him or her to make an informed decision as to what you need to do. And to echo comments my colleagues have made earlier, that includes appropriate intelligence. That also includes a matrix. And it also includes a risk methodology that you have to include as part of your decisionmaking process.

My experience has been that any time you have such an important responsibility that is bifurcated and that has several people involved in the process, if you will, there is always the possibility that you may have gaps in the organizational chain, may have time delays. And minutes in this case are absolutely critical, in some cases even seconds. So I think you need this overarching authority that needs to be able to harness all the input from all the components that serve stakeholders to develop policy. I can't stress enough what I think the importance of this authority needs to have to be able to require minimum standards for all evacuation plans. And then once they have those evacuation plans individually that have been created and implemented and tested, you can now look at them in an enterprise perspective through a modeling capability, if you will, that you can test these things collectively and determine where your problems may be.

This is not a total panacea, however. You absolutely must have unannounced testing for this entire complex if you want to be successful. Human behavior is such that it is impacted in many, many ways by different things. Human nature, a lot of people just by the way they walk in the building sometimes dictates the way they walk out of it.

One of the things I would like to point out. A couple years ago up in Rhode Island there was a horrendous fire in a nightclub, and a lot of people perished there. And a lot of the people perished because everyone tried to go back out the same door they came in. It is human nature. The only way that you can change that human nature is through the unannounced testing and the drills that basically solidify your plan, that basically educate people as to why you go a certain way, why you evacuate to a certain point, why we go through certain procedures. This isn't going to occur in a modeling scenario. That helps you identify your gaps and your impediments. It must occur with real-life, unannounced testing.

Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Excellent. And I am sorry to have called you Mr. Jackson, Mr. Johnson. And so I apologize for that.

Speaking about behavior, Dr. Still, you spoke about that and the predictability. How do you expound on this, given the behavior that many talked about with reference to that day of May 11, with those faces looking—you know, they were just fearful. And folks even talked about the leadership and their behavior. How do you, what can you tell us in terms of predictable behavior, and how do we get into that?

Mr. STILL. First of all, I think the testimony we had earlier demonstrates that you have made enormous progress, and that the procedures and practices that are in place are probably second to none. When dealing with the human condition, and to echo Mr. Johnson's comments, people invariably assess risk in their mind differently to how they assess risk mathematically. So there are mathematical solutions and computer simulations that give us one set of answers looking at how the human being responds under both normal and emergency conditions, as you cited the example of Rhode Island where 100 people perished coming out the way they came in.

These things are predictable, and they are mitigated by information, communication, and training. A lot of the exercises we run in Saudi Arabia, where we had 171 different countries, 121 different languages, many different forms of communications, you succeed by embedding the information into the environment.

I think there was some talk earlier about orientation and way-finding on the floors, knowing where you are, where you need to go. A lot of the exercises we run at Canary Wharf, our financial district, was about orientating people within the context of the building, within the context of the island, and within the context of the emergency, and the core—because we didn't know where the accident or incident may occur. So we need to be able to keep people informed of the severity of the incident, the location of the incident, and the most appropriate action to take place.

Now, prior to 9/11, there was the GTFOD principle for, you know, as an accident, a fire in the building: Let's everybody get out of there as quickly as possible. Now you have got directed egress. You might need to move people away from the scene of the threat, or phased evacuation where you need to contain people for decontamination process. And there is the stay put policy which has been observed in the U.K. During the IRA terrorist activities. It is safer to keep people in buildings under certain types of scenarios or threats.

So these are modeling exercises that we can test the boundary conditions, how efficient the system may operate, and then look at how we then implement and structure training, education, and processes to cover for how people may react in emergencies.

So there is a degree that is predictable, but there is also a degree that is programmable by building smarter environments, better signage, better communication systems, and processes and procedures.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. How can you predict behavior when it is staged as opposed to when it is real?

Mr. STILL. I think anybody that would state that a computer simulation can give you all the answers is probably not adequately competent to answer those questions. It is a combination of education and training. It is a combination of unannounced drills. And basically the computer simulations allow you to understand the boundaries. For instance, your southeast exit, how many people could we get out of there over a period of time? What procedures do we need to put into place to prevent an area becoming overwhelmed? So you can test with simulations the limits, the boundaries, and then you develop appropriate strategies, processes, pro-

cedures, and information systems to prevent those boundaries being broken.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Mr. Coxall, I am going to say this. This might be a little sensitive, so. Our planes have to come in from Andrews Air Force Base. Would there be a possibility that having that closer in would help in terms of getting to the scene quicker by having maybe a helicopter at the National Reagan as opposed to having to come out as far as—or is that something that we need to talk about now or later?

Mr. COXALL. Well, this may be outside my sphere, inasmuch as I have not studied the situation here; I am principally here talking about the systems we have put in effect to deal with terrorism in central London. But the backup situation with helicopters I really cannot comment on, ma'am.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Okay. Is there anyone here who can? And if that is anything that you can say publicly, or should we just perhaps talk about that later on? Either one of you may respond. In terms of having initially some type of military plane at Washington, at Reagan National.

Mr. JOHNSON. If I may, as you are aware that there are a number of resources that respond to this type of situation. It goes into a phased approach. The first phased approach, my understanding, was a Department of Homeland Security Blackhawk helicopter which made the initial interception, and immediately upon responding to that, it phased a secondary notification to the response planes.

My personal opinion is that the distance in locating planes from Reagan to Andrews Air Force Base, given the speeds that those jets can accelerate, is somewhat insignificant.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. I see. Fine.

Mr. Coxall, the last question I have is closed-circuit television, as we know that in London you indicated that it reduced crime. Would that, can that also be some other means of an apparatus to be used in terms of discerning any impending threats, or any likelihood of closed-circuit television being used for anything with reference to terrorist threats?

Mr. COXALL. We are. The closed-circuit television systems that we principally have been using are those related to the movement of vehicles. Our deep concern in London was the threat from moving vehicles, and all of the terrorist bombing attacks we suffered were a result of vehicles being moved into sensitive areas. And, therefore, we discovered that—what was self-evident, of course—that terrorists and criminals need vehicles to move around.

And it was essential, therefore, for our security services and our police to enhance our intelligence-gathering methods that they could link vehicles to terrorists and link vehicles to criminals. And so, therefore, there was a change of methodology in the police service and the security services throughout the U.K. So that the intelligence-gathering process was linking people to the vehicles, and in some cases many vehicles, and this had to be constantly kept up to date.

We therefore had data warehouses which could therefore be searched upon by CCTV systems around the capital, particularly around the financial area which we were trying to protect because

there were huge threats to the financial center. And these CCTV systems would capture the index plates of vehicles and the description of vehicles, would search against this database in less than 3 seconds usually, but never more than 4 seconds, and would relay to the command and control centers if it was necessary to take action in relation to a vehicle. It may be a stolen vehicle, it may be a vehicle known to be used in crime, it may be a vehicle known to be associated with terrorism. And I could give you many, many vehicles of how this was successful, and by this method we prevented any further bombing attacks taking place within the financial center.

The terrorists then moved the threat to areas where they knew we didn't have the camera systems. And I am going back to the early stages. They then moved it then to Canary Wharf, which was our second financial center in London. That then came under attack by vehicle-borne bombs until we then put the camera systems into there. And we very publicly told the community, in fact told everybody in the country, exactly what we were doing. And we had a huge support from the community.

We have now moved those camera systems around our country at strategic places which you wouldn't expect me to discuss to, and we have therefore systems where vehicles moving towards London who are believed to be involved in terrorism or serious crime can be taken out at areas where they are not a danger to the public.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Because of time, I have other questions, and if we can get to that before the Chairman concludes the committee, I will. But you spoke about the huge support from the public and the community. And that is in and of itself some type of behavioral changes there. So I thank you all so much; and if I can get back, I will raise up other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from California.

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, thank you. And our Blackberries worked.

We have got votes in about 10 minutes or less so I will be very quick.

This has been interesting, and I appreciate especially our witnesses from Great Britain coming all the way here to share their experiences with us.

I am interested, Mr. Coxall, on in your testimony relative to the automated license plate recognition system, and I don't know if you are familiar with what we are doing here on the Capitol Police Truck Interdiction Program, which is essentially orange cones on Independence Avenue and a visual look at who is driving. I don't know if you have comments about that or not. If you do, I would be interested in whether you think there is a better approach to that given the layout of the Capitol complex.

Mr. COXALL. The layout, of course, is of crucial importance. Visual identification, it is very much down to guesswork and the intellect of the officers who are doing it and the instructions they might receive. It is not a very accurate way.

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, the trucks can't go at all. I don't want to mislead. The trucks are not supposed to go down the street. But certainly there are large—I mean, limousines can, and they can carry a load as well. So there is—but there is an inspection of vehicles coming by.

Mr. COXALL. Yes. The system we have used particularly very close to our central financial area, which was so threatened, was that the officers stand alongside the camera systems. But the camera systems will be reading the index plates of the vehicles as they approach. And so within a few seconds, in fact less than 4 seconds, the officers will be informed if they should be taking any particular action in relation to a given vehicle.

Ms. LOFGREN. I was interested in that further in reading through your written testimony. Clearly London has deployed cameras and a system to evaluate the information that we have not done, and whether or not we are prepared to do that is a different question. But the database would be essential. I mean, you can see the license plate, but what do you do with it?

And, you know, the World Trade Center, the first World Trade Center bombing with the truck bombs, that was a rented truck bomb. It is not very hard to rent a truck; frankly, it is even easier to go buy some junker truck. And that—how would you know that that was something to be worried about? How did you create a database that would alert the authorities to be concerned?

Mr. COXALL. This is the work of the intelligence services and the police service. They are monitoring a certain group or certain individuals, which is their job. They would then be loading their systems.

Ms. LOFGREN. So it is intelligence-based.

Mr. COXALL. It is an intelligence-based process for the officers, but it is capable, of course, of screening so that any vehicle—if the threat was coming from rented vehicles, the hard vehicles, you could then screen out those vehicles so that all rented vehicles or all rented trucks, for instance, could be stopped. And if it is known, of course, a certain terrorist group are using vehicles, rented vehicles, from a certain company, then, of course, intelligence can be gathered about that particular company, and particular effort can be taken in relation to those particular vehicles. It is all intelligence-based, and the systems are only as good as the intelligence that goes into it.

Ms. LOFGREN. Perhaps, whether in this committee or Homeland Security, we should explore that further, because I remember years ago when I was a young staffer here, my mother came out to visit me for a week, which was great, and we rented a car. And it cost so much to rent the car, and at the end of the week I went out and bought a junker car for less than we paid to rent it. And it was an education to me that a good terrorist wouldn't necessarily have to—they would go to the next alternative that wouldn't actually catch you up in an automatic screen.

So the intelligence issue would be key, and I don't know that we are in the same spot that Great Britain is on that, but I appreciate your willingness to share your experience and your good work.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Millender-McDonald.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Mr. Chairman, let me first thank you and your staff and even my staff for bringing on such extraordinarily effective experts and men, and they are men all at this juncture, who have brought some insight, further insight, into the challenges that we face.

There are a few more questions I have, and one would be what would have happened, how could we have done the evacuation, had the weather been either raining or freezing? Would the evacuation process be the same? Should we have any other diversions from that? If someone can answer that question.

The other question I have is in terms of, Mr. Kennedy, this evacuation was achieved within 10 minutes. Could we have made that a faster process? And, if reasonably so, given the thousands of people, how could we have done that better?

And the third and last one would be aside from airplane-based threats, are there any other things that we should be doing? And what about the Capitol Police Truck Interdiction Program?

Those are the three questions I have. If any one of you can jump on those. Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you. As far as the time element goes, you raised a very interesting question, which makes Capitol Hill evacuation for the air type of attack very, very unique. I looked at approximately 250 evacuations over a 13-year period. Only about 6 percent deal with what we call malevolent type of causes. Most evacuations what you are looking to do is to evacuate as quickly and as safely as possible. Capitol evacuation is evacuate as quickly, as safely, and, oh, by the way, you have 3 minutes and 32 seconds because the aircraft is traveling at a certain—you know, distance equals rate times time. That adds a factor to—I will only speak for myself—to—in my 35 years of experience, that adds a factor that I have not considered very often. If you have a bomb and you see a clock, I mean, but this type of thing is not addressed.

There are modeling simulations on people flow. My colleague mentioned testing and actually plans where—unscheduled. That is one of the best things you have to do. You have to train people to go in certain directions at certain times. Otherwise in a real situation they are liable to do, as my colleague said, go for the door they walked in that morning.

Also, as I mentioned in my statement, in order to—on the time element, I think a couple of Members and yourselves have alluded to it, and I had said to kind of think out of the box, which is—in fact, take the Longworth Building for instance. In walking here, I think I observed about five or six elevator banks, a number of floors in the building. There is certainly enough to key and have one individual responsible for one floor to take handicapped to the first floor in a matter of—in this case would be seconds as opposed to possibly minutes to take someone to the first floor.

These things—of course, backup systems, which the police chief had talked about, have to also be discussed. But we have to start thinking of unique and different ways that heretofore hadn't been considered to get people out quicker, models I think will work, and then test them with real drills. I would do a lot of modeling, some of which I recommended, my colleague has recommended some modeling, and then actually test them unannounced.

In all due respect to the Members, I noticed one Member commented that he wanted to be with his staff. That gets to continuity of operations. I don't know if that is part of the continuity of operations, but he may have, thinking he was doing good by going with his staff, just violated one of the keeping the Capitol operational.

So people have to be trained, tested, and the Members have to participate in those tests.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Quickly, the weather conditions.

Mr. JOHNSON. Madam Ranking Member, a comment I would like to make about that, and that is an excellent question. You said that is one of the variables that needs to factor into your entire risk methodology. If it is a sunny day, you are probably going to evacuate; if it is raining, you are probably going to evacuate; if it is cold, you are probably going to evacuate. If it is snowing and ice outside, that is another variable you need to plug into your risk methodology coupled with what do we know about the threat? The threat in this case is a small plane, unknown origin, unknown what is on board. And this is what you have to incorporate into this methodology that goes to this overarching authority to help him or her make that ultimate decision: Do we stay or do we go?

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Excellent. Excellent. And I wish we could expound more, but we can't. We are hearing the bells.

And the third one is the Capitol Police Truck Interdiction Program. Anyone can expound on that?

Mr. COXALL. I could touch on that, if I may, ma'am.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Sure.

Mr. COXALL. Yes, of course, it is—I am sure it is a good system, providing the technology is working. But my only comment on that was we in London would be very uncomfortable indeed of allowing the uninterrupted or the unsecured access to an area as sensitive as this by any vehicles, because large—any large sort of goods-type vehicle or any large vehicle can carry—potentially carry a bomb which could cause severe damage and destruction and destruction to life. Therefore, we have a system where every vehicle coming into the sensitive part of central London, every vehicle has its index plate read, and we have it in a system. The technology is now so good, irrespective of the speed the vehicles travel, that is a 98 percent—nearly up to 99 percent of vehicles the index plate is read accurately now by the police service. So they have the option of stopping that vehicle if they are concerned about the vehicle or the driver of the vehicle or the contents of those vehicles.

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. You all have been extraordinarily good. So has our panel of our insiders. We thank you all.

Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for a very timely, informative, and a very effective hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank the gentlelady. And I want to again thank all our witnesses, both panels, and our staff here, both sides of the aisle, and the gentlelady and the Members who worked so hard for the hearing. It is important. We have a family here on Capitol Hill, as I call it. 9/11 brought everybody that deals with or visits the Capitol into a new world of thinking.

I think staff of the Hill, the Capitol Hill Police, the staff the House officers, and everybody else has risen to the occasion, kept an eye out for one another, and did the right thing in how they reacted to a bad situation. But the purpose of today's hearing, was accomplished. We wanted to look at what other ways we can improve as we look back on these situations—which is constantly done, by our House officers and the staff anyway. But this is a very good way to do it.

Also, having this panel is a good way for us to look outside the box, and we have always been willing to do that. Our House officers have been our chiefs.

So with that, I again want to thank everybody for your time and travel. And you two get the award for the longest travel. Thank you for being here in the United States.

With that, I ask for unanimous consent that Members and witnesses have 7 legislative days to submit material into the record, and for those statements and materials to be entered into the appropriate place in the record. Without objection, the material will be entered.

The CHAIRMAN. I also ask unanimous consent that staff be authorized to make technical and conforming changes on all matters considered by the Committee in today's hearing. Without objection, so ordered.

And completing our business, that will conclude our Committee hearing, and we are adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

