THE CRITICAL ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AT HOME AND ABROAD

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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THE CRITICAL ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AT HOME AND ABROAD

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Davis of Virginia, Shays, Gutknecht, Souder, Platts, Issa, Dent, Foxx, Schmidt, Waxman, Kanjorski, Sanders, Cummings, Kucinich, Clay, Watson, Van Hollen, Ruppersberger, and Norton.

Staff present: Melissa Wojciak, staff director; David Marin, deputy staff director/communications director; Jennifer Safavian, chief counsel for oversight and investigations; Rob White, press secretary; Drew Crockett, deputy communications director; Grace Washbourne and Brien Beattie, professional staff members; Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Sarah D'Orsie, deputy clerk; Leneal Scott, chief information officer; Karen Lightfoot, minority press secretary; Andrew Su, minority professional staff member; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk; and Gilad Wilkenfeld, minority staff assistant.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Good morning. A quorum being present, the Committee on Government Reform will come to order.

Today, the Committee on Government Reform continues our inquiry into the responsibilities our Nation places on the National Guard, and whether the Federal Government is fulfilling its commitment to our men and women in uniform.

Today's Army National Guard is in a tough spot—tougher than perhaps at any time since the Second World War. Nearly one-third of all of the soldiers in Iraq are National Guard troops. At the same time, the citizen soldiers of the National Guard continue their numerous domestic tasks: providing security to airports and borders; monitoring the airspace of the continental United States; and responding to natural disasters, as we saw with Hurricane Katrina.

They do their jobs, and they do them exceedingly well. However, the committee has learned that too often we are expecting Guard soldiers to perform their jobs without the assurance that they have all of the equipment and the training that we can and should provide them.

At today's hearing, we are going to examine the Department of Defense policies and actions affecting the future of the National Guard, as well as hearing the critical needs of States for National

Guard manpower and resources. Unfortunately, what we will hear about the state of the Army National Guard's equipment is unacceptable.

Today, the Government Accountability Office will report that: Non-deployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because they have been equipped at less than war-time levels, despite their vital contribution to the war on terrorism.

The Army has required Army National Guard units to transfer or leave behind close to 100,000 items for use by follow-on forces, but the Army can only account for about 45 percent of these items, and has not developed a plan to replace them, as DOD policy requires. Without a completed and implemented plan to replace all the Guard equipment left overseas, Army Guard units will face growing equipment shortages and challenges in regaining readiness for future missions.

Although deploying Army National Guard units have been getting priority for getting the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the equipment inventory of the Guard's non-deployed units, and it threatens the Guard's ability to prepare forces for future missions both at home and overseas. Quite simply, we are robbing the non-deployed "Peter" to pay the deployed "Paul." I understand the need to prioritize in wartime, but this shouldn't have to be a zero-sum game.

At the rate we are going, we will bankrupt the National Guard. And I want to know today what we are going to do to change that prognosis.

At a recent congressional hearing, General Steven Blum reported that the National Guard has only one-third of the equipment it needs to respond to domestic disasters and terrorist attacks, and will need at least $7 billion to acquire radios, trucks, construction machinery, and medical gear, to be in a position to support homeland operations.

As confirmed by GAO in the study being released today, General Blum has reported that the equipment problem became worse as Guard units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan; taking the newest equipment with them, leaving the home front with an outdated and dwindling supply of gear.

Hurricane Katrina has shown us that the National Guard is our Nation's first military responder. And I think it is unfathomable that they are approaching equipment bankruptcy.

Today I want to hear exactly how and when the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army will reequip the Army National Guard. All the policies on homeland defense and homeland security will come to naught if the Department of the Army doesn't equip the Guard.

I hope to hear when they will be reimbursed for their outstanding response to the citizens of the Gulf Coast. I hope to hear when the equipment they left in Iraq is going to be replaced with new equipment. I hope to hear how the National Guard is integrated in all DOD and Army transformation policies, including the Guard's role in homeland defense and military assistance to civilian authorities.

Where is the predictability in current DOD policies for State and local leaders to rely on? There appears to be none.

We are honored today to have the Governor of Pennsylvania and the Governor of Idaho, to express their deep concerns with the current equipment situation and their needs for Guardsmen to assist with State security and emergency preparedness and response. They are joined by the State Adjutants General of West Virginia and Oregon. And we thank all of you for coming.

Without debating the legalities of Federal and State laws concerning the National Guard, or lamenting the traditionally weak funding of the National Guard, it is important that we look at what the National Guard has done and is doing for this country right now.

It is not enough to be grateful—even amazed—as they do so well with so little. We need to make sure that the DOD decides quickly what its responsibilities will be here at home, and establishes requirements that result in appropriate training and equipment for the National Guard.

We need to make sure that the Army starts recognizing that the Army National Guard is charged with the same responsibilities of active duty forces; should be equipped at the same readiness levels as active duty; and it should not be funded at just 11 percent of what the active Army receives.

And we have to be sure that Congress starts adjusting our authorizations and appropriations to recognize the resources required by the National Guard, who are also expected to be America's first military responders.

I have been working closely with Senator Kit Bond and the Senate Guard Caucus, to get $1.3 billion in equipment for the National Guard included in the next applicable supplemental. This is not even close to the amount needed, and the measure may fail in conference. We can't let this happen.

The time to ensure the brave and dedicated men and women of the Guard receive the training and equipment they need to fulfill missions of safety and security for the people of the United States is now. I look forward to hearing today from our witnesses what we need to do to make this happen.

I would now yield to our ranking member, who has been active on these issues as well, Mr. Waxman, for his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
OVERSIGHT HEARING

"The Critical Role of the National Guard at Home and Abroad"

October 20, 2005

CHAIRMAN'S OPENING STATEMENT

Good morning.

Today, the Committee on Government Reform continues our inquiry into the responsibilities our nation places on the National Guard, and whether the federal government is fulfilling its commitment to our men and women in uniform.

Today's Army National Guard is in a tough spot – tougher than perhaps any time since the Second World War. Nearly one-third of all the soldiers serving in Iraq are National Guard troops. At the same time, the citizen soldiers of the National Guard continue their numerous domestic tasks – providing security at airports and borders, monitoring the airspace of the continental United States, and responding to natural disasters, as we saw with Hurricane Katrina.

They do their jobs, and they do them exceedingly well. However, the Committee has learned that, too often, we are expecting Guard soldiers to perform their jobs without the assurance that they have all the equipment and training we can and should provide them.

At today's hearing we will examine Department of Defense policies and actions affecting the future of the National Guard, as well as hearing the critical needs of states for National Guard manpower and resources. Unfortunately, what we will hear about the state of the Army National Guard's equipment is unacceptable.

Today the Government Accountability Office will report that:

- Non-deployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because they have been equipped at less than war-time levels, despite their vital contribution to the War on Terrorism.

- The Army has required Army National Guard units to transfer or leave behind close to 101,000 items for use by follow-on forces, but the Army can only account for about 45 percent of these items and has not developed a plan to replace them, as DOD policy requires. Without a completed and implemented plan to replace all Guard equipment left overseas, Army Guard units will face growing equipment shortages and challenges in regaining readiness for future missions.

- Although deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the equipment inventory of the Guard's non-deployed units and threatens the Guard's ability to prepare forces for future missions at home and overseas.

Quite simply, we are robbing the non-deployed Peter to pay the deployed Paul. I understand the need to prioritize, but this shouldn't have to be a zero sum game.

At the rate we are going, we will bankrupt the National Guard, and I want to know today what we are going to do to change that prognosis.

At a recent congressional hearing, General Steven Blum reported **that the National Guard has only one-third of the equipment it needs to respond to domestic disasters and terrorist attacks** and will need at least $7 billion to acquire radios, trucks, construction machinery and medical gear to be in a position to support homeland operations. As confirmed by GAO in the study being released today, General Blum also reported that the equipment problem became worse as Guard units deployed to Iraq and

Afghanistan, taking the newest equipment with them, leaving the home front with an outdated and dwindling supply of gear.

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Without debating the legalities of federal and state laws concerning the National Guard or lamenting the traditionally weak funding of the National Guard, it is important that we all look at what the National Guard has done and is doing for this country right now. It's not enough to be grateful, even amazed that they do so well with so little; we need to make sure that:

- The Department of Defense decides quickly what its responsibility will be here at home and establish requirements that result in appropriate training and equipment for the National Guard

- The Army starts recognizing that the Army National Guard is charged with the same responsibilities of active duty forces, should be equipped at the same readiness levels as active duty, and should not be funded at just 11 percent of what the active duty Army receives, and that

- Congress starts adjusting our authorizations and appropriations to recognize the resources required by the National Guard, who are also expected to be America's first military responders.

I have been working closely with Senator Kit Bond and the Senate Guard Caucus to get $1.3 billion in equipment for the National Guard included in the next applicable supplemental. This is not even close to the amount needed, but the measure may fail in conference anyway. We can not let this happen. The time to ensure the brave and dedicated men and women of the National Guard receive the training and equipment they need to fulfill missions of safety and security for the people of the United States is now. I look forward to hearing today from our witnesses what we all need to do to make this happen.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased you are continuing to focus committee attention on issues affecting the men and women serving in the National Guard.

Over the history of this country, the Guard has played a significant role in ensuring the safety and well-being of Americans; but the recent increasing use of Guardsmen in conflicts abroad has placed tremendous strains on Guard members and the institution overall. We must do everything we can to ensure the National Guard functions effectively and efficiently.

The Guard currently faces two major problems. First, the Nation has not been meeting its fundamental obligations to the Guard. As this committee has learned from previous oversight hearings, Guardsmen aren't getting paid on time; they aren't getting the proper and timely health care and benefits they deserve; and they have received sub-par equipment and training, compared to active duty forces.

Second, the recent over-extension of Guardsmen overseas appears to be posing challenges to the Guard's ability to respond to domestic disasters. The recent response to Hurricane Katrina is a case in point. When the hurricane hit, many of the Louisiana and Mississippi Guardsmen were serving in Iraq and unavailable to help their friends and neighbors. Moreover, National Guard equipment important for the hurricane relief effort, such as Humvees, night goggles, and high-water trucks, were also over in Iraq.

According to DOD and Guard plans, our reliance on the National Guard for security at home and abroad may only increase in the coming years. That is why I am so concerned about predicaments confronting the Guard today.

We must make sure that the country is meeting its commitments to the individuals serving, and ensuring they have the resources necessary to do the job right.

I look forward to hearing the witnesses today. I particularly want to welcome our former colleague in the Congress, Governor Kempthorne. And I know Governor Rendell will be here soon.

And to the Governors, and to other witnesses, unfortunately, I have a conflict of interest—not a conflict of interest; a conflict of time—[laughter]—a conflict in schedule, that will keep me from being here. But my staff will give me a full report. And I will be working with the chairman to accomplish the goals we all seek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]

Statement of
Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Government Reform
Hearing on
"The Role of the National Guard at Home and Abroad"

October 20, 2005

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that you are continuing to focus Committee attention on issues affecting the men and women serving in the National Guard. Over the history of this country, the Guard has played a significant role in ensuring the safety and well being of Americans. But the recent increasing use of Guardsmen in conflicts abroad has placed tremendous strains on Guard members and the institution overall. We must do everything we can to ensure the National Guard functions effectively and efficiently.

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We must make sure that the country is meeting its commitments to the individuals serving, and ensuring they have the resources necessary to do the job right. Thank you, and I look forward to hearing the witness testimony today.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. I have a conflict of interest. I was in the Guard for 8 years, so I want to keep it strong.

Do any other Members wish to make opening statements?

[No response.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. If not, we will call our first witness: a former member of the other body, a former Mayor of Boise, ID, and the current Governor of Idaho, the Honorable Dirk Kempthorne, who has had a very distinguished public career.

Dirk, we appreciate you being here today. It is our policy we swear everybody. Would you just raise your right hand?

[Witness sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. And thank you so much for being here. And I would just note, as you do in your testimony, Idaho has basically put more people over in Iraq and had more people deployed than any other State, on a proportional basis. You have taken heavy losses. You have people down in Katrina, helping out down there. And you had an outstanding record as Governor.

We are just really happy to have you here today, and I thank you for being with us to share your thoughts.

STATEMENTS OF DIRK KEMPTHORNE, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF IDAHO; AND EDWARD RENDELL, GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

STATEMENT OF DIRK KEMPTHORNE

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Chairman Davis, thank you very much, and I was very encouraged with your opening comments and those comments by Congressman Waxman. And to all members of the committee, I am very delighted to be here to have these discussions.

As we meet here today, the Idaho National Guard's 116th Brigade Combat Team is deployed in Iraq; our 183rd Attack Helicopter Battalion is being deployed to Afghanistan; our 189th Airlift Squadron continues to rotate its C–130 aircraft and crews in and out of Southwest Asia.

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, there are also 400 Idaho National Guardsmen deployed in Louisiana to assist the hurricane response effort in the Gulf Coast States. I am proud that today, in all, Idaho has the highest percentage of Guard forces mobilized than any other State.

I am also proud of the fact that the Idaho National Guard has accepted every mission that has ever been requested of it, without exception or reservation. And I am proud of the men and women who carry out these missions with great professionalism and honor. They represent Idaho, and they represent the United States of America extremely well; as to all Guard units of all States.

So I come here today with firsthand knowledge of the impact these missions have on a State's ability to respond to a terrorist event or a natural disaster.

In anticipation of your first question, "What can the Federal Government do to help States prepare?", my first response is to ensure that we do have equipment. Now, why would I say that, when we have an entire National Guard? Because over the next several

weeks, the 116th Brigade Combat Team will demobilize from Iraq and, significantly, they will leave behind their vehicles and rolling stock that would fill a train with 212 railroad cars—over 400 vehicles.

Additionally, in the event of a natural or manmade disaster, my State will have a significant shortage of state-of-the-art tactical communication equipment to enable effective communication, control, and synchronization of efforts; as well as a shortage of critical medical equipment to facilitate immediate casualty treatment and care.

At this time, I have not been made aware of any plan to reequip the 116th with the basic equipment that will be left in Iraq. Couple this with the BRAC recommendation to remove the C–130 cargo aircraft from the Idaho Air National Guard—a move that will not only leave Idaho, but the entire Pacific Northwest, without airlift capabilities—and you can begin to understand the magnitude of the gap left in our response capabilities.

These facts are in direct conflict with my ability as a Governor to prepare for disaster and/or domestic terrorist attacks. We need a commitment from the Federal Government that the equipment that is left in Iraq will be replaced in quick order. And we need further assessment of the BRAC recommendations on our ability to respond immediately to a regional disaster.

When assets such as a C–130 are under the control of a Governor, that Governor can make one call and, within an hour, props are turning. This is not always the case with Federal assets. A comparison of total flights flown by Air National Guard units versus Air Force and Air Force Reserve units over a 4-day period in response to Hurricane Katrina shows that the Guard flew 10 missions to every 1 mission flown by the Air Force and Air Force Reserve.

A case in point: I spoke to a Governor of a southern State who said there were 60 C–130's under Federal jurisdiction and—much to the frustration and the disappointment of the Air Force flight crews—few, if any, were flying.

When brigades return from a 1-year tour of duty in the Middle East, they are at a truly proficient and efficient level of training. How do we maintain that level of readiness upon their return, if they now encounter a critical equipment shortage? And what does this imply for homeland security? What are the implications for recruitment and retention?

No one can predict the magnitude of the next natural or manmade disaster, but I believe that we are prepared to sustain an emergency response for a 24 to 48-hour period; and at that point, based on the situation, we may well need to move additional personnel quickly to the disaster scene.

Additionally, as we begin to activate National Guard personnel, we deplete the bank of emergency responders—such as doctors, nurses, EMTs, firefighters, law enforcement officers—because in many cases, these men and women are part of the National Guard.

I commend General Steven Blum and his team from the National Guard Bureau for their efforts to coordinate State-to-State, Governor-to-Governor support during the Gulf Coast hurricanes. The

General's efforts truly showcased how this model can work properly.

Where it does not always work so well is in the coordination between the State and Federal Governments. Let me give you an example from Hurricane Katrina. In the days after the hurricane devastated the Gulf Coast region, Idaho responded to an urgent request to evacuate the frail elderly from the Gulf Coast States.

We had identified more than 400 nursing home beds in Idaho for these evacuees. We sent two C–130's, with critical care nurses and emergency room physicians, to Houston and to Mississippi. When our planes touched down, our people were met with significant resistance. In one case, despite the overwhelming need for evacuation for many of the frail elderly, we could not find anyone who would release patients to us. It was only after the Governor of Texas personally interceded with the person in charge at the Astrodome that we were able to get 10 individuals out. But that was the total and the final number of individuals that we could evacuate.

In the other case, the temporary hospital that had been set up to receive frail elderly was on a Federal installation. When our people arrived, they were warmly greeted by overworked and stressed Mississippi medical personnel. But they were then told by a Federal official that they could not help, because they had not been "Federalized." As patients were coming into the hospital, two emergency room physicians and eight critical care nurses from Idaho were literally informed to stand against the wall, because they did not have the necessary Federal credentials to treat patients.

It is worth noting that, had the hospital been anywhere else besides Federal property, there would have been no problems with our doctors and nurses seeing patients.

Since when did it become illegal for one State to help another State in these United States? This is the United States of America; it is not "The Federal Government of America."

From my perspective, this is a fundamental breakdown in State-to-State assistance, that is caused by inflexible Federal regulations. I would encourage this committee to look at this issue as you consider various reforms to Federal emergency response policy.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, we need to ensure the men and women of our National Guard are celebrated for their contributions to our safety and security; that we stand for our Guard in all that they must carry out.

I look forward to this discussion with you and the members of the committee.

[The prepared statement of Governor Kempthorne follows:]

WRITTEN TESTIMONY

OF

GOVERNOR DIRK KEMPTHORNE
STATE OF IDAHO

House Committee on Government Reform
Thursday, October 20th, 10:00 am

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the very important and timely issue of the role of the National Guard in Homeland Security preparedness and disaster relief.

As we meet here today, the Idaho National Guard's 116th Brigade Combat Team is deployed in Iraq, our 183rd Attack Helicopter Battalion is being deployed to Afghanistan and our 189th Airlift Squadron continues to rotate its C-130 aircraft and crews in and out of Southeast Asia.

There are also 400 Idaho National Guardsmen deployed in Louisiana to assist with Hurricane Response efforts along the Gulf Coast. I'm proud that today, in all, Idaho has a higher percentage of our Guard forces mobilized than any other state.

I am also proud of the fact that the Idaho National Guard has accepted every mission that has ever been requested of it, without exception or reservation. And I am proud of the men and women who carry out those missions with great professionalism and honor.

They represent Idaho and they represent the United States of America extremely well.

So, I come here today with firsthand knowledge of the impact these missions have on a state's ability to respond to a terrorist event or a natural disaster.

In anticipation of your first question: "what can the federal government do to help states prepare," my first response is to ensure that we have equipment. Now why would I say that when we have an entire National Guard?

Because over the next several weeks, the 116th Brigade Combat Team will demobilize from Iraq, and significantly, they will leave behind their vehicles and rolling stock that would fill a train with 212 railroad cars.

This includes 60 Humvees, 213 mid-sized and heavy trucks, 37 trailers, 96 tracked vehicles and 6 recovery vehicles.

At this time, I have not been made aware of any plan to reequip the 116th with the basic equipment that will be left in Iraq.

Couple this with the BRAC Recommendation to remove the C-130 heavy cargo aircraft from the Idaho Air National Guard – a move that will not only leave Idaho, but the entire Pacific Northwest without airlift capabilities – and you can begin to understand the magnitude of the gap left in our strategic response capabilities.

These facts are in direct conflict with my ability as a Governor to prepare for disaster and/or domestic terrorist attacks. We need a commitment from the federal government that the equipment that is left in Iraq will be replaced in quick order.

And we need further assessment of the BRAC recommendations on our ability to respond immediately to a regional disaster.

When assets such as a C-130 are under the control of a Governor, that Governor can make one call and within an hour props are turning.

This is not always the case with federal assets. A comparison of total flights flown by Air National Guard units versus Air Force Reserve units over a four-day period, in response to Hurricane Katrina, shows that the Guard flew ten missions to every one mission flown by their Reserve counterparts.

A case in point: I spoke to a Governor of a southern state who said there were sixty C-130s under federal jurisdiction and, much to the frustration and disappointment of the Air Force Reserve flight crews, few if any of them were flying.

When brigades return from a one-year tour of duty in the Middle East, they are at a truly proficient level of training. How do we maintain that level of readiness upon their return if they now encounter a critical equipment shortage? And what does this imply for Homeland Security?

What is the effect of this on retention and recruitment inside our National Guard units, immediately following a deployment to Iraq?

We have spent millions of dollars preparing and equipping our men and women for battle, but after they return from war, our ability to train and maintain readiness is significantly lessened by lack of a basic equipment complement.

If we are to retain these highly skilled soldiers, and if we are to attract the next generation of men and women to the National Guard, then we must have equipment to train with…it is just that simple.

In addition to the obvious issues surrounding equipment, I think it is also very important that we remain vigilant with respect to qualified personnel.

In the case of natural disaster or terrorist attack, as the immediate response begins to transition into widespread search & rescue operation, we need to be prepared to backfill emergency personnel with relief teams from the National Guard, federal government, or other states.

Idaho's initial responders can sustain an adequate emergency response for a 24 to 48 hour period…at that point we will need to move more personnel quickly to the disaster scene.

Additionally, as we begin to activate national guardsmen, we deplete the bank of emergency responders, such as doctors, nurses, EMT's and law enforcement officers, because, in many cases, these men and women are part of the National Guard.

As this backfilling process takes place, the federal government should become a facilitator of state-to-state aid, not a roadblock.

Moreover, when this immediate need occurs and there is a specific request from a Governor through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact or EMAC process, all equipment and personnel necessary should be provided as a coordinated, significant force instead of doing it piecemeal, over the course of time.

I commend General Steven Blum and his team from the National Guard Bureau for their efforts to coordinate state-to-state, Governor-to-Governor support during the Gulf Coast Hurricanes. The General's efforts truly showcased how this model can work properly.

Where it does not always work so well, is in the coordination between the state and federal governments. Let me give you an example from Hurricane Katrina.

In the days after the Hurricane devastated the Gulf Coast region, Idaho responded to an urgent request to evacuate the frail elderly from Gulf Coast states. We had identified more than 400 nursing home beds in Idaho for these evacuees and sent two C-130s with critical care nurses and emergency room physicians to Houston and to Meridian, Mississippi.

When our planes touched down, our people were met with significant resistance. In one case, despite the overwhelming need for evacuation for many of the frail elderly, we could not find anyone who would release patients to us. It was only after the Governor interceded with the person in charge of the Astrodome that we were able to get 10 individuals out.

In the other case, the temporary hospital that had been set up to receive frail elderly was on a federal installation. When our people arrived, they were warmly greeted by overworked and stressed Mississippi medical personnel. But they were told by a federal official that they could not help because they had not been "federalized".

As patients were coming into the hospital, two emergency room physicians and eight critical care nurses from Idaho literally stood against the wall because they did not have the necessary federal credentials to treat patients.

It is worth noting that, had the hospital been anywhere else besides federal property, there would have been no problem with our doctors and nurses seeing patients.

From my perspective, this is a fundamental breakdown in state-to-state assistance that is caused by inflexible federal regulations.

Since when did it become illegal for one state to help another state in these United States? This is the United States of America, not the Federal Government of America.

I would encourage this committee to look at this issue as you consider reforms to federal emergency response policy.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, we need to ensure the men and women of our National Guard are celebrated for their contributions to our safety and security.

They are a significant part of our first line of defense from enemies both foreign and domestic and make up a growing percentage of our active troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. In time of disaster within our country, they are the most effective way of carrying out the great American tradition of neighbor helping neighbor.

We need to ensure that they are provided with the best equipment, the best health care and the best opportunities for training and development available. This ensures their benefits are commensurate with their service.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. I am passionate about the support we provide for our men and women in uniform and I commend you for your interest in these matters and for holding these hearings. I look forward to this discussion.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

We now have our distinguished second witness today, Governor Rendell of Pennsylvania. Let me just note, we first met when I was chairman of the County Board in Fairfax. You were active in the National League of Cities and the Conference of Mayors—an outstanding job as mayor, a leader in unfunded mandates; as were you, Governor Kempthorne. We worked together. And then again, when he was chairman of the Democratic National Committee, I was chairman of the Campaign Committee for the Republicans in the House.

In this business, which can be very hard-edged, you always performed very admirably; as you are now. And we are just so pleased to have you here, Governor, today to testify on some of the problems the Guard is facing in Pennsylvania. And you do a great job. I just want to thank you for being here.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD RENDELL

Governor RENDELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And I know Mr. Kanjorski would say the same thing, but I thought I would say it from this side. Thank you.

Governor RENDELL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And Mr. Platts, here.

Governor RENDELL. And it is great to see Congressman Platts and Congressman Kanjorski here. And I appreciate this opportunity. I will try to shorten my written remarks a little bit, because I am going to cover some of the same ground that Governor Kempthorne has spoken to you about.

Obviously, everyone is aware of the joint status of the National Guard. It is the only military personnel that perform in that joint status. It goes all the way back to the militia clause of the Constitution.

In many ways, today's National Guard carries out the genius of our founders, and it constitutes federalism in action in a military context. Formation of the militia predates the founding of our country. The Massachusetts National Guard traces its lineage to the first regiments established by the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636.

And our most renowned Pennsylvanian, Benjamin Franklin, founded the Pennsylvania National Guard when he formed the Associators in Philadelphia in 1747. In 1755, the Colonial Assembly passed Pennsylvania's first militia law. And coincidentally, on November 25th, we will celebrate the 250th anniversary of the Pennsylvania National Guard.

Today's National Guard in Pennsylvania and across America is the modern militia reserved to the States by the U.S. Constitution. Based on a dual enlistment system, every member of the Pennsylvania National Guard takes an oath of enlistment in a reserve component of the Armed Forces—the National Guard of the United States—and in the modern State militia—the State national guard.

These State and Federal military entities are linked inseparably. On a day-to-day basis, the Guard remains under the State command and control, and the Governors serve as commanders in chief. When the Guard is called into active Federal service—as is

the case with our soldiers and airmen in Iraq—they are under the command and control of the Federal Government.

There are a little more than 20,000 soldiers and airmen in the Pennsylvania Army and Air National Guard. We are proud to be, with Texas and California, the largest National Guard in the United States of America.

Since September 11, 2001, of those 20,000-plus soldiers and airmen, a total of 13,372 Guard members have been deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and Noble Eagle. More than two out of three of our Guard have been deployed in the fight against global terrorism. Today there are more than 3,000 members of the Pennsylvania National Guard deployed in Iraq.

When they are not deployed overseas, Guard personnel serve in readiness centers, armories, and the Air National Guard bases across Pennsylvania. The Guard provides me as Governor with a well trained and equipped military force to respond to State emergencies such as floods, blizzards, hurricanes, and local emergency situations.

Pennsylvania is home to the National Guard's third Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team. These National Guard teams provide the Defense Department with unique expertise and capabilities to assist State Governors in preparing and responding to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incidents, as part of the States' emergency response structure. Each team consists of 22 highly skilled, full-time National Guard members who are federally resourced, trained, and exercised.

The National Guard is a partnership between States and Federal Government. As any of you who have been involved in this partnership know, this involves give and take. Today's National Guard is supposed to involve day-to-day communication, collaboration, and interaction between the State and Federal Governments.

The National Guard Bureau, a bureau within the Department of Defense, serves as the channel of communication between DOD and the States. And I join with Governor Kempthorne in saying that General Blum has done an excellent job in trying to carry out that function.

It is fair to say that the Federal Government is the senior partner in this partnership between the States and the Federal Government, in terms of the supply, the equipment, and the funding it provides for most National Guard activities. But what is sometimes overlooked is that the States provide the most precious resource of all to the National Guard: the young men and women who serve their State and their Nation, and who risk, and sometimes give, their lives in service.

The States recognize how important it is to recruit and retain the high-quality personnel necessary to maintain and strengthen the Guard. For example, in Pennsylvania we invest about $10 million a year in our educational assistance programs to provide public service educational grants to new enlistees and members of the Pennsylvania National Guard. This is an important recruitment and retention tool that keeps the Guard strong to accomplish both its State and Federal missions.

So it is wrong to say that the States do not participate in the funding of the Guard? We very much do, in recruitment efforts like this and in other benefits that we provide.

Unfortunately, the relationship between the Guard and the States and the Federal Government has broken down to some extent. One place where the National Guard partnership between the States and the Federal Government broke down badly was in the actions of the Defense Department and the Air Force with regard to the 2005 BRAC round.

The Department of Defense and the Air Force chose to ignore clear congressional statutes and mandates requiring the consent of the Governors with regard to major changes in National Guard units. They argued that the BRAC process superseded the requirement for input from the States, and that it was impractical to ask 54 National Guard entities for input.

In an incredible effort to justify elimination of Air National Guard units and missions across America, the Air Force even suggested that the Civil Air Patrol could fill in for the Air National Guard. Don't get me wrong: The Civil Air Patrol is carrying out homeland security missions and helping us in many ways. It is a great organization. But it is no substitute for the Air National Guard. It is ludicrous to even suggest that.

Let me take a brief moment to describe what happened with the 111th Fighter Wing of the Pennsylvania National Guard. For several years, my staff, the Adjutant General, and the Commander of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard had received briefings that the 111th, which flies the A–10 Warthog aircraft out of the Willow Grove Joint Reserve Base, was likely to receive additional mission aircraft as part of the future total force planning process. Imagine our surprise and dismay when, on May 13th of this year, we received the DOD recommendation that the 111th Fighter Wing should be deactivated.

The DOD recommendation came without a word of advance warning. There was no coordination, no request for input, and certainly no request for my approval as Governor, for the elimination of this important Air National Guard unit.

The 111th has about 1,000 full-time and part-time military personnel. It is based at Willow Grove, right outside of Philadelphia, which of course is a key strategic location of our State. The 111th does not just consist of pilots and airplanes. It has security forces, mechanics, medical personnel, and all the rest that make up a modern fighter wing. Seventy-five percent of the members of the 111th have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 4 years.

These personnel are also key assets to me as Governor in addressing potential threats to the security of our homeland. What is more, I believe it is vital to maintain military flying operations at Willow Grove to provide a surge capability to respond to emergencies in the Philadelphia region.

Make no mistake: If terrorists again hijacked a plane, and that plane was bearing down on Independence Hall or the Liberty Bell—two of our three most important national icons—the planes nearest to Philadelphia who could intercept those terrorist-held planes would be at Willow Grove. The difference between their re-

sponse time and the response time from other bases is a matter of minutes but, as we learned on September 11th, a matter of minutes can cost thousands of lives.

Congress has mandated that the U.S. Government cannot make changes to the branch, organization, or allotment of National Guard units located within the States without the approval of the Governor. That is found in Title 10 and Title 32 of the U.S. Code. The same law provides that I, as Governor, cannot disband a National Guard unit that receives Federal funds without the approval of the President. The law aptly describes the fundamental principles of federalism upon which the National Guard is built. Neither the State nor the Federal Government can make basic changes to National Guard units without the input and consent of the other.

At least, that is the way it was supposed to work. But the Air Force decided that the BRAC law superseded these other Federal laws passed by Congress, and that it could completely ignore the States in making recommendations to eliminate Air National Guard units and missions.

The 111th Fighter Wing was the only National Guard unit in the country actually recommended for deactivation, but others were stripped of aircraft and personnel. Aside from ignoring what we saw as clear legal requirements, I was completely surprised by the Air Force's attitude toward the National Guard in general, and to the partnership between the Guard and the States in particular.

An Air Force spokesman testifying before the BRAC Commission said it would be unreasonable and impractical to expect the Air Force to talk to 54, or even 28, National Guard entities in making plans to eliminate units and missions. It was almost as if they were saying that, "Those pesky States stand in the way of us getting our job done." Somebody even suggested that Governors would bring politics into the BRAC process—something that, as we all know, has been immune to politics in its total existence.

As Governor of Pennsylvania, I was not going to stand by and watch DOD attempt to eliminate one-fourth of the Air National Guard force in my State. In late May, I wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld, to advise him that I did not consent to the proposed deactivation of the 111th. And in early July, Senators Arlen Specter, Rick Santorum, and I filed suit in Federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the DOD violated the Governor consent statutes when they commenced action to deactivate an Air National Guard unit without the consent of the Governor.

We filed suit not just to stand up to the Guard [sic], or to protect the security interests of Pennsylvania; we filed suit to protect the vital principles of federalism grounded in our Constitution that established the National Guard as a military force shared by the State and the Federal Government. We also filed suit to stand up for Congress, which had passed laws requiring the consent of the Governor for certain changes to National Guard units.

As a result, I was very pleased that Senators Specter and Santorum joined me in this litigation, because their support emphasized that DOD's actions were not just ignoring the Governor's prerogative with regard to the National Guard, but also ignoring the direction provided by Congress.

In the end, Federal District Judge John Pedova ruled in favor of the Commonwealth, and held that the DOD's recommendation for deactivation of the 111th Fighter Wing was "null and void."

On the same day that the court decision was issued, the BRAC Commission found that the DOD's recommendation substantially deviated from the BRAC criteria, and overturned the proposed deactivation of the 111th Fighter Wing. The Commission also ruled that military flying operations should be maintained at Willow Grove.

We believe the Commission should have stopped there, and had no legal right to go forward. But unfortunately, they went ahead to recommend that the A–10's assigned to the 111th be distributed to other units, even as they encouraged the Air Force to maintain the A–10's there. So that set up the unbelievably ludicrous proposition that we were going to continue to employ and pay and train and equip in other ways 1,023 airmen and airwomen, but give them no planes to carry out their mission.

Now, Senator Santorum and I have talked to the Defense Department, and we are trying to reconcile what is a very difficult situation, and one that makes no sense for the taxpayers of the United States and the security of the State of Pennsylvania. It is my hope that the Defense Department will settle this litigation—and as I said, we are the only State that was successful in Federal court—and agree to maintain the A–10's at Willow Grove.

In fact, ironically, 12 A–10's are headed to, essentially, a graveyard in Arizona; even though those planes are not scheduled for deactivation until 2028. Makes no sense.

Contrary to what I have just outlined, where the relationship between the Guard as a State unit and a Federal unit broke down, in the aftermath of Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Katrina, I think it worked fairly well. Obviously, I understand the incidents that Governor Kempthorne talked about; but in our experience, it worked well.

Pennsylvania sent more than 2,500 Guard personnel to Louisiana and Mississippi to respond to those emergencies. We sent the largest Guard contingent of any outside State. We responded promptly. Our Interim Satellite Incident Site Communication Set deployed from Fort Indiantown Gap to the Mississippi Gulf Coast in the first days after the storms. And for more than a week, it provided just about the only form of reliable communications in the region. It later redeployed to Texas in the wake of Hurricane Rita.

We sent security and military police forces from several units—including, ironically, the 111th Fighter Wing—to Louisiana within 24 hours after we received the request for support. About 200 Pennsylvania National Guard personnel deployed by air to Louisiana, and elements of our 213th Area Support Group and our 56th Brigade deployed by convoy to the area of devastation within just a few days.

This is a great example of how the Guard can serve in a way that is beyond our borders. I got, personally, tens and tens of letters and e-mails from citizens of Mississippi and Louisiana, thanking me for sending the Guard, sending it so quickly, and for the caliber of service that was rendered by the Guard. I believe that,

as I said, this was a good example of the best in the Federal-State cooperation.

Now, you have heard Senator, Governor Kempthorne talk about what is the second-biggest problem, and that is the equipment problem, or the reequipment problem. My testimony is replete with examples of Pennsylvania Guard units who went over to Iraq and Afghanistan and were forced—and we understand this—to leave a lot of the equipment behind; in one case, 10 of 41 Humvees; in one case, 7 airplanes—7 CH–47D helicopters, excuse me.

The Defense Department has been slow in replacing materiel. In many cases, we haven't gotten that materiel back when the units have come back. And in many cases, it has been reported to me that the equipment that is sent to replace the equipment left behind in Iraq and Afghanistan is older, is inferior, and in many cases just plain and simply doesn't work. That is a second and huge problem, when it comes to the integrity of State National Guards and their ability to carry out their mission at home.

If in fact the Guard units are deployed, and I want to remind you, two-thirds of Pennsylvania's—that is the largest National Guard in the country—two-thirds of those soldiers and airmen have served in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is how active we have been. We have over 3,000 members there now. The Second Combat Brigade left from Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and 4,100 Guardsmen went over; 2,100 were Pennsylvanians.

It is our obligation to make sure—and Congress should enforce and make certain—that when these Guard units leave equipment behind, that they receive commensurate equipment quickly and as soon as they return to their States.

So those are the two problems that I see most graphically, and the ones that I think that need to be addressed. As I said, we have a number of specific examples about the equipment failures in my testimony that I won't belabor you with now.

But let me tell you that the National Guard has changed. When I was a Reservist, Reserve and National Guard were considered weekend warriors. The contemplation that we would go into active duty theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan was literally something no one ever considered. Now, as I said, two-thirds of the Pennsylvania National Guard have been activated.

Since August 1st, 15 members of the Pennsylvania National Guard have died in Iraq; 15 members since August 1st.

Of the 2,100 Pennsylvanians whom I said goodbye to at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, I said that I hope to see all of them back when their mission ended 1 year from the date that we stood in Mississippi. Unfortunately, that is not going to be the case.

The Guard makes tremendous sacrifices. Our personnel deserve the best equipment when they are fighting on foreign soil, and when they are doing their security missions here. The relationship between the Guard and its Federal and State status needs to be addressed.

I salute you, Mr. Chairman, for having these hearings. I believe they are very, very, very important. And I wish you well in the work ahead.

[The prepared statement of Governor Rendell follows:]

The Critical Role of the National Guard at Home and Abroad
Statement of
The Honorable Edward G. Rendell
Governor
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Before the
House Committee on Government Reform
October 20, 2005

Thank you Chairman Davis. It is a great pleasure to appear before you today to give you one Governor's perspective on the critical role of the National Guard at home and abroad. I am honored to appear on this panel.

The National Guard is the only military force shared by the federal and the state governments. The status of the National Guard as a state military force is rooted in our constitution, and our militia heritage goes back to a time before we were an independent nation.

In many ways, today's National Guard carries out the genius of our founders and it constitutes "federalism in action" in the military context. Formation of the militias predates the founding of our country. The Massachusetts National Guard traces its lineage to the first regiments established by the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636. Benjamin Franklin founded the Pennsylvania National Guard when he formed the Associators in Philadelphia in 1747. In 1755, the colonial assembly passed Pennsylvania's first militia law. The year 2005 is the 250th Anniversary of Pennsylvania's first militia law.

Today's National Guard, in Pennsylvania and across America, is the modern militia reserved to the states by the United States Constitution. Based on a dual enlistment system, every member of the Pennsylvania National Guard takes an oath of enlistment in a reserve component of the Armed Forces (the National Guard of the United States) and in the modern state militia (the state National Guard). These state and federal military entities are linked inseparably. On a day to day basis, the Guard remains under state command and control and the governors serve as commanders in chief of their state Guard forces. When the Guard is called into active

federal service – as with our soldiers and airmen in Iraq – they are under the command and control of the federal government.

There are about 20,000 soldiers and airmen in the Pennsylvania Army and Air National Guard. Since September 11, 2001, a total of 13,372 Guard members have deployed in support of Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom and Noble Eagle. Today more than 3,000 members of the Pennsylvania National Guard are deployed in Iraq.

When they are not deployed overseas, our Guard personnel serve in readiness centers, armories and Air National Guard bases across Pennsylvania. The Guard provides me as Governor with a well-trained and equipped military force to respond to state emergencies such as floods, blizzards, hurricanes and local emergency situations.

Pennsylvania is home to the National Guard's 3rd Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team. These National Guard teams provide DoD's unique expertise and capabilities to assist state governors in preparing for and responding to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) incidents as part of a state's emergency response structure. Each team consists of 22 highly skilled, full-time National Guard members who are federally resourced, trained and exercised, and employs federally approved CBRN response doctrine.

The National Guard is a partnership between the states and the federal government. As any of you who have been involved in a partnership knows, they involve give and take. Today's National Guard is supposed involve day-to-day communication, collaboration and interaction between the state and federal governments The National Guard Bureau, a bureau within the Department of Defense, serves as channel of communications between DoD and the states.

It's fair to say that the federal government is the senior partner in this partnership between the state and federal governments in terms of the supplies, the equipment and the funding it provides for most National Guard activities. But what's sometimes overlooked is that the states provide the most precious resource of all to the National Guard: the young men and women who serve their state and their nation and who risk, and sometimes give, their lives in this service.

The states recognize how important it is to recruit and retain the high quality personnel necessary to maintain the strength of the Guard. For example, in Pennsylvania, we invest about $10 million per year in our Educational Assistance Program to provide public-service educational grants to new enlistees in, and members of, the Pennsylvania National Guard. This is an important recruiting and retention tool that helps keep the Guard strong to accomplish both its state and its federal missions.

During 2005, we've seen examples of when the National Guard partnership between the states and the federal government worked well and when it broke down. Let me make it clear that I reject the notion that because the federal government provides the great bulk of the funding for the National Guard, it can ignore the role of the states in command and control of the Guard's forces or overlook the concerns of the states with regard to Guard funding, equipment and strength. The Congress, acting to implement the constitutional status of the modern National Guard, has enacted legislation to set the appropriate balance between the states and the federal government with regard to National Guard units. And this balance must be honored by the Department of Defense.

One place where the National Guard partnership between the states and the federal government broke down badly was in the actions of the Department of Defense and Air Force with regard to the 2005 round of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. The Department of Defense and the Air Force chose to ignore clear congressional mandates requiring the consent of the Governors with regard to major changes to National Guard units. They argued that the BRAC process superseded the requirement for input from the states and that it was impractical to ask 54 National Guard entities for input. In an incredible effort to justify elimination of Air National Guard units and missions across America, the Air Force even suggested that the Civil Air Patrol could fill in for the Air Guard. Don't get me wrong. The Civil Air Patrol is a great organization, but it is no substitute for the Air National Guard in the carrying out homeland security missions and helping me address my responsibilities to respond to state emergencies.

Let me take a brief moment to describe what happened with the 111th Fighter Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard. For several years, my staff, including the Adjutant General and the Commander of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard, received briefings indicating that the

111th, which flies the A-10 Warthog aircraft out of Willow Grove Joint Reserve Base, was likely to receive additional mission aircraft as part of the future total force planning process. Imagine our surprise and dismay when, on May 13, we received the DoD recommendation that the 111th Fighter Wing should be deactivated. The DoD recommendation came without a word of advance wording. There was no coordination, no request for input, and certainly no request for my approval as Governor for the elimination of this important Air National Guard unit.

The 111th has about 1,000 full-time and part-time military personnel. It is based at Willow Grove, just outside Philadelphia, which is a key strategic location in our state. The 111th does not consist of just pilots and airplanes. It has security forces, mechanics, medical personnel and all the rest that make up a modern fighter wing. Seventy-five percent of the members of the 111th have deployed in the last four years. These personnel are key assets to me as Governor in addressing potential threats to the security of our homeland. What's more, I believe it is vital to maintain military flying operations at Willow Grove to provide a surge capability to respond to emergencies in the Philadelphia region.

Congress has mandated that the United States Government cannot make changes to the branch, organization or allotment of National Guard units located within the states without the approval of the Governor. The same law provides that I as Governor cannot disband a National Guard unit that receives federal funds without the approval of the President. This law aptly describes the fundamental principles of federalism upon which the National Guard is built. Neither the state nor the federal government can make basic changes to National Guard units without the input of the other.

At least that's the way it's supposed to work. But, the Air Force decided that the BRAC law superseded these other federal laws, and that it could completely ignore the states in making recommendations to eliminate Air National Guard units and missions. The 111th Fighter Wing was the only Air National Guard unit in the country actually recommended for deactivation but others were stripped of the aircraft and personnel.

Aside from ignoring what we saw as clear legal requirements, I was very surprised by the Air Force's attitude toward the National Guard in general and to the partnership between the Guard and the states in particular. An Air Force spokesman, testifying before the BRAC Commission, said that

it would unreasonable and impractical to expect the Air Force to talk to 54 or even 28 National Guard entities in making plans to eliminate units and missions. It was almost as if they were saying those pesky states stand in the way of us getting our job done. Somebody even suggested that the Governors would bring politics into the BRAC process!

As Governor of Pennsylvania, I was not going to stand by and watch DoD attempt to eliminate about one-fourth of the Air National Guard force in my state. In late May, I wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld to advise him that I did not consent to the proposed deactivation of the 111th, and in early July, Senators Arlen Specter, Rick Santorum and I filed suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that the DoD violated the Governor consent statutes when they commenced action to deactivate an Air National Guard unit without the consent of the Governor.

We filed suit not just to stand up for the Guard. We filed suit to protect the vital principles of federalism, grounded in our Constitution, that establish the National Guard as a military force shared by the state and the federal government. We also filed suit to stand up for Congress, which had passed laws clearly requiring consent of the Governor for certain changes to National Guard units. I was very pleased that Senators Specter and Santorum joined me in this litigation because their support emphasized that DoD's action were not just ignoring the Governor's prerogatives with regard to the National Guard but also the direction provided by the Congress.

In the end, Federal District Judge John Padova ruled in favor of the Commonwealth and held that DoD's recommendation for deactivation of the 111th Fighter Wing was "null and void." On the same day as the Court decision was issued, the BRAC Commission found that the DoD's recommendation substantially deviated from the BRAC criteria and overturned the proposed deactivation of the 111th Fighter Wing. The Commission also ruled that military flying operations should be maintained at Willow Grove. We believe the BRAC Commission should have stopped right there, but unfortunately, they went ahead to recommend that the A-10s assigned to the 111th be redistributed to other units, even as they encouraged the Air Force to maintain A-10s there.

As I said out the outset, the National Guard can only succeed in carrying out its critical role at home and abroad if the strong partnership between the state and federal government, first forged in our Constitution, is

maintained and nurtured. The DoD's approach to the states in this year's BRAC recommendations for the Air National Guard represented a major breach of the trust upon which this partnership is built. I believe the DoD must take action to heal that breach and rebuilt that trust. For Pennsylvania, the best way to start this effort would be for DoD to announce that it will cease and desist any plans or efforts to strip the 111th Fighter Wing of it's A-10s. This action would restore the appropriate balance between state and federal needs and support our efforts to maintain a strong military force to address homeland security issues in the southeastern part of my state.

If the 2005 DoD BRAC recommendations represented a breach in the partnership between the states and the federal government with regard to oversight and command and control of the National Guard, the Guard's role in responding to the devastation caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita should have shown how the partnership can work. Pennsylvania sent more than 2,500 Guard personnel to Louisiana and Mississippi to respond to the emergencies caused by these hurricanes. We responded promptly. Our Interim Satellite Incident Site Communications Set (ISISCS) deployed from Fort Indiantown Gap to the Mississippi gulf coast in the first days after the storms and for more than a week it provided just about the only form of reliable communications to that region. It later redeployed to Texas in the wake of Hurricane Rita. We sent security and military police forces from several units, including the 111th Fighter Wing, to Louisiana within 24 hours after we received the request for support. About 200 Pennsylvania National Guard personnel deployed by air to Louisiana. And elements of our 213th Area Support Group and our 56th Brigade deployed by convoy to the area of devastation within just a few days.

These deployments were authorized under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact among the states, and we were prepared to send these personnel in a state active duty status. Fortunately, within a few days, the National Guard Bureau stepped up to the plate and decided that these personnel could deploy in a federally-funded state status under Title 32, United States Code. Use of Title 32 duty for this deployment maintained the essential principle of state command and control over National Guard forces while provide a mechanism for direct federal funding of this duty. I appreciate the response of the National Guard Bureau in authorizing duty in this status, and I believe it is a good example of how the partnership between the state and federal government can work.

When Guard personnel perform federally-funded state duty under Title 32 they remain under state command and control. This is as it should be for nearly all domestic emergencies. I've heard suggestions that the President should have federalized the Guard and put them under federal command in this situation, but I believe that would have been wrong. I believe the active forces can and should play an important role in responding to major emergencies by providing humanitarian aid and assistance in search and rescue, evacuation and other essential missions. The idea that we should put active duty soldiers on the front line of civilian law enforcement does not follow from the lessons we should have learned from Katrina. There is nothing in federal law that prevents the use of the military and the Guard to perform the vast majority of missions that need to be performed in most major disasters. Like my fellow Governors, I see no need to diminish the responsibilities of state governors or the role of the state National Guard forces operating under state command and control in responding the state emergencies.

As Governor, I want our Guard to have the best possible equipment to carry out their missions. When our personnel are ordered to federal active duty to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan, I want the federal government to do everything possible to make sure they have equipment that will keep them as safe as possible as they risk their lives to serve their country. I recognize that equipping the National Guard is a federal responsibility, but we in the states care deeply about this.

Over the last few years, Pennsylvania National Guard personnel have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. I know that the Government Accountability Office report being issued today deals with the issue of "stay behind equipment" and how this impacts on Guard units when they return.

I recognize that it sometimes is appropriate to leave equipment, weapons systems, and protective gear in country rather than returning it with the unit when it redeploys to the United States and to Pennsylvania. This makes sense, and I certainly would not question the military judgment about what equipment should be considered to stay behind.

But, it's vitally important that once our units return to Pennsylvania, they be resupplied with the equipment they need to perform their missions and that the replacement equipment they receive be of the same quantity and

quality as the equipment that stayed behind in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our units need this equipment to train, to respond to homeland security missions and to respond to state emergencies. The need for force protection equipment and supplies does not end when the unit leaves the combat zones.

Let me give you some real world examples reported to me by Pennsylvania's Adjutant General, Major General Jessica L. Wright. When units returned from some of the earliest deployments to Iraq, they generally brought the most critical equipment back with them. There were a few exceptions. For example, Company A of the 28th Signal Battalion, was directed to leave 10 of 41 HUMVEE vehicles behind when they redeployed.

More serious concerns arose after the redeployment of Company G of the 104th Aviation, which deployed to Afghanistan. You might recall those great pictures of this unit, which flies the CH-47D helicopter, extracting personnel in various dangerous situations. The unit took a lot of equipment with them to Afghanistan and they were directed that a lot of equipment should stay behind when they redeployed. This included 7 CH-47D aircraft, trucks, generators, liter kits, radios, tents and the liked. Company G has been back in the United States for ten months now. It has received five replacement CH-47s (of the 7 that stayed behind), but they report the aircraft are not of the same quality as those they deployed with. The unit has received very little of the other equipment that stayed behind in Afghanistan. Although they have been able to make do, this lack of critical equipment affects both training and mission readiness.

Another example is the 131st Transportation Company. Trucks, trailers, field kitchens, and other gear stayed behind in Iraq when they returned to Williamstown. Fifty-nine tractors, and 118 trailers, stayed behind when they returned. The process of replacing this equipment has been too slow. And the unit is concerned that much of the replacement equipment is older models some with missing components. These trucks and trailers are the kinds of equipment we might need to respond to an emergency situation.

We also have serious concerns about the re-equipping of our Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) unit that just recently returned. They were directed that equipment including weapons, googles, trucks, control stations, UAVs and launchers, should stay behind. Some of this equipment

was first issued to the unit when it deployed. The question now is when will the unit receive the equipment it needs to train for and perform its mission.

Our largest deployments to Iraq are underway now, with the Pennsylvania Army National Guard forces assigned to Task Force Dragoon scheduled to redeploy over the next few weeks and the 2nd Brigade Combat Team scheduled to return next summer. It appears that the Army is trying to identify and use a more systematic approach for stay-behind equipment, but it also appears that these units will be directed to leave a good deal of equipment in country.

This process is a cause of serious concern to me. We send our brave men and women abroad to fight our country's battles with a feeling of great pride mixed with fear for their safety. Pennsylvania has lost nineteen Pennsylvania National Guard soldiers in Iraq, fifteen of whom died in the last two months. The Guard has proven again and again that it is a full partner in the total force when it comes to courage and sacrifice.

We delight when these personnel return safely to our country and our Commonwealth. I have personally participated in welcome ceremonies for many of our units, and I plan to participate in many more. As I told the Second Brigade Combat Team when it departed, I want to welcome everyone back when their tour is completed. Sadly, that will be impossible.

Once these units return, it's important that they have the equipment to train and perform their vital military missions. The lack of equipment has not yet resulted in an inability to respond to a homeland security or emergency mission in Pennsylvania or other states, but it does not take much imagination to foresee a contingency where there could be negative impacts.

Today's National Guard plays a critical role in the security of our nation and our state. I depend on my Adjutant General and the military forces under her command and control to respond when we need to provide security to address terrorist threats at nuclear power plants or to provide airport security or to respond to floods or blizzard. When there is a disaster, be it natural or manmade, the Guard is the backbone of our ability to respond. Anything that weakens the Guard, whether it be the ill-advised effort to deactivate an Air National Guard fighter wing or the failure to re-equip a unit after redeployment, is of concern to me as a Governor and commander-in-chief of our Guard forces.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Governor, thank you very much. Let me ask both of you, we know the equipment shortages. I mean, we can just look at the funding across the board. But if you were to prioritize, what specific equipment are you most concerned about? Communications, airlift helicopters, trucks? Is there anything you can, if they had to set priorities?

Governor RENDELL. Well, again, for Pennsylvania, which has a large Air National Guard, as well—an Air National Guard of almost 4,500—the planes and the helicopters are the most important. For example, in floods—and we were hit this past year with two or three major floods—the helicopters are of enormous importance at home.

For a homeland security mission—and again, the whole nature of the Guard changed after September 11th. To say that planes in Willow Grove under the command of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard might be scrambled to protect the Liberty Bell or Independence Hall from airborne assault, that was a foreign concept before September 11th.

So I think the planes the helicopters are the first, most important equipment. I think communication equipment is second, because that is important, as we showed in Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. And then last, the trucks and vehicles that are needed to move personnel—again, as we saw in Hurricane Rita. Of the 2,500 Pennsylvania Guardsmen who went down to the Gulf, only about 400 went by plane. The other 2,100 went by convoy.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Governor.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, I would add that the airlift capability is No. 1. And again, from my testimony, you know that they are now recommending that the C–130's go away from Idaho. I can show you—I would love to come back and just show you my presentation to the BRAC Commission, to show you response time, and how there is now a void throughout the Pacific Northwest.

We also need the rolling stock. Idaho is a large land mass, very mountainous. If we have an earthquake, if we have something of that nature, or floods, the idea of evacuating—we are going to have to have a rolling stock. The fact that we are leaving over 400 vehicles in Iraq is very problematic.

Big picture: Mississippi ran out of gasoline for their first responders. That was one of the requests that they put out to the States. So the idea was, why not take a KC–135, a tanker, fly it down there? Well, we then determined that you cannot offload it. You need to do an aerial offloading; not on the ground. So from Idaho, which is a 6-day trip from Mississippi, we sent a convoy of tanker trucks down there. When we got the urgent request from Louisiana, we sent a convoy of 120 vehicles to Louisiana.

So just as Governor Rendell is talking about response to the Gulf Coast, we are talking about the States helping one another, the States of these United States, for homeland security, or natural disasters.

Much of our equipment is now in the Middle East. We have to have that equipment back in the area of rolling stock; airlift capability; communications; and the engineering, if in fact you have to repair the bridges, restore the bridges, open up roads. I think much

of what you saw in the aftermath of Katrina was moving devastation aside so that you could get transportation realigned.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me ask you, the "Hot Line" this morning has a headline saying, in a rare split with his brother, the President, Florida Governor Jeb Bush said he does not support Federalizing the emergency response to future disasters.

How do you feel about easing posse comitatus restrictions on active duty forces and others performing domestic missions in your State?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. First, I would associate myself with the remarks of Governor Jeb Bush. He is right on target. The last thing we need when a State has a disaster, or a local area within a State, is to have a Federalization of the assets.

We often say that the solution is always closest to the problem. And the idea that somehow Governors would be usurped of their responsibilities as Governors and commanders-in-chief and that there would be some force that would come in that would then take over the control, I do not agree with.

There needs to be a partnership, a strong partnership, and that is what federalism is all about. But the idea of someone immediately declaring the posse comitatus, coming in, taking over law enforcement—I totally disagree with that.

Governor RENDELL. And let me just add, I think all Governors would agree with, Mr. Chairman, what Governor Bush said.

But let me give you an example. And this is not meant to place the finger of blame anywhere, but as you know, the Federal Government—and we can talk all we want about the reasons why this happened—it wasn't until 4 or 5 days later, till the Federal Government activated the Army. We responded to Governor Barber and Governor Blanco the day after Katrina hit; we had our Guard mobilized to go down there.

If we had waited for the Federal Government's approval, it would have been another 4 or 5 days before the Pennsylvania Guard could have been ready to go down. And some actually left that very next day. The communications team that I talked about in my testimony left Tuesday. And if we had waited for the Federal Government, we wouldn't have gotten approval until Friday.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Kanjorski.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Let me say, I appreciate the testimony of both Governors; but, of course, my Governor is always superior to all others. [Laughter.]

So, welcome to the Congress, Governor Rendell.

I am disturbed, because I have heard the same problems at home about this equipment. And in effect, most of my Guardsmen are telling me that they feel that they have been somewhat castrated—I will use the term. They are there in spirit and body, but they are not capable of functioning as a unit any more, without the use of the equipment. And as you so rightly say, 75 percent of the Pennsylvania National Guard has gone to Iraq, and left the equipment in Iraq. And now they are substantially uncovered.

I want to commend the chairman for having these hearings. I certainly, when I get back to the floor, am going to be talking to Mr. Murtha. We have to do something on an emergency basis here

to reequip the National Guards to make them sound. And I commit myself to both the Governors to do that.

And, too, I happen to agree with you, Governor Kempthorne, that the closest to the problem is the best solution. This whole idea of going Federal—I mean, not that I want to strike out at anyone, since I am part of the Federal Government—but we didn't get very high scores in Katrina.

And I think that with every disaster that I have been associated with in Pennsylvania, we have seen what the National Guard can do. And my constituents sleep a hell of a lot more comfortably knowing the National Guard is there, instead of waiting for the Army or the Federal Government to come.

So I commend both of you for coming today, and encourage your pursuit of this. And we will do the same thing.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes, Governor?

Governor RENDELL. And Congressman, I think you are right on. The Congressman used the word "castrate," "emasculate," whatever. Our Guards feel that.

I mean, consider the ludicrous proposition, leaving aside the Federal court decision—and we believe the Federal court decision mandates that the A–10's stay in Willow Grove. But consider what has happened through the BRAC process and the position that DOD has at least temporarily taken. We have 1,023 trained airmen and airwomen; 75 percent of whom have flown combat missions. The 111th has flown 2,500 combat missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. And they are going to be paid by the Federal Government. They are going to be equipped in all other ways by the Federal Government. Yet they have no planes, if the BRAC decision and the DOD recommendation stands and withstands the court challenge.

That is a huge waste of taxpayers' money. And think of what it does to the morale of those people who have flown all those combat missions, to take their planes away.

I would suggest, respectfully—and nobody knows the pressures of balanced budgets more than we do, because we by law have to balance our budgets—I would respectfully submit, though, that you cannot fight global terrorism abroad or at home on the cheap.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, may I also respond to the Congressman?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Surely.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Two points. One with regard to the attitude of the Guard members. I will just say that I see the communications back from the people in Louisiana and Mississippi, also, that are so grateful. And what I hear from our Guard members down there that are serving is this is one of the greatest deployments that they have ever participated in, because they are helping fellow Americans. They are on home soil.

And there is such a "can-do" attitude by Guard members, they bring such skill sets, that even if they do not have all of the equipment, the job they do is just exemplary. We hear that from the brigade that will be coming home, that is Guard, that is being replaced by active Army that says, "We do not have the skill sets that you have here in the Guard."

The other point I would make follows onto Governor Rendell. Think of the irony of this. Today, 62 percent of the combat soldiers

in Iraq, the Middle East, are Guard and Reserve. So you have brigades that then come home. They are at an all-time level of readiness, training, camaraderie, cohesiveness. What could be better for homeland security? And yet, to deny them the very equipment, so that we can retain that level of readiness, would be tragic for the well-being of this Nation.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your comments today. We are hearing in each State the problem with our Guards.

Governor Kempthorne, in your statement you talked in particular about what the Army had left. Do you know how much of things like the trucks and the radios, the Humvees and the radios and other communication equipment, that you also use for domestic?

According to the testimony we are going to get in the second panel, it says some of those Guard units had additional materiel to go over. In Indiana, I guess 70 percent of the materiel is coming back. But do you know what percentage of that materiel in Idaho belonged to the units before they went over?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congressman, you mean that when the brigade arrived in Iraq, the equipment that was there, waiting for them?

Mr. SOUDER. Or was shipped in, knowing they were going to be deployed.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congressman, I cannot give you a percentage. I will tell you that it is the majority of our vehicles. It is over 400 vehicles that will be left in Iraq; much of which was brand new equipment, new trucks, etc. Those will remain behind.

We were still able to put together 120 vehicles to go to Louisiana and, significantly, to make sure, as Governor of Idaho, that I still have rolling stock and personnel in the event of a natural disaster in my State. But you can well imagine, it stretches us very thin. And that is the current situation: we are stretched thin.

Mr. SOUDER. Before I ask Governor Rendell the same question, have any of your units been deployed twice? And how did that factor in?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. This is the first deployment of the brigade. I will tell you that the Idaho Air Guard are on continual deployment. Many of those are 8, 9, and 10 deployments of those personnel.

Mr. SOUDER. But can I clarify? My Air Guard unit that was deployed I don't believe had the same equipment problems as the Army. In other words, they don't have to leave their materiel.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. I believe that is correct.

Mr. SOUDER. Any of the Army groups that were deployed twice, how did they get resupplied then? Do you know? Governor Rendell, do you have any——

Governor RENDELL. Again, most of the redeployment in Pennsylvania was the Air National Guard. But in my testimony—and I didn't read all of the different examples—but there is one example where initially all seven helicopters that this helicopter unit had were left behind, and they are still over in Iraq. We have gotten

five replacements, but it has been reported to me that the replacements are older and not nearly as effective and as efficient as the vehicles we left behind.

If we went over again, if that unit went over again, query whether they would get the original vehicles back, or whether we would take some of the replacement vehicles with us. But the redeployment tends to be more Air National Guard; although some of our ground forces have been redeployed. And I think those that have been redeployed catch up with some of the equipment.

Mr. SOUDER. And it doesn't change the fact that we need to resupply for our State Guards, but do you know how much of the equipment that has been left behind has been damaged; as opposed to just not being able to be brought home?

Governor RENDELL. I don't know that. But I can get you and submit to the chairman those figures from the adjutant general.

Mr. SOUDER. I would appreciate that. I know that the Humvees are made in the district next to mine, but my district supplies most of the parts. I believe 40 to 50 percent of them are damaged, and are going through repair. And I know in Indiana we do some of our own repair, because I have seen some of the equipment coming back and then we are kind of reconditioning it.

Do you have that process as well in your two States? And are you getting the things that are damaged back, and in fact they are leaving the good things there?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congressman, no, I do not believe we are. And also, just one other element. Much of the equipment that is being left there is because it has been up-armored, and so it provides greater protection for the personnel. I do not question—I would not suggest that I want to bring back that Humvee that in any way puts at risk the soldier who replaced the Idaho Guard member who comes home; nor would the Guard member. So I understand the rationale.

What I do not understand is lack of rationale: that you don't reequip the National Guard based on homeland security, based on further deployments, based on natural disasters that we respond to. It would be tragic.

Governor RENDELL. And that is absolutely correct, Congressman. And again, it goes back to what I say. You cannot do a mission, fight terrorism abroad—and the 62 percent figure for Reserve and Guard is right—you can't do that dual mission, and protect the homeland, on the cheap. And that is the bottom line. And we have to come to grips with that.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Yes. I would like to keep following through on that issue. Thank you all for being here. And there are a lot of issues that we have to look at on a broader basis. Do you have concerns about the effect of the overseas deployments on your States' abilities to respond to natural disasters or conduct homeland security missions?

Governor RENDELL. No. Even though there were over 3,000—almost 4,000—Pennsylvania Guardsmen in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time we deployed 2,500 to the Gulf—which, as I said, Congress-

man, was the largest of any State Guard that went to the Gulf—that still left us with a little bit over 13,500 Guardsmen at home in Pennsylvania to carry out whatever missions we needed there.

And although we have complained about equipment, I echo what Governor Kempthorne said. It still left us—even with the equipment left behind—it still left us with enough equipment to respond to anything other than a cataclysmic event.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. And Congressman, I would just add this element. We have an agreement with General Blum and the National Guard Bureau that no State will be drawn below 50 percent personnel without the agreement of a Governor. And so we monitor this closely.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Is that a formal agreement, or informal? Is that with every State?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. It is with every State.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK.

Governor RENDELL. But that doesn't apply to equipment. And I know Governor Schwitzer from Montana has told me that at one point his planes, that are often used for forest fires and things like that, about 90 percent of his air capacity was abroad.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me ask you this. Right now, the Department of Defense does not consider equipping the National Guard for homeland security or emergency response and its missions there; although they did make an exception for Katrina. Do you believe that DOD should assist States with resourcing equipment for homeland use?

Governor RENDELL. I do, absolutely.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. We would love to have it.

Governor RENDELL. And you know, not only would we love to have it, I think we all know the world has changed after September 11th. And the National Guard has changed after September 11th, as well. There is absolutely no doubt about that.

And it is clear that the BRAC Commission, if you looked at the military criteria—the criteria that were set up were called "military value criteria." Homeland security was one of the criteria that the Commission was supposed to pay attention to. But from my view of all of the hearings, it played very little part in the decision-making process. It was basically ignored.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. I totally concur that DOD has a part to play financially. It should not come with additional strings attached. This should not mean that there is a Federalization of the troops.

Also, by homeland security, by being prepared, those are the very people that are being deployed to Iraq, performing marvelously because of that training that they have received here in the States. So, yes, it is to the benefit of all of us, including DOD, against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What procedures or steps have your States taken to identify the equipment needed to respond to natural disasters or security missions? And what types of equipment do you think are most needed?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. I sit down with the Adjutant General of Idaho, General Lefrenz. We go over different scenarios. For example, we have been experiencing a recent swarm of small earth-

quakes in one part of our State. So we ask ourselves, "What could that lead to? What are our resources? What rolling stock do we have? What personnel do we have? What have we predeployed? What about the infrastructure of bridges? If we do lose that bridge which is the major link between the north and the south part of our State, how do we quickly get into that?" So we continually monitor scenarios and ensure that we have the capabilities.

I will also mention that the Emergency Management Assistance Compact [EMAC], is critical, because we may reach a point, just as Louisiana and Mississippi did, that I may need to ask other Governors for help.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me ask one question. And this goes back to Katrina and the whole issue which is going to be out there for a while about the role of the Federal Government in natural disasters. When you have a situation where you have like what happened in New Orleans, where both the local and the State were totally overwhelmed—and I believe the President did declare a disaster before the hurricane occurred—now, when you have one decisionmaker, whether that be the mayor or the Governor, and for whatever reason—for not realizing the magnitude of the problem, or feeling that, "This is our role; we must take care of it," when they are totally overwhelmed—do you believe that there should be a mechanism where the Federal Government has to go in and help Americans, if they have the equipment and the ability to do that?

And if you were in that situation, how would you all handle it? And what systems do you believe—it is all about systems—should be in place so that there can be immediate reaction to save American lives right away, and not about the inability to mobilize or whatever?

Governor RENDELL. I think putting the systems in place is the hard part of that, Congressman, because of the nature of our Government and our Constitution. And even in the interrelationship between a Governor and a mayor, there are only certain instances where I have the power to override a mayor in Pennsylvania on a decision like evacuation.

But I think that you could look at the power the President has when he declares an emergency. That would be the time. That is the time when I get my powers to override mayors, for example. That would be the moment that I would look toward giving some additional powers, as long as they do not hinder the Federal relationship.

But I think it is more than just systems. It is people. And if the situation had occurred in, let's say, State "X," and I thought that State "X" needed Federal troops and the people of State "X" needed Federal troops, I would have picked up the phone and I would have said, "Governor Jones, sending in the 82nd Airborne. You can stand with me and say 'That's a good idea', or you don't have to. But I am sending in the 82nd Airborne, because you are going to need them."

I think we have to develop some form of leadership. And if you look at the way FEMA and the State emergency management agencies are supposed to work, we have that, I think, in most cases. And obviously, in Katrina there were breakdowns. But in most cases—and I think the two Pennsylvania Congressmen would

agree with me—when we had serious flooding all over the State, I thought FEMA did a great job working with PEMA to get not only aid, but to get reimbursement quickly. I thought that was as good an example of the joint Federal-State response as possible.

But if Congress is looking to fashion something to give the President a range of powers, it would be consistent with the declaration of the emergency. That is the way we structure it here. And of course, when General Honore was designated as in charge of the efforts, I think everyone fell into place. General Honore became the commander of the Pennsylvania National Guard, in the sense of deployment, etc., and we followed that, as well. But I would focus on the power that is given to the President to make those declarations, if you wanted to buttress it.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. So you do believe that power should exist and that the President should have the ability in a situation where it is overwhelmed; whether or not the leader—the Governor or the mayor—understands that?

Governor RENDELL. I think under certain unique situations—and it should be framed carefully—but I think that would be the place to do it.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. How about you, Governor?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. I believe it would be an extreme situation, because it signals a breakdown of government, of the system that we have all come to rely upon. I think it would be a dire, dire situation if that ever happened. It should be at the invitation of a Governor.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Even in the sense of an emergency where—the total overwhelm, the facts are there, and the lack of action will cost human lives?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. I would, again, use the term "extreme." When we think of pandemic, when we think of some of these scenarios with potential flus that may have an outbreak, the ideas of quarantines, etc.—very extreme. But I think that should be the last measure taken. Because we are 50 sovereign States, comprising the United States, and the Governor should be the individual that invites in.

When you do have regular troops that are brought in, there is now a concept being developed of "dual hat," so that your National Guard general can then have operational control over the military that is brought in. I believe that is very workable.

There is one other thing, Congressman, that I would like to note. And that is when the 82nd and the First Cav were brought into New Orleans, National Guard, the 82nd Airborne, First Cav, could communicate with one another with their radio equipment; the National Guard could not get in on that frequency. That is a problem.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I would like to agree that General Blum is doing a great job running the National Guard.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Thank you.

Mr. Gutknecht.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think a lot of the questions that I was going to ask have already been asked.

I would like to agree with Governor Kempthorne, and it is something we sometimes forget in this city, and that is that the Federal Government was created by the States; and not the other way

around. And I think we have to be very careful, and try to create systems that, "We know when someone is overwhelmed." Obviously, there were some breakdowns done in Louisiana, but I think we have to be careful we don't use that example as an excuse if we are going to send in the 82nd Airborne.

Let me come back, though. I think one other point I was going to make—and I had a welcome home ceremony to some Reservists this weekend. And they are an engineering group, and normally their parking lot is absolutely filled with equipment. And there was one lonely, little beat-up truck just out in their area where they keep all their equipment. And it did seem funny that here is the unit back, and they really couldn't do much in terms of exercises, because all their equipment is still over in the desert.

But I want to come back to, I think, a more serious problem, and ask your opinions about this. One of the concerns we have heard expressed—and we in Minnesota, I think, the numbers that I hear are pretty good, in terms of retention and recruitment. But this off-tempo thing, when you are sending people back and forth as often as we are to places like Iraq and Afghanistan and other parts of the world, not only are we wearing out the equipment, I think we are wearing out our personnel. How are you doing in your two States in terms of recruitment and retention of Guard members?

Governor RENDELL. Well, I would say in Pennsylvania retention is remarkable. I can't say enough about the men and women of our Guard, and I think it holds true around the country. As worn out as they are, as difficult as it must be, our retention rates are terrific.

I was at a welcome home ceremony in Chillington, PA, just a couple of months ago, and this ceremony was about 2 months after the troops had physically come back. And everyone got a special medal, and I presented it with the commander. And they came up one by one. Two people came up in civilian clothes. Their service had run out, and they weren't retained. And one of the two came up to me afterwards with his wife, and he apologized to me. He said, "I wanted to re-up, but she wouldn't let me." And you know, given the multiple deployments, you can understand that from a wife's perspective.

But the retention and the morale remain tremendously high. It is just—it really is remarkable. You know, these days, we are all so jaded, there is not much that inspires us. It is almost inspiring.

But recruitment is a much, much, much different case. Recruitment, we are going to have to keep building up incentives. As I told you, in Pennsylvania, we have made a tremendous educational incentive that we pay for, to get people to come into the Guard. But notwithstanding that, recruitment is much more of a challenge than retention.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congressman, really, I would echo much of what Governor Rendell said. And there is a schedule—be it informal—but the concept that a brigade would not be required to go back any sooner than 6 years, that would be a normal cycle. I think anything more frequent than that, then you are going to have problems with the retention of families, etc.

Morale is extremely high. The brigade from Idaho are extremely proud of the progress which they are making. They answered the

call to duty. They are proud to have done so. When they come back, it will be to a heroes' welcome. And again, morale is extremely high.

I would add this that we all need to think about. With demobilization, this is the largest single deployment ever in the history of my State; therefore, it is the largest single demobilization. We need to also be sure that we are in a support for those troops that have come home—post-stress disorder—to make sure that the support mechanism is there.

For 2 years, we have taken these wonderful people, and we have now made them warriors. They have changed. They are going to come home changed. Their families have had to cope. They have had to change. And now they are going to come back together. The world has changed at home. And so we need to help them with those expectations, with their concerns that they go through.

With the National Guard different than coming back and going to the fort where they live, they are dispersed throughout our rural communities. It is tough for them to go down to a coffee shop and say, "I am having trouble at night. I am having nightmares." Because in the coffee shop, maybe nobody went with them.

I would also just say, one of the toughest assignments that I have heard from our Guard members are those that have not been asked to deploy. They want to be with their comrades. They are an awesome organization.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. I want to thank both Governors for coming and sharing with us. I have been concerned about the increasing use of our National Guard to fight in Iraq. I think it was so appropriate that you were able to respond and come to our own Gulf Coast and help out there. It is an absolute essential use of our National Guard.

I have been reading through our background materials on under what title you are called up, and how long. And what bothers me is the equipment left behind. But more so than that are the families and the jobs left behind.

What impact have you experienced—and I would like both Governors to respond—with your National Guard spending additional time off our shores, and leaving equipment off our shores? There are going to be more Katrinas and Ritas. In fact, one is headed to the Florida coast at the moment. And I think when we talk about homeland security, we ought to have not only the forces, but the resources to protect our homeland. I also am worried about the families and the jobs that are left behind.

So can you respond as to the overall effect of your National Guards being called up for extended periods of time off our shores?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congresswoman, I appreciate what you have said. I will affirm that National Guard members would tell you they are soldiers. And they are awesome soldiers. That is my editorial comment.

I believe that their level of morale is the highest it has been, because they are doing something that they believe in. It is helping freedom. It is ensuring that if we can somehow bring stability to that troubled part of the world that used to be called the cradle of

civilization, it allows the children back home to still grow up with peace, and to have dreams and to be able to pursue those.

I tell them, it is so ironic. As they are hugging and kissing their little children, as mom and dad are deployed to go overseas, by doing that, they are ensuring that those little children are going to continue to grow up in freedom in the United States.

Ms. WATSON. Can you address the economic impact of the extended stays?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Yes. I will tell you that I think another group that needs to be saluted are the employers; what they have been asked to do, and how they have stepped up to make sure that those jobs will be there for the Guard members when they return.

Also, it is very important that we have raised funds for family emergency situations, so that if a family has a problem, we have the money to step forward and to help that family so that the soldier can remain focused on his or her mission, not worry about a family financial situation at home.

Ms. WATSON. Governor Rendell, is that the same situation in Pennsylvania?

Governor RENDELL. If I can add, I think there are severe financial hardships that are put on Guard families. We have the same emergency fund, and that helps in emergencies. But on the day-to-day hardships, you take—let's say it is an Airwoman, and she is activated. And she is the breadwinner, and earning $35,000 a year for that family. And obviously, her family takes a tremendous financial hit by her service. Even if the employer keeps the job available, the employer doesn't pay the differential.

We are working on legislation in the Pennsylvania State Legislature that will tax credit employers for paying 25 percent of the differential. But even if that gets through, it is only 25 percent of the differential.

Then you have things like health care. You have things like student loans. A lot of these Guardsmen and women are repaying student loans. We have put legislation in that freezes their obligation to make those payments while they are abroad serving the country, or down in Katrina for any length of time. While they are on active duty, we freeze those payments.

But the big gap—and something that I think Congress should take a look at doing, now that the Guard and the Reserve, too, are playing much bigger roles, 62 percent of the force—is filling the gap between what "John Jones" or "Mary Smith" was making at the time they were called to active duty, and what they are making with the service. I think that is an area that I would love to see the Federal Government look at. The State government can do certain things, as well. But together, we should take care of that problem.

No Guardsman's or Guardwoman's family should have—in addition to the hardships and the stress of actually fighting and being abroad, they shouldn't suffer a financial hit as well.

Ms. WATSON. Yes. I know a difference—is my time up, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Your time is up. I will give you one last question.

Ms. WATSON. OK. I know there is a difference from State to State. One of the problems I face in my district, Los Angeles, CA, is that the Guard who were in school tend to lose that time from their course work, and then have to go back and start all over again.

And so we do have some other problems besides equipment and readiness, preparedness. And I just wanted to hear directly from the States as to how they impact.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker [sic], for the additional time.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. I look forward to the second panel every bit as much as the first.

I am a little confused, though, on some of the testimony. Governor Rendell, if the BRAC Commission base realignment and closure had sent you 50 A–10's, would you have refused to take them as inappropriate to take from another State? If they came from California, would you have defended that how dare the Air Force move California assets into your State and provide those Federal jobs and opportunities?

Governor RENDELL. Well, I think, as a practical matter, the answer to that is, no, I don't think any State would.

Mr. ISSA. So isn't your basic objection to losing the A–10—a questionable aircraft in today's environment, anyway—really all about simply wanting to have, as something like the ninth-largest State, the third-largest National Guard; not wanting to lose any of that?

Governor RENDELL. No. First of all, it is founded on a clear—you, as the Congress, passed Title 32, which said nothing could be done of any significance to the National Guard, clearly not deactivation or——

Mr. ISSA. I mean, you actually quoted the Constitution.

Governor RENDELL. The militia clause of the Constitution, and this Congress—not this Congress——

Mr. ISSA. Well, I will quote that. "A well-regulated militia being necessary to security of a free State, the right of a people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." Where does it say the Federal Government is supposed to spend a nickel? What if we just said, "Keep the A–10's, but you pay for them?" Would anything be wrong with that?

Governor RENDELL. The Congress said that in Title 32.

Mr. ISSA. We also passed BRAC.

Governor RENDELL. Right, but——

Mr. ISSA. Ultimately, whichever preempts—you know, I appreciate the fact that you have gone to court.

Governor RENDELL. And the Federal court decided that BRAC did not preempt Title 32, for a whole lot of reasons.

Mr. ISSA. But your position is that your preferential amount of National Guard substantially paid for by the Federal Government is a right that cannot be taken away? I can't move those? The Federal Government cannot move them to another State unless you decide that is OK?

Governor RENDELL. That is what Title 32 says, and that is what the Federal court has said, because Congressman——

Mr. ISSA. Would it surprise you to know that I will seek to change that, the idea that we should have to continue to subsidize and pay, and not be able to move it from State to State because a Governor who has a preferential position in the amount of their Guard should continue to do so?

Governor RENDELL. Well, Governor—I mean Congressman, let me say, No. 1, you would have to change Title 32, and you have the right to try to do that. That is No. 1. And No. 2, you would have to do something to ensure our ability to protect our homeland.

Again, the 111th is the only Air National Guard unit in the southeastern part of the State. That is our most populous part of the State. That has two nuclear reactors. It has all of these national icons. And we have a duty. I have a duty as Governor to protect our State.

Mr. ISSA. Sure, Governor. And with all due respect, your responsibility is from your pocketbook; not from the Federal pocketbook.

Governor RENDELL. And exercise that, when in the prior BRAC rounds BRAC decided that it wanted to deactivate Fort Indiantown Gap as an air base. We stepped up and said, "We will pay to run Fort Indiantown Gap as an air base." Everyone agreed that was a good idea, and the planes were left.

We have offered to run Willow Grove as a State National Guard facility—to pay for the upkeep, etc.—as long as the planes are kept there. I mean, why would you want—why would you want—to be paying the salaries of 1,023 Airmen and Airwomen, and not give them planes?

Mr. ISSA. Look, I have no problem with us talking about the decisions of the BRAC. My question was your questioning of the Constitutional ability to move federally paid-for assets.

Governor RENDELL. It is different than a Reserve unit. You have to understand the difference. And it comes from the founders of this country. The militia was first and foremost a State militia. It can be Federalized, but it is first and foremost a State militia. We are all called "commanders-in-chief" of the State militia.

Mr. ISSA. I have no problem, and I am sure that——

Governor RENDELL. If we were to pay for it, for example—let's assume you were to transfer the whole bill to us. Then what justification would there be for ever Federalizing them?

Mr. ISSA. I would certainly say that the A–10's that have been parked in the desert, if you want them back and you want to go get them, we can make arrangements to do so. But you would own them.

Governor RENDELL. But with respect——

Mr. ISSA. And, no, we wouldn't want to Federalize them.

Governor RENDELL [continuing]. If we paid for the entire National Guard, how could the Federal Government have any claim to Federalize them in times of—and remember, this is the National Guard unit that two-thirds of the members have served multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. You are paying for them because you have the right to come in and Federalize them and use them to fight foreign conflicts. And the way that this administration is running this war, the National Guard is becoming more and more a part of the Federal Government.

Mr. ISSA. My time has expired. Hopefully, there will be a second round. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for calling two important Governors in to give us some of the insights we really need as we fight our wars. This is a war on two fronts. And I appreciate the testimony of Governor Kempthorne and Governor Rendell.

I have to say a special "Hello" to my good friend, Governor Rendell, who has been not only a good friend of mine, but a good friend of the District of Columbia. He did so well in bringing Philadelphia back from economic crisis that the citizens of Pennsylvania said, "Wow!" and made him Governor.

And I just want you to know, Ed, all we did in bringing D.C.—which is now in extraordinary good health—back is to copy what you did in Philadelphia.

I have a question for you both. By the way, Mr. Gutknecht raised an interesting point, a Constitutional point, to which you both responded, about who knows best; after all, the States created the national government. And of course, he is right.

I would suspect that your replies, which went to extreme cases, would be not so much in natural disasters, but in a terrorist disaster, where the President and the Federal Government had information and intelligence that no Governor could have, and maybe time was of the essence. I have the feeling that is more likely to be the kind of circumstance where the Federal Government moves in than a natural disaster.

I want to ask you about how we can make do. You all, I think, can really help us. One of the reasons that support for the war in Iraq is falling away is that there is this sense of the American people that there is some robbing of Peter to pay Paul. People are generally very favorable about helping the Iraqi people, but the more they think that there is some sacrifice being made for themselves over too long a time, the less support there is for the war.

And one of the ways, it seems to me, to deal with this period is to see how we can do what Americans always try to do: do everything at once.

My question for you comes from the fact that I represent the Nation's Capital, and so I am always concerned about two kinds of disasters. One is the disaster that we are perhaps greater at risk than most, and that is a terrorist disaster. And then there is the other disaster, the kind that—well, Ed Rendell is in my region, so he knows about those: hurricanes and floods and the rest.

I am very close to my own National Guard. Just this past—it was October 13th, we deployed, for yet another time, some of our MPs. They are in high demand. You could imagine why we have more MPs, though; because it is the Nation's Capital. And they would be in especially high demand here in the event of any kind of disaster, natural or terrorist. So there they go again.

My generals tell me that some have been deployed two or three times in the last 2 years. My generals tell me, my D.C. National Guard generals tell me, at least 70 percent of the Army National Guard have been deployed multiple times to Iraq, Afghanistan, and

Guantanamo. Sometimes there is one deployment Stateside. By that, they mean perhaps Guantanamo.

I was interested. For example, Governor Kempthorne, you talked about your experience. I am looking at your written testimony, where you speak very highly of Idaho having sent more, a greater proportion, of National Guard to the Gulf Coast than any other National Guard. And there is great applause, it seems to me, due the compact that you Governors have among the States, where you come to the aid of one another. And that apparently happened just like that, and no question asked, and everybody was on the ground.

You also say, Governor Kempthorne, that when you got there, there was a lot of confusion in the Gulf Coast—Houston and Meridian. There had been an urgent request to evacuate the frail elderly. You had identified more than 400 nursing beds. Some problem in even getting releases; had to go all the way up to the Governor.

This is what my question is. We talk about borrowing equipment. I am concerned that every time my guys and girls go over, whatever new equipment we get goes over. So we are in an unending lose-lose game, because we can't keep any of it.

Beyond that, the wonderful borrowing of National Guard means, however, that whatever advantage, in either a terrorist disaster or a natural disaster, that comes from the fact that you have National Guard who have been practiced in what to do, are not where you imagine them to be. They are abroad. This is what happened to Governor Kempthorne. And his people went to a completely new place, and they didn't know the place as well. They wanted to do their mission, and they had to go through what you had to go through.

With equipment gone, with personnel unfamiliar with other States, if we have to borrow—we would have to borrow from, I don't know, Maryland, Ohio, you in Pennsylvania—what are we to do, and what do you do—what did you do, what can be done—if in fact we need Guard personnel in territory where they have never been before, have no idea about anything about that territory?

I mean, how useful can they be? And what would you suggest we do to shore up the possibility that for some time we may be increasingly using, at least in the event of a natural disaster or a terrorist disaster, personnel from other jurisdictions?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Ms. Norton, thank you very much for the question. And, too, as a citizen, may I thank all of my fellow citizens from Washington, DC, and their deployment schedule. I know they are doing just tremendous service for all of us.

I jotted down a few things as you spoke. One are the lessons learned. You referenced one of the situations that we experienced. I would note, we use the Air Guard to take food and water. It was critically needed. But on that same aircraft, we put from the private sector the emergency room physicians and the nurses. So it is a partnership that goes down there.

Lessons learned: One of them is that we now believe that if it is something out of the ordinary, if it is sheer manpower, if it is to go and repair a breach in a dike, it is just sheer manpower and equipment.

But if it is something that is a niche, if it is to help the frail elderly, if we can get an advance team to do the triage, to get on the

ground first—we did this in Louisiana, when we received an urgent request from Louisiana to send additional Guard members. We sent an advance team, so that when the convoy arrived, we immediately knew where they were assigned and what their responsibilities were; so that there was not just a gathering of hundreds of Guard members and then trying to sort it out. So order, by sending the advance.

The EMAC process: It does work, but one of the things that we found is that it needs to be specific so that if you are going to indemnify—if you are going to have reciprocity of people with credentials, that in Idaho we will accept people from Louisiana who are professionally credentialed, that may need to be noted in the EMAC; so that we don't run into this confusion of who is Federalized and who isn't. But I would hope that the Federal Government could look at that whole process, and streamline that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Your time has expired.

Mr. Shays, we have a series of three votes, and the panel will be over at that point.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, I am going to just be 2 minutes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, you can yield, then, to Mr. Dent.

Mr. SHAYS. I am told that General Honore was never in charge of the National Guard. Not a major point——

Governor RENDELL. I don't think in a formal way.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Governor RENDELL. But I think in a deployment way, people looked to it.

Mr. SHAYS. But he wasn't in charge. I would like to know from both of you, do you think DHS should assist States in—no, forget that one.

The one I want is just the NORTHCOM Control was established to provide command and control over Federalized emergencies in the United States. Has anyone from NORTHCOM or DOD asked you specifically about your States' needs and assets? Have they asked you for your input at any time? This is NORTHCOM. I will start with you, Governor Kempthorne.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. If we have had requests from NORTHCOM?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. I will tell you——

Mr. SHAYS. To ask your needs, etc. Has there been a dialog?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congressman, Shays, approximately 18 months, 2 years ago, we had General Eberhardt from NORTHCOM, who came and met with the National Governors Association, where we discussed the whole process. I cannot tell you——

Mr. SHAYS. Right, at the Governors' association, but has he ever met with your State and your National Guard people, to your knowledge?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. I have not personally had conversation.

Mr. SHAYS. How about you?

Governor RENDELL. And I haven't, either, but I can get that information from our adjutant general.

Mr. SHAYS. It would be good to know. I mean, the bottom line is, we set NORTHCOM up to focus on protecting the North American continent, and it would seem logical that there should be this interaction with the States on this kind of issue. I thank you, and I would be happy to yield to Mr. Dent.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Governor Rendell, Governor Kempthorne. Good to see you here. Governor Rendell, I am pleased to report to you that I located one of Willow Grove's aviation assets in Kuwait when I was there this summer—big green and black stripes on the tail, with "Eagles" logo right on top.

Governor RENDELL. There you go.

Mr. DENT. Just thought you would appreciate that. Just very quickly, I was part of the hearing yesterday with Governors Bush, Perry, and Napolitano, discussing the Federal role in emergency response. And all three categorically said "No" to revisiting posse comitatus. I believe both of you have said the same thing.

And just as a point of clarification, Governor Rendell, you indicated there might be some circumstances where there would be a greater Federal role, even if perhaps the Governors weren't willing to accept that assistance at that particular moment. Could you just clarify that?

Governor RENDELL. I think, and Governor Kempthorne mentioned, a pandemic. Assume there was an outbreak of some very significant plague that had the opportunity to travel across State lines in a flash, something of that unique nature; a terrorist attack that involved multiple States, something of that nature, too.

And again, I think Congress should revisit that, consistent with the President's power to declare national emergencies; but should revisit it very carefully.

Mr. DENT. Thank you. And my final question is, what do you Governors see as the Federal role—whether it is the Guard or some other aspect of the Federal Government—in implementing the State's evacuation plan? You know, we saw what happened in Texas with that mass evacuation of Houston. Of course, Philadelphia and New York and all of Pennsylvania would be impacted by either evacuation. What are your thoughts on that?

Governor RENDELL. Let me take that first, and very quickly. I think that it should be an advisory role. And we do lean on FEMA, we do lean on DHS, the Department of Homeland Security, for their advice. They have come in and done table-top exercises with us. But I think the evacuation plans should be a peculiarly State function. But DHS and FEMA should be available to give us all of the best advice and all of the cumulative experience from around the country.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congressman, I would just add that, in addition to that, as a preliminary, but in the actual event of an evacuation, we may need equipment, personnel to transport people. So it should be to augment what the State is implementing, in full partnership.

Mr. DENT. OK, and just real quick and finally, in the event of a natural or manmade disaster, who would you see as the lead Federal department, DHS or DOD? And do you see enough coordi-

nation between those two Federal departments, with respect to how they assist States, particularly in light of Katrina? Any thoughts?

Governor RENDELL. I would think that, in terms of a natural disaster as opposed to a terrorist attack, a natural disaster, I would still like to see FEMA take the lead. And I am talking about FEMA from prior days. I think that FEMA was well equipped to lead in that effort.

And again, remember, PEMA—and of course, Congressman, you are familiar with PEMA—PEMA has contact with FEMA almost on a weekly basis. And they are the ones best positioned, I think, to move in. I would like to see the role of FEMA totally reexamined by the Federal Government and by the Congress.

Mr. DENT. Thank you.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congressman, I believe, if it is a natural disaster, it would be the Department of Homeland Security. I will add, however, we in years past have had such significant forest fires that we have asked from the Department of Defense, and received, active battalions that have come and helped us on the front line of firefighting. That would also be true if it were earthquakes or floods. So I wouldn't want to rule out that one.

Governor RENDELL. Nor would I, but the coordination of it should be done by FEMA. I think we need to revitalize FEMA.

Mr. DENT. No further questions, just a comment. But I know in our State we have had some difficulty with the homeland security operations center and the way it communicates with our State homeland security department. I know it is a problem in Pennsylvania. Is that a problem in Idaho?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. No, sir.

Mr. DENT. OK.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Can I just say, thank you, both. You have been very generous with your time. It has been very helpful in establishing a record here. We again appreciate the accomplishments and the trials and tribulations of being a Governor, but you both honor us with your presence today.

We are going to recess, as we are in a series of votes right now, and come back in about a half an hour.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. And Mr. Chairman, may I just thank you for conducting this. This is critically important. And talking about demobilization, Dr. Chu and the others at the Pentagon are helping us. They are doing a great job.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Governor, thank you.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Good afternoon. And I want to thank the witnesses for their patience. I think the Members will be trickling in.

We now move to our second panel. And we are extremely lucky to have with us today an outstanding group of experts on the National Guard—not only those who create and debate policies, but those who walk the walk to serve their charges and their country—with us today.

David Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States; accompanied by Janet Saint Laurent, the Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of the GAO; the Honorable Thomas Hall,

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; Lieutenant General David Melcher, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army; Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau; Major General Allen Tackett, the State Adjutant General of West Virginia; and Major General Raymond Rees, the State Adjutant General of Oregon.

I want to thank all of you for being here today. I remember in my early days in the Guard, the closest I used to get to the officers' club was when we cut the grass there, you know, on Saturday afternoons. So we appreciate everybody being here.

Also, Mr. Walker, let me just say, the committee is just very grateful for the outstanding work of Ms. Saint Laurent and her team on the report that you have issued today.

It is our policy that we swear all witnesses, so if you would, rise for me and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right. Thank you. The entire GAO report is in the record. General Walker, and for the rest of you, try to stay in the 5-minute timeframe. If you feel you have to go over to make your point, that is fine. But your entire statements are in the record. Thank you.

STATEMENTS OF DAVID WALKER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY JANET A. ST. LAURENT, DIRECTOR, CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; THOMAS F. HALL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, RESERVE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID F. MELCHER, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY; LIEUTENANT GENERAL H STEVEN BLUM, CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU; MAJOR GENERAL ALLEN TACKETT, STATE ADJUTANT GENERAL, STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; AND MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND REES, STATE ADJUTANT GENERAL, STATE OF OREGON

STATEMENT OF DAVID WALKER

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the critical role of the National Guard, both at home and abroad. As you know, recent and ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and new homeland missions, including the response to Hurricane Katrina, have led to higher demands on the Reserve component; in particular, the Army National Guard.

Before I address a couple of other issues, I want to mention that I had the pleasure and privilege this last Saturday evening to attend the Secretary of Defense's annual Freedom Awards banquet, which is sponsored by the National Committee of Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve.

At this banquet, it became very clear to me that the Federal Government, which is the largest employer in the United States, is not leading by example, nor practicing what it preaches, with regard to support for the Guard and Reserve.

For example, GAO and other Federal employers would like to have the opportunity to make up any pay gap that any of our activated Guard and Reserve members might experience, but we are precluded from doing so under current law. And candidly, we would like this committee's and the Congress' help to be able to give us the authority to do so, under appropriate facts and circumstances.

With regard to the other issues that you have asked me to address today, as you know, we issued our 21st Century Challenges report, which demonstrated that a vast majority of the Federal Government's policies, programs, functions, and activities are based upon conditions that existed in the 1950's and 1960's; and that we face large and growing structural budget deficits that we are going to have to deal with.

In that regard, with regard to the National Guard, we believe that Congress and the DOD need to reexamine the current business model for the Guard, since it appears to be unsustainable in light of recent changes in the security environment, growing recruitment challenges, and DOD's significant use of Reserve units.

GAO believes that policymakers should be focusing on identifying an appropriate business model for the National Guard that balances the Guard's multiple roles with the appropriate human capital policies, readiness standards, and equipment practices.

The overall readiness of the non-deployed Army National Guard units is declining, because the Guard has transferred large amounts of personnel and equipment from non-deployed units to fully staffed and equipped units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan.

However, DOD's increased use of the Army National Guard has not been matched with a change in its equipping or funding strategy. Increasing equipment shortages among non-deployed Army National Guard units illustrate the need for DOD to reexamine its equipment strategy for the Army National Guard in order to better match operational requirements with the Guard's equipment inventory.

The amount of essential equipment that non-deployed National Guard units have on hand has continued to decrease since we last reported in 2004. For example, DOD has required Army units to leave more than 64,000 equipment items, valued at over $1.2 billion, in Iraq, for use by follow-on forces. However, the Army has not developed replacement plans for this equipment, as required by DOD policy.

The Army is in the process of developing a plan, by November 2005, to replace some of that equipment. However, we are recommending that the Army develop a comprehensive replacement plan covering all equipment that the Guard units have left in Iraq.

In addition, the overall decline in equipment levels among non-deployed units may have made it more difficult to locate and transport some equipment needed for Katrina; such as communication equipment. We are conducting a review of the Federal response in Katrina, including the Guard's involvement. And as you know, Mr. Chairman, we will be reporting more information on this within the next several months.

DOD and the Army have some initiatives underway to improve the Guard's organization and readiness for these missions. However, it is too early to determine whether the Army's initiatives to-

gether comprise a sustainable equipping and funding model for the Army National Guard in the future, because implementation plans are not complete and funding requirements have not been fully identified.

The Department of Defense also produced a strategy for homeland defense and civil support in 2005, June 2005, that describes the National Guard's key role in these areas. However, the DOD has not yet developed an implementation plan that outlines how Guard units should be trained and equipped to carry them out.

Until these initiatives are more fully developed and key implementation decisions are made, DOD and the Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh their affordability and effectiveness, and the Army National Guard will be challenged to train and prepare and adequately equip for all of its missions.

In conclusion, the Army National Guard's equipment problems and personnel and recruiting challenges are symptoms of a much larger problem of an outdated business model. While current strategies have met DOD's immediate needs to support overseas operations, these strategies are not sustainable over the long term.

Moreover, it is not clear that DOD's initiatives, as currently defined, will result in a comprehensive and integrated strategy for preparing the Army National Guard for future missions.

We therefore are recommending that the Army better integrate its initiatives and conduct a broader rethinking of the basis for Army National Guard equipment requirements that considers both overseas as well as homeland security requirements.

In this regard, we believe that the Congress and senior DOD leadership must be ready to play a key role in pressing the Army to provide more detailed plans for these initiatives and to identify the specific funding required to implement them in the most efficient manner.

And needless to say, Mr. Chairman, the Congress will have a critically important role to play, to make sure that we allocate limited resources to achieve the best value and mitigate the most risk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]

United States Government Accountability Office

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RESERVE FORCES

Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined

Statement of David M. Walker
Comptroller General of the United States

GAO-06-170T

October 20, 2005

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Highlights

Highlights of GAO-06-170T, a testimony before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

RESERVE FORCES

Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to Be Reexamined

Why GAO Did This Study

Since September 2001, the National Guard has experienced the largest activation of its members since World War II. Currently, over 30 percent of the Army forces now in Iraq are Army National Guard members, and Guard forces have also carried out various homeland security and large-scale disaster response roles. However, continued heavy use of the Guard forces has raised concerns about whether it can successfully perform and sustain both missions over time. In the short term, the National Guard is seeking additional funding for emergency equipment. GAO was asked to comment on (1) the changing role of the Army National Guard, (2) whether the Army National Guard has the equipment it needs to sustain federal and state missions, and (3) the extent to which DOD has strategies and plans to improve the Army National Guard's business model for the future.

What GAO Recommends

For this statement, GAO drew on previous work, primarily on a report titled: *Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Transformation Initiatives* (GAO-06-111). In this report, GAO makes recommendations intended to improve the structure and readiness of the Army National Guard for overseas and homeland operations. DOD agreed with the recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-170T.

To view the full product, click on the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found

The heavy reliance on National Guard forces for overseas and homeland missions since September 2001 has resulted in readiness problems which suggest that the current business model for the Army National Guard is not sustainable over time. Therefore, the business model should be reexamined in light of the current and expected national security environment, homeland security needs, and fiscal challenges the nation faces in the 21st century. Under post-Cold War planning assumptions, the Army National Guard was organized as a strategic reserve to be used primarily in the later stages of a conflict after receiving additional personnel, equipment and training. Therefore, in peacetime Army National Guard units did not have all the equipment and personnel they would need to perform their wartime missions. However, over 70,000 Guard personnel are now deployed for federal missions, with thousands more activated to respond to recent natural disasters. To provide ready forces, the Guard transferred large numbers of personnel and equipment among units, thereby exacerbating existing personnel and equipment shortages of non-deployed units. As a result, the preparedness of non-deployed units for future missions is declining.

The need to reexamine the business model for the Army National Guard is illustrated by growing equipment shortages. As of July 2005, the Army National Guard had transferred over 101,000 equipment items to units deploying overseas, exhausting its inventory of some critical items, such as radios and generators, in non-deployed units. Nondeployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because: (1) prior to 2001, most Army National Guard units were equipped with 65 to 79 percent of their required war-time items and (2) Guard units returning from overseas operations have left equipment, such as radios and trucks for follow-on forces. The Army National Guard estimates that its units left over 64,000 items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas. However, the Army cannot account for over half of these items and does not have a plan to replace them, as DOD policy requires. Nondeployed Guard units now have only about one-third of the equipment they need for their overseas missions, which hampers their ability to prepare for future missions and conduct domestic operations. Without a plan and funding strategy that addresses the Guard's equipment needs for all its missions, DOD and Congress do not have assurance that the Army has an affordable plan to improve the Guard's equipment readiness.

DOD is taking some steps to adapt to the new security environment and balance the Army National Guard's overseas and homeland missions. For example, the Army has embarked on reorganization to a modular, rotational force. Also, DOD issued a strategy for homeland defense and civil support in June 2005. However, until DOD develops an equipping plan and funding strategy to implement its initiatives, Congress and DOD will not have assurance that these changes will create a new business model that can sustain the Army National Guard affordably and effectively for the full range of its future missions.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the critical role of the National Guard in conducting missions at home and overseas as well as equipment issues affecting the Army National Guard. Recent and ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and new homeland missions have led to higher demands on the reserve component, particularly the Army National Guard. As we described in our previous report and testimony on the Department of Defense's (DOD) use of the National Guard, the launch of the Global War on Terrorism has resulted in the largest activation of National Guard forces for overseas missions since World War II. In addition, Guard members have been called upon to perform new homeland security missions as well as state missions ranging from fighting forest fires to providing hurricane relief. As of July 2005, more than 30 percent of the Army forces deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom are National Guard members and as of September 2005 over 50,000 National Guard personnel from over 48 states, 2 U.S. territories and the District of Columbia supported the hurricane disaster response in the Gulf Coast.

Before I address the primary subject of this hearing, I would like to bring an important matter to the attention of this committee relating to the Guard and Reserves. This past Saturday evening, I had the privilege and pleasure to attend the Annual Freedom Awards Banquet sponsored by the National Committee of Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve here in Washington. This year's banquet honored 15 employers, including Enterprise Rent-a-Car and Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. who demonstrated their above and beyond commitment to their employees who are members of the Guard or Reserves. During the evening it became clear to me that the U.S. Government is not leading by example or practicing what it preaches in connection with employer support for the Guard and Reserves. GAO would like to be able to do what many of the awardees have already done but we are limited in doing so under current law. Namely, we believe federal agencies should be able to make up any salary differential that activated Guard and Reserve members might otherwise lose out of our annual appropriation. We would also like to be able to be sure that applicable employees and their family members continue to receive their employer provided benefits. We and other federal employers need your help to make this a reality.

The Army National Guard's heavy involvement in recent operations and growing equipment problems are a reflection of the significant changes in the security environment—changes that are occurring at a time when our nation is threatened by growing fiscal imbalances stemming, in large part,

from an aging population and rising health care costs. If left unchecked, these fiscal imbalances will ultimately impede economic growth, which could impact our ability to address key national and homeland security needs. To assist the Congress in reviewing and reconsidering federal programs in light of changing security threats and fiscal challenges, we have identified a number of fundamental questions that we believe policymakers will need to address in the coming years to ensure that federal programs and organizations are focused on the nation's highest priority challenges and are affordable in light of fiscal projections. To facilitate a process of reexamining the base of federal government, we issued a report in February 2005 that identifies a number of 21st century challenges and includes 12 reexamination areas.[1] One of these areas is the need to reassess defense programs and practices that stem from the Cold War era. Within defense, a specific issue we believe bears review is the need to reexamine the current business model for the reserve component. The current business model is unsustainable, especially in light of recent changes in how the DOD uses its reserve units. In essence, we believe that policymakers need to focus on helping to assure that DOD has an appropriate model for the National Guard that adequately balances the demand for forces with appropriate human capital policies, readiness standards, and equipping policies for all of the National Guard's missions.

My statement today focuses on (1) challenges facing the Army National Guard as a result of its changing role and high pace of operations, (2) whether the Army National Guard has the equipment needed to maintain readiness for future missions, and (3) the extent to which DOD is transforming the Army National Guard to enhance its equipment posture and preparedness for the future. In conjunction with this testimony, we have also prepared a report[2] at the committee's request, on Army National Guard equipment issues and the Army's plans to convert the Army National Guard to a modular force that equips units to support continuous overseas operations.

[1] GAO, *21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government*, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb., 2005).

[2] GAO, *Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Transformation Initiatives*, GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2005).

To address these objectives, we drew from previous reports on the National Guard's use for overseas and homeland security missions[3] and collected and analyzed data to assess the status of Army National Guard equipment. To determine the status of equipment, we analyzed information on the types and quantities of Army National Guard equipment that have been used in overseas operations; determined the equipment status of nondeployed units; assessed the extent to which Army National Guard equipment has been retained overseas to support ongoing operations; and identified some of the equipment issues associated with responding to homeland security missions and natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina. To assess DOD's transformation plans, we evaluated the Army's plans to convert Guard units to modular brigades and develop a rotational deployment model to equip units to support continuous overseas operations. We interviewed officials in the DOD, the Department of the Army, the National Guard Bureau, and the Army National Guard and supplemented this information with visits to Army commands and two units—the 30th Brigade Combat Team in North Carolina, which deployed in February 2004, and the 48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia, which deployed in May 2005. We selected these units because they enabled us to evaluate how the process used to prepare units has changed with subsequent rotations to Operation Iraqi Freedom. We also discussed the National Guard's response to Hurricane Katrina with senior leaders of the National Guard and visited National Guard officials in Louisiana and Mississippi to gain their perspectives. We conducted our review of the National Guard's equipment status from December 2004 to October 2005 and determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives.

Summary

The significant use of Army National Guard forces for overseas and homeland missions since September 11, 2001 has resulted in declining readiness, weakening the Army National Guard's preparedness for future missions and indicating that DOD's business model for the Army National Guard is unsustainable and needs to be reassessed. The current heavy reliance on the Army National Guard for overseas operations represents a fundamental change from the Guard's planned role as a strategic reserve force whose principal role was to deploy in the later stages of a major

[3]GAO, *Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and Homeland Missions*, GAO-04-670T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2204.) and *Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions*, GAO-05-21 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004).

conflict if needed. Under this model, which still governs how resources are provided to the Guard, the majority of Army National Guard combat forces are only provided with 65 to 74 percent of the people and 65 to79 percent of the equipment needed to conduct their assigned wartime missions. Units are generally expected to receive additional personnel, training, and equipment during a mobilization period before deploying to support military operations. However, for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, combatant commanders have required the Army National Guard to provide large numbers fully manned and equipped units to conduct stability operations on an ongoing basis. To meet these demands, the Army National Guard has transferred thousands of personnel and equipment from nondeployed units to support deploying units. As a result, the preparedness of nondeployed units for future missions is declining, and DOD's strategy of transferring large numbers of equipment and personnel among units is showing signs of increased stress. The declining readiness of nondeployed units could also make it more difficult for the Guard to respond to homeland security and disaster response missions. Importantly, DOD has not developed a system for measuring the Guard's preparedness for such missions.

Worsening equipment shortfalls affecting the Army National Guard illustrate the need for DOD to reexamine its strategy and plans for the Army National Guard. As we noted in our report, National Guard Bureau officials estimate that the Guard's nondeployed units had only about 34 percent of their essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005, after subtracting equipment that has been left overseas, substitute items that may be incompatible with the active component's equipment, or items that are undergoing maintenance after being overseas. As of July 2005, the National Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from nondeploying units to fully equip deploying units. This practice has depleted the Army National Guard's inventories of more than 220 critical items, such as armored humvees, and reduced the Guard's remaining inventory of other mission-essential items. In addition to planned equipment shortfalls, another key reason why the equipment condition of nondeployed units has worsened in recent months is that the Army has required units returning from deployment to leave significant quantities of equipment overseas for use by follow-on forces. As of June 2005, Army National Guard units had left more than 64,000 pieces of equipment, valued at more than $1.2 billion, overseas to support continuing operations. Moreover, the Army cannot account for over half the equipment Army National Guard units have left overseas and has not developed replacement plans for the equipment as, DOD policy requires. Further, extensive use of the Guard's equipment overseas has significantly

reduced the amount of equipment available to state governors for domestic needs. National Guard officials believe that the National Guard's response to Hurricane Katrina was more complicated because significant quantities of critical equipment, such as satellite communications equipment, radios, trucks, helicopters, and night vision goggles, were deployed to Iraq. In the absence of a plan and funding strategy that addresses the Guard's equipment needs for all its missions, DOD and the Congress currently do not have assurance that the Army National Guard will be well prepared for future missions at home or abroad, particularly those that arise on short notice.

DOD is undertaking some initiatives to improve the Guard's equipment readiness and to balance its multiple roles in overseas and domestic operations. However, it is not clear whether these initiatives will be effective in enhancing the Army National Guard's equipment posture because DOD has not yet developed detailed plans and included funding for all the initiatives in its budget. The Army has begun reorganizing Army National Guard units into modular brigades and is planning to implement a rotational deployment model in which it expects Guard units would deploy overseas no more than about once every 6 years. However, the Army has not yet worked out many details of these initiatives, such as what readiness standards units will be required to maintain after returning from deployments, what specific types of equipment Guard modular brigades will receive and how their equipping levels will differ from the active component, and how quickly Guard units will be provided new equipment needed for modular formations after converting to the new modular structure. In addition, DOD has not yet fully assessed the Guard's role and requirements for homeland defense and civil support missions. In June 2005, DOD published a strategy for homeland defense and civil support missions that recognizes the Army National Guard's federal and state roles and sets out the department's overall approach to securing the nation from attack. However, the department has not determined how it will implement the strategy, nor has it clarified the responsibilities of the National Guard or established specific personnel and equipment requirements for these missions, as we recommended in our 2004 report. Until these initiatives are more fully developed and key implementation decisions are made, the Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh the affordability and effectiveness of DOD's strategy for positioning the Army National Guard to remain a relevant and sufficiently equipped force for the future.

In the report we are publishing with this testimony, we are recommending that DOD develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy that

addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard and a plan for the effective integration of the Army National Guard into its rotational force model and modular force initiatives. DOD agreed with our recommendations and said that it is taking actions to posture Army National Guard forces for prolonged operations by building a rotational force and developing resource plans for all Army units. It further noted that the Army is taking steps to implement stricter accountability over Guard equipment currently left in theater and is working to develop replacement plans for these items.

Background

As we have previously testified,[4] legislative proposals involving substantial long-term costs and commitments should be considered in the context of the serious fiscal challenges facing this country. The federal government's liabilities and commitments have grown from $20.4 trillion to $43.3 trillion from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2004. This amount continues to increase due to continuing deficits, known demographic trends, and compounding interest costs. Furthermore, our long-range budget simulations show that this nation faces a large and growing structural deficit. Given the size of our projected deficit, we will not be able to eliminate the deficit through economic growth alone. The long-term fiscal pressures created by the impending retirement of the baby boom generation, rising health care costs, and increased homeland security and defense commitments intensify the need to weigh existing federal budgetary resources against emerging new priorities. In our 21st Century Challenges report,[5] we noted that it is time for a baseline review of all major federal programs and policies, including the military's reserve components. [6] We have previously reported on a number of military force management issues in the active and reserve components, including roles

[4] See GAO, *Long-Term Fiscal Issues: The Need for Social Security Reform*, GAO-05-318T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2005); *Budget Process: Long-term Focus Is Critical*, GAO-04-585T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2004); *Long-term Budget Issues: Moving from Balancing the Budget to Balancing Fiscal Risk*, GAO-01-385T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6, 2001).

[5] See GAO-05-325SP.

[6] The reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces are the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The Selected Reserve consists of military members assigned to organized reserve units and reservists who participate in at least 48 scheduled drills or training periods each year and serve on active duty for training of not less than 14 days during each year.

and missions of the Army and Air National Guard [7]and the Army Reserve[8] and the process for assessing the numbers of active duty military forces.[9] We have also reported on a number of military personnel issues, including military compensation, health care, and recruiting and retention. In each of these areas, questions have arisen as to whether DOD has the right strategies to cost effectively sustain the total force in the future. In the case of the National Guard, how this is accomplished is of particular importance in light of its dual missions of supporting overseas operations as well as its considerable responsibilities in its state and homeland security roles.

The National Guard of the United States consists of two branches: the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. The National Guard Bureau is the federal entity responsible for the administration of both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. The Army National Guard, which is authorized 350,000 soldiers, makes up more than one-half of the Army's ground combat forces and one-third of its support forces (e.g., military police and transportation units). Army National Guard units are located at more than 3,000 armories and bases in all 50 states and 4 U.S. territories. Traditionally, the majority of Guard members are employed on a part-time basis, typically training 1 weekend per month and 2 weeks per year. The Guard also employs some full-time personnel who assist unit commanders in administrative, training, and maintenance tasks. In the past 2 years, the Army National Guard has faced increasing challenges in recruiting new soldiers to fill authorized positions.

Army National Guard personnel may be ordered to duty under three general statutory frameworks – Titles 10 or 32 of the United States Code or pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. In a Title 10 status, Army National Guard personnel are federally funded and under federal command and control. Personnel may enter Title 10 status by being ordered to active duty, either voluntarily or involuntarily (i.e., mobilization) under appropriate circumstances. When Army National

[7] See GAO-05-21.

[8] See GAO, *Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages*, GAO-05-660 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 2005).

[9] See GAO, *Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Conduct a Data-Driven Analysis of Active Military Personnel Levels Required to Implement the Defense Strategy*, GAO-05-200 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2005).

Guard forces are activated[10] under Title 10, the National Guard is subject to the Posse Comitatus Act,[11] which prohibits it from law enforcement activities unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or law. Personnel in Title 32 status are federally funded but under state control. Title 32 is the status in which National Guard personnel typically perform training for their federal mission. In addition, the federal government reimburses states for Guard units' activities in response to federally-designated disasters, such as hurricane response. Personnel performing state missions are state funded and under state command and control. Under state law, a governor may order National Guard personnel to respond to emergencies, civil disturbances, or perform other duties authorized by state law. While the Army National Guard performs both federal and state missions, the Guard is organized, trained, and equipped for its federal missions, and these take priority over state missions.

The Guard can also be tasked with homeland security missions under the state governors or, when activated, by DOD under command of the President. DOD refers to its contributions to the overall homeland security effort as "homeland defense." Homeland defense activities include military missions within the United States, such as flying armed patrols over U.S. cities and guarding military installations. DOD also supports civilian authorities to provide quick response or capabilities that other agencies do not have. The U.S. Northern Command provides command and control for DOD's homeland defense missions, including land, air, aerospace, and maritime defense operations, and coordinates DOD's support to civil authorities for homeland security missions.

[10] Activation refers to the ordering of units and individual members of the reserve component, which includes the Army National Guard, to active duty under the statutory authority granted to the President, the Congress, or the secretaries of the military departments.

[11] 18 U.S.C. § 1385. The Army and Air Force are prohibited by the Act and the Navy and Marine Corps are prohibited by Defense Directive 5525.5.E.4.1.3.

Declining Preparedness from High Pace of Operations Signifies A Need to Reexamine the Army National Guard's Business Model

As we previously reported, the high number of Army National Guard forces used to support overseas and homeland missions since September 11, 2001, has resulted in decreased preparedness of nondeployed Guard forces[12] which suggests the need to reassess DOD's business model for the Army National Guard. We have previously reported that high-performing organizations must reexamine their business models to ensure that their structures and investment strategies enable them to meet external changes in their operational environments efficiently and effectively.[13] To meet the demand for forces since September 11, especially for forces with special skills that reside heavily in the Army National Guard, such as military police, over 50 percent of Army National Guard members have been called upon to deploy. At the same time, the Army National Guard's involvement in operations at home has taken on higher priority since 2001. The change in the roles and missions of the Army National Guard has not been matched with a change in its equipping strategy that reflects its new high pace of operations, and as a result the Army National Guard's ability to continue to support ongoing operations is declining.

In keeping with post-Cold War planning assumptions, most Army National Guard units were not expected to deploy in the early days of a conflict, but to augment active duty units in the event of an extended conflict. Therefore, the Army accepted some operational risk by providing the Army National Guard fewer soldiers than it would need to fully equip its units and less equipment than it would need to deploy, on the assumption that there would be time to provide additional personnel, equipment, and training during the mobilization process before units would deploy. For example, as of 2004, the Army National Guard's force structure called for about 375,000 soldiers, but it was authorized about 350,000 soldiers. In addition, Army National Guard combat units are only provided from 65 to 74 percent of the personnel and from 65 to 79 percent of the equipment they would need to deploy, depending on the priority assigned to their warfighting missions.

However, after September 11, 2001, the President authorized reservists to be activated for up to 2 years, and approximately 280,000 Army National Guard personnel have been activated to support recent operations. As of July 2005, about 35,500 Army National Guard members were deployed to

[12] See GAO-05-21.

[13] See GAO, *A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management*, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).

Iraq—nearly one-third of the 113,000 U.S. forces in theater. Army National Guard personnel deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq are expected to serve 1 year in these countries and to spend up to several additional months mobilizing and demobilizing. As figure 1 shows, the number of activated Army National Guard personnel for federal missions has declined since its peak in December 2004 and January 2005. However, the Army National Guard continues to provide a substantial number of personnel to support current operations.

Figure 1: Army National Guard Activity under Federal Command and Control from September 2001 through July 2005



Source: Army National Guard data.

The Army National Guard has begun adapting its forces to meet the warfighting requirements of current operations, but some measures taken to meet immediate needs have made sustaining future operations more challenging. Because its units did not have all the resources they needed to deploy at the outset of current operations, the Army National Guard has had to transfer personnel and equipment from nondeploying units to prepare deploying units. We reported in November 2004 that as of May 2004, the Army National Guard had performed over 74,000 personnel transfers and shifted over 35,000 pieces of equipment to deploying units. These initial transfers worsened personnel and equipment shortages in

units that were then alerted for deployment and had to be staffed and equipped through more transfers. The cumulative effect of these personnel and equipment transfers has been a decline in the readiness of Army National Guard forces for future missions, both at overseas and at home.

Even as significant numbers of personnel and equipment are supporting overseas operations, since September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard's role in homeland security and civil support has taken on greater priority, as demonstrated by the Guard's recent involvement in responding to Hurricane Katrina. Since September 11, 2001, the Guard has performed other operational duties such as providing airport security and supporting events such as the 2004 Democratic and Republican national conventions. In the pre-September 11 security environment, it was assumed that the National Guard could perform its domestic roles with the personnel and equipment it was supplied for its warfighting missions. While the Army National Guard is implementing pilot programs to strengthen capabilities to respond to homeland security needs, such as improving critical infrastructure protection, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the full spectrum of the Guard's roles and requirements for homeland security, as we recommended.[14] Until such an analysis is completed, congressional policymakers may not be in the best position to assess whether the Army National Guard's current structure and equipment can enable it to sustain increased homeland security responsibilities in addition to its overseas missions.

[14] See GAO-05-21.

Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Readiness of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions

Increasing equipment shortages among nondeployed Army National Guard units illustrate the need for DOD to reexamine its equipping strategy and business model for the Army National Guard. The amount of essential warfighting equipment nondeployed National Guard units have on hand has continued to decrease since we last reported on the Army National Guard in 2004. Compounding the equipment shortages that have developed because most Army National Guard units are still structured with lesser amounts of equipment than they need to deploy, Army National Guard units have left more than 64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion in Iraq for use by follow-on forces; however, the Army has not developed replacement plans for this equipment as required by DOD policy. In addition, DOD has not determined the Army National Guard's equipment requirements for homeland security missions, and some states are concerned about the Guard's preparedness for future missions.

Equipment Status of Nondeployed Units Has Worsened in Recent Months due to Challenges in Supporting Overseas Operations with Current Inventory Levels

While most Army National Guard combat units are typically provided from 65 to 79 percent of the equipment they would need for their wartime missions, for recent operations, combatant commanders have required units to deploy with 90 to100 percent of the equipment they are expected to need and with equipment that is compatible with active Army units. While the Army can supply deploying Army National Guard forces with additional equipment after they are mobilized, nondeployed Guard units will be challenged to maintain readiness for future missions because they transferred equipment to deploying units and have less equipment to train with or to use for other contingencies.

The Army National Guard began transferring people and equipment to ready units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan in the early days of the Global War on Terrorism and the number of transfers has grown as overseas operations have continued. In June 2004 the Army National Guard had transferred more than 35,000 pieces of equipment to ready units for overseas operations.[15] By July 2005, the number of equipment items transferred among Army National Guard units had grown to more than 101,000 items. As a result of these transfers, the proportion of nondeployed units that reported having the minimum amount of equipment they would need to deploy[16] dropped from 87 percent in

[15] See GAO-05-21.

[16] To meet minimum deployment criteria, a unit must generally have at least 80 percent of its mission-essential equipment items on hand.

October 2002 to 59 percent in May 2005. However, Army National Guard officials estimated that when substitute items which may be incompatible with active forces, equipment undergoing maintenance, and equipment left overseas for follow-on forces are subtracted, nondeployed units had only about 34 percent of their essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005. Further, as of July 2005, the Army National Guard reported that it had less than 5 percent of the required amount or a quantity of fewer than 5 each of more than 220 critical items. Among these 220 high-demand items were generators, trucks, and radios, which could also be useful for domestic missions.

Retaining Army National Guard Equipment Overseas without Plans for Replacement Hinders the Guard's Ability to Prepare and Train Units

To address equipment requirements for current overseas operations, the Army now requires units, in both the active and reserve components, to leave certain essential items that are in short supply in Iraq for follow-on units to use,[17] but it has not developed plans to replace Army National Guard equipment as DOD policy requires. [18] The Army's requirement for leaving equipment overseas is intended to reduce the amount of equipment that has to be transported from the United States to theater, to better enable units to meet their deployment dates, and to maintain stocks of essential equipment in theater where it is most needed. While this equipping approach has helped meet current operational needs, it has continued the cycle of reducing the pool of equipment available to nondeployed forces for responding to contingencies and for training.

The Army National Guard estimates that since 2003, it has left more than 64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas to support continuing operations, but the Army lacks visibility and cannot account for all this equipment and has not developed plans to replace it. According to Army officials, even though DOD policy requires the Army to replace equipment transferred to it from the reserve component for more than 90 days,[19] the Army neither created a mechanism in the early phases of the

[17] The Army has directed that equipment purchased specifically for Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, or other key items currently in short supply such as armored vehicles, improvised explosive device jammers, long-range surveillance systems, and generator sets, remain in theater for the duration of operations.

[18] DOD Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, April 7, 2005.

[19] Replacement plans for removed equipment and supplies are not required for transfers in support of force restructuring adopted as result of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process decisions approved by the Secretary of Defense.

war to track Guard equipment left in theater nor prepared replacement plans for this equipment because the practice of leaving equipment behind was intended to be a short-term measure. As operations continued, in June 2004, the Army tasked the Army Materiel Command with overseeing equipment retained in theater. However, according to Army and National Guard officials, the Army Materiel Command developed plans to track only certain high-demand equipment items that are in short supply, such as armored humvees and other items designated to remain in theater for the duration of the conflict. As of July 2005, the National Guard Bureau estimates that the Army Material Command was only tracking about 45 percent of the over 64,000 equipment items the Army National Guard units have left in theater. The tracking effort does not include over half of the equipment items, such as cargo trucks, rough terrain forklifts, and palletized load trucks Guard units have left behind that were only documented at the unit level through unit property records, even though these items may remain in theater for up to 3 years. As a result, the Guard does not know when or whether its equipment will be returned, which challenges its ability to prepare and train for future missions.

As operations have continued, the amount of Guard equipment retained in theater has increased and has hampered the ability of returning Guard units to maintain a high level of readiness and train new personnel. For example, according to Army National Guard officials, three Illinois Army National Guard military police units were required to leave almost all of their humvees, about 130, in Iraq when they returned home from deployment, so they could not conduct training to maintain the proficiency they acquired while overseas or train new recruits. In all, the National Guard reported that 14 military police companies left over 600 humvees and other armored trucks overseas, and these items are expected to remain in theater for the duration of operations.

In May 2005, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs expressed concerns about the significant amount of equipment Army National Guard units have left overseas and directed the Army to develop replacement plans as required by DOD policy.[20] The Army expects to complete its plans to replace stay behind equipment by October 2005. While Army officials have stated that the equipment tracked by individual

[20] The Comptroller General plans to initiate additional work on accountability for equipment left overseas this fall. That work will further explore strategies to manage this equipment and address the ramifications of plans for the disposition of this equipment.

units may eventually be returned to the Guard, both Army and Army National Guard officials said that even if this equipment is eventually returned, its condition is likely to be poor given its heavy use and some of it will likely need to be replaced. Until the Army develops plans to replace the equipment, including identifying timetables and funding sources, the National Guard will continue to face critical equipment shortages that reduce its readiness for future missions and it will be challenged to train and prepare for future missions. In the report we are publishing concurrently with the testimony,[21] we recommended that DOD develop and submit to the Congress a plan and funding strategy that address the equipment needs of the Army National Guard for the Global War on Terrorism and how the Army will transition from short-term equipping measures to long-term equipping solutions. DOD agreed with this recommendation, stating in its written comments that the Army needs to determine how Army National Guard forces will be equipped to meet state disaster response and potential homeland defense requirements and include these requirements in its resource priorities. We believe that such a plan should address the measures the Army will take to ensure it complies with existing DOD directives to safeguard reserve component equipment readiness.

States Are Concerned about Preparedness for Future Domestic Missions in Light of Growing Army National Guard Equipment Shortages

While Army National Guard forces have supported a range of homeland security missions since September 11, 2001, states are concerned about the Guard's ability to perform future domestic missions given its declining equipment status. For example, New Jersey officials told us that Army National Guard units lacked some essential equipment, such as chemical protective suits and nerve agent antidotes; they needed to respond to a terrorist threat in December 2003. More recently, Louisiana Army National Guard units lacked some key items they needed to conduct large-scale disaster response. According to National Guard officials, at the time Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf coast, much of the Guard's most modern equipment was deployed to Iraq while less capable equipment remained in the United States. We are currently examining the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, including the roles of DOD's active duty and reserve forces. At the time of the hurricane over 8,200 personnel and two brigade sets of equipment from the 155th Armored Brigade of Mississippi and the 256th Infantry Brigade of Louisiana were deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and were not available to perform their domestic missions.

[21] See GAO-06-111.

Furthermore, the Adjutant General of Louisiana reported to the Army National Guard in August 2005 that based on their analysis of the state Guard's equipment for state missions, even after the 256th Infantry Brigade returned home from deployment, the brigade would lack about 350 essential equipment items needed for hurricane response including trucks, humvees, wreckers, and water trailers because it was required to leave a majority of its equipment items in Iraq. When we visited the area in October 2005, Louisiana National Guard officials particularly noted that more radios would have enabled them to communicate with other forces and more vehicles that could be used in high water would have been very helpful.

Louisiana and Mississippi, like many other states, have entered into mutual assistance agreements with other states to provide additional National Guard forces in times of need, typically to facilitate natural disaster response.[22] Under such agreements, in August and September 2005, over 50,000 National Guard personnel from 48 states, 2 U.S. territories and the District of Columbia responded to the devastation caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the Gulf Coast region. According to Louisiana officials, state partners were proactive in identifying troops to send to the area when the magnitude of the storm was anticipated. These forces brought with them additional equipment such as key command and control equipment and aviation assets.

[22] While the mutual support arrangements, called Emergency Management Assistance Compacts, have been useful in responding to natural disasters, it is not clear whether these arrangements will always meet the states' needs for forces or capabilities for homeland security missions because states can withhold forces if they are needed in their home state.

DOD and Army Have Some Initiatives to Improve Future Readiness of Army National Guard Forces but Has Not Developed Detailed Implementation and Funding Plans

DOD, and the Army have recognized the need to transform the Army National Guard to meet the new threats of the 21st century and support civil authorities, and are undertaking some initiatives to improve the Guard's organization and readiness for these missions. However, it is too early to determine whether these initiatives together comprise a sustainable equipping and funding model for the future because implementation plans are not complete and funding strategies have not been fully identified. For example, the Army has not decided how to manage equipment to ready forces as they move through the proposed rotational force model. In addition, while DOD has produced a strategy for homeland defense and civil support in June 2005, it has not yet completed a plan to implement that strategy, including clarifying the Army National Guard's role and assessing what capabilities the Guard will require for domestic missions, as we previously recommended. Until these initiatives are more fully developed and key implementation decisions are made, DOD and the Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh their affordability and effectiveness, and the Army National Guard will be challenged to train and prepare for all its future missions.

Army Converting Guard to Modular Designs, but Plans and Cost Estimates for Equipping Units Are Incomplete

In 2004, the Army developed a plan to restructure Army forces, including the Army National Guard, to become more flexible and capable of achieving a wide range of missions, but it has not yet completed detailed implementation plans or cost estimates for its transformation. Rather than being organized around divisions, the Army will transform to an organization based on standardized, modular brigades that can be tailored to meet the specific needs of the combatant commander. Two primary goals of this new structure are to standardize designs and equipment requirements for both active and reserve units and maintain reserve units at a higher level of readiness than in the past. While the Army plans to convert most Army National Guard units to the modular organizational structure by 2008, Guard forces will not be fully equipped for the new design until 2011 at the earliest. The Army had originally planned to convert Guard units on a slower schedule by 2010, but at the request of the Army National Guard, accelerated the conversions so that Guard units would share the new standardized organizational designs with the active component at least 2 years earlier, which is expected to help avoid training soldiers for the previous skill mix and better facilitate recruiting and retention efforts. However, our work indicates that accelerated modular conversions will exacerbate near-term equipment shortfalls for three key reasons. First, according to current plans, units will be expected to convert to the new modular designs with the equipment they have on hand. However, because of existing shortages and the large number of

equipment items that deployed units have left in Iraq or that need repair or replacement due to heavy use, units will not have the equipment needed for their new unit designs. For example, converted Guard units expect initially to be without some key equipment items that provide improved capabilities, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, single channel ground and airborne radio systems, and Javelin antitank missiles. Second, the Army has not planned funding to provide equipment based on the new conversion schedule. Instead, the Army plans to proceed with the original equipping schedule, which will not equip the Guard's modular force until at least 2011. Army resourcing policy gives higher priority to units engaged in operations or preparing to deploy than those undergoing modular conversions. As a result, the requirements of ongoing operations will continue to deplete the Army National Guard's equipment resources and will affect the pace at which equipment will be available for nondeployed units to transform to the modular design. In the meantime, modular Guard units are expected to continue using equipment that may be older than their active counterparts' and will initially lack some key enablers, such as communications systems, which are the basis for the improved effectiveness of modular units.

In addition to the equipment shortfalls and lack of comparability that are projected for near-term Guard conversions, the Army's initial estimate of $15.6 billion through 2011 for converting Guard units to modular designs is incomplete and likely to grow for several reasons. First, the Army's cost estimate was based on a less modern equipping plan than the design the Army tested for the new brigades. Second, the estimate does not include costs for 10 of the Guard's support units, nor does it include nearly $1.4 billion that the Guard currently estimates is needed for military construction costs associated with the modular conversion of the Guard's 40 support units. Third, current cost estimates assume that Guard equipment inventories will be at prewar levels and available for modular conversions. This, however, may not be a reasonable assumption because as discussed previously, Army National Guard units have left large amounts of equipment overseas, some of which will be retained indefinitely, and the Army has not provided plans for its replacement. The lack of complete equipping requirements and cost estimates for converting the Army National Guard to the new modular structure raises concerns about the affordability and effectiveness of this multibillion dollar restructuring effort. Furthermore, without more detailed data, the Congress may not have sufficient information to fully evaluate the adequacy of the Army's funding requests for its modular force initiative.

Army Plans for Managing Equipment under Its Rotational Force Model Are Not Complete

While the Army plans to transform into a rotational force, it has not yet finalized plans for how Army National Guard units will be equipped under its new model. The rotational force model is intended to provide units with a predictable cycle of increasing readiness for potential mobilization once every 6 years. As such, it involves a major change in the way the Army planned to use its reserve forces and has implications for the amount and types of equipment that Army National Guard units will need for training to improve their readiness as they progress through the cycle. Under the rotational force concept, rather than maintain units at less than full readiness, the Army would cycle Army National Guard units through phases of increasing readiness and provide increasing amounts of equipment to units as they move through three training phases and near readiness with the goal of predictable availability for potential deployment once in a 6-year period.

While the Army has developed a general proposal to equip units according to the readiness requirements of each phase of the rotational force model, it has not yet detailed the types and quantities of items required in each phase. Under this proposal, the Army National Guard would have three types of equipment sets: baseline sets, training sets, and deployment sets. The baseline set would vary by unit type and assigned mission and the equipment it includes could be significantly reduced from the amount called for in the unit design, but plans call for it to provide at least the equipment Guard units would need for domestic missions, although this standard has not been defined. Training sets would include more of the equipment units will need to be ready for deployment, but units would share equipment that would be located at training sites throughout the country. The deployment set would include all equipment needed for deployment, including theater-specific equipment, items provided through operational needs statements, and equipment from Army prepositioned stocks. At the time of our report, the Army was still developing the proposals for what would be included in the three equipment sets and planned to publish the final requirements in December 2005.

At present, it is not clear how the equipment requirements associated with supporting deployment under the new rotational readiness cycle will affect the types and quantities of items available for converting the Army National Guard to a modular force. Until the near-term requirements for the rotational model and long-term requirements for a modular force are fully defined and integrated, the cost of equipment needed to most efficiently implement the two initiatives will not be clear. Without firm decisions as to requirements for both the new modular structure and rotational deployment model and a plan that integrates requirements, the

Army and Army National Guard are not in a position to develop complete cost estimates or to determine whether the modular and rotation initiatives will maintain the Guard's readiness for all its missions, including warfighting, homeland security, and traditional state missions such as disaster response. In our report,[23] we recommend that DOD develop and submit to the Congress a plan for the effective integration of the Army National Guard into the Army's rotational force model and modular initiatives. We recommended that this plan include the equipment requirements, costs, timelines and funding strategy for converting Army National Guard units to the modular force and the extent to which the Army National Guard will have the types of equipment and equipment levels comparable to the active modular units. We further recommended that the plan include an analysis of the equipment the Army National Guard's units will need for their missions in each phase of the rotational cycle and how the Army will manage implementation risks to modular forces if full funding is not provided on expected timelines. DOD agreed with our recommendation.

DOD Has Developed a Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, but Identification of Requirements and Readiness Measures Are Not Complete

In June 2005, DOD published its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which recognizes the National Guard's critical role in these missions in both its federal and state capacities. However, the strategy does not detail what the Army National Guard's role or requirements will be in implementing the strategy. DOD has not yet completed a review of the full range of the Army National Guard's missions and the assets it will need to successfully execute them. In the absence of such requirements, National Guard units will continue to be structured and funded largely for their warfighting roles, and with the exception of certain specialized units, such as weapons of mass destruction civil support teams, Army National Guard forces are generally expected to perform civil support missions with either the resources supplied for their warfighting missions or equipment supplied by states.

In its homeland defense and civil support strategy,[24] DOD sets goals of

(1) maximizing threat awareness; (2) deterring or defeating threats away from the U.S. homeland; (3) achieving mission assurance in performance

[23] See GAO-06-111.

[24] Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 2005).

of assigned duties under attack or after disruption; (4) supporting civil authorities in minimizing the damage and recovering from domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive mass casualty attacks; and (5) improving national and international capabilities for homeland defense and homeland security. The strategy recognizes the need to manage risks in the homeland defense and civil support mission areas given resource challenges the department faces in performing all its missions. Therefore, the strategy puts first priority on homeland defense missions that the department will lead, with second priority on ensuring the department's ability to support civil authorities in the event of multiple mass casualties from chemical, biological, radiation, or nuclear incidents within the United States.

To accomplish these goals, DOD has noted that it will have to integrate strategy, planning, and operational capabilities for homeland defense and civil support more fully into its processes. It plans to implement its strategy with dual-purpose forces that are simultaneously trained and equipped for warfighting and homeland missions. The strategy recognizes that National Guard forces not on federal active duty can respond quickly to perform homeland defense and homeland security within U.S. territory and are particularly well suited for civil support missions because of their locations across the nation and experience in supporting neighboring communities in times of crisis. Based on this strategy, U.S. Northern Command has been tasked to develop detailed contingency plans to identify the full range of forces and resources needed for the homeland missions DOD may lead or the civil support missions in which active or reserve forces should be prepared to assist federal or state authorities. However, it is not clear when this effort will be completed.

DOD has taken some steps to develop additional information on the National Guard's readiness for some of its domestic missions. In August 2005, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) directed the National Guard to include readiness assessments for both its Title 10 (federal missions) and Title 32 (state missions conducted with federal funding) in the department's new readiness reporting system, the Defense Readiness Reporting System, which is scheduled for implementation in 2007. The new system is expected provide officials better visibility into unit readiness by reporting standardized metrics rather than general categories of readiness. The National Guard Bureau is also preparing a report for the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) on concepts for reporting the Guard's readiness for domestic missions and plans to prepare a detailed implementation plan by mid-January 2006. Until detailed concepts and implementation for these plans for domestic

readiness reporting are developed and approved, it is not clear whether they will fully meet the recommendation in our prior report that DOD establish readiness standards and measures for the full range of the Guard's homeland missions so that readiness for these missions can be systematically measured and accurately reported.

As we reported in 2004, some states expressed concerns about the Army National Guard's preparedness to undertake state missions, including supporting homeland security missions and disaster relief, given the increase in overseas deployments and the shortages of personnel and equipment among the remaining Guard units. Moreover, to meet new threats, some homeland security missions could require training and equipment, such as decontamination training and equipment that differ from that needed to support warfighting missions. Some Guard officials noted that states have limited budgets and that homeland security requirements compete with other needs, although the states have funded some homeland security activities, such as guarding critical infrastructure, and have purchased some equipment for homeland security purposes.

To address some potential homeland security needs, DOD began establishing weapons of mass destruction civil support teams within the Army National Guard, as authorized by Presidential Directive and the Congress in fiscal year 1999. These teams, which are comprised of 22 full-time personnel, are maintained at high readiness levels and can respond rapidly to assist local officials in determining the nature of an attack, provide medical and technical advice, and help identify follow-on federal and state assets that might be needed. These teams are unique because they are federally funded and trained, but perform their missions under the command and control of the state governor. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the Louisiana civil support team provided command and control technology that was valuable in responding to this natural disaster.

Conclusions

While strategies such as transferring large numbers of Army National Guard personnel and equipment from non-deploying units to deploying units and leaving Guard equipment overseas have met DOD's immediate needs to support overseas operations, these strategies are not sustainable in the long term, especially as increasing numbers of Army National Guard personnel have already been deployed for as long as 2 years, recruiting challenges have arisen, and equipment challenges have increased. The current status of the Army's equipment inventory is one symptom of the much larger problem of an outdated business model. Critical shortages of deployable equipment and the Army's lack of accountability over the Army

National Guard's equipment retained overseas have created considerable uncertainty about what equipment the Guard will have available for training and domestic missions, and DOD has not developed detailed plans that include timeframes and identify resources for replacing equipment that has been heavily used or left overseas in the short term. Without replacement plans for equipment its units left overseas, Army National Guard units are unable to plan for training and equipping forces for future missions. Moreover, without a broader rethinking of the basis for Army National Guard equipment requirements that considers both overseas and homeland security requirements, preparedness will continue to decline and the Guard may not be well positioned to respond to future overseas or homeland missions or contingencies. As a result, we are recommending that DOD develop an equipping strategy that addresses how the Army National Guard will transition from short-term equipping measures to long-term solutions.

DOD and the Army are implementing some initiatives to transform the Army National Guard so that it can better support a broader range of missions in light of the new security environment characterized by new threats, including global terrorism. These initiatives include establishing modular brigades; establishing a rotational model that seeks to target equipment to a unit's expected mission; and clarifying the Guard's role, training, and equipment needs for homeland security missions. However, supporting ongoing operations will continue to strain Army National Guard equipment inventories, and, under current plans, equipping Guard units for new modular designs will take several years. Further, it is not clear that these initiatives will result in a comprehensive and integrated strategy for ensuring that the Army National Guard is well prepared for overseas missions, homeland security needs, and state missions such as responding to natural disasters. We are therefore making recommendations to better integrate its initiatives. In this regard, we believe that the Congress and senior DOD leadership must be ready to play a key role in pressing the Army to provide more detailed plans for these initiatives and outlining the specific funding required to implement them in the most efficient manner.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have.

GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments

For more information regarding this testimony, please contact Janet St. Laurent, Director, at (202) 512-4402. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Margaret Morgan, Assistant Director; Frank Cristinzio; Alissa Czyz; Curtis Groves; Nicole Harms; Tina Morgan Kirschbaum; Kim Mayo; Kenneth Patton; Jay Smale; and Suzanne Wren.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Secretary Hall.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS F. HALL

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, you will be happy to know that Mr. Walker just told me that we have outsourced all the grass cutting now. If you were still in, you wouldn't have to cut the grass around the club.

I deeply appreciate your support, and that of the committee, for the National Guard and Reserve forces. And on behalf of those men and women, I want to thank you for caring about them. They and their families certainly appreciate it. And my job, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is the overall supervision of all reserve components in the Department of Defense.

In that capacity, I make it a priority to visit with our reserve component members in the field. And during those visits, I see America's finest young men and women serving their Nation with pride and professionalism. They are performing in a superb fashion at home and around the world, and are closely interlocked with the States, cities, towns, and communities in America.

As you already know, there is increased stress on the force, and we are continuing to closely monitor the impact of that stress on our Guard and Reserve members, on their families, and their employers.

Since September 11, 2001, our Guard and Reserve have performed superbly in missions ranging from humanitarian assistance to high-intensity combat operations and State disaster assistance missions such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita—and we are preparing for Wilma.

These operations have presented a number of challenges; particularly for our ground forces, which carry the larger burden of our security and stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, the deployment burden is not shared equally among all the reserve components. It is concentrated on those specific capabilities and skills required for stabilization and security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

There are still high demands in theater for military police, civil affairs, military intelligence, and motor transport capabilities. Since certain of these skills reside predominantly in our reserve components, we have called upon many of our citizen soldiers to serve, and they have done so admirably.

Recognizing that the global war on terrorism will last for many years, the Department established a strategic approach to ensure the judicious and prudent use of Guard and reserve components in support of war efforts. Innovative changes to equipping policies and budgets have been made, and will continue.

This has involved evaluations of what equipment is currently on hand, and how to balance these requirements with the legacy equipment, modern equipment, and the available budget. In the short term, the Army resolved equipment shortages with cross-leveling of equipment among mobilized units, or having units fall in on stand-behind equipment. These actions have impacted equipment availability, training, reconstitution, and resetting of the re-

turn units' equipment, as well as affecting the available equipment inventory.

My staff remains engaged with the services, supporting their efforts to develop new approaches to mitigate the very complex equipping challenges.

I want to just close in saying that we must guard against overuse of our reserve components, through judicious and prudent use. We must encourage volunteerism. We must manage expectations through predictability and timeliness. We must continue to address family concerns. And finally, we must continue to encourage our employers at every turn.

A mission-ready National Guard and Reserve is a critical element of our national security strategy. The requirement for our reserve components has not and will not lessen. Our reserve components will continue with their expanded roles in all facets of the total force.

We cannot lose sight of the need to balance their commitment to country with their commitment to family and civilian employers.

The idea of operational reserve components is now a fact. That is why relieving the stress on the force is absolutely essential, rebalancing is so crucial, and ensuring that utilization not turn to over-utilization.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]

Statement Of

Honorable Thomas F. Hall
Assistant Secretary Of Defense For Reserve Affairs

Before the

House Committee on Government Reform

Hearing Subject:

"The Critical Role of the National Guard at Home and Abroad"

October 20, 2005
10:00 AM.
Room 2154 RHOB

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Davis, Ranking Member Waxman, and members of the Committee: thank you for the invitation to offer my perspective on the Critical Role of our National Guard to meet current and future operational requirements. I would like to provide information to assist you in making the critical and difficult decisions you face over the next several months. I appreciate the interest in our National Guard and Reserve Forces. On behalf of those men and women, I want to publicly thank you for your help in providing for our Reserve components. The Secretary and I are appreciative, and our military personnel certainly appreciate it, also.

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS' MISSION

The mission of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA), as stated in Title 10 USC, is the overall supervision of all Reserve components' affairs in the Department of Defense. I make it a priority to visit with our Reserve component members in the field, and during those visits I see America's finest young men and women serving their nation with pride and professionalism. Our Guard and Reserve men and women perform--in a superb fashion--vital national security functions at home and around the world, and are closely interlocked with the states, cities, towns, and communities in America. Throughout my travels, I have seen and listened to the men and women in our Guard and Reserve at hundreds of sites throughout the world. My staff and I have spent time with members of the Guard and Reserve, and we have listened carefully to their comments, concerns, and suggestions. As you already know, the stress on the force has

increased and we are continuing to closely monitor the impact of that stress on our Guard and Reserve members, on their families and their employers.

In the four years since September 11, 2001, our Reserve components have performed extremely well in missions ranging from humanitarian assistance to high intensity combat operations; and in the case of the National Guard, state disaster assistance missions such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. At the same time, these operations have presented a number of challenges, particularly for our ground forces, which carry the larger burden of our security and stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The continuing challenge is to sustain our military forces for the current operations while meeting our worldwide commitments.

Currently, the deployment burden is not shared equally among all the Reserve components; it is concentrated on those specific capabilities and skills required for stabilization and security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, there are high demands in-theater for military police, civil affairs, military intelligence, and motor transport capabilities. In the Army, large portions of these units have been recently deployed, are currently deployed, or are scheduled to deploy. Since certain of these skills reside predominantly in our Reserve components, we have called upon many of our citizen soldiers to serve, and they have done so admirably.

PURPOSE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

The purpose of the Reserve components has changed. They are no longer a strategic reserve—a force to be held in reserve to be used only in the event of a major war. They are an operational reserve that supports day-to-day defense requirements. In fact, they have been an operational reserve ever since we called them up for Operation Desert Shield.

RESERVE COMPONENT MISSIONS TODAY

The Reserve components have performed a variety of non-traditional missions in support of the Global War on Terrorism. One such mission is training the Iraqi Security Forces and the Afghan National Army. The Reserve components are now providing command and control, transition, and advisory teams in support of the training that will allow Iraqi and Afghan forces to assume a greater role in securing their own countries.

In addition, the Reserve components support missions in the Balkans, at Guantanamo, in the Sinai, and are found integrated with our active forces throughout the world.

By far the most demanding operations are Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Reserve components currently furnish 30% of the troops in theater. The Reserve components will remain an integral player in Homeland Defense, in Operation Noble Eagle, and the National Guard will remain a dual-missioned force under both titles 10 and 32.

POLICIES

Recognizing that the Global War on Terrorism will last for many years, the Department established a strategic approach to ensure the judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components in support of the war effort. The personnel policy guidance published in September 2001 established the guidelines for using the National Guard and Reserve to support combatant commander requirements. This policy guidance specified that:

- No member of a Reserve component called to involuntary active duty under the current partial mobilization authority shall serve on active duty in excess of 24 cumulative months

- Reserve members may serve voluntarily for longer periods of time in accordance with Service policies
- Service Secretaries may release individuals prior to the completion of the period of service for which ordered based on operational requirements.

In July 2002, the personnel policy guidance was expanded to require proactive management of Guard and Reserve members, particularly focusing on husbanding Reserve component resources, being sensitive to the quality of life of mobilized personnel, and the impact on civilian employers of reservists. This policy guidance contained four key elements:

1. It reemphasized the maximum period of mobilization.
2. It reminded the Services of the requirement to achieve equitable treatment, to the extent possible, among members in the Ready Reserve who are being considered for mobilization—considering the length and nature of previous service, family responsibilities, and civilian employment.
3. It required management of individual expectations, considering morale and retention, by ensuring:
   - Reserve Component members are performing essential and meaningful tasks
   - Reservists are provided as much predictability as possible
   - Orders are issued in a timely manner, with a goal of 30 days minimum prior to deployment (Today, early notifications are the norm, not the exception)

- Reservists are provided as much of a "break" as possible before involuntarily recalling the members a second or subsequent time, with a goal of providing a break of at least 24 months.

4. It required tailoring mobilization and demobilization decisions by using both Selected Reserve units and individuals--as well as volunteers--before involuntarily calling members of the Individual Ready Reserve, unless precluded because of critical mission requirements; and maximizing the use of long-term volunteers when possible to meet individual augmentation requirements.

In his July 9, 2003 *Rebalancing Forces* memo, the Secretary of Defense reiterated the need to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve Components through a series of force rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain on the force. As part of this effort, he directed the Military Departments to structure the active and reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilizations during the first 15 days of a rapid response operation, and to plan involuntary mobilizations, when feasible, to not more than one year in every six years. This "one-in-six" construct is a planning factor only and should be viewed as such.

It is within this framework that we are managing the Reserve components. We will continue to assess the impact mobilization and deployments have on Guard and Reserve members and adjust our policies as needed to sustain the Reserve components.

STRESS ON THE FORCE

Discussion about the stress that the Global War on Terrorism is placing on the force—both active and reserve has occurred and continues. From my perspective, the

dominant question is: What level of utilization can the Guard and Reserve sustain while still maintaining a viable Reserve force?

Answering this question involves a number of issues. But first it is necessary to quantify how much of the Reserve force we have used as of August 2005 to support the Global War on Terrorism. Then I will describe the effect that our rate of utilization is having on the Reserve force.

The overwhelming majority of Guard and Reserve members want to serve, and they want to be part of the victory in the War on Terrorism. That is why they joined the Guard or Reserve and that is why they serve this nation. But we must also be mindful of the reserve service commitment, which includes drills, annual training, and the requirement to serve on active duty when called. We must do everything we can to provide reasonable service requirements within the context of that commitment by using the reserve force wisely. Also, the additional responsibilities that National Guard members bear to their respective state or territory were very evident in the recent Gulf Coast disaster.

Reserve Utilization to Date

There are two ways to look at rates of mobilization for the Guard and Reserve. The first is to look at all Reserve component members who have served since September 11, 2001—the cumulative approach.

Under the cumulative approach, a total of 455,000 Guard and Reserve members have been mobilized between September 11, 2001, and August 31, 2005. That represents about 38 percent of the 1,195,690 members who have served in the Selected Reserve during this

period. Of the total number of Guard and Reserve members who have been activated under the current partial mobilization authority, 76,561 (or 6.4 percent of all members who have served in the Selected Reserve force since September 11, 2001) have been mobilized more than once. Of the 76,561, a total of 61,445 (5.1 percent) have been mobilized twice, 11,043 (less than one percent) have been mobilized three times and just 4,073 (three tenths of one percent) have been mobilized more than three times. Most multiple call-ups involve volunteers, to the best of our knowledge. No reservist has been involuntarily mobilized for more than 24 cumulative months.

The other way to look at mobilization is in terms of today's force—those who are currently serving. Looking at today's force of 829,016 Selected Reserve members currently serving as of August 2005, we have mobilized 374,165 Reserve component members, or 45 percent of the force.

Effects of Reserve Utilization

The Department has monitored the effects of reserve utilization and stress on the force since 1996. The key factors we track are (1) end strength attainment; (2) recruiting results; (3) retention; (4) attrition; and (5) employer/reservist relations.

End Strength Attainment: From fiscal year 2000 (just before we entered the Global War on Terrorism) through 2003, the Reserve components in the aggregate were at or slightly above 100 percent of their authorized end strength. However, in fiscal year 2004 the Reserve components in the aggregate were slightly below their authorized end strength achieving 98.4 percent. Preliminary data indicates that, in the aggregate

for fiscal year 2005, the Reserve components will achieve approximately 95 percent of their authorized levels, with the most significant shortages in the Army Reserve components and the Navy Reserve. The actual end strengths for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005 are: ARNG – 333,177, USAR – 189,005, USNR – 76,473, USMCR – 39,938, ANG – 106,430, USAFR – 75,802, USCGR – 8,088

Recruiting Results: In a very challenging recruiting environment, the DoD Reserve components achieved 96% of their fiscal year 2004 recruiting objectives. Fiscal year 2005 continued to present those recruiting challenges — particularly in the Army Reserve components. Overall, the DoD Reserve components achieved 85.5% of their fiscal year 2005 recruiting objectives. Two of the six DoD Reserve components will achieve, or exceed, their recruiting objectives the Marine Corps Reserve and the Air Force Reserve. The Army National Guard fell short by 12,783 (achieving 80 percent of its recruiting objective); the Army Reserve fell short by 4,626 (achieving 84 percent of its recruiting objective); the Navy Reserve fell short by 1,353 (achieving 88 percent of its recruiting objective); and, the Air National Guard fell short by 1,413 (achieving 86 percent of its objective). It should be noted that the Navy Reserve under executed its recruiting mission in anticipation of a reduction in end strength programmed for fiscal year 2006, and the Air National guard limited new accessions because attrition was lower than expected enabling the Air National Guard to meet its end strength. The outlook for fiscal year 2006 is that it will be another challenging year for reserve recruiting—particularly in the Army Reserve components.

Attrition: Measuring all losses, regardless of reason, from the Reserve components, we saw enlisted attrition remain below established ceilings in fiscal year 2004, and that trend continued in fiscal year 2005. All components are currently, and are projected to finish the year, near or below their established enlisted attrition ceilings. These attrition rates remain near historically low levels. FY 2005 enlisted attrition rates are generally slightly lower than the base comparison year of FY 2000 (before the current partial mobilization) – but slightly higher than last year FY 2004. Officer attrition rates generally follow the same trends as the enlisted force, but at lower levels.

(The Navy Reserve is two percent above its historical attrition rate thus far, but this is the direct result of programmed end strength reduction.)

Retention: The requirements to support the Global War on Terrorism—particularly our commitment in Iraq—have clearly placed a strain on the Reserve force. Nonetheless, measuring those who reenlist at the completion of their current contract, we find that reenlistments were slightly higher (by about 4,000) in fiscal year 2004 than they were in fiscal year 2003, up from 94.5% of goal in FY03 to 95.5% of goal in FY04. This is a very positive trend and appears to be holding for fiscal year 2005. We are closely monitoring retention, particularly for those members who have been mobilized and deployed to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Employer/Reservist Relations: The number of complaints filed with the Department of Labor under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act declined each year from 1995 through 2000. Complaints filed during the first four

years of the Global War on Terrorism have increased, but the ratio of complaints to the total number of duty days of operational support provided actually declined. I've devoted more to this subject later in my statement. (Effect on Employers)

Mitigation Strategies

The department has employed several strategies to help reduce the stress on the force. The first, and one of the most important, is to ease the burden on some high demand, low density units and skills. We have employed innovative joint concepts to spread mission requirements across the entire Reserve force. For example, using joint sourcing, we will have Navy and Air Force solutions to relieve stress on the Army and Marine Corps, such as truck drivers, engineers, and supporting detainee operations.

Second, and also an important strategy is to rebalance the force. The old force was designed in response to Cold War threats. The purpose of rebalancing is to fashion the force to be responsive, producing the capabilities we need today. Rebalancing improves responsiveness and eases stress on units and individuals by building up capabilities in high demand units and skills. This is accomplished by converting capabilities in both the Active and Reserve components that are in lesser demand, changing lower priority structure to higher priority structure, which will result in a new Active component/Reserve component mix. As outlined in the January 15, 2004 report *Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve*, the rebalancing effort also seeks to limit involuntary mobilizations to reasonable and sustainable rates. The force structure planning metric was to limit the involuntary mobilization of individual reservists to one year out of every six.

The Services are improving their posture with respect to Active component/Reserve component mix by rebalancing about 70,000 spaces between fiscal years 2003 and 2005. The Services have planned and programmed additional rebalancing initiatives for FY 2006 through 2011. The amount and type of rebalancing varies by Service. By 2011, we expect to have rebalanced over 100,000 spaces. Easing stress on the force through rebalancing includes more than just military-to-military conversions.

A third initiative is the conversion of military spaces to Department of Defense civilian positions or contractors. The purpose of this initiative is to move military out of activities not "military essential." The military resources gained through this initiative are being converted to high demand/low density units and stressed career fields, which reduces stress on the force. All the services have an aggressive program to convert military to civilian over the next few years. We converted over 7,600 military spaces to civilian manning in FY 2004, converted over 16,000 additional in FY 2005, and plan to accomplish more in FY06 through FY11.

Fourth, the application of technology is also being used to offset requirements for military force structure, making more military spaces available to ease the stress in high demand areas. We plan to continue to leverage technological applications to further those offsets.

A fifth area involves innovative force management approaches under our continuum of service construct. This approach maximizes the use of volunteers, military retirees, and

provides greater opportunities for reservists who are able to contribute more to do so, and offers innovative accession and affiliation programs to meet specialized skill requirements.

Under the old rules, constraints in end strength and grade accounting hindered the use of reserve volunteers. Because reservists were counted as active duty end strength and were required to compete for promotion against active duty personnel, reservists were reluctant to volunteer for extended periods of active duty. We are extremely grateful to Congress for removing these barriers with a new strength accounting category that was included in last year's defense authorization act for reservists performing operational support.

I want to take this opportunity to personally thank the Congress for its support of our continuum of service initiatives. These policies and initiatives were developed to preserve the nature of the "citizen soldier" while still allowing us to meet operational requirements. Predictability and reasonable limits on frequency and duration of mobilization are key elements of our policies, which are designed to not only support reservists, but also sustain the support of employers and families, and ultimately enable the components to meet recruitment and retention objectives. Similarly, the emphasis on volunteerism is designed to allow service members who want to shoulder a greater burden of mobilization to do so.

Adhering to these policy guidelines and program changes will allow the Reserve components to sustain a utilization rate not to exceed 17 percent per year in the near future. Our planning factors limit the mobilization period and limit the frequency with which Reserve component members may be mobilized (e.g., to no more than one year in every six years). The Department must also complete its rebalancing effort. This will provide

reservists with reasonable tour lengths and give reservists, their families, and their employers a reasonable expectation of the reserve service requirements. With these parameters, we can sustain a viable reserve force and preserve the citizen-soldier.

Meeting Future Requirements

The Army's initiative to create provisional units—drawing upon underutilized skills to meet current mission requirements—and the DoD initiative to draw from skill sets in other components and services—the joint solution—are the near-term strategies being employed today. We will continue to maximize the use of volunteers when possible. Retiree and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members provide a source of volunteers. While volunteers from members of the Selected Reserve are also an option, consideration must be given to pending unit deployments and the need for unit cohesion.

Compared to Operation Desert Storm, when we mobilized 30,000 IRR members, we have not used the Individual Ready Reserve to that extent to support the Global War on Terrorism. In the past four years, we have mobilized 9,956 IRR members. The further utilization of the IRR remains a viable option for meeting both near-term and long-term commitments.

We must also establish the proper expectations for our Reserve component members, their families, their employers, and the public in general. We are undertaking a program to establish those expectations: reasonable service requirements for the 21st century based on the frequency and duration of military duty, and predictability to the greatest extent possible.

For the long term, we will continue to pursue these transformation strategies energetically. Rebalancing the force will continue, as will the conversion of military to civilian positions. The Army's transformation to a modularized structure will significantly help relieve stress on the force.

Specific examples of rebalancing include:

- Forming 18 provisional Military Police companies from Artillery Units
- Converting underused force structure to Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Chemical, Special Operating Forces, and intelligence
- Transitioning Reserve Naval Coastal Warfare squadrons to the active component.

The overall objective is to have a flexible force capable of meeting diverse mission requirements.

NATIONAL GUARD UTILIZATION

As evidenced by the three devastating hurricanes that hit Florida or the wildfires that blazed through our western states during 2004, or more recently Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which devastated the Gulf Coast states; the National Guard is a crucial element in a Governor's response to natural disasters. Similarly, the National Guard will play a prominent role in supporting local and state authorities in their efforts to manage the consequences of a domestic terrorist attack.

An important part of this effort is the fielding of Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD CSTs). These teams are to support our nation's local first responders as the initial state response in dealing with domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high yield explosives (CBRNE) by identifying the agents/substances, assessing

current and projected consequences, advising on response measures and assisting with appropriate requests for additional state support. Each team is comprised of 22 highly-skilled, full-time, and well equipped Army and Air National Guardsmen. To date, the Secretary of Defense has certified 32 teams as being operationally ready.

The fight against terrorism and the protection of our homeland will be protracted endeavors. To that end, many outside policy experts, independent panels, and analytic studies have advocated expanded roles for the National Guard in homeland security. Some have even suggested that the National Guard should be reoriented, reequipped, and retrained solely for the homeland security mission.

However, there has been no national strategy change to justify the need to establish a separate role for the National Guard, under which it only performs homeland security related missions under new statutes or administrative guidelines. There are already sufficient legal mechanisms in place that enable state and territorial governors to employ their National Guard forces in support of local authorities to meet a wide range of these existing missions. The National Guard is an integral part of the Air Force and Army total force mission capability. Their roles are vital to the survival of the nation. Therefore, we believe the National Guard should remain a dual-missioned military force.

EFFECT ON RECRUITING AND RETENTION

The high usage of the Reserve component force has been characterized as having a negative effect on Reserve component recruiting and retention. Empirical and anecdotal data do support the conclusion that the extremely high usage rates will have some negative effects. But, those same data also show that low levels of usage have negative effects, too.

Our Reserve component members are willing to serve when called. Also, recent analysis indicates that retention is high among Reserve component members whose service and mobilization experiences match their expectations. Our job is to ensure that we continue to use them prudently and judiciously. To that end, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is reviewing many facets of the Reserve components. We should be able to utilize the myriad of those findings to good advantage

However, as I indicated earlier, this has been a very challenging year for recruiting in the Reserve components. The Department is reviewing possible amendments to various statutory authorities that could enhance recruiting results. One area in particular where we are focusing our attention is in attracting service members who have separated from the Regular forces but still have a military service obligation. The temporary increase in the Reserve Affiliation bonus authorized by the congress in the supplemental appropriation is helping us attract more prior service members to serve in the Guard and Reserve. Also, the newly established Commission on the National Guard and Reserves will review personnel pay and other forms of compensation as well as other personnel benefits. Finally, the Advisory Committee on Military Compensation is looking at incentive structures and may make suggestions for improvements that the committee believes will assist the department in meeting recruiting and retention objectives.

We are working closely with these entities as they assess the compensation and benefits package needed to sustain a healthy National Guard and Reserve.

EFFECT ON FAMILIES

In one of his speeches, President Bush stated, "The time of war is a time of sacrifice, especially for our military families." This administration is sensitive to the hardships and challenges faced by Reserve component families, especially when the Reserve component member is called up and away from home for an extended period of time. All families play a critical role in retention and reenlistment decisions.

We have taken an aggressive, total force approach to supporting military families. We recognize that many families of National Guard and Reserve members do not live close to a military installation where many of the traditional family support activities are located. To address this issue, over 700 family support centers have been established around the country. In fact, the National Guard alone has over 400 family support centers. These family support centers are not component or service specific, but they are available to the family of any service member, regardless of component or service.

The Department has implemented a 24-hour/7 day a week toll-free family assistance service—Military OneSource. The support provided through this service is particularly important for young families or families of reservists who are not familiar with military service. Military OneSource can assist with referrals for every day problems such as child care and how to obtain health care.

We are also maximizing the use of technology—using the worldwide web to provide information that will help families cope with the mobilization and deployment of their spouse, son, daughter, brother, sister, relative or friend. The Reserve Affairs website includes a "Guide to Reserve Family Member Benefits," which is designed to inform family

members about military benefits and entitlements, and a "Family Readiness Tool Kit," which provides information to assist commanders, service members, family members and family program managers in preparing Guard and Reserve members and their families for mobilization, deployment, redeployment/demobilization and family reunions.

RESERVE COMPONENT HEALTH BENEFIT ENHANCEMENTS

The Department has implemented recent benefit enhancements for Reserve component members and their families authorized by Congress last year. Over the last two years Congress has authorized dramatic improvements in health benefits for Reserve component members and their families. Earlier TRICARE eligibility (up to 90 days prior to activation) for certain Reserve component members and the extension of post-mobilization health coverage for 180 days was made permanent.

In April 2005 the Department implemented the premium-based "TRICARE Reserve Select" program. This benefit is available to Reserve component members who have served on active duty in support of contingency operations on or after September 11, 2001, and commit to continued service in the Selected Reserve. As of September 2005, just under 12,200 Guard and Reserve members have taken steps to enroll in this new benefit.

Taking care of our servicemembers who have been wounded in combat or may experience adverse psychological effects of armed conflict is one of our highest priorities. To complement and augment service programs such as the Army's Disabled Soldiers Support System (DS3), and the Marine Corps' Marine for Life (M4L), OSD has opened the Military Severely Injured Joint Support Center. This center is a 24/7 operation to serve as a

safety net for any service member or family member who has a question or is experiencing a problem.

EFFECT ON EMPLOYERS

The mission of the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) is directly related to retention of the Guard and Reserve force. ESGR's mission is to "gain and maintain active support from all public and private employers for the men and women of the National Guard and Reserve as defined by demonstrated employer commitment to employee military service." Employer support for employee service in the National Guard and Reserve is an area of emphasis given the continuing demand the Global War on Terrorism has placed on the nation's Reserve components and the employers who share this precious manpower resource. I should state up front that the broad-based, nationwide support for our troops by employers has been and continues to be superb. In fact, we just honored 15 outstanding employers at our annual "Patriot Awards Banquet' last Saturday night, October the 15th. We truly owe all of our employers a debt of gratitude.

We respond to all inquiries we receive from an employer, family member, or individual Guardsmen or Reservist. The number of inquiries to the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) is in decline. ESGR is the Department of Defense's employer outreach agency whose mission is to gain and maintain support from all public and private employers for the men and women of the National Guard and Reserve. Through its locally based network of volunteers and its full time National Staff, it reaches out to both employers and service members to help ensure the requirements of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) , 38 U.S.C., sections 4301-4334)

are understood and applied. Service members and employers may resolve USERRA conflicts by utilizing the free mediation and ombudsman services provided by this organization. Since July 2004, ESGR shows a continuing decline in the number of cases opened (from 750 per month in July 2004 to approximately 250 per month in July 2005).

Service members may also seek resolution of USERRA concerns by asking the Department of Labor Veterans Employment and Training Service (VETS) to provide technical assistance or by filing a formal complaint with VETS and invoking the formal investigative process. VETS projects that it will receive about 13% fewer USERRA complaints in FY 2006 than it did last year due largely to increased outreach efforts. (In FY 2004, there were 1,465 USERRA complaints submitted; in FY 2005, there were 1,300 complaints).

There have been 30% fewer employment-related complaints, per capita, since September 11, 2001, than were received during the last comparable mobilization in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, again primarily due to the aggressive outreach efforts and collaboration of VETS and ESGR.

One can grasp a sense of the enormous challenge facing ESGR by considering the following aggregate numbers, which helps one to understand a dynamic and complex human resource environment. There are 7.4 million employers identified by the U.S. Census Bureau. These employers, from the senior leadership, to the human resource managers, and down to the supervisors, must understand, observe, and apply the tenets of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). Toward

that end, ESGR has established a Customer Service Center hotline to provide information, assistance and to gather data on issues related to Reserve component service. We established the Civilian Employment Information (CEI) database requiring Reserve component members to register their employers. These databases enable ESGR to measure and manage employment issues much more effectively, and will be used by the Department to develop policies and practices that will help mitigate the impact on employers when a reservist employee is called to military duty.

Misunderstandings between employers and Reserve component members do arise. ESGR ombudsmen provide "third-party assistance" and informal mediation services between employers and Reserve component members. Ombudsmen provide assistance in the resolution of employment conflicts that can result from military service. ESGR has an initiative to train volunteers in mediation techniques to provide more effective service.

Other major initiatives by the ESGR National Staff include:

- Establishing a Defense Advisory Board (DAB) for Employer Support (comprised of senior leaders from the entire spectrum of the employer community) to provide advice on issues critical to shared human capital
- Employing information technology systems to create ESGR volunteer manpower efficiencies
- Initiating a scientific survey of employer attitudes in cooperation with the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences
- Enhancing strategic relationships with employer organizations such as the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, National Federation of Independent Business, Society for Human Resource Management, and professional associations

- Implementing a follow-up process to promote the mission of "gain and maintain" employer support by encouraging employers to sign a statement of support, review their human resource policies, train managers and supervisors, adopt "over and above" policies, and to become advocates
- Building on marketing successes achieved in the Civic National Employer Outreach program, involved nine governors, two senators, 19 mayors, 17 Adjutants General which exposed ESGR to well over 25,000 employers
- Gaining significant national exposure in traditional and new media with the singular focus of defining the American employers' role in national security

EQUIPMENT READINESS

Equipment Readiness

The Reserve components are transitioning to an operational reserve—a force supporting day-to-day operational missions and equally prepared to conduct their wartime mission. This transition stands in stark contrast to the Cold War "First to Fight" or a "Force in Reserve" these doctrines affected readiness levels both equipment and personnel. As a result, the Department is assisting the Services in adjusting their force structure through transformation initiatives with a goal to ensure the acquisition of interoperable equipment to meet joint training and operational mission requirements; a prerequisite for a seamlessly integrated Total Force.

Historically, the Reserve components have been resourced with an annual procurement budget averaging $2.3 billion, equating to 3% of the total defense procurement budget supporting 45% of the Total Force. The Reserve components have been budgeted about $2.5 billion in FY 2006 for equipment procurement to reduce current shortfalls and replace older equipment with more modern and capable models. The Army's reserve

components have been resourced at approximately 70% of the equipment requirement with legacy equipment accounting for 30% percent of equipment on hand. The Army has programmed $48 billion for the Army's modularity initiative with $15.6 billion for the ARNG and $2.2 billion for the USAR across the FYDP.

Having said this, the Department and the Services have made an effort to balance the new requirements for the operational reserve transition requirements and the Global War on Terrorism and Home Land Defense concerns. They have reviewed and made some innovative changes to their equipping policies and budgets. This has involved evaluations of what equipment is currently on hand and how to balance these requirements with the legacy equipment, modern equipment, and the available budget.

In the short term, the Services' immediate requirements have been resolved with cross leveling of equipment among units for mobilization or having units fall on the equipment remaining in theater as Stay Behind Equipment (SBE). These equipping actions have an equipment availability and training impact on the units remaining or returning to their home station. The timeframe for the reconstitution and resetting of returning unit's equipment has also affected the available equipment inventory.

As a long term goal, given the limited budgets and expanding requirements, the Services' have developed innovative equipping strategies to meet these challenges. Some of these strategies include initiatives like our AC/RC rebalancing, the Services development of blended or augment units to share modern equipment with the Active components, the Air Force's Future Total Force and the Army's Modularity plan.

The Army has developed a dynamic transformation strategy that includes Active and Reserve component's requirements with its Modularity initiative. It establishes a means of providing force elements that are interchangeable, expandable, and tailorable to meet the changing needs of the Army. This initiative along with the GWOT requirements has also resulted in the Army's development of a new equipping strategy that guarantees mobilized units to be equipped at 100% and non-mobilized Army Reserve and Army Guard units to be equipped with training sets, and identified ARNG units to meet the Home Land Defense requirements at higher equipping rates. This strategy is a unit rotation model called the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN). It spreads the operational tempo across the force and adds predictability for Soldiers, families and employers. As a managed, cyclical process, ARFORGEN consists of progressive and sequential levels of increasing readiness from reset/train, to a ready force available to deploy. While the optimal rotation rates of AC and RC forces will differ (AC=1 deployment in 3 years, USAR = 1 deployment in 5 years and ARNG = 1 deployment in 6 years), the necessary planning, resourcing, and training validation process will be synchronized so that the Army can generate ready forces from both components to achieve a steady state deployment capability.

We are excited about the future. The Department is focused on the Reserve component efforts to integrate into a cohesive total force with the Active Component. This will result in a total force capable of meeting all requirements through a combination of equipment redistribution from the Active component, new procurements, and sustained maintenance.

EFFECT ON TOTAL FORCE

To further that cohesive total force, The Department is partnering with the Reserve Forces Policy Board to host a conference in November entitled "The New Reserves: Strategic in Peace, Operational in War." The objective is to present evidence and establish facts regarding Reserve force utilization and personnel management in view of expanded use and anticipated future demands for their use. We expect to generate wide interest throughout DoD, the congressional staff, and military associations.

LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS

While too early to list FY06 legislation, last year's legislative efforts are extremely helpful in managing the Reserve components. Most notable was the ability to allow members to be on active duty without the "179-day rule" detracting from mission completion.

Also, the increased bonus and incentive programs will make a difference for the Reserve components in meeting recruiting and retention goals in a very challenging environment. The services are implementing the enhancements to the reserve enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, which doubled and in some cases tripled the authorized bonus amount and the new reserve officer accession/affiliation bonus. These changes have aided our efforts greatly and will have far-reaching effects on our ability to recruit and retain members.

The improved involuntary access to Reserve component members for enhanced training will enable us to "Train-Mobilize-Deploy." This change provides commanders added flexibility to train for non-traditional emergent missions. It should also decrease the

duration of operational mobilizations. The Department's goal for Mobilization for Training is to ensure judicious and prudent use of Reserve component forces and we await the Services mobilization for training concepts.

As I mentioned earlier, we now have a very supportive set of medical benefits.

CONCLUSION

In summary, we must guard against overuse of our reserve components through judicious and prudent use; encourage volunteerism; manage expectations through predictability and timeliness; continue to address family concerns; and finally continue to encourage our employers at every turn. A mission-ready National Guard and Reserve is a critical element of our National Security Strategy. The requirement for our Reserve components has not, and will not lessen. Our Reserve components will continue with their expanded roles in all facets of the Total Force.

We cannot lose sight of the need to balance their commitment to country with their commitment to family and civilian employers. The idea of "Operational Reserve Components" is now fact. That is why relieving stress on the force is absolutely essential, rebalancing is so crucial, and ensuring that utilization not turn into over-utilization so critical.

Thank you very much for this opportunity to testify on behalf of the greatest Guard and Reserve force this nation, and the world, has ever known.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

General Melcher, welcome.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID F. MELCHER

General MELCHER. Chairman Davis, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am privileged to be here with the committee and this esteemed panel.

We on the Army staff share with this committee and all represented here a common goal to see that our dedicated Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve soldiers have the right equipment for the missions we have asked them to perform for the Nation.

As the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, G–8, I am responsible to the Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army for materiel integration and resourcing. This includes the fielding of equipment according to our national strategy and departmental priorities to Army units within all components of our service—active, Reserve, and National Guard.

I work closely with the Director, Army National Guard, and the Chief, Army Reserve, to ensure that our reserve component soldiers are equipped and resourced properly, according to their mission. This includes everything from major weapons platforms to the soldiers' individual equipment.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your acknowledgement of our written statements and entering them into the record.

Our overall equipping posture is showing great progress, thanks to the steadfast support the Army has enjoyed from Congress and the Department of Defense. However, we acknowledge that significant challenges remain, as reflected in reports from the Government Accountability Office; particularly with respect to equipping the Army National Guard while at war. I am confident, though, that by working together, we will overcome the difficulties noted.

These equipping challenges are exactly the reason why the Army is transforming to a modular force, and why we are moving to a force rotation model called the "Army Force Generation Model," or ARFORGEN. The modular force initiative and the ARFORGEN model fully integrate the Army National Guard, Reserve, and active Army. We are moving from a cold war approach, in which the Army National Guard was the strategic reserve, to a modular force construct that counts on the Guard and Reserve as operational assets.

That means we also look at the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve as full partners in the requirements, resourcing, and fielding processes. The Army plans to invest approximately $21 billion on equipping and modernizing the Army National Guard during fiscal years 2005 through 2011. This compares to only $5.6 billion just 2 short years ago. This investment will provide the Army National Guard with equipment essential to both its wartime and homeland defense missions.

We are also conducting a comprehensive review with the Army National Guard to determine what items of equipment needed for major combat operations also have the greatest use for homeland defense missions. Thus far, the list has been refined to 342 items, such as communications equipment, including radios that can com-

municate with both military and civilian first responders; transportation equipment, including cargo, fuel, and water dispensing trucks; engineering equipment, including the tractors and trailers for transporting this equipment; chemical, biological, and radiological detection, contamination, and protection equipment; aviation equipment, including support equipment essential to keep the aircraft flying; medical equipment, including dental, medical, and veterinary functions; and logistics equipment, including cranes and forklifts, mobile containerized kitchens, and so forth.

In collaboration with the National Guard Bureau, we have determined the times and quantities of equipment we need to provide the Army National Guard so it can perform its missions for both homeland defense and wartime.

The Army has done a great deal to close the equipment gap for all three components, but we must continue to focus in the areas of tactical wheeled vehicles, aircraft, night vision devices, and force protection equipment, as we build this next program for the period 2008 to 2013.

As we build the program, we are committed to working very closely with the National Guard Bureau and the Army National Guard, to ensure they are appropriately funded and equipped.

On behalf of our outstanding soldiers and civilian employees who are serving around the world, I thank you for your support. Many in this committee, including yourself, sir, have traveled to Afghanistan or Iraq and seen firsthand our soldiers sacrifice for the Nation. Nothing we do is more urgent or pressing than ensuring that they have the best equipment.

I look forward to answering the committee's questions today. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Melcher follows:]

STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID F. MELCHER
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-8, UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

ON THE CRITICAL ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AT HOME AND ABROAD

FIRST SESSION, 109TH CONGRESS

OCTOBER 20TH, 2005

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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

Chairman Davis, Ranking Member Waxman, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. We on the Army Staff share a common goal with the members of this Committee to see that our magnificent Army National Guard Soldiers have the right equipment at the right place at the right time. These Citizen-Soldiers play a critical role as warfighters abroad defending our Nation, and as the military first-responder at home when disaster strikes. The Army leadership recognizes this dual role as central to the National Guard's place in our Army. The Guard comprises about one third of our total force and National Guard Soldiers in their local communities form the Army's strongest, most direct link to the American people. The Guard's expertise, versatility, and connectedness make it a force of choice in almost any situation where the Nation calls on its military Services. The Army has a vital interest in ensuring that the National Guard is equipped to the same level as active component units.

Throughout our history, the Guard has been there whenever and wherever called. Within hours after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Guard had Soldiers on duty—over 3,000 within three days and over 5,000 within ten days. These Soldiers provided immediate security at nuclear power plants (supporting the Department of Energy), domestic water supplies, bridges, tunnels, border security sites (supporting the Treasury and Customs Service Departments), and military bases across the nation. Since September 11, 2001, over 206,500 Army National Guard Soldiers have answered the call, serving over 246,500 tours of duty, defending the homeland and fighting the global war on terror abroad. They have always been there for us, and we are here for them.

I will explain briefly how we arrived at the current situation, in terms of equipping the force, and how we are working to carry out an equipping strategy that fulfills the requirements of the Army's total force, to include the Army National Guard, in support of the National Military Strategy. That equipping strategy is showing tremendous progress, which has only been made possible by the steadfast support the Army has enjoyed from Congress and the Department of Defense. We are grateful for your support when the needs of the Army come

before Congress. We are also grateful to those excellent citizens across our Nation who employ reserve component Soldiers in their businesses—who willingly share the additional cost of defending freedom when their most valuable employees must answer the call to duty, and who welcome them home after the battle.

As the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, I am responsible to the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army for materiel integration and resourcing, which includes the fielding of equipment to Army units within all components of our Service, Active, Reserve, and National Guard. I work closely with the Director of the Army National Guard, Lieutenant General Clyde Vaughn, and with the Chief, Army Reserve, Lieutenant General James Helmly, to ensure that our reserve component Soldiers are equipped and resourced properly according to their mission. I am also responsible for analysis and development of the Army's Program as part of the Future Years Defense Plan.

In the Cold War era, the reserve component was held in strategic reserve to face the Soviet threat. However, this policy does not serve us well in the present security environment, either for projecting forces overseas or defending the homeland. Today's security environment demands highly responsive forces that are flexible enough to be employed across the full spectrum of conflict from humanitarian relief to major combat operations. In the Army's plan for modular forces, the Army National Guard is modernizing as an integral part of the Army along with the active component force, not as an adjunct or a collateral effort. Today, it is critical that our reserve component employs as part of the operational force.

We have learned from past experience that units held in strategic reserve only for a major mobilization suffer from equipping shortfalls, stemming from lower prioritization. However, as an operational force, when reserve component units are subject to imminent call-up for both overseas and domestic employment, the outcome is a more effective and ready force, and a better equipped force. This is precisely what the Army's conversion to modular forces prescribes. Our reservists play a dynamic role in defending the Nation, and the

American people connect with the Nation's defense effort through their local Guard and Reserve Soldiers. I am proud to say that our Guard and Reserve Soldiers are answering the call to duty today in the very highest traditions of the American Citizen-Soldier.

The concerns raised in the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, *Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives*, dated October 2005, and *Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions*, dated November 2004, reflect certain conditions that are legacies of the post-Cold War and pre-September 11th status quo. The November 2004 report states that, "...the Army National Guard is still resourced according to a post-cold war military planning strategy that provides it only a portion of the resources needed to perform warfighting missions." While significant progress has been made since September 11th towards rectifying this outdated resourcing strategy and procuring the necessary equipment to support the Guard's homeland defense capabilities, more work remains to be done.

Several factors have contributed to the continuing challenge of equipping the Army National Guard for its homeland and state missions. First, the legacy of the Cold War-era tiered resourcing strategy is a reserve component that has a low equipping posture in terms of quantity and modernization. Second, due to the urgent necessities of fighting and winning the Global War on Terrorism, the top priority of the Army has been to fully equip deploying units to ensure that they go into theater with the best equipment and protection possible. This at times requires that units leave certain equipment in theater upon returning to the United States. In addition, significantly higher usage rates for equipment in theater reduce the service life of equipment about five times faster than during normal training operations. Finally, when units return, some equipment must be repaired and overhauled before it can be available again for homeland missions.

The Army is taking prompt near-term measures and instituting far reaching systemic changes to address these challenges for today's force and the future force.

In the 1990s, the Army leadership began implementing systemic changes away from the Cold-War model of mobilization and employment for forces by developing deployable expeditionary forces. The security environment and National priorities indicated a level of defense spending that would not support thorough or rapid transformation. The Army's average annual budgets of that era were about the same as the Army's share of the supplemental funding we have received in these recent war years. Even so, the Army assumed risk in 1999 by embarking on a comprehensive transformation process in order to provide capable and responsive land forces to our Combatant Commanders. This meant filling an immediate capability gap by fielding a more rapidly deployable force based on existing armored and tactical wheeled vehicles in a revised organizational structure we now call Stryker Brigades. A year ago this month, at Fort Indiantown Gap, we celebrated the activation of our sixth Stryker Brigade—the 56th Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard. Having a Stryker Brigade in the National Guard is consistent with the Army's commitment to maintaining similar capabilities across the force in order to deploy and sustain military capabilities in accordance with the National Military Strategy.

The response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, greatly accelerated the Army's transformation efforts. We are now transforming while we fight, in order to be a more expeditionary, more powerful, more flexible and more rapidly deployable force. The Army is modernizing in all its components to become more modular and strategically responsive, and promoting a joint and expeditionary culture throughout the force. This modernization and cultural shift applies to Guard forces in the same way it applies to Active and Army Reserve forces. The changes that we are making to all Army forces will not only make them more responsive when projecting force overseas, but also more effective in responding to disasters at home. This will ensure that we retain the necessary depth of forces to draw upon during larger scale emergencies, and to maintain a rotational commitment of some duration such as we now have in Iraq and Afghanistan. If a large segment of our total force, whether Active, Guard, or Reserve, were converted to a structure narrowly

designed for disaster relief, for example, we would reduce our capability to respond militarily across the spectrum of contingencies.

The Army's conversion to a brigade-based, modular force, and the shift to the cyclic Army Force Generation model will go far toward eliminating the effects of the tiered-resourcing era. We have already conducted three quarterly equipping conferences to ensure the equipping needs for the total force are dealt with in real time.

Army National Guard units began converting to our new modular force design this year and are scheduled to complete their transformation by 2010 and be fully equipped in the 2012 time frame. The Guard's transformation takes place at the same time as units of the Active Army and Army Reserve to ensure that we maintain a balanced total force with the right capabilities to support the National Military Strategy. When units redeploy, we are transforming them to the new modular force. We are doing this for all components. The difference is that we are equipping active units in 1 year in concert with their 3-year rotation cycle, and we are equipping Army National Guard units in 2 years in concert with their 6-year rotation cycle. The first three Army National Guard units to transform are the 30th Brigade from Clinton, North Carolina; the 39th Brigade from Little Rock, Arkansas; and the 81st Brigade from Seattle, Washington. These units redeployed in the spring and summer of this year and are now in their transformation window. As Army National Guard units transform, they receive the most modern equipment available, fully interoperable with their active component counterparts. In fact, Guard units that deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan before they were transformed, were equipped as well or better, in many cases, than their active component counterparts. As Army National Guard units transform, they receive the most modern equipment available, fully interoperable with their active component counterparts. The continued outstanding performance of Guard divisions and brigades in Iraq clearly shows that they are manned, trained and equipped to perform their missions.

In addition to modernization, the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study continues to convert selected Guard combat forces to much needed

combat support and combat service support forces while the remaining combat forces convert to the modular, brigade-centric designs. This means that the National Guard is gaining in total capabilities in those areas such as military police, engineers, and logistics units where they can be most effectively employed by the states' governors for humanitarian relief and in a homeland defense role.

The other systemic solution, in addition to our modular conversion, is a change in the Army's readiness paradigm and the way it mobilizes to provide forces. In order to further enhance reserve component availability and equipment readiness over the long term, the Army has implemented a new process of Army Force Generation. We call it ARFORGEN. The current system of "tiered" readiness does not support continuous operations, unit rotation, and lifecycle manning. In the ARFORGEN model, units rotate through a structured progression of increased unit readiness over time. This creates recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment. The ARFORGEN model is a completely new approach to providing Army forces. It enables the Army to support regional combatant commanders in much the same way that Air Force and Navy forces are provided to the joint force. Army units will progress through three phases of the operational readiness cycle, culminating in full mission readiness and availability to deploy. These phases are the reset and train phase, the ready phase, and the available phase. In the reset and train phase, units will redeploy, recover, receive and stabilize personnel, receive new equipment, and conduct individual and collective training. Through the ready phase, units will conduct mission preparation and collective training. They may be mobilized and committed to operations if necessary. In the available phase, units are trained, equipped, and resourced to meet operational needs. This is the planned mission time window. The ARFORGEN model will be flexible to meet changing operational requirements. Our goal is to create a planning cycle where active component forces are available for deployment one year out of three years, while reserve component combat units are available one year out of six years. This means that most reserve forces will

be available for non-federalized commitments every year not deployed. The ARFORGEN will increase predictability and stability and allow the Army to cross-level equipment and personnel to ensure appropriate force readiness.

Until the Army reaches equilibrium under the AFORGEN model, the equipping of units, both active and reserve, will remain a daily challenge. In the near term, there is no substitute for vigilant and detailed staff work at the major Army command and Army Staff levels making sure that the right unit has the right equipment. The internal sections of G-8's Force Development Directorate are just some of many staff sections within Headquarters, Department of the Army, that work constantly to fulfill the validated requirements of operational units.

The Army does not have enough equipment to resource every unit at 100 percent of its authorized equipment in the near term. As an example, when we deployed the 1st Cavalry Division to support operations related to Hurricane Katrina, we had to take trucks from other active units to fill the Division's shortages. Over time, the ARFORGEN model of cyclical readiness will mitigate this limitation. In the short term, we fill equipment shortages in priority from the most critical requirement to the least critical requirement. Equipment is fielded in accordance with a priority list developed by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations (G-3). This list is called the Army Resourcing Priority List. Deployed units have top priority. Deploying units are the second priority. Units are sequenced within these priorities based on their deployment sequence regardless of component. Because of this, reserve component units may receive equipment ahead of active component units. These are the guiding principles of the Army's strategy to equip the total force.

An example of these resourcing principles can be seen in a recent Army Resourcing Priority List where Army National Guard units were placed in the following sequence among other active component brigades: 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Tennessee Army National Guard), 256th Infantry Brigade (Louisiana Army National Guard), 116th Brigade Combat Team (Idaho Army National Guard), 1st Brigade Combat Team/3rd Infantry Division (Active Component), 3rd Brigade Combat Team/3rd Infantry Division (Active

Component), 2nd Brigade Combat Team/3rd Infantry Division (Active Component), 155th Separate Armored Brigade (Mississippi Army National Guard), 4th Brigade Combat Team/3rd Infantry Division (Active Component), 3rd Brigade Combat Team/1st Armored Division (Active Component), and 1st Brigade Combat Team/10th Mountain Division (Active Component).

In addition to fielding equipment by unit, the G-8 also manages integration of equipment by system. Again, this fielding is done on the basis of mission and need, not on the basis of component. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System is an example of Army National Guard units receiving comparative or better systems than Active Component units. Starting in 2004, we fielded our most modern systems to most of the Army National Guard field artillery battalions, but to only one fourth of the active component battalions. We will field the remaining 10 Army National Guard battalions to 100 percent in fiscal year 2006, and upgrade the remaining 75 percent of active component battalions in the next few years.

Another example of Army National Guard modernization is the fielding of the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles. Although the Army National Guard did not formally request it, the Army, in coordination with National Guard Bureau, developed and executed a modernization plan to support the fielding of 464 of the newest medium tactical vehicles to the 155th, 278th, 256th, and the 116th Army National Guard brigades before they deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. These trucks provided increased force protection, and improved sustainability. Additionally, the Army and the National Guard Bureau supported the fielding of 275 medium tactical vehicles to the 42nd Infantry Division (New York Army National Guard). These trucks allowed the Army National Guard to have the most modern capability prior to deploying. The Army also provided additional quantities of medium tactical vehicles with add-on-armor when these units arrived at their overseas mission sites. Active component units deploying in the same time frame did not receive any additional medium tactical vehicles until they arrived overseas; but all units received enough to fully support mission requirements.

In reference to trucks, let me amplify a couple of points about the Army's up-armoring status for tactical wheeled vehicles, and more specifically the Up Armored HMMWV. By the end of this year, all of the wheeled vehicles that operate outside of a Forward Operating Base will be either Level I or Level II armored. This is irrespective of the component. We are continuing to produce and send Level I Up Armored HMMWVs to the Theater to provide the greatest level of protection possible for our Service Members. The prioritization for getting armor is based upon mission and threat in each unit's area of responsibility. This priority has never considered the component of the unit. This armoring effort continues to save lives almost daily, and the Army is thankful for your continued support in this area.

The Rapid Fielding Initiative is the Army's method of giving Soldiers state-of-the-art equipment when they need it by greatly expediting testing, acquisition, and fielding. It is driven by the Soldiers themselves in feedback from lessons learned in combat. The Army National Guard's 116th and 256th Brigades and the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment each received their Rapid Fielding Initiative equipment based on their advanced placement on the Army Resourcing Priority List. Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) fielding was completed for all deploying Army National Guard units before the active units.

Thermal Weapon Sights are fielded in accordance with the Army Resourcing Priority List to all deploying brigade combat teams, regardless of component. The Army G-3-approved quantity is 110 per brigade combat team, of both the heavy and medium models. In the past, units received these systems in two issues of 50 percent each. Production now supports 100 percent in one issue.

If we have Army-wide shortages of equipment critical to the Theater Commander's mission requirements, our last resort is to direct units to leave equipment in theater. We are aware that this further complicates the Army National Guard's ability to respond to state and homeland defense missions. We have implemented a process, in accordance with existing directives, to approve and track equipment transfers from reserve component units to active component

units. This process also makes sure that equipment replacement plans are developed and executed so that our reserve component units are ready for homeland missions after they redeploy from overseas missions. We have instituted quarterly Army Equipping Conferences which address total Army equipping requirements and develop fielding solutions to fill or mitigate those shortages. The Army is committed to resourcing the Army National Guard in each phase of their rotation cycle within the Army Force Generation model to ensure that Army National Guard units can conduct Homeland Defense and Homeland Security operations, provide Military Support to Civil Authorities such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, and train for full spectrum operations.

Given our current Total Obligation Authority, the 25 billion dollars in Modularity Reserve, and the fiscal year 2006 supplemental, the Army plans to invest approximately 21 billion dollars on equipping and modernizing the Army National Guard during fiscal years 2006 through 2011. This investment includes approximately 6.9 billion dollars in combat vehicles and weapon systems, 4.5 billion dollars in tactical wheeled vehicles, 3.5 billion dollars in communications equipment, and 3 billion dollars in force protection equipment. These investments provide the Army National Guard with equipment useful to both their wartime and homeland defense missions. Based upon recent discussion with National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard believes that after this investment the Army is still accepting risk in the capability areas of tactical wheeled vehicles (approximately $4.9B), aircraft (approximately $993M), night vision (approximately $532M), and force protection equipment (approximately $438M). The Army is continuing to work with National Guard Bureau to ensure that the Army National Guard is appropriately funded and equipped.

We have identified, in coordination with the Army National Guard, ten essential homeland defense capabilities that are critical to domestic civil support operations. These categories are: transportation, medical, logistics, maintenance, security, chemical, aviation, signal, engineer, and command and control. We have completed two phases of a joint, comprehensive study with

Army National Guard to determine what equipment needed for major combat operations has the greatest use for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security missions. We started with the list of 318 items of equipment that the Army National Guard needed to support their ten essential homeland defense capabilities. We worked jointly with the Army National Guard and the Army G3 to validate capability requirements and identify modern equipment to meet capability requirements. In some cases we agreed to eliminate obsolete equipment from the Army National Guard's initial list and replace it with modern equipment comparative to active component units. In some cases we recommended additional equipment to meet a required capability. The new, jointly developed list has been refined to 342 items of equipment needed for major combat operations that also have a high pay-off value for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense missions. We have a good grasp on the types and quantities of equipment we need to provide the Guard so they can perform their missions during all phases of the rotation cycle. We also have a significant investment, which includes most of the 342 items listed, over the Army's plan for equipping the Army National Guard.

To further mitigate the effects of disasters or emergencies that exceed a state's resident or available resources, Governors may turn for assistance to other states or to the federal government. At least forty-eight states have established a means of mutual disaster and emergency management support known as Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs). EMACs encourage deliberate emergency planning and coordination between and among states. EMACs allow state emergency planners to cross-level assets between and among state EMAC partners to make the best use of available personnel and resources at any given time in an emergency. The response to Hurricane Katrina involved deployment of 50,000 National Guard Soldiers and Airmen, and their equipment, from 45 states and the District of Columbia to the Gulf Coast within seven days of the storm's landfall. The EMAC request system demonstrated effectiveness while many National Guard units were concurrently deployed in a warfighting mission.

The Department of Defense recognizes the value of the EMACs in its deliberate planning processes. Because a significant percentage of each state's National Guard resources remain undeployed, states can use the EMAC process to leverage assets regionally and nationally to support a disaster or emergency response. The Department of Defense goal is to deploy no more than 50 percent of any state's National Guard assets at any one time.

Use of EMACs or other state or local emergency systems is not a prerequisite to requesting or obtaining federal assistance in response to a disaster or emergency. States retain the ability to request federal disaster relief or recovery assistance at any time, which of course includes the full capability of the whole United States Army—National Guard, Reserve, and Active.

America's Army stands ready to serve our people in their times of need at home and abroad. We appreciate the work of this Committee on behalf of the Army, and that of the GAO. Their reports have helped greatly in confirming the resourcing difficulties that the Army is experiencing as a result of historical circumstances and the current operational environment. I am confident that, working together, we can overcome the difficulties noted. The Army's modular force initiative and Army Force Generation model have already put us on the path to a greatly improved future combat force that includes the Army National Guard as a vital and indispensable component.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

General Blum, welcome.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENENT GENERAL H STEVEN BLUM

General BLUM. Thank you. Chairman Davis, members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to appear here today and discuss the National Guard, its role in supporting responses to threats to our Nation both overseas and here at home.

As General Melcher has adequately stated, I totally concur with everything that he has brought before this committee. That is a first, probably. It shows that the U.S. Army is in fact committed, and that we are standing as one army, all three components—active, Guard, and Reserve—in resolving and accepting the responsibility for equipping the National Guard. That is the first time that has happened in the history of this Nation.

Today, we are faced with issues that have resulted from a deliberate and, arguably, appropriate cold war draft era strategy that accepted large risk, significant risk, by chronically under-equipping the Army National Guard.

The Army National Guard today is no longer a strategic reserve. We are an operational force. You heard from the Governors that appeared earlier about the fact that actually over half of the combat forces in Iraq of the U.S. Army are from the National Guard.

So we are no longer a strategic reserve. We are an operational force abroad, as well as the first Department of Defense responders for missions here in the homeland; whether it is homeland defense or to support the homeland security operations.

I want it on the record that our soldiers from the Army National Guard, for the first time in the history of this Nation and for the last 2 years, have not gone in harm's way—ever in the history of this Nation have we ever sent soldiers into harm's way or into a combat zone without the very finest equipment that this Nation could offer.

Today, I can say that for the last 24 months, because of the leadership of the U.S. Army, that is a reality. The senior leadership of the Army is committed to ensuring that is a reality and that the National Guard gets equipment, in some cases ahead of its active duty counterparts, but in no cases does it go without the equipment it needs for the overseas mission.

Now we need to focus that same sense of commitment, that same sense of dedication and sense of urgency, to ensuring that no citizen-soldiers are called out by Governors or the President to perform missions here in the homeland without the equipment that they need to protect them and to deliver the capabilities that our Governors and our citizens expect; whether it would be ill effects delivered by a terrorist organization, or by Mother Nature.

Before September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard had 75 percent of its authorized equipment on hand. Over the last 4 years, that equipment has been cross-leveled, sent overseas to ensure the soldiers overseas in harm's way had the very best equipment we could possibly provide. It was the right thing to do. Much of that equipment has been destroyed, worn out, left in place for others; which is rightfully the way to handle that.

But the bottom line is, our inventory that started at 75 percent 4 years ago is now at 34 percent. And when you consider items that are considered substitute items, that are really not appropriate for overseas deployment, the number is even smaller.

We can no longer accept the risk that this Nation once took with its Army National Guard and its Air National Guard, and today we must take the first steps to correcting this. We did not get into this situation overnight; we won't get out of it overnight. But this journey must begin immediately.

The fact that Army National Guard units were deployed to Iraq at the same time that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and now Wilma, are visiting our Nation does not mean that the National Guard in any way had lessened its ability to respond. It made it more difficult, but it did not lessen our capability. We had to take measures to mitigate that, and we did.

It should be noted that the National Guard delivered 50,000 citizen-soldiers and airmen to the Gulf region to respond to Hurricanes Rita and Katrina in a historically unprecedented, largest response to a natural disaster with national implications—faster, more forces, more capabilities delivered by every State, our territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. All closed on the affected areas in a period of 6½ days. This immediate, rapid reaction is unprecedented in military history of the world; not only the United States.

More than 50,000 National Guard members responded. They dropped what they were doing; interrupted their lives; had no idea how long they were going to be there, under what conditions they would be there. But when the Governors called and the Nation called out the Guard, you called out America, truly, in every part of the Nation.

Our highest equipment priorities are exactly in line with what you heard from the two Governors that testified earlier and what General Melcher just outlined. It is communications equipment. You cannot coordinate, synchronize, and organize a response without effective communications.

That communications must be interoperable with the other joint and interagency responders that are there. But first and foremost, we must be able to talk to the Army; and then, beyond that, the other elements of DOD; and then ultimately, hopefully, the civilian first responders, the emergency community.

Helicopters are essential. You heard it from both Governors, and probably the three that appeared yesterday. Tactical vehicles—modern, reliable, economical tactical vehicles; not the M–35 series of vehicles that are older than most of the people in this room.

Heavy engineering equipment is essential in the time of an emergency to save lives, to remove debris, to clear lines of communication, to allow both civilian and military first responders to in fact respond.

The chemical equipment, the medical sets, the logistical equipment, the night vision goggles, are exactly the items that are on our list.

We estimate it will take an immediate $1.3 billion to address this need to improve the National Guard's ability to respond in our

homeland when we are called out either by the Governors or the President.

Thank you, sir. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Blum follows:]

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STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL H STEVEN BLUM
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
UNITES STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 109TH CONGRESS

ON
RESPONDING TO CATASTROPHIC EVENTS: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND NATIONAL GUARD IN DISASTER RESPONSE

OCTOBER 20, 2005

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

STATEMENT BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL H STEVEN BLUM
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

Chairman Davis, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the National Guard, its role in supporting responses to overseas and domestic missions, and the requirements associated with those missions.

Today, the National Guard finds itself more than ever linked to the vital interests of our nation, both here at home and around the world. Over 140,000 Guard soldiers are currently deployed in support of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and dozens of other nations. At the same time, the men and women on the Guard have responded magnificently to the catastrophic events of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita here at home. Over 50,000 National Guard personnel hailing from every state and territory have responded to calls for support during this difficult period. The efforts of these Guard soldiers and airmen are a source of tremendous pride to those of us in uniform as well as citizens throughout the nation.

As our government begins the vitally necessary process of assessing the effects of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita and the response to those events, the picture is one of laudable successes as well as areas requiring improvement.

I am particularly proud of the timeliness and magnitude of our efforts in advance of Hurricane Katrina and in our response in its immediate aftermath. Guard forces were in the water and on the streets of New Orleans rescuing people within four hours of

Katrina's passing. More than 6,500 Guard soldiers and airmen were in New Orleans alone by the second of September. The Guard deployed over 30,000 additional troops within 96 hours of the passing of the storm. As I noted earlier, we eventually saw over 50,000 Guard men and women deployed to the region. More than 22,000 Guard personnel remain on active duty in Louisiana alone, with over 31,000 total personnel in the five affected states. In short, the National Guard response to the catastrophic events of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita has been and continues to be both timely and extensive.

While I am extraordinarily proud of our efforts in responding to Katrina and Rita, room exists for improvement. Current resource levels for Combat Support and Combat Service Support equipment permit a response to domestic contingencies that falls short of our objectives in meeting the challenges of similar mission requirements. We are currently working with the Department of Defense and the Congress to better define our requirements in this area, with a view toward enhancing our capabilities in the future.

While the events of the past weeks and months have stressed the Guard and its capabilities, we are not broken. The Guard will continue to meet its requirements, both domestically and overseas, as an integral part of the Joint Force. The Guard has risen effectively to the challenges of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, Katrina, Rita and countless other domestic and overseas mission requirements during the course of the past several years, and we will continue to meet any and all challenges in the future.

While we have been successful in meeting the needs of the warfighter overseas, there exists room for improvement in our capability to respond effectively to domestic mission requirements. As noted in the draft GAO report "*Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives*", resourcing Guard units deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom has reduced the equipment inventory of in the Guard's non-deploying units[1]. We have made every effort to ensure that our deploying units are fully equipped and ready to support operations anywhere in the world. To date, as the GAO report notes, we have transferred over 101,000 items of equipment in support of these missions. The report also notes, correctly, that these efforts have resulted in the reduced numbers of many critical equipment items, including night vision equipment, trucks and radios[2].

Support for National Guard equipment needs has been significant and timely. Resources earmarked in current legislation will allow the National Guard to take its first steps on the road to recovery. Nonetheless, the road to full recovery will be long and will require an order of magnitude increase in resourcing relative to that seen today. Working with the Department of Defense and the Congress, I firmly believe that we can meet this important challenge.

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[1] GAO, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, and the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, House of Representatives; *Reserve Forces; Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, October 2005.

[2] Ibid.

Meeting the equipping needs of the National Guard in future years requires a closer working relationship with our Active Component Military partners than ever before. The Guard can only succeed in meeting these challenges its faces by working hand in hand with the Active Component Army and Air Force in identifying requirements and developing workable plans designed to attain these goals. I am pleased to note that the Guard's working relationship with these services has been extremely constructive and continues to improve.

One of the critical challenges facing the National Guard and the Army involves the implementation of the Army Modular Force initiative. The Guard fully supports this process, which will result in a more flexible, effective and deployable force than ever before. The Guard is fully integrated into the Modular Brigade fielding process, which will move the Guard and the Army closer than ever toward the shared vision of a truly seamless, joint force.

Meeting the ambitious challenges presented by the Modular Force initiative will only be possible with the active support of the Congress and the Department of Defense. To that end I endorse the recommendation in the GAO report, which specifies that the Secretary of the Army develop and submit to Congress a plan for the effective integration of the Army National Guard into its rotational force model and modular force initiatives[3].

[3] GAO Report: *Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives*, p.26.

Events in the wake of 9/11, both here at home and abroad, have stressed this nation's armed forces to an extent rarely witnessed in the modern history of this nation. As a full member of the national security team, the National Guard has given its unstinting support in meeting these challenges both here at home and abroad. While the Guard has been successful in meeting these mission requirements, additional support will be vital to ensure we are effectively postured to meet the needs of the future. Working closely with the Department of Defense and the Congress, I am fully confident that we will continue to provide the outstanding support that our nation and its leadership have come to expect.

Thank you.

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NATIONAL GUARD TITLE 32 HURRICANE RESPONSE



LEGEND

Katrina: Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, ANG Airlift Support, External JOA Support

Rita: Florida, Texas

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DATA AS OF: 172400ROCT05

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NATIONAL GUARD TITLE 32 HURRICANE RESPONSE



LEGEND	Katrina						Rita	
	Louisiana	Mississippi	Alabama	Florida	ANG Airlift Support	External JOA Support	Florida	Texas

UNCLASSIFIED

DATA AS OF: 182400ROCT05

National Guard Response to National Commitments
SEPT 05 SNAPSHOT
ARNG: 13,457
ANG: 307
TOTAL: 13,764
TX
LA
MS
AL
FL
SEPT 05 SNAPSHOT
ARNG: 76,104
ANG: 1,899
TOTAL: 78,003
SEPT 05 SNAPSHOT
ARNG: 13,841
ANG: 1,259
TOTAL: 15,100 in place
SEPT 05 SNAPSHOT
ARNG: 42,249
ANG: 4,347
EXT JOA: 3,520
TOTAL: 50,116

Spectrum of Operations



Full Spectrum Force





Joint Force HQ (State)(C4ISR and RSOI)
Civil Support Teams
Maintenance
Aviation
Engineer (Technical Search & Rescue)
Medical (Mass Decon)
Communications
Transportation
Security

1

	EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AGENCY
1	Transportation	Department of Transportation
2	Communications	National Communication System
3	Public Works and Engineering	Army Corps of Engineers
4	Firefighting	Dept. of Agriculture/Forest Service
5	Emergency Management	FEMA
6	Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services	Red Cross
7	Resource Support	General Services Administration
8	Public Health and Medical Services	Dept. of Health and Human Services
9	Urban Search and Rescue	FEMA
10	Oil and Hazardous Material Response	Environmental protection Agency
11	Agriculture and Natural Resources	Dept. of Agriculture/Food Nutrition Services
12	Energy	Department of Energy
13	Public Safety and Security	Dept. of Homeland Security/Justice
14	Long-term Community Recovery and Migration	FEMA
15	External Affairs	Department of Homeland Security

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

General Tackett.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL ALLEN TACKETT

General TACKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today on issues that I believe are of vital importance to our Nation as a whole and to each of our States.

As demonstrated recently in the response to Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard is vital to recovery efforts following natural disasters. In West Virginia, the National Guard has responded to 37 federally declared disasters in the last 10 years. The soldiers and airmen of the Army and Air National Guard have become expert at these types of operations.

However, this mission, as vital as it is to the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of this Nation, has never been resourced by the Federal Government with the equipment needed to conduct these missions. All equipment issued to the National Guard is issued on the basis of the National Guard unit's Federal war-fighting mission. No consideration is given to another, equally important, mission of the National Guard, disaster relief.

As an example, our 1092d Engineer Battalion was mobilized and deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. When the unit returned, its engineer equipment remained in theater for use by incoming units. When the battalion was called to State active duty by the Governor for flood duty shortly after its demobilization, it had no equipment, no end-loaders, no dump trucks, to assist with recovery efforts. We were forced to rent Bobcats and go to the EMAC to assist the citizens of our State to recover from flooding.

I believe that this situation must be addressed before the next hurricane, earthquake, tsunami, finds us ill equipped to respond to a threat as potentially deadly as any enemy attack.

The military has long recognized that preparation for combat in a realistic environment leads to fewer casualties on the battlefield. At the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA, units fight realistic mock battles to prepare them for combat. The result can be seen in our decisive victories in Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. In contrast, Katrina illustrates what a lack of collective training can lead to.

Compare this with the situation when the Ohio River flooded parts of Ohio and West Virginia earlier this year. National Guard units were able to work with State and county emergency services directors, the Red Cross, and Noah's Wish, to help the citizens of both States in the flooded areas recover in a timely, effective manner.

The lessons of Katrina and Rita demonstrate a clear need for a joint interagency training capability the new Joint Interagency Training Center, established by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, can provide.

We must focus not only on consequence management and emergency response, but, just as importantly, on the preventive and deterrence. The Joint Interagency Training Center operated by the West Virginia National Guard focuses on key aspects of informa-

tion and intelligence sharing; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear enhanced collective training exercises focused on interagency and intergovernmental response; critical infrastructure protection and mission assurance; and in the future, non-lethal weapons.

All of these are key elements of homeland defense and homeland security; whether it is preventing or mitigating a terrorist attack, or effectively responding to a catastrophic natural disaster.

Just as we use the Joint Readiness Training Center and the National Training Center to be the most effective fighting force in the conventional warfare, we need to use the Joint Inter-agency Training Center concept to be the most effective force in the new realm of homeland defense, homeland security, and emergency preparedness.

In the new threat environment, this is just as vital a mission as any other war-fighting mission we have for the "away game." It is clearly a mission for the National Guard, but it must be effectively resourced and supported, and not at the expense of reducing the Guard's resources and participation in other war-fighting missions.

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in conjunction with the adjutants general, has already laid the groundwork for such efforts with initiatives such as the Joint Inter-agency Training Center; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear or High-Yield Explosive Response Force Package; the CERFP; Civil Support Teams; Full Spectrum Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams; and a Rapid Reaction Force.

An example of this is the methodology the Joint Inter-agency Training Center-East is developing on behalf of the National Guard Bureau for assessing critical infrastructure and mission assurance. Working jointly with the Secretary of Homeland Defense, the Defense Contract Management Agency, and NORTHCOM, we are looking at an "all hazards" approach for making these assessments; thus allowing for the identification, mitigation, and response planning for not only terrorist threats, but also natural threats.

Each of the States has, or soon will have, a civil support team on duty as a part of its National Guard force structure. The purpose of the civil support team is to respond to chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks, and to determine what agents have been used, and to work with civilian first responders in consequence management.

I propose an expansion of the civil support mission to include natural disaster response. Civil support teams are already trained in first aid and casualty evacuation. This type of approach would have dedicated forces in place, ready to respond quickly when needed.

The major criticism of the relief efforts after Katrina was the perceived length of time it took to get troops on the ground. The States and counties are responsible for providing first responders. FEMA does not have a first responder mission; nor does any other Federal agency. A dedicated force of National Guard first responders would reduce the time, from the call for help, to having boots on the ground.

In addition, in 1989, Congress had the foresight to establish the National Guard Counterdrug Program. It provided additional force

structure for Guard soldiers to work in an interagency approach to fighting the war on drugs.

It uses a "State plans" approach that tailors efforts to the specific threats of each State and also allows for States to develop multiple State initiatives. This program has been a model for interagency and intergovernmental support for over 15 years. It could be rapidly expanded at a minimal cost to the broader homeland defense, homeland security, and emergency preparedness missions.

In fact, many of its assets have already been used in key events, such as the response to Katrina and Rita, as well as the national political conventions, the G8 summit, and the Presidential Inauguration.

The model is there. It just needs the authorization for the expanded role and full funding of its current 4,000-troop authorization. It could become the core of a dedicated force for both the narco-terrorism and the homeland defense, homeland security, and emergency preparedness missions that are then augmented by traditional Guard, Reserve, and active component units, depending on the scope of an event. If properly structured and resourced, these units could also provide assets for key OCONUS response in training allies for homeland defense, as well as humanitarian and nation-building missions.

In my view, funding for disaster recovery operations conducted by the National Guard should come directly from the Federal Government. Statutory authority to fund homeland security missions is now in place, with the recently enacted Chapter 9 of Title 32, U.S. Code. This statute allows the Secretary of Defense to fund homeland security missions at the request of a Governor for 180 days. An amendment to this statute to provide similar authority to fund disaster relief efforts is badly needed.

There has been some discussion of adding a disaster response mission to our active forces. I believe that this would be a mistake. Our active component forces are the finest in the world. One of the reasons they are so good is their focus solely on preparedness for war. Adding another mission would detract from the single-minded focus required of the forces whose primary mission has always been, and should remain, fighting our Nation's wars.

In addition, the current OPTEMPO makes adding another mission to our active forces unwise, if not impossible. The primary mission military responsibility for natural disaster relief should rest with the National Guard.

As a member of both the National Guard Domestic Operations Advisory Board, and the Adjutants General Association of the U.S. Homeland Security Committee, I can tell you that the National Guard Bureau and the Adjutants General stand ready to work with Congress, the President, and the Department of Defense, to quickly and effectively address this vital need.

With the threats we face in the 21st century, this mission is too vital to the safety and security of our Nation not to address immediately. And the Guard, in its role as the militia, is clearly the core force for the mission.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Tackett follows:]

TESTIMONY OF

MG ALLEN E. TACKETT
ADJUTANT GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

The Critical Role of the National Guard at Home and Abroad

October 20, 2005

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today on issues that I believe are of vital importance to our nation as a whole and to each of our states.

As demonstrated recently in the response to Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard is vital to recovery efforts following natural disasters. In West Virginia, the National Guard has responded to 37 federally declared disasters in the last ten years. The soldiers and airmen of the army and air National Guard have become expert at these types of operations.

However, this mission, as vital as it is to the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of this nation, has never been resourced by the federal government with the equipment needed to conduct these missions. All equipment issued to the National Guard is issued on the basis of the National Guard unit's federal warfighting mission. No consideration is given to another, equally important mission of the National Guard, disaster relief. As an example, our 1092d Engineer Battalion was mobilized and deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. When the unit returned, its engineer equipment remained in theatre for use by incoming units. When the battalion was called to state active duty by the governor for flood duty shortly after demobilization, it had no end loaders or dump trucks to assist with recovery efforts. We were forced to rent Bobcats to assist the citizens of our state to recover from flooding. I believe that this situation must be addressed before the next hurricane, earthquake or tsunami finds us ill-equipped to respond to a threat as potentially deadly as any enemy attack.

The military has long recognized that preparation for combat in a realistic environment leads to fewer casualties on the battlefield. At the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana, units fight realistic mock battles to prepare them for combat. The result can be seen in our

decisive victories in Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. In contrast, Katrina illustrates what a lack of collective training can lead to.

Compare this with the situation when the Ohio River flooded parts of Ohio and West Virginia earlier this year. National Guard units were able to work with state and county emergency services directors, the Red Cross and Noah's Wish to help the citizens of both states in the flooded areas recover in a timely, effective manner.

The lessons of Katrina and Rita demonstrate a clear need for a joint interagency training capability the new Joint Interagency Training Center, established by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, can provide. We must focus not only on consequence management and emergency response, but just as importantly, on prevention and deterrence. The Joint Interagency Training Center operated by the West Virginia National Guard focuses on key aspects of information and intelligence sharing; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or High-Yield Explosive collective training exercises focused on interagency and intergovernmental response; critical infrastructure protection and mission assurance; and, in the future, non-lethal weapons. All of these are key elements of homeland defense and homeland security, whether it is preventing or mitigating a terrorist attack, or effectively responding to a catastrophic natural disaster. Just as we use the Joint Readiness Training Center and the National Training Center to be the most effective fighting force in conventional warfare, we need to use the Joint Inter-agency Training Center concept to be the most effective force in the new realm of Homeland Defense, Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. In the new threat environment this is just as vital a mission as any other warfighting mission we have for the "away game". It is clearly a mission for the National Guard, but it must be effectively resourced and supported, and not at the expense of reducing the guard's resources and participation in other warfighting missions. The Chief, National Guard Bureau, in conjunction with the Adjutants General has already laid the ground work for such efforts with initiatives such as the Joint Inter-agency Training Center; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear or High-Yield Explosive Response Force Package; Civil Support Teams; Full Spectrum Integrated Vulnerability Assessment teams and a Rapid Reaction Force. An example of this is the methodology the Joint Inter-agency Training Center-East is developing on behalf of the National Guard Bureau for assessing Critical Infrastructure and Mission Assurance. Working jointly with the Assistant Secretary of Defense-Homeland Defense, the Defense Contract Management Agency and NORTHCOM we are looking at an "all Hazards" approach for making these assessments, thus allowing for identification, mitigation and response planning for not only terrorist threats, but also natural threats.

Each of the States has, or soon will have, a Civil Support Team on duty as a part of its National Guard force structure. The purpose of the Civil Support Team is to respond to chemical, biological or nuclear attacks and to determine what agents have been used and to work with civilian first responders in consequence management. I propose an expansion of the Civil Support Team mission to include natural disaster response. Civil Support Teams are already trained in first aid and casualty evacuation. This type of approach would have dedicated forces in place, ready to respond quickly when needed. The major criticism of the

relief effort after Katrina was the perceived length of time it took to get troops on the ground. The states and counties are responsible for providing first responders. FEMA does not have a first responder mission, nor does any other federal agency. A dedicated force of National Guard first responders would reduce the time from the call for help to having boots on the ground.

In addition, in 1989 Congress had the foresight to establish the National Guard Counterdrug program. It provided additional force structure for Guard soldiers to work in an interagency approach to fighting the war on drugs. It uses a "state plans" approach that tailors efforts to the specific threats of each state and also allows for states to develop multiple state initiatives. This program has been a model for interagency and intergovernmental support for over 15 years. It could be rapidly expanded at minimal cost to the broader Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and Emergency Preparedness mission. In fact, many of its assets have been used in key events such as the response to Katrina and Rita as well as the National political conventions, G8 Summit and the Presidential Inauguration. The model is there, it just needs the authorization for the expanded role and full funding of its current 4000 troop authorization. It could become the core of a dedicated force for both the narco-terrorism and Homeland Defense/Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness missions that are then augmented by traditional Guard, Reserve and Active Component units depending on the scope of an event. If properly structured and resourced these units could also provide assets for key OCONUS response in training allies for Homeland Defense as well as humanitarian and nation building missions.

In my view, funding for disaster recovery operations conducted by the National Guard should come directly from the federal government. Statutory authority to fund homeland security missions is now in place with the recently enacted Chapter 9 of Title 32, United States Code. This statute allows the secretary of defense to fund homeland security missions at the request of a governor for 180 days. An amendment to this statute to provide similar authority to fund disaster relief efforts is badly needed.

There has been some discussion of adding a disaster response mission to our active forces. I believe this would be a mistake. Our active component forces are the finest in the world. One of the reasons they are so good is their focus solely on preparedness for war. Adding another mission would detract from the single-minded focus required of the forces whose primary mission always has been, and should remain, fighting our nation's war. In addition, the current OPTEMPO makes adding another mission to our active duty forces unwise, if not impossible. The primary military responsibility for natural disaster relief should rest with the National Guard.

As a member of both the National Guard Bureau Domestic Operations Advisory Board and the Adjutants General Association of the United States Homeland Security Committee I can tell you the National Guard Bureau and The Adjutants General stand ready to work with Congress, the President and the Department of Defense to quickly and effectively address this vital need. With the threats we face in the 21st century, this mission is too vital to the safety and security of our nation not to address immediately and the Guard, in its role as the militia is clearly the core force for this mission.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.
General Rees.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND REES

General REES. Mr. Chairman, I am Major General Raymond Fred Rees, the Adjutant General of Oregon. I thank you and the committee for inviting me to testify here. I provided my written comments for the record.

I would like to focus first on equipment. I had the opportunity, at the direction of my Governor, to go out and survey the Oregon National Guard in the May and June timeframe, before I assumed office on July 1st. The No. 1 issue among soldiers was not, "When will I deploy again?" It was, "Where is my equipment?"

This affects readiness, obviously, directly; but indirectly, the attitude of soldiers toward their organizations, where most of our National Guardsmen are veterans. We have more veterans in the Oregon National Guard now than we have had since World War II, and they have deployed with the very best equipment. They now see they have nothing, or "in lieu of" equipment, and it is demoralizing. And they, I believe, will not put up with it for long and, unfortunately, may vote with their feet, as far as staying in our organization.

Likewise, potential recruits are expecting to be part of a 21st century organization, and they see very little evidence of it.

I strongly endorse the efforts by the National Guard Bureau, the Army, and the Government Accountability Office, to highlight the equipment shortage and the need for the emergency supplemental equipment appropriation.

In the area of disaster response, Oregon is one of many States. I believe, 50 to 54 entities out there responded to the call of the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi. We had 2,000 individuals who were called, both Army and Air Guard. Basically, from a cold start, our advance party was on the ground within 48 hours. The main body was there within another 48 hours after that. And this is all over a holiday weekend. The limiting factor on this was airlift.

How did we meet these standards? How did we get there in that timeframe? I think a lot of it has to do with the fact that the 4-years of mobilizations has improved our processes, refined and honed our skills at calling and moving troops—certainly, a byproduct of the military training and the Federal overseas mission.

How did we do it? Three things. First of all, the authorities under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact [EMAC], were there and in place and could be used. No. 2, the National Guard Bureau coordination was phenomenal, as directed by General Blum. And three, the national treasure that I call the Air National Guard was available to provide us with airlift. I can tell you, even though I have two fighter bases in Oregon, having those two air bases was absolutely essential to be able to move those troops rapidly to New Orleans and to Bell Chase Naval Air Station.

What needs to be improved? General Tackett has already talked about training. I endorse what he said about training requirements. Exercises: we need to think big in terms of how these exercises should be done. How do we stabilize and preserve State and

local government, and not attempt to supplant it? We need to think big, start small-scale fast, in these exercises.

The equipment, we have already talked about. And the business of Title 32, want to thank this committee for what it did last year to spur on revisions to Title 32. But I can tell you that, from what I have seen, we need more work on this. The ideas that General Tackett has just endorsed—or I endorse what Major General Tackett has just talked about. But I see a resistance still in the operational use of the National Guard in Title 32.

In the area of EMAC, this needs to be improved, also, because there needs to be clarification there. I think Governor Kempthorne talked to that. Certainly, there is a need for provisions in there to talk about support to law enforcement.

Standardization needs to be worked on. We need to talk about the expansion, perhaps, of the CERFP concept that the National Guard Bureau has advocated. And I would look at certain other areas in there, such as aviation, for composite organizations that could help in faster response.

Finally, I would say in the area of requirements in funding that certainly in the business of homeland defense the tightknit relationship between the Bureau and the Army has worked very well in defining requirements in funding, but when it comes to the business of homeland security I think we need to look, and I would recommend a study directed by this committee to look at three areas.

One, is the current DOD process for getting to homeland security activities adequate? That is where the Guard is looked at as a reserve of the Army and the Air Force. Or, No. 2, should NORTHCOM have authorities such as the Special Operations Command has, where they can do requirements and funding specifically aimed at homeland security?

Or, third, should we look at what I would call a reverse Coast Guard model, where there is a direct relationship between the Bureau and DOD and DHS, so that the National Guard can respond appropriately to the requirements of the Department of Homeland Security?

That concludes my remarks, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Rees follows:]

Major General Raymond F. Rees Testimony
Before
House Committee on Government Reform
20 October, 2005

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am Major General Raymond F. Rees; I serve as The Adjutant General for the State of Oregon. I am pleased that you invited me here today to discuss the important role that the National Guard plays in Homeland Defense, Homeland Security and disaster relief and recovery.

We have all just witnessed the terrible disaster that struck the Gulf Coast. It is a sobering reminder of what may happen to any place in this country when we least expect it. We must learn from past episodes so we can do a better job when the next befalls us as it will. A natural disaster is never quite the same as the last. In this most recent case, I believe that we can look to some positive improvements over what I have observed in the past decade. The most positive aspects of these efforts were and are the effective use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and the use of the National Guard in Title 32 operational status. I make this judgment based on my background as an Adjutant General for 9 years, 7 years at the National Guard Bureau as Director of the Army National Guard, Vice Chief of the Guard Bureau, and the acting Chief on two occasions and as Chief of Staff at Northern Command/NORAD for 2 years. It is clear, the National Guard has made improvements in how we respond and react to disasters.

In this instance, unlike the disasters in the early 1990's, we had in place the EMAC that allowed the Guard from the several states that did have available resources to more easily marshal those assets and send them to the Gulf States. In Oregon, we recalled just over 2000 soldiers and equipment from a cold start on

a holiday weekend and moved that force to New Orleans within 4 days. The advance parties were on the ground within 48 hours. The pace of the movement was based on the availability of airlift and the right kind of airlift. In our instance, we placed our soldiers initially on State Active Duty based on what Louisiana was identifying as its needs through a coordinating process by the National Guard Bureau. They then deployed to New Orleans in Air National Guard aircraft and were placed into the most ravaged parish in the city immediately upon arrival. Did EMAC work? In my opinion, it worked exceedingly well and as it was designed. It reinforces the basic premises of the National Incident Management System.

We have proven that the states and the National Guard can move quickly when ordered to do so. Our traditional role in any state emergency has been to deploy to the event as soon as possible. Once on the scene, we do search and rescue, recovery operations and support law enforcement within the confines of the law and the direction of the Commander in Chief, the Governor. Oregon and many other states were called to duty, dispatched to the Gulf States and were fully engaged in record time. In my view this was a classic case of the flexibility and capacity of the nation's citizen soldiers and airmen. The execution coordination and control were properly placed in support of the Governor to stabilize and restore civilian authority. The National Guard Bureau provided resources and coordination among the states to achieve the objective as well as working with DoD to properly place this operation in Title 32 status for our soldiers and airmen. (Title 32 status provided uniformity among the states for pay, benefits and protection under the law for those called to duty, while the Governors remained in command.)

EMAC needs to be an evolving document. Based on what we have learned, I would suggest we look at the timing of invoking the EMAC and language regarding the use of the National Guard in support of law enforcement. We also need to look at timely use

of Title 32 operational status. Had that call come as the hurricane was approaching or soon their after, the result in New Orleans might have been significantly different. I think the results we witnessed with Hurricane Rita, demonstrates that when a ready force is pre-staged and in place, the recovery occurs much sooner with fewer problems. There has always been a reluctance to act prematurely because of the costs involved and the fear of "crying wolf" too often. Certain fundamental functions could be placed in a warm status or moved out of harms way and relationships established to insure a quick response. Training programs for this type of activity are essential.

A good deal of debate has arisen about the need to modify or terminate the Posse Comitatus Act. I do not believe that changing Posse Comitatus is the answer or any part of the answer. It provides a clear trip wire for the American people in this balance between the states rights and the federal government. It has worked for over 100 years and I have heard of nothing that occurred in this event that would convince me that it needs to be changed. It is apparent that the states need to clearly include law enforcement provisions in the EMAC for the use of the National Guard. Analysis may also show that it would be helpful for the states to pursue uniform statutory authority for use of the National Guard in support of law enforcement.

We can and must make some fundamental changes on how we view and execute our duties as separate states. Adjutants General must maintain our historical and constitutional role with our governors but we also rely on the federal government for resources and coordination of assets that don't exist within the states. In a sense, the National Guard represents a 6th service of the armed services when it comes to our domestic role. If we look at the Coast Guard as a model, the National Guard is a close cousin with respect to our constitutional and statutory roles as well as our functional role. The Coast Guard is viewed by many as a law enforcement organization not a "go to war" service. Yet as we

know, it is both. It provides law enforcement and has a vital role in our overseas war efforts. I believe that the National Guard is viewed similarly but with an emphasis on our "go to war" role as opposed to our domestic role. I think the question we should answer is how should the National Guard be organized, trained, resourced and function to best respond to domestic needs as well as the war fight?

If we examine the National Guard's current role in the Global War on Terror, it is clear that we are a vital part of this effort. The Department of Defense primarily resources and organizes the National Guard as a war fighter not a disaster relief organization. On the other hand, most Governors look to the National Guard for the domestic mission and not the global mission. Our funding and training is designated by DoD for the global mission. The advantage to the Governors is that these missions and training are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the organization, structure, equipment and training provide the domestic mission capability to the Governors at minimal cost. It truly is the best of both worlds. However, I think we all recognize that we do have a gap in the case of large multi-jurisdictional catastrophes. The larger question is how do we cover that gap?

The gap I speak to can be covered and should be covered by the National Guard. We are in over 3300 communities in the nation. Our soldiers and airmen are members of the community and the expertise and knowledge these citizen soldiers bring to the table is not replaceable by any outside organization. If DoD is to address this gap following current authorities, it will have to identify resources, missioning, and standards through service channels. Alternatively, it could follow a model similar to the resourcing for the Special Operations community that could be directed by USNORTHCOM, and would not have to compete with conventional service resource requirements. If DoD is not directed to address this we should examine the lessons of the Coast Guard

model. In the Coast Guard model we see that Congress has taken the expertise of this service and used them to cover gaps within the DoD mission. The National Guard could cover inter jurisdictional gaps we have seen between federal government and the states and the DoD and DHS responsibilities, much the same as we have with DoD and the Coast Guard.

How would this be done?

Congress would legislate this gap coverage by establishing a permanent relationship between the Homeland Security Department and the DoD for utilization of the National Guard.

One means of accomplishing this would be to minimally but formally expand the federal structure of the National Guard into a dual-missioned organization consistent with its existing dual-mission at the state level.

This could be accomplished as follows: First, the statutory purpose of the National Guard Bureau and the legal duties of its Chief would need to be expanded to include coordination between the Department of Homeland Security and the states with regard to the National Guard's participation in disaster response. Second, a means for the governors of the states to build enhanced National Guard capability for disaster response would need to be established. This second element could simply be an expansion, of or a parallel to the existing National Guard Counter-drug program in which a state governor provides a plan outlining the state's needs for military support to civilian capabilities (currently for drug fighting) and submits it to the federal government (currently the Department of Defense) for funding approval subject to federal guidance. This program could be expanded to include disaster response and then shifted to DHS or, alternatively, a parallel DHS program exclusively focused on disaster response could be established.

Additionally, we need to examine the current structure both in organizational capability and the need for equipment located regionally around the nation. [1]The National Guard Bureau developed and fielded 12 Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) teams through out the United States to provide a response capability to meet Homeland Defense Requirements. Coupled with our Civil Support Teams in every state, the National Guard is the best organization to fulfill these missions. The Guard Bureau is completing a review of these capabilities as well as several I have not mentioned. This review will make recommendations to strengthen these dual responsibilities to allow us to continue to maintain our "Go to War" structure while at the same time provide the Homeland Security requirements that our nation deserves. This can not be accomplished without the man power and the equipment.

As we look at our primary mission, to prepare to deploy as a reserve of the U.S. Army and Air Force, we must also be able to support our Governors requirements on an immediate basis, and respond with the right capabilities at the proper time and place. The National Guard Bureau has established a list of 10 essential capabilities each State, Territory and the District of Columbia must have and maintain at all times.[2]

1. Aviation
2. Engineering
3. Civil Support Teams
4. Security
5. Medical
6. Transportation

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[1] National Guard Homeland Defense White Paper: September 11, 2001 Hurricane Katrina, and Beyond, pg 9

[2] National Guard Homeland Defense White Paper: September 11, 2001 Hurricane Katrina, and Beyond, pg 11

7. Maintenance
8. Logistics
9. Joint Force Headquarters
10. Communications

Many States do not have all of these capabilities in their force structure. Again, we must look at the Regional capabilities and the use of EMAC to provide such elements. However, unless Congress adequately provides the necessary resources for the organization, training, and purchase of the needed equipment, we will have a hollow force. (Oregon could not have moved 2000 troops to New Orleans in 4 days without the 30 sorties of Air National Guard cargo aircraft and the capabilities Oregon's two ANG bases provided to transload soldiers and equipment. That was a national or strategic lift requirement.)

As I look at our Northwest Region, we see a demonstrated need for organizing aviation assets in order to have the capability to not only move in our own state, but also within the region. The benefit of the CERFP could also be realized by aligning war fighting structure under composite aviation structures. This would guarantee a full spectrum of aviation capabilities in time of critical circumstances. Presently, some National Guard units are still flying Viet Nam era rotary wing aircraft. Congress must recognize these failings and support Department of the Army plans to replace these air frames with newer more capable aircraft such as the LUH, Light Utility Helicopter and the FCA, Future Cargo aircraft.

These new aircraft must be stationed appropriately within each region to provide the capability we so desperately need during an emergency. Additionally, as we see the War Fighting requirements develop and evolve within the aviation community, new transformational configurations such as the V-22 for special operations, would be a valued asset for Homeland Defense, the War Fight and for Emergency response, again using the same

equipment and personnel to do all three missions. All of these major equipment requirements must be enhanced if we are to meet the expectations of our Governors and our fellow citizens. We have seen a tremendous degradation of our force primarily due to the past policies of only equipping the Guard to minimal levels, (C-3) and the need to cross level this equipment to deploying Guard units upon deployment. This can not continue if we are expected to be an operational force for the Army and Air Force but also as the primary force for Homeland Defense and disaster response. The assumed easy answer that might direct the Active Duty to assume a greater responsibility for these missions simply will not change this dynamic. The National Guard is the closest to the American public. Our Constitutional role is clear and our governors depend on us in times of need. If additional responsibilities and standardization are required, the National Guard will provide the best return on investment.
The National Guard Bureau has developed equipment requirement needs that all Adjutants General agree must be funded and procured. We can no longer afford to manage our force at a reduced level when it is required that we respond to a disaster for our governors or deploy in support of the Global War on Terror. We need the equipment now so when we are called for either state or federal missions we have the trained personnel with the best equipment to accomplish that mission.

In pursuing this new structure, it is essential that no part of the National Guard's time, funding or equipment should be diverted away from military readiness. The new structure should be entirely additive allowing the National Guard to put in place, using either DoD or DHS guidance and resources, new personnel and equipment needed to better integrate into and respond to the needs of the nation's and the states' emergency response systems. The existing Counter-drug program does this for the war on drugs without intruding on military readiness. A similar arrangement can

do the same for the war on terrorism and domestic operations generally.

The obvious elements within the DoD to do this coordination are U.S. Northern Command and the National Guard Bureau. U.S. Northern Command and the Bureau could establish the training and execution requirements; drive the resourcing, the mission sets, and the standards.

A revised DoD model or a reverse Coast Guard-like structure with a DHS relationship would allow the National Guard a more uniform organization and discipline in response to of America's disasters. Analysis of these three models by the Congress and inside the Departments of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security is needed to more completely select and develop such initiatives. It is time to build on the momentum of the lessons of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Actions to accomplish this should be taken sooner rather than later.

Finally, I thank you once again for addressing this issue. It is of the utmost importance that the American people continue to have confidence in its military forces be it at home or abroad. From my stand point, the National Guard has never been better. We have proven that we can mobilize around the globe to fight the War on Terror or deploy to assist our fellow Americans in a time of desperate need. We have demonstrated for over a decade and a half that we can work effectively and efficiently to assist law enforcement in the war on drugs and we have shown that when the nation needs us for a new mission set, as in the Civil Support Teams, our soldiers and airmen can perform in a superb manner at an affordable cost to the taxpayer. All of this suggests that our Founding Fathers wisdom was insightful and timeless when they

recognized the importance of the balance between the federal forces and the Militia. We continue to represent those principles and the wisdom our founders with pride and passion.

Thank you

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. General Melcher, I will start with you. You are kind of the point-guy here. It seems to me that the Army is forgetting what is important in transformation and reform. That is, how does it affect the individual Guard soldier?

First, we had the pay problems. They weren't getting paid correctly, and I think we reported on that widely. Then we subjected them to the administrative nightmares in medical holds, and this committee did a hearing on that. Some very tragic cases of people that were caught in some "catch–22s" in terms of getting medical attention.

Then, just the recent revelations that we were sending some of our Guardsmen to debt collection agencies for pay errors that they didn't make, that we made; ruining their credit in some cases.

And today, from the GAO, who calls the balls and strikes in these issues for Congress, it appears that the Army is saying it is OK that the Army Guard soldiers don't have adequate equipment to train; nor can they expect it any time soon, under modularity or the non-issuance of homeland requirements.

What is the problem here? Why is the Army treating the Guard as second-class? Given the Guard's operational role in the global war on terrorism, why are Guard units still equipped at less than wartime readiness levels?

In fact, if the active duty are equipped at C–1 readiness, why not the equally operational Guard? I mean, is this just a question of limited resources and having to set priorities?

General MELCHER. Sir, let me start by recapping just one comment that I made in the opening statement. And that is that I would say, up to a period of about 2 years ago, the Army National Guard was considered, not only by the Army, but the Department of Defense, as a strategic reserve; in that the operating assumption was that we would have a long lead time in which to mobilize soldiers, in which to potentially make up shortfalls of equipping and perhaps even manning, in order to prepare those units for war.

What happened 2 years ago is that the Army, in concert with this global war on terror, embarked on a journey not only to recognize that the Army National Guard was an integral part of our operational forces, but that we should also equip and man them commensurate with that new status.

Where you see that being played out in this global war on terror is in Iraq and Afghanistan today, where 7 out of the 17 combat brigades in theater are Army National Guard. The number of those brigades with each rotation varies, but the point is, the Guard is very much committed, as is the U.S. Army Reserve.

And so 2 years ago, we embarked upon a plan, which we have called Army Modular Forces, to try and, first of all, standardize each one of the types of units we have in the Army, between the active and the Guard; and second, to fill those units with the kind of equipment and capabilities that they require for a model that says they must be ready to go.

And we also have aligned ourselves in terms of the rotation scheme which I believe you are aware of, the Army Force Generation Model, where the assumption is active forces should be ready

to go one out of every 3 years; Guard forces, one out of every 6 years.

And so that is the reason in the equipping arena that we have gone from about $5 billion over the program years dedicated to Army Guard equipping, to a total of $21 billion today. And what that does is it takes each one of those Guard units, those combat brigades, and it fills them up with equipment between now and the fiscal year 2012 time period, in order to make them on an equal par with their active duty counterparts.

If I were to characterize even active units at the beginning of this war, I would tell you that I think active units were filled anywhere between 90 and 100 percent of their required equipment. Not every one of those was at 100 percent. Guard units, as you have heard here today, were equipped at about the 75-percent level. At the end of this period where we intend to transform all units, the intent is that all units be equipped at the 100-percent level, and that is the direction that we are going.

With respect to the other things that you mentioned, I am not an expert on pay, and I am not an expert necessarily on——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We have had other people up here on that.

General MELCHER. But I did just want to make a point that, in preparing for this hearing, I reviewed some of the things that the Army has done to try and take a harder look at our disabled soldiers and how they are being treated with respect to pay problems and so forth. And in fact, we have taken a hard look at how to deal with that, both for active and Guard soldiers alike.

And one case in particular of trying to look out for Guard soldiers can be illustrated by Taskforce Care, which was an effort initiated because of Hurricane Katrina to establish a taskforce that went to theater; talked to soldiers from Louisiana that were about to redeploy back to their home State; tried to determine what was the situation for each one of those soldiers and their families; and, in theater and when they got back, make sure that we followed through to find housing for them, or to find the benefits that they needed and so forth.

And so we looked at—you know, when I say "we," the U.S. Army—looks at the Army National Guard as an equal partner in this war on terror that we are conducting. And they should be so equipped.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I mean, I think in some of these areas, particularly in the pay and the health areas, it was about systems and procedures; and we forget about the individual soldier. There are just too many exceptions.

Let me ask another question. I understand that the $1.3 billion that is included in the Senate appropriations bill for Guard equipment for Katrina and other homeland emergencies isn't included in the House appropriation bills and, because of spending caps, it might not get in at all.

I also understand the Army has requested $850 million, and that the difference includes communications equipment and trucks that might be used in other disasters. Why hasn't the Army included these two key items in its request?

General MELCHER. Sir, in the Army's supplemental requests for 2006—and I am talking about the supplemental associated with war, and not necessarily the hurricane—the Army has requested dollar amounts for the kind of materiel you described for the Guard and for the active forces, in order to try and equip these units that are converting to modular configuration.

The Congress is entertaining right now a proposal for $1.3 billion, as you mentioned. Were the Congress to approve that proposal, that would go a long way, certainly, toward providing those capabilities quicker than we might otherwise be able to do with the ordinary appropriations cycle and year-by-year approach of how we intend to improve over time.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, let me ask Secretary Hall. Why does the Title 32 authority for Hurricane Katrina only cover pay allotments, and not the equipment used or the training required? I think we heard testimony and we understand that as they lose equipment, it weakens their ability to perform State-side. Why does the Guard stand—well, the Guard, alone, has to come to the Hill to ask for equipment for Katrina; where every other DOD department or Federal agency can be assured reimbursement through Title 10 or through FEMA.

Mr. HALL. I think that there is little disagreement here at the table and with either one of the Generals that we need to have within the equipping strategy for the future, within the $21 billion that the General mentioned, and more perhaps, equipment for homeland defense, for resetting the force, for repair of equipment, for the modularity, and for supporting the ARFORGEN.

So I think within that model there is a commitment to provide that equipment for homeland defense that the Guard and the Reserve would need. So I don't think we disagree on the requirement. It is making sure that we maintain that funding flow over the next few years, to provide that equipment.

Under Title 32, as you know, when requested by the Governors—the forces remain under control of the Governor—their pay and allowances are paid for by the Federal Government. But again, the equipment that they will need has to be included in our overall equipping strategy, to get that equipment that they will need now and for the future for homeland defense.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. It appears that the Army and DOD are, I think wisely, adopting equipment requirements for Iraqi Freedom and the global war on terror. But the Department isn't coming up with requirements for homeland military assistance.

Mr. HALL. No, I think they are. And separately, General Melcher and General Blum have told me that over 300 separate items that will be required for homeland defense are being identified for the National Guard—in fact, I think 342, by exact number. And those will be identified for homeland defense requirements for the Guard.

Those are coming to us in a report by the end of the month, which we will forward to you. So they are addressing those particular requirements, and over 300 of them are identified—trucks, communications, heavy-duty hauling equipment.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes, General Blum.

General BLUM. And it might be useful, also, Mr. Chairman, to remind everybody that these 342 identified items are dual-use items.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Right.

General BLUM. They are equally applicable for both overseas war fighting as they are for here at home.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. What has hastened this is the fact that we are just leaving a lot of equipment over in Afghanistan or Iraq. That just depletes it, and we are not replenishing it. And a lot of that can be used—like you say, it could be used over there, but it could be used here, and we are missing it. And we heard testimony from the two Governors earlier, there is a huge deficit.

General BLUM. Exactly. And it is not that the Army and DOD are not addressing it. The issue is that the problem is so deep and so longstanding that the measures that they have taken—and some of them are quite extraordinary. I mean, within the supplemental and on the global war on terrorism there is $2.5 billion identified to reset equipment for the Army National Guard. There is $3 billion identified by the U.S. Army in their submission for modularity for the National Guard. But that still leaves us woefully short.

And again, we didn't get here overnight; but we are where we are. And we are in a different world today than we were even 4 years ago.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That is right.

General BLUM. And we can no longer assume the risk that we are accepting. And I, for one, welcome any emergency or extraordinary measures to solve this problem sooner than later.

Mr. HALL. Could I just add that I compliment GAO on their report, which we haven't mentioned, for the National Guard equipment. They had three major findings. I concurred with all of those three; sent them a letter back; asked the Army to provide information by the end of this month on addressing those three areas, so that I may prepare a report, the Army and DOD, to you, outlining these exact issues of what are we going to do about the equipment left behind; how are we going to have a good accounting system for that equipment; and how are we going to support the Army's ARFORGEN model in the future.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. General Walker, we don't have any questions for you. The work that you have done, and your staff has done, and Ms. Saint Laurent has done, on this is great. Nobody is disputing that, so no need to give you questions. You have kind of defined it. You have called the balls; you have called the strikes. Nobody is disputing the calls. The question now is what we do. And so, just again, we appreciate what you did.

Let me just ask General Tackett, what do you think about the Army modularity?

General TACKETT. From a National Guard standpoint, it is going to be very difficult to meet it. We are going to have a lot of our forces that have to be retrained. It puts a lot of stress onto the National Guard. But it is something that has to be done. We have to mirror the active duty component.

It is taking away a lot of engineer structure from the States, which is very important for the State missions. It is going to cause the adjutant generals and Governors to use EMAC a lot more than what they have in the past. There are a lot of difficulties involved in modularity.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Thank you. How is retention coming at this point, as people come back from the war front?

General TACKETT. Well, in the State of West Virginia, I am proud to say that we are one of the few States that met our in-strength, and our actual retention rate is 147 percent of what it was intended to be.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I asked the right guy; didn't I, General Blum? I asked the right man.

General TACKETT. We are very fortunate. We are 106 percent of assigned strength. And we are one of only three States in the entire Nation that is above their assigned strength. And we have been very fortunate and lucky in the State of West Virginia.

The State supports us big-time. You heard one of the Governors—from Pennsylvania, Governor Rendell—talk about the education assistance program. We have several programs in West Virginia that help us in our recruiting, and help us with our retention of our Guardsmen. But we have been extremely fortunate to meet our goals.

General BLUM. Mr. Chairman, that is a great question. And the answer that you got from West Virginia is only representative of what you would get from almost any State that you asked.

It almost is counter-intuitive, but the more we are using the Guard, particularly for domestic operations—hurricane relief and humanitarian operations right here in the United States—it has been a spike or a boon to our recruiting in the last 30 days.

It is interesting to see that, while we were the busiest, with 50,000 people in the Gulf and 80,000 people overseas fighting the war on terrorism, where we are stretched and probably busier than we have ever been at any time in modern history, our recruiting was better because of it. Because the young men and women of this Nation want to be part of an organization that is professional and is doing something that makes a difference.

That is why having modern equipment in their hands when they show up is so important to attract them and to keep them in our formations. And then, when they are called to perform in such a magnificent way, the only way they have capabilities is that people training and equipment. So this equipment is a vital leg in the three-legged stool of our capabilities in the Guard.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You know, it is kind of counter-intuitive that retention—really, recruitment—would be up in this environment. But if you go down to New Orleans, as I was there, and Mississippi, and you see these people, and you see them on the ground, and you see their morale—and I mean, they are working hard. They are working 24-7. They are not getting much sleep. They are certainly not living a very luxurious life; some of them in tents. But the morale is amazing. And you know, people do want to be part of something helping their fellow man.

So I didn't know what answer I would get when I asked the question, but I am glad to hear that.

Mr. HALL. Could I just——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Sure.

Mr. HALL. Could I also just add, we were focusing on the Guard here, but from all the components which I look at, attrition is almost at an all-time low. And again, it is counter-intuitive, but we

have used all the components. Look at the Marine Corps, who are 104 percent of all of their goals. We look at the other services, the retention and attrition is at all-time highs, and so more people are staying with us.

We have some recruiting challenges, but not in the retention for our people that have served. And we have seen, in fact, some of our highest levels have been the people who have gone forward into the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan; and by the way, many of them taking advantage of reenlisting with the bonuses that you all provided. That was probably the most effective tool, the $15,000 bonus that you provided last year for our young men and women staying in-theater.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. General Walker.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, as has been said by several of the panel members, for decades, the Army National Guard's role was to be a strategic reserve. The fact is, it is no longer strategic, and it is no longer a reserve. It is now being used tactically, both overseas and domestically. And it is being used with recurring frequency.

People are doing a great job. People are trying very hard with regard to the resources and the authorities they have. But the simple fact of the fundamental change in how the Guard and Reserve are being used has significant human capital, has significant equipment, has significant operational, and has significant fiscal implications. And we need to recognize that reality.

A part of the issue is, it is not a matter of whether or not the Guard and Reserve need more money. They do. The question is, where is it going to come from? And is it a reallocation of existing resources, or is it an addition added on top? And we need to engage in that exercise, and start making some tough choices which haven't been made in quite a long time.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I would really like to segue. That is a wonderful segue for me. I feel like I am in a funny environment right now, because I feel like, as I read your statement, under the summary: "The significant use of Army National Guard forces for overseas and homeland missions since September 11, 2001, has resulted in declining readiness, weakening the Army National Guard preparedness for future missions, and indicating the DOD's business model for the Army National Guard is unsustainable and needs to be reassessed." Other than that, things are working well, I guess.

"The current heavy reliance of the Army National Guard for overseas operations represents a fundamental change from the Guard's planned role as a strategic reserve force whose principal role was to deploy in the later stages of a major conflict." I will just read a little longer. It is needed.

"Under this model, which still governs how resources are provided to the Guard, the majority of Army National Guard combat forces are only provided with 65 to 74 percent of the people, and 65 to 79 percent of the equipment needed to conduct their assigned wartime missions." I mean, I could keep going on. But then you say: "DOD is undertaking some initiatives to improve the Guard's equipment readiness and to balance its multiple roles in overseas

and domestic operations. However, it is not clear whether these initiatives will be effective in enhancing the Army National Guard's equipment posture, because DOD has not yet developed detailed plans; nor has it included funding for all its initiatives in its budget." Do you stand by your statement, Mr. Walker?

Mr. WALKER. I stand by that report, and my statement.

Mr. SHAYS. Have you heard anything that followed your statement that makes you want to qualify your statement?

Mr. WALKER. No. I think people here are trying to do the best they can with the resources and authorities that they have. Candidly, Mr. Shays, as you know, I think one of the problems you have is we need to engage in a much more strategic and integrated review and reassessment of DOD, period. This is a small piece, but an important piece.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, it is a very important piece. But what I am trying to understand is, I admit to not hearing all the statements, but the statements I did hear didn't seem to address your statements. I mean, I feel like you have to look for the gold thread of relevance in this lots of talk.

I would like to ask each of you how you are addressing specifically; and not a long terminology. And what I would like from DOD is just straight talk—not bullshit; straight talk. You know, "It is true, we haven't done this, but this is what we are doing, and this is how long it is going to take, and this will be the result."

I think the head of GAO owes it. He didn't send someone else here. He came himself to deliver this message. And I would like some straight talk.

And I will just start to say why I don't think I am hearing straight talk. And Secretary Hall, I have a lot of respect for you. But I am reading that the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, produced by your office, indicates a total reserve component shortfall of critical items of more than $15 billion. Yet I read in your testimony that in fiscal year 2006, funding for the reserve component will be only $2.5 billion for equipment procedure.

In other words, so how could DOD let the reserve component get into a position of a shortfall of critical items of more than $15 billion?

Mr. HALL. Well, in the testimony before you came in, some of it was addressed; in that the $21 billion that the Army has planned, as General Melcher indicated, will address that $15 billion, and there might be more. That $1.3 billion is immediate. Within the supplemental, within the yearly planning, there is a total of $21 billion planned which 2 years ago was not planned, as General Melcher indicated. So that is money to address the shortfall that General Blum has talked about of $15 billion.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, you go on to State, I think, that in the short term, the Army Guard's immediate requirements have been resolved. How have they been resolved?

Mr. HALL. I think they have been resolved by the $1.3 billion that is going to be put in for immediate requirements, plus through cross-leveling of their equipment. As they send their forces forward, they are provided with 100 percent of the requirements when they go into theater. Now, that involves taking equipment and cross-lev-

eling from units that are not going. So I think in the immediate——

Mr. SHAYS. So you mean in Iraq they are resolved?

Mr. HALL. For the forces that go forward in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are resolving the homeland defense requirements, as I said, as part of the five areas that we are looking at—resetting the equipment, repairing the equipment—the homeland defense requirements.

Mr. SHAYS. You are giving me the impression that we are resolving it.

Mr. HALL. No, I think the problem has been identified. What I am giving you an impression and a straight talk is that we are all committed to providing the resources to resolve the requirements of the National Guard in all of those five areas.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. HALL. And that commitment from all of us at the table is here.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, explain to me, General Blum, why he needs at least $1.3 million of supplemental funding for Katrina.

General BLUM. I need $1.3 billion to buy equipment to do the job here in the United States——

Mr. SHAYS. Because——

General BLUM. Because Katrina, Rita, Wilma, and the forest fires, and the snow storms in North Dakota, and the flooding in New Hampshire, and all of the operational requirements we respond to that the Adjutants General alluded to and the Governors talked to, require equipment. That means night vision goggles, communications——

Mr. SHAYS. So let me come back——

General BLUM. I need the money to buy equipment, sir, in straight talk.

Mr. SHAYS. I understand what you need, and I hear you. So let me go back to you, Mr. Hall. How do I say that in the short term the Army Guard's immediate requirements have been resolved?

Mr. HALL. I indicated for Iraq and Afghanistan. We are in the process, as General Blum just said, of resolving their requirements for homeland defense.

Mr. SHAYS. In the process, or have been resolved?

Mr. HALL. We are in the process.

Mr. SHAYS. So they haven't been resolved?

Mr. HALL. They have been resolved for their forces going forward in Iraq and Afghanistan. We still have to resolve how we provide the necessary equipment for disasters and homeland defense.

Mr. SHAYS. And that they get proper equipment to train with.

Mr. HALL. Well, in all areas. To reset the equipment, to repair the equipment, to train for the ARFORGEN, and to meet all the other missions abroad and at home. So we have to do it in all five areas.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, then walk me back to how—I am still having trouble reconciling Mr. Walker's statement. I mean, I don't mean to be dense here, but Mr. Walker stands by his statement, and you agree with his statement. And yet you somehow feel like it is being resolved. I don't understand.

If you are telling me you know he is right and somehow in the future it is going to be resolved, I might say, OK, at least you are acknowledging that. But you are saying it differently. You are saying it has been resolved.

Mr. HALL. Well, it has not all been resolved. And I think General Melcher wanted to comment.

General MELCHER. Congressman, let me give this a try. One of the things that was said in the report was that the old business model was not sustainable, and we would agree with that. The business model that says that the Reserve is a strategic reserve is not complementary with the current security environment that we live in, and so that model had to change.

The way it changed, as I described it, is to accept that the Guard is going to be an operational force, as is the Reserve, and that they should be equipped commensurate with that status. And so where that is being played out in terms of a plan is in the Army's campaign plan over time to transition both active units and Guard units to this new design—you know, to this modular force, standardized design—and to equip them as rapidly as possible, as rapidly within resources allowed——

Mr. SHAYS. What does it mean, "in time?"

General MELCHER. All right, sir. For the active force, we are transitioning all 43 active brigades between now and the end of fiscal year 2007. For the Guard brigades, they have expressed the desire to transition as rapidly as possible to the new design, by the end of fiscal year 2008.

Mr. SHAYS. The 43 is what? I'm sorry.

General MELCHER. Forty-three active, and 34 Guard brigades. And they will transition to the new design by the end of fiscal year 2008. The equipping for those units will continue throughout this 5-year defense plan period, up through fiscal year 2011. And with lead times, they will probably get the last of their equipment in fiscal year 2012. That is what the $21 billion that the Army has allocated is going against.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, it is 7 years, but this $21 billion won't begin to address all of those needs.

General MELCHER. Sir, the $21 billion addresses all the needs of these new formations; which, quite honestly, have more of everything. It has more trucks, it has more unmanned air-able vehicles——

Mr. SHAYS. How much will it address?

General MELCHER. $21 billion takes care of, I would say, probably about three-quarters of the total need. There is another $7 billion on top of that, that General Blum and I have agreed is the remainder. Most of that is replacing those things that are "in lieu of" items, and bringing them up to the most modernized level. Some are communications and others.

But those for the entire Army extend well into the next half of the next decade. The U.S. Army, for example, will still have less than modernized types of equipment that we will replace—tactical wheel vehicles, for example—up to the 2015 timeframe. So that condition I described for the Guard is the same as for the active.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Walker, help me out here. What are you hearing, and what aren't you hearing?

Mr. WALKER. Well, what I am hearing is, I believe that there has been general agreement with regard to not just what the report we issued says, but also with regard to other issues that I talked about in my statement.

At the same point in time, obviously there are limits as to the authority and the resources that these gentlemen have. And therefore, there is a reconciliation that needs to take place, both within the Department of Defense as well as with the Congress, as to what the overall resource level will be and how might those resources get allocated to be able to meet the most critical needs.

And so I don't think there is disagreement here at this table. I think the question is, what is going to happen to engage in that overall reconciliation.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, the one disagreement I have is that I am left with the impression from you, "It is not clear whether these initiatives will be effective in enhancing the Army National Guard's equipment posture, because DOD has not yet developed detailed plans; nor has it included funding for all initiatives in its budget."

And I get the impression from General Melcher and Secretary Hall that, "Everything is all planned out; we just have to carry it out; and by 7 years, it is all going to be done." They don't jive.

Mr. WALKER. I can explain part of that delta, or inconsistency, Mr. Shays. And that is that there are certain things that have been done by the Department that we have not had the opportunity to see yet. For example, there is a listing of 342 items—or whatever it was—of requirements for the Army National Guard, and possibly other entities, that have been developed by the Department of Defense; but that is still pre-decisional. They haven't made decisions. We have not taken a look at that yet.

But even if they do make decisions that this is what they need, there is no guarantee that they are going to get the resource allocation for it. And that is part of the other problem.

Mr. SHAYS. Which is to say, in a way, to the general public listening, "Everything is fine." But to a Member of Congress, I could leave this meeting thinking everything is fine, and then I could have someone from the press come up to me 2 years later and say, "You had a hearing. You were told there was a problem. You didn't do a damn thing about it." And because I am left with this feeling like what you said is true, and it has all been taken care of.

So let me ask it differently, General Blum or anyone else. What steps have to be taken by Congress?

Mr. HALL. Could I comment on that?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Mr. HALL. Following their report, we told GAO that we concurred. I asked the Army to give us their detailed plan on how they will accomplish this equipping. That is due by October 31st. Part of their recommendation was that, based upon that, we, DOD, submit to Congress a report on exactly the equipping strategy of what the Army will do. As soon as we get the report, we will be submitting by detail on how this money is going to be spent, on how future requirements. So this has flowed from that to us giving——

Mr. SHAYS. When will that report be done?

Mr. HALL. Well, it is soon after October 31st, which is 10 days.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. HALL. We need to review that. We need to make sure that we have the correct and agreed upon integrated strategy. And then we will give to you, the committee and the Congress, what we have been saying about our future strategy, and what General Melcher has outlined. So we are providing that based upon the work that they did. And we are committed to doing that as soon as we can.

Mr. SHAYS. So being committed to doing it, and its being resolved, are two different issues. And I think that is maybe my problem with your terminology. Your recognizing this has to be done is a helpful and encouraging sign. That it has been dealt with yet, no. That it will be dealt with, and that you are pledging to this committee and others that you will deal with it, is another issue.

And it seems to me that this is really, Mr. Chairman, almost a preliminary effort; that it would make good sense for us to get you back in 4 months and see where we are at.

Mr. HALL. It could have been better terminology, I admit. But what I want you to know is, we are committed, and as you have heard, to addressing this problem and providing equipment that the National Guard needs to do its missions worldwide, overseas and here.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Let me just tell you why I get a little anxious about this, and I will conclude with this.

Having been to Iraq 10 times; having continually had my own constituents in the National Guard complain about equipment; having shown up in the Kurdish area on a base and having the commander of, I think, North Carolina troops show me three Humvees—one with no protection, one with makeshift, and one with, you know, factory protection; coming back to my staff saying, "Dammit, we need to deal with this issue"; and then having the military say, "Done, taken care of"; and then finding out that we kept revising the number of targets, so they said, "We will reach this target by—" but we never solve the issue with the target adequate to meet the whole needs of all our troops—and I realize that I have to ask these questions differently.

And because we let our troops down, I know and you know there were men and women who died because they didn't have the proper protection, because we continually underestimated our needs. And the end result was, we may finally have gotten it up there, but it took us too long. Had we agreed on day one, "This is where we need to get, way over here," we would have gotten to it sooner.

And you know, it is kind of a terrible thing to have to say, but we cost some lives of our own troops, because we didn't, collectively, target it right.

So I am leaving this hearing with a total recognition on the part of the military that you buy in, do not argue with what Mr. Walker has said and his people; that you have a plan to resolve it; that you are going to come back with a detailed outline as to how long it will take, how much money it will require from Congress to do the job. And then, if we don't appropriate the dollars, it is on our shoulders. If you don't tell us in plain English what you need, it rests on your shoulders. That is kind of how I am feeling.

Do any of you disagree with that?

General BLUM. No, sir. As a matter of fact, I agree with it completely. But I want to make sure for the record you know where

I stand on this. I think the GAO report has described the ugly baby in perfect detail. I think that the Department of Defense recognizes we have an ugly baby that needs to be addressed.

I think that the U.S. Army is working, the Department of Army has recognized and has taken this on in a serious manner for the first time ever. And we don't have a total plan and we don't have a total solution, but we are working to it right now. And we are working within the budgets that we have been provided, and we are making some trades based on——

Mr. SHAYS. OK, now, that is the part that makes me nervous. And let me say, General Blum, that I have heard nothing but compliments about the job you have done. Nothing but compliments about your honesty. You are straightforward.

But to say then you are working within the budget means that you may have been provided less than the budget you need. And if you have, you need to tell us.

General BLUM. I will tell you now. I am currently, and we agree on a number—and if you don't, please say it. We think we are $7 billion short on what we are resourced to provide against what we would like to have to be able to not have risks.

Mr. SHAYS. $7 billion above the $21? Is that the number? You are nodding your head. Some one say "Yes" or "No."

General BLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And General, is the $21 appropriated in the budget, or hoping to be in the budget?

General MELCHER. Sir, this amount, $21 billion, is what is in the Army's plan over the 5-year defense plan period.

Mr. SHAYS. So it is not in the budget yet?

General MELCHER. Well, it is partially in the 2006 budget request, the 2006 supplemental request, and so forth. But the key point is, you are absolutely right. Once we lay this out, we will need the support of both the administration, the Department of Defense, and Congress, in order to make this vision for what these forces ought to be a reality.

Mr. SHAYS. So is this $21—I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, because I am concluding here. Is the $21 now becoming $28?

General MELCHER. Well, the $21 only covers up through fiscal year 2011, which is as far as we plan out for this point in time. When we build a new program in the spring, we push that time horizon out to 2013. And so there are some things for both the active and the Guard that continue to happen over time.

Mr. SHAYS. And it will be, by 2013, full? That is a long time from now, folks. It is going to take us that long?

General MELCHER. Sir, if the Army had a lot more money in current years, we would go after this problem much quicker.

Mr. SHAYS. No, no, no. You know, I was going to conclude, but that is not the way I would like to think about how you communicate with us. Because you have already made an assumption that you are not going to ask for more because you are not going to tell us—so what I am hearing is, for the next 8 years, basically, we are going to have the problem that Mr. Walker outlined.

General MELCHER. Sir, I think we are going to continually have a problem with equipping. And perhaps it is worth just 1 second to explain why do we have stay-behind equipment. The reason we

have it is because it is things like up-armored Humvees or specialized equipment, night vision goggles, that you want the next soldier to fall in on when they come over there.

Mr. SHAYS. I am not arguing that they shouldn't have it. What is your point?

General MELCHER. Well, my point, sir, is that we continue to evolve and change this mission over time. For example, we have transition teams now that are training the Iraqi army. Those teams all had to be equipped. We are putting pre-positioned stocks back together overseas. Those things must be created. So there is a constant dynamic of new equipping requirements that come over time.

What I am saying is, this plan that we have for the $21 billion is a sound plan, but it must be seen through in each one of the years in which it unfolds.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I will just again recommend to our committee, Mr. Chairman, that we have a followup, not in the too-distant future, since your report is going to come. And I appreciate all of you being here.

And I didn't have any questions for our National Guard folks, but I know that your statements were pretty straightforward: You need help. And you are proud of the people that you have working for you, and you are happy with your enrollments, in some instances.

But we know nationwide we have a problem of enrollment, and we are overworking our National Guard. We are totally overworking them, and under-equipping them still.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. I just want to thank you all. I want to thank our Guard representatives. Your statements are in the record. I think you made a strong case. General Walker, thank you. And I want to thank our Pentagon officials, too.

The hearing is adjourned. And we will be back in about 5 minutes to start the committee markup.

[Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statements of Hon. Todd Russell Platts, Hon. Jon C. Porter, Hon. Patrick T. McHenry, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, and additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

FULL COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT HEARING:

The Critical Role of the National Guard at Home and Abroad

OPENING STATEMENT OF

***REP. TODD RUSSELL PLATTS** (R-PA-19)*

OCTOBER 20, 2005

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today on such an important and timely topic. The National Guard and the citizen-soldier ideal behind its creation predates the founding of our nation. Our founding fathers saw the need for a well-trained cadre of Americans who would stand ready to serve in times of crisis.

All of us have watched our brave women and men in uniform assisting citizens and maintaining order in the wake of a natural disaster. We are grateful for their service as they fight side-by-side with active duty soldiers to advance the causes we, as Americans, hold dear.

Now, perhaps more than any time in our nation's history, we are relying on these citizen-soldiers more and more. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Guard began to mobilize soldiers in support of the Global War on Terror. These soldiers fought the Taliban and al Qaeda throughout Asia and Africa. They continue to guard prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and perform support missions here in the U.S. Similarly, National Guard soldiers serve on the front lines in Iraq. Even with an unprecedented number of Guardsmen serving in harm's way overseas, the National Guard has been called to respond to the most destructive hurricane season on record.

I believe that one of the most important roles of the Congress is to ensure that we support these soldiers effectively. This hearing is an important part of that effort, and it complements the work of the Committee over the past three years to improve the treatment of wounded Guardsmen and to make needed changes to the outdated and ineffective pay and travel systems.

I have personally visited with many of Pennsylvania's Guard troops deployed in places like Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Just recently, I joined a group of soldiers at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, as they prepared to ship out to Iraq. These soldiers deserve nothing less than a full commitment of support from those of us here at home.

We cannot overlook the importance of the National Guard to our state governments. My home state of Pennsylvania has a proud history, with citizen-soldiers serving in every war since the Revolution. The foundation of what is now the Pennsylvania National Guard began in 1747 under the leadership of Benjamin Franklin. Today, Pennsylvania is the home of the second largest National Guard force in the nation. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that we will hear from the current Governor of Pennsylvania Ed Rendell. Governor Rendell and Idaho's Governor Kempthorne will provide an important perspective as we balance the needs of the nation with those of the states.

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing and for the Committee's continuing oversight of issues affecting the National Guard.

Rep. Platts serves as Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance and Accountability.

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STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
CONGRESSMAN JON C. PORTER (R-NV-3)
"The Critical Role of the National Guard at Home and Abroad."
October 20, 2005

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today. I would also like to thank the witnesses for being here to testify today.

The National Guard is truly our "citizen army." Made up of quality individuals who may also be doctors, lawyers, laborers, police and fire personnel, etcetera—the Guard is a cross-section of America that plays a critical role in assisting our authorities with natural disasters and homeland security.

The role of the National Guard has been especially highlighted during the Global War on Terror; and again with Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. In Nevada, for example, our National Guard sent more than two dozen support troops to aid in the hurricane relief efforts in Louisiana alone. It is essential that we, in Congress, make sure that our guardsmen and women are given the equipment and training that they need in order to be an effective frontline defense for our homeland. We must also remember in Congress that the duties of Guardsmen are threefold: federal, state, and local.

In remembering the numerous duties of Guardsmen and women, I am especially looking forward to the hearing the testimony of the Honorable David Walker of the Government Accountability Office, as he will be able to give this Committee great insight into whether or not we may be stretching our National Guard too much. If we are, I would like to know what his suggestions are as to what can be done in order to make ensure that our members of the National Guard are best able to protect our homeland.

On another note, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your strong interest in making sure that our injured, retired, and/or returning guardsmen and women are being taken care of. Granted, this subject has been the subject of hearings in the past and I'm sure will be the subject of a future hearing. However, I would like to publicly thank you for your hard work on working to ensure that Guardsmen and women are protected on multiple levels, and I look forward to working with you on this into the future.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing the testimony from our witnesses, and I thank you for holding this hearing today.

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Congressman Patrick McHenry
Statement of Support for NC National Guard
October 20, 2005

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing today on the readiness and preparedness of our National Guard. Over the years, the duties of the National Guard have expanded to include defending our national security at home and abroad. The U.S. Army relies on the Guard to defend freedom in Iraq and Afghanistan and for that, we are extremely grateful.

North Carolina is America's leading military state and we must continue to stand firm in support of our National Guard and insist that our troops have the supplies, equipment and training they need to defend our nation. We must develop and deploy the most advanced technologies and weapons systems to ensure that our armed forces remain the most effective and lethal fighting force on Earth.

Since September 11, 2001, over 9,000 members of the North Carolina National Guard have been deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Currently we have around 1,200 members deployed to the Gulf Region, which is a testament to the diversity of operations the Guard undertakes in their service to our great country.

In the 10th District I would like to thank the battalions and brigades that provide the needed support and relief for the state. Those units are Detachment 1, 1451st Transportation Company in Burke County; HQ, 540th Quartermaster Battalion and 1450th Transportation Company in Caldwell County; Detachment 1, Company B, 505th Engineer Battalion in Rutherford County; 626th Maintenance Company and Detachment 1, 626th Maintenance Company in Catawba County; Battery A, 1/113th Field Artillery Brigade in Lincoln County; Detachment 1, Battery A, 1/113th Field Artillery Brigade in Iredell County; Headquarters, 505th Engineer Battalion in Gaston County; and Company B, 505th Engineer Battalion in Cleveland County. God bless the National Guard, both current and past, for their service and sacrifice.

I would like thank our witnesses for taking the time to be here to lend us their expertise so that we can better understand how to equip and prepare our Guard and address the states growing need for their assistance with homeland security and natural disasters. Thank you again Mr. Chairman and I look forward to a productive hearing.

Opening Statement of

Representative Elijah E. Cummings, D-Maryland

Hearing Entitled: "The Critical Role of the National Guard at Home and Abroad"

Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
109th Congress

October 20, 2005

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for calling this important hearing regarding the essential role of the National Guard.

With the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq abroad, and the threat of future catastrophic disasters here at home, there can be little doubt that the time for a candid evaluation of the challenges that confront the Guard is long overdue.

The National Guard has long served our nation by dutifully performing a broad range of tasks that range from providing disaster relief and security, to assisting in drug interdiction activities and fire-fighting. However, in the post 9/11 world, the National Guard is increasingly engaged in the federal government's efforts to secure the homeland and increasingly called upon to participate in active duty military missions overseas. Taken together, these dual missions have left the Guard

stressed and overextended in terms of manpower and resources. As a result, the National Guard's state of readiness and effectiveness is disturbingly being called into question during a period of national crisis.

Specifically, I am deeply concerned that due to the activation of approximately 260,000 Guard soldiers over the past four years, the Guard Bureau's limited resources are under mounting pressure to do more with less. As Guard units are deployed in ongoing war efforts, their latest equipment accompanies them overseas, leaving Guardsmen here at home to contend with an insufficient supply of out-of-date equipment.

Our obligation as stewards of public safety demand that we ask why in a nation of plenty are some of our Guard soldiers relegated to using Vietnam War era radios and KC-135 tankers that have an average age of 44 years? Is this the best the American taxpayer can expect from this Administration and Congress? In no uncertain terms, shortchanging the Guard in this way shortchanges our national preparedness and homeland security.

Unfortunately, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated with abundant clarity that shortages of vital equipment and the overseas deployment of Guard soldiers can impact domestic relief efforts.

For example, with 40% of the Mississippi National Guard serving in Iraq, scores of soldiers who are knowledgeable about the Gulf region as well as many high water vehicles, humvees, and generators were unavailable. Moreover, *The New York Times* reported that today's witness, Lt. Gen. Blum, said that "the National Guard has ***only a third*** of the equipment it needs to respond to domestic disasters and terrorist attacks."

Mr. Chairman, Congress has an obligation to work with Lt. Gen. Blum to ensure that critical shortages in modern communication equipment, vehicles, construction machinery, medical gear, and night vision goggles are immediately addressed. Further, we should evaluate transformation proposals that would help ensure that the Guard is capable of realizing its state and federal responsibilities effectively and efficiently. Incorporating predictable deployment schedules, modern training, and reasonable deployment distributions also seem to be essential components to a comprehensive strategy to make certain the Guard is at a state of readiness that best serves the American people and the needs of our soldiers.

I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses and yield back the balance of my time.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
HARRISBURG

THE GOVERNOR

October 27, 2005

The Honorable Christopher Shays
United States House of Representatives
1126 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-0704

Dear Congressman Shays:

At last week's hearing conducted by the House Committee on Government Reform, you asked me a question about military command and control of National Guard personnel deployed to Louisiana and Mississippi in the wake of the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina.

As I testified at the hearing, more than 2,500 Pennsylvania National Guard members left their homes, their jobs, their schools, and their families and deployed to the disaster areas along the Gulf Coast in response to requests for emergency assistance from the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi. I am tremendously proud of our Guard members for their prompt and professional response to this emergency.

All Pennsylvania National Guard personnel deployed in connection with hurricane relief remained under state command and control at all times. These personnel were deployed in a federally funded state status under Title 32, United States Code. Our personnel were not "federalized" at any time, and they never fell under the command and control of U. S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) or First U.S. Army. Operational control of deployed units was handled through established joint task forces in the region, and missions were assigned through these joint task forces.

Keeping our National Guard forces under state command and control was the right thing to do. This does not minimize the important role played by USNORTHCOM and LTG Honore. The active armed forces and their commanders played a significant role in coordinating and providing assistance to our forces, but from a legal perspective, the states remained in command of their National Guard forces.

Thank you again for your question. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need additional information.

Sincerely,

Edward G. Rendell

Edward G. Rendell
Governor

cc Congressman Davis
Congressman Waxman
Congressman Kanjorski
Congressman Platts
Congressman Dent

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
HARRISBURG

THE GOVERNOR

October 27, 2005

The Honorable Mark E. Souder
U.S. House of Representatives
2231 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Souder:

At last week's hearing conducted by the House Committee on Government Reform, you asked me a question about military equipment left in Iraq and Afghanistan when units of the Pennsylvania National Guard redeploy to the United States. Specifically, you asked about why the Department of Defense directs that some equipment stay behind.

As I said at the hearing, I recognize that the decision on identifying what the Army calls "stay behind equipment" or "SBE" is made by DoD for military reasons, which are primarily related to use of the equipment by other soldiers who arrive in the combat zone after our forces depart. The best information we have is that the vast majority of the SBE left in the country by Pennsylvania National Guard units was in good and serviceable condition. This equipment is not left behind because it has been lost, damaged, or destroyed. The disposition of damaged military equipment is handled by a separate military process. My National Guard headquarters does not have specific percentages, but our units report that the equipment that stayed behind was, in most cases, in good condition.

We all want the soldiers deployed in combat zones to have the best possible equipment in the best possible condition. No one takes issue with DoD's decisions that certain equipment should stay behind when units redeploy. What concerns me and my fellow governors is when the units redeploy to their home stations and are not promptly re-equipped with military equipment in the same quantity and of like quality. As your hearing showed, these concerns are clearly shared by the National Guard Bureau and the Government Accountability Office. I believe DoD, can and must, do a better job of resupplying these units, and I appreciate the efforts of the House Committee on Government Reform to highlight this important issue.

Thank you again for your question. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need additional information.

Sincerely,

Edward G. Rendell

Edward G. Rendell
Governor

cc Congressman Davis
Congressman Waxman
Congressman Kanjorski
Congressman Platts
Congressman Dent

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
CHAIRMAN TOM DAVIS
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
October 20, 2005 Hearing

Questions for Governor Edward G. Rendell of Pennsylvania

How do you feel about easing Posse Comitatus restrictions on active duty forces performing domestic missions in your state? Do you believe the Stafford Act needs amending?

The principle that active duty forces should not ordinarily engage in civilian law enforcement is sound. I oppose federalizing law enforcement in response to most emergency situations. It's important to keep civilian law enforcement in the hands of state and local governments, and not the active duty military. However, I believe there is a widespread misconception that the Posse Comitatus Act somehow prohibits active duty military forces from assisting in emergency situations, but this is not the case. The law limits when the military can be used to enforce civilian laws and has exceptions for truly extraordinary situations.

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Assistance and Emergency Relief Act, (Pub.L. 93-288), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, *et seq.* sets forth the basic federal policies and statutory direction on responding to disasters and federal assistance to state and local governments and citizens in disaster situations. A great deal has changed since the last major amendments to this law, including the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Pennsylvanians, like all Americans, are concerned about reports of the performance of this agency and its components in response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster. I have no doubt that lessons learned from the response to the terrorist attacks in 2001 and the disasters over the last few years, including most notably, Hurricane Katrina, should be considered when Congress undertakes a review of this legislation. I would urge Congress to solicit input from the states when it undertakes a review of the Stafford Act.

Do you believe that emergency response and homeland missions should be kept in the hands of the National Guard? Why? What capabilities do they bring that active duty does not?

Yes. The National Guard, under state – not federal – command and control, provides the well-trained military forces that the Governors need to respond to most emergency and homeland security situations. The Guard can provide more direct assistance to civilian law enforcement than the active forces, and this is how it should be. For most emergencies not involving an interstate response, the Guard provides an on-scene local force ready and able to respond quickly and professionally.

The relatively new Emergency Management Assistance Compact, joined by Pennsylvania and the other states, provides a mechanism to respond to emergencies in our sister states. I'm particularly proud that the Pennsylvania National Guard was able to mobilize and deploy more

than 3,200 soldiers and airmen in response to the requests of the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi in support of Hurricane Katrina. I should note that our response to EMAC requests was not limited to Hurricane Katrina. Since June 2005, the Pennsylvania National Guard received and responded to 33 EMAC requests from other states.

Of course, the active duty military can and should play a role in responding to major emergencies with interstate consequences. Active duty military forces provide essential humanitarian assistance, and their capabilities may be needed in certain situations. But this does not mean that we need to federalize disaster response.

Do you think DHS should assist states in funding the National Guard for homeland security activities?

I believe the federal government needs to provide more funding to enhance the National Guard's homeland security missions. Ordinarily, federal funding for the Guard comes through the National Guard Bureau, which serves as a channel of communication and coordination between DoD and the states. Although I would not want to disrupt the well-established system of DoD funding for the National Guard, I note that DHS funds could also be distributed directly to states through the states' emergency management agencies A few specific examples of where additional DHS funding would be appropriate include:

- When the Guard provides infrastructure protection at airports, power plants, etc.
- For Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear High Explosives (CBRNE) and WMD training when it is specifically provided for civilian, local and state entities. These funds could be used to augment other initiatives.
- In concert with other emergency management agencies, such as PEMA, for development of Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP) and Continuity of Government (COG) plans.
- For development of contingency plans as it relates to synchronization and interoperability with federal military partners.

Do either of you distribute any DHS grant money to the National Guard? If so, for what and if not, why not?

The Pennsylvania National Guard received DHS funding to enhance emergency response capabilities in connection with Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear High Explosives (CBRNE) missions. These funds came to the Guard through PEMA. These funds (about $2 million over a period of 3 years) helped procure personal protective equipment, search and rescue and communications equipment as well as other equipment and CBRNE reference materials. Pennsylvania also received from DHS approximately $1 million for terrorism training for law enforcement agencies through the Guard's Northeast Counter-drug Training Center (NCTC).

Do you believe FEMA should be funding the National Guard for its emergency response work on Hurricane Katrina?

FEMA funds are used to support National Guard emergency responses in some situations such as where the Guard is ordered to state active duty and federal funds become available after the fact.

These funds usually flow through our state emergency management agency. The Hurricane Katrina response was handled differently. The U.S. Government stepped up to the plate and authorized the EMAC missions to be performed in federally-funded state status under Title 32, United States Code. This means that DoD directly funded the pay and allowances and operating and maintenance costs for this mission even as the soldiers and airmen remained under state command and control. Federal funding under Title 32 USC (state command and control) should be the accepted "standard" for responding to catastrophic events like Hurricane Katrina.

What steps has your state taken to identify the equipment it would need to respond to disasters and homeland security missions? What types of equipment are most needed?

The types of equipment needed depend on the mission and the nature of the disaster. For chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high explosive incidents, highly specialized and sophisticated equipment would be required. In Pennsylvania, we have the 3rd Civil Support Team (WMD). The 3rd Civil Support Team (CST)(WMD) supports civil authorities in domestic incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosives(CBRNE). The 3rd CST consists of 22 full-time Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel of the Pennsylvania Army and Air National Guard.
This small team, and its specialized equipment, provides a Tier Two response capability for these kinds of incidents.

For many natural disasters, the equipment needed is what the Guard is supposed to have on hand every day. Unfortunately, as we discussed at the hearing on October 20, some Guard units find themselves short of this equipment (trucks, trailers, aircraft, etc.) because of its use for overseas missions. As I pointed out in my statement to the Committee, some of equipment stays behind in Iraq and Afghanistan when our forces come home. DoD has been too slow in replenishing this equipment so that the units are once again fully equipped at their home stations.

Right now the Department of Defense does not consider equipping the National Guard for homeland security or emergency response its mission, although they did make an exception with Hurricane Katrina response. Do you believe that DOD should assist states with resourcing and equipment for homeland use? If so, how?

Yes. DoD needs to provide funding for personnel and equipment for the National Guard to perform all its missions, including those related to homeland security and emergency responses. It's often been said that the National Guard is "federalism in action" in the military context. Over the years, we have shown that the partnership between the states and the federal government with regard to the National Guard can work well. However, when the federal government views the Guard as just another Reserve Component to provide manpower for overseas missions with no special requirements as a result of its state and homeland security missions, then the partnership does not work as effectively as it should. The federal government needs to take a systematic approach in working with the states to identify equipment needs and making sure that, when equipment is left behind overseas, it is replaced promptly. I also believe DoD should allocate training time and resources to enhance the capability of our Guard forces to respond to homeland security and emergency response needs.

Do you see any coordination between DHS and DOD that helps you as Governors with homeland defense and security? What improvements need to be made?

DHS, including FEMA, and DoD need to work together to coordinate the funding and operations of the military and non-military assets available to respond to emergencies. One example of coordination at the state level is when our National Guard personnel use the classified information network to share threat information through the NGB with state homeland security personnel and law enforcement.

What do you think Congress needs to do to assist you and the people of your states in preparing the National Guard for missions in the homeland?

Congress needs to make sure that DoD is not overlooking or undervaluing important homeland security/homeland defense missions. For example, in Pennsylvania, DoD proposed closure of the Willow Grove Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base and deactivation of a Pennsylvania National Guard fighter wing as part of the 2005 BRAC Round. I have seldom seen a better example of a short-sighted action in response to a very real threat. Willow Grove is located in a key strategic location just outside Philadelphia. It provides important staging and surge capabilities to respond to emergencies in some of our nation's largest metropolitan area, including the National Capital Region. And yet, DoD proposed to abandon military flying operations at this site, and we are still struggling to get DoD support for this installation even though the BRAC Commission said flying operations should continue. Congress needs to hold DoD's feet to the fire and make sure it provides the installations, equipment and resources to let the state National Guard forces do the jobs they do best.

Question Taken for the Record:

Has anyone from NORTHCOM or DOD asked you specifically about your stated needs and assets?

The Pennsylvania National Guard has received no direct requests from US NORTHCOM concerning its stated needs and assets. The National Guard Bureau, the established channel of communication between the states and DoD for National Guard matters, regularly queries the states, including Pennsylvania, about this and many other questions. From a policy perspective, it appears that some at NORTHCOM believe that federalizing disaster response is the way ahead. On the contrary, I firmly believe that strengthening the state/federal partnership and enhancing the response capabilities of the National Guard is the way to proceed. On October 13, 2005, the National Governors' Association issued a position statement on "federalizing emergencies." The NGA observed: "Governors are responsible for the safety and welfare of their citizens and are in the best position to coordinate all resources to prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters. Federal aid and assistance are sometimes necessary to accomplish these goals, and governors are open to discussing how to best team with federal emergency officials."

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
USHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
CHAIRMAN TOM DAVIS
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Governor Kempthorne

- ***How do you feel about easing Posse Comitatus restrictions on active duty forces performing domestic missions in your state? Do you believe the Stafford Act needs amending?***

  The Posse Comitatus restrictions for active duty forces should not be eased. Historically the use of active duty forces by the states have been limited with due consideration to both legal and political ramifications. While there has been a limited roll for the active duty military to assist in domestic missions with such skills as surveillance, information gathering and logistical support, the law enforcement must remain with National Guard citizen soldiers and airmen who have a much closer relationship with local leadership and local citizens. We must not forget that individual states are in fact sovereign, and any use of federal troops in the law enforcement mission, must not be a unilateral decision made at the federal level.

  The current Stafford Act is satisfactory and should not be changed; there is sufficient language in the law to assist the states in their recovery efforts. The real issue is insuring that the states and assisting entities understand the Stafford Act and are prepared to enact it in a timely manner.

- ***Do you believe that emergency response and homeland missions should be kept in the hands of the National Guard? Why? What capabilities do they bring that active duty does not?***

  Yes, the National Guard should be the primary agency to provide military support to local and state governments during a state and/or federally declared disaster. The National Guard is under the control of a state's governor so my response to this question is limited to Idaho.

  The Idaho National Guard has adequate contingency plans to respond to declared emergencies. It also has a proven success record in dealing with events such as wild land fires, floods, and civil emergencies. The Idaho National Guard has a trained, equipped, and capable Civil Support Team ready to respond to any WMD event in our state or region.

The National Guard of any state, brings a number of capabilities not present in active duty formations. These include, in part, a familiarity with the political environment within the state, a knowledge of the geographical features, an understanding and working relationships with local emergency service providers, a knowledge of physical assets available within the state, and the ability to deploy within hours, not days.

- ***Do you think DHS should assist states in funding the National Guard for homeland security activities?***

  Yes, DHS should fund state National Guard activities where appropriate to allow each state the ability to tailor and streamline their response to declared emergencies within its' sovereign borders and beyond when requested for assistance via EMAC . While the National Guards primary mission is military specific, its secondary responsibility is one that is valued added to the Governor of the state by providing a readily accessible, highly trained, well supplied organization which is capable of responding to critical public safety issues in an expeditious manner. A formula should be developed that adequately funds the National Guard for their planning, training, exercising and response to homeland security events.

- ***Do either of you distribute any DHS grant money to the National Guard? If so, for what and if not why not?***

  No, but to some limited degree there is a sharing of pooled resources such as combined homeland security training and exercising. We are exploring providing the National Guard with DHS grant dollars to allow for the assignment of personnel as liaison officers to the state emergency coordination center which would assist in the coordination and control of military assets during an incident of national significance.

- ***Do you believe FEMA should be funding the National Guard for its emergency response work on Hurricane Katrina?***

  Yes, there should be the same type of system in place for the payment by FEMA to the National Guard as is currently done for other local and state agencies that provided services for the victims of Katrina. During a national event a funding mechanism should be in place that expedites the process so that operational activities are not hindered. Wherever possible, funds should be directly passed from the Federal government to the agency providing the assistance. A direct funding/reimbursement process would not only expedite delivery of assistance, but would also lessen the burden on the impacted state government during a time of crisis.

- ***What are the top concerns of your fellow Governors at the National Governors Association concerning National Guard readiness, training, equipment and ability to assist in state emergencies?***

Currently, the most pressing issues facing the nation's Governors is the lack of equipment and/or the need to reequip the National Guard for new missions both home and abroad.

As I discussed in my testimony, and have conferred with my fellow Governors, we are faced with the daunting task of managing a natural or man made disaster with a significant shortage of rolling stock, state of the art tactical communication equipment, airlift capabilities, and critical medical equipment.

Our National Guard soldiers are returning home from missions abroad to a "hero's welcome", which is absolutely fitting. However, when these men and women return to our training facilities in order to maintain their level of readiness they will most likely be handed a book or given the keys to a World War II era vehicle. We cannot maintain our readiness for future missions, domestic or foreign, or expect that when asked to extend their military obligation our soldiers will comply, if we do not have the proper, state-of-the-art equipment complement.

An additional issue that the Nation's Governors are facing is the belief that Congress should improve healthcare benefits for members of the National Guard and Reserves by allowing them to enroll in TRICARE, regardless of mobilization status. The men and women in our National Guard and Reserves are playing an increasingly integral role in military operations domestically and around the world. The reserve component of our military forces' overall activity level has increased from relatively modest annual duty days in the 1970s to having made up over 50 percent of the troops being utilized in the current war in Iraq and Afghanistan. As our nation makes more demands on the National Guard and Reserve, we must make every effort to keep their health benefits commensurate with their service. We urge you and your colleagues to take this opportunity to bolster your support of our troops by giving them the healthcare extension they deserve.

A third priority for the nation's Governors, in the wake of the natural disasters that our nation has faced this past year, is the manner in which we handle emergency response. As the Governor of Idaho, I am willing to work with the Federal Government to improve the manner in which we coordinate response to large-scale disasters, as are all the nation's Governors. Any action taken by the federal government to pre-empt the authority of states or Governors in emergencies would be a mistake.

The National Governors Association (NGA) released a statement in mid-October that explained the Governors position on emergency response. The statement read:

"Following the tragedies inflicted on the citizens of the gulf coast by hurricanes Katrina and Rita, local, state and federal government must examine the way the three levels of government communicate and coordinate their response. The possibility of the federal government pre-empting the authority of states or governors in emergencies, however, is opposed by the nation's governors.

Governors are responsible for the safety and welfare of their citizens and are in the best position to coordinate all resources to prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters. Federal aid and assistance are sometimes necessary to accomplish these goals, and governors are open to discussing how to best team with federal emergency officials."

- ***What steps has your state taken to identify the equipment it would need to respond to disasters and homeland security missions? What type of equipment is most needed?***

I have identified several factors that will seriously limit my ability to respond to a homeland security/homeland defense event. First, during the last round of BRAC, the Air Force recommended the withdrawal of Idaho's C-130 tactical airlift aircraft. The result of this action will leave Idaho and many other parts of our region, without the capability to quickly and adequately respond to a natural or man made disaster. During the Hurricane Katrina emergency, the Air National Guard flew eight out of every ten missions flown. The ability for governors to provide this immediate and quick life-saving response will be severely handicapped with the withdrawal and realignment of these C-130 assets.

Secondly, Idaho's Army National has just returned from its 18 month deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. As part of the redeployment, we were directed to leave behind in Iraq large amounts of equipment necessary for the homeland security mission, including in part, 357 radios; 325 wheeled vehicles; 14 maintenance, utility and low boy trailers; 4 water purification units; and 3 mobile kitchen units. I do not object to leaving this equipment behind; however, there must be a plan to rapidly re-equip our units with modern, not outdated, equipment. If this does not happen, the National Guard will not be able to retain our combat veterans or recruit new Soldiers into our units. Furthermore, the governors will be severely limited in homeland security/homeland defense capabilities options.

The most critical equipment required to respond to the homeland mission include communication assets; airlift support (helicopter & fixed wing); wheeled vehicles; medical and engineer equipment; and an increasing need for search and rescue unit capabilities. All of these assets are available in National Guard formations provided that they are equipped as authorized, or stationed where required.

- ***Right now the Department of Defense does not consider equipping the National Guard for homeland security or emergency response its mission, although they did make an exception with Hurricane Katrina response. Do you believe that DOD should assist states with resourcing and equipment for homeland use? If so, how?***

  A vast majority of the equipment needs for homeland security or emergency response are the same the National Guard will use when they are activated in their federal role. The resourcing and equipping of National Guard in its federal capacity assists the states as well as give the citizens of this state and nation a greater return on their investment. Readiness is readiness whether in support of our federal or state missions.

- ***Do you see any coordination between DHS and DOD that helps you as Governors with homeland defense and security? What improvements need to be made?***

  As I answered above, tactical airlift, interoperable communications equipment, rolling stock, and coordination between federal agencies and Governors are all essential to successfully responding to a homeland security event. Any effort to improve access to and coordination of resources will improve our response to crisis.

- ***At the hearing, you commented on improvements that can be made to the EMAC process in terms of credentialing and reciprocity. Can you please explain in detail what you think needs to be done? Can the role of the National Guard Bureau be improved in the EMAC process?***

  There needs to be a clarifying and streamline within the Federal system that allows professionals from other states such as physicians to practice in impacted states with some form of national credentialing authority or recognition of the assisting state credentials. The same is true of law enforcement officers who are POST certified in their home state and working in another state during the disaster.

  The role of the National Guard Bureau should be to facilitate the sourcing of National Guard personnel in response to a national catastrophic event thus allowing the supported state or states to focus on timely emergency response actions.

Hearing Date: 20 October 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep. Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Questions # 1-2

ARMY EQUIPPING REPLACEMENT PLANS

Question. Why has the Army not complied with Department of Defense (DoD) policy in developing equipment replacement plans for Army National Guard (ARNG) equipment that has been left in theater?

What is the current status of the Army effort to develop replacement plans?

Answer. In answer to both questions, the Army is complying with DoD policy and is developing replacement plans in close coordination with the ARNG. In fact, the ARNG recently provided two officers to assist the Army staff to better manage the timeline requirements in Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1225.6, *Equipping the Reserve Forces*, dated April 7, 2005. This directive updates policies and responsibilities for procuring and distributing items of new and combat-serviceable equipment to the Reserve components.

About four months ago the Army began to formally document replacement plans in compliance with DoDD 1225.6 and currently has 10 separate equipping payback actions related to the ARNG in various stages of the approval process. These 10 actions represent the Army's commitment to replace equipment moved from the ARNG to satisfy Global War on Terror requirements. The Army staff is working with the ARNG to diligently reconcile information to ensure all equipment items left behind is properly documented with a specific payback plan. The Army staff will continue to monitor the process of capturing past events and strive to get ahead of future needs to better allow the ARNG to understand the effects with The Adjutants General and post deployment needs of their assigned units.

The Army will replace ARNG equipment with recapitalized equipment from Army depots, repaired equipment from Active component commands, Army sustainment stocks, or production line redirection. The Army staff is concentrating its efforts for the ARNG on the 342 equipment items identified are needed for combat operations and also have a high pay-off value for homeland security and homeland defense missions. ARNG equipment will be replaced with more modern equipment as much as possible in the near term.

The Army is replacing equipment in-kind, and focusing on early replacement of equipment that has the highest payoff for homeland missions. This is being accomplished in close coordination with the ARNG. The Army is committed to equipping the ARNG for full spectrum operations, thereby enabling them to meet both Federal and State missions.

Hearing Date: 20 October 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Question # 3

ARMY EQUIPPING REPLACEMENT PLANS

Question. What is the affect (effect sic) on returning unit's ability to train for future missions when they have left equipment overseas?

Answer. The overall equipping posture has some adverse effects on Army collective training. Selected units have experienced degradation in their ability to train to the full spectrum mission requirements as a direct result of the equipment left behind in the Theater of Operations. The Army's Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) will assist in mitigating the degraded equipping situation by prioritizing the Active and Reserve Components' available resources while HQDA works to fill equipment shortages. Further, use of "training sets" by units during training cycles will help to mitigate some of the combat equipment shortfall until we are able to resource modernized equipment to adequate levels across the Army. This "bridge" strategy will ensure that ARNG units have the required equipment training sets to facilitate full integration into the ARFORGEN training strategy. It will allow ARNG units to respond to homeland security and homeland defense needs throughout the six year ARFORGEN cycle as required by the State's Governors and their Adjutants General's mission analysis in support of the various National Response plans. It will also provide the necessary resources to train during their "ramp up" for potential full spectrum operations deployment every six years in accordance with the Army Campaign Plan.

Hearing Date: 20 October 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep. Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Question # 4

ARMY EQUIPPING REPLACEMENT PLANS

Question. When will detailed equipment fielding plans for converting the Army National Guard (ARNG) to a modular force be developed?

Answer. Detailed equipment fielding plans for converting the ARNG to a modular force are being developed on an ongoing basis in deliberate, sequential processes in accordance with the Army Campaign Plan. The Director of the ARNG has oversight for transforming ARNG units. The ARNG develops detailed equipping plans for ARNG units in coordination with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G8, Force Development. The Army uses Equipping Conferences to develop plans to field equipment for specific units in priority sequence governed by the Army Campaign Plan, Army Force Generation Model, and the Army Resourcing Priorities List. The ARNG has a Modularity Control Cell that coordinates with the Adjutants General to synchronize the fielding of equipment. The organizational designs that identify the quantities and types of personnel and equipment for each unit are provided by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, Force Management. We refer to the design documents as Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment.

The Army Campaign Plan directs planning, preparation, and execution of Army operations and Army transformation within the context of ongoing strategic commitments including the Global War on Terror. Army strategic commitments and resource availability dictate sequencing of campaign objectives.

The Army Force Generation model, driven by operational requirements, prioritizes units to ensure the Army allocates the correct mix of equipment to provide a sustained capability of operationally ready units to fulfill regional combatant commander requirements. This includes United States Northern Command's mission to perform Homeland Security and Homeland Defense using the ARNG as the first military responder.

Hearing Date: 20 October 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep. Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Question # 5

ARMY EQUIPPING REPLACEMENT PLANS

Question. Will Army National Guard (ARNG) units continue to be equipped with older, less capable items?

Answer. The previous National Military Strategy to employ the ARNG as a strategic reserve resulted in the ARNG being equipped with older, less capable equipment. The legacy of the previous strategy is a capability gap between the Active and Reserve components. Today, the Army employs the Reserve components the same as their Active counterparts, as an Operational Force. This significant change has altered the way the Army generates, equips, trains, and employs the force. The Army now distributes equipment to reset, reconstitute, and transform forces regardless of component into a revised, modular force structure to meet future mission requirements.

As ARNG units transform, they receive the most modern equipment available, fully interoperable with their Active component counterparts. However, the Nation needs time and funding to overcome the legacy of the previous National Military Strategy. ARNG units "Deployed" and identified as "Next to Deploy" in support of Named Operations will continue to receive the most modern equipment. The ARNG will be equipped with more modern equipment when they transform, and with the most modern equipment as the Army garners the funding to replace the remaining sufficient, but less capable equipment. The goal of the Army is to equip the ARNG to 100 percent of the Army required equipment to ensure interoperability with the Army for all mission types. The Army will make substantial progress toward that goal over the next five years through its plan to provide $21 billion for ARNG equipment.

Hearing Date: 20 October 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Question # 6

ARMY EQUIPPING REPLACEMENT PLANS

Question. Please explain how reorganizing to the modular design will help improve the readiness of Army National Guard (ARNG) units when they do not expect to have all the equipment they would need to deploy for several years.

Answer. The modular force design will ensure interoperability within the Army which will make the Army better prepared to meet national defense needs. The Army accelerated the transformation timeline of ARNG units in response to the ARNG request in order to enable manning and individual training requirements to be met. This will enable ARNG units to optimize collective unit training as more equipment is made available to them over time. The acceleration decision requires the Army to synchronize limited resource distribution to ARNG units to ensure select units are ready for future national defense needs and provide the Adjutants General with as much capability as economically feasible to respond to homeland security and homeland defense needs. Overall, the modular force designs are already enhancing the operational and homeland security / homeland defense capabilities of the ARNG. Once personnel, training and equipment requirements for full spectrum warfight requirements are met, these formations will have the added capability desired by the Army for the Nation's defense.

Hearing Date: October 20, 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Question # 7

ARMY EQUIPPING REPLACEMENT PLANS

Question. To what extent are the Guard's homeland security and disaster response needs being considered in setting the Guard's equipment requirements under the new rotational deployment model?

Answer. The National Military Strategy establishes homeland security as the first priority of the Nation, which includes actions overseas and at home. The Army is committed to ensure the Guard's homeland security and disaster response needs will be considered within ARFORGEN. In the future modular force, the difference between baseline equipment set and deployment equipment set will be small. In the near term, the Army does not have enough equipment to resource every unit at 100 percent of its authorized equipment. Until the Army reaches equilibrium under the Army Force Generation model, the equipping of units, both active and reserve, will remain a daily challenge. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, works constantly to fulfill the validated requirements of operational units.

We have identified, in coordination with the Army National Guard, 10 essential homeland defense capabilities that are critical to domestic civil support operations. These categories are: transportation, medical, logistics, maintenance, security, chemical, aviation, signal, engineer, and command and control. We have completed two phases of a joint, comprehensive study with the Army National Guard to determine what equipment is needed for major combat operations and has the greatest use for homeland security missions. We started with a list of 318 items of equipment that the Army National Guard needed to support their 10 essential homeland defense capabilities. We worked jointly with the Army National Guard and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3 to validate capability requirements and identify modern equipment to meet capability requirements. In some cases, we agreed to eliminate obsolete equipment from the National Guard's initial list and replace it with modern equipment comparative to active component units. In some other cases, we recommended additional equipment to meet a required capability. The new, jointly developed list has been refined to 342 items of equipment needed for major combat operations that also add value for homeland security missions. We have a good grasp on the types and quantities of equipment we need to provide the National Guard so they can perform their missions during all phases of the rotation cycle. We also have a significant investment, which includes most of the 342 items listed, over the Army's Program Objective Memorandum for equipping the Army National Guard.

Hearing Date: 20 October 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep. Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Question # 8

ARMY EQUIPPING REPLACEMENT PLANS

Question. Has the risk of equipping Guard units at lower levels in certain phases of the rotational cycle been considered? Have strategies been considered to mitigate risks?

Answer. If there are Army-wide shortages of equipment critical to the Theater Commander's mission requirements, the Army's last resort is to direct units to leave equipment in theater. We are aware that this further complicates the Army National Guard's (ARNG) ability to respond to state and homeland defense missions. The Army has implemented a process, in accordance with existing directives, to approve and track equipment transfers from Reserve component units to Active component units. This process also ensures that equipment replacement plans are developed and executed so that Reserve component units are ready for homeland missions after redeployment from overseas missions. The Army has instituted Army Equipping Conferences which address total Army equipping requirements and develop fielding solutions to fill or mitigate those shortages. The Army is committed to resourcing ARNG units in each phase of their rotation cycle within the Army Force Generation model to ensure that ARNG units can conduct homeland defense and homeland security operations, provide Military Support to Civil Authorities such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, and train for full spectrum operations.

Hearing Date: 20 October 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep. Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Question # 9

ARMY EQUIPPING REPLACEMENT PLANS

Question. Does the Department of Defense (DoD) expect the states to provide resources to National Guard forces for domestic missions? If so, what resources are the state's responsibilities? What are DoD's responsibilities?

Answer. These questions fall under the purview of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, and they have offered the following response to your questions.

Since the inception of the National Guard or "Militia," States and Territories routinely provide state funding in using their respective National Guard forces in state active duty to respond to domestic natural and manmade disasters. In those cases where the President authorizes federal disaster assistance, the Federal Emergency Management Agency reimburses states for the use of their National Guard forces in state active duty. As an exception to DoD policy, due to the magnitude of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized selected National Guard members to be activated in Title 32 status to respond.

States are responsible for the following costs when their National Guardsmen are performing state active duty: All personnel costs, to include, basic pay and allowances, any incentive pay, per diem and subsistence, and health care expense; all operations and maintenance costs of employed vehicles and equipment, as provided for by state laws. When states employ their members in state active duty, DoD is still responsible for real property maintenance and utility costs, furnishing equipment for the federal missions, acquisition for upgrades and replacement of military equipment, and the continued pay and allowances of military technicians and those Guardsmen who still remain in a Title 10 or 32 status.

Hearing Date: 20 October 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep. Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Question # 10

ARMY EQUIPPING REPLACEMENT PLANS

Question. Do you support the Government Accountability Office's recommendations to create a tracking system for Guard equipment? If so, what will the system look like and what participation will the Army National Guard (ARNG) have in the development of this system?

Answer. The Army does not support the recommendation to create a separate tracking system for Guard equipment. We believe the present systems are adequate and will provide a very clear picture of Guard equipping as a part of the total Army. The Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1225.6, *Equipping the Reserve Forces*, dated April 7, 2005, lays out specific requirements for Reserve component equipment transfers to the Army with payback plans. The Army "EQUIPFOR" database lays out the Army equipping plan to the line-item number level for all components. It is the Army equipping database of record and represents asset visibility for all components.

Hearing Date: 20 October 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep. Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Question # 11

ARMY EQUIPPING REPLACEMENT PLANS

Question. As of June 2005, the Army estimated that it would cost about $15.6 billion to convert most of the Army National Guard's (ARNG) units to modularity, but this estimate did not include all expected costs and the Army was unable to provide detailed information to support the estimate. To convert the entire Army, the cost was estimated at $28 billion in 2004, and has grown to $48 billion in 2005. Until that Army fully identifies Guard equipment requirements and associated costs for both the near and long term, Department of Defense (DoD) and Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh their affordability and effectiveness.

So what is the Army going to do to ensure Congress that we have the correct information we need to support the ARNG?

Answer. To convert Brigade Combat Teams, the cost was estimated at $28 billion in 2004. To convert the entire Army, the cost was estimated at $48 billion in 2005.

The Army is committed to identifying and equipping the total requirement. DoD and the Army (Active, ARNG, and U.S. Army Reserve) understand that equipping shortages have historically existed across the force but especially in the ARNG. The strategic change in how the Nation employs its Reserve component units has changed the way the Army generates, equips, trains, and employs the force. Driven by the realities of the Global War on Terror and the need to deploy the Reserve component as an Operational Force alongside Active component formations, the Army has revised its equipping strategy and is in the process of implementing it with the full support of the ARNG. These equipping challenges did not develop overnight, and cannot be resolved overnight. However, the Army will continue striving to provide the best available equipment to its forces charged to fight our nation's wars and provide domestic security. The path the Army has set, enabled by continued support from Congress, will allow it to do accomplish this through the Future Years Defense Plan.

Hearing Date: 20 October 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep. Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Question # 12

ARMY EQUIPPING REPLACEMENT PLANS

Question. Even if DoD and U.S. Northern Command define domestic requirements for the Guard, it will take the Department of the Army to increase its funding of the National Guard to provide the equipment and training. Policies without dedicated equipment and training are just pieces of paper. How is the Army preparing to recognize the role of the Army National Guard (ARNG) at home to make sure equipment and training are secured?

Answer. Today, the Army employs the Reserve component and the Active component as an Operational Force. This significant change has altered the way the Army generates, equips, trains, and employs the force. The Army now distributes equipment to reset, reconstitute, and transform forces into a revised, modular force structure to meet future mission requirements, regardless of component. The highest equipping priorities are for units deployed in overseas and homeland operations, and the next highest equipping priority is for units scheduled to deploy, regardless of component. As an example, priority for equipment fill to units engaged in hurricane relief operations was second only to those units deploying for combat to Iraq or Afghanistan. The Army is also working closely with the ARNG and U.S. Army Reserve to ensure sufficient equipment is available to support annual training readiness and joint missions including homeland security and defense.

Given the Army's current Total Obligation Authority, the $25 billion (B) in Modularity Reserve, and the fiscal year 2006 supplemental, the Army plans to invest approximately $21B on equipping and modernizing the ARNG during fiscal years 2006 through 2011. To put it into context, the Army's investment strategy for the ARNG two years ago of $5.6B has increased for validated ARNG equipping requirements by 380 percent, to $21B. The current investment strategy includes approximately $6.9B in combat vehicles and weapon systems, $4.5B in tactical wheeled vehicles, $3.5B in communications equipment, and $3B in force protection equipment. These investments provide the ARNG with equipment useful to both its wartime and homeland defense missions. Based upon recent discussion with the National Guard Bureau (NGB), the ARNG believes that after this investment the Army is still accepting risk in the capability areas of tactical wheeled vehicles (approximately $4.9B), aircraft (approximately $993 million (M)), night vision (approximately $532M), and force protection equipment (approximately $438M). The Army is continuing to work with the NGB to ensure that the ARNG is appropriately funded and equipped.

Hearing Date: October 20, 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Question # 13

ARMY EQUIPPING REPLACEMENT PLANS

Question. Under the Army's Force Generation Model, Guard units may be provided a significantly reduced set of equipment for several years. How have you consulted the National Guard Bureau in developing the baseline set of equipment that will be used to perform domestic missions?

Answer. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 is responsible for materiel integration and resourcing, which includes the fielding of equipment, to Army units, active, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard. The G-8 works closely with the Director of the Army National Guard and the Chief, Army Reserve, to ensure that our reserve component Soldiers are equipped and resourced properly according to their mission. The Army is committed to ensure that National Guard units have the equipment required to provide military support to civil authorities during each phase of the Army Force Generation readiness cycle.

The Army has identified, in coordination with the Army National Guard, 10 essential homeland defense capability categories that are critical to domestic civil support operations. These categories are: transportation, medical, logistics, maintenance, security, chemical, aviation, signal, engineer, and command and control. The Army has completed two phases of a joint, comprehensive study with the Army National Guard to determine what equipment is needed for major combat operations and has the greatest use for homeland security missions. The process started with a list of 318 items of equipment that the Army National Guard needed to support their 10 essential homeland defense capabilities. The Army staff worked jointly with the Army National Guard and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3 to validate capability requirements and identify modern equipment to meet capability requirements. In some cases, it was agreed to eliminate obsolete equipment from the National Guard's initial list and replace that equipment with modern equipment comparative to active component units. In some other cases, additional equipment to meet a required capability was recommended. The new, jointly developed list has been refined to 342 items of equipment needed for major combat operations that also add value for homeland security missions. The Army has a significant investment, which includes most of the 342 items listed, over the Army's Program Objective Memorandum for equipping the Army National Guard.

Hearing Date: 20 October 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Question # 14

NATIONAL GUARD PROCUREMENT

Question. Would it help if Congress changes procurement procedures for the National Guard? Please explain.

Answer. I have asked the National Guard to respond to your question as they are intimately familiar with the impact of current procurement procedures.

The National Guard works closely with its Army and Air Force Total Force partners in ensuring that National Guard units across the country are adequately equipped. Over the next several years, as the entire military transforms, we have agreements from both the Army and Air Force to get new equipment for emerging missions, however the National Guard believes that Homeland Defense requirements, in general, are treated as a lower priority in the service's Program Objective Memorandum due to current recapitalization requirements of aging war fighting equipment. A national-level dialogue is required to define the procurement process of homeland defense equipment once the requirements are defined by U.S. Northern Command. This process requires both an inter- and intra-agency look based on Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security's involvement in resourcing both the Homeland Defense and Security missions for the United States.

We welcome Congress's interest in our procurement situation. As you know we must work with both the Army and Air Force to validate our requirements. As such, pieces of procurement flow from the parent service to the National Guard Bureau and eventually to the state. This is a very tedious and cumbersome process. Indeed the Army National Guard stood up a separate branch to track the flow of equipment to the National Guard. However, an immediate change in procurement policy could be detrimental to the National Guard. If the National Guard received its own procurement line, it would alter the requirements process, which the organization is not capable of handling at this time. This situation requires a further assessment, but our initial response would be that an immediate change would not be in the best interest of any Total Force partner.

Hearing Date: 20 October 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep. Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Question # 15

ARMY EQUIPPING REPLACEMENT PLANS

Question. At the hearing you mentioned that the Army is conducting a comprehensive review with the Army National Guard (ARNG) to determine what items of equipment needed for major combat operations also have the greatest use for homeland defense missions. Can you please share this review with the Committee?

Answer. The Army would gladly share the results of the review after it is complete in January 2006. In coordination with the ARNG, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3 has identified 10 essential homeland defense capabilities that are critical to domestic civil support operations. These categories are: transportation, medical, logistics, maintenance, security, chemical, aviation, signal, engineer, and command and control. The Army also has completed two phases of a joint, comprehensive study with the ARNG to determine what equipment needed for major combat operations has the greatest use for homeland defense and homeland security missions. Initially a list of 318 items of equipment that the ARNG needed to support their ten essential homeland defense capabilities was developed. The Army then worked jointly with the ARNG and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, to validate capability requirements and identify modern equipment to meet capability requirements. In some cases it was agreed to eliminate obsolete equipment from the ARNG's initial list and replace it with modern equipment comparable to Active component units. In some cases additional equipment was recommended to meet a required capability.

The new, jointly developed list has been expanded to 342 items of equipment needed for major combat operations that also have a high pay-off value for homeland security and homeland defense missions. The Army has a good grasp on the types and quantities of equipment it needs to provide the ARNG so it can perform its mission during all phases of the rotation cycle. The Army also has a significant investment, which includes most of the 342 items listed, over the Army's program objective memorandum for equipping the ARNG. Now the Army is engaged in determining how to resource the critical need of $7B for the ARNG in the next budget process.

Hearing Date: 20 October 2005
Committee: HGRC
Member: Rep Tom Davis
Witness: LTG Melcher
Question # 16

Proposed $1.3 Billion for Army National Guard Equipment

Question. At the hearing both you and Secretary Hall seemed to support the $1.3 billion proposal for equipment for the Guard. What will you do to ensure that they receive this amount?

Answer. The Army understands Congress is entertaining a proposal for $1.3 billion. Based on the proposal, it appears that these funds would be divided between the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account, which is executed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Air Force Procurement and Army Procurement. For the Army's portion of the funding – approximately $700 million – the Army staff would coordinate with the Army acquisition community and the National Guard to procure the equipment specified by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. Tracking procurement and funding by using Army-established databases in order to provide unit level and quantity detail would also be used.

It is critical that funding to support the $1.3 billion proposal not be taken from other Army accounts as that may have an unintended adverse impact on other key programs.

TESTIMONY OF

MG ALLEN E. TACKETT
ADJUTANT GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

The Critical Role of the National Guard at Home and Abroad

October 20, 2005

Questions for the Record

Q: What is the affect on returning units' ability to train for future missions when they have left equipment overseas?

A: Obviously, if a unit leaves its MTOE equipment in theater, it cannot conduct training which requires that equipment. You can't effectively simulate operating bulldozer, a truck or a front end loader. The only way to develop expertise with equipment is to get your hands on it and use it. We have simulators for tanks, Bradleys and other weapon systems, but not for the type of equipment most commonly used in disaster response missions, which is why leaving equipment in theater has such a detrimental impact on training. This issue goes deeper than just mobilized units, however. When a unit mobilizes, equipment is "cross-leveled", that is, other units in the state give up equipment so that the mobilized unit is at the highest possible state of equipment readiness. The "robbing Peter to pay Paul" approach eventually depletes the stock of available equipment for later deploying units. If equipment is left in theater, this process is accelerated.

Q: The capabilities of the National Guard Civil Support teams to react to incidents at home are one of the first steps Congress took to let the Department of Defense know how important securing the homeland is to us. In your testimony, you propose an expansion of this mission to include natural disaster response. Can you tell us how to do this and in light of Katrina, how it will improve emergency response?

A: The Civil Support Teams (CSTs) are already trained and on the payroll. Their mission is clearly and narrowly defined. By merely authorizing an expansion of their role to include disaster response, we would have units ready to respond within an hour of a disaster. The CSTs could be the first military units on the scene to establish communications, survey for hazardous materials, conduct casualty evacuation and administer first-aid. The CSTs are

composed of highly trained, highly motivated soldiers. Allowing them the opportunity to assist in disaster response would take advantage of an asset we already have.

Q: Today, there are many people asking how we should expand the role of the military in disaster response. What ideas or opinions do you offer on this question?

A: I feel very strongly that disaster response should remain the purview of the national guard. Our active duty military should remain focused on external threats and should not have to field a new mission that would detract from their war-fighting abilities. If there is to be an expansion of the military role in disaster response, I feel that that expansion should come in the form of equipment dedicated to disaster response missions. Military equipment is issued based upon the wartime mission of the unit. An M-1 tank is a great piece of combat equipment, but of limited usefulness if you are trying to move relief supplies to flood victims. I think that the Congress should, for the first time, consider equipping national guard units with disaster response equipment regardless of the unit's MTOE.

Q: What can Congress do – new laws, new authorities, new limitations, new reporting requirements, shifted funding – that is both realistic and at the same time likely to make some real progress toward better equipping of the Army National Guard?

A: Beyond expanding the scope of duties authorized for Civil Support Teams, the Congress needs to take a realistic look at the state of national guard equipment and determine if the amount and condition of that equipment are sufficient to allow the national guard to play its ever-increasing role in mobilization operations and respond in an effective manner to domestic disaster relief efforts. The amount of equipment lost due to combat and accidents, plus the accelerated wear and tear on surviving equipment due to increased OPTEMPO makes our whole inventory, from tracked and wheeled vehicles, to radios, night vision goggles and helicopters suspect. I have seen first-hand the scavenging and scrounging that units must do in order to deploy with their full complement of equipment. Eventually, there will come a time when scavenging and scrounging won't be enough to support the defense needs of the nation. Congress needs to make sure that day never comes.

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
CHAIRMAN TOM DAVIS
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
October 20, 2005 Hearing

General Rees

You were a top official at the National Guard Bureau during the creation of the Civil Support Teams. You also oversaw the deployment of National Guardsmen to the Nation's airports after 9/11. Subsequently, you served as Chief of Staff at NORTHCOM. Today, there are many people asking how we should expand the role of the military in disaster response. What ideas or opinions do you offer on this question?

Rees: There is little need for an expansion of a role in disaster response for the active duty military. There is a clear need for federal support and partnership to make the National Guard response even better than it already is. This includes setting expectations and standards, training and exercises, appropriate resourcing, and adequate equipment.

What is the affect on returning units' ability to train for future missions when they have left equipment overseas?

Rees: Deploying units expect to have a full complement of the best equipment. Everyone works to fulfill that expectation through cross-leveling and other transfers. Army requirements to leave that equipment in theater for future rotations, creation of prepositioned sets, and transfers to other units is devastating to the domestic response of the National Guard and to readiness for future expeditionary requirements. It is the number one readiness issue and a real morale problem for the thousands of veterans returning from Iraq/Afghanistan.

You propose in your testimony that the National Guard could cover inter-jurisdictional gaps we have seen between the federal government and the states and the DOD and DHS responsibilities, much the same as we have with DoD and the Coast Guard. How could this be done?

Rees: The Coast Guard is an armed service that functions under Title 14 as a part of DHS and maintains a relationship with DOD under Title 10. That duality of purpose, authority, and funding allows the USCG to perform all manner of domestic duties to include federal law enforcement. The National Guard is an armed service that functions under state law as a part of state government and maintains a relationship with DOD under Title 32 and Title 10. That duality of purpose, authority, and funding allows the National Guard to perform all manner of domestic duties to include state and federal law enforcement. The difference is that the USCG gets both DOD and DHS guidance on expectations and standards, training, and exercises, and to appropriate resourcing for the same. The National Guard does not. The National Guard is given DOD guidance as a reserve of the

Army and the Air Force almost exclusively for expeditionary warfare.DOD resources are distributed to the states and territories based on DOD's expeditionary war needs. As a result, the National Guard state domestic disaster response is largely an unresourced by-product of training and equipping for war.With a proper relationship with DHS the National Guard could provide a more even and effective response across the nation. This would promote the strategic interests of DHS in its expectations for efficient use of resources in state and local government.

What do you think of Army modularity?

Rees: Army modularity has a great deal of promise for a prolonged and indeterminate period. It should increase the tooth-to-tail ratio and effectively increase efficiency in standardization and resource management. The dilemma for a National Guard already hurting for equipment is that it may take far too long to see results and leave us with limited domestic response capability for a significant period. The fielding of National Guard assets associated with transportation, communications, utility aviation, engineers, and military police/security roles must be accelerated.

There have been so many studies on the use of the National Guard for homeland missions. The Defense Science Board, RAND, GAO and about 8 others quickly come to mind. It should come as no surprise that the Guard is and will continue to be the nation's first military responder, whether in a man-made or natural disaster.

> Given all this, why do you believe the NORTHCOM Commander has hesitated in defining operational requirements for the National Guard for homeland defense or military assistance to civilian authorities?

Rees: NORTHCOM's mission statement makes its primary focus the defense of North America and support of civil authorities is secondary. It has a doctrinal regional combatant command relationship with its subordinate service commands of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. That conventional/traditional approach means that the National Guard is seen as a reserve of the Army and Air Force. Requirements for domestic roles for the military are given to the Army and Air Force who may then decide if they are active, reserve, or National Guard requirements and prioritize them for resource competition with all other Army and Air Force missions, domestic and expeditionary.
This will not change until it is clearly defined that for domestic purposes the National Guard is very much a sixth service that is most efficiently used under the direction of the governor following federal guidelines and standards. Resourcing must be prioritized either by weighting in the service POM process, creating a SOCOM like MFP for the National Guard, or creating a reverse USCG model with a National Guard relationship with DHS.

What can Congress do -- new laws, new authorities, new limitations, new reporting requirements, shifted funding -- that is both realistic and at the same time likely to make some real progress toward better equipping of the Army National Guard?

Rees: Serious and effective reform will require a study of the three authority and funding models: 1) domestic mission priorities in Army and Air Force POM processes; 2) NORTHCOM MFP for domestic missions; or 3) a National Guard/DHS relationship. Any of these would work provided there is congressional oversight.

What do you think of the current NORTHCOM plan to create an active duty emergency response unit?

Rees: There is no need to divert active duty resources to emergency response units. The active duty force should remain focused on their expeditionary role. The National Guard can perform these functions in a far more flexible fashion and give the governors the tools they need. The role of the federal government is to aid in continuity of state and local government operations or in restoring the same as quickly as possible.

Can you describe the status of NORTHCOM contingency plans for implementing DOD's strategy for homeland defense and civil support?

Rees: I think it would be inappropriate for me to comment on the status of NORTHCOM's contingency plans given the time elapsed since my departure in April. It was not apparent at the time of my departure that NORTHCOM had recognized additional equipment requirements for the National Guard beyond the CSTs.

> Do you know if these contingency plans will create additional equipment requirements for National Guard forces?

At the hearing, you mentioned that EMAC needs to be improved, in particular provisions that address support to law enforcement. Can you explain how EMAC can be improved and address what needs to be addressed relating to law enforcement?

Rees: EMAC is primarily an agreement for mutual aid that protects states and their employees in liability issues and provides reimbursement mechanisms/processes. Specific authorities for support to law enforcement were not included. Memoranda had to be exchanged between governors to authorize the use of the supporting state National Guard for the supported state law enforcement needs. This was not a huge impediment. Analysis should show that efficiencies in execution and in promoting standards could be achieved by including these provisions in an updated EMAC with amendments specifically authorizing supporting state National Guard personnel to perform law enforcement functions with the approval of the supported state.

Can you comment on how the current DOD process for getting to homeland security activities needs improvement?

Rees: NORTHCOM has no counterpart in DHS. This causes a layering effect that is overcome through liaison, exchanges, etc. DOD and DHS need a permanent Joint Interagency coordination process. The simplest way may be to have those military entities associated with homeland security work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense. The primary effort would include ASD Homeland Defense, Commander NORTHCOM, Commandant, USCG, and Chief NGB. This brings together the military of DOD, DHS, and the states. The most complex way would be the makeover of NORTHCOM or a major subordinate into a true Joint Interagency Task Force that would include the USCG and NGB as partners and not as a reserve of the Navy, Army, and Air Force.

How would modeling NORTHCOM authorities like SOCOM or the reserve Coast Guard model help the National Guard with performing homeland duties?

Rees: The federal government typically achieves goals through the promulgation of standards and the "power of the purse" to enforce them. Based on the assumption that our constitutional precepts are to provide for the continuity and success of state and local government then we must find a way to strengthen the states' ability to use their National Guard. This means training, equipping, and exercising the National Guard for homeland duties. Historically, DOD in the form of the Army and the Air Force has resisted doing that. To do so would mean decreasing resources for the active components and the expeditionary mission. As previously discussed, there are three models to be studied: 1) prioritized/weighted National Guard domestic requirements competing in service POMs with strong congressional oversight; 2) follow the success of the congressionally-directed use of SOCOM's MFP 11 and create a similar vehicle MFP 12 for NORTHCOM and the National Guard; 3) create a reverse USCG model with the National Guard primarily a DOD entity but with a DHS relationship. New authorities and relations for NGB would be required.

I believe the most effective solution would be the reverse USCG model. The elements of this model are: 1) under this model the NG would continue to be resourced, trained, and equipped as a reserve of the Army and Air Force with congressional guidance to prioritize as described in paragraph 4 above; 2) a relationship between the NG, NGB, and DHS would be established to resource, train, and equip for unique domestic requirements such as WMD-CST's; 3) the current state Counter-Drug Program (which is a very efficient and effective model of state-federal relations) would be modified to a Counter-Narco Terrorism Program or a parallel DHS-state program would be created to deal with DHS issues. This would create a daily force of approximately 4000 soldiers and airmen available to the states to directly achieve the standards and goals established by DHS. The reverse USCG model defines the equities of DOD and DHS in the use of the NG, promotes more even distribution of resources to the states, and provides the tools necessary to enhance interagency and interjurisdictional cooperation at the operational and strategic level.

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, and Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, House of Representatives

October 2005

RESERVE FORCES

Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives

GAO-06-111

October 2005

GAO
Accountability·Integrity·Reliability

Highlights

Highlights of GAO-06-111, a report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, and Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, House of Representatives

RESERVE FORCES

Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives

Why GAO Did This Study

Recent military operations have required that the Army rely extensively on Army National Guard forces, which currently comprise over 30 percent of the ground forces in Iraq. Heavy deployments of Army National Guard forces and their equipment, much of which has been left overseas for follow-on forces, have raised questions about whether the Army National Guard has the types and quantities of equipment it will need to continue supporting ongoing operations and future missions.

GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) the Army National Guard has the equipment needed to support ongoing operations and (2) the Army can account for Army National Guard equipment left overseas. GAO also assessed the Army's plans, cost estimates, and funding strategy for equipping Guard units under its modular and rotational force initiatives.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress plans and funding strategies to address the Army National Guard's equipment shortfalls, accurately track and replace equipment its forces left overseas, and complete planning to integrate the Army National Guard into its modular and rotational force initiatives. DOD agreed with the recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-111.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent, 202-512-4402, stlaurentj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found

While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the equipment inventory of the Guard's nondeployed units and threatens the Guard's ability to prepare forces for future missions at home and overseas. Nondeployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because (1) they have been equipped at less than war-time levels with the assumption that they could obtain additional resources prior to deployment and (2) current operations have created an unanticipated high demand for certain items, such as armored vehicles. To fully equip its deploying units, as of July 2005, the Army National Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from its nondeployed units. As of May 2005, such transfers had exhausted the Guard's inventory of more than 220 high demand equipment items, such as night vision equipment, trucks, and radios. Further, as equipment requirements for overseas operations continue to evolve, the Army has been unable to identify and communicate what items deploying units need until close to their scheduled deployments, which challenges the Guard to transfer needed equipment quickly.

To meet the demand for certain types of equipment for continuing operations, the Army has required Army National Guard units to leave behind many items for use by follow-on forces, but the Army can account for only about 45 percent of these items and has not developed a plan to replace them, as DOD policy requires. DOD has directed the Army to track equipment Guard units left overseas and develop replacement plans, but they have not yet been completed. The Army Guard estimates that since 2003 it has left more than 64,000 items, valued at more than $1.2 billion, overseas to support operations. Without a completed and implemented plan to replace all Guard equipment left overseas, Army Guard units will likely face growing equipment shortages and challenges in regaining readiness for future missions. Thus, DOD and Congress will not have assurance that the Army has an effective strategy for addressing the Guard's equipping needs.

Although Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new designs within the Army's modular force by 2008, they are not expected to be equipped for these designs until at least 2011. The Army has not developed detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard's equipment requirements to transform to a modular force while supporting ongoing operations. As of June 2005, the Army estimated that it would cost about $15.6 billion to convert most of the Guard's units, but this estimate did not include all expected costs and the Army was unable to provide detailed information to support the estimate. In the short term, units nearing deployment will continue to receive priority for equipment, which may affect the availability of equipment needed for modular conversions. Until the Army fully identifies the Guard's equipment requirements and costs for both the near and long term, DOD and Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh the affordability and effectiveness of the Army's plans.

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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

October 4, 2005

The Honorable Tom Davis
Chairman
Committee on Government Reform
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman
Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives

In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army National Guard has been called upon to play a significant role in supporting active Army forces overseas while, at the same time, taking on new homeland defense missions, such as protecting critical infrastructure—all of which require that the Army National Guard have sufficient quantities and types of equipment items. In addition, the Army National Guard must use its allotted equipment to perform other domestic responsibilities, including responding to natural emergencies or incidents of civil unrest. Historically, the Army National Guard has been structured as a follow-on force that supports the active Army in overseas conflicts, and as such, Guard units have not been resourced with all of the equipment and personnel they require for their missions. Instead, it was assumed that there would be sufficient time for units to obtain the remainder of their resources prior to deployment. However, Army National Guard members now comprise 31 percent of the ground forces in Iraq. While Army officials anticipate Guard involvement to decline somewhat in 2006, the tempo of operations over the long term remains uncertain. The post-September 11 increase in the Army National Guard's responsibilities, particularly its increased involvement in overseas operations, raises concerns about whether the Army National Guard has the equipment it needs to continue to support operations in the future.

The Army recognizes that it needs to transform its forces, including the National Guard, to better meet the emerging threats of the 21st century and is undertaking two initiatives designed to enhance the capability of active and reserve forces. One of the Army's key initiatives—called the modular force initiative—is a multibillion dollar effort to restructure the entire Army. It involves increasing the flexibility and responsiveness of the

force by converting from a division-based structure to smaller brigade combat teams and increasing the pool of units available for deployment. In addition, the Army is in the process of developing a rotational force model in which active and reserve forces would progress through a cycle of increasing readiness, culminating in the availability of a specified number of units for deployment if needed. The Army also hopes the model will increase deployment predictability for Army National Guard soldiers, who have been heavily involved in recent operations and must balance their military duties with civilian careers.

The challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in managing its reserve forces and allocating its resources across services and programs are some of the many issues that we have highlighted to Congress as the nation entered the 21st century.[1] We have previously reported on how the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have been used in recent operations.[2] In 2004, we reported on the effect of the continuing high use of National Guard forces and challenges to prepare the Guard for future overseas and domestic missions.[3] In addition, we recently testified on the Army's plans to convert to a modular force.[4] And, in August 2003 and September 2004, we reported on several reserve mobilization issues, including the limited use of the individual ready reserve and long-term availability issues.[5]

In response to your request that we examine Army National Guard equipment issues, the objectives of this report are to assess the extent to which (1) the Army National Guard has the types and quantities of equipment needed to support the Global War on Terrorism and (2) the

[1] GAO, *21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government*, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005).

[2] GAO, *Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages*, GAO-05-660 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005).

[3] GAO, *Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions*, GAO-05-21 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004).

[4] GAO, *Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to Implement and Fund Modular Forces*, GAO-05-443T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005).

[5] GAO, *Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces*, GAO-03-921 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 21, 2003) and *Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues*, GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004).

Army can account for Army National Guard equipment that has been transferred to the active component in theater and its plans for replacing this equipment. We also examined the Army's plans for converting the Army National Guard to a modular force and implementing a rotational force model to determine how Army National Guard units will be equipped for future missions and the estimated costs of the conversion.

To address these objectives, we analyzed data on the types and quantities of Army National Guard equipment that have been used in support of the Global War on Terrorism and the equipment status of nondeployed units; the extent to which Army National Guard equipment has been retained overseas in the theater of operations; and the Army's plans to create a modular force and its new rotational force model. We interviewed officials in the DOD, the Department of the Army, and the National Guard Bureau to obtain information on how equipment needs have evolved, the extent to which equipment has been transferred to the active component and the Army's plans for replacing it, and the Army's plans to include the Army National Guard in the modular force initiative and the rotational force model. We supplemented this information with visits to Army commands and conducted a case study of unit equipment experiences by visiting two units, the 30th Brigade Combat Team in North Carolina, which deployed in February 2004, and the 48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia, which deployed in May 2005. We selected these units because they allowed us to evaluate how the process used to prepare units has changed with subsequent rotations to Operation Iraqi Freedom. We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards between December 2004 and August 2005 and determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives. The scope and methodology used in our review are described in further detail in appendix I.

Results in Brief

While Army National Guard units have deployed overseas with most of the equipment they have needed to support current operations, the Guard is experiencing growing equipment shortages which are decreasing the ability of its nondeployed forces to be ready for future operations at home and overseas. Equipment shortages have developed for two primary reasons. First, the Army National Guard has been equipped at less than war-time readiness levels under the assumption that there would be sufficient time for its forces to obtain additional equipment prior to deployment; in peacetime, units generally had only about 65 to 75 percent of the equipment they needed for their wartime missions. For recent operations, theater commanders have generally required Army National

Guard units to deploy with 90 to 100 percent of the equipment that is needed for their missions and, in some cases, to obtain different equipment, such as more modern communications systems, than Army National Guard units are authorized in peacetime. Thus, to fully equip its deploying units, as of July 2005 the Army National Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from nondeployed units to prepare deploying units; an increase of 189 percent from the 35,000 equipment items that were transferred as of June 2004.[6] Providing this equipment has depleted its inventories of more than 220 critical items and reduced inventories of other mission-essential items[7] to only 61 percent of requirements by May 2005. Second, demand for some types of equipment, such as armored humvees and night vision equipment, has increased across the Army, and equipment requirements continue to evolve. This has made it very difficult for the Army to communicate to deploying units what equipment is needed in theater and further challenges the Army National Guard to identify and transfer the right equipment. The continuing strategy of transferring equipment to deploying forces hampers the ability of nondeployed forces to train for future missions. The Army has developed processes to ensure that deploying active and reserve forces are provided the equipment they need for their deployments through transferring equipment between units and concentrating high-demand equipment in theater. However, growing equipment shortages resulting from these processes among the Army National Guard nondeployed force make it unclear whether the Guard will be able to maintain acceptable levels of equipment readiness for missions overseas or at home.

Compounding the problem of equipment transfers within the Guard, Army National Guard units that have returned from overseas deployments have left behind many equipment items for use by follow-on forces by transferring equipment to active Army units. However, the Army does not have a complete accounting of these items or a plan to replace the equipment, as DOD policy requires. DOD Directive 1225.6, which implements this policy, requires the services to develop a replacement plan for equipment transferred from the reserve component to the active component for more than 90 days. The Army National Guard estimates that since 2003, it has transferred more than 64,000 pieces of equipment,

[6]GAO-05-21.

[7]Mission-essential items are those items that are critical for accomplishing missions, including principal weapon/mission systems and equipment and critical mission support items.

valued at more than $1.2 billion, to the Army to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, the Army is only centrally tracking the portion of the Guard's equipment that it expects will remain in the theater for the duration of current operations such as those items purchased specifically for units deploying to the theater or certain high-demand items in short supply. Items that units transfer to other units may also remain in theater for up to 3 years, but the Army does not have a complete accounting of these items because they are not tracked centrally. The Army expects that the items transferred from unit to unit will eventually be returned to the Guard, although the Guard does not know whether or when the items will be returned. Army officials told us they did not track and develop plans to replace Guard equipment because there were many other priorities in the early phases of the war, and the strategy of having units leave some equipment was expected to be a short-term measure. Yet, as operations continue, the amount of Guard equipment overseas has increased and, without a centralized process to account for all items that have been retained in theater, it is not clear how the Army will be able to develop the replacement plans required by the DOD directive. In May 2005, DOD expressed its concerns about the magnitude of equipment Guard units have left overseas and directed the Army to submit replacement plans for Guard equipment. Until these plans are completed and replacement equipment provided, Army National Guard units will face continuing equipment shortages while challenged to train and prepare for future missions.

Although Army National Guard units are converting to new designs within the Army's modular force by 2008 and entering the Army's new rotational cycle, some units are not expected to be equipped for the new designs until 2011. Further, the Army has not developed detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard's equipment requirements for each phase of the rotational cycle. One of the Army's chief goals of its modular force initiative is to create standardized unit designs in the active and reserve forces with similar structures and equipment that are as effective as current brigades. Under this initiative, the Army National Guard's new units will need different types and quantities of equipment for wartime missions and training. However, the Army is modifying the preferred designs to include the equipment it can reasonably expect to have based on current funding plans. As a result, Army National Guard units will continue to lack equipment items and have to use less modern equipment to fill gaps until at least 2011, and not be comparably equipped with their active duty counterparts. Our analysis of other DOD initiatives has shown that detailed plans which outline the major implementation tasks and identify realistic funding requirements are needed to facilitate success and

avoid unintended consequences, such as differing assumptions among key leaders in DOD and Congress about priorities or program performance. The Army has not completed detailed plans or cost estimates for these initiatives because it is moving quickly to implement them to better support continuing operations. Until the Army fully identifies the requirements and associated costs of these two initiatives and makes key implementation decisions, DOD and Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh their affordability and effectiveness, and the Army National Guard will face uncertainty as it prepares to implement the restructuring efforts.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy that addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard and a plan for the effective integration of the Army National Guard into its rotational force model and modular force initiatives. DOD agreed with our recommendations and cited actions the Army is taking to posture the Army National Guard for prolonged operations by building a rotational force and developing a resource priority plan for all Army units. DOD stated that the details raised in our recommendations need to be addressed in the Army's strategy for equipping Army National Guard units to prepare for future state emergency response, homeland defense, and federal missions. DOD also stated that the Army is taking steps to implement stricter accountability over Guard equipment currently left in theater and is working to develop replacement plans for these items.

Background

The Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States are two components of the armed forces Selected Reserve.[8] The National Guard Bureau is the federal entity responsible for the administration of both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. The Army National Guard, which is authorized 350,000 soldiers, makes up more than one-half of the Army's ground combat forces and one-third of its support forces (e.g., military police, transportation units). Army National Guard units are located at more than 3,000 armories and bases in

[8]The reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces are the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The Selected Reserve consists of military members assigned to organized reserve units and reservists who participate in at least 48 scheduled drills or training periods each year and serve on active duty for training of not less than 14 days during each year.

all 50 states and 4 U.S. territories. Traditionally, the majority of Guard members are employed on a part-time basis, typically training 1 weekend per month and 2 weeks per year. However, after September 11, 2001, the President authorized reservists to be activated for up to 2 years. As of July 2005, more than 70,000 Army National Guard personnel were activated under this authority to support ongoing operations. The Guard also employs some full-time personnel who assist unit commanders in administrative, training, and maintenance tasks.

Army National Guard personnel may be ordered to perform duty under three general statutory frameworks: Title 10 or 32 of the United States Code or pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. In a Title 10 status, Army National Guard personnel are federally funded and under federal command and control. Personnel may enter Title 10 status by being ordered to active duty, either voluntarily or under appropriate circumstances involuntarily (i.e., mobilization). Personnel in Title 32 status are federally funded but under state control. Title 32 is the status in which National Guard personnel typically perform training for their federal mission. Personnel performing state active duty are state-funded and under state command and control. Under state law, the governor may order National Guard personnel to perform state active duty to respond to emergencies, civil disturbances, and for other reasons authorized by state law.

While the Army National Guard performs both federal and state missions, the Guard is organized, trained, and equipped for its federal missions, and these take priority over state missions. The Global War on Terrorism, a federal mission, is a comprehensive effort to defeat terrorism and protect and defend the homeland and includes military operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. As we reported in our November 2004 report on the National Guard, the Army National Guard's involvement in federal operations has increased substantially since the September 11 terrorist attacks, and Army National Guard members have participated in overseas warfighting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and homeland missions, such as guarding Air Force bases. Figure 1 shows that while the number of activated Army National Guard personnel has declined since its peak in December 2004 and January 2005, it continues to provide a substantial number of personnel to support current operations. As of July 2005, about 35,500 of the 113,000 soldiers, or nearly one-third of the soldiers serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, were Army National Guard members. In a June 30, 2005, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee the Army's Chief of Staff said that the Army National

Guard's participation in overseas operations is expected to decrease somewhat in the near future. Although the Army National Guard is expected to continue its participation in ongoing operations, decisions as to the level of participation have not been made.

Figure 1: Post-September 11, 2001 Army National Guard Activity under Federal Command and Control

Source: Army National Guard data.

The Department of the Army is responsible for equipping the Army National Guard. DOD policy requires that equipment be provided to units according to their planned wartime mission, regardless of their component. However, based on the Army's funding priorities, the most modern equipment is usually provided to units that would deploy first. Later deploying units, such as most Army National Guard units, are equipped with older items from the Army's inventory as active forces receive newer and more modern equipment. Army National Guard units are responsible for conducting some maintenance of their equipment.

Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Overall Equipment Readiness of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units

While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the equipment inventory of the Guard's nondeployed units and equipment shortages threaten the Guard's ability to prepare forces for future deployments. Among nondeployed National Guard units, the amount of essential warfighting equipment on hand has continued to decrease since we last reported on the Army National Guard in 2004. Equipment shortages have developed because most Army National Guard units are still structured with lesser amounts of equipment than they need to deploy. To ready deploying units for overseas missions, the Guard has had to transfer large numbers of equipment items from nondeployed units—a practice that has left nondeployed units with increasing shortages of equipment and made it difficult to prepare units for future missions and maintain readiness for any unplanned contingencies. Moreover, the equipment requirements for deploying Army National Guard units have evolved as the nature of current operations has changed. This has meant that in some cases, the Army National Guard has had little time to identify sources of equipment and transfer needed items to deploying units. The Army is adapting some of its processes to help units address the evolving equipment requirements.

The Army National Guard's Initial Equipment Shortages and the Continuing Need for Fully Equipped Forces for Current Operations Have Resulted in Critical Equipment Shortages

Most Army National Guard units mobilized[9] for recent overseas operations had equipment shortages that had to be filled so that the unit could meet the combatant commander's equipment requirements for their mission. These shortages exist because the Army, following DOD planning guidance, has historically equipped all Army units, including the Army National Guard, according to a tiered resourcing strategy. Under tiered resourcing, those units expected to deploy overseas early in a conflict receive first priority for equipment, and most Army National Guard units were expected to deploy after the active component units to serve as follow-on forces. The Army therefore accepted some operational risks by providing lower priority Army National Guard units with less equipment than they would need for their mission under the assumption that there would be time to provide additional equipment to these units before they would be deployed. For example, Army National Guard enhanced separate

[9]Mobilization involves assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel for active military service. Deployment is defined as the relocation of forces, personnel or equipment from home station to meet operational requirements.

brigades[10] are generally supplied with about 75 percent of the equipment they require for their warfighting missions and divisional units, which comprise the majority of the Guard's combat forces, are supplied with about 65 percent. In addition to being given less equipment, most Army National Guard units did not have priority for the newest, most modern equipment, so much of the Guard's equipment is older and less modern than that of the active Army and is not always compatible with more modern items.

However, for recent operations, combatant commanders have required Army National Guard units to deploy with 90 to 100 percent of the equipment they are expected to need and with equipment that is compatible with active Army units. As an increasing number of Army National Guard forces have been needed to support current operations, the Army National Guard has supplied the equipment its deploying units need to meet combatant commander requirements by transferring equipment from within the Army National Guard. The Army National Guard first tries to identify the needed equipment within the same state as the deploying unit. If the equipment cannot be found within the state, the National Guard Bureau requests the equipment from Army National Guard units across the United States. If the equipment is not available in the Army National Guard, the Army National Guard notifies the Army that the equipment is not available, and the Army takes over the task of providing the equipment to the mobilized unit.

For example, although the 30th Brigade Combat Team needed about 8,810 night vision goggles to deploy, it only had about 40 percent of its requirement on hand when it was alerted to prepare to deploy, so the Army National Guard had to identify and transfer about 5,272 pairs of goggles to fully equip the unit. In another case, the Army tasked the National Guard to convert 40 nonmilitary police units, including field artillery companies, to security units capable of performing selected military police missions in Iraq during 2004 and 2005. While a military police company typically has 47 humvees in its inventory, field artillery companies have only about 3 humvees that are suitable for this new

[10]Enhanced separate brigades have between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers and are the Army National Guard's highest priority combat units. These 15 brigades received specialized training and higher priority than other National Guard units for personnel and resources during peacetime. Once called to active duty, they are expected to be ready to deploy overseas within 90 days. In October 2004, the Army stopped using the enhanced separate brigade designation and now refers to these units as brigade combat teams.

mission. Therefore, the converted units had to obtain armored humvees from other units already in Iraq because the Army National Guard had depleted its inventory of armored humvees.

As current operations have continued, the pool of equipment from which the Army National Guard can draw has been reduced because so many items have been transferred to deploying units or left overseas. Shortages of some equipment items have forced the Army National Guard to take measures that have further exacerbated existing shortages in nondeployed units to provide training equipment for deploying units. For example, because the Army National Guard's supply of armored humvees was depleted, the Army directed the Army National Guard to transfer more than 500 humvees from nondeployed Guard units to create training sets for units to use when preparing for deployment.

Significant numbers of equipment transfers have persisted as operations overseas have continued. We previously reported that as of June 2004 the Army National Guard had transferred more than 35,000 pieces of equipment to ready units for recent operations.[11] By July 2005, the number of equipment items transferred among Army National Guard units had grown to more than 101,000. As a result of these transfers, the equipment readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard units has declined. As figure 2 shows, the percentage of nondeployed units that reported having the minimum amount of equipment they would need to deploy[12] dropped from 87 percent in October 2002 to 59 percent in May 2005. However, this estimate includes units that have older, less modern equipment referred to as substitute equipment. While these substitute items are useful for training purposes, commanders may not allow these items in the theater of operations because they may not be compatible with the equipment other units are using and cannot be sustained logistically in theater. In addition, this estimate includes units that have equipment that is undergoing maintenance after returning from deployment or was left overseas, so these items are not readily available for deployment. The National Guard Bureau estimates that when substitute items, equipment undergoing maintenance, and equipment left overseas for follow-on forces are subtracted, its nondeployed units had available only about 34 percent of essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005.

[11] GAO-05-21.

[12] To meet minimum deployment criteria, a unit must generally have at least 80 percent of its mission-essential equipment items on hand.

Figure 2: Percentage of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units Meeting Minimum Equipment Criteria to Deploy



Source: Army National Guard data.

Note: Units must have at least 80 percent of their mission-essential equipment to meet minimum deployment criteria. Because data were not available for all months between October 2002 and July 2004, some chart points in this period were estimated based on trends.

With respect to some equipment items, transfers of equipment to deploying units have depleted the inventories of many key items in nondeployed units. Table 1 shows selected items needed for current mobilization for which inventory levels in nondeployed Guard units have fallen below 20 percent of authorized levels.

Table 1: Examples of Current Mobilization Equipment Shortages among Nondeployed Army National Guard Units

	Number of items authorized	Number of items on hand	Percentage of authorized in inventory
Equipment for handling truck containers	25	4	16
Machine guns	1,088	150	14
Chemical decontamination equipment	514	73	14
Armament carrier humvees	2,240	220	10
Truck flatbed semitrailers	2,287	180	8
Lightweight rifles	16,839	788	5
Individual night vision goggles	127,000	1,000	1
Weapon night vision sights	11,400	0	0
Up-armored scout humvees	3,922	0	0
Chemical agent monitoring equipment	7,200	0	0

Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data as of May 2005.

As of July 2005, the Army National Guard reported that equipment transfers had reduced its inventory of more than 220 items to less than 5 percent of the required amount or a quantity of fewer than 5 items. Among these 220 high-demand items are generators, trucks, and radios.

While the Army can supply deploying forces with additional equipment after they are mobilized, nondeployed units will be challenged to maintain readiness for future missions because they do not have the equipment to train with or to use for other contingencies. The effect of equipment shortages on nondeployed units' ability to perform homeland defense missions is not known because, as we reported in 2004, DOD has not developed requirements or preparedness standards and measures for the homeland missions in which the Army National Guard is expected to participate. However, as previously reported, some of these items such as humvees, night vision goggles, and chemical protective suits are useful for the Guard's domestic missions, such as responding to potential terrorist threats.

Evolving Equipment Requirements Challenge Efforts to Equip Units for the Global War on Terrorism

As current military operations have evolved, equipment requirements for the Global War on Terrorism have continued to change. This has challenged Guard units preparing to deploy because equipment requirements are not defined and communicated to them until close to their deployment dates. Equipment that was not considered essential for some units' expected missions has become important for ongoing operations, and units have been required to have equipment that is newer than or different from that on which they have been trained. For example, the 30th Brigade Combat Team from North Carolina, which deployed in the spring of 2004, and the 48th Brigade Combat Team from Georgia, which deployed in 2005, were directed to deploy as motorized brigade combat teams with humvees instead of the heavy-tracked equipment, such as Bradley fighting vehicles and tanks, with which they had trained for their expected missions. Overall, the combatant commander required that the 30th Brigade deploy to Operation Iraqi Freedom with more than 35 types of items that were previously not authorized for the unit, including different radios and weapons.

Due to changing conditions in theater and a desire to tailor a unit's equipment as closely as possible to its expected mission, the Army has continued to modify equipment requirements after units are alerted. These changes have resulted in requirements not being communicated to some Army National Guard units in a timely manner so that the units could be equipped as efficiently as possible for current operations or be provided ample time for training. In some instances, Army National Guard units have not known exactly what equipment they would require to deploy and what they could expect to receive in theater until close to their deployment dates, which has made it more difficult for Army National Guard officials to gather the equipment deploying units need to fill equipment shortages. For example, the 48th Brigade Combat Team, which was preparing for deployment in May 2005, had still not received a complete list of all of the equipment it would need at the time of our visit in April 2005. Because officials did not know exactly what they would need to take with them overseas, the brigade packed and transported 180 different vehicles to be shipped to theater. When officials learned that this equipment was already available in theater, these vehicles had to be shipped back to the brigade's mobilization station at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

In some cases, delays caused by the changing equipment requirements reduced the amount of time units had to train with their new equipment. For example, the 30th Brigade did not have a chemical agent identification set to train with until its final exercise before deploying, and it did not

have access to a Blue Force Tracker, a digital communications system that allows commanders to track friendly forces across the battlefield in real time, for training until the unit was in theater. In some cases, the 30th Brigade did not receive some items until they could be transferred from nondeployed units or they were provided in theater. For example, the unit received the 4,000 ceramic body armor inserts needed to protect soldiers from small arms fire upon arrival in Kuwait. According to Army officials, in such instances units may undergo training upon arrival in the theater of operations to acquaint them with new equipment. However, we did not evaluate the adequacy of the training units received in the theater of operations.

Army Has Adapted Its Equipping Process to Better Address Critical Equipment Shortages and Evolving Equipment Requirements for Ongoing Operations

To address critical equipment shortages and the evolving equipment requirements for current operations, the Army has adapted its equipping process in two ways. First, rather than having units bring all their equipment to the theater of operations and take it back to their home stations when they return home, the Army now requires units, in both the active and reserve components, to leave certain essential equipment that is in short supply in theater for follow-on units to use.[13] This is intended to reduce the amount of equipment that has to be transported from the United States to theater, to better enable units to meet their deployment dates, and to maintain stocks of essential equipment in theater where it is most needed. While this equipping approach has helped meet current operational needs, it has continued the cycle of reducing the pool of equipment available to nondeployed forces for unplanned contingencies and for training.

Second, the Army has instituted a process, known as a predeployment site survey, to allow large[14] units preparing to deploy to send a team to the mission area to determine equipment needs. The team generates a list of equipment, known as an operational needs statement, which the unit will need in theater but was not previously authorized and will need to obtain before deployment. Once the Army has approved the items, the unit can

[13] The Army has directed that equipment purchased specifically for Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, or other key items currently in short supply such as armored vehicles, improvised explosive device jammers, long-range surveillance systems, and generator sets, remain in theater for the duration of operations.

[14] Units that are smaller than a brigade complete a virtual pre-deployment site survey by communicating with units already in theater to determine the equipment they need to request.

obtain them through transfers from other units or procurement. Over the course of current operations, the Army has improved the operational needs statement process by pre-approving packages of equipment that are in high-demand for current operations so that deploying units do not have to request these items separately. For example, more than 160 items, such as interceptor body armor; Javelin, a medium antitank weapon system; kits to add armor to humvees; and night vision goggles, among other items, are pre-approved. For example, in 2003, the 30th Brigade Combat Team prepared about 35 lists of additional equipment it would need to deploy in January 2004. By the time the 48th Brigade was preparing for deployment in 2005, changes to the process resulted in the unit preparing only one operational needs statement.

In addition, an existing Army program, the Rapid Fielding Initiative, has provided individual equipment to soldiers, including those in the Army National Guard, more quickly than the standard acquisition process by fielding commercial-off-the-shelf technology. The Army provides 49 items such as body armor, helmets, hydration systems, goggles, kneepads, and elbow pads through this initiative to units preparing to deploy at their home stations and in theater.

Filling shortages in deploying units has left nondeployed forces with worsening equipment shortages and hampers their ability to train for future missions. Growing shortages make it unclear whether the Guard will be able to maintain acceptable levels of equipment readiness for missions overseas or at home.

Army's Lack of Accountability and Plans to Replace All Army National Guard Equipment Retained in Theater Hinder the Guard's Ability to Prepare and Train Units

The Army National Guard estimates that, since 2003, it has left more than 64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas to support continuing operations. But, the Army lacks a full accounting of this equipment and has not prepared plans to replace it as required under DOD policy. As a result, the Guard is challenged in its ability to prepare and train for future missions. The policy reflected in DOD Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, April 7, 2005, requires a replacement plan for reserve component equipment transferred to the active component for more than 90 days.[15] According to Army officials, the Army did not initially track the Guard's equipment or prepare replacement plans in the early phases of the war because the practice was intended to be a short-term measure and there were other priorities. In addition, the Army did not have a centralized process to develop plans to replace the equipment Army National Guard units left overseas and transfers of equipment between units were only documented at the unit level in unit property records.

However, as operations have continued, the amount of Guard equipment retained in theater has increased, which has further exacerbated the shortages in nondeployed Army National Guard units. For example, when the North Carolina 30th Brigade Combat Team returned from its deployment to Iraq in 2005, it left 229 humvees, about 73 percent of its pre-deployment inventory of those vehicles, for other units to use. Similarly, according to Army National Guard officials, three Illinois Army National Guard units were required to leave almost all of their humvees, about 130, in Iraq when they returned from deployment. As a result, the units could not conduct training to maintain the proficiency they acquired while overseas or train new recruits. In all, the National Guard reports that 14 military police companies left over 600 humvees and other armored trucks which are expected to remain in theater for the duration of operations. While the Army has now instituted processes to account for certain high-demand equipment items that are being left in theater for the duration of the conflict and expects replacement plans for this equipment to be developed by August 2005, it does not appear that these replacement plans will account for all items transferred to the active component because the Army has not been tracking all Guard equipment left in theater in a centralized manner.

[15]Replacement plans for removed equipment and supplies are not required for transfers in support of force restructuring adopted as result of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process decisions approved by the Secretary of Defense.

In June 2004, six months after the first Army National Guard units left equipment overseas when they returned from deployment, the Army tasked the Army Materiel Command with overseeing equipment retained in theater. However, according to Army and National Guard officials, the Army Materiel Command developed plans to track only certain high-demand equipment items that are in short supply, such as armored humvees and other items designated to remain in theater for the duration of the conflict. However, Guard units have also left behind equipment that was not designated to stay for the duration of the conflict, but which may remain in theater for up to three years, such as cargo trucks, rough terrain fork lifts, and palletized load trucks, which the Army Materiel Command does not plan to track. Of the over 64,000 equipment items the Army National Guard estimates Guard units have left behind, the National Guard Bureau estimates that as of July 2005, the Army Material Command was only tracking about 45 percent of those items. Given the lack of tracking of all Guard equipment left in theater, it is not clear how the Army will develop replacement plans for these items as required by DOD policy.

In May 2005 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs requested that the Army submit a replacement plan for all Army National Guard equipment retained in theater by June 17, 2005. The Assistant Secretary noted that while the exact amount of equipment transferred between the reserve and active components is unknown, overall the magnitude of these transfers has been significant and was an area of concern. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs subsequently extended the date replacement plans were due to August 15, 2005. According to Army officials, the equipment tracked by individual units may eventually be returned to the Guard. However, Army and Army National Guard officials said that even if it is eventually returned, equipment condition is likely to be poor given its heavy use during current operations and some of it will likely need to be replaced. The National Guard estimates it will cost at least $1.2 billion to replace the equipment it has left in Iraq, if it is not returned or is not useable. Until the Army develops plans to replace the equipment, including identifying timetables and funding sources, the National Guard will continue to face critical equipment shortages which reduce readiness for future missions.

Army National Guard Units Are Changing to New Designs, but Will Continue to Lack Equipment Comparable to Active Forces

Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new designs within the Army's modular force by 2008, but they are expected to convert with the equipment they have on hand and will lack some equipment for these designs until at least 2011. However, the Army is modifying the designs it tested and found to be as effective as current brigades to include the equipment it can reasonably expect to have based on current funding plans. As a result, Army National Guard units will continue to lack equipment items and have to use less modern equipment to fill gaps until at least 2011 and will not be comparably equipped with their active duty counterparts. While the Army estimated in June 2005 that it would cost about $15.6 billion to convert most of the Guard's units, this estimate did not include all expected costs and the Army was unable to provide detailed information to support the estimate. Further, it has not developed detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard's equipment requirements as it progresses through the new rotation cycle used to provide ready forces for ongoing operations. The Army is quickly implementing its initiatives to transform its forces into modular units and a rotational cycle of deployment without detailed plans and cost estimates because it views these initiatives as critical to sustaining current operations. In the short term, units nearing deployment will continue to receive priority for equipment, which may delay when units will receive the equipment needed for modular conversions. In 2004 and 2005, the Army published and subsequently updated the Army Campaign Plan,[16] to establish the broad goals, assumptions, and time frames for converting to the modular force and implementing the rotational force model. However, the plan does not include detailed equipping plans, cost estimates, or resources needed for implementing the modular and rotational deployment initiatives. Our analysis of best practices in strategic planning has shown that detailed plans, which describe how the objectives will be achieved and identify resources, facilitate success and avoid unintended consequences, such as differing assumptions among key leaders in DOD and Congress about priorities or program performance. Until equipping requirements for implementing the modular designs and the rotational model are specified, costs are better defined, and funding is identified, the Guard faces risks as it prepares to implement the Army's restructuring while supporting the high pace of operations at home and overseas.

[16] The Army updated the plan in October 2004 and June 2005.

Army National Guard Units Will Continue to Face Equipment Shortfalls That May Delay Transformation to Modular Designs and Hinder Comparability with Active Forces

The Army has recognized that it needs to become more flexible and capable of achieving a wide range of missions. To this end, in 2004, the Army began to reorganize its forces from a structure organized around divisions to one based on standardized, modular brigades that can be tailored to meet the specific needs of the combatant commander. The Army is in the process of developing and approving detailed designs,[17] including equipment requirements, for active[18] and reserve combat units, support units, and warfighting headquarters so that the first Guard units can begin their scheduled conversions in September 2005. Among the goals of the new structure are to maximize the flexibility and responsiveness of the force by standardizing designs and equipment requirements for both active and reserve units and maintaining reserve units at a higher level of readiness than in the past. However, under current plans, Guard units will continue to be equipped with items that may be older than their active counterparts and less capable than the new modular unit designs require. The Army's initial estimate for converting Guard units to modular designs is about $15.6 billion through 2011, but this estimate is incomplete because it does not include the costs for converting all units to the new structure or the full costs of equipping them for the design the Army tested and determined was as effective as current brigades. Moreover, the Army has not developed plans to equip Guard units to the tested modular unit design and instead plans to equip them for a less modern design. Without a detailed equipping plan that identifies funding priorities over time, the Army National Guard is likely to continue to face challenges in its ability to train and maintain ready forces in the future.

The Army expects that the new modular brigades, which will include about 3,000 to 4,000 personnel,[19] will be as capable as the current brigades of between 3,000 and 5,000 personnel through the use of enhanced military intelligence capability, introduction of key technology enablers, such as weapons and communications systems, and by having support capabilities

[17]Unit designs prescribe the unit's wartime mission, capabilities, organizational structure, and mission-essential personnel and equipment requirements.

[18]The Army plans to reorganize its 10 active divisions by the end of fiscal year 2006, expanding from the current 33 to 43 modular, standardized brigade combat teams and creating new types of command headquarters.

[19]The Army's plan calls for three variants of the modularized brigade combat team. The infantry variant will have about 3,300 personnel, the armored variant 3,700 personnel, and the Stryker variant 4,000 personnel.

contained in the brigade itself instead of at a higher echelon of command. The Army tested the new modular brigade designs and found that they were as effective as current brigades. However, the Army has modified the tested designs based on the equipment it can reasonably expect to provide to units undergoing conversion based on its current inventory of equipment, planned procurement pipelines, and other factors, such as expected funding. At the time of this report, the Army had not tested the modified designs to determine whether they are as capable as the current brigades or the tested design. The Army plans to equip modular Guard units for the modified design by 2011. In the meantime, modular Guard units are expected to continue the practice of using approved substitute equipment and will initially lack some of the key enablers, such as communications systems, which are the basis for the improved effectiveness of modular units.

As of June 2005, the Army had approved modified designs for the 25 Army National Guard brigade combat teams and 25 support brigades scheduled to convert to the modular structure between 2005 and 2007, and all eight warfighting headquarters converting between 2005 and 2008. Under current plans, all the Army National Guard units will be converted to the modular organizational structure by 2008 with the exception of 3 support brigades which will be converted in 2011. The Army expects to complete modular designs for the remaining 9 brigade combat teams and 15 support brigades by September 2005. The Army had originally planned to convert Guard units on a slower schedule by 2010, but at the request of the Army National Guard, accelerated the plan so that Guard units would share the new standardized organizational designs with the active component at least two years earlier, avoid training soldiers for the previous skill mix, and better facilitate recruiting and retention efforts.

However, our work indicates that accelerated modular conversions will exacerbate near-term equipment shortfalls. There are significant shortfalls in the Army's ability to equip Guard units for the modified design in the short term for three key reasons. First, according to current plans, the units are expected to convert to their new designs with the equipment they have on hand. However, because of existing shortages and the large number of equipment items that deployed units left in Iraq or that need repair or replacement due to heavy use, units will not have the equipment needed to reach even the modified design. For example, converted Guard units expect initially to be without some equipment items, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, single channel ground and airborne radio systems, and Javelin antitank missiles that provide the basis for the improved capability of the new brigades. Second, the Army has not

planned funding to provide equipment to the additional Guard units converting to the modular structure on the accelerated schedule. Although most Guard units are scheduled to be reorganized by 2008, they are expected to receive equipment for their new designs on a slower schedule, and in some cases are not expected to receive their equipment until 2 to 3 years after they reorganize. The lack of detailed plans for equipping Army National Guard units makes it difficult to determine how the Army intends to transition Guard units from the old to the new organizational structure effectively.

Finally, the Army's cost estimates for converting Guard units to the modular structure are incomplete and likely to grow. The Army's current cost estimate for converting all its active and reserve units to the modular force is $48 billion, a 71 percent increase from its initial rough order of magnitude estimate of $28 billion made in 2004. Of the $48 billion, the Army estimated in June 2005 that Army National Guard modular conversions would cost about $15.6 billion. This estimate included costs to convert all eight of the Guard's warfighting headquarters and 33 of the Guard's 34 combat units between 2005 and 2011. It also includes procurement of some high-demand equipment such as tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, humvees, and antitank guided-missile systems. During our work, we obtained summary information on the types of cost and key assumptions reflected in the Army's estimates; however, we were unable to fully evaluate the estimate because the Army did not have detailed supporting information.

Our work highlighted several limitations to the Army's cost estimate for Army National Guard modular force conversions. First, the estimate was based on a less modern design than both the modified design that the Army plans to use in the near term and the tested design it intends to evolve to over time. The estimate assumes that Guard units will continue to use substitute equipment items that may be older and less capable than that of active units and does not include costs for all the technology enablers that are expected to provide additional capability for modular units. As a result, the estimate does not include costs for all the equipment Guard units would require to reach the capabilities of the tested modular brigade design. Second, the estimate does not include costs for 10 of the Guard's support units, nor does it include military construction costs associated with the Guard's 40 support units. According to the Army National Guard, military construction costs for converted support units are expected to near the $1.4 billion in military construction costs already included for the Guard's warfighting headquarters and combat units. Furthermore, current cost estimates assume that Guard equipment

inventories will be at prewar levels and available for modular conversions. However, this may not be a reasonable assumption because, as discussed previously, Army National Guard units have left large amounts of equipment overseas – some of which will be retained indefinitely and the Army has not provided plans for its replacement.

Further, the Army has currently identified funding sources for only about 25 percent ($3.9 billion) of the current estimate— $3.1 billion programmed in the fiscal year 2006-2011 future years defense program and $.8 billion expected from fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding. Approval for funding the remaining $11.7 billion is pending within DOD. However, equipping priorities and the amount designated for equipment have not been decided.

In the long term, according to the Army, the intent is to equip all active and reserve component units to the tested design over time. However, it will take until at least 2011 under current plans for the Army National Guard units to receive the equipment they will need for the modified designs which are still less modern than the one the Army tested and found as effective as current brigades, and the pace of operations may further delay equipping Guard units. Moreover, the Army does not have detailed plans or cost estimates that identify the funding required for equipping Guard units for the tested design. Without detailed plans for when Guard units will get the equipment they need for the tested design, it is unclear when the Army National Guard will achieve the enhanced capabilities the Army needs to support ongoing operations. Further, without more complete equipment requirements and cost estimates, the DOD and Congress will not have all the information they need to evaluate funding requests for the Army National Guard's transition to the modular force.

Army Plans for Equipping Army National Guard Units Under Its Rotational Force Model Are Not Complete

The Army's initiative to transform into a rotational force, which is intended to provide units with a predictable cycle of increasing readiness for potential mobilization once every 6 years, involves a major change in the way the Army planned to use its reserve forces and has implications for the amount and types of equipment that Army National Guard units will need over time. Historically, Army National Guard units have been provided only a portion of the equipment they needed to train for their wartime missions because they were generally expected to deploy after active units. However, current military operations have called for the Army National Guard to supply forces to meet a continuing demand for fully equipped units, a demand the Army National Guard met through transfers of equipment to deploying units and which undermined the readiness of

nondeployed units. Under the rotational force concept, the Army would provide increasing amounts of equipment to units as they move through training phases and near readiness for potential deployment so they would be ready to respond quickly with fully equipped forces if needed. However, the Army has not yet finalized equipping requirements for Army National Guard units as they progress through the rotational cycle. In addition, it is not clear how the equipment needed to support units in the new rotational cycle will affect the types and quantities of items available for modular conversions and affect the pace of the Army National Guard's transformation. Without firm decisions as to requirements for both the new modular structure and rotational force model and a plan that integrates requirements, the Army and Army National Guard are not in the best position to develop complete cost estimates or to determine whether the modular and rotational initiatives are working together to reach the goal of improving Army National Guard readiness.

While the Army has developed a general proposal to equip units according to the readiness requirements of each phase of the rotational force model, it has not yet detailed the types and quantities of items required in each phase. Under this proposal the Army National Guard will have three types of equipment sets: a baseline set, a training set, and a deployment set. The baseline set would vary by unit type and assigned mission and the equipment it includes could be significantly reduced from the amount called for in the unit design, but plans call for it to provide at least the equipment Guard units need for domestic missions. Training sets would include more of the equipment units will need to be ready for deployment, but units would share the equipment that would be located at training sites throughout the country, so the equipment would not be readily available for units' state or homeland missions. The deployment set would include all equipment needed for deployment including theater specific equipment, items provided through operational needs statements, and equipment from Army prepositioned stock. At the time of this report, the Army was still developing the proposals for what would be included in the three equipment sets and planned to publish the final requirements in December 2005.

Army resourcing policy gives higher priority to units engaged in operations or preparing to deploy than those undergoing modular conversions. As a result, the requirements of ongoing operations will continue to drain the Army National Guard's equipment resources and affect the pace at which equipment will be available for nondeployed units to transform to their new design. At the present time, it is not clear how the equipment requirements associated with supporting deployment under the new

rotational readiness cycle will affect the types and quantities of equipment available to convert the Army National Guard to a modular force. Until the near-term requirements for the rotational force and long-term requirements for a modular force are fully defined, the Army and Army National Guard will not be in a position to prioritize funding to achieve readiness goals in the near and long term. Further, although Army leaders have made it a priority to ensure that Army National Guard units have the equipment they need to continue to perform their domestic missions, it is not possible to assess whether units will have the equipment they need until unit designs and training set configurations are finalized and homeland defense equipment requirements are known.

Conclusions

Evolving equipment requirements for the Global War on Terrorism have challenged the Army National Guard in equipping its units for deployment while trying to maintain the readiness of its nondeployed force for training and future missions. While strategies such as transferring needed equipment from nondeploying units to ready deploying units, completing operational needs statements, and leaving equipment overseas when Guard units return home have helped to equip deploying units, these strategies may not be sustainable in the long term, especially as the Guard's equipment inventories continue to diminish. In the meantime, as the Army National Guard's equipment stocks are depleted, risks to its ability to perform future overseas and domestic missions increase.

The Army's lack of accountability over the Guard's equipment stocks retained in theater has created a situation in which deploying Guard units face considerable uncertainty about what equipment they need to bring overseas and what equipment they will have for training when they return from deployment. DOD Directive 1225.6 requires a plan to replace reserve component equipment that is transferred to the active component, but the Army has not prepared these plans. Without a replacement plan, the Army National Guard faces depleted stocks of some key equipment items needed to maintain readiness and is unable to plan for how it will equip the force for future missions.

Supporting ongoing operations will continue to strain Army National Guard equipment inventories, which will likely delay the pace of its transformation to a modular force. Further, current modular plans for the Guard's conversion will not provide for equipping Guard units to the less modern modified design and there are no plans to equip the Guard for the design the Army found as capable as current brigades. As a result, Guard units will continue to face equipment shortages and have to use older

equipment than their active counterparts. If units are not comparable, the Army National Guard will have to continue its current practice of transferring equipment to fill the shortfalls in deploying units, thereby undermining the readiness of nondeployed forces. With lower readiness of Guard forces, the nation faces increased risk to future overseas operations, unplanned contingencies, and the homeland missions the Guard may be called upon to support.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy that addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard for the Global War on Terrorism and addresses how the Army will transition from short-term equipping measures to long-term equipping solutions. This plan should address the measures the Army will take to ensure it complies with existing DOD directives to safeguard reserve component equipment readiness and provide a plan to replace depleted stocks resulting from equipment transferred to the active Army, so that the Guard can plan for equipping the force for future missions.

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan for the effective integration of the Army National Guard into its rotational force model and modular force initiatives. This plan should include:

- the specific equipment requirements, costs, timelines, and funding strategy for converting Army National Guard units to the modular force and the extent to which Guard units will have comparable types of equipment and equipment levels as the active modular units,
- an analysis of the equipment the Army National Guard's units will need for their missions in each phase of the rotation cycle, and
- how the Army will manage implementation risks to modular forces if full funding is not provided on the expected timeline.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written comments on a draft of this report. The department agreed with our recommendations and cited actions it is taking to implement them. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

DOD agreed with our recommendation to develop and submit a plan and funding strategy to Congress that addresses the equipment needs of the

Army National Guard for the Global War on Terrorism, specifically addressing how the Army will transition from its short-term equipping measures to long-term equipping solutions. In its comments, DOD said that the Army needs to determine how Army National Guard forces will be equipped to meet state disaster response and potential homeland defense requirements as well as federal missions and include these requirements in its resource priorities. DOD also said that the Army is working to implement stricter accountability over equipment currently left in theater and to comply with DOD guidelines which require replacement plans for these items.

DOD also agreed with our recommendation to develop and submit a plan to Congress that details the effective integration of the Army National Guard into the Army's rotational force model and modular force initiatives. DOD said that the Army plans to develop resourcing alternatives to mitigate potential risks should full funding for transformation initiatives not be realized. DOD also agreed that readiness goals for the Army National Guard in the 6-year rotational model need to be established and that the Army's equipping strategy for the Army National Guard must include the resources required to be prepared to carry out both their federal and state missions.

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4402. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Janet A. St. Laurent
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from the Army National Guard, the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. We supplemented this information with visits to the United States Army Forces Command, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command, and the First Army of the United States. We also developed case studies of two units: the 30th Brigade Combat Team located in North Carolina and the 48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia. These states were chosen to provide representative examples of how Army National Guard units were prepared for deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The 30th Brigade Combat Team was one of the first National Guard units to deploy for Operation Iraqi Freedom and had just returned from deployment when we visited in March 2005. The 48th Brigade Combat Team was preparing for deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom at the time of our visit in April 2005. In both states we met with unit logistics staff who had visibility over how the unit prepared for deployment.

To examine the extent to which Army National Guard units have the equipment needed for the Global War on Terrorism, we obtained and analyzed data on critical shortages and the types and quantities of equipment transferred from nondeployed units to deploying units from the National Guard Bureau and our two case study states. Additionally, we supplemented these data with interviews, briefings, and documentation from officials at the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the U.S. Army Forces Command, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command, and the First Army of the United States. We did not examine whether shortages of particular items were the result of industrial base issues. To understand the processes the Army adapted to equip units as equipment requirements evolved for the Global War on Terrorism, we interviewed officials from and analyzed data provided by the 30th Brigade Combat Team in North Carolina, the 48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia, the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army, the U.S. Army Forces Command, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command, and the First Army of the United States.

To assess the Army National Guard equipment retained in theater, we analyzed Army National Guard data and the Guard's estimate of the cost to replace the equipment if it is not returned. Additionally, we interviewed officials and reviewed documentation and data from the Army National Guard, Department of the Army, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Reserve Affairs, U.S. Army Forces Command, and the Coalition Forces Land Component Command about the lack of reliable data and whether any plans exist to replace the Guard's equipment. We supplemented data on how much of the Army National Guard's equipment has been left in theater with briefings and reviewed internal Army messages regarding the accountability and visibility of this equipment.

To evaluate how the Army National Guard has been integrated into the Army's plans for a modular structure and force generation model, we interviewed officials at the Army National Guard, the Department of the Army, and U.S. Army Forces Command. We reviewed documents such as the Army Campaign Plan, the Army Transformation Roadmap, the Army's force generation model, and numerous briefings on the Army's plans for a modular force and the new force generation model. Additionally, we interviewed Guard officials from both of our case study states about the units' plans to convert to modular force given Army time frames and cost estimates.

To assess the reliability of data used during the course of this engagement, we interviewed data sources about how they ensured the accuracy of their data and reviewed their data collection methods, standard operating procedures, and other internal control measures. In addition, we reviewed available data for inconsistencies, and, when applicable, performed computer testing to assess data reliability. We determined that the data were sufficient to answer each of our objectives.

We conducted our review between December 2004 and August 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Agency comments were made on GAO-05-954. This report number was subsequently changed to GAO-06-111.

RESERVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

SEP 15 2005

Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
U.S. Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Ms. St. Laurent:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft report, "RESERVE FORCES: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives," dated August 18, 2005 (Code 350607/GAO-05-954).

The Army Campaign Plan includes the Army Force Generation Model that is designed to posture the Army National Guard for prolonged operations by building a rotational force. The Army has also developed the Army Resource Priority List that identifies the priority for providing resources to all units in all components of the Army. As the Army moves forward in the implementation of these initiatives, the details raised in your recommendations need to be addressed in order to determine the appropriate readiness levels for Army National Guard units at each phase of the rotational model. The equipping strategy for the Guard must include the resources required to be prepared to carry out their state emergency response requirements, Homeland Defense missions, and to be trained and equipped to mobilize under Title 10, U.S.C.. In today's environment where support to our deployed forces is paramount, it is equally important that we do not lose sight of the readiness of our Army National Guard forces at home.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. I concur with the recommendations as stated, and will work to resolve the issues addressed in this report. Detailed comments on the GAO recommendations and report are enclosed. The point of contact for this office is Captain Scott Walton, OASD/RA (M&F), at 703-693-7485.

Sincerely,

T. F. Hall

Thomas F. Hall
Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs

Enclosure: As stated

GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED AUGUST 18, 2005
GAO CODE 350607/GAO-05-954

"RESERVE FORCES: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy that addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard for the Global War on Terrorism and addresses how the Army will transition from the short-term equipping measures to long-term equipping solutions. This plan should address the measures the Army will take to ensure it complies with existing DoD directives to safeguard reserve component equipment readiness and provide a plan to replace depleted stocks resulting from equipment transferred to the active Army, so that the Guard can plan for equipping the force for future missions. (page 26/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Army has developed the Army Resource Priority List that identifies the priority for providing resources to all units in all components of the Army. The Army must now determine how Army National Guard forces will be equipped to meet state disaster response and potential DoD Homeland Defense requirements and include them in their resource priority list. In today's environment where support to our deployed forces is paramount, it is equally important that we do not lose sight of the readiness of our Army National Guard forces to meet their traditional state emergency response requirements here at home.

The Army has begun to implement stricter accountability of their assets and is in the process of identifying Army Reserve and Army National Guard equipment currently left in theater. As the report states, this is a significant amount of equipment. The Army is working to comply with the guidelines in DoD Directive 1225.6 to request future transfers of equipment from the Reserve to the Active component and provide the Secretary of Defense replacement plans prior to this equipment transfer.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan for the effective integration of the Army National Guard into its rotational force model and modular force initiatives. This plan should include:

- The specific equipment requirements, costs, timelines, and funding strategy for converting Army National Guard units to the modular force and the extent to which

Guard units will have comparable types of equipment and equipment levels as the active modular units;

- An analysis of the equipment the Army National Guard's units will need for their missions in each phase of the rotation cycle; and
- How the Army will manage implementation risks to modular forces if full funding is not provided on the expected timeline. (page 26/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Army Campaign Plan (ACP) includes the Army Force Generation Model that is designed to posture the Army National Guard for prolonged operations by building a rotational force. The budget process has many entities competing for scarce resources and for that reason, the Army must prepare a plan to manage implementation risks if full funding is not realized in the expected timeline to meet the requirements of the ACP. The cyclical construct of the Army Force Generation Model was developed to ensure the reserve component units of the Army returning from operations outside the Continental United States reset and reorganize into modular formations and are placed on a ramp to combat readiness over a six-year period. As the Army moves forward in the implementation of these initiatives, the details addressed in recommendation 2 need to be answered in order to determine the appropriate readiness level for Army National Guard units at each phase of the six year rotational model. The equipping strategy for the Guard must include the resources required to be prepared to carry out their state emergency response requirements, Homeland Defense missions, and to be trained and equipped to mobilize under Title 10, U.S.C..

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402

Acknowledgments

In addition to the person named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant Director; Frank Cristinzio; Alissa Czyz; Curtis Groves; Nicole Harms; Tina Morgan Kirschbaum; Kim Mayo; Kenneth Patton; Jay Smale; and Suzanne Wren also made major contributions to this report.

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