

**THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE QUADRENNIAL  
DEFENSE REVIEW**

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**HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**  
**UNITED STATES SENATE**  
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION

MARCH 8, 2006

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# **THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW**

**WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 2006**

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:42 p.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Chambliss, Levin, Reed, Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, and Dayton.

Committee staff members present: Charles S. Abell, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Regina A. Dubey, professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Sandra E. Luff, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic staff director; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Bridget W. Higgins, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Benjamin L. Rubin, Jill L. Simodejka, and Pendred K. Wilson.

Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul, assistant to Senator McCain; Mackenzie M. Eaglen, assistant to Senator Collins; Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Darcie Tokioka, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Kimberly Jackson, assistant to Senator Dayton; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton.

## **OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN**

Chairman WARNER. The committee will come to order. I will forego my opening statement. I welcome Secretary England, Admiral Giambastiani, and Mr. Henry. I have had preliminary conversations with each of you about the importance of what you have done.

I commend you for a very fine job, and we will learn this afternoon the importance of it as it relates to our future military planning. [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Good afternoon, the Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony on the Department of Defense (DOD) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The witnesses here today are:

- Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gordon England;
- Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr; and
- Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Ryan Henry.

We welcome you here today and look forward to your testimony. The QDR is a congressionally-mandated comprehensive examination of national defense strategy, force structure, modernization, budget plans, and other defense plans and programs with view towards determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States with an eye towards the future.

The 2006 QDR is the third QDR since the 106th Congress created a permanent requirement for a QDR every 4 years. Senator Thurmond considered the requirement for a QDR one of his most significant accomplishments in his tenure as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Each of these reviews has made important contributions to our national defense and yet each QDR has been different from the others. Gentlemen, I commend you, the Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the senior military and civilian leaders in the Department for their personal input into this QDR, especially at a time when the entire Department is so fully engaged.

This is the third QDR, but the first one conducted during wartime. The previous QDR hearing was conducted less than a month after the events of September 11. The Nation was at a critical juncture in our history. In the period since then, our Nation has demanded much from our men and women in uniform. Their performance has consistently been magnificent and heroic. I may add that so too has the support of their families at home.

During this same period, our Nation and our allies have come to recognize the nature of the disturbing threat we all face in this long war, now in its fifth year.

The long war against terrorism and extremism is at the heart of this QDR. General Pace aptly recognized this point in his risk assessment that accompanied the QDR. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said:

- We must transform in stride during wartime, and
- We must hedge against uncertainty by identifying and developing a broad range of capabilities.

Those are compelling comments from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I, for one, will continue to keep those words in mind as our discussion of this QDR continues.

The 2006 QDR has been called evolutionary, not revolutionary. It reflects a process of change that has gathered momentum since the release of the 2001 QDR; intensified after the events of September 11; and sharpened by lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Like previous QDRs, this one has strengths and weaknesses that we will, no doubt, discuss and debate.

I applaud the attention provided to interagency and coalition operations. I fully support the 2006 QDR's recommendations to strengthen both.

The QDR identified four specific priorities:

- defend the homeland;
- defeat violent extremists;
- help countries at strategic crossroads; and
- prevent terrorists and dangerous regimes from obtaining weapons of mass destruction.

These priorities capture the complexities of the strategic landscape post-September 11. It is clear that the DOD cannot meet these difficult challenges alone. On page 22 of the QDR it states "broad cooperation across the United States Government, and with NATO, other allies, and partners is essential."

This is so true. All elements of national power must be brought to bear to meet today's and tomorrow's national security challenges. The last section of the QDR is entitled "achieving unity of effort." We must move out on this expeditiously—and with no further delay.

I stand ready to support efforts to expand the expeditionary capability of other Federal agencies to provide the President with greater flexibility to respond to national security challenges.

In addition to strengthening interagency operations, I found the recommendations relating to increasing Special Operations Forces, strengthening language capabilities, improving cultural awareness, as well as sharpening our ability to conduct strategic communications to be central to winning this long war and preparing for the uncertainties of the next conflict.

This QDR also details initiatives to amend the Department's business enterprises, some of which are already underway. One of special note is the reorientation of its processes around joint capability portfolios. The portfolio approach offers promise and is a logical extension of the success achieved under the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act.

Like its predecessors, certain aspects of this QDR will require further explanation and discussion. As the author of the requirement to develop and publish the national military strategy, I was struck that this QDR relied on a national military strategy that is 2 years old. I understand that you anticipate the QDR will inform the next strategy document. This seems a bit unconventional to me; however, I look forward to the dialogue, discussion, and debate as we craft a defense plan for the future.

I am especially interested in the analysis that supports QDR recommendations affecting:

- the size of ground forces;
- support to homeland security in the wake of Hurricane Katrina; and
- threat integration in your capabilities-based force planning.

We commend your service and work on this QDR.

Without objection, I ask that the entire text of the QDR Report be inserted in the record. The committee looks forward to your testimony here today.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin.

#### **STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN**

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, you make it difficult, if not impossible, for me to give an opening statement, as brilliant as it is. So your punishment, Mr. Chairman, is that I am going to send it to your office. I need you to make an absolute commitment that you will not only read it, but that you will tell me after you read it that you agree with every single word in it. That is the punishment. Can you handle that?

Chairman WARNER. We will do that.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. I will waive my opening statement. My staff is going to kill me because they put a lot of time in this, as did I. But I will put it in the record, with the usual welcome to our witnesses and with thanks to them for their great service and for the truly important issue which they are going to address.

[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

#### **PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN**

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses this afternoon. In the past decade, our military has made great strides in transforming itself to be lighter yet more lethal. We can deploy faster and attack more precisely. Our military has proven itself to be flexible and adaptable, and we have done all this as the preeminent military power in the world, without a peer competitor to spur us on. As the Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR) puts it, "Sustaining continuous operational change and innovation are a hallmark of U.S. forces." Americans are justly proud of our military.

However, to quote your report, "The United States will not win the war on terrorism or achieve other crucial national security objectives discussed in this Report by military means alone." Both Congress and the executive branch can do more to integrate all the instruments of national power—offense, defense, and prevention—to promote and protect our security both at home and abroad. The QDR talks about extending the Goldwater-Nichols spirit of jointness into the interagency process, and

I think that should be done. But we should think beyond the government's role as well.

In his testimony to our committee last month, General Pace wrote: "Thankfully, the daily life of the average American citizen reflects none of the hardships or shortages we associate with a nation at war." That is true, but there is another side to that coin. An Army officer returning from Iraq last summer was quoted in the New York Times as saying "Nobody in America is asked to sacrifice, except us."

If we are truly engaged in a "long war" against terrorism, then the Nation, not just the soldier and the marine, need to be involved. Yet so far, that has not been the case. To date, the President has not asked those of us who are not serving in Iraq and Afghanistan to even make the most obvious sacrifice of paying the bill to support the few of us who are asked to serve. Every penny of the cost of these operations has been borrowed and added to the national debt our children must repay. If this is a long war, our children will end up paying our share as well as their own if this practice persists.

In October 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote a memo to the senior Department of Defense (DOD) leadership that stated in part, "we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions."

Secretary Rumsfeld wrote that memo in the opening weeks of fiscal year 2004. In the 2 years that would follow, we spent \$160 billion on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Last month, the administration submitted yet another supplemental request that would push the total spent in connection with these operations to \$122 billion in fiscal year 2006, the highest level ever. That is over \$10 billion a month. Clearly we have not yet found the right solution to the problem the Secretary posed. This is not a sustainable path for our Nation. The QDR states that "the United States must constantly strive to minimize its own costs in terms of lives and treasure, while imposing unsustainable costs on its adversaries." I do not believe any of us could tell the American people we are doing so today.

One step in forging the national consensus we all seek is to start budgeting for this long war honestly—telling the American people what it costs and deciding how to pay the bill now. That is why I have written to the Budget Committee asking that the costs relative to these operations not be added to the budget above the line as emergencies, but included into the budget itself, and into the normal authorization and appropriation process.

Honest budgeting could also help spark a fuller public debate about whether we are relying too much on costly military methods to fight terrorism. If the American taxpayer was actually being presented with a \$10 billion per month bill, the public would demand that we would all work harder at finding alternative solutions.

I am also concerned that maintaining our current troop levels in Iraq is not sustainable over the long term. Despite the Department's belief that we are in a "long war," the QDR calls for returning our Army and Marine Corps personnel strengths to their lower pre-Iraq levels despite the significant increase in our demands on our ground forces. How does the Department believe a smaller ground force will sustain itself for this long war?

The QDR raises other questions as well:

- How confident are we that we can bring over 50,000 military personnel presently stationed overseas back to the United States with no increase in our strategic lift requirements and no impact on our alliances and regional engagement?
- The report states that "There is growing and deep concern in the Department of Defense's senior leadership and in Congress about the acquisition processes. This lack of confidence results from an inability to determine accurately the true state of major acquisition programs when measured by cost, schedule, and performance." The report makes this very troubling description of our acquisition process, but it is not clear what changes you have in mind to address this issue.
- The QDR calls for the need for more language skills and cultural knowledge in our military. The report then states the logical conclusion that people with such skills should probably "serve on long-term assignments in key strategic regions of the world rather than assuming the traditional career path of multiple, short-term assignments." Few people outside the military may understand how potentially revolutionary a change in DOD's culture this could turn out to be. How broadly might such a change in our assignment policies extend?
- The QDR talks about the threat of terrorists or others obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction. Yet there is not a single mention of truly preventative measures like the cooperative threat reduction program.

Why is the Department calling for new efforts to locate or defend against weapons of mass destruction, but giving inadequate attention to ways of destroying fissile material before it can get into the hands of those who would use it to make the weapon?

- Finally, the QDR repeatedly calls for “more flexible authorities from Congress” on a number of fronts, including training foreign military and police forces, providing them with logistical support and equipment, and allowing U.S. military personnel to spend funds under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program around the globe. The need to act quickly in the modern world is evident, and I understand why the Department would seek as much flexibility and authority as it can get, but you need to recognize that Congress has its role, and that checks and balances have their place in a democratic society, in order to ensure oversight and accountability. There is a natural tension between the executive branch’s desire for sweeping authority and the need for accountability. Additionally, such authorities, in a narrower form, have been provided to the Department of State and overseen by the Foreign Relations Committee. Why should these authorities be broadened and provided to the Department of Defense? This report discusses the need for more “jointness” between executive branch agencies. How would DOD work with or through other agencies if given additional authorities?

Secretary England, I very much appreciate and agree with the words in your prepared testimony: “America needs a strong, bipartisan consensus on national security.” Your actions as well as your words have shown your commitment to that in the past. On a number of fronts, from Iraq to the Patriot Act, we do not have that consensus today. I hope that our conversation this afternoon will be part of building such a consensus.

Chairman WARNER. Good. Thank you. At this point in time, I would also like to submit Senator Lieberman’s opening statement for the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN

Good afternoon. I would like to thank Secretary England, Admiral Giambastiani, and Secretary Ryan for attending this hearing and serving our Nation. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is extremely important. In Washington, DC, we are usually consumed with coping with the imminent problems that confront us on a daily basis. The QDR gives us an opportunity to make careful judgments about what we will require in 10 to 15 years and make considered connections between today and tomorrow to guide us in deciding what we will need, while also enabling the best use of scarce resources.

Because this was the first QDR issued after September 11, I had high expectations that it would more clearly begin to shift military capabilities to match our new security environment. There are some important changes outlined in the QDR that achieve this goal. Special forces battalions will be increased by one-third to fight the war against radical Islamists. We will make a greater investment in human intelligence, psychological operations, and civil affairs units and we will also embark on the too-long delayed program to increase land-based long-range air strike capability and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Although these initiatives are promising, I was disappointed in the scope and intensity of the QDR’s ambition. This QDR had the potential to serve as the framework for substantial alterations in our Nation’s military. In fact, early reports from the Pentagon in 2005 indicated that Secretary Rumsfeld welcomed the opportunity for a significant transformation. An undertaking of this magnitude requires leaders to make hard choices. It also necessitates the willingness to scrutinize our security challenges and capabilities with a birds-eye view. Unfortunately, I conclude this QDR fell short.

While the substantial changes in our Nation’s threat environment since September 11 are clearly outlined in the QDR, this new reality did not cause reconsideration of resource allocation. The relative shift in resources is small. All our weapons are technologically capable. The question is not whether a particular weapons system performs well today, but which capable weapons systems are more likely to prove indispensable in the future. The QDR provides the opportunity for such a critical consideration to take place, but I’m afraid that the recent review failed to fully meet this challenge.

It appears that the starting point was the President's budget. Budgetary constraints, rather than strategic need, determined the QDR's outcomes. As a result, this QDR merely layers a few additional capabilities on top of the status quo program. An assessment of our Nation's most pressing security threats reveals that we need to reconsider this approach. One area that received little critical attention in the QDR is homeland security. For example, the QDR provided no concrete proposals to prepare for and respond to disasters on the scale of Hurricane Katrina. Only one concrete decision—an increase in funding for biodefense—addresses the numerous problems of homeland security we face in the United States.

Likewise, our post-September 11 strategy demands more reliance upon joint warfighting. Bulging Federal deficits demand not just service integration, but also a more efficient development of weapons systems to ensure that our military services coordinate their acquisitions. We cannot simply pay lip service to this matter. A serious plan would demand that every major weapon be "born joint" rather than made joint at adolescence or maturity to prevent costly conflicts and duplication down the road. Secretary England previously testified that we should be examining Department-wide tactical air integration, similar to the preliminary steps to integrate Navy and Marine Corps tactical air. But instead of moving forward, the fiscal year 2007 budget, derived from the QDR, seems to have lost ground. The cancellation of the Joint Unmanned Combat Aircraft, in deference to separate service programs, is a case in point.

The QDR also does a lackluster job in evaluating the nature of the conventional threats that the United States faces in the future and the capabilities our military must maintain to meet them. There is little detailed discussion about the long-term security challenges posed by Russia and China, and the changes in conventional forces that may be necessary. The few recommended actions are inadequate to meet the risks at hand. The QDR recognizes the rapid rate of Chinese submarine production and the potential future threat associated with this growth, but does not advocate an increase in submarine production for the United States until 2012. By 2020, this delay will put us slightly behind China.

I remain very concerned about the immediate and long-range future of our military. For that reason, I regret to conclude that the QDR has not seized the moment to make the serious capability adjustments the future requires. As the United States continues the "long war" on terrorism, we must realize that avoiding hard decisions is a pathway riddled with danger. How much risk do we undertake to maintain the status quo? This QDR does not provide a complete enough answer to this consequential question.

Secretary England, will you proceed?

**STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON ENGLAND, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY ADM EDMUND P. GIAMBASTIANI, JR., USN, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND CHRISTOPHER RYAN HENRY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY**

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Chairman, I also feel a bit intimidated at this time, but I will say just a few words about the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). First of all, I thank you for the opportunity to be here along with the Admiral and Mr. Henry.

My only comments are, first of all, that we answered the 10 questions you posed in your letter to us. In the written testimony for the record, we have answered the questions that you directed to us.

I would also mention that the QDR is a strategic level document. I say that because it is not a program document. The actual programs show up in the 2007 budget. In preparing the QDR, we tried to incorporate some facets of the QDR in the 2007 budget, but we certainly did not incorporate the entire QDR in the 2007 budget. So we will be going through the QDR as part of the 2008 budget exercise and you will see more of the implementation of the QDR in the 2008 budget, I expect, than you have seen in the 2007 budget.

Also, I would like to add that this was a very inclusive process, not only within the Department of Defense (DOD), but we also included the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Intelligence Community (IC), and friends and allies that were with us. This is a very unified output from the Federal Government and also from our friends and allies who participated in this review.

We will also be recommending as a consequence of the QDR some legislative changes. There are about 20 changes in the works that we will recommend. For example, one of those would be to extend the authority that we have today for Iraq and Afghanistan to provide in limited circumstances supplies and services to allies who are in combined operations with U.S. forces to provide them goods and services as needed, and we would have a dollar limit on that. What we have learned in the past 4 years we have tried to incorporate in the QDR and in some of the legislative changes we are recommending to you.

This is a critical time for America. This is about will, resolve, and determination, and it will require both the DOD and Congress working together to move the military into a direction that is most appropriate for the future.

I thank you for the opportunity to be able to discuss this with you and your committee. So thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary England follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. GORDON ENGLAND

Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to engage in a dialogue with you today. It is a special privilege to appear together with my close friend and colleague, Admiral Ed Giambastiani, who has been my constant counterpart in co-leading the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process, and with Ryan Henry, who has spearheaded the effort all the way through. Let me start out by saying how much we appreciate the opportunity to meet with this committee. The Department of Defense (DOD) needs your support in making hard choices as we try to be more effective in preparing the military and the Nation for the future. Without the full support of Congress, there will be no way that the Department can implement this QDR and the strategic direction it lays out.

The Department has worked diligently this past year on the 2006 QDR. Today, we are prepared to discuss our efforts to date, and our plans for the implementation of the QDR's strategic direction. In an Annex to this statement for the record, responses to the QDR questions raised in the recent letter from Chairman Warner and Senator Levin are provided.

The QDR is a strategic document. It is based on the recognition that the DOD, and our Nation as a whole, face a global security climate of dynamic, complex threats, and that these threats will continue into the foreseeable future. The Nation has accomplished a great deal over the 4 years since our last QDR. Much more remains to be done.

This is a critical time for America. We are a Nation at war.

America is fighting against dispersed networks of terrorist extremists. This enemy is adaptable, relentless, and will continue the attack whenever and wherever he finds the opportunity. We did not choose this fight, but we don't have the option of walking away. Victory requires that our military continue to adopt unconventional, irregular, and indirect approaches to eliminate the enemy's ability to strike.

But the long war is only part of the Nation's security challenge.

Hostile states or non-state actors could acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and could strike a shattering blow to the U.S. or our allies. This is a real danger as corrupt regimes are actively developing WMD, while terrorists seek access to WMD. Guarding against this threat—and preparing for possible attacks—requires that we pursue new technologies, build new sets of skills, and redouble our counter-proliferation efforts with international partners.

The Nation also faces the possibility that a major or emerging power could choose to pursue a hostile course. The most effective approach will be to foster cooperation with emerging powers, while taking prudent steps to hedge against surprise. Traditional, state-based threats are still a concern. They have been kept at bay precisely because our Nation has been so well prepared.

Of course, all of these challenges have a bearing on the security of our U.S. homeland. Detecting, deterring, and defeating the threats far from our shores is the best way to keep America safe. But the DOD is also prepared to defend America closer to home, and the Department continues to provide support to other agencies of the U.S. Government for homeland security missions.

Importantly, over the next quarter century, scientific change will proceed significantly more rapidly than ever before. These advances will help us improve and expand our economy, but they will also help our adversaries who would do us harm. In a global marketplace, small competitors will increasingly have access to the latest commercial technologies and, in some cases, to advanced military technologies as well.

The 2006 QDR lays out the strategic approach of the DOD for meeting these challenges. It captures the Department's best thinking, planning, and decisions as of early 2006. It is therefore an "interim" document, intended to launch a continuous wave of future improvements.

Highlighted below are the key findings of the 2006 QDR, for consideration as this committee and the full Congress decide how best to act on the QDR's recommendations. Some of these steps apply to the DOD alone, but many require the cooperation of other agencies.

- Defeat terrorist extremists in the long war.
- Defend the Homeland in depth.
- Help shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.
- Prevent the acquisition or use of WMD by hostile state or non-state actors.
- Ensure that the United States maintains its scientific and technological leadership.
- Integrate all the elements of U.S. national power for both Homeland and national security.
- Develop a management structure for the DOD that is as agile as our forces, moving to an information age enterprise rather than the industrial age enterprise we have today.
- Meet the security challenges of a new century with the broad support of all political parties and administrations.
- Focus on building capabilities, rather than numbers.

Putting all of this into practice will take time. This year, for the first time, the Department submitted the QDR Report to you at the same time as the President's budget request. This allowed us to insert a few "leading edge" QDR measures into the request. But for the most part, the full effects of this QDR will appear in 2008, 2009, and beyond.

To realize the QDR's strategic vision, and to meet the challenges of the 21st century, America will require constancy of leadership, and unity of purpose within the U.S. Government and with our friends and allies.

It was a steady commitment of national and international will, sustained for over 40 years, that succeeded in defeating the Communist threat. In the difficult days of the Cold War, America was blessed to have a succession of leaders with vision and courage, who faced down Communist expansion and intimidation, and stood up for freedom, liberty, and prosperity.

This commitment of national will transcended multiple Presidencies and Congresses. It included Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, all of whom put America's security first.

At the beginning of the Cold War, Harry Truman, a Democrat, was fiercely opposed on many issues by the Republican Congress. Nevertheless, to make sure we succeeded in the epic struggle between freedom and totalitarianism, the two parties found common cause, forged a consensus, and established capable, long-lasting new institutions of national security, including our own DOD.

At the beginning of this new long war, our Nation needs to build on its past successes. More than in any past conflict, America needs a strong, bipartisan consensus on national security. Success will also require coordination between the executive and legislative branches. This committee has a critical role to play in facilitating these relationships. The Nation will also need an integrated effort among all agencies and at all levels of the U.S. Government, as well as with our international partners.

The security challenges before us are difficult and complex, and how well we handle them will profoundly shape the prospects for future generations. This is a war of commitment, will, and resolve, over a sustained period of time. America remains the strongest nation on Earth. With the united will of Congress and the American people, and the hard work and sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, the DOD will continue to provide the security that supports the freedom we all enjoy.

Thank you for your commitment to this most profound endeavor.

ANNEX A TO WRITTEN STATEMENT BY DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GORDON  
ENGLAND

*I. Goals of the Department of Defense in the QDR*

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was designed to serve as a catalyst, to spur the Department's continuing adaptation and reorientation, as part of a longer-term continuum of change. The QDR effort had two main goals:

- To reorient the Department's capabilities and forces to be more agile, to prepare for wider asymmetric challenges and to hedge against uncertainty over the next 20 years; and
- To implement enterprise-wide changes to ensure that organizational structures, processes, and procedures effectively support the Department's strategic direction.

These efforts are two sides of the same coin — you cannot achieve the former without the latter.

*II. Any deviation from the requirements of section 118 of title 10, U.S. Code, in the conduct or results of the QDR, and the reasons therefore*

The 2006 QDR does not deviate from the requirements of section 118 of title 10, U.S. Code. As a point of clarity, section 118 (b)(1) requires the Department, as part of the QDR, to “delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy.” Though issued as a separate document, the March 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) provides the strategic foundations for the 2006 QDR, as the QDR Report states.

*III. Program and policy changes recommended by the QDR*

To continue the Department's reorientation to meet 21st century security challenges, the 2006 QDR recommended programmatic and policy changes, in several broad categories:

- Adapting capabilities, forces, and policies to better address the four priorities identified as the focus of the QDR: defeating terrorist networks; defending the homeland in depth; shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads; and preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD
- Reshaping the defense enterprise itself, to be more agile and responsive to the requirements of warfighters
- Updating workforce management policies, practices, and authorities for the Total Force—Active and Reserve military, civilian and contractor—to improve its ability to adapt.
- Recommending policies and authorities to improve unity of effort within the U.S. Government, and with international allies and partners.

Major recommendations of the 2006 QDR include the following:

- Increasing the capabilities of Special Operations Forces.
- Increasing General Purpose Forces' capabilities for irregular warfare.
- Continuing reorientation of tailored deterrence based on the New Triad.
- Improving long-range strike capabilities.
- Improving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) response capabilities.
- Investing in broad-spectrum medical countermeasures.
- Strengthening intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
- Improving joint command and control capabilities.
- Strengthening and reshaping the defense enterprise.
- Strengthening and rebalancing the Total Force—Active and Reserve military components, civil servants, and contractors.
- Enhancing unity of effort in the interagency.
- Supporting U.S. Government strategic communications efforts.

*IV. Threats and risks facing the United States and our allies that were examined for the purposes of the review*

The foundation of the 2006 QDR is the 2005 National Defense Strategy, which outlines the four major categories of threats that the U.S. faces: familiar traditional threats; irregular threats, including terrorism, insurgency or guerrilla warfare; catastrophic threats, including WMD; and disruptive threats designed to disrupt or negate traditional U.S. military advantages. While America still faces traditional threats, the preponderance of future challenges are likely to fall into the other three areas, which requires the DOD to continue to reorient and broaden its focus.

Against the backdrop of the NDS, the QDR's terms of reference identified four key challenges that the United States faces:

- The U.S. faces threats from distributed, multiethnic networks of terrorist extremists, who use indiscriminate violence, propaganda, and intimidation to advance their ends.
- The U.S. Homeland is vulnerable to transnational movement of terrorists, extremist ideologies, advanced weapons, and disease, as well as to conventional military threats and natural disasters.
- Major and emerging powers could reject the path of cooperation and choose instead a hostile course, affecting the strategic position and freedom of action of the U.S. and its allies.
- A growing number of hostile regimes and terrorist groups seek to acquire WMD, or to use it to devastating effect. They are not likely to respond to the traditional tools of deterrence.

Accordingly, four key priorities for the Department are: defeating terrorist networks, defending the Homeland in-depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing the acquisition or use of WMD by hostile actors. While these four areas are not exhaustive, they are areas of particular concern, and addressing them will provide the Department with the capabilities, forces and policies it needs to be adaptable and versatile in response to other potential threats.

To refine the Department's vision and approach, senior civilian and military leaders engaged in detailed discussions of each focus area. Those discussions included input from the military departments, components, and combatant commands, and were informed by Defense Intelligence Agency assessments. The entire process was further informed by operational experiences from the irregular long war we are currently fighting, which shed additional light on the nature of the threats we face. Also, throughout the QDR process, the Department conducted outreach to key allies and partners, exploring their views of the shared threats we face. Their best ideas were incorporated into the QDR effort.

*V. Assumptions used in the review including desired/required readiness levels, warning times, the cooperation of allies, and interagency mission sharing*

The QDR adopted the basic assumption of the President's 2002 National Security Strategy, and the Department's own 2005 NDS, that the 21st century offers a greater range of security challenges, and greater uncertainty, than ever before. The importance of non-state actors is increasing, and they are less susceptible than states are to traditional deterrence tools. Most potential adversaries, unable to challenge America successfully through conventional means, will opt for unconventional, asymmetric ones. At the same time, traditional, state-based threats remain. We have been successful in keeping them at bay precisely because we are so well-prepared. Meanwhile, the pace of technological and scientific change, and the dispersion and availability of these changes through globalization, will only enhance the uncertainty.

The QDR also recognized that DOD cannot meet the array of challenges alone. The U.S. needs to apply all available instruments of national power, through enhancing the expeditionary capabilities of some agencies, and through closer integration across the board in planning, training, exercising, and implementation.

The QDR further assumed that the U.S. Government as a whole cannot succeed in the Long War, or meet the rest of the array of security challenges, alone. The U.S. will adapt longstanding alliances and foster new partnerships.

*VI. Role that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Combat Support Agencies played in development of the QDR*

The 2006 QDR process was the most inclusive review process ever carried out by the Department. It was leadership-driven, and it also included broad participation from all relevant stake-holders, in order to achieve unity of vision and purpose for the Department's ongoing, comprehensive re-orientation of focus.

The process was chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Throughout 2005, the Department's senior civilian

and military leaders met regularly. That QDR deliberative body reported periodically to the Secretary of Defense. The process reached out to the military departments, DOD components, and combatant commands.

The JROC—chaired by the Vice Chairman and including the Vice Chiefs of the Services—did not have a separate defined role in the process. Rather, all of its members were full-time participants in the QDR effort, and were instrumental in shaping the process and the outcomes.

The QDR process did draw on the expertise of the combat support agencies and their leadership. For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency provided intelligence and analytical support for the QDR discussions of the “four focus areas.” The Defense Threat Reduction Agency provided analytic support for QDR work on the focus area, “preventing acquisition or use of WMD by hostile actors.”

#### *VII. Explanation of any new terminology used in the QDR*

A critical component of the Department’s 20-year strategic outlook is the force planning construct (FPC) used to size and shape the force. As part of the 2006 QDR, the Department’s senior civilian and military leaders refined the FPC, to synchronize it with the QDR’s updated strategic vision. The refined FPC divides the Department’s activities into three broad categories: Homeland defense, war on terrorism/irregular warfare, and conventional campaigns. It accounts for both “steady-state” requirements, activities that the Department conducts continuously; and “surge” requirements, those that occur episodically.

The refined force planning construct calls on U.S. forces to be able to do the following things:

- *Defend the Homeland.* Steady-state requirements include detecting, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating external threats to the U.S. Homeland, and enabling partners to contribute to U.S. national security. Surge requirements include contributing to the Nation’s management of the consequences of WMD attacks or catastrophic events.
- *War on Terror/Irregular Warfare.* Steady-state requirements include deterring and defending against external transnational terrorist attacks, enabling partners through integrated security cooperation programs, and conducting multiple, globally distributed irregular operations of varying duration. Surge requirements include conducting a large-scale, potentially long-duration irregular warfare campaign including counterinsurgency, and conducting security, stability, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.
- *Conventional Campaigns.* Steady-state requirements include deterring interstate coercion or aggression through forward-deployed forces, enabling partners through theater security cooperation, and conducting presence missions. Surge requirements include waging two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns (or one, plus a large-scale long-duration irregular campaign), while reinforcing deterrence against opportunistic aggressions.

#### *VIII. Any changes in doctrine and training that would be required*

Achieving the QDR strategic vision will also require some adjustments to doctrine and training. A number of these recommendations are spelled out in the QDR Report. In addition, in eight specific areas that cross-cut military department and the Office of the Secretary of Defense component interests, the Department has created QDR follow-on “execution roadmap” efforts, to refine further and help implement QDR decisions. Those ongoing roadmap efforts may produce additional recommendations for training and doctrine changes needed to support the QDR decisions.

Highlighted here are some of the areas in which the Department’s reorientation is likely to produce training and doctrinal changes:

- *Preparing to participate in complex, interagency, and multinational operations.* The QDR stressed the need for further advances in joint training and education to prepare for participation in complex operations, at home and abroad. To shift focus and address the shortfalls, the QDR recommended that the Department develop a joint training strategy to address new mission areas and gaps; and that it revise the Training Transformation Plan to incorporate irregular warfare, complex stabilization operations, combating WMD, and information operations.
- *Helping improve interagency unity of effort.* To help improve U.S. interagency integration in planning and conducting complex operations, the QDR recommended enhancing opportunities for interagency training, including transforming the National Defense University into a National Security University with broad interagency participation.
- *Building the security capacity of partner states.* Fostering competent, indigenous security forces in partner countries is a key element of the strat-

egy for success in the long war. The QDR recommended that U.S. general purpose forces assume greater roles in training, mentoring and advising foreign security forces. This new emphasis will require some adjustments in training.

- *Improving language and cultural skills.* To succeed in the long war, and to facilitate closer cooperation with international partners, the QDR recommended significantly enhancing the language and cultural skills of the force. Measures include expanding Service Foreign Area Officer programs, recruiting and training heritage speakers to serve as translators, requiring language training as part of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and Service Academy curricula, and improving pre-deployment language and cultural training.

- *“Operationalizing” the Reserve component.* The QDR stressed the need to use the Reserve component as an “operational,” rather than a “strategic,” force, and to make it more accessible. Recommendations include better focusing Reserve component competencies for homeland defense and civil support operations; increasing flexibility for long-term service by individual Reserve component volunteer augmentees; and developing select Reserve component units that train intensively and require shorter deployment notice. These initiatives would likely require adjustments in training.

#### *IX. Any changes in the Unified Command Plan that would be required*

The 2006 QDR makes no changes to the Unified Command Plan.

The QDR’s decision to transform designated existing military department operational headquarters into fully functional and scalable Joint Command and Control Joint Task Force-capable Headquarters, complements standing guidance to move toward greater jointness at the operational level.

#### *X. Any proposed legislation that would be required to implement decisions in the QDR*

Implementing some aspects of the QDR strategic vision may require some changes to legislation. The DOD is in the process of elaborating and putting forward specific proposals for legislative change. The Department’s senior leadership looks forward to working closely with Congress on these initiatives.

Highlighted here are some of the more important initiatives:

- *Increasing flexibility in the use of the Reserve component.* The QDR stressed the need for greater flexibility in the use of the Reserve component in the Department’s support to civil authorities for homeland security missions. The QDR recommended seeking authorization to allow the use of National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams for cross-border WMD events in Canada and Mexico. The QDR also recommended seeking authorization to use Presidential Reserve Call-up for natural disasters.

- *Expanding ability to shape the force.* The QDR stressed the need to improve the Department’s ability to shape and manage the force, in order to meet today’s much more diverse array of challenges. The QDR recommended seeking the authority to extend the length of service prescribed by Presidential Reserve Call-up from 270 days to 365. It also recommended seeking tools to allow the Air Force and Navy to shape their forces for the future, including greater flexibility in separation incentives and interservice transfer bonuses.

- *Managing healthcare.* The QDR stressed the Department’s commitment to responsible management of healthcare costs, while maintaining force medical readiness and satisfaction with TRICARE. The QDR recommended seeking legislative support to restore the balance between government and individual health care contributions.

- *Improving options for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations abroad.* Victory in the long war requires the application of all elements of U.S. national power. To that end, the QDR proposed the creation of the President’s Security Investment Fund, to enable the President to commit resources to respond to high-priority requirements overseas. The QDR also recommended seeking changes to make permanent the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program currently in force in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

- *Facilitating the more rapid integration of coalition partners into complex operations.* The QDR recommended the creation of a Defense Coalition Support Account, to fund rapidly and, where appropriate, stockpile, high-demand equipment such as helmets, body armor, and night vision devices, in order to reduce the lead time required to equip coalition partners. The QDR

also recommended seeking the authority to provide nonreimbursable logistic support, supplies, and services to coalition partners in combined operations. This would make permanent authorities currently restricted to OEF and OIF. Finally, the QDR supported easing restrictions on the transfer of significant military equipment, such as armored high mobility multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), for temporary use by coalition partners in combined operations.

- *Building relationships with new partner countries.* The QDR stressed the need to initiate and build robust security relationships with new partners. To support that goal, the QDR recommended expanding the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund and the Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program, which would allow combatant commands to seize opportunities for building partnerships.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.  
Admiral?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and members of the committee. As always, it is a pleasure to be here before you today and also appear with Secretary England.

I just have a couple of very brief comments. Our attempt here was to tackle challenges in a very broad manner for the QDR, making hard choices along the way. Some of them have been made, as the Secretary said, in the 2007 President's budget and some of them will be presented as we move forward in our program review and then in next year's presidential budget.

We kept in mind the two customers while we were putting this together, one customer being of course the commander in chief and the President and the second one being the combatant commanders who execute the strategies and the missions that they are assigned. We made them first and foremost in our minds because they represent those troops.

I recently returned from a trip, like many of you make constantly to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. I know many of you made trips recently. I know you have, Mr. Chairman, along with many members of the committee, and it is always satisfying to me when I return from these trips to see the tremendous faith that our troops have in us that we will be supporting them fully back here. In my view, it also reinforces that we have the vector set correctly as we have described in this QDR. The determination that these troops show to conduct the mission at hand, their purposefulness, and their direction once again gives me great faith that we are moving in the right direction. I am proud to have been able to see them and present about 1,500 coins to a lot of troops in a short period of time.

One of the things that is different about this QDR is our force planning construct. I will not get into that now. We call it a refined force planning construct and we based it on three major capability areas, which I think is important for me just to review: homeland defense, the war on terrorism, irregular warfare, and then of course, conventional warfare.

All of those account for both steady state and surge operations. I bring this up because it is important in this refined force planning construct to understand that we spent a significant amount of time looking at that. We did it early on in the game before we went through the QDR. Frankly, in 2001 we came up with the force planning construct after many months of deliberation. We refined

it and worked through it before actually we went through the QDR this past year, and I think that is important.

I emphasize that there is a considerable down payment in 2007, as the Secretary mentioned, and of course the bulk of this will be contained in the 2008 budget.

With that, sir, we are ready to take your questions.

Mr. HENRY. Sir, I do not have an opening comment.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.

We will proceed to a round of questions. I first say to my witnesses, not by way of apology, but this is just the real world: The Senate has on the floor a very important piece of legislation and a number of our colleagues are engaged in that at this time. Senator McCain has an amendment and for that reason he had to depart. Since I am going to remain here throughout this hearing, I would be happy to yield my position to you or other colleagues who are here that may have a short time commitment.

Senator LEVIN. I also will be here. I am wondering if any of our colleagues have that need?

Chairman WARNER. Senator Akaka?

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Levin.

I also want to add my welcome to the panel. I looked with interest at the QDR as setting the strategy for our military. Gentlemen, according to the QDR the DOD will continue to strengthen traditional allied operations in order to facilitate the sharing of military and security burdens around the world. Are you envisioning a series of bilateral and multilateral term-limited agreements or the development of formal institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) dedicated to fighting the war on terrorism?

Also, as the QDR makes clear that we will rely on our allies to achieve a unified effort, what responsibilities does the United States have in ensuring that the allied forces have adequate warfighting capabilities?

Mr. HENRY. I will go ahead and start that and perhaps the deputy or the vice chairman would like to add to my comments. First of all, the QDR does recognize the enduring value of the alliances and coalitions we have. As you well point out, some of those are formal multilateral ones and some, as we have with Japan, tend to be bilateral. We specifically acknowledge the contributions of the United Kingdom and Australia where they have been by our side in almost every operation that we have engaged in.

But we see that as we go forward, rather than needing new formal multilateral alliances, there are different mechanisms. An example of that might be the proliferation security initiative, where we have over 70 countries coming together on a voluntary basis, each contributing the best they can to be able to stem the flow of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other illegal items in a proliferated world, driven by globalization that makes this easier.

We think that is a good example of how we want to go forward. Obviously, for different operational needs we will engage those who would be willing to join us in a coalition effort.

Senator AKAKA. I recall that, in visiting some of the European countries in the past, that we, our country, helped them a lot in

training and also in equipment. Will we be ensuring that the allied forces have adequate warfighting capabilities as well?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Senator Akaka, my first comment is that a very key component of this QDR is what we call increasing partner capacity. By partner we mean allied, coalition, or our friends. Mr. Henry discussed a couple of our bilateral initiatives, but let me discuss it more on the military level but I will get to the NATO piece right now.

We have made a substantial commitment to NATO in the form of, first of all, dual-hatting my former position. Here in the Senate you confirmed my position as the first Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation, back in June 2003. We stood up this brand new command, of which the United States when it finally settles out at full operational capability, will actually have about 40 percent of the manning, but the commander and one other flag and general officer.

The importance of that is because it is tied and dual-hatted with the Commander of United States Joint Forces Command. That is a big initiative.

The next part of it is that the United States has been a very strong proponent of establishing joint warfare training capabilities across the NATO alliance. In fact, now the entire alliance has come on board and has funded the creation of a joint warfare center with all types of construction going on, installation of information technologies, and manning in a variety of areas, located in Norway, Poland, Lisbon, and Portugal. This is very significant.

Another piece of this is that on a bilateral basis from the United States side, for example, we have a huge international presence that most people are unaware of in Norfolk, Virginia, to help each of these countries in concept development and experimentation of warfighting principles. In June 2003 we had only about four to six countries located in Norfolk, Virginia. Today we have over 40. As a matter of fact, while we are speaking right now, we have a huge exercise sponsored by Joint Forces Command, called the Multinational Experiment No. 4. The actual senior leader seminar at the end of this experiment, probably has on the order of not only NATO but another 6 or 7 countries, adding up to about 30 countries participating. It'll be done in Brussels for the European audience, to help bring them along.

Those are the types of initiatives we are doing right now to bring our partner capacity in a big way. But this is not just NATO. It is also Australia, Singapore, Japan, and Korea. We have invited Pakistan. We have invited many other countries to participate in this, and many of them expressed great desire.

Senator AKAKA. As I said, I have witnessed part of this and it is a tremendous program. I was interested in the cost, but that will be for another question.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.

Chairman WARNER. Are there other colleagues at this time seeking recognition?

Senator LEVIN. We are going out of order, if you need to go early.

Chairman WARNER. I am going to stay throughout.

Senator Nelson.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me express my appreciation to our panelists for being here today as well. Secretary England, I was pleased that the Army agreed to reverse their original QDR and budget decisions recognizing that the Army recruiting could be successful. The Guard says that they are on track to reach 350,000 personnel. I am also glad that they are committed to finding the additional resources to pay for end strength if it rises above 333,000. The latest end strength number I was given had the Army Guard at 336,094, and that is as of today.

I think we can all agree that it is absolutely critical, as the QDR points out, to have the Total Force ready, able, and capable, meaning properly manned and equipped. This morning, as the ranking member of the Personnel Subcommittee of this committee, I testified before the congressionally-mandated Commission on the National Guard and Reserves and I mentioned at that time about the Pentagon efforts to bring stability to the deployment schedule for the Total Force, the plans to bring deployment schedules down to 1-year of deployment and 5 years at home.

Now, considering the long and extended deployment of the National Guard units at the beginning of the war and the strain put on the soldiers, families, jobs, and employers, I asked the commission to carefully analyze this proposal to see if it is reality-based on end strength and on the deployment. On page 76 of the QDR under the section on, "Reconfiguring the Total Force," and more specifically "A Continuum of Service," DOD states: "To fight the long war and conduct other future contingency operations, Joint Force Commanders need to have more immediate access to the Total Force. In particular, the Reserve component must be operationalized so that select reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today."

I have two questions and perhaps Mr. Henry might want to respond to it first. Which units are we referring to there, if you can help me with that in terms of the Total Force and the continuum of service; and how does the QDR statement square with the Pentagon's 1-year every 6-year proposal? I really want to know whether that can be looked at as reality-based, given what we have been through and what the numbers truly are.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Senator Nelson, I think I can address that. There are many Reserve component individuals, men and women, for example in the Air National Guard, who although the 1 in 6 is our goal, you take some Air National Guard folks who work in airlift, tankers, and the rest. They come on Active-Duty constantly. They will be on Active-Duty 2 weeks a month and they will do this continuously over long periods of time. They will be on call for special mission flights and the rest.

In some of these Reserve specialty areas we simply do not see a change in how they are doing business. What we are really talking about here in the one-in-six is, for example, many of these Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) and other Army brigades, where what we want to do is not have to cross-deck, as we would say in the Navy, or cross-level in the Army, where we have to take individuals from one unit, move them over to another unit to make that unit whole, so that when we deploy the unit we go out with all of them, and then when this unit where we took people from

have to go the next time around. We want to get out of that, which is why the Army initiative to fully equip and train all of these units right from the start makes great sense, so that you can get into a better rotation.

We have had experiences where up to 40 percent of some of our National Guard BCTs have been cross-leveled from other units. We want to get away from that.

For those skill sets where we generally rely on units as opposed to individuals or single crews to do certain things, that is really the rotational policy we are talking about, in more of the unit level. Does that make sense?

Senator BEN NELSON. It does. I appreciate it.

Secretary England, last week as we were looking at the marines I asked General Osman a question about the Marine Corps end strength. The proposal is to reduce the number from 180,000 down to 175,000. That may not sound like a lot, but end strength has a significant impact on mission capabilities. I am very concerned that that may not be an appropriate reduction, that we may want to stay at the end strength that we are, given the operational tempo at the present time and not knowing what it is going to be in the future.

Do you know whether the Marine Corps had adequate input to the QDR regarding that desired end strength and that proposed reduction?

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, the 175,000 is the authorized end strength. Today they are up by 5,000 because of the war. But the projection is by 2011 that would come down again to 175,000, obviously dictated by events on the ground. While that is the end objective, and the schedule is by 2011, our best projection at the end of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) at this time, it is not mandated, this will happen on some particular schedule. Rather it is our best projection of events on the ground of what we can do in terms of steady state as we go forward.

There are efficiencies in the force. That is, we have been able to free up marines and replace marines with civilians, so we have in the Marine Corps, like the Army, been able to effectively grow the Corps in terms of its fighting strength. It is effectively larger today, even larger than the 180,000, when you think of the number of marines that are actually in the fighting force as opposed to clerical jobs, et cetera, that we have freed up in the past. As I recall from my Secretary of the Navy days, that was a couple of thousand marines right there.

Again, it is not mandated. It is the objective in 2011, and events will dictate that drawdown and we will do what is reasonable and rational to do.

Senator BEN NELSON. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Secretary ENGLAND. You are welcome, sir.

Chairman WARNER. I will ask a question or two and then turn to my colleague.

Mr. Secretary, as you well know, you have to make assumptions in preparing a very comprehensive report like this, and it is important for the committee to know, how did you formulate the assumptions with regard to the threat in the out-years? To what extent did

you involve Ambassador Negroponte and his organization in helping you project out into the future and establish the parameters of what we can estimate to be the types of threat and the seriousness of the threats, therefore how best to equip the United States and train to meet those threats?

Mr. HENRY. I will go ahead and jump in, Senator. My remarks might be amplified later on. We first of all looked at a set of challenges that we faced at the beginning of the 21st century. Those are in the area of hastening the demise of terrorist networks and defeating the terrorist threat, defending the Homeland in depth, making sure that there is no acquisition or use of WMD by rogue powers, and then finally influencing countries at strategic crossroads.

We did that in consultation with the IC. As you might be aware, the defense strategy, which also has a number of assumptions laid out in it, was completed before we actually started the work on the QDR and it was published in March 2005. That did a broad scan of what we had in front of us. The IC participated with that every step of the way.

Then we came and as part of the QDR, looked at these challenging areas. As the Vice Chairman mentioned, we looked at them from a perspective of what did the commander in chief need as far as options in being able to respond for the national security and then what did the combatant commanders need as far as specific capabilities to be able to handle the tasking that would come down through the national command authority.

As we set out to do and look at each of those capability areas, we brought the IC in. We had day-long briefings where they would lay out what the threat spectrum was before us, and then as we did the development in that we continued to communicate with the IC. They are going through a process, I believe it is referred to as the Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review (QICR), where they look at also a 4-year look at the IC. We married those efforts and then when we completed the brief we had consultations with the principal staff members on the Directorate of National Intelligence to make sure that we were also linked up there.

At each step of the way we made sure that we were tightly coupled with the IC.

Chairman WARNER. I think that is a pretty comprehensive answer. Mr. Secretary, do you have anything to amplify that with?

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, I just say that this was, as I commented in my opening statement, very comprehensive in terms of literally trying to engage all aspects of the Federal Government, our friends, and our allies. We took the best information and the best projections we could from the best minds in the Federal Government, our friends, and allies.

Chairman WARNER. Admiral?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to reinforce exactly what Mr. Henry said. I think the important piece is not only engaging through Defense Intelligence Agency assessments across the IC, but the other part was bringing in the operational aspects from the geographic combatant commanders and having them bounce this against one another. In addition, early on in the process, back in early 2005, the Secretary signed out a QDR terms of

reference in which we posted a series of challenges that were based on this intelligence information. Continually throughout the process we challenged those assumptions, if you will, those threats and risks that were listed, and we would revisit them for their validity. That is an important component of the process.

Chairman WARNER. I was going to ask that question, whether or not the combatant commanders had a voice, and you have reassured me that that is the case.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, sir. As a combatant commander, I was as each of us were, and I wrote a letter to the Secretary of Defense on the areas that I thought we ought to be focusing on, and each of us did as a combatant commander, and we shared that with the Secretary, the Deputy, the Chairman, and the rest.

Then of course, I turned around and changed hats when I came here in August after I was confirmed, and then had to go out and execute them.

Chairman WARNER. Let us address your second hat.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, sir.

Chairman WARNER. That is, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Was there full participation by the Joint Chiefs in this work process?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, sir. Just to give you an example, this is probably the most unprecedented amount of military-civilian interaction I have seen in the three QDRs that I have participated in. I have been through all three of them at various levels, from a one star up now to the Vice Chairman. I had my staff go out and calculate how much time senior civilian/military: It is almost 6,500 man-hours of engagement.

The group that the Deputy Secretary and myself chaired had involved in it the Vice Chiefs of all four Services. We had all of the Under Secretaries. We had a variety of other individuals such as Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). We had the Comptroller, et cetera. So we had this group who we deliberated with continuously, and then we had various tank sessions, for example, where I went to the Joint Chiefs, we brought information in to them. Or the Joint Chiefs would have met on some issue and then we would feed it into what we called this Group of 12.

This was an unprecedented amount of engagement between the combatant commanders and the chiefs. As part of this group we had the Deputy Commander for Special Operations Command (SOCOM) there with us on all deliberations because we focus so much on the special operations area. In addition, the Secretary and I invited in on numerous occasions combatant commanders to make presentations.

Chairman WARNER. The Secretary, you said?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The Deputy Secretary and myself.

Chairman WARNER. We will come momentarily to Secretary England. We want to have on the record the participation by Secretary Rumsfeld, at what juncture did he come in, perhaps did an overview, perhaps sent back queries to you, and then the final product of course bears his signature?

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, we, the group of 12, basically report in to what we call the Senior Level Review Group (SLRG), and that is chaired by the Secretary and consists of the Service Chiefs

and at different times all of the combatant commanders. The Secretary actually drove this from what we call the SLRG group, where he runs that group. The Secretary was actively involved in the direction and the decisions. We stood up information and trade-offs at this group of 12, debated all the issues, and then took them up to the Secretary level along with the Service Chiefs and the combatant commanders, where they again were debated and discussed and decisions were reached, with the ultimate decision residing with the Secretary.

Chairman WARNER. To lay a foundation for this hearing, my last question, is this: We have gone through one of the most unusual budget periods that I have ever witnessed. Senator Levin and I have been here these 28 years, but we have never seen a succession of supplementals of the magnitude that we have had, the major part of those supplementals understandably necessary to meet defense requirements. The war, of course, was the principal funding item in each of these supplementals, but nevertheless there were other items in there that went to the new equipment for the forces, certain aspects of the personnel situation. They had other very important components.

I do not say this by way of criticism, or warning, or threat. But I have talked to my good friend and longstanding colleague Senator Stevens, and he thinks there is going to come a time, and probably after the cessation of whatever period this current Afghanistan and Iraq requires such heavy drawdown, but at some point we are going to try and get back in the regular budget process, where the authorizers basically take the President's budget and it is inclusive of all the needs for the military department and then it goes to the appropriators after the authorizers' work.

How did you deal with the current budget situation in relation to this look forward into the out-years? I hope you had an assumption that this type of supplemental funding was not something that would go on in subsequent years.

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, first let me say the decision on the supplemental frankly is above my pay grade. That was a decision by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the President and the leadership of Congress.

Chairman WARNER. I am not faulting or criticizing. I am just saying, you are trying to do a very difficult job of looking out into the years. One component is intelligence. Another component is what is the funding level that we are likely to have?

Secretary ENGLAND. We did not look at the QDR in terms of a supplemental. We did not consider a supplemental because a supplemental is war-related and this is a long-term strategic view.

Chairman WARNER. That is important. So you did not work on any assumptions that in times of war or otherwise you would suddenly have supplementals?

Secretary ENGLAND. No, sir. The QDR is a strategic level document. Obviously it is bounded by realism, but it is a strategic level document as opposed to a budget document. A budget is separate. This is a strategic look, and we then take the strategic view and we translate that into programs and to budget.

During this whole time period we were not looking at the budget per se during the QDR, except as we went along in the QDR there

were some aspects of the QDR we wanted to incorporate in the 2007 budget. It became a budget decision in 2007. But they are separate in terms of one is strategic and the other is the implementation of that strategic direction in the budget. There is no consideration of supplementals or anything of that sort, Senator.

Chairman WARNER. I just wanted that reassurance that that was not a component.

Senator LEVIN.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On that subject, you may try to keep them separate, but I am afraid they are very clearly related, because if we are talking strategically about a long war that sounds strategic to me. What General Pace wrote seems to me is very true. He says "The daily life of the average American citizen reflects none of the hardships or shortages that we associate with a nation at war." As I think a newspaper put it, nobody in America is asked to sacrifice except our Armed Forces. We are not even paying for this beginning of a long war. We are just sending the bill to our children and our grandchildren. It seems to me it is unsustainable.

Secretary Rumsfeld wrote a memo in October 2003 to the senior DOD leadership that said: "We are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us. Our cost is billions against the terrorists' cost of millions."

In the 2 years that would follow that statement we spent \$160 billion on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Last month we got another supplemental request that would push the total of spending in connection with these operations to \$122 billion in fiscal year 2006 alone. That is \$10 billion a month.

So this is not a sustainable path. The QDR says that "The U.S. must constantly strive to minimize its costs in terms of lives and treasure while imposing unsustainable costs on its adversaries." That is in the QDR. I do not think any of us could tell the American people that that is what we are doing today.

We have to start budgeting honestly, both for short-term and long-term reasons. Until these costs are included in the budget request and unless they go through the ordinary process, we are not engaged in honest budgeting here. I would reinforce what I think the chairman was making reference to, perhaps a little more sharply, but nonetheless I believe for QDR reasons, as well as short-term reasons we have to change this. This year again, we should ask the Budget Committee when this next budget comes up to include the cost that we expect will be actually laid out in the war, not just the ones that come in the budget request.

Secretary ENGLAND. May I respond, Senator?

Senator LEVIN. Sure.

Secretary ENGLAND. First, understand the cost is high, but it is somewhere between 3.7 and 3.9 percent of gross domestic product, which I believe is the lowest it has ever been in time of war. It is a lot of money.

Senator LEVIN. That is not the issue. The issue is whether we engage in honest budgeting, whether it is 3.7, 3.5, 3.2, or 4.0 percent. It does not make any difference what percent.

Secretary ENGLAND. May I respond, Senator?

Senator LEVIN. Sure.

Secretary ENGLAND. The question is, is it in the budget or the supplemental? If it is in the budget, today we are working on the 2008 budget. When you work on the 2008 budget, if you are talking about the wartime, we are trying to project 2 years ahead, as opposed to a supplemental where we are very close to the time of expenditures, we actually know what is being spent. I think you will find a supplemental is very supportable. Sort of the choice we have is very supportable, detailed data regarding the supplemental or much less data trying to project ahead. I am not sure there is a definitive answer, but I can tell you that the supplemental is much more realistic in terms of costing and trying to project ahead 2 years when we are uncertain about what will be happening in 2 years on the ground.

Senator LEVIN. I am sure it is more realistic and definitive, but it has a huge disadvantage, which is that we are borrowing for it. We are not putting it into the mix of our Nation's priorities to match against resources. So it becomes irresponsible.

Of course, there is always more detail the longer you wait in terms of putting together a budget. We have a responsibility, it seems to me, to pay for this war. We are not doing it. We are borrowing for it and one of the reasons is we are doing this by supplementals instead of through the ordinary budget process.

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, there are pros and cons. The decision has been made to do the supplemental, so we are proceeding that way. But I think it depends on the strength of the supporting data, and the timing of that. That is the decision to be made.

Senator LEVIN. Admiral, let me go to a more specific QDR question. The QDR says that the Department will stabilize Active-Duty end strengths of the Army and the Marine Corps at 482,000 and 175,000 respectively, by fiscal year 2011. Relative to the Guard, the QDR would propose to reduce the Army Guard's end strength to 333,000, which has already been reversed, as Senator Nelson indicated.

Two recent studies examined the strain on the Army. Each of these studies independently concluded that the Active-Duty Army is too small. The Commandant recently stated he is not sure that the Marine Corps end strength should be reduced below 180,000 marines. The QDR talks about 175,000 as the stabilized figure. So the Commandant is launching his own study to reexamine the issue.

Given what the facts and the reality are in this world, why does the Department believe that the Army and Marine Corps end strengths should be reduced and has the stress that the force is taking been taken into account in these QDR proposals?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Sir, the way I would address that is as follows. With regard to the Army, all of the rotations that we have had that have taken place have been done with both Active component, in general order, BCTs, for example, on the combat side, both Army Active component and National Guard, and now we are at a point where we expect the very last unit that is an old structure BCT—the First Brigade of the First Armored Division has just deployed to Tal Afar to relieve the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment. We expect that will be the last rotation of a non-modularized, non-changed unit.

We are somewhere in 37 BCTs on the Active component side along with our modularity, and increasing the number, if you will, from a smaller number all the way up to 42 BCTs. There are a lot of numbers here, but the bottom line is we expect to be able to rotate on a continuous basis up to 14 Active component BCTs with that base. That is substantially larger than the 32 that we had before if you were doing a one-in-three rotation. Clearly, if you had to go to what we call in the Navy port and starboard, or one-in-two, which we do not want to do on the chiefs' side, you could come up with a large number of 21.

Now, if I extend that to the National Guard side and now take the 28 BCTs, use the one-in-six rotation I mentioned before, suddenly we are talking about a sustained level inside the Army of somewhere between 18 and 19 BCTs with one-in-three and one-in-six rotations. That then allows us to sustain this effort over a longer period of time with fully equipped and manned and trained units. That is something we just have not done before in the National Guard. That is why we are doing all this cross-leveling, and that is what created a lot of this strain.

The same thing will occur inside the Active component side. We feel comfortable that we have created upwards of 30,000 to 40,000 more, if you will, combat positions to populate this operational force on the Active side. On the National Guard side fully populating these units, plus creating for the very first time what we call a training, transient account, so that we can in fact have National Guard members who are treated just like they are in the Active component, so that we have folks that have this surplus of people that we have in these accounts. We are not just decreasing the numbers in the line units.

We are working on making them a more operational reserve. Frankly, we have made great progress here. This is not a static situation. It is happening as we move on. That is part of what this modularity is.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. I feel constrained. I must ask a supporting question to my colleague. You said a much more operational Guard and Reserve. Tell me, to what extent did you consult governors and their needs with regard to their Guard and implement the governors' input?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. What I would tell you very honestly and forthrightly is that it was not well done, frankly, up front. It was done with the senior National Guard leadership, but sitting down and having this discussion occurred in the January-February time frame, near the completion of this. It should have been done earlier. There is always a balance that goes on, Mr. Chairman. But unfortunately, we are where we are right now.

Chairman WARNER. We need to cure that problem.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, sir.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Dayton.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen. Picking up perhaps where the chairman and the ranking member left off, the QDR lists four priorities for the time period: adapting capabilities and forces to better address priorities; defeating terrorist networks; defending the Homeland in

depth; shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads; preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMDs—all relatively new, at least in degree, from the previous QDR, given the nature of what has happened since that time.

The major recommendations, I will not go through them all, but they are: increasing capabilities of Special Operations Forces (SOFs), they are increasing, improving, investing, strengthening, et cetera, all of which I think we would support.

But the question is, is this affordable over the extended period of time, and in particular can we do all of this and finance all of the more advanced new weapons systems that were previously contemplated and have been put into the beginning of the budget process? Are there any major weapons systems that you are recommending be discontinued or not developed to respond to this changing set of priorities? Or is this all in addition to what we have been doing heretofore?

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, this is about hard choices, frankly, because we understand there is not an unlimited amount of money. This is about hard choices. Like I said, we did some of the leading edge work in the 2007 budget, but we have yet to address the full implications of the QDR, because the QDR was finished at the end of the year and the budget was turned in at the end of the year. We only had literally the last couple months of the year to take the benefit of the QDR and try to impact the 2007 budget.

Senator DAYTON. Mr. Secretary, if you have made hard choices, what hard choices have you specifically made?

Secretary ENGLAND. That is why I say, most of them I believe are still in front of us because the QDR is still to be implemented. On the other hand, this is not about cancelling programs. It is about getting the right structure of forces to do this array of tasks that we need to do. We have made some recommendations in 2007 relative to programs, some older systems to retire, not to have some backup systems, and to finish production on other systems. You will continue to see some of that.

I think most of it will be sort of below the waterline. You will not see this in terms of major programs, but you will see a lot of money being moved and that has already happened in 2007, like, for example, in SOCOM. We have stood up a lot more in terms of special operations. That money came out of other programs that was otherwise programmed in the budget.

You will continue to see adjustments. This is not an exercise in just trying to kill major programs. This is an effort to get the right balance across the United States military looking forward to address those missions that you just articulated that are in the QDR. That is the consensus again of the leadership at this time in terms of the best way to position our forces.

We still have to deter conventional threats. The conventional end of this has not gone away, and those conventional forces, as we have found, are extraordinarily useful to us even in this war on terrorism. This is not like decimating some part of our budget, because every one of these systems we have looked at in terms of those four threats to America, and we will continue to do that.

There will be hard choices for us and Congress, Senator.

Senator DAYTON. You are saying that those hard choices have not yet begun to be made. Let me read part of an editorial in the Washington Post and then I ask for any of you to respond: "One thing that military analysts agree on is that, even given the 40 percent increase in defense spending during the Bush administration, including 7 percent for next year, it will not be enough money to pay for the four dozen systems under development."

Everything is desirable. The question is, is it all cumulatively affordable? I guess you are saying that none of those hard decisions, and they are hard decisions, have been made by the administration and served as recommendations to Congress?

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, I think some of those hard decisions have been made in the 2007 budget. I just hope they can be sustained here in Congress. Frankly, we are making recommendations in the 2007 budget, and they do change. Again, it will take the cooperation of the Senate with the DOD to start moving in a different direction. We are starting to move money as part of our budgeting process in response to the findings of the QDR and we will need to work together to be able to implement those. But it will take the cooperation of Congress also to do this.

Senator DAYTON. I recognize that. But again, trying to get specific, do you agree or disagree with the statement that the four dozen, if that is the right number, systems under development are not affordable, given the budget realities and despite the significant increases, and in addition to all the other additional things that you want to do in terms of special operations and the like? Are they affordable or are they not? If they are not, then how are you going to go about a process of recommending to us what we cannot afford?

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, first of all, we will always submit to you a balanced budget. We do that every year and we go through this deliberative process within the Department to make decisions between programs and costs. When we present you a budget, that is a balanced set of programs that we provide every year to Congress, and we will continue to do that.

I would just take issue with the Washington Post. If we need to make tradeoffs in programs, in either requirements or quantities, we will evaluate that relative to what the needs are of the DOD. This is a risk-based decision that we go through every year and we never have everything we want. We do a risk-based assessment of our needs, and we will continue to do that, Senator. That is the way the process works.

Senator DAYTON. Admiral or Mr. Henry?

Mr. HENRY. In support of what the Deputy said, some hard choices were made. I also take issue with the Washington Post. With the airborne laser, the decision was made to take that to a demonstration phase, but not to put any money in for production. The E-10, the E/A-10, the Air Force's future command and control platform and surveillance platform, a decision was made to take that to an engineering development stage, but not to move into production. The Joint Unmanned Combat Air System, that was totally restructured, scoped differently, opt some early wins and then looked at longer range, more robust capabilities.

On the F-22, we relooked at that decision. We had down-scoped that quite a bit in the last budget cycle. The QDR was to go back and look at that to ensure that that smaller size was correct. We looked at that, although we extended the production line 2 years to make sure we would not have a gap in fifth generation fighters. The decision was made on the second engine for the Joint Strike Fighter, to postpone that decision, not to get the second engine, but at this point in time we do not think that we know enough to make a decision to put that into production.

So there were a number of points where we actually made decisions that, based on the capabilities we would need, a lot of it coming out from the lessons learned from operations we had been in and projecting what our needs would be in the future, that we needed more of the capability in the irregular warfare area and less in some of these traditional areas.

Senator DAYTON. That is very responsive to my question, so I thank you for that.

Admiral, sir?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. One other one I would add is we also came forward with a change in the aerial common sensor, which is an Army-led program. The important thing that you should get out of all of this is what is underlying in the Washington Post editorial is that there is always a bow wave of procurement out there.

As the Deputy said, our job is to figure out how to put these together in a way so we can propose to Congress a balanced and reasonable program that gives the best we can for the defense of this Nation and to equip our men and women in the armed services. Our job is to come in with a balanced program and we do that every year. These are some examples.

I think what we should not do is try to grade a QDR or anything else by the number of scalps that we can put on the wall up here, or the number of program kills that you can get. That is not the way we look at these things. It is how they are balanced. We can provide the capability across the spectrum that we have talked about.

Senator DAYTON. I thank you for doing that.

My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today and for all the work on the QDR. Admiral Giambastiani, you mentioned in terms of response to Senator Levin that the modularity buys us many more units and perhaps more capability, but in terms of personnel in those brigades, are they much less in number than the current brigades that we are transforming?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Senator Reed, the numbers of people that we have in here, or the manning, will be better. That is what I am saying.

Senator REED. Can you give me an idea of how many troops are in the old brigades, and how many troops in the new brigades?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. It depends. For example, take a Stryker BCT. The number of infantry in those units is substantially larger—it could be 500, 600, or 700. I would get you specifics. I will

take that for the record. But when we look at these, the numbers of infantry, or the trigger-pullers, are larger. If you will, we have populated units such as the Stryker BCTs with unmanned aerial vehicle reconnaissance capability.

[The information referred to follows:]

Pre-modular, or "old" brigades consisted of three maneuver (infantry or armor) battalions and a headquarters company. A pre-modular heavy unit consisted of 1,075 soldiers. A pre-modular infantry unit consisted of 2,186 soldiers. Pre-modular force numbers only include assigned infantrymen.

By contrast, modular force brigade combat teams (BCTs) are far more capable, consisting of two maneuver battalions; a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition squadron; a fires battalion; a brigade support battalion; a headquarters company; and company-sized elements of engineers, military police, and signal and military intelligence. The new modular force heavy unit consists of 3,787 soldiers. The new modular force infantry BCT consists of 3,431 soldiers. The increased force totals for the modular force BCTs highlight the fact that these new BCTs include not only infantrymen, but also engineers, military police, and military intelligence specialists who operate side-by-side with the maneuver forces.

In a "boots on the ground" comparison, a pre-modular heavy (armor and infantry-centric) unit had 909 soldiers and a pre-modular unit consisting of light infantry and airborne/air assault had 2,016 soldiers. In comparison, a new modular force heavy BCT has 603 soldiers. A new modular infantry BCT has 1,006 soldiers. A third unit, the Stryker BCT, whose personnel numbers were previously embedded in the pre-modular brigade numbers above, are now counted separately in the modular force at a strength of 1,209 soldiers. When adding the numbers of this "boots on the ground" comparison, the pre-modular brigades totaled 2,925 and the new modular force totals 2,818.

As you can see, there is not a simple answer when comparing pre-modular and modular force structure. A line item comparison of end strength numbers does not accurately reflect functionality or capability. The most important point to remember is that because of the new unit structure and unit makeup, soldiers are performing multiple roles and bringing added capability. The modular force is more capable, more agile, and more lethal.

Senator REED. I am not talking about technology, but boots on the ground.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I am talking about the people who do these things. We have more, if you will, infantry. We have additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) with them. We bring lots with them, so they are a more complete unit, when they go out, and we can use them, in addition to the numbers we have.

Senator REED. Can you not give me a notional figure that in an old brigade you would have 2,000 people—

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I would like to give you a number, but I am going to take it for the record, and I will tell you why. Because so many of these brigades are different and trying to make them more alike and more unitized is what is happening right now. I do not have on the top of my head the exact numbers. I could look in my notes here and I might be able to get it for you.

Senator REED. But it seems to me you have adopted an end strength of 482,400 Army personnel and 175,000 marines. You have more brigades, so you have increased the number of units with a fixed number of people. You lose people because of your increased number of special operators within this fixed end strength. You pick up some because you have taken civilians and substituted them. So I am just wondering about the math, and how you come up with essentially more trigger-pullers in every brigade.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. How I would describe it is this way. Like in life, when you want something more you just do not go out and

buy more. You look at what you already have and you can redistribute, if you will, under that top line. That is one of the things we are doing. Temporarily, we have increased the end strength numbers authorized.

Senator REED. But we are not talking about that. We are talking about the QDR, 482,000 troops, modular brigades going forward.

Secretary ENGLAND. Can I step in a second? As I recall—and again, I will leave this to the Army; they are a little better than I am, Senator Reed. But as I recall, the Army has 40,000 they are actually taking out of what I call the back end of the Army and into the front end of the Army. That is, there is a 40,000 effective growth in the Army in terms of the combat force within the Army, both through conversions of civilians doing military jobs and also taking jobs that people were doing, say back office jobs, and now are going to be in combat units.

So my understanding, each of these BCTs have actually increased fighting capability as opposed to the older configuration.



Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. This is the redistribution I was talking about.


Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, I think it would be helpful, maybe just from a personal standpoint, if we could have the simple answer of the end strength numbers in these brigades. On the capability issue, I would hope they would be more capable.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. We will get them for you.

[The information referred to follows:]

Prior to our transformation and current global force requirements, the Army was composed of multiple brigade formations assigned to a division centric force, based on large, robust, fixed organizations. The divisions were supported by functional brigades based on mission requirements. The combat brigade formations were composed of approximately 1,600 soldiers resident within the brigade. The brigade required the task organization of forces and units from the division in order to conduct combat operations. As part of our decisive effort within transformation, the Army is migrating capabilities previously found at divisions and corps to the brigade—our building block of combat forces in the future force. There will be three standard brigade formations: Heavy, Infantry and Stryker. Each type of brigade will be of a standard configuration and organization permanently task organized for combat. These brigades will be composed of 3,787 soldiers in the Heavy, 3,431 soldiers in the Infantry, and 3,903 soldiers in the Stryker brigade combat teams (BCTs). As the Army transforms to three standardized formations, these brigades will gain improved force packaging, sustainability, battle command, and situational awareness while retaining the same lethality as the larger, task-organized BCTs. These units will serve as the foundation for a land force that is balanced and postured for rapid deployment and sustained operations worldwide.





Senator REED. One reason for this line of questioning is when I am looking at the force planning construct for the QDR, it talks about, forces to defend the Homeland, operating in forward areas, swiftly defeating adversaries in two overlapping military commands, campaigns, and conducting limited numbers of military and humanitarian contingencies. I do not see nation-building or conducting a 3-year counterinsurgency in this force planning project. One of the stresses on the force that we are seeing today is not a result of being unable with our present brigade forms to swiftly defeat an enemy. It is trying to rebuild a country and essentially conduct a—

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Sir, part of the refined force planning construct would assume in what that 1-4-2-1 construct we have is, where we can do two major things at a time, if you will. One of them is considered to be this long-term, long duration, or what we are doing right now. That is an assumption that we have.

Mr. Henry, do you want to elaborate on that a little bit?

Mr. HENRY. Yes, sir. With operational availability, which is a study effort that has been going on with the Joint Staff for the last 4 years to get a handle on what it takes to have sufficiency of the force, we put a lot of effort this year into understanding how we support the force planning construct.

As the Vice Chairman was saying, one of the ones that we looked at was a prolonged irregular conflict in the future, to be able to support something the size of Iraq and Afghanistan combined, and yet still be able to do a conventional operation. We ran that through, and here is where we would probably take exception to you. The big lesson that we took out of the QDR is it is not about

end strength numbers; it is about the capability of the force and what the force can do.

As is pointed out in the QDR, as we go to these BCTs we increase the combat effectiveness of these by 46 percent over what we had last time. So if you just want to count the numbers and you want to freeze technology and you want to freeze the capability and the learning of the forces, then those numbers work. But as we look to the future and as we change the mix of the force, which has been a big problem, as we looked at it we, based on the first 3 years of work that we did, it appeared that the total end strength was about right, but the mix of capabilities and the mix of the force was not right, and that we needed to have more capability to be able to do these irregular type of operations.

We spent the last year, specifically the Joint Staff and their analysis group, getting into the details, working with the combatant commanders, working with the Services, to understand how we had to change that mix. That is what you see in the QDR.

There is another reason why we are able to do more than we have in the past and that is the concept of jointness and joint interdependency. In the past, we tried to get compatibility between the Services, but the lessons learned from both Iraq and Afghanistan is that one Service can put the other Service on its critical path for mission success. There is an opportunity to focus on core expertise and core capability, and we see that today in Iraq, where we have different Services helping out each other.

Senator REED. What capability do we have in Iraq today or that we will have in a few years that will allow us to cover more ground, train police officers better, and to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs)? Is that what you are talking about when you say new capabilities?

Mr. HENRY. Countering IEDs is a near-term significant effort that we are doing right now. As you look at what the investment is in, it is in increasing civil affairs and having civil affairs officers. We are increasing that by one third; increasing psychological operations by one third, specifically those for communicating with the local populace, embedding those in the combat brigades so that they will have a coherent capability to do that locally. Those do make a difference.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Another significant one Senator, if I could just add, is the shift of taking conventional forces and training them to do foreign military training. Most of the embedded trainers that are in Iraq and Afghanistan typically would be almost all special forces in the past. We are now training, in fact using conventional operators to do this. We have a significant capability increase that we are bringing in the civil affairs.

We have moved some of the artillery folks into the military police area. Like I said, we have a mix of the force so that we can get the right capability.

We also have taken joint sourcing to a level that we have not done before. We have used a significant amount from both the Navy and the Air Force to make up for many of these, where they are not as stressed in a rotational way in some of the lesser utilized skill sets. We have done a lot of joint force sourcing, if you will.

Senator REED. My time has expired, but I remain skeptical that you can do all these things with 482,000 soldiers.

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, we will get back with you on this subject. We also have asked General Schoomaker to get with you, because this has been through a lot of analysis and it does have the support of the Army leadership.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator, very much.

Senator Clinton.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, and thank you for your service. Thank you for your work. I have to confess that listening to the exchanges, and reading the QDR, is a little bit confusing. There are so many issues that we can look back on over the past 5 years that have been very troubling.

The words are all here. We have had trouble getting up-armored Humvees and body armor to our troops. We have had strategic and tactical challenges. We have had recruitment difficulties. We have had many problems, in addition to the larger considerations that both the chairman and Senator Levin mentioned about budgeting, which has been deeply troubling, the failure to pay for this war I think has grave implications for our Nation's security. We are ceding our fiscal sovereignty every single day and passing the costs and the dangers on to our children.

You can read this and it says all the right stuff. You can quibble with some of the strategic statements and the operational recommendations. The problem is how do we really vet this.

It is one of the frustrations, Mr. Chairman, that I think I have as a member of what I believe to be certainly the best-functioning committee, a committee of great bipartisanship, of really very wise and comprehensive leadership on both sides of the aisle. At some point I think it would be useful to subject a document like this, as you have done internally, I assume, to the critiques of outside experts. In our 5-minute rounds we can barely scratch the surface. We cannot get to anything beyond just the most superficial. This is really serious business.

It would be helpful perhaps to have some other witnesses who can help us really think through, whether or not we are headed in the right direction. The questions that Senator Reed was asking are of deep concern to many of us. The force structure does not look large enough to carry out this multitude of responsibilities.

I do not really have a question so much, Mr. Chairman, as a concern, that it is different to exercise oversight responsibilities in the format in which information comes to us.

The second point I would make is that there is a great deal in here, as there has been in the rhetoric of the administration for several years, that we are in a long war. I am not going to argue with the description, but it strikes me that it is a very strange long war when the vast majority of Americans are not being asked to sacrifice or share the sacrifice at all. This is the longest conflict I think we have had perhaps since the Revolutionary War with an All-Volunteer military. It is these young men and women and their leaders who are bearing the day-to-day burdens and making the sacrifices.

We continue here to act as though we are living in a parallel universe, where we are cutting taxes almost on a regular basis, where we are spending like teenagers who stole our mother's credit card, where the defense budget is increasing but the accountability does not seem to be there for the financial burdens that that imposes.

It is not any specific issue about the QDR, because I know that this has been a long and very challenging process. Putting it into context, I think we have a lot of questions.

Mr. Secretary, you said it was above your pay grade and I appreciate that because these decisions are obviously being at the highest levels of the administration. But you are the person in the hot seat. I hope that we could perhaps get a slightly different perspective, maybe bring in some experts, some people who have been there, who have some constructive criticism, just to get a more rounded view of what our options are.

The final thing I would like to say is that there is a great emphasis throughout here on interagency cooperation, rebuilding our alliances, all of which I agree with absolutely. It strikes me in looking at this QDR and with the work that we need to do throughout the government that we may have gone beyond the DOD QDR and we might need a broader look that brings to the table other stakeholders in the government, because we have had some really serious lapses. What happened with Katrina was really embarrassing. We have not yet sorted out what we need to be doing going forward.

One recommendation I might make is that we try to figure out how we would have a broader process that would look at the elements of our security that are dependent upon the cooperation and participation of other agencies and personnel within our government, because we had a disastrous experience with the Coalition Provisional Authority, based on my observation, and I do not know, if we were to do it again tomorrow, what would be the alternative, how would we do it better, and what lessons have been learned.

I thank our witnesses because they have labored mightily on behalf of this and there is food for thought in here. But I think that we need to put it in a broader context.

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, if I could just respond for a minute. My only comment about being above my pay grade—

Chairman WARNER. Take all the time you want because it is an important foundation.

Secretary ENGLAND. Okay, thank you.

Chairman WARNER. I would just like to interject before you respond. Senator Levin and I shared similar concerns, not by way of criticism, but there may be other areas. We have written to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review this for the committee.

Senator CLINTON. Excellent, thank you.

Chairman WARNER. That review is going on. Also, Senator, Senator Levin and I will be considering such legislation as may be required to implement sections of the QDR, and in that context we will be reviewing it, in a sense, with a critical eye.

Please respond to our colleague if you would, and if you would like to take time for a question or so we have adequate time.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, my comment about above my pay grade was just the decision in terms of is there a supplemental or is it in the base budget. I think that is a debatable point, but the decision has been made for a supplemental. I believe there are benefits in terms of knowledge in the supplementals because we can readily defend each of the costs, where we could not if we did it 2 years ahead of time. That is the fundamental issue. Again that is above my pay grade, but I actually believe it is better in terms of the discussion.

This question of force structure. Again, force structure is not free. The most expensive part of the military is the people. When Vern Clark was the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and I was Secretary of the Navy, our view was we want every single sailor we need but not one more, because we cannot afford the one more all the time.

So we have gone through a lot of analysis understanding and we have restructured all of the forces in terms of jointness and equipment, and we are spending a lot of money in terms of equipment. In the Army alone, the Future Combat System is over \$100 billion in time. So you would hope that we would get a high degree of capability, effectiveness, and efficiency from those kind of expenditures.

Frankly, the responsibility is on us to realize the benefits of those investments. I hope that in time the force continues to go down as we increase the effectiveness.

By the way, in the United States Air Force, many missions now are unmanned, and the Air Force is planning to come down in manpower, the same as the Navy did. The Army is also now seeing the benefits of this investment. In my judgment, we are making informed decisions and the best ones that this entire leadership team across the DOD.

Now, we have brought in all the other agencies of the Federal Government to participate. We have brought in friends and allies. There have been a lot of outside organizations that have reviewed and provided comment. But, if people provide a better insight we would be more than happy. Our job is to protect and defend America and we have no "invented here" in that regard.

Regarding the long war, the Cold War was 40 years and the Israelis have been fighting terrorism for 60 years now. We have been in long wars before. This is a different kind of war that we fight. As a matter of fact, once in a while I almost feel like the term "war" is perhaps misleading because "war" conjures up a certain image of tanks, soldiers, artillery, and airplanes and that is not this war. Even in Iraq today, that is not the war. It is not about firefights at this point. It was for a very short period, but it is not at this point.

This requires new thinking. We are trying to transform and I believe we have succeeded in transforming our thinking and our approach. This debate is very valuable. This is important, and we are not just going to do this QDR. This is a constant reassessment because the world is changing very rapidly. Our view is to keep reassessing and keep redirecting. We will need the help of Congress to do this. It is very hard, both within the Department and I know within Congress, to move into a different direction, because we

have different suppliers, and different kinds of equipment. This is going to be a joint concerted effort by Congress and the DOD and, frankly, we welcome the dialogue, and we welcome the debate. Our objective is to end up with the best forces we can for our country.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Secretary, before Senator Clinton departs, you in your response were discussing firefights. Of course, you and I know there are firefights going on at every hour of every day in Iraq and in, unfortunately, Afghanistan. That was not the context in which you were using that term?

Secretary ENGLAND. No, I was using it more in the conventional warfare of artillery and large—

Chairman WARNER. Yes. There are a lot of them. I know you are currently concerned, as I am, about the daily activities and the risks taken by our troops.

Secretary ENGLAND. Absolutely, sir.

Chairman WARNER. Admiral Giambastiani, I was extremely pleased in the QDR to see that recognition was given for the need to provide a riverine capability for patrol, interdiction, and tactical troop movement on the inland waterways. I think it is a very important adjunct to have that in the Navy, particularly in this time of the war on terrorism, and terrorism takes so many multitudes of forms. As the Secretary said, it does not conjure up the extraordinary Armed Forces that confronted each other in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and so forth. But nevertheless it is a bitter and costly war for those who fight it.

I think that is a great idea. As a matter of fact, I remember when I was privileged, as Secretary of the Navy, going to Vietnam and actually seeing our riverine force in action in periods over there. They were extraordinary in the courage manifested by those individual boats and the difficulty and high risk patrols that they performed.

I am interested in what sort of analysis preceded this requirement, and is this capability funded in the President's budget request, including the hardware, and the personnel?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. First off, Mr. Chairman, I too, like you, am very pleased that we have been able to get the leading edge of the riverine force starting in 2007. There is a wedge of funding in 2007. I will have to get you the exact amount for the record, but frankly the remainder of the riverine force will be in the FYDP, which is stated in the piece here. We only have the leading edge and that is the leading edge of the investment.

With regard to analysis of the force, this is a hard question to answer. Should there be two units of riverine forces or should there be three? The Navy's best guess, based on working, if you will, with SOCOM, is that two units of riverine forces would be satisfactory to conduct the type operations we currently foresee in the future, which may occur, frankly, in places like Iraq or, if you will, in other locations in littoral areas of the world with rivers and where all these large populations are.

I would like to take that for the record and get back to you the exact analysis we did. It was a balance between how much capability we could put out there, how much we could equip, and how

many people we needed with what we foresaw. We do not have a clear picture. That crystal ball out into the future is not perfect on how large this riverine force should be.

[The information referred to follows:]

1. The Navy's decision to invest in a riverine force is best captured by the chronology of events as depicted below:

November 2004 — U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Request for Forces (RFF) “. . . suitable small craft capable of operating on . . . inland waterways” [in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom].

December 2004 — Navy's response to the Joint Staff stated that the Service lacked the capability to meet the CENTCOM RFF, but would look “at the timeline associated for creating, training, and then subsequently deploying this type of unit.”

May 2005 — Navy included a modest Riverine Force capability (one 200 man unit in the Active component) in Program Review 2007 (PR07), as briefed to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).

June 2005 — A CNO-directed global war on terrorism working group recommended the PR07 Riverine Force capability be accelerated into fiscal year 2006/2006 and complemented by two similar units in the Reserve component in fiscal year 2007/2008. CNO directed implementation of this recommendation.

August 2005 — Fleet Forces Command (FFC) recommended establishment of a more robust Riverine Force capability (three operational units, all in the Active component, with appropriate Reserve component integration in the future).

October 2005 — USN-USMC Warfighter Talks — “Navy commits to assume In Zone requirement from USMC in March 2001.”

November 2005 — FFC proposed initial organizational, financial, and timeline requirements necessary to relieve the marines in March 2007 and sustain the capability into the future.

December 2005 — Navy considered funding alternatives that could establish a deployable, combat-ready Riverine Force capability within 15 months.

2. In addition to the above chronology, the Navy has conducted a CNA study, released in December 2005, which will be provided via separate correspondence. Additionally, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command recently released its Riverine Concept of Operations brief, which will also be sent via separate correspondence.

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The requirement of Navy Riverine Warfare capability originated from a U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) request for forces (RFF) in November 2004. Initial riverine warfare capability studies during the Navy's Fiscal Year 2007 Program Review process produced the Integrated Sponsor's Program Proposal, creating the requirement for a Navy riverine warfare capability. The Navy, in collaboration with the Marine Corps and the Fleet Forces Command, refined the details of Navy riverine warfare to initial requirements for three operational units. In November 2005, the Navy developed a plan for three Active component commands consisting of 712 personnel and 36 boats, at an estimated cost of \$426 million over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review codified the requirement for riverine warfare capability and initial funding was proposed in the President's fiscal year 2006 Emergency Supplemental funding request and in the fiscal year 2006 President's Baseline Budget Submission for Defense.

Initial fiscal year 2006 funding, through the fiscal year 2006 emergency supplemental, requested \$73.1 million for operations, weapons and ammunition procurement, and boat procurement. The total FYDP funding request for the riverine warfare capability—to include hardware, personnel, and support—is \$128.2 million. Initial personnel for the riverine squadrons will come from existing Navy end strength levels and funding levels. Out-year personnel costs are programmed in the Navy's fiscal year 2007–2011 President's budget request.

Chairman WARNER. Fair enough, but let me say—and I am speaking only for myself—that folks who exercise a little leadership—and Senator Clinton very nicely spoke of the two of us, Senator Levin—if you want to accelerate this program, you have a champion up here.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I will pass that message along, sir.

Chairman WARNER. The opportunity is there. Secretary England, in your watch as Secretary of the Navy, the best job either of us ever had bar none, you and the CNO at that time envisioned this

new class of ships to be called the littoral warfare. I would assume that the riverines would be a complementary adjunct to that concept of ship operation. Would I be correct?

Secretary ENGLAND. The Littoral Combat Ship is in the littoral and the riverine is actually even more in the rivers. So you are right, they are complementary. It just gets you into more waterways than otherwise are inaccessible to other ships in the United States Navy, where, by the way, we do need a presence in many situations. We did in Vietnam. That is still the case. Now, if anything, the enemy is more shadowy in these areas, so we have to be able to penetrate those areas. It was recognized in the QDR that this was a void that we had in the riverine. This was an effort to help fill that void.

Chairman WARNER. I am going to extend the time here just to make a personal observation. In my rather inauspicious little short-term career at the end of World War II, all of us younger enlisted guys, 17, 18, we all wanted to be on the patrol torpedo (PT) boats. They were the most exciting part of the Navy. Then later when I became Secretary, I was amazed to look around when I had by some lucky force gotten to this position, there were no more PT boats. They were scrapped immediately at the end of World War II, sunk and torn up. You could hardly find one.

Years ago we were privileged here in the Senate to have Howard Baker as our leader of the United States Senate and he was a PT boat commander in World War II. We lamented the fact. He once said to me: "if you want to put some of them in the budget, you are going to have my support."

You have my support, Admiral.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, sir. Thank you very much.

Chairman WARNER. The Department recently published the Mobility Capability Study. It determined that projected military mobilities when fully mobilized and augmented by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and the voluntary intermodal sealift agreement are adequate to achieve U.S. objectives with acceptable risk during the period from fiscal years 2007 to 2013. Continued investment in the mobility system in line with the current Department priorities is required to maintain these capabilities in the future. The study made recommendations to conduct further studies, develop plans and strategies, and improve data collection and mobility models.

Getting to the point, let's not have any more of this long debate up here.

One of the great things that sets our military apart from the other militaries of the world is the extraordinary lift that we have. They all envy the fleet of helicopters, the C-17s, the 130s. There is not an allied commander that comes through my office from time to time—and a great many of them do and I enjoy their visits—that doesn't marvel at our lift.

What are the continued investments that are required to maintain this mobility in the future? What do you think about the immediate future as to the purchase of the C-17s and the 130s? It is going to be up for debate in this committee in the weeks to come.

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, I will ask the Vice Chairman here to comment in just a minute. But the decision after the study, particularly for our large lift fleet, is to continue with the planned pro-

gram of 180 C-17s and also to complete an upgrade on the C-5As and the C-5Bs, and that at the heavy end that that would indeed satisfy the lift requirements of the United States Government. The plan is to complete the program at 180, with one proviso. The proviso is there are still some international countries that are interested in the C-17, so there could be sales for C-17s.

Also, the other proviso is that there is a higher than anticipated usage of the C-17 because of the war, so we are actually using them at a higher rate. To maintain the 180 effective level we will likely need a few more airplanes. But that will be an issue to be addressed, not in this budget but in the next. There could be somewhat over the 180 because of the increased usage and international sales, which is not a U.S. component.

So the C-17 effectively 180 and that would be the end of the line is our recommendation, and also to upgrade the C-5As and the C-5Bs. Then in addition, there is the C-130 multi-year, so that is C-130 investment. There is also in the QDR a Light Cargo Airplane for intra-theater.

You are absolutely right, lift is what makes us a unique expeditionary force around the world. We have addressed this as a very important element of the QDR. It was lift in terms of the QDR, then in the budget we started to translate that into actual budget detail in 2007 and in the FYDP.

Chairman WARNER. I will be working with colleagues on this committee to see what we can do to move along the 130 issues, which have been somewhat of an impediment thus far. They need careful oversight and addressing by this committee because there is a tremendous sum of money involved here. We had this concept that it was going to be built as a civilian aircraft and then transferred to the military and now we are going to build it as a military aircraft, where it should be. Anyway, that is history. But we are going to have to solve that problem.

You did not mention that there would be an overseas market once we convert this thing to a military model. Is there not that option?

Secretary ENGLAND. You are talking about the C-17?

Chairman WARNER. The 130.

Secretary ENGLAND. Of course, there is a large international market for C-130s.

Chairman WARNER. You did not mention that and I did not know whether you omitted it, because the current line as it transitions from the concept of manufacture for the civilian market versus the military market, where it is now going to be and properly should be—you did not add on that and my ear picked up on it.

Secretary ENGLAND. That issue I believe, Senator, is the contracting approach we used on the C-130, changing that from the FAR.

Chairman WARNER. It is essential you do it.

Secretary ENGLAND. The Air Force is working to straighten out that contract.

Chairman WARNER. That is correct.

Secretary ENGLAND. They are reporting to you on their progress in that regard.

Chairman WARNER. They are doing it, no question about it.

Secretary ENGLAND. But you are right, there are international sales for C-130. There are also international sales now starting to occur for the C-17.

Chairman WARNER. Let us hope, because I think this committee will look at that figure that you had in there on the C-17 in the context of our markup session. We might have some slightly different views than you have.

Senator LEVIN.

Senator LEVIN. In addition to the views which the chairman mentioned, apparently General Moseley has asked to remove the C-5A retirement provision to free up funds to purchase more of the C-17s. Is that accurate?

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, that is accurate. My view is that is not likely going to be the case. People are still looking at this issue. In my judgment it will turn out that we will upgrade the C-5s. The timing is such that we need the C-5 capability. My expectation is we will continue with that program. I know there is some question and discussion about that, so perhaps it is not totally closed out. But at least my judgment at this time will be that we will proceed with the C-5 and finish the program for the C-17 except for the situations I mentioned.

Senator LEVIN. General Schwartz, the Transportation Command commander wants 20 more, is that accurate?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I think what he said was is that his view was we need to move forward with the tanker program called KCX, which should be not only a tanker but do airlift for us. They call it having floors and doors. That program is more important, I believe his quote was something like, the 181st C-17, the 201st C-17, or the 221st C-17.

Senator LEVIN. My understanding was that he said that we should buy 20 more C-17s.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I think you have to read all of his statement, which I did, and I think you will see that what he was talking about was if it is more important for us as a Nation to move on with the tanker.

Secretary ENGLAND. Here is the dilemma we have. Obviously, cost is an issue. We obviously have to spend the money wisely. But the tankers are very old today and when we bought the tankers we bought them at some high rate. When we start replacing the tankers, we will replace them at a relatively low rate, just because of affordability issues. If we start replacing those at 15 a year, we are going to need about 450; it will take 30 years just to replace the tankers we have today. The tankers are already about 30 years old, so that last tanker is going to be a very old airplane.

It is vitally important that we start the tanker replacement program as soon as possible. It also gives us lift for commodity type packaging, not tanks and all but commodity type things. Today we use C-17s for all kinds of lift. We could be much more efficient with a combination of new tankers and C-17s rather than more C-17s. There is only enough money to do one or the other and that becomes the dilemma.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Secretary England, the report says on page 18 that "In a number of recent operations the lack of needed authorities hindered the

ability of U.S. forces to act swiftly and the process to get appropriate authorities has often taken months to achieve.” What operations—what authorities do you need for our forces to act swiftly?

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, we are going to come back to you on this, but I believe the grand total is 20 legislative requests to Congress, and only two of those have actually made it through DOD and the OMB and the rest are still going through the system. As I commented in my opening statement, one of them is just to be able to provide equipment to friends and allies that are fighting with us, to give us added flexibilities in terms of being able to equip forces who are in the fight with U.S. forces. I believe what we are going to ask for is about \$100 million a year to be able to transfer that kind of equipment.

Senator LEVIN. You do not have that authority now?

Secretary ENGLAND. We have it for Iraq and Afghanistan, but it is limited. We are going to try to expand that.

Senator LEVIN. From the lessons of Katrina we learned that one of the problem areas had to do with the relationship between the National Guard and regular forces, two chains of command, one for the Guard, one under General Honore for the title 10 forces. Does the QDR analysis support a particular command relationship for future large-scale natural disasters, and if so, should we not focus on that?

The report did say that DOD is going to work with DHS, DOS, and local governments to improve Homeland security capabilities and cooperation. In terms of the command relationship, where there are apparently these uncertainties and these dances that go on, which seem to me to be unconscionable—I am not trying to lay blame on anybody, believe me. I just think that there should not be ambiguity or doubt. There should not be an Alphonse and Gaston. When we have a natural disaster it ought to be clear who has what responsibilities and I do not think that was the case relative to Katrina.

Are you going to be proposing clarification of these relationships?

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, I believe the answer to that is, it is not in the QDR, but it will be in the lessons learned and recommendations out of Katrina, because there are all these different circumstances. Sometimes the Guard is called up by the governor and it is clear it is by the governor. Other times they are under our command. There is only confusion when they are called up and we have both Active Forces and Guard Forces.

Senator LEVIN. There also seems to be confusion as to what kind of a request is required. I know the chairman is particularly interested in this subject, too.

Secretary ENGLAND. Senator, it is being addressed and there will be recommendations in that regard. I know that is being discussed as part of the lessons learned out of Katrina. I believe it will be in that venue rather than in the QDR.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The military and the civilian side have both played heavily in this inside the Department and working it with the National Guard to come out to what we consider to be some answers as a result of this. We will be working very hard on these lessons learned. This was clearly one of the lessons learned.

Senator LEVIN. Admiral, the law lays out as one of the principal aims of the QDR to identify the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in the national defense strategy at a low to moderate risk. Then it says also that “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs shall prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense the Chairman’s assessment of the review, including the Chairman’s assessment of risk.”

Apparently General Pace’s assessment of risk does not state whether the risk is low, moderate, or high. How do you assess the risk? Is it low, moderate, or high?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. First of all, you are referring to General Pace’s answer that is attached to the QDR report?

Senator LEVIN. Yes.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. It is in the back of the QDR report, and in fact what we typically do is when we get into specifics, which are classified, is we normally send them to Congress separately. This is the assessment that the Joint Chiefs came up with of where we feel the QDR meets the strategy.

Now, I would have to specifically go in here and take a look at what we are talking about.

Senator LEVIN. Is there an overall assessment of the review?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The assessment is that as stated on pages A4, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Is there an assessment of the risk? Does it ever say low or moderate, which is what is required? One of the principal aims of the QDR according to the law that creates it is that it is supposed to give us an assessment as to—

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Here is our assessment, sir, and I am just going to read it because I think it accurately describes where we chiefs came down on this: “We cannot accurately characterize the security environment in 2025. Therefore, we must hedge against this uncertainty by identifying and developing a broad range of capabilities. Further, we must organize and arrange our forces to create the agility and flexibility to deal with unknowns and surprises in the coming decades.

“This review has carefully balanced those where risks might be taken in order to provide the needed resources for areas requiring new or additional investment. Today the armed forces of the United States stand fully capable of accomplishing all of the objectives of the national defense strategy, securing the United States from direct attack, securing strategic access, and the rest. These recommendations contained in this report provide future capability, capacity, and flexibility to execute these assigned missions while hedging against the unknown threats of 2025.”

That is exactly how we stated our dealing with the risk that exists out there in an unclassified fashion.

Senator LEVIN. But you do not give an overall assessment as to whether—

Chairman WARNER. Could I interrupt you a minute?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, sir.

Chairman WARNER. There is a classified annex that has been provided our committee and in that you will find, I think, the responses.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. That is what I was referring to, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LEVIN. It does not give the overall assessment. I do not want to say what it says.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, sir, and I would prefer not to say what it says.

Chairman WARNER. We can adjourn this session. We have made provisions to go to SR-222 for a closed session. I am perfectly happy to go over there and explore this question with you with some thoroughness.

Senator LEVIN. Would you agree that you are required to give us an overall assessment, either in the classified or unclassified world as to whether the overall—an overall assessment as to whether the risk is low, moderate, or high? Is that what you understand the law to require?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, sir. I would have to reread the exact words, but I am pretty sure that what you said is accurate.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, shall I take a few more minutes?

Chairman WARNER. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. On the D5 missile, the QDR proposes to field within 2 years an initial capability to deliver conventional warheads using the Trident D5 missile on ballistic missile subs. Those D5 missiles today carry nuclear warheads and there is a real question as to whether we are creating a very dangerous ambiguity if we proceed to have on a boat either D5 conventional or D5 nuclear. I am wondering from an arms control perspective and from a security perspective—if other countries are not clear as to whether or not a launch is a nuclear or a conventional launch it creates huge dangers.

I would only point to the Norway launch of a missile in the 1990s, where in this case there was a notification which was not fully disseminated in time and apparently the Russians came close to launching a retaliatory strike just because there was a lack of clarity. That is a different issue there. It had to do with whether there was enough time for notice.

Apparently the whole goal of a prompt global strike, which is driving this move to conventional strike on the D5 missiles, is to be able to strike anywhere in the world in less than 60 minutes, and a notification protocol it would seem to me might defeat that very purpose. Without a notification protocol, you enlarge this ambiguity, which could be, to put it mildly, dangerous.

Can you provide us all the studies and analyses which have been conducted which address or discuss the issues which are associated with this proposal? Could you give us also a list of ongoing studies and additional studies that are planned relative to this proposal? Could you do that for the record?

[The information referred to follows:]

The DOD has always taken seriously the issue of potential misinterpretation in the employment of ballistic missiles and weapon systems capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional munitions.

- We have a long history of ballistic missile test launches; since the 1960s, the United States has conducted over 1,300 ballistic missile test launches, from both land- and sea-based systems, without incident.
- The notification process with Russia has served us well.

We recognize that, as our capabilities change to meet the challenges of the current strategic environment, we need to look closely at measures to comprehensively address the question of ambiguity. To date we have been very open in our discussions and we intend to remain open about what we are doing.

- Through open congressional hearings, bilateral talks, and other fora, we will make others aware of our plans and concept of operations.
- The Russians and Chinese are already well aware of the purpose of the Conventional Trident Modification (CTM).

A key factor in the potential for misinterpretation of a CTM launch will be the geopolitical context at the time. Any country that detects a launch and tracks the trajectory of the warheads (currently, very few countries can) will first consider the geopolitical situation as it evaluates whether or not the launch poses a threat.

The 1995 launch of a Norwegian sounding rocket is an historical example of how Russia responded to an ambiguous incident. Russian military professionals and senior national leadership carefully analyzed the situation, identified inconsistencies with an actual attack, and initiated no response.

- The 1995 incident serves to reinforce the perception that both the United States and Russia do not expect a “bolt out of the blue” attack, and will view an unexpected launch in the geopolitical context at the time.
- Regarding the Norwegian rocket incident, Major General Vladimir Dvorkin (Director, Strategic Rocket Forces Fourth Central Scientific Research Institute, Ministry of Defense of Russia), stated: “No [Russian] president, no matter what president it is, will ever make a decision about launch-on-warning based on information about one rocket or missile or even two or three missiles. I don’t think that there are sufficient grounds for Americans to be concerned or worried about our command and control system.”

Observable operational measures to further mitigate any risk of misinterpretation will include:

- Selection of appropriate launch points and ballistic trajectories to avoid overflight whenever possible.
- Command and control procedures for CTM that differ from procedures for nuclear-armed Trident missiles.

DOD is also exploring additional transparency measures to reduce ambiguity. These may include advance notification to leaders of selected countries.

- Russia is the country about which we would be most concerned in the near term.
- Fortunately, we have a robust set of communication links between senior U.S. leaders (E.g. POTUS, VP, SecDef, etc.) and their Russian counterparts.
- We have planned, or in work, additional communications links with senior Russian officials.

Regarding studies over the past 2 years, DOD has examined a variety of concepts to fill the gap in our offensive capability.

- For example, a Prompt Global Strike concept of operations study, completed in 2004, included a concept for a Common Aero Vehicle (CAV). The concept of operations for CAV addresses issues regarding misperception. Many of the issues identified in the concept of operations study concerning the CAV are also relevant to CTM.
- A similar study specifically focused on CTM has been initiated. An April 2006 Defense Policy Board (DPB) review of Conventional Trident recently reported its findings to the Secretary of Defense. The DPB review concluded the potential for misinterpretation can be successfully managed, and recommended that the CTM program be pursued with high priority.

We have a significant effort underway to refine our draft concept of operations for CTM and to implement appropriate measures to mitigate any risk of misinterpretation.

- USSTRATCOM has conducted a variety of seminars, analysis efforts, and initiatives to assess all aspects of CTM to include mitigating the potential for misinterpretation.
- Over the past year, DOD has had outside advisory groups of distinguished individuals from government, industry, and the scientific community, such as the JASON Group and the USSTRATCOM Senior Advisory Group, review options and DOD’s evolving plans related to the Conventional Trident program.

- Drawing from the previously described body of work, USSTRATCOM and OSD are currently assessing which of the many steps available to mitigate the potential of misperception are appropriate. As an initial step we are beginning to develop an international engagement plan to inform and educate our friends, allies, and others.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. From the policy side, we are going to let Mr. Henry answer that. Then I am going to talk to you about START accountability and a few other things.

Mr. HENRY. As part of the nuclear posture review, we spoke of a new triad—it was both responsive infrastructure, defensive capabilities. In the area of offensive capabilities we spoke to not just the massive retaliation on a nuclear basis, but to be able to have advanced conventional strike capability, which this falls into, and then also perhaps non-kinetic capabilities.

You are right, there is an issue of ambiguity, one that can be handled with protocols if you were going to use these against certain nations. There are many nations where you might choose to use this or you might actually use it, not against a specific nation but against a terrorist organization due to its responsiveness. Protocols would not always necessarily be appropriate.

We have dealt with these issues in the past of ambiguity. We have a long history of dual capable aircraft and we have worked out these issues. We would be happy to provide you the work that we have done. We do not necessarily think that this is new territory.

Senator LEVIN. I don't think that the analogy to dual capable aircraft is a particularly good one. You can call back that aircraft.

In any event, has the State Department been consulted on this proposal?

Mr. HENRY. Yes. As we mentioned, in doing the QDR the State Department was part of the initial discussions of what the capabilities were, and then they have fully reviewed the QDR report and this represents a U.S. Government—

Senator LEVIN. I know that, but does the State Department have any qualms about this?

Mr. HENRY. When working with them, they did not raise any.

Senator LEVIN. This will be my final question. Please answer this for the record. Could you request from the State Department any studies that they have done? We could make that request, but it would be more direct, since you know what we are talking about. Please request from the State Department to give us any studies that they have undertaken on the political, treaty, and policy ramifications of this recommendation? Would you be willing to do that?

Mr. HENRY. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of State supported DOD efforts during the 2006 QDR and has participated in ongoing interagency activities regarding the CTM program. The Department of State has not conducted, separately, any independent reviews, studies, or analyses on CTM proposal outside of day-to-day policy, arms control, and treaty responsibilities related to the effort.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I might mention, Senator Levin, that the other piece that we need to remember about the conventional Trident compared to the strategic one is that all of these submarines and their capabilities are START-accountable. They are under an

inspection regime, which is an important part of this, so that everybody knows and there is transparency here in this regime.

Senator LEVIN. I do not think inspection is the issue.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Sir, I understand your question, but I just want to make sure that—

Senator LEVIN. Inspection will prove the ambiguity.

Chairman WARNER. We have had a good hearing and I want to thank the witnesses. I want to particularly say, Mr. Henry, I have admired you from afar and I do not doubt that you have put in maybe 2 years on this. How long have you put in working on it?

Mr. HENRY. I am just part of a dedicated team that works throughout the Department, that has made a difference. It would not be proper not to acknowledge the leadership of both the vice chairman and the deputy and the critical difference that they made in the product that we have here.

Chairman WARNER. I am not suggesting that, but—

Mr. HENRY. I did not assume you were.

Chairman WARNER. —but I compliment everybody. But having served in the Department, I know the value of someone like yourself who is given a specific assignment and with a team of people working. You have done a good job.

Mr. HENRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Chairman, I will second that.

Chairman WARNER. To show you how good it is, we are going to submit to you probably 30 or 40 questions for the record to answer.

Senator LEVIN. Given your response, yes, I think it is going to probably double.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I would also second that motion.

Senator LEVIN. For the record, since we are asking for the record: Mr. Secretary, you talk about efficiencies and not spending money unwisely. We have two programs going, one Army and one Air Force, for Light Cargo Aircraft. If you could let us know for the record how that complies with jointness, it would be most appreciated.

[The information referred to follows:]

We are developing a joint approach to the Army and Air Force efforts with respect to a medium range, light cargo aircraft. The Department intends to resolve the separate efforts this month and, if appropriate, combine these programs to form a Joint Cargo Aircraft program. The Department is working to further define the joint requirements and develop a single sustainment process for the final aircraft.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. I'd like to place the QDR Report into the record at this point.

[The report referred to follows:]

# Quadrennial Defense Review Report



February 6, 2006

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

6 February 2006

The Report of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review is herewith submitted.

In the pages that follow, the Department's senior leadership sets out where the Department of Defense currently is and the direction we believe it needs to go in fulfilling our responsibilities to the American people.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review reflects a process of change that has gathered momentum since the release of its predecessor QDR in 2001. Now in the fifth year of this global war, the ideas and proposals in this document are provided as a roadmap for change, leading to victory.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld".

## PREFACE

The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war.

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, our Nation has fought a global war against violent extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of choice, and who seek to destroy our free way of life. Our enemies seek weapons of mass destruction and, if they are successful, will likely attempt to use them in their conflict with free people everywhere. Currently, the struggle is centered in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we will need to be prepared and arranged to successfully defend our Nation and its interests around the globe for years to come. This 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review is submitted in the fifth year of this long war.

In developing this Quadrennial Defense Review, the senior leaders of the Department of Defense – civilian and military – worked side by side throughout 2005 to:

- test the conclusions of the 2001 QDR;
- apply the important lessons learned from more than four years of war against a global network of violent extremists; and
- test assumptions about the continuously changing nature of the world in which we find ourselves.

There is a tendency to want to suggest that documents such as this represent a “new beginning.” Manifestly, this document is not a

“new beginning.” Rather, this Department has been and is transforming along a continuum that reflects our best understanding of a world that has changed a great deal since the end of the last century. This study reflects the reality that the Department of Defense has been in a period of continuous change for the past five years.

Indeed, when President Bush took office in 2001, the country was in many respects still savoring victory in the Cold War – the culmination of that long struggle that occupied generations of Americans. But the President understood well that we were entering an era of the unexpected and the unpredictable, and he directed a review of the Department of Defense and urged us to transform our forces to better fit this new century.

The terrorist attacks on September 11 imposed a powerful sense of urgency to transforming the Department. Much has been accomplished since that tragic day. We have set about making U.S. forces more agile and more expeditionary. Technological advances, including dramatic improvements in information management and precision weaponry, have allowed our military to generate considerably more combat capability with the same or, in some cases, fewer numbers of weapons platforms and with lower levels of manning. We also have been adjusting the U.S. global military force posture, making long overdue adjustments to U.S. basing by moving away from a static defense in obsolete Cold War garrisons, and placing emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to trouble spots across the globe.

### Transforming by Shifting Emphasis from the 20<sup>th</sup> Century to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

The QDR is not a programmatic or budget document. Instead, it reflects the thinking of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense:

- Need to “find, fix and finish” combat operations against new and elusive foes.
  - Need for considerably better fusion of intelligence and operations to produce action plans that can be executed in real time.
  - Realization that everything done in this Department must contribute to joint warfighting capability.
  - Central reality that success depends on the dedication, professionalism and skills of the men and women in uniform – volunteers all.
- If one were to attempt to characterize the nature of how the Department of Defense is transforming and how the senior leaders of this Department view that transformation, it is useful to view it as a shift of emphasis to meet the new strategic environment. In this era, characterized by uncertainty and surprise, examples of this shift in emphasis include:
- From a peacetime tempo – to a wartime sense of urgency.
  - From a time of reasonable predictability – to an era of surprise and uncertainty.
  - From single-focused threats – to multiple, complex challenges.
  - From nation-state threats – to decentralized network threats from non-state enemies.
  - From conducting war against nations – to conducting war in countries we are not at war with (safe havens).
  - From “one size fits all” deterrence – to tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks and near-term competitors.
  - From responding after a crisis starts (reactive) – to preventive actions so problems do not become crises (proactive).
  - From crisis response – to shaping the future.
  - From threat-based planning – to capabilities-based planning.
  - From peacetime planning – to rapid adaptive planning.
  - From a focus on kinetics – to a focus on effects.
  - From 20<sup>th</sup> century processes – to 21<sup>st</sup> century integrated approaches.
  - From static defense, garrison forces – to mobile, expeditionary operations.
  - From under-resourced, standby forces (hollow units) – to fully-equipped and fully-manned forces (combat ready units).
  - From a battle-ready force (peace) – to battle-hardened forces (war).

- From large institutional forces (tail) – to more powerful operational capabilities (teeth).
- From major conventional combat operations – to multiple irregular, asymmetric operations.
- From separate military Service concepts of operation – to joint and combined operations.
- From forces that need to deconflict – to integrated, interdependent forces.
- From exposed forces forward – to reaching back to CONUS to support expeditionary forces.
- From an emphasis on ships, guns, tanks and planes – to focus on information, knowledge and timely, actionable intelligence.
- From massing forces – to massing effects.
- From set-piece maneuver and mass – to agility and precision.
- From single Service acquisition systems – to joint portfolio management.
- From broad-based industrial mobilization – to targeted commercial solutions.
- From Service and agency intelligence – to truly Joint Information Operations Centers.
- From vertical structures and processes (stove-pipes) – to more transparent, horizontal integration (matrix).
- From moving the user to the data – to moving data to the user.
- From fragmented homeland assistance – to integrated homeland security.
- From static alliances – to dynamic partnerships.
- From predetermined force packages – to tailored, flexible forces.
- From the U.S. military performing tasks – to a focus on building partner capabilities.
- From static post-operations analysis – to dynamic diagnostics and real-time lessons learned.
- From focusing on inputs (effort) – to tracking outputs (results).
- From Department of Defense solutions – to interagency approaches.

#### The 2006 QDR in the Context of Continuing Change

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), above all else, reflects a process of change that has gathered momentum since the release of its predecessor QDR in 2001. A great deal more is underway – all in the midst of a continuing Global War on Terror. A brief summary of some of the work and ongoing initiatives of the Department during this period is outlined below to set the context for the 2006 QDR.

- Liberated more than 50 million Afghans and Iraqis from despotism, terrorism and dictator-

- ship, permitting the first free elections in the recorded history of either nation.
- Conducted attacks against the al Qaida terrorist network, resulting in the death or incarceration of the majority of its top leadership.
  - Worked with a global coalition of over 75 countries participating in the Global War on Terrorism.
  - Executed urgently needed transformation. As a result of recent combat experience, U.S. Armed Forces today are more battle-hardened and combat ready than in decades.
  - Transformed a variety of elements and activities in the Department, including contingency planning, strategic reconnaissance, management of deployments and redeployments, logistics and risk assessment.
  - Incorporated hundreds of real world lessons learned from the battlefields in the Global War on Terrorism and adapted the force to ongoing and future operations.
  - Initiated a post-9/11 Global Military Force Posture Plan to rearrange U.S. forces around the world, while reducing the Cold War era static footprint abroad, resulting in more expeditionary and deployable forces.
  - Reorganized the operational forces, creating Northern Command, with important responsibilities for homeland defense, and merged Space and Strategic Commands into a single command, Strategic Command.
  - Initiated a new concept for Army organization, including integrating Active, Guard and Reserve forces around a new modular Brigade Combat Team structure.
  - Strengthened U.S. Special Forces by increasing manpower, integrating new technologies, procuring new aircraft, and including the U.S. Marines in Special Operations Forces.
  - Spearheaded steps to transform NATO, including enlarging the membership of NATO, enabling the rapid deployment of forces, and extending NATO's role to Afghanistan and Iraq.
  - Invested in new equipment, technology and platforms for the forces, including advanced combat capabilities: Stryker Brigades, Littoral Combat Ships, converted cruise-missile firing submarines, unmanned vehicles and advanced tactical aircraft – all linked by Net-Centric Warfare systems.
  - Brought on-line an initial Missile Defense System, while continuing research and development, providing a nascent defensive capability.
  - Initiated the largest Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process in history, right-sizing U.S. infrastructure to future needs.
  - Supported the Department of Homeland Security in natural disaster relief for hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
  - Undertook massive disaster relief efforts for the South Asia tsunami and the Pakistan

earthquake.

- Reorganized the Office of the Secretary of Defense, creating the positions of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs. Initiated pay for performance and a responsive *National Security Personnel System*. The Department is developing a stronger partnership with the Department of Homeland Security across the spectrum of potential missions.

#### Conclusion

It is clear we cannot achieve all we might without significant help from the rest of the U.S. government. Within the Executive Branch, we are seeking ways to achieve greater efficiencies in the interagency, in our work with partners in the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security, the CIA, and other participants in the Global War on Terror. Still encumbered with a Cold War organization and mentality in many aspects of Department operations, the Department will seek new and more flexible authorities in budget, finance, acquisition and personnel. Now is the time to institute still further changes necessary for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The Report of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review represents a snapshot in time of the Department's strategy for defense of the Nation and the capabilities needed to effectively execute that defense. In the pages that follow, the

Department's senior leadership sets out where the Department is and where it needs to go in fulfilling our responsibilities to the American people. To realize our goals, the Department stands ready to join in a collaborative partnership with key stakeholders in the process of implementation and execution – the Congress, other agencies of the Executive Branch and alliance and coalition partners. It will take unity of effort to win the long war in which our Nation is engaged. The benefits from such cooperation will be reaped by future joint warfighters, Presidents and, most of all, by the American people we serve.

Finally, it is important to note that this 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review is part of the continuum of transformation in the Department. Its purpose is to help shape the process of change to provide the United States of America with strong, sound and effective warfighting capabilities in the decades ahead. As we continue in the fifth year of this long global war, the ideas and proposals in this document are provided as a roadmap for change, leading to victory.

## INTRODUCTION

The Department of Defense conducted the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in the fourth year of a long war, a war that is irregular in its nature. The enemies in this war are not traditional conventional military forces but rather dispersed, global terrorist networks that exploit Islam to advance radical political aims. These enemies have the avowed aim of acquiring and using nuclear and biological weapons to murder hundreds of thousands of Americans and others around the world. They use terror, propaganda and indiscriminate violence in an attempt to subjugate the Muslim world under a radical theocratic tyranny while seeking to perpetuate conflict with the United States and its allies and partners. This war requires the U.S. military to adopt unconventional and indirect approaches. Currently, Iraq and Afghanistan are crucial battlegrounds, but the struggle extends far beyond their borders. With its allies and partners, the United States must be prepared to wage this war in many locations simultaneously and for some years to come. As the Department of Defense works to defeat these enemies, it must also remain vigilant in an era of surprise and uncertainty and prepare to prevent, deter or defeat a wider range of asymmetric threats.

This QDR defines two fundamental imperatives for the Department of Defense:

- Continuing to reorient the Department's capabilities and forces to be more agile in this time of war, to prepare for wider asymmetric
- Implementing enterprise-wide changes to ensure that organizational structures, processes and procedures effectively support its strategic direction.

challenges and to hedge against uncertainty over the next 20 years.

Assessing how the Department is organized and operates has been a centerpiece of this QDR. Just as U.S. forces are becoming more agile and capable of rapid action and are exploiting information advantages to increase operational effectiveness, headquarters organizations and processes that support them need to develop similar attributes. Changes should focus on meeting the needs of the President of the United States and joint warfighting forces, represented by the Combatant Commanders. This QDR sought to provide a broader range of military options for the President and new capabilities needed by Combatant Commanders to confront asymmetric threats. The principles of transparency, constructive competition to encourage innovation, agility and adaptability, collaboration and partnership should guide the formulation of new strategic processes and organizational structures.

The Department must also adopt a model of continuous change and reassessment if it is to defeat highly adaptive adversaries. In this sense, the QDR is not an end state in itself, but rather an interim Report designed to capture the best contemporary thinking, planning and decisions during this period of profound change. The Department will continue this process of

continuous reassessment and improvement with periodic updates in the coming years and by directing the development of follow-on "roadmaps" for areas of particular emphasis in the QDR, including:

- Department institutional reform and governance.
- Irregular warfare.
- Building partnership capacity.
- Strategic communication.
- Intelligence.


These roadmaps should guide the implementation of key QDR proposals and continue the refinement of the Department's approaches in these important areas.

The complexity of the challenges facing the Department and the changes needed to address them necessitate a considerably closer partnership between the Executive and Legislative branches of government and continuous dialogue. Without the support of the Congress, it will not be possible for the Department to undertake many of the changes outlined in this Report. The ideas and recommendations presented represent a starting point for such a dialogue. The Department welcomes other viewpoints and innovative proposals from the Congress, allies, and others that build upon these ideas or provide preferable alternatives.

This QDR builds upon the transformational

defense agenda directed by the President and articulated in the 2001 QDR, changes in the U.S. global defense posture and Base Realignment and Closure study, and, most importantly, on the operational experiences of the past four years. In addition to its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military has conducted a host of other missions, from providing humanitarian relief in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami and the South Asian earthquake to supporting civil authorities at home and responding to natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. Lessons from these missions, which informed the QDR's deliberations and conclusions, include the critical importance of:

- Having the authorities and resources to build partnership capacity, achieve unity of effort, and adopt indirect approaches to act with and through others to defeat common enemies – shifting from conducting activities ourselves to enabling partners to do more for themselves.
- Shifting from responsive actions toward early, preventive measures and increasing the speed



Coalition Forces and local fishermen in the Khawr Abd Allah (KAA) waterway in the Persian Gulf communicate through an Arabic translator. Coalition Forces are working with Iraqi patrol vessels in a joint effort to deny the use of the KAA for illegal activity.

Photo by Photographers' Mate List  
Chris Adams/Coalition, U.S. Navy

of action to stop problems from becoming conflicts or crises.

- Increasing the freedom of action of the United States and its allies and partners in meeting the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.
- Minimizing costs to the United States while imposing costs on adversaries, in particular by sustaining America's scientific and technological advantage over potential competitors.

Applying these lessons will increase the adaptability of the force when confronting surprise or uncertainty. Maintaining a joint process to identify lessons learned is important to support a process of continuous change and improvement.

The foundation of this QDR is the *National Defense Strategy*, published in March 2005. This strategy calls for continuing to reorient the Department's capabilities to address a wider range of challenges. Although U.S. military forces maintain their predominance in traditional warfare, they must also be improved to address the non-traditional, asymmetric challenges of this new century. These challenges include irregular warfare (conflicts in which enemy combatants are not regular military forces of nation-states); catastrophic terrorism employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and disruptive threats to the United States' ability to maintain its qualitative edge and to project power.

To operationalize the strategy, the Department's

senior civilian and military leaders identified four priorities as the focus of the QDR:

- Defeating terrorist networks.
- Defending the homeland in depth.
- Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.
- Preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.

Although these priorities clearly do not represent the full range of operations the U.S. military must be prepared to conduct, they do indicate areas of particular concern. By focusing on them, the Department will continue to increase its capabilities and forces to deal with irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges. Improving capabilities and forces to meet these challenges will also increase the forces overall adaptability and versatility in responding to other threats and contingencies.

Based on their evaluation of the four QDR focus areas, the Department's senior leaders decided to refine the capstone force planning construct that translates the Department's strategy into guidance to shape and size military forces. This wartime construct, described in detail later in this Report, makes adjustments to better capture the realities of a long war by:

- Better defining the Department's responsibilities for homeland defense within a broader national framework.
- Giving greater emphasis to the war on

terror and irregular warfare activities, including long-duration unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and military support for stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

- Accounting for, and drawing a distinction between, steady-state force demands and surge activities over multi-year periods.

At the same time, this wartime construct requires the capability to conduct multiple, overlapping wars. In addition, it calls for the forces and capabilities needed for deterrence, reflecting a shift from “one size fits all” deterrence toward more tailorable capabilities to deter advanced military powers, regional WMD states, or non-state terrorists.

The 2006 QDR provides new direction for accelerating the transformation of the Department to focus more on the needs of Combatant Commanders and to develop portfolios of joint capabilities rather than individual stove-piped programs. In 2001, the Department initiated a shift from threat-based planning toward capabilities-based planning, changing the way war-fighting needs are defined and prioritized. The essence of capabilities-based planning is to identify capabilities that adversaries could employ and capabilities that could be available to the United States, then evaluate their interaction, rather than over-optimize the joint force for a limited set of threat scenarios. This QDR continues this shift by emphasizing the needs of the Combatant Commanders as the basis for programs and budgetary priorities. The

goal is to manage the Department increasingly through the use of joint capability portfolios. Doing so should improve the Department’s ability to meet the needs of the President and the Combatant Commanders. Moving toward a more “demand-driven” approach should reduce unnecessary program redundancy, improve joint interoperability, and streamline acquisition and budgeting processes. The Department is continuing to shift from stove-piped vertical structures to more transparent and horizontally-integrated structures. Just as the U.S. forces operate jointly, so too must horizontal integration become an organizing principle for the Department’s investment and enterprise-wide functions. These reforms will not occur overnight, and care must be taken not to weaken what works effectively during the transition to a more cross-cutting approach. However, the complex strategic environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century demands greater integration of forces, organizations and processes, and closer synchronization of actions.

This environment also places new demands on the Department’s Total Force concept. Although the all-volunteer force has been a key to successful U.S. military operations over the past several decades, continued success in future missions is not preordained. The Total Force of active and reserve military, civilian, and contractor personnel must continue to develop the best mix of people equipped with the right skills needed by the Combatant Commanders. To this end, the QDR updates the Department’s workforce management policies to guide investments in the force and improve the workforce’s ability

to adapt to new challenges. For example, to meet the demands of irregular warfare and operate effectively alongside other U.S. agencies, allies or partners, the Department will increase investments focused on developing and maintaining appropriate language, cultural, and information technology skills. The Department is also adopting new personnel systems to reward performance rather than longevity. New joint training initiatives should help ensure that the Total Force is capable of adapting to emerging challenges as the Military Departments continue to rebalance forces between their Active and Reserve Components. Acquiring the right knowledge and skills relevant to the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century will receive new emphasis in recruitment, retention, training, assignments, career development and advancement. Aligning authorities, policies and practices will produce the best qualified Total Force to satisfy the new demands.

This QDR benefited from the change in the legislation mandating the review. By shifting the completion date of the review to coincide with the submission of the President's Fiscal Year 2007 budget request, the Congress permitted the Department to "front load" a limited number of initiatives into the budget submission for Fiscal Year 2007, rather than having to wait until the next full budget cycle. This QDR therefore recommends a number of adjustments to align Defense plans, policies and programs with the broader strategic direction as "leading edge" measures in the President's budget request for Fiscal Year 2007. These proposals represent only the vanguard of changes that the Department

will initiate in coming years. The Department will develop additional proposals, based on the strategic direction set in this Report, including recommendations for the Fiscal Year 2008 budget submission.

Among the key programmatic decisions the QDR proposes to launch in Fiscal Year 2007 are the following:

- To strengthen forces to defeat terrorist networks, the Department will increase Special Operations Forces by 15% and increase the number of Special Forces Battalions by one-third. U.S. Special Operations Command (U.S. SOCOM) will establish the Marine Corps Special Operations Command. The Air Force will establish an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron under U.S. SOCOM. The Navy will support a U.S. SOCOM increase in SEAL Team manning and will develop a riverine warfare capability. The Department will also expand Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units by 3,700 personnel, a 33% increase. Multipurpose Army and Marine Corps ground forces will increase their capabilities and capacity to conduct irregular warfare missions.
- To strengthen homeland defense and homeland security, the Department will fund a \$1.5 billion initiative over the next five years to develop broad-spectrum medical countermeasures against the threat of genetically engineered bio-terror agents. Additional initiatives will include developing advanced detection and deterrent technologies and

facilitating full-scale civil-military exercises to improve interagency planning for complex homeland security contingencies.

- To help shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, strengthen deterrence, and hedge against future strategic uncertainty, the Department will develop a wider range of conventional and non-kinetic deterrent options while maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent. It will convert a small number of Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles for use in conventional prompt global strike. The Department will also increase procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles to increase persistent surveillance, nearly doubling today's capacity. It also will begin development of the next generation long-range strike systems, accelerating projected initial operational capability by almost two decades.
- To improve the nation's ability to deal with the dangers posed by states that possess weapons of mass destruction and the possibility of terrorists gaining control of them, the Department will greatly expand its capabilities and

forces for addressing such contingencies. It has assigned U.S. Strategic Command as the lead Combatant Command for integrating and synchronizing combating WMD, which provides a focal point for the Department's efforts. The Department will also establish a deployable Joint Task Force headquarters for WMD elimination to be able to provide immediate command and control of forces for executing those missions.

Achieving the vision set out in this Report will only be possible by maintaining and adapting the United States' enduring alliances. Alliances are clearly one of the nation's greatest sources of strength. Over the past four years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.S. bilateral alliances with Australia, Japan, Korea and other nations have adapted to retain their vitality and relevance in the face of new threats to international security. These alliances make manifest the strategic solidarity of free democratic states, promote shared values and facilitate the sharing of military and security burdens around the world. The United States

Photo by Petty Officer Steve Lewis, Royal Navy.



Photo by Photographer Mateo Zard, Chief of Staff, U.S. Navy.

A soldier of the United Kingdom Black Watch Regiment (center) thanks a U.S. Army heavy transporter driver who has safely delivered his Warrior armored vehicle to Shaibah base, Basra after a long drive south from North Babil, Iraq. Australian and U.S. personnel discuss enemy troop movements during an exercise involving Navy, Army, Air Force, Marine and Special Forces units. The United Kingdom and Australia are key partners in ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Photos left to right)

places great value on its unique relationships with the United Kingdom and Australia, whose forces stand with the U.S. military in Iraq, Afghanistan and many other operations. These close military relations are models for the breadth and depth of cooperation that the United States seeks to foster with other allies and partners around the world. Implementation of the QDR's agenda will serve to reinforce these enduring links.

The 2006 QDR was designed to serve as a catalyst to spur the Department's continuing adaptation and reorientation to produce a truly integrated joint force that is more agile, more rapidly deployable, and more capable against the wider range of threats. Through a process of continuous improvement, constant reassessment and application of lessons learned, changes based on this review will continue over time. Collectively, and with the cooperation of the Congress, these changes will ensure that the Department adapts to meet the increasingly dangerous security challenges of the 21st century.

## FIGHTING THE LONG WAR

*This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo...Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge and no rest.*

*President Bush, September 20, 2001*


Since 2001 the U.S. military has been continuously at war, but fighting a conflict that is markedly different from wars of the past. The enemies we face are not nation-states but rather dispersed non-state networks. In many cases, actions must occur on many continents in countries with which the United States is not at war. Unlike the image many have of war, this struggle cannot be won by military force alone, or even principally. And it is a struggle that may last for some years to come.

On any given day, nearly 350,000 men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces are deployed or stationed in approximately 130 countries. They are battle-hardened from operations over the past four years, fighting the enemies of freedom as part of this long war. They maintain the Nation's treaty obligations and international commitments. They protect and advance U.S. interests and values. They are often asked to be

protectors of the peace and providers of relief. They are a force for good.

## Afghanistan

Within weeks after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. and allied forces clandestinely entered Afghanistan and linked up with indigenous Afghan forces. Forces on the ground leveraged joint air power and swiftly toppled the Taliban's repressive theocratic dictatorship. Defeat of the Taliban and their foreign patrons – al Qaida terrorists and their associates – was swift. The war in Afghanistan demonstrated the ability of the U.S. military to project power rapidly at global distances; to conduct operations far inland; to integrate air, ground, special operations, and maritime forces into a joint force; to provide humanitarian relief; and to sustain operations with minimal local basing support. The actions in 2001 in Afghanistan reinforced the principles of adaptability, speed of action, integrated joint operations, economy of force, and the value of working with and through indigenous forces to achieve common goals.



DOD Photo

Special Operations Forces ride alongside Afghan Northern Alliance forces during a patrol in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Special Operations Forces employed local transportation and worked closely with air and space assets to bring precision fires against the Taliban.

Since 2001, U.S. forces have helped to establish the Afghan National Army, to support their first free election in a generation, and to set security conditions for enduring freedom in Afghanistan. Vital international contributions have helped to achieve this result: An International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of 9,000 military personnel, led by NATO since 2003, operates in Kabul and an increasing portion of Afghanistan's territory, with plans to expand into still more Afghan provinces later this year. As part of the ISAF mission, civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams operate in the countryside and undertake reconstruction projects, in coordination with local Afghan officials, to help extend the authority of the central government beyond Kabul and build its capacity for the long term.

### Iraq

Much has been accomplished in Iraq since the U.S.-led coalition removed the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein and liberated the Iraqi people in 2003: holding free elections, ratifying a constitution, improving infrastructure after decades of neglect, training and equipping Iraqi security forces, and increasing the capability of those forces to take on the enemies of freedom and secure their nation. Although many challenges remain, Iraq is steadily recovering from decades of a vicious tyranny, in which government authority stemmed solely from fear, terror, and brutality. The international coalition is succeeding in setting security conditions for the emergence of a democratic Iraq that will be able to defend itself, that will not be a safe haven for terrorists, that

will not be a threat to its neighbors, and that can serve as a model of freedom for the Middle East.

Like Afghanistan, Iraq is a crucial battleground in the long war against terrorism. Al Qaida and its associated movements recognize Iraq as the place of the greatest battle of Islam in this era. As freedom and democracy take root in Iraq, it will provide an attractive alternative to the message of extremists for the people of the region. Success in building a secure, free Iraq will deal the enemy a crippling blow.

*"Victory by the armies cannot be achieved unless the infantry occupies the territory. Likewise, victory for the Islamic movements against the world alliance cannot be attained unless movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region"*  
-Ayman al-Zawahiri, 2001

Over the past four years, joint forces have adapted to the demands of long-duration, irregular operations. The weight of effort in Iraq has shifted over time, from defeating the Iraqi military and liberating the Iraqi people, to building up Iraqi security forces and local institutions, and to transitioning responsibility for security to the Iraqis.



Iraqi women display their ink stained fingers as proof that they voted.

Photo by Sergeant April L. Johnson, U.S. Army.

Iraqi security forces, military and police, continue to grow in numbers and capability. The Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) has helped create more than 125 Iraqi combat battalions that are now operating with U.S. and other coalition units to find and clear out enemy forces. As more Iraqi units gain confidence and operational experience, they will increasingly take the lead in security operations. This example is a model for the future: helping others to help themselves is critical to winning the long war.



The U.S. Army is harnessing the diversity of American society by recruiting heritage speakers of priority languages to serve as translators and interpreters. A soldier (at the desk with his back turned) is interpreting for his commander at a local police recruiting station in Iraq. To date, the Army has recruited 479 individuals into the heritage speaker program, 133 of whom are currently deployed.

One of the greatest challenges facing U.S. forces is finding the enemy and then rapidly acting on that information. To address this challenge in Iraq, the Department has established in the theater the Joint Intelligence Operations Center – Iraq. This Center integrates intelligence from all sources – imagery, signals intelligence, and human intelligence – and then fuses that information with planning and execution functions to support operations that are often conducted within hours or even minutes of receiving an intelligence tip.

### The Fight Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq

The long war against terrorist networks extends far beyond the borders of Iraq and Afghanistan and includes many operations characterized by irregular warfare – operations in which the enemy is not a regular military force of a nation-state. In recent years, U.S. forces have been engaged in many countries, fighting terrorists and helping partners to police and govern their nations. To succeed in such operations, the United States must often take an indirect approach, building up and working with others. This indirect approach seeks to unbalance adversaries physically and psychologically, rather than attacking them where they are strongest or in the manner they expect to be attacked. Taking the “line of least resistance” unbalances the enemy physically, exploiting subtle vulnerabilities and perceived weaknesses. Exploiting the “line of least expectation” unbalances the enemy psychologically, setting the conditions for the enemy’s subsequent defeat. One historical example that illustrates both concepts comes from the Arab Revolt in 1917 in a distant theater of the First World War, when British Colonel T.E. Lawrence and a group of lightly armed Bedouin tribesmen seized the Ottoman port city of Aqaba by attacking from the undefended desert-side, rather than confronting the garrison’s coastal artillery by attacking from the sea. Today, efforts large and small on five continents demonstrate the importance of being able to work with and through partners, to operate clandestinely and to sustain a persistent but low-visibility presence. Such efforts represent an application of the indirect approach to the long war.

Photo by Sgt. Alvin Laonita  
L. Brown, U.S. Air Force.



In the Republic of Georgia, a two-year U.S. military train and equip mission with small teams of military trainers resulted in the creation of that country's counterterrorism force. Georgian forces are maintaining security internally and are taking part in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In East Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is currently helping to build host-nation capacity in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Operating across large areas but using only small detachments, CJTF-HOA is a prime example of distributed operations and economy of force. Military, civilian, and allied personnel work together to provide security training and to perform public works and medical assistance projects, demonstrating the benefits of unity of effort. Steps toward more effective host nation governance have improved local conditions and set the stage to minimize tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict, decreasing the possibility of failed states or ungoverned spaces in which terrorist extremists can more easily operate or take shelter.

In the Trans-Sahara region, the U.S. European Command's Counter-Terrorism Initiative is helping regional states develop the internal security forces and procedures necessary for policing their national territories. This initiative uses military and civilian engagements with

partners in northern and western Africa to counter emerging terrorist extremist threats. In Niger, for example, a small team of combat aviation advisors has helped Niger's Air Force hone its skills to prevent the under-developed eastern part of the country from becoming a safe haven for transnational terrorists.

### Humanitarian and Early Preventive Measures

U.S. forces continue to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations around the globe. Preventing crises from worsening and alleviating suffering are goals consistent with American values. They are also in the United States' interest. By alleviating suffering and dealing with crises in their early stages, U.S. forces help prevent disorder from spiraling into wider conflict or crisis. They also demonstrate the goodwill and compassion of the United States.

In the eastern Indian Ocean, the U.S. military was at the vanguard of an international effort to provide relief to stranded victims of the disastrous December 2004 tsunami. The U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Transportation Command responded rapidly, deploying a Joint Task Force to Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka within five days of the catastrophe. Strategic airlift, supplemented by the arrival of an aircraft carrier, amphibious ships, and a hospital ship provided urgent relief. These forces maintained 24-hour operations and helped coordinate the various international relief efforts. Over a six-week period, U.S. forces airlifted over 8,500 tons

of critical emergency supplies to isolated and previously unreachable areas, conducted search and rescue operations and treated more than 10,000 patients.




Photo by Photogrammetry, Aerial Site Survey, U.S. Air Force

A Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) crew assigned to the USS Bonhomme Richard unloads humanitarian relief supplies in the city of Meuloboh, on the island of Sumatra, Indonesia. U.S. military elements quickly responded to provide aid to victims of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

Similarly, in October 2005, when a devastating earthquake struck northern Pakistan, U.S. forces proved their adaptability by responding within eighteen hours. U.S. military aircraft, among the first on the scene, transported and distributed humanitarian supplies throughout the affected areas. A combined Pakistani-U.S. Civil-Military Disaster Assistance Center seamlessly integrated contributions from various nations and international aid organizations. U.S. strategic airlift augmented the capacity of partner countries by transporting relief personnel and supplies from across the globe to Pakistan. Deployable U.S. military field hospitals were quickly established to supplement damaged Pakistani medical facilities, and U.S. military engineers helped to re-open hundreds of miles of roads, permitting the flow of aid to remote communities.




Photo by Photogrammetry, Aerial Site Survey, U.S. Air Force

Pakistani earthquake victims crowd around a U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter delivering disaster relief supplies to the devastated area surrounding the town of Uch, Pakistan. The U.S. military participated in the multinational effort to provide humanitarian assistance after the October 2005 earthquake.

Over the past four years, U.S. forces have also played critical roles preventing crises from becoming more serious conflicts. In Liberia in 2003, civil war and the dissolution of the government prompted a multinational intervention to restore order and prevent a full-blown humanitarian crisis. A U.S. European Command joint task force accompanied a force from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) throughout the mission. The U.S. team, working with regional partners, secured and re-opened the country's major seaport to permit the flow of humanitarian assistance. The United States and ECOWAS succeeded in stabilizing the country, permitting a rapid turnover of humanitarian assistance responsibility to the United Nations in support of the new interim Liberian government.

Similarly, in response to increasing political violence in Haiti in early 2004, U.S. joint forces rapidly deployed as part of a multinational stabilization force. This early action prevented the collapse of political and social structures



Photo by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Collins, U.S. Army

The commander of U.S. forces under Joint Task Force Liberia speaks with soldiers from Ghana, one of the West African countries that led the effort to stabilize Liberia. With the arrival of West African forces, the security environment and humanitarian conditions in Liberia improved significantly.

in the country, averted a humanitarian crisis, and established a more secure and stable environment, which enabled the speedy transfer of responsibility for supporting the Haitian transitional government to the United Nations.

U.S. Southern Command's support for Plan Colombia is yet another example of preventive action. The United States has worked with the Government of Colombia to combat the production and trafficking of illegal drugs. In 2002, at the request of the Administration, Congress granted expanded authorities to help the Colombian Government wage a unified campaign against terrorism as well as drugs, and thereby assert effective control over its territory. This broader mission has helped the Colombian Government seize the initiative against illegal armed groups, demobilize thousands of illegal paramilitaries, decrease violence and return to government authority areas that had been under the control of narcoterrorists for decades.

Integrated joint operations have also played critical roles in deterring conflict and preserving

stability in the Pacific. Forward-deployed forces and flexible deterrent options have successfully dissuaded potential enemies and assured allies and partners. During operations in Iraq in the spring of 2003, regional deterrence capabilities and global repositioning of joint forces and precision munitions demonstrated U.S. resolve and commitment to maintaining the armistice on the Korean Peninsula.

Highly distributed global operations over the past several years – in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Central Asia, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Africa, and Latin America – make manifest the importance of small teams conducting missions uniquely tailored to local conditions. These operations also demonstrate the agility of U.S. forces forward-deployed in and near these regions to transition quickly from deterrence to humanitarian or other operations as required. In some places, U.S. forces have concentrated on attacking and disrupting enemy forces. In others, U.S. forces have worked to improve the lives of people in impoverished regions, or to build up the capacity of local security forces to police their own countries. In almost all cases, updated authorities, processes and practices were required to ensure unity of effort in these distributed operations. Still, additional cooperation authorities will be required if the U.S. Government is to be able to achieve its goals in the most cost-effective manner.

Recent operations have reinforced the need for U.S. forces to have greater language skills and cultural awareness. It is advantageous for U.S. forces to speak the languages of the regions



Photo by Technical Specialist  
John M. Foster, U.S. Air Force.

During the exercise New Horizons 2005 in El Salvador, U.S. Army personnel describe preventive health measures to local citizens. New Horizons included a civic action project which provided medical assistance visits, two new schools and three clinics in areas hit by earthquakes in 2004.

where the enemy will operate. In 2004, the Department of Defense launched the Defense Language Transformation Initiative to improve the ability of the Armed Forces to work more effectively with international partners. The Military Departments have also begun more intensive cultural and language training, which over time will create a more culturally aware, linguistically capable force, better able to forge victory in the long war. The Department must overcome a legacy of relatively limited emphasis on languages and continue to expand efforts to place linguistically capable individuals at all levels of the military – from the tactical squad to the operational commander.

#### The Department's Role at Home

The long war has also seen U.S. forces taking on greater roles at home. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, U.S. forces were called upon to assist in securing the homeland. Working aside other Federal agencies, the Department

answered the call. At the President's direction, active and reserve forces conducted combat air patrols over major cities to prevent follow-on attacks, reinforced the Nation's land borders, guarded shipping lanes, protected harbors, secured critical infrastructure, and guarded airports and other transportation hubs until the establishment of the Transportation Security Administration. Specialized anti-terrorism and chemical and biological incident response forces deployed to Washington, D.C. in the wake of the 2001 anthrax attacks.


The Department has undertaken a number of major changes to strengthen its ability to defend the homeland and support civil authorities. In 2002, the Department created a new Combatant Command, U.S. Northern Command (U.S. NORTHCOM), with the responsibility to consolidate homeland defense missions under a single headquarters. To coordinate its efforts and to increase the emphasis on homeland defense issues, the Department established the new civilian post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

The Department has played an active role in Federal efforts to shore up defenses against the threat of biological terrorism. It is helping to develop vaccines for Project BioShield, a national effort to accelerate the development of medical counter-measures to defend against potential biological attacks. In Project BioWatch, the Department collaborates with other Federal agencies on improving technologies and procedures to detect and identify biological attacks. In 2004, the Department led the

establishment of the National BioDefense Campus at Fort Detrick, Maryland, which provides a means for coordination among agencies working on research and development of medical biological defenses.

At the state level, the National Guard is fielding 55 WMD Civil Support Teams (CSTs) – in each state, territory and the District of Columbia. These 22-member teams can provide critical communications links, quick assessment of damage from any WMD attack and consequence management support to local, state and Federal agencies. The National Guard is also creating twelve Enhanced Response Force Packages for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive attacks. These units provide capabilities to locate and extract victims from a WMD-contaminated environment, to conduct casualty and patient decontamination and to provide medical treatment. To improve command and control functions for emergencies and major public events, the National Guard is creating a Joint Force Headquarters in each state.

Just as they have proved adaptable in providing rapid response to disasters abroad, U.S. forces have been called upon to respond to natural disasters at home. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, pre-positioned forces arrived in neighborhoods of Gulf Coast communities within four hours after the storm hit, to assist rescue efforts. More than 50,000 National Guard personnel deployed to the disaster zone. Active forces added an additional 22,000 personnel, including units previously deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. Together, working with the Coast Guard, they conducted



An Air Force fire truck is loaded onto a C-130 Hercules bound for Mississippi during Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. The U.S. Air Force personnel are from the 162nd Fighter Wing, Arizona Air National Guard.

David Naeff, U.S. Air Force

search and rescue missions, evacuations, and medical airlift from the air, land, and sea. The Department's response to Hurricane Katrina and other civil support operations provided valuable lessons for improving force integration and command and control in large, complex interagency operations.

### Operational Lessons Learned

Operational experiences – in Afghanistan and Iraq, in wider operations as part of the war on terror, in humanitarian relief efforts and preventive actions and in the Department of Defense's role at home – have provided important lessons and principles that the Department has already begun to apply. These overarching lessons have broad applicability to many of the challenges the Department faces. They have informed the new approaches developed during the QDR aimed at continuing the reorientation of military capabilities and implementing enterprise-wide reforms to ensure that structures and processes support the warfighter. They include:

- Having the Authorities and Resources to Build Partnership Capacity. Recent operations demonstrate the critical importance of being organized to work with and through others, and of shifting emphasis from performing tasks ourselves to enabling others. They also underscore the importance of adopting a more indirect approach to achieve common objectives. The Department must help partners improve their ability to perform their intended roles and missions. This includes foreign governments trying to police themselves and govern their populations more justly and effectively; at home, it includes other Federal agencies and state and local governments. The U.S. military's interaction with foreign militaries provides valuable opportunities to expand partner capacity as well as to establish trust and build relationships. Recent efforts to build partnership capacity also highlight the importance of flexible access to funding through programs such as the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and Train and Equip authorities for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Expanding authorities to build on the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan will help enable the United States to defeat terrorist networks wherever they are located. Congress is urged to work alongside the Department to provide the full set of authorities needed to build security partnerships to fight the war on terror. In addition to the recently enacted authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces and Emergency Transfer Authority for the State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization amendments, needed

authorities include: institutionalizing CERP for named contingency operations *world-wide*; expanding the President's authority to task and resource best-situated Federal agencies in an emergency; and broader reimbursement authority for coalition support forces and expanded logistics support to other nations partnering with the United States in the war on terror.



Members of Task Force Phoenix, Indiana National Guard (center), conduct an after-action review with Afghan National Army soldiers. With the aid of U.S. forces, Afghan soldiers are becoming increasingly self-sufficient.

Photo by Spectator, Perry L. Comber, U.S. Army.

- Taking Early Preventive Measures. Drawing on lessons from recent operations, the QDR emphasized the importance of early measures to prevent problems from becoming conflicts and conflicts from becoming crises. Operations in Haiti and Liberia demonstrate the advantage of taking prompt action to quell disorder before it leads to the collapse of political and social structures. Those operations help set conditions for the restoration of security and civil society. Taking early measures requires greater speed of action and a clear understanding of the situation, including the way potential adversaries make decisions. In many recent counterterrorist operations, the

time available to apprehend a terrorist, once located, has been measured in mere minutes. Similarly, as the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 showed, defending the homeland against air or missile attacks with little or no warning also requires the ability to act on very short notice. U.S. forces have demonstrated time and again their agility in responding rapidly to crises. However, operational agility has not yet been matched by the availability of sufficiently broad authorities or the processes and procedures needed to support the warfighter. In a number of recent operations, the lack of needed authorities hindered the ability of U.S. forces to act swiftly, and the process to get appropriate authorities has often taken months to achieve.

- Increasing Freedom of Action. Recent operations also reinforce the need to increase the freedom of action and the range of options available to the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to address the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The ability of U.S. and allied forces to conduct operations in land-locked Afghanistan only weeks after the 9/11 attacks demonstrated the value of operational readiness and global reach. Building partnership capacity and strengthening alliances to defeat terrorist networks is an example of how the United States can strengthen freedom of action at the strategic level. The QDR proposes measures to increase both strategic and operational freedom of action by combining a more indirect approach, stealth, persistence, flexible basing and strategic reach.

- Shifting Cost Balances. For a few hundred thousand dollars and the lives of nineteen terrorists, on September 11, 2001, al Qaida murdered some 3,000 people and inflicted enormous economic costs on the United States. In confronting the range of security challenges it will face in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the United States must constantly strive to minimize its own costs in terms of lives and treasure, while imposing unsustainable costs on its adversaries. The United States, NATO, other allies and partners can impose costs by taking actions and making investments that complicate an adversary's decision-making or promote self-defeating actions. Effective cost-imposing strategies also heighten an adversary's sense of uncertainty, potentially creating internal fissures in its leadership. Sustaining America's scientific and technological advantages over any potential competitor contributes to the nation's ability to dissuade future forms of military competition.

The Department applied these lessons over the course of the QDR as it identified changes to the mix of joint capabilities and the enterprise-wide reforms needed to fight the long war.


## OPERATIONALIZING THE STRATEGY

The *National Defense Strategy*, published in March 2005, provides the strategic foundation of the QDR. The strategy acknowledges that although the U.S. military maintains considerable advantages in traditional forms of warfare, this realm is not the only, or even the most likely, one in which adversaries will challenge the United States during the period immediately ahead. Enemies are more likely to pose asymmetric threats, including irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges. Some, such as non-state actors, will choose irregular warfare – including terrorism, insurgency or guerrilla warfare – in an attempt to break our will through protracted conflict. Some states, and some non-state actors, will pursue WMD to intimidate others or murder hundreds of thousands of people. Finally, some states may seek capabilities designed to disrupt or negate traditional U.S. military advantages.

To operationalize the *National Defense Strategy*, the Department's senior civilian and military leaders identified four priority areas for examination during the QDR:

- Defeating terrorist networks.
- Defending the homeland in depth.
- Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.
- Preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.

These inter-related areas illustrated the types of capabilities and forces needed to address the challenges described in the *National Defense Strategy*. They helped the Department to assess that strategy and review its force planning construct.



As the diagram shows, the Department is shifting its portfolio of capabilities to address irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges.

Although these focus areas do not encompass the full range of military activities the Department may have to conduct, senior leaders identified them as among the most pressing problems the Department must address. All of them have both near-term and long-term implications. In all four areas, there are immediate measures that can be put in place to reduce near-term risks while other measures are being developed to increase the range of options available in the future. Strengthening capabilities in these areas will also improve the versatility of the force to perform a wider range of military operations than today.

Senior leaders considered the nature of each problem, identified desired objectives in each area

and developed approaches for achieving those objectives. The focus areas helped to identify the capabilities that are needed to continue the reorientation of the joint force over time. These changes will not occur all at once, but will be part of a process of continuous change.

Common to all of the focus areas is the imperative to work with other government agencies, allies and partners and, where appropriate, to help them increase their capacities and capabilities and the ability to work together. In all cases, the four focus areas require the application of multiple elements of national power and close cooperation with international allies and partners. The Department cannot solve these problems alone. The QDR proposes, therefore, that the United States strengthen existing alliances and develop new partnerships to address common threats. Through these partnerships, the Department can assist others in developing the wherewithal to protect their own populations and police their own territories, as well as to project and sustain forces to promote collective security.



Photo by Sergeant Brent Clares, U.S. Army

An Army reservist with the Herat Provisional Reconstruction Team visits children at a local orphanage. Working on Provincial Reconstruction Teams alongside personnel from the U.S. State Department, NATO and other allies, U.S. forces are bringing a sense of normalcy to remote areas of Afghanistan.

This chapter outlines each of the four focus areas. It then describes the refinement of the Department's force planning construct to better align the shape and size of U.S. forces to address these new challenges and to conduct the full range of military operations.

### Defeating Terrorist Networks

The rise of global non-state terrorist networks is one of the defining characteristics of the last decade. The enemies we face are not traditional conventional military forces, but rather distributed multi-national and multi-ethnic networks of terrorists. These networks seek to break the will of nations that have joined the fight alongside the United States by attacking their populations. Terrorist networks use intimidation, propaganda and indiscriminate violence in an attempt to subjugate the Muslim world under a radical theocratic tyranny. These networks also aim to exhaust the will of the United States and its allies and partners, including those in the Muslim world, to oppose them. Terrorist networks seek ever deadlier means, including nuclear and biological weapons, to commit mass murder.

*"The jihad movement must adopt its plan on the basis of controlling a piece of land in the heart of the Islamic world on which it could establish and protect the state of Islam and launch its battle to restore the rational caliphate based on the traditions of the prophet."  
- Ayman al-Zawahiri, 2001*

For the past several decades, al Qaida and its associated movements have focused their efforts on their "near enemy": moderate governments

throughout the greater Middle East. In the 1990s, they shifted toward attacking their “far enemy”: the United States and other western powers – in an attempt to change the character of the conflict, galvanize pan-Islamic support, bleed the United States (as the Mujahideen had done to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s), and weaken Western support for Middle Eastern governments. They use terrorist attacks to perturb the international community and trigger actions that could strengthen their position and move them closer toward their objectives.

Such terrorist networks oppose globalization and the expansion of freedom it brings. Paradoxically, they use the very instruments of globalization – the unfettered flow of information and ideas, goods and services, capital, people and technology – as their preferred means of attack. They target symbols of modernity like skyscrapers with civilian jetliners used as missiles. They exploit the Internet as a cyber-sanctuary, which enables the transfer of funds and the cross-training of geographically isolated cells. They use cell phones and text messaging to order attacks and detonate car bombs. They send pre-recorded video messages to sympathetic media outlets to distribute their propaganda “free of charge” and to spread their ideology of hate. They encourage terrorist “startup franchises” around the world that conduct attacks in copy-cat fashion. They depend on 24/7 news cycles for the publicity they seek to attract new recruits. They plan to attack targets from safe-houses half a world away. They seek weapons of mass destruction from transnational proliferation networks.




Photo by Staff Sergeant Kevin Wainwright, U.S. Army.

A U.S. soldier questions an Iraqi man on a rooftop during a nighttime raid at the location of a known terrorist in Mosul, Iraq. Apprehending terrorists is vital for security and stability in Iraq.

Currently, Iraq and Afghanistan are crucial battlegrounds in this war, but the struggle extends far beyond their borders and may well be fought in dozens of other countries simultaneously and for many years to come. Al Qaida and its associated movements operate in more than 80 countries. They have conducted attacks around the world – in New York, Washington, D.C., Jakarta, Bali, Istanbul, Madrid, London, Islamabad, New Delhi, Moscow, Nairobi, Dar Es Salaam, Casablanca, Tunis, Riyadh, Sharm el-Sheikh, and Amman – killing ordinary people of all faiths and ethnicities alike. They exploit poorly governed areas of the world, taking sanctuary where states lack the capacity or the will to police themselves. State sponsors such as Iran and Syria provide yet another form of safe haven. Increasingly, in many states in the developing world, terrorist networks pose a greater threat than external threats.

Victory will come when the enemy's extremist ideologies are discredited in the eyes of their host populations and tacit supporters, becoming unfashionable, and following other discredited

creeds, such as Communism and Nazism, into oblivion. This requires the creation of a global environment inhospitable to terrorism. It requires legitimate governments with the capacity to police themselves and to deny terrorists the sanctuary and the resources they need to survive. It also will require support for the establishment of effective representative civil societies around the world, since the appeal of freedom is the best long-term counter to the ideology of the extremists. The ultimate aim is that terrorist networks will no longer have the ability or support to strike globally and catastrophically, and their ability to strike regionally will be outweighed by the capacity and resolve of local governments to defeat them.

Just as these enemies cannot defeat the United States militarily, they cannot be defeated solely through military force. The United States, its allies and partners, will not win this long war in a great battle of annihilation. Victory can only be achieved through the patient accumulation of quiet successes and the orchestration of all elements of national and international power. U.S. military forces are contributing and will continue to contribute to wider government and international efforts to defend the homeland, attack and disrupt terrorist networks, and counter ideological support for terrorism over time. But broad cooperation, across the entire U.S. Government, society, and with NATO, other allies, and partners is essential.

This war is both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas—a fight against terrorist networks and against their murderous ideology. The Department

of Defense fully supports efforts to counter the ideology of terrorism, although most of the U.S. Government's capabilities for this activity reside in other U.S. Government agencies and in the private sector. It is important, however, that the Department continues to improve its ability to understand and engage with key audiences. The Department will work closely with interagency partners to integrate strategic communication into U.S. national security policy planning and operations. The battle of ideas ultimately will be won by enabling moderate Muslim leadership to prevail in their struggle against the violent extremists.

The United States, its allies and partners must maintain the offensive by relentlessly finding, attacking and disrupting terrorist networks worldwide. They must increase global pressure on terrorist networks by denying them sanctuary in both the physical and information domains. They will continue to survey, infiltrate and attack the enemy's global networks and to perturb those networks. Such efforts will yield actionable intelligence that can be operationally exploited with follow-on actions combining military and non-military measures directed against the visible parts of the enemy's network as a means to reach what is hidden. There is, however, no "one size fits all" approach, no "silver bullet." To achieve global effects across countries, regions and groups, the United States must localize and defeat terrorist extremist cells with approaches that are tailored to local conditions and differentiated worldwide. Doing so will help to disaggregate the global network and sever transnational links.



Photo by Technical Sergeant David D. Underwood, Jr., U.S. Air Force.

A Senegalese squad practices maneuvers during small unit training exercises which are part of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), the U.S. Government's long-term interagency plan to combat terrorism in northern Africa.

Long-duration, complex operations involving the U.S. military, other government agencies and international partners will be waged simultaneously in multiple countries around the world, relying on a combination of direct (visible) and indirect (clandestine) approaches. Above all, they will require persistent surveillance and vastly better intelligence to locate enemy capabilities and personnel. They will also require global mobility, rapid strike, sustained unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency capabilities. Maintaining a long-term, low-visibility presence in many areas of the world where U.S. forces do not traditionally operate will be required. Building and leveraging partner capacity will also be an absolutely essential part of this approach, and the employment of surrogates will be a necessary method for achieving many goals. Working indirectly with and through others, and thereby denying popular support to the enemy, will help to transform the character of the conflict. In many cases, U.S. partners will have greater local knowledge and legitimacy with their own people

and can thereby more effectively fight terrorist networks. Setting security conditions for the expansion of civil society and the rule of law is a related element of this approach.

*"In the absence of... popular support, the mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows..."*  
 — Ayman al-Zawabiri, July 2005

Consistent with this approach, defeating terrorist networks highlights the need for the following types of capabilities:

- Human intelligence to discern the intentions of the enemy.
- Persistent surveillance to find and precisely target enemy capabilities in denied areas.
- Capabilities to locate, tag and track terrorists in all domains, including cyberspace.
- Special operations forces to conduct direct action, foreign internal defense, counterterrorist operations and unconventional warfare.
- Multipurpose forces to train, equip, and advise indigenous forces; deploy and engage with partner nations; conduct irregular warfare; and support security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations.
- Capabilities and organizations to help fuse intelligence and operations to speed action based on time-sensitive intelligence.
- Language and cultural awareness to facilitate the expansion of partner capacity.
- Non-lethal capabilities.

- Urban warfare capabilities.
- Prompt global strike to attack fleeting enemy targets rapidly.
- Riverine warfare capabilities to improve the ability of U.S. forces to work with the security forces of partner countries to deny terrorist groups the use of waterways.
- The ability to communicate U.S. actions effectively to multiple audiences, while rapidly countering enemy agitation and propaganda.
- Joint coordination, procedures, systems and, when necessary, command and control to plan and conduct complex interagency operations.
- Broad, flexible authorities to enable the United States to rapidly develop the capacity of nations to participate effectively in disrupting and defeating terrorist networks.

### Defending the Homeland in Depth

Throughout much of its history, the United States enjoyed a geographic position of strategic insularity. The oceans and uncontested borders permitted rapid economic growth and allowed the United States to spend little at home to defend against foreign threats. The advent of long-range bombers and missiles, nuclear weapons, and more recently of terrorist groups with global reach, fundamentally changed the relationship between U.S. geography and security. Geographic insularity no longer confers security for the country.

Globalization enables many positive developments such as the free movement of capital, goods and services, information, people and technology, but it is also accelerating the transmission of disease, the transfer of advanced weapons, the spread of extremist ideologies, the movement of terrorists and the vulnerability of major economic segments. The U.S. populace, territory and infrastructure, as well as its assets in space, may be increasingly vulnerable to these and a variety of other threats, including weapons of mass destruction, missile and other air threats, and electronic or cyber-attacks.


Globalization also empowers small groups and individuals. Nation-states no longer have a monopoly over the catastrophic use of violence. Today, small teams or even single individuals can weaponize chemical, biological and even crude radiological or nuclear devices and use them to murder hundreds of thousands of people. Loosely organized and with few assets of their own to protect, non-state enemies are considerably more difficult than nation-states to deter through traditional military means. Non-state enemies could attempt to attack a wide range of targets including government facilities; commercial and financial systems; cultural and historical landmarks; food, water, and power supplies; and information, transport, and energy networks. They will employ unconventional means to penetrate homeland defenses and exploit the very nature of western societies – their openness – to attack their citizens, economic institutions, physical infrastructure and social fabric.

*"The need [is] to inflict the maximum casualties against the opponent, for this is the language understood by the west, no matter how much time and effort such operations take."  
—Ayman al-Zawabiri, 2001.*

The threat to the U.S. homeland, however, is broader than that posed by terrorists. Hostile states could also attack the United States using WMD delivered by missiles or by less familiar means such as commercial shipping or general aviation. They could attack surreptitiously through surrogates. Some hostile states are pursuing advanced weapons of mass destruction, including genetically engineered biological warfare agents that can overcome today's defenses. There is also a danger that the WMD capabilities of some states could fall into the hands of, or be given to, terrorists who could use them to attack the United States.

As set forth in the Defense Department's *National Maritime Security Policy* and in the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, the Department's strategic goal for homeland defense is to secure the United States from direct attack. To achieve this goal, the Department will work as part of an interagency effort, with the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal, state and local agencies, to address threats to the U.S. homeland. The Department will maintain a deterrent posture to persuade potential aggressors that their objectives in attacking would be denied and that any attack on U.S. territory, people, critical infrastructure (including through cyberspace) or forces could result in an overwhelming response. U.S. forces

must be capable of defeating threats at a distance and of swiftly mitigating the consequences of an attack. Capabilities to mitigate attacks on the U.S. homeland may also play a role in responding to natural disasters, as the response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated. Over time, the goal is that the capacity of other agencies and state and local governments to respond to domestic incidents will be sufficient to perform their assigned responsibilities with minimal reliance on U.S. military support. To that end, the Department will develop concepts of operations to leverage its strengths in areas such as planning, training and command and control, in support of its interagency homeland security partners.



A National Guard multi-purpose utility truck fords Hurricane Katrina floodwaters to bring supplies to victims in downtown New Orleans, Louisiana.

Protecting the U.S. homeland requires an active and layered defense strategy. The strategy emphasizes partnerships with neighboring states and allies, as well as with other Federal, state and local agencies. The Department's *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* identifies three different roles it plays: leading Department-specific assigned missions; supporting other agencies; and helping to enable partners.

Lead. At the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense executes military missions that dissuade, deter or defeat external attacks upon the United States, its population, and its defense critical infrastructure.

The Department plays an important role in identifying and characterizing threats at the earliest possible time so that, where possible, they can be prevented, disrupted, interdicted, or otherwise defeated. In the air domain, the Department has primary responsibility for defending U.S. airspace and protecting the nation's air approaches. In the maritime approaches, the Department works alongside the Department of Homeland Security to integrate U.S. maritime defense – optimizing the mutually supporting capabilities of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. Forward deployed naval assets work with other agencies to identify, track, and intercept threats before they threaten the United States. The Department remains prepared to reinforce the defense of the land approaches to the United States if directed by the President.

Through its deterrent force posture and capabilities, the Department seeks to convince adversaries that they cannot achieve their objectives through attacks on the U.S. homeland, and that any attack will prompt a swift response. U.S. forces are prepared to: intercept and defeat threats against U.S. territory, within U.S. territorial waters and airspace, and at a distance from the homeland; protect against and mitigate the consequences of any attack; and / or conduct military operations in response to any attack. The

Department has begun deploying interceptors to protect the U.S. homeland from ballistic missile attack. It is taking steps to ensure it can continue to perform its assigned duties during or after an attack. It ensures the nation's ability to respond to an attack by protecting its forces and the defense-critical infrastructure necessary to project power and sustain operations.

Support. At the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense, the Department supports civil authorities for designated law enforcement and / or other activities and as part of a comprehensive national response to prevent and protect against terrorist incidents or to recover from an attack or a disaster. As discussed, the Department's substantial humanitarian contributions to relief efforts in the aftermaths of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita fall into this category. In the future, should other catastrophes overwhelm civilian capacity, the Department may be called upon to respond rapidly with additional resources as part of an overall U.S. Government effort. In order to respond effectively to future catastrophic events, the Department will provide U.S. NORTHCOM with authority to stage forces and equipment domestically prior to potential incidents when possible. The Department will also seek to eliminate current legislative ceilings on pre-event spending.

Enable. The Department seeks to improve the homeland defense and consequence management capabilities of its national and international partners and to improve the Department's capabilities by sharing information, expertise and technology as appropriate across military

and civilian boundaries. The Department does this by leveraging its comparative advantages in planning, training, command and control and exercising and by developing trust and confidence through shared training and exercises. Successful homeland defense requires standardizing operational concepts, developing compatible technology solutions and coordinating planning. Toward that end, the Department will work with the Department of Homeland Security and with state and local governments to improve homeland security capabilities and cooperation. Working together will improve interagency planning and scenario development and enhance interoperability through experimentation, testing and training exercises.

Overall, consistent with the *National Maritime Security Policy* and the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, defending the homeland in depth and mitigating the consequences of attacks highlight the need for the following types of capabilities:

- Joint command and control for homeland defense and civil support missions, including communications and command and control systems that are interoperable with other agencies and state and local governments.
- Air and maritime domain awareness capabilities to provide increased situational awareness and shared information on potential threats through rapid collection, fusion and analysis.
- Capabilities to manage the consequences of major catastrophic events.




Photo by: Emergency Support Team - 1st USNS, US Navy

U.S. Navy Search and Rescue personnel retrieve an evacuee victim of Hurricane Katrina from a rooftop in New Orleans, Louisiana. The Navy's involvement in the humanitarian assistance operations is led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in conjunction with the Department of Defense.

- Broad spectrum medical countermeasures to defend against genetically engineered or naturally mutating pathogens for which there are no current defenses.
- Tailored deterrence, including prompt global strike capabilities to defend and respond in an overwhelming manner against WMD attacks, and air and missile defenses, as well as other defensive measures, to deter attacks by demonstrating the ability to deny an adversary's objectives.
- New or expanded authorities to improve access to Guard and reserve forces for use in the event of a man-made or natural disaster.

### Shaping the Choices of Countries at Strategic Crossroads

The choices that major and emerging powers make will affect the future strategic position and freedom of action of the United States, its allies and partners. The United States will attempt to

shape these choices in ways that foster cooperation and mutual security interests. At the same time, the United States, its allies and partners must also hedge against the possibility that a major or emerging power could choose a hostile path in the future. The pursuit of exclusionary or coercive policies and the development of high-end military capabilities that target U.S. or coalition forces are of particular concern.

Beyond Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America are in flux and represent new geo-strategic crossroads. The United States will seek to shape not only the choices of countries in those regions, but choices of countries outside them that have interests or ambitions within them.

Many countries in the Middle East find themselves at strategic crossroads. Democracy is emerging in Iraq, giving political voice to people who suffered for decades under a ruthless tyranny. Freedom is also taking root in Lebanon. Libya has decided to give up its nuclear program. Many countries in the region are acting in partnership with the United States to combat terrorist networks. Although positive developments have been made, the region remains volatile. Many states continue to face internal security threats. The pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by Iran is a destabilizing factor in the region. Terrorist networks remain active in many states and could threaten regional energy supplies in an attempt to cripple the global economy.

The countries of Central Asia have emerged from decades of Communist rule, but some countries

still have a long way to go toward adopting basic political liberties and free markets. States in the region face the threat of Islamist terrorist extremism. The energy resources of the region offer both an opportunity for economic development, as well as a danger that outside powers may seek to gain influence over those resources.

In Latin America, there has been steady progress toward political and economic development over the past several decades. Still, slow economic growth, weak democratic institutions and continuing stark economic inequality have led to a resurgence of populist authoritarian political movements in some countries, such as Venezuela. These movements threaten the gains achieved and are a source of political and economic instability.


Beyond these regions, the choices of major and emerging powers, including India, Russia and China, will be key factors in determining the international security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

India is emerging as a great power and a key strategic partner. On July 18, 2005 the President and Indian Prime Minister declared their resolve to transform the U.S.-India relationship into a global partnership that will provide leadership in areas of mutual concern and interest. Shared values as long-standing, multi-ethnic democracies provide the foundation for continued and increased strategic cooperation and represent an important opportunity for our two countries.

Russia remains a country in transition. It is

unlikely to pose a military threat to the United States or its allies on the same scale or intensity as the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Where possible, the United States will cooperate with Russia on shared interests such as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism, and countering the trafficking of narcotics. The United States remains concerned about the erosion of democracy in Russia, the curtailment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and freedom of the press, the centralization of political power and limits on economic freedom. Internationally, the United States welcomes Russia as a constructive partner but views with increasing concern its sales of disruptive weapons technologies abroad and actions that compromise the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of other states.

Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies. U.S. policy remains focused on encouraging China to play a constructive, peaceful role in the Asia-Pacific region and to serve as a partner in addressing common security challenges, including terrorism, proliferation, narcotics and piracy. U.S. policy seeks to encourage China to choose a path of peaceful economic growth and political liberalization, rather than military threat and intimidation. The United States' goal is for China to continue as an economic partner and emerge as a responsible stakeholder and force for good in the world.



DoD Photo

A Tomahawk Land Attack Missile is launched from the USS Florida during Giant Shadow, a U.S. Navy experimental exercise. The USS Florida is one of four nuclear ballistic missile submarines being converted to conventional-warhead guided missile submarines. After conversion, the submarines will be able to launch Tomahawk Missiles, Unmanned Underwater and Aerial Vehicles and Special Forces personnel and equipment.

China continues to invest heavily in its military, particularly in its strategic arsenal and capabilities designed to improve its ability to project power beyond its borders. Since 1996, China has increased its defense spending by more than 10% in real terms in every year except 2003. Secrecy, moreover, envelops most aspects of Chinese security affairs. The outside world has little knowledge of Chinese motivations and decision-making or of key capabilities supporting its military modernization. The United States encourages China to take actions to make its intentions clear and clarify its military plans.

Chinese military modernization has accelerated since the mid-to-late 1990s in response to central leadership demands to develop military options against Taiwan scenarios. The pace and scope of China's military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk. China is likely to continue making large investments in high-end, asymmetric military capabilities, emphasizing electronic and cyber-warfare; counter-space

operations; ballistic and cruise missiles; advanced integrated air defense systems; next generation torpedoes; advanced submarines; strategic nuclear strike from modern, sophisticated land- and sea-based systems; and theater unmanned aerial vehicles for employment by the Chinese military and for global export. These capabilities, the vast distances of the Asian theater, China's continental depth, and the challenge of en route and in-theater U.S. basing place a premium on forces capable of sustained operations at great distances into denied areas.

The United States will work to ensure that all major and emerging powers are integrated as constructive actors and stakeholders into the international system. It will also seek to ensure that no foreign power can dictate the terms of regional or global security. It will attempt to dissuade any military competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities that could enable regional hegemony or hostile action against the United States or other friendly countries, and it will seek to deter aggression or coercion. Should deterrence fail, the United States would deny a hostile power its strategic and operational objectives.

Shaping the choices of major and emerging powers requires a balanced approach, one that seeks cooperation but also creates prudent hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches by themselves may fail to preclude future conflict. A successful hedging strategy requires improving the capacity of partner states and reducing their vulnerabilities. In this regard, the United States will work to achieve greater integration

of defensive systems among its international partners in ways that would complicate any adversary's efforts to decouple them. The United States will work with allies and partners to integrate intelligence sensors, communication networks, information systems, missile defenses, undersea warfare and counter-mine warfare capabilities. It will seek to strengthen partner nations' capabilities to defend themselves and withstand attack, including against ambiguous coercive threats.



Photo by Matthew Sargent, USAF  
Group 1, U.S. Air Force

An F-15 Eagle pilot assigned as an exchange officer to Nuytabaru Air Base, Japan (right) discusses tactics with a Japan Air Self Defense Force F-15 pilot (left) before a mission. The U.S. alliance with Japan is important to the stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

To dissuade major and emerging powers from developing capabilities that could threaten regional stability, to deter conflict, and to defeat aggression should deterrence fail, the United States is further diversifying its basing posture. Based on the Department's Global Defense Posture Review, the United States will continue to adapt its global posture to promote constructive bilateral relations, mitigate anti-access threats and offset potential political coercion designed to limit U.S. access to any region. The United States will develop capabilities that would present any adversary with complex and multidimensional challenges and complicate its offensive planning

efforts. These include the pursuit of investments that capitalize on enduring U.S. advantages in key strategic and operational areas, such as persistent surveillance and long-range strike, stealth, operational maneuver and sustainment of air, sea and ground forces at strategic distances, air dominance and undersea warfare. These capabilities should preserve U.S. freedom of action and provide future Presidents with an expanded set of options to address all of the QDR focus areas and a wide range of potential future contingencies. The aim is to possess sufficient capability to convince any potential adversary that it cannot prevail in a conflict and that engaging in conflict entails substantial strategic risks beyond military defeat.

Consistent with this approach, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads highlights the need for the following types of capabilities:

- Security cooperation and engagement activities including joint training exercises, senior staff talks, and officer and foreign internal




Photo: Albert Segura/John E. Kennedy, U.S. Air Force.

U.S. Air National Guard personnel familiarize their Polish counterparts with aspects of the F-16 Fighting Falcon during the U.S. European Command exercise Sentry White Falcon 2005. In 2006, the Polish Air Force will begin receiving delivery of 48 F-16 Fighting Falcons they purchased to begin replacing their Soviet-made MiG fighters as the country modernizes its military to NATO standards.

defense training to increase understanding, strengthen allies and partners, and accurately communicate U.S. objectives and intent. This will require both new authorities and 21<sup>st</sup> century mechanisms for the interagency process.

- Considerably improved language and cultural awareness to develop a greater understanding of emerging powers and how they may approach strategic choices.
- Persistent surveillance, including systems that can penetrate and loiter in denied or contested areas.
- The capability to deploy rapidly, assemble, command, project, reconstitute, and re-employ joint combat power from all domains to facilitate assured access.
- Prompt and high-volume global strike to deter aggression or coercion, and if deterrence fails, to provide a broader range of conventional response options to the President. This will require broader authorities from the Congress.
- Secure broadband communications into denied or contested areas to support penetrating surveillance and strike systems.
- Integrated defenses against short-, intermediate-, and intercontinental-range ballistic and cruise missile systems.
- Air dominance capabilities to defeat advanced threats.
- Undersea warfare capabilities to exploit stealth

and enhance deterrence.

- Capabilities to shape and defend cyberspace.
- Joint command and control capabilities that are survivable in the face of WMD-, electronic-, or cyber-attacks.

### Preventing the Acquisition or Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

During the Cold War, the main challenge facing the United States was deterring the former Soviet Union from using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the United States and its allies. Today, the United States faces a greater danger from an expanding number of hostile regimes and terrorist groups that seek to acquire and use WMD. These actors may not respond to traditional tools and concepts of deterrence.

A number of potentially hostile states possess or seek weapons of mass destruction. For these states, WMD – particularly nuclear weapons – provide the means to assert regional hegemony and intimidate others. They may brandish nuclear, chemical and biological weapons to ensure regime survival, deny the United States access to critical areas, or deter others from taking action against them. Even when they do not pose a direct military threat to the United States, these states may threaten the United States or its allies indirectly by transferring weapons or expertise to terrorists. North Korea has pursued nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and has developed and sold weapons, including long-range missiles, to other states of concern.

Iran's pursuit of nuclear capabilities, support for terrorism, and threatening statements about regional neighbors raise similar concerns about its intentions. Iran is rapidly developing long-range delivery systems and a full nuclear fuel cycle that would enable it to produce nuclear weapons.

*"Israel must be wiped off the map. And God willing, with the force of God behind it, we shall soon experience a world without the United States and Zionism."*  
Iranian President Ahmadinejad, October 2005

In the event of a conflict, WMD-armed states could use their weapons against the United States or its allies preemptively, during conflict or to slow follow-on stabilization efforts. In some cases, states could have hundreds of suspect facilities and storage sites that would need to be secured, searched and remediated following the end of combat. Such operations could overwhelm stabilization efforts.

Several other WMD-armed states, although not necessarily hostile to the United States, could face the possibility of internal instability and loss of control over their weapons. The lack of effective governance in many parts of the world contributes to the WMD danger, providing opportunities for terrorist organizations to acquire or harbor WMD. The prospect that a nuclear-capable state may lose control of some of its weapons to terrorists is one of the greatest dangers the United States and its allies face.

Technological trends heighten the threat. Nuclear weapons, sophisticated and/or bio-engineered biological agents, and non-traditional

chemical agents – once the sole purview of large, complex state weapons programs – will be within reach of a growing number of actors in the coming decades. Technological advances and widely distributed technical information are making ever more dangerous weapons easier to produce. At the same time, expanded reliance on sophisticated electronic technologies by the United States, its allies and partners increases their vulnerability to the destructive effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) – the energy burst given off during a nuclear weapon explosion. The effect of a nuclear blast could be catastrophic to both military forces and the civilian population.

It is extremely difficult to collect reliable intelligence on WMD programs and activities, which are closely guarded secrets. The prevalence of dual-use technologies and legitimate civilian applications means nuclear, chemical and biological research efforts are easy to conceal and difficult to detect and monitor. Based on the demonstrated ease with which uncooperative states and non-state actors can conceal WMD programs and related activities, the United States, its allies and partners must expect further intelligence gaps and surprises.

It is in this environment that terrorists – including Osama bin Laden and his associates – seek to acquire these catastrophic weapons and technologies, preying on vulnerable governments, ungoverned territories and susceptible individuals. They benefit from determined proliferators and criminal enterprises that seek to traffic in catastrophic technologies and that continue to aid and abet them.

*Posted Monday, January 11, 1999*

*TIME Reporter: "The U.S. says you are trying to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons."*

*Osama bin Laden: "Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims."*

The principal objective of the United States is to prevent hostile states or non-state actors from acquiring WMD. This involves diplomatic and economic measures, but it can also involve active measures and the use of military force to deny access to materials, interdict transfers, and disrupt production programs. For example, in October 2003, German and Italian authorities, acting under the framework of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and based on information provided by the United States, stopped a shipment of advanced centrifuge parts bound for Libya's nuclear program. Two months after confronting Libyan officials with this new evidence of an active and illegal nuclear program, Libya voluntarily agreed to end its WMD and long-range missile programs. Yet despite such successes, additional states and some terrorist organizations may nevertheless acquire WMD in the coming years.

To address such threats, the United States must be prepared to deter attacks; locate, tag and track WMD materials; act in cases where a state that possesses WMD loses control of its weapons, especially nuclear devices; detect WMD across

all domains; sustain operations even while under WMD attack; help mitigate the consequences of WMD attacks at home or overseas; and eliminate WMD materials in peacetime, during combat, and after conflicts. National efforts to counter the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction must incorporate both preventive and responsive dimensions.

**Preventive Dimension:** The United States seeks to build and expand global partnerships aimed at preventing proliferation; stopping WMD-related trafficking; helping friendly governments improve controls over existing weapons, materials and expertise; and discrediting weapons of mass destruction as instruments of national power. Improving the ability to detect, identify, locate, tag and track key WMD assets and development infrastructure in hostile or denied areas and to interdict WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials in transit are essential to this approach. In addition, the United States must improve its ability to identify and penetrate criminal networks bent on profiting from the proliferation of such dangerous weapons and

expertise. Multinational efforts such as PSI provide a model to expand global cooperation to prevent proliferation.

**Responsive Dimension:** If prevention efforts fail, the United States must be prepared to respond. An effective response requires that the United States use all elements of national power, working with like-minded nations, to locate, secure, and destroy WMD. The United States will use peaceful and cooperative means whenever possible, but will employ force when necessary. This will require growing emphasis on WMD elimination operations that locate, characterize, secure, disable and/or destroy a state or non-state actor's WMD capabilities and programs in a hostile or uncertain environment. The Military Departments will organize, train and equip joint forces for this increasingly important mission.

There are two particularly difficult operational and technical challenges associated with WMD elimination: detecting fissile material and rendering safe nuclear, chemical and biological devices. This requires the ability to locate, tag and track fissile materials rapidly, including in denied areas, and to deploy specialized teams trained to render safe nuclear weapons quickly anywhere in the world.

Finally, if a WMD attack cannot be prevented, the Department must be prepared to respond to requests to help mitigate the effects of the attack at the earliest opportunity, initiate or support ongoing consequence management efforts, and actively support local, state, Federal and allied and partner authorities. To ensure that its responses



Photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class Aaron Peterson, U.S. Navy

U.S. and Pakistani sailors prepare to conduct boardings in a simulated maritime interdiction operation. In 2003, international cooperation led to the interdiction of a shipment of centrifuge parts to Libya. This action, combined with Pakistani arrests of A.Q. Khan network affiliates, helped to successfully shut down the sophisticated black market network.

to the new WMD threat are considered both credible and legitimate, the United States will work closely with its partners, allies, and other members of the international community.

Consistent with this approach, preventing state or non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD highlights the need for the following types of capabilities:

- Special operations forces to locate, characterize and secure WMD.
- Capabilities to locate, tag and track WMD, their delivery systems and related materials, including the means to move such items.
- Capabilities to detect fissile materials such as nuclear devices at stand-off ranges.
- Interdiction capabilities to stop air, maritime, and ground shipments of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials.
- Persistent surveillance over wide areas to locate WMD capabilities or hostile forces.
- Human intelligence, language skills and cultural awareness to understand better the intentions and motivations of potential adversaries and to speed recovery efforts.
- Capabilities and specialized teams to render safe and secure WMD.
- Non-lethal weapons to secure WMD sites so that materials cannot be removed.
- Joint command and control tailored for the

WMD elimination mission.

- The capability to deploy, sustain, protect, support and re-deploy special operations forces in hostile environments.
- The capability to shield critical and vulnerable systems and technologies from the catastrophic effects of EMP.




Photo by Staff Sergeant Quinton T. Bourke, U.S. Air Force.

A U.S. Navy Hospital Corpsman (left) and Department of Defense Civilian Equipment Specialist (right) discuss assembling a Chemical Biological Protective Shelter during a training session at Camp Coyote, Kuwait. The Department leverages expertise in all elements of the Total Force to conduct operations.

### Refining the Department's Force Planning Construct for Wartime

The four focus areas informed the Department's review of the guidance for sizing and shaping the U.S. Armed Forces. This guidance is commonly referred to as the Department's Force Planning Construct. Such guidance informs the analysis that provides a guide to determine both the appropriate size of the force (capacity), as well as the types of capabilities (forces and equipment) needed across a range of scenarios.

The 2001 QDR led the Department to direct the military to organize, train and equip sufficient forces to defend the U.S. homeland; operate in and from four forward regions; “swiftly defeat” adversaries in two overlapping military campaigns while preserving for the President the option to “win decisively” one of those campaigns; and conduct a limited number of lesser military and humanitarian contingencies.

During this QDR, senior leaders confirmed the importance of the main elements of that Force Planning Construct: maintaining the ability to defend the U.S. homeland; continuing to operate in and from forward areas; and above all, the importance of maintaining capabilities and forces to wage multiple campaigns in an overlapping time frame – for which there may be little or no warning of attack. This latter capability in particular remains a strong deterrent against opportunistic aggression or attempted coercion. At the same time, lessons learned from recent operations suggest the need for some refinement of the construct to take better account of wartime demands:

- The Department’s homeland defense responsibilities should be more clearly distinguished from the responsibilities of other agencies.
- U.S. forces must continue to operate in forward areas, but operational demands over the past four years demonstrate the need to operate around the globe and not only in and from the four regions called out in the 2001 QDR (Europe, the Middle East, the Asian Littoral, and Northeast Asia).

- In the post-September 11 world, irregular warfare has emerged as the dominant form of warfare confronting the United States, its allies and its partners; accordingly, guidance must account for distributed, long-duration operations, including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction operations.
- For the foreseeable future, steady-state operations, including operations as part of a long war against terrorist networks, and associated rotation base and sustainment requirements, will be the main determinant for sizing U.S. forces.
- Consistent with the QDR’s emphasis on prevention, guidance must place greater emphasis on forces and capabilities needed for deterrence and other peacetime shaping activities.
- Finally, operational end-states defined in terms of “swiftly defeating” or “winning decisively” against adversaries may be less useful for some types of operations U.S. forces may be directed to conduct, such as supporting civil authorities to manage the consequences of catastrophic, mass casualty events at home, or conducting a long-duration, irregular warfare campaign against enemies employing asymmetric tactics.

Based on these considerations, the Department has refined its Force Planning Construct, dividing its activities into three objective areas: Homeland Defense, War on Terror / Irregular (Asymmetric) Warfare and Conventional Campaigns. In




Photo by Photographer's Mate and  
Crewmember, U.S. Navy.

Photo by Technical Sergeant  
Amp Durango, U.S. Air Force.

Photo by Major Sergeant Val  
Gomez, U.S. Air Force.

U.S. military forces are deployed around the globe conducting operations in accordance with the Force Planning Construct refined for wartime. The amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima sits pier-side in New Orleans, Louisiana, in support of Hurricane Katrina humanitarian assistance operations. U.S. Army soldiers and U.S. Marines look for weapons caches and insurgents near the Syrian border in Iraq. A B-2 Spirit bomber soars during a deployment to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, as part of a rotation that has provided U.S. Pacific Command a continuous bomber presence in the Asia-Pacific region. (photos top to bottom)

all cases, the Department should increase its capabilities to conduct operations against enemies who employ asymmetric approaches. This refined Force Planning Construct for wartime describes the relative level of effort the Department should devote to each of the three objective areas. In

each area, it accounts both for activities that the Department conducts continuously (steady-state) as well as those it conducts episodically (surge). In addition to normal force generation, sustainment and training activities, this wartime force planning construct calls for U.S. forces to be able to:

#### Defend the Homeland

- Steady-state – detect, deter, and if necessary, defeat external threats to the U.S. homeland, and enable partners to contribute to U.S. national security. Examples of such activities include: routine homeland security training and exercises with other Federal agencies and state and local governments; strategic deterrence; routine maritime operations conducted with the U.S. Coast Guard; North American air defense, including air sovereignty operations; missile defense; and readiness to provide support to civil authorities for consequence management events.
- Surge – contribute to the nation's response to and management of the consequences of WMD attacks or a catastrophic event, such as Hurricane Katrina, and also to raise the level of defense responsiveness in all domains (e.g., air, land, maritime, space and cyberspace) if directed.

#### Prevail in the War on Terror and Conduct Irregular Operations


- Steady-state – deter and defend against external transnational terrorist attacks, enable partners through integrated security

cooperation programs, and conduct multiple, globally distributed irregular operations of varying duration. Employ general purpose forces continuously to interact with allies, build partner capability, conduct long-duration counterinsurgency operations and deter aggressors through forward presence.

- **Surge** – conduct a large-scale, potentially long-duration irregular warfare campaign including counterinsurgency and security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations. An example of an irregular surge campaign would be the current level of effort associated with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Conduct and Win Conventional Campaigns

- **Steady-state** – deter inter-state coercion or aggression through forward deployed forces, enable partners through theater security cooperation, and conduct presence missions. These activities include day-to-day presence missions, military-to-military exchanges, combined exercises, security cooperation activities and normal increases in readiness during the seasonal exercises of potential adversaries.
- **Surge** – wage two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns (or one conventional campaign if already engaged in a large-scale, long-duration irregular campaign), while selectively reinforcing deterrence against opportunistic acts of aggression. Be prepared in one of the two campaigns to remove a hostile regime, destroy its military capacity and set conditions for the transition to, or for the restoration of, civil society.



This refined force planning construct for wartime will be used in lieu of the force planning guidance published in the March 2005 *National Defense Strategy*. The Department will use this construct as the basis for future analysis of needed capabilities and forces.

In conducting follow-on analyses and assessments to determine more fully the implications of this guidance, U.S. operational and force planning will consider a somewhat higher level of contributions from international allies and partners, as well as other Federal agencies, in surge operations ranging from homeland defense to irregular warfare and conventional campaigns. This assumption is consistent with the increased level of security cooperation and other activities to enable partners as required by the refined Force Planning Construct. The construct also acknowledges that policy decisions, such as mobilization policies and war aims, may change over time and have implications for the shape and size of U.S. forces. Finally, as part of a process of continuous reassessment and improvement,

this wartime construct will be further developed over time to differentiate among the Military Departments as to how they should best size and shape their unique force structures, for use by the Combatant Commanders, since all parts of the construct do not apply equally to all capability portfolios.

## REORIENTING CAPABILITIES AND FORCES

During the QDR, the senior leadership of the Department considered potential adjustments to capabilities and forces in light of the four focus areas and refined Force Planning Construct. They identified desired future force characteristics prior to developing proposals for the following capability portfolios: joint ground; special operations forces; joint air; joint maritime; tailored deterrence; combating WMD; joint mobility; ISR and space capabilities; net-centricity; and joint command and control. As part of a process of continuous change, the Department's capabilities and forces will be reoriented over time to reflect these desired characteristics.

This reorientation builds upon transformational changes already underway, shifting the joint force: from dependence on large, permanent overseas garrisons toward expeditionary operations utilizing more austere bases abroad; from focusing primarily on traditional combat operations toward greater capability to deal with asymmetric challenges; from deconflicting joint operations to integrated and even interdependent operations – all while massing the cumulative power of joint forces to achieve synergistic effects.

Insights derived from a series of complementary analyses, including the Mobility Capabilities Study and the Joint Staff's Operational Availability (OA) Studies, informed capability portfolio development. The Operational Availability series

of studies is a four-year ongoing joint analytical effort to assess force capabilities and capacities to meet the priorities of the *National Defense Strategy*. These analyses helped to identify the Department's progress in each capability portfolio since 2001, gaps in capabilities needed to realize the future force vision, insights about potential excess capacity, and future opportunities for investment. For example, Operational Availability assessed the availability of forces prior to, during and following major combat operations, as well as to meet routine missions and the increased demands of the long war. It revealed shortfalls in capabilities for special operations forces and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, among other capabilities.

Based on the Operational Availability analysis, other related assessments, and extensive senior leader discussions, the Department concluded that the size of today's forces – both the Active and Reserve Components across all four Military Departments – is appropriate to meet current and projected operational demands. At the same time, these analyses highlighted the need to continue re-balancing the mix of joint capabilities and forces. This chapter summarizes recommended changes in the mix of capabilities and the Department's resource priorities. The President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2007 reflects the QDR's "leading edge" priorities to change the mix of capabilities in key areas. The full budgetary and programmatic implications of the QDR will be reflected in the upcoming budget cycle.

### Joint Ground Forces

**Vision.** Joint ground forces will continue to take on more of the tasks performed by today's special operations forces. The result will be a new breed of warrior able to move more easily between disparate mission sets while preserving their depth of skill in primary specialties. Future warriors will be as proficient in irregular operations, including counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, as they are today in high-intensity combat. They will be modular in structure at all levels, largely self-sustaining, and capable of operating both in traditional formations as well as disaggregating into smaller, autonomous units. They will be able to sustain long-duration irregular operations, while exploiting reach-back to non-deployed elements of the force. They will understand foreign cultures and societies and possess the ability to train, mentor and advise foreign security forces and conduct counterinsurgency campaigns. They will have increased capabilities to conduct time-sensitive operations, by fusing intelligence and operations at the tactical level and with larger numbers of Joint Tactical Air Controllers to achieve a higher level of joint ground-air integration.




Photo by Staff Sergeant Lance L. Hayter Jr., U.S. Air Force

U.S. Army soldiers conduct a patrol in Mosul, Iraq, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Their Stryker vehicles enable them to maneuver rapidly in both urban environments and open terrain.

**Progress to Date.** Consistent with these future force characteristics, the Army is significantly expanding its capabilities and capacity for the full range of military operations, including irregular warfare and support to security, stability and transition operations. It is reorganizing its combat and support forces into modular brigade-based units – including brigade combat teams (BCTs) and the support brigades to sustain them – to increase breadth and depth for the long war. They are increasing their proficiency in irregular warfare, thereby freeing up some special operations forces for more complex tasks. Tactical and operational headquarters have been redesigned to support geographically distributed brigade operations and provide joint command and control. In 2004, the Army terminated the Comanche helicopter program and reallocated funds to reinvigorate its aviation capabilities, including unmanned aerial vehicles. The restructured Future Combat Systems (FCS) program is accelerating “spin-outs” of advanced capabilities into the new Army modular forces, as well as for U.S. SOCOM and the Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps has increased both its capacity and its capability to conduct irregular warfare. Since 2001, the Marine Corps has realigned its force structure to address lessons learned in recent operations, resulting in a 12% increase in infantry capacity and related intelligence support to infantry units, an additional Active Component rotary wing aircraft squadron, a 25% increase in light armor units, a 38% increase in reconnaissance capacity, 50% more Joint Fire Liaison Teams and a 30% increase in reserve intelligence structure. It has also established Foreign Military Training

Units to train indigenous forces worldwide. This rebalancing has increased potential Marine Corps contributions, especially for preventive actions and irregular warfare operations. Additionally, the Marine Corps has increased the capability of the individual Marine to conduct distributed operations, providing the Combatant Commanders an expeditionary force able to conduct “low-end” SOF missions as well as traditional operations.

**QDR Decisions.** To achieve future joint ground force characteristics and build on progress to date, the Department will:

- Continue to rebalance capabilities by creating modular brigades in all three Army components: 117 in the Regular Army (42 BCTs and 75 support brigades); 106 in the Army National Guard (28 BCTs and 78 support brigades); and 58 support brigades in the U.S. Army Reserve. This equates to a 46 percent increase in readily available combat power and a better balance between combat and support forces.
- Transform Army units and headquarters to modular designs.
- Incorporate FCS improvements into the modular force through a spiral development effort that will introduce new technologies as they are developed.
- Expand the Air Force Joint Tactical Air Control program by jointly training personnel for air/ground operations and use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.




Photo by: U.S. Air Force  
E. Country IV, U.S. Air Force



Photo by: The United States  
Army, Daraway, U.S. Air Force

The small, tactical Raven unmanned aerial vehicle is an example of UAVs being employed by ground forces to provide persistent, remote surveillance and reconnaissance for U.S. forces beyond their line of sight. This Raven pictured at bottom is used to identify and deter the placement of improvised explosive devices on Route Trans-Am, Iraq.


- Stabilize the Army's end strength at 482,400 Active and 533,000 Reserve Component personnel by Fiscal Year 2011.
- Stabilize the Marine Corps' end strength at 175,000 Active and 39,000 Reserve Component personnel by Fiscal Year 2011.

### Special Operations Forces (SOF)

**Vision.** The future special operations force will be rapidly deployable, agile, flexible and tailorable to perform the most demanding

and sensitive missions worldwide. As general purpose joint ground forces take on tasks that Special Operations Forces (SOF) currently perform, SOF will increase their capacity to perform more demanding and specialized tasks, especially long-duration, indirect and clandestine operations in politically sensitive environments and denied areas. For direct action, they will possess an expanded organic ability to locate, tag and track dangerous individuals and other high-value targets globally. SOF will also have greater capacity to detect, locate and render safe WMD. For unconventional warfare and training foreign forces, future SOF will have the capacity to operate in dozens of countries simultaneously. SOF will have increased ability to train and work with partners, employ surrogates, operate clandestinely and sustain a larger posture with lower visibility. SOF will sustain current language and cultural skills while increasing regional proficiency specific to key geographic operational areas: the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Longer duration operations will emphasize building personal relationships with foreign military and security forces and other indigenous assets to achieve common objectives.

Progress to Date. There have been impressive gains in SOF capabilities since 2001, supported by an 81% increase in the baseline budget. This increase is consistent with U.S. SOCOM's designation as the lead Combatant Command for planning, synchronizing and executing global operations against terrorist networks as specified in the 2004 Unified Command Plan. Supplemental appropriations of \$5.5 billion



The AC-130 gunship's primary missions are close air support, air interdiction and force protection. The ability to call on direct fire power from the air by joint forces on the ground gives SOF a unique edge in urban and rural environments.

between Fiscal Years 2002 and 2006 contributed to improvements in dedicated SOF intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), organic human intelligence and technical capabilities. The Army Special Forces (SF) School increased its training throughput from 282 new active duty enlisted Special Forces personnel in 2001 to 617 new personnel in 2005 – the equivalent of an additional SF Battalion each year – with a further goal of increasing to 750 students per year. The demands of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have also led to a dramatic improvement in SOF's unconventional warfare capabilities and skills.

QDR Decisions. To achieve the future force characteristics for SOF and build on progress to date, the Department will:

- Further increase SOF capability and capacity to conduct low-visibility, persistent presence missions and a global unconventional warfare campaign.
- Increase (starting in Fiscal Year 2007) active duty Special Forces Battalions by one-third.

- Expand Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units by 3,500 personnel (33% increase) to provide increased support for SOF and the Army's modular forces.
- Establish a Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) composed of 2,600 Marines and Navy personnel to train foreign military units and conduct direct action and special reconnaissance.
- Increase SEAL Team force levels to conduct direct action missions.
- Establish a SOF unmanned aerial vehicle squadron to provide organic capabilities to locate and target enemy capabilities in denied or contested areas.
- Enhance capabilities to support SOF insertion and extraction into denied areas from strategic distances.

Photo by Chief Photographer's Mate Andrew A. Kozicki, USN, Navy.



A member of U.S. Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Delivery Vehicle Team prepares to launch on a training exercise from the deck of the submarine USS Philadelphia. The vehicles are one method of insertion and extraction of Special Operations Forces.

### Joint Air Capabilities

**Vision.** Joint air capabilities must be reoriented to favor, where appropriate, systems that have far

greater range and persistence; larger and more flexible payloads for surveillance or strike; and the ability to penetrate and sustain operations in denied areas. The future force will place a premium on capabilities that are responsive and survivable. It will be able to destroy moving targets in all weather conditions, exploit non-traditional intelligence and conduct next-generation electronic warfare. Joint air forces will be capable of rapidly and simultaneously locating and attacking thousands of fixed and mobile targets at global ranges. The future force will exploit stealth and advanced electronic warfare capabilities when and where they are needed. Maritime aviation will include unmanned aircraft for both surveillance and strike. Joint air capabilities will achieve a greater level of air-ground integration.

**Progress to Date.** Consistent with these future force characteristics, the Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) concept has matured over the last four years, increasing personnel available for deployment by 20% (51,000). The Air Force Battlefield Airman concept has improved combat training to increase joint air-ground integration for directing air strikes in support of ground forces during conventional and irregular warfare operations. Since 2001, Air Force Joint Tactical Attack Controllers (JTACs), many attached to SOF units, have directed over 85% of air strikes in Afghanistan. The Air Force is optimizing Reserve Component personnel for new missions that can be performed from the United States, including unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations and ISR reach-back, leveraging the core competencies of the reserves while reducing stress on the force.

Since 2002, the Navy and Marine Corps have integrated their tactical aircraft programs to reduce excess capacity and provide equal or greater combat capability with fewer resources. The Navy and Marine Corps have integrated their tactical aircraft squadrons within a common scheduling process to address their air requirements, achieving greater operational gains. Their integration cut potential costs by approximately \$35 billion and reduced future Department of the Navy procurement by nearly 500 tactical aircraft.

The Department is continuing to reconfigure its strategic bomber fleet for enhanced conventional long-range strike missions. Satellite communications now permit the near instantaneous re-targeting of bombers and cruise missiles in flight. The integration of smart standoff weapons keeps older systems like the B-52 relevant in the modern, high-threat battlespace. New weapons provide increased capacity: the new 500-pound Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) gives a single B-2 the ability to strike 80 separate targets, with precision, in all




Photo by Senior Airman Brian Ferguson, U.S. Air Force.

A B-52 Stratofortress drops live ordnance over the Nevada Test and Training Range during a firepower demonstration. In its fifth decade of service, B-52s continue to provide long-range strike capability to the joint force. The B-52 continues to be upgraded to provide new capabilities, including close air support to U.S. and partner ground forces, through the use of precision strike weapons.

weather. The Air Force has set a goal of increasing its long-range strike capabilities by 50% and the penetrating component of long-range strike by a factor of five by 2025. Approximately 45% of the future long-range strike force will be unmanned. The capacity for joint air forces to conduct global conventional strikes against time-sensitive targets will also be increased.

**QDR Decisions.** To achieve the future joint force characteristics and build on progress to date, the Department plans to:


- Develop a new land-based, penetrating long-range strike capability to be fielded by 2018 while modernizing the current bomber force.
- Reduce the B-52 force to 56 aircraft and use savings to fully modernize B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s to support global strike operations.
- Restructure the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) program and develop an unmanned longer-range carrier-based aircraft capable of being air-refueled to provide greater standoff capability, to expand payload and launch options, and to increase naval reach and persistence.
- Nearly double UAV coverage capacity by accelerating the acquisition of Predator UAVs and Global Hawk.
- Restructure the F-22A program and extend production through Fiscal Year 2010 with a multi-year acquisition contract, to ensure the Department does not have a gap in 5<sup>th</sup> generation stealth capabilities.



Navy and Marine Corps fleet forces. Applying distributed operating concepts, the Navy increased the number of available independent strike groups from 19 to 36. The Fleet Response Plan (FRP) modified the Navy's tiered readiness posture to increase the amount of time a ship or other naval unit is fully ready to deploy. The FRP produces adaptable force packages and sustains higher readiness throughout a unit's operational cycle, decreasing the Fleet's down time and enabling immediate deployment of six of the Navy's eleven carrier strike groups, with the addition of two more within 90 days. Rotational crewing has further increased the operational availability of forces by up to 33%.

The Navy is rapidly developing and fielding the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to provide an advanced littoral warfare capability. The Coast Guard is recapitalizing its deepwater ships and improving its ability to conduct joint operations with the Navy. In 2003, the Navy began converting four of the oldest nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to guided missile and special operations platforms. The four submarines will re-enter service by September 2007. Modifications will allow embarked Special Operations Force (SOF) personnel to penetrate denied areas to locate high-value individuals, designate targets for precision strike, or conduct direct action missions. Each submarine will also carry more than 150 Tomahawk cruise missiles.

**QDR Decisions.** To achieve the future joint maritime force characteristics and build on progress to date, the Department will:



The USS Florida is underway in the Atlantic Ocean. A port security Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) is underway off the starboard side. The USS Florida is one of four submarines being converted to a guided missile and special operations platform.

Photo by James S. Deament, 3rd Class, U.S. Marine Corps, Navy

- Build a larger fleet that includes 11 Carrier Strike Groups, balance the need to transform and recapitalize the fleet, improve affordability and provide stability for the shipbuilding industry.
- Accelerate procurement of Littoral Combat Ships to provide power projection capabilities in littoral waters.
- Procure the first eight ships of the Maritime Pre-Position Force (Future) to improve the Department's ability to operate in restricted access environments.
- Provide a Navy riverine capability for river patrol, interdiction and tactical troop movement on inland waterways.
- Build partner capacity to improve global maritime security by reinvigorating the Navy Foreign Area Officer program and procuring Disaster Relief Command and Control fly-away communication support capabilities.
- Return to a steady-state production rate of two attack submarines per year not later than 2012 while achieving an average per-hull procurement cost objective of \$2.0 billion.

### Tailored Deterrence / New Triad

Vision. The Department is continuing its shift from a “one size fits all” notion of deterrence toward more tailorable approaches appropriate for advanced military competitors, regional WMD states, as well as non-state terrorist networks. The future force will provide a fully balanced, tailored capability to deter both state and non-state threats – including WMD employment, terrorist attacks in the physical and information domains, and opportunistic aggression – while assuring allies and dissuading potential competitors. Consistent with the New Triad priorities developed during the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the force will include a wider range of non-kinetic and conventional strike capabilities, while maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent, which remains a keystone of U.S. national power. The force will also include integrated ballistic and cruise missile defenses, and a responsive infrastructure. These capabilities will be supported by a robust and responsive National Command and Control System, advanced intelligence, adaptive planning systems and an ability to maintain access to validated, high-quality information for timely situational awareness. Non-kinetic capabilities will be able to achieve some effects that currently require kinetic weapons. The Department will fight with and against computer networks as it would other weapon systems. For prompt global strike, capabilities will be available to attack fixed, hard and deeply buried, mobile and re-locatable targets with improved accuracy anywhere in the world promptly upon the President’s order. Nuclear weapons will be accurate, safe and

reliable, and tailored to meet modern deterrence requirements.


Progress to Date. Consistent with these future force characteristics, the Department has retired the Peacekeeper ICBM, removed four ballistic missile submarines from strategic nuclear service, and removed hundreds of warheads from deployed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Department has fielded and deployed new conventional precision-guided munitions, including the conventionally armed Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile and improved Tactical Tomahawk cruise missile, which can hold at risk targets that might have required nuclear forces in the past. Ballistic missile defenses have begun limited operations to defend against a range of potential threats as system development, testing, and fielding continue. In late 2004, the Navy began limited defensive operations in the Sea of Japan to identify and track ballistic missile launches aimed at the United States or its allies. U.S. efforts to expand international missile defense cooperation have also seen success. For example, the United States and Japan recently agreed in principle to cooperate in the area of missile defense through the joint development of an advanced SM-3 sea-based interceptor. The Department is working with the Department of Energy to assess the feasibility and cost of the Reliable Replacement Warhead and, if warranted, begin development of that system. This system could enable reductions in the number of older, non-deployed warheads maintained as a hedge against reliability problems in deployed systems, and assist in the evolution to a smaller and more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure.

The U.S. Strategic Command (U.S. STRATCOM) has been assigned a number of new missions, including global strike; integration of global missile defense; space operations; integration of command, control, communications and intelligence; and combating WMD. In the information domain, the Department assigned U.S. STRATCOM responsibility for global network operations. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks & Information Integration (the Department of Defense's Chief Information Officer) in coordination with U.S. STRATCOM, has developed a defense-in-depth strategy for protecting the Department's computer networks. U.S. Joint Forces Command is developing an information operations evaluation capability to integrate computer network operations into warfighting activities more effectively, consistent

with its role as joint force integrator established by the Unified Command Plan of 2004.

QDR Decisions. To achieve the characteristics of the future joint force and build on progress to date, the Department will:

- Within two years, deploy an initial capability to deliver precision-guided conventional warheads using long-range Trident Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles.
- Reduce the number of deployed Minuteman III ballistic missiles from 500 to 450 beginning in Fiscal Year 2007.
- Retire four E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) aircraft and accelerate procurement of two C-32 aircraft with state-of-the-art mission suites as replacement aircraft.
- Upgrade E-6B TACAMO command and control aircraft to sustain a survivable airborne link to strategic nuclear forces and provide an airborne cellular base station for domestic catastrophic events.
- Retire the U.S. STRATCOM Mobile Consolidated Command Center in Fiscal Year 2007, while funding a new distributed ground-based communications system to provide survivable and enduring command and control for nuclear forces starting in Fiscal Year 2007.
- Make additional investments in information assurance capabilities to protect information and the Department's computer networks.



A Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) is launched from the Aegis cruiser USS Lake Erie as part of a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) test to defeat a medium range ballistic missile target.

- Strengthen coordination of defensive and offensive cyber missions across the Department.
- Leverage lessons learned from computer network attack and exploitation activities to improve network defense and adopt a defense-in-depth planning approach to protect information.
- Improve the Department's information sharing with other agencies and with international allies and partners by developing information protection policies and exploiting the latest commercial technologies.

### Combating WMD

**Vision.** The future force will be organized, trained, equipped, and resourced to deal with all aspects of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. It will have capabilities to: detect WMD, including fissile material at stand-off ranges; locate and characterize threats; interdict WMD and related shipments whether on land, at sea, or in the air; sustain operations under WMD attack; and render safe or otherwise eliminate WMD before, during or after a conflict. The Department will develop new defensive capabilities in anticipation of the continued evolution of WMD threats. Such threats include electro-magnetic pulse, man-portable nuclear devices, genetically engineered biological pathogens, and next generation chemical agents. The Department will be prepared to respond to and help other agencies to mitigate the consequences of WMD attacks.




Photo by Corporal Bryant V. Cox, U.S. Marine Corps.

Marines of the Decontamination Team from the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) responded to anthrax attacks in Washington, D.C. CBIRF teams have also been deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and are trained to manage a host of contingencies.

**Progress to Date.** Since the 2001 QDR, the Department has nearly doubled its investments in chemical and biological defenses and implemented several important organizational changes to address the challenges posed by WMD more effectively. For the next five years, beginning in Fiscal Year 2006, the Department is further increasing funding for the Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP) by an additional \$2.1 billion (an increase of approximately 20%), focused primarily on improving its research, development and testing infrastructure as well as expanding efforts to improve defenses against emerging chemical and biological threats. In 2004, the Department led the establishment of a National BioDefense Campus at Fort Detrick, Maryland – with the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).

and the Defense Intelligence Agency's Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) at its core – to improve cooperation among agencies conducting research and development of medical biological defenses.

In 2002, the United States led a NATO effort to establish the Alliance's multinational CBRN Defense Battalion, a unit that can provide rapidly deployable chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) detection, identification and hazard response support in the event of a WMD attack. This unique multinational unit became operational in July 2004. To date, more than seventeen NATO countries have contributed forces and capabilities to this battalion.

In 2003, the United States launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a multinational effort to interdict WMD proliferation-related shipments. Since then, more than 60 countries have begun participating in the initiative. In the past year, the United States and ten of its PSI partners have quietly cooperated on more than eleven successful WMD interdiction efforts. The Department has played a leading role in efforts to improve the operational capabilities of the United States and other PSI nations, with more than 40 countries having hosted and participated in 19 multinational PSI interdiction training exercises and gaming activities.

In 2005, the Secretary of Defense modified the Unified Command Plan by designating the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command as the lead Combatant Commander for integrating and synchronizing efforts to combat WMD.

This designation establishes for the first time a single focal point charged with integrating the Department's efforts for combating WMD in support of the geographic Combatant Commanders' operational requirements.

QDR Decisions. To achieve the characteristics of the future joint force and build on progress to date, the Department will:

- Designate the Defense Threat Reduction Agency as the primary Combat Support Agency for U.S. Strategic Command in its role as lead Combatant Commander for integrating and synchronizing combating WMD efforts.
- Expand the Army's 20th Support Command (CBRNE) capabilities to enable it to serve as a Joint Task Force capable of rapid deployment to command and control WMD elimination and site exploitation missions by 2007.
- Expand the number of U.S. forces with advanced technical render-safe skills and increase their speed of response. The Department will develop further recommendations to improve render-safe capabilities for the Fiscal Year 2008 budget.
- Improve and expand U.S. forces' capabilities to locate, track and tag shipments of WMD, missiles and related materials, including the transportation means used to move such items.
- Reallocate funding within the C.BDP to invest more than \$1.5 billion over the next five years

to develop broad-spectrum medical countermeasures against advanced bio-terror threats, including genetically engineered intracellular bacterial pathogens and hemorrhagic fevers.

The Department will conduct this last initiative in cooperation with partner agencies utilizing the National Biodefense Campus. After leading the initial effort, the Department will pass responsibility for further research to those agencies best suited to manage medical projects.

### Joint Mobility

**Vision.** Rapid global mobility is central to the effectiveness of the future force. The joint force will balance speed of deployment with desired warfighter effects to deliver the right capabilities at the right time and at the right place. Effectiveness of mobility forces will be measured not only by the quantity of material they move, but also by the operational effects they help to achieve. Mobility capabilities will be fully integrated across geographic theaters and between warfighting components and force providers, with response times measured in hours and days rather than weeks. They will enable the Department's move from a large institutional force to a future force that concentrates more operational capabilities at the front line. They will underpin the transition from a Cold War-era garrisoned force to a future force that is tailored for expeditionary operations. Future joint forces will increasingly use host-nation facilities with only a modest supporting U.S. presence, decreasing the need for traditional overseas main operating bases with large infrastructures and

reducing exposure to asymmetric threats. The U.S. overseas posture will include upgraded air support infrastructure, additional forward-deployed expeditionary maritime capabilities, long-range strike and ISR assets, and cutting-edge ground forces such as rotational Stryker units. The effective combination of seabasing, overseas presence, enhanced long-range strike, reach-back, and surge and prepositioned capabilities will reduce the forward footprint of the joint force.




Photo by Tech Sergeant Brian Gonzalez, U.S. Air Force.

U.S. Navy personnel provide perimeter security for a C-17A Globemaster III aircraft operating in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The operation marked the first successful airlift operation by C-17 aircraft into an undeveloped dirt landing strip.

**Progress to Date.** The Department's overseas posture plan and the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy informed QDR assessments of mobility priorities. In addition, the recommendations of the BRAC, now being implemented, will support overseas restructuring and the imperative of rapid power projection, with domestic basing that provides needed training infrastructure. BRAC changes will also promote joint and multi-Service basing in order to achieve economies of scale. Global mobility has made significant advances in the last decade. The Department has procured 140 of 180 contracted C-17 heavy-lift aircraft and 27 lighter

C-130Js. Both are being fielded with defensive countermeasure systems, improving their ability to operate in irregular warfare environments. The Department is also considering the acquisition of a future KC-X aircraft that will have defensive systems and provide significant cargo carrying capacity while supporting its aerial refueling mission. The U.S. Air Force is upgrading its C-5 aircraft with new engines and modernized avionics to improve fleet reliability and mission capability rates. The Department is pursuing the development of Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) and inter-theater high-speed sealift while maintaining sealift capabilities to support the needs of the future joint force.

**QDR Decisions.** In accordance with Section 131 of the Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the Department provides the following assessment of the inter-theater airlift capabilities:

- Extensive investments in cargo transportability, strategic lift, and prepositioned stocks over the past decade have yielded military forces capable of responding to a broad spectrum of security challenges worldwide.
- To maintain and enhance this capability, the Department must continue to recapitalize and modernize its mobility platforms, complete the C-17 multiyear contract, replenish prepositioned stocks consumed in recent operations, and proceed with C-5 modernization efforts. The Department plans to acquire and modernize a fleet of 292 inter-theater airlifters (180 C-17s and 112 modernized and reliability-enhanced C-5s). C-17 tooling will

be moved to offsite storage to preserve the option of procuring additional C-17s.

- In addition, the Department must continue to pursue enabling technologies for transformational logistics and innovative operational concepts such as seabasing.

The Department's Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) examined the mobility force structure needed to support the *National Defense Strategy*. Study participants included the Military Departments, the Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The study analyzed the deployment of forces to two overlapping major wars as outlined in the Joint Staff-led Operational Availability (OA) studies. It also examined concurrent demands on the mobility system associated with multiple homeland defense events and contingency operations in other theaters. Included in these latter activities are the demands associated with Special Operations Forces' worldwide operations. Additionally, both the OA studies and the MCS took into account alterations in the deployment of forces associated with the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy.

The MCS and OA studies assessed the capabilities provided by a combination of forward-deployed forces, prepositioned equipment, and forces deploying from the United States. The MCS found that programmed mobility forces were capable of deploying and sustaining combat forces called for in the scenarios. The simulation exploited the air transportability of modular brigade combat teams in support of Combatant Commanders'

needs. The swift employment of larger division-sized units relied upon a combination of airlift, fast sealift and prepositioned materiel. The study demonstrated the mobility system's ability to deploy these units on timelines consistent with the Combatant Commanders' needs, as well as to provide ongoing support to combat forces within the theater of operations.

To achieve the characteristics of the future joint mobility force and build on progress to date, the Department will also:

- Complete the C/KC-130 multi-year contract to procure an additional 18 Air Force C-130Js and 8 Marine Corps KC-130Js.
- Establish a joint program office for a new intra-theater light cargo aircraft for future expeditionary needs.
- Recapitalize the tanker fleet to ensure global mobility and power projection.

### **Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR)**

*Vision.* The ability of the future force to establish an "unblinking eye" over the battle-space through persistent surveillance will be key to conducting effective joint operations. Future capabilities in ISR, including those operating in space, will support operations against any target, day or night, in any weather, and in denied or contested areas. The aim is to integrate global awareness with local precision. Intelligence functions will be fully integrated with operations down to the tactical level, with far greater ability to reach back

to intelligence collection systems and analytic capabilities outside the theater. Supporting this vision will require an architecture that moves intelligence data collected in the theater to the users, rather than deploying users to the theater. Future ISR capabilities will be designed to collect information that will help decision-makers mitigate surprise and anticipate potential adversaries' actions. An essential part of the future ISR architecture is a robust missile warning capability.

The future force will define ISR needs by sensor or type of intelligence needed rather than the platforms that carry the sensors or the medium in which they operate. This approach will facilitate the substitution of one capability for another to achieve the same effect, and will allow the suppliers of sensor capability to meet the needs of Combatant Commanders more efficiently. This sensor-centric approach will also improve the ability to integrate data horizontally across sensor inputs, thereby ensuring that information is available on a timely basis to a much wider range of users. Future ISR systems will employ faster and more secure technical solutions to improve the automation, integration, analysis and distribution of information to operational forces.

The United States should continue to enjoy an advantage in space capabilities across all mission areas. This advantage will be maintained by staying at least one technology generation ahead of any foreign or commercial space power. The Department will continue to develop responsive space capabilities in order to keep

access to space unfettered, reliable and secure. Survivability of space capabilities will be assured by improving space situational awareness and protection, and through other space control measures. Penetrating airborne surveillance will complement space-based capabilities in order to focus on areas of interest in or near denied areas.

Progress to Date. Experience from recent operations, supported by the findings and recommendations in the 2001 QDR and a number of studies and commissions chartered by the Congress and the President – including those on national security space management, remote sensing, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism – have underscored the increasingly critical role that intelligence capabilities, including those in space, play in supporting military operations, policy and planning and acquisition decisions in the Department.

The Department has undertaken a number of organizational and operational changes, and has directed new or additional investments to increase intelligence and space capabilities and better manage the ISR resources available to the warfighter. The Department established the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to provide leadership, guidance and oversight of Defense Intelligence, Security and Counterintelligence to meet Combatant Commander requirements. It also created the Executive Agent for Space and implemented steps to meet the demand for space services, including intelligence, from defense and non-defense users.

The Department has implemented measures

to strengthen human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities, including steps to improve cultural and linguistic skills across the joint force. It is improving the integration of intelligence with operations as well as integration across intelligence disciplines (e.g., imagery, signals and human intelligence). In particular, the Department is establishing Joint Intelligence Operations Centers within the Combatant Commands and developing Intelligence Campaign Plans for all theaters. Under U.S. STRATCOM, the Department established a functional command to synchronize strategy and planning and integrate all national, theater and tactical ISR capabilities.



Photo by Specialist Johnny R. Aragon, U.S. Army


A U.S. military intelligence officer (middle) and Afghan military intelligence soldier (right) speak privately with the elder of a village (left) in the Shah Wali Ko District, Afghanistan. Coalition Forces are building capacity of indigenous forces, forging relationships with local leaders and preventing Taliban attempts to reestablish themselves in the area.

To manage more effectively the Department's intelligence resources, the Department has approved the creation of a Military Intelligence Program and is implementing an enhanced Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System to better compete for, develop and retain the professional intelligence workforce. The Department has increased the number of intelligence professionals working in collection and analytical disciplines to support growth in homeland defense and war on terror missions.

Combat Support Agencies have also relocated or deployed significant numbers of intelligence analysts, intelligence collectors and collection managers to areas where they can be of greatest value to their customers.

QDR Decisions. To achieve the future joint force characteristics and build on progress to date, the Department will:

- Improve both the capability and capacity of defense human intelligence assets to identify terrorists and characterize and penetrate their networks, in cooperation with other government agencies and international partners.
- Increase measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) capabilities to identify enemy WMD and their delivery systems, and to support other applications.
- Expand signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection with sufficient revisit rate and geo-location capabilities for military operations. The Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) program will be restructured as the Department explores a new tri-service solution to meet “multi-intelligence” requirements.
- Fund the U.S. contribution to establish a NATO Intelligence Fusion Center.
- Increase investment in unmanned aerial vehicles to provide more flexible capabilities to identify and track moving targets in denied areas.
- Realign capabilities to free up resources for next generation systems and modernize and sustain selected legacy systems (e.g., a new engine for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System).
- Implement a new imagery intelligence approach focused on achieving persistent collection capabilities in cooperation with the Director of National Intelligence. Investments in moving target indicator and synthetic aperture radar capabilities, including Space Radar, will grow to provide a highly persistent capability to identify and track moving ground targets in denied areas.



The Space Radar program (in development) will provide persistent, all-weather, day and night surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in denied areas for the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. (Artist's conception)

such as the space industrial base, space science and technology efforts, and the space professional cadre.

- Increase Maritime Domain Awareness through improved integration with interagency and international partners, and accelerated investment in multinational information sharing systems such as the Automatic Identification System and the Multinational Information Sharing System.

### Achieving Net-Centricity

**Vision.** Harnessing the power of information connectivity defines net-centricity. By enabling critical relationships between organizations and people, the Department is able to accelerate the speed of business processes, operational decision-making and subsequent actions. Recent operational experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the value of net-centric operations. Ground forces were able to reach back to remote UAV pilots in Nevada to direct UAVs in support of their operations, achieving a level of air-ground integration that was difficult to imagine just a decade ago. Such connectivity is helping joint forces gain greater situational awareness to attack the enemy.

Achieving the full potential of net-centricity requires viewing information as an enterprise asset to be shared and as a weapon system to be protected. As an enterprise asset, the collection and dissemination of information should be managed by portfolios of capabilities that cut across legacy stove-piped systems. These

capability portfolios would include network-based command and control, communications on the move and information fusion. Current and evolving threats highlight the need to design, operate and defend the network to ensure continuity of joint operations.

**Progress to Date.** The foundation for net-centric operations is the Global Information Grid (GIG), a globally interconnected, end-to-end set of trusted and protected information networks. The GIG optimizes the processes for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, managing and sharing information within the Department and with other partners. The Department has made steady progress implementing net-centric systems and concepts of operation. It has deployed an enhanced land-based network and new satellite constellation as part of the Transformational Communication Architecture to provide high-bandwidth, survivable internet protocol communications. Together, they will support battle-space awareness, time-sensitive targeting and communications on the move. Deployed



Photograph by Douglas M. Little, Airman  
Dennis A. Roberts, U.S. Navy

Air Traffic Controllers stand watch in the Carrier Air Traffic Control Center aboard the USS Nimitz. The collection and sharing of information such as that obtained by the USS Nimitz in support of Maritime Security Operations denies terrorists use of the maritime environment as a venue for attack or to transport personnel, weapons or other material.

terminals – from command and control (Joint Tactical Radio System) to very large bandwidth ISR systems – are extending the communications “backbone” down to the smallest tactical unit in the field. The Department has also implemented a data strategy enabling the fusion of information from any platform or terminal. Pulling all this together, the revised Unified Command Plan has assigned U.S. STRATCOM lead responsibility to operate and protect the Department’s Global Information Grid.

**QDR Decisions.** To move closer toward this vision and build on progress to date, the Department will:

- Strengthen its data strategy – including the development of common data lexicons, standards, organization, and categorization – to improve information sharing and information assurance, and extend it across a multitude of domains, ranging from intelligence to personnel systems.
- Increase investment to implement the GIG, defend and protect information and networks and focus research and development on its protection.
- Develop an information-sharing strategy to guide operations with Federal, state, local and coalition partners.
- Shift from Military Service-focused efforts toward a more Department-wide enterprise net-centric approach, including expansion of the Distributed Common Ground System.

- Restructure the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program to “spiral develop” its capabilities and re-phase launches accordingly, and add resources to increase space-based relay capacity.
- Develop an integrated approach to ensure alignment in the phasing and pacing of terminals and space vehicles.
- Develop a new bandwidth requirements model to determine optimal network size and capability to best support operational forces.




Photo by Scott Bergquist/Field Report, U.S. Air Force

The master air attack plan (MAAP) toolkit is an example of software tools that will improve accuracy and facilitate planning. The toolkit is designed to make production of the MAAP and subsequent air tasking order quicker and less prone to error.

### Joint Command and Control

**Vision.** The joint force of the future will have more robust and coherent joint command and control capabilities. Rapidly deployable, standing joint task force headquarters will be available to the Combatant Commanders in greater numbers to meet the range of potential contingencies. These headquarters will enable the real-time synthesis of operations and intelligence functions and processes, increasing joint force adaptability

and speed of action. The joint headquarters will have better information, processes and tools to design and conduct network-enabled operations with other agencies and with international partners. Implementation of Adaptive Planning in the Department will further enhance the lethality of both subordinate standing joint task force headquarters and their parent Combatant Commands by enabling them to produce high-quality, relevant plans in as little as six months. Adaptive Planning is the catalyst that will transform the Department's operational planning processes and systems. Furthermore, Global Force Management, the Department's model for force management, reporting and analysis systems model, will provide Commanders with an unprecedented depth of up-to-date and decision-quality information on unit readiness, personnel and equipment availability.

Progress to Date. Since 2001, the Department has made marked progress towards strengthening joint operations as a focus of defense transformation. The activation of standing joint task force headquarters has improved the ability of the force to respond to crises. With a "core element" – a standing command and control team with functional and geographic expertise – these headquarters provide peacetime planning capabilities for contingencies, a departure from past practices of implementing ad hoc approaches after crises occur. The first Standing Joint Force Headquarters (core element) was established in 2004 and has since deployed to Iraq, the Horn of Africa and to relief efforts associated with Hurricane Katrina and the Pakistani earthquake. The implementation of Global

Force Management, by integrating data on worldwide availability and readiness, allows the Department's leadership to source forces flexibly for operations, regardless of where they are located or what command they have traditionally supported.

QDR Decisions. To achieve the characteristics of the future joint force and build on progress to date, the Department will:

- Transform designated existing Service operational headquarters to fully functional and scalable Joint Command and Control Joint Task Force-capable Headquarters beginning in Fiscal Year 2007.
- Establish a second operationally ready and immediately deployable Standing Joint Force Headquarters core element at the U.S. Joint Forces Command consistent with its responsibilities as Joint Force Integrator under the 2004 Unified Command Plan.
- Automate and link key planning processes in a networked, virtual environment to enable real-time collaboration and rapid production of high-quality planning products.
- Implement Adaptive Planning across the Department by increasing the number of fully qualified planners, investing in advanced planning toolsets, and organizing planning staffs to exploit the advantages that new technology and highly trained, experienced planners provide.
- Increase resources to develop software, tactics,

techniques, procedures and other initiatives needed to support the Global Force Management System.

## RESHAPING THE DEFENSE ENTERPRISE

*Just as we must transform America's military capability to meet changing threats, we must transform the way the Department works and what it works on. We must build a Department where each of the dedicated people here can apply their immense talents to defend America, where they have the resources, information and freedom to perform... It demands agility—more than today's bureaucracy allows. And that means we must recognize another transformation: the revolution in management, technology and business practices. Successful modern businesses are leaner and less hierarchical than ever before. They reward innovation and they share information. They have to be nimble in the face of rapid change or they die.*

*Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense,  
September 10, 2001*

To win the long war, the Department of Defense must reshape the defense enterprise in ways that better support the warfighter and are appropriate for the threat environment. Today, the armed forces are hampered by inefficient business practices. The Department's current structure and processes are handicaps in the protracted fight we now face against agile and networked foes. Over the last twenty years, the Department has increasingly integrated its warfighting concepts, organization, training and operations to create the world's most formidable joint force. Sustaining continuous operational change and innovation are a hallmark of U.S. forces. The Department's organizations, processes and enabling authorities urgently require a similar

transformation. The Department's approach is to improve significantly organizational effectiveness, and in so doing, reap the rewards of improved efficiencies.

The 2001 QDR highlighted the loss of resources, in terms of people and dollars, caused by inefficiencies in the Department's support functions. The Department responded with a comprehensive effort to streamline business and decision-making processes, with the express goal of better supporting the joint warfighter. Since 2001, the Department has moved steadily toward a more integrated and transparent senior decision-making culture and process for both operational and investment matters. The Department has made substantial strides in fostering joint solutions, including the creation of new organizations and processes that cut across traditional stovepipes. It has standardized business rules and data structures for common use. Most importantly, the Department has made notable progress toward an outcome-oriented, capabilities-based planning approach that provides the joint warfighter with the capabilities needed to address a wider range of asymmetric challenges.

Recent operational experiences have demonstrated the need to bring further agility, flexibility and horizontal integration to the defense support infrastructure. The Department has responded to that need with several innovations in its organizations and support services. Three examples of such innovations are the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Task Force, the Joint Rapid Acquisition

Cell and improved supply-chain logistics.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the terrorist weapon of choice remains the improvised explosive device, normally taking the form of roadside bombs, suicide car bombs and a variety of remotely initiated devices. To counter the threat posed by these weapons, the Department created the Joint IED Defeat Task Force. The Task Force unified all Department efforts to defeat IEDs, combining the best technology solutions with relevant intelligence and innovative operating methods. In Fiscal Year 2005, the Department invested more than \$1.3 billion in IED Defeat initiatives, including counter-radio controlled IED electronic warfare, IED surveillance, the Joint IED Defeat Center of Excellence, counter-bomber programs and stand-off IED detection and neutralization. The Task Force has also provided funds for training to military units en route to operational theaters as well as expert field teams that work directly with units in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the Task Force's inception, the Department has decreased the IED casualty rate by a factor of two.



Photo by Technical Sergeant Russell E. Conley IV, U.S. Air Force.

A Talon 3B tracked robot waits for its next command after an improvised explosive device was detonated in Baghdad, Iraq. The increasing use of robotics has improved U.S. force protection significantly in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) is another innovation that grew out of U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department's standard processes for providing materiel and logistics proved too slow and cumbersome to meet the immediate needs of forces in the field. Recognizing this deficiency, the Secretary of Defense established a cell dedicated to finding actionable solutions to urgent warfighter needs. The JRAC has supported efforts that provided military personnel key force protection items such as the Advanced Combat Helmet, lightweight Global Positioning System receivers, improved ammunition packs and individual weapon optics. Working with the Military Departments and Combatant Commands, this initiative has accelerated development and delivery of more than a dozen critical programs, from intelligence collection and dissemination to enhanced force protection.

Improved support to the warfighter has occurred in the logistics chain as well. The Department vested leadership of the complex distribution process in a single owner, the U.S. Transportation Command (U.S. TRANSCOM). Exercising its new role, U.S. TRANSCOM established a Deployed Distribution Operations Center in Kuwait to speed the flow of materiel into Iraq and Afghanistan in support of coalition operations. The Center quickly assembled a team of logistics experts and gave them authority to direct air and seaport operations and cross-country moves in the theater. Lead times for stocked items dropped by more than 45% since the peaks recorded in 2003. Better synchronization of transportation assets allowed the Army to cut costs by \$268 million in

Fiscal Year 2004. On-time delivery rates are now at over 90%. The Center's process innovations improved mission performance at less cost to the Department and the American taxpayer.

Department reforms since 2001, including those innovations born of wartime necessity, represent the types of changes the QDR has sought to accelerate.

### Toward A New Defense Enterprise

The Department's enterprise reforms are guided by a three-part vision:

- First, the Department must be responsive to its stakeholders. Not only must the Department's support functions enhance the U.S. military's ability to serve the President and provide a strong voice for the joint warfighter, it must also provide the best possible value to the American taxpayer. The Department will work to improve effectiveness dramatically across civilian and military functions as the foundation for increased efficiency.
- Second, the Department must provide information and analysis necessary to make timely and well-reasoned decisions. The Department's culture, authorities, and organizations must be aligned in a manner that facilitates, rather than hinders, effective decision-making and enables responsive mission execution while maintaining accountability. Improved horizontal integration will be critical to the Department's success.
- Third, the Department must undertake

reforms to reduce redundancies and ensure the efficient flow of business processes. As we capitalize on existing transformational efforts across the enterprise, we will continually evaluate support systems and processes to optimize their responsiveness.

To achieve this vision and produce strategy-driven outcomes, the Department's roles and responsibilities, and those of each of its component organizations, must be clearly delineated. Roles and responsibilities within the Department of Defense fall into roughly three categories. At the senior-most levels, leaders are concerned with *governance* – setting strategy, prioritizing enterprise efforts, assigning responsibilities and authorities, allocating resources and communicating a shared vision. In order to meet the strategic objectives set out by the Department's senior leadership, some components act in a *management* role, focusing on organizing tasks, people, relationships and technology. The vast majority of the Department's personnel then *work* to execute the strategy and plans established at management level.

In the 2006 QDR, the Department looked across these three levels of responsibility – governance, management and work – to ensure that organizations, processes and authorities are well aligned.

### Governance Reforms

#### Senior Leadership Focus

A key measure of success is the extent to which the Department's senior leadership is able to

fulfill the following functions:

- Strategic Direction – Identify the key outputs – not inputs – they expect from the Department’s components and determine the appropriate near-, mid-, and long-term strategies for achieving them. Such outputs will be focused on the needs of the President as Commander in Chief and the joint warfighters.
- Identity – Establish an organizational culture that fosters innovation and excellence. Communicate the Department’s strategy, policy and institutional ethos to the internal workforce and to external audiences.
- Capital Acquisition and Macro Resource Allocation – Shape the Department’s major investments in people, equipment, concepts and organizations to support the Nation’s objectives most effectively.
- Corporate Decision Making – Implement agile and well-aligned governance, management and work processes. Ensure the Department has the processes, tools and transparent analyses to support decisions.
- Performance Assessment – Monitor performance to ensure strategic alignment and make adjustments to strategic direction based on performance.
- Force Employment – Determine how U.S. forces are utilized and meet the day-to-day oversight needs of the joint force. Operational matters are the responsibility of the joint warfighters. The Department’s senior civilian and military leaders ensure that forces

are employed in ways that meet the President’s strategic objectives.

The Department will work to better align processes, structures and, as necessary, authorities to improve its senior leaders’ ability to govern in these core areas. Today, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff perform many functions beyond those identified above, including program management and execution. To ensure that senior leadership can maintain focus on the key governance issues elaborated above, the Department will identify management and execution activities currently being conducted at the governance level and consider them for elimination or realignment.

#### Build Capability to Inform Strategic Choice

To better support the joint warfighter, the Department is launching several initiatives to integrate the processes that define needed capabilities, identify solutions and allocate resources to acquire them. The following four interrelated reforms emphasize the need for improved information-sharing and collaboration.

First, the Department will implement a more transparent, open and agile decision-making process. To do this, common authoritative information sources will be identified, Department-level financial databases will be combined, and common analytic methods will be adopted. For example, the Department is testing a number of tools that could provide common capability views using existing resource and programming databases. One such pilot project

is a transparent integrated air and missile defense database. Experimenting through such pilots, the Department will seek to identify and rapidly develop preferred capability area solutions that will facilitate open and agile decision-making.

Second, the Department will reach investment decisions through collaboration among the joint warfighter, acquisition and resource communities. Joint warfighters will assess needs in terms of desired effects and the time frame in which capabilities are required. Assessments of potential solutions should be informed by the acquisition community's judgment of technological feasibility and cost-per-increment of capability improvement, and by the resource community's assessment of affordability. These inputs will be provided early in the decision-making process, before significant resources are committed. Once an investment decision has been approved, changes will require collaboration among all three communities at the appropriate decision level to ensure strategy-driven, affordable and achievable outcomes.

A recent, much-needed restructuring of the troubled Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program exemplifies this collaborative approach. Because the radio system must be interoperable with other systems across the full spectrum of the joint force, decisions regarding the future of the JTRS program had profound effects throughout the Department. To ensure a solution that will meet the joint warfighter's needs and provide best value to the taxpayer, the warfighting and acquisition communities worked closely together to develop the investment strategy and

the Military Departments contributed needed resources for the restructuring.

Third, the Department will begin to break out its budget according to joint capability areas. Using such a joint capability view – in place of a Military Department or traditional budget category display – should improve the Department's understanding of the balancing of strategic risks and required capability trade-offs associated with particular decisions. The Department has already developed and tested at U.S. Pacific Command an automated process that maps resource needs to discrete operational plans and missions. For the first time, a Combatant Commander is able to ascertain the resource requirements associated with particular capabilities, such as striking fleeting targets. The Department is working to expand on this program to enable Department-wide assessment of capability areas and facilitate capability portfolio management and will explore this approach with the Congress.

Fourth, to manage the budget allocation process with accountability, an acquisition reform study initiated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense recommended the Department work with the Congress to establish "Capital Accounts" for Major Acquisition Programs. The purpose of capital budgeting is to provide stability in the budgeting system and to establish accountability for acquisition programs throughout the hierarchy of program responsibility from the program manager, through the Service Acquisition Executive, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.


Together, these improvements should enable senior leaders to implement a risk-informed investment strategy reflecting joint warfighting priorities.

#### Aligning Authority and Accountability through Joint Capability Portfolios

Most of the Department's resources are provided through the Military Services. This arrangement can lead both to gaps or redundancies within capability areas as each Service attempts to supply a complete warfighting package rather than organize to depend on capabilities provided by other Military Departments. To optimize the provision of capabilities for the joint warfighter, the Department will work to re-orient its processes around joint capability portfolios. In the acquisition realm, the Department has already instituted several joint capability reviews. These reviews look across major force programs to assess needed investments in specific capability portfolio areas such as integrated air and missile defense, land attack weapons and electronic warfare.

The QDR used such a portfolio approach to evaluate surveillance capabilities. The Department began by accounting for all of its current and planned surveillance capabilities and programs. This included a transparent review of capabilities at all levels of classification. Viewing capabilities across the entire portfolio of assets enabled decision-makers to make informed choices about how to reallocate resources among previously stove-piped programs, to deliver needed capabilities to the joint force more rapidly and efficiently.

The Department will build on these initial efforts to integrate tasks, people, relationships, technologies and associated resources more effectively across the Department's many activities. By shifting the focus from Service-specific programs to joint capabilities, the Department should be better positioned to understand the implications of investment and resource trade-offs among competing priorities. As a first step, the Department will manage three capability areas using a capability portfolio concept: Joint Command and Control, Joint Net-Centric Operations and Joint Space Operations. As we learn from experience and gain confidence in this approach, we plan to expand it to other capability areas.



DoD Photo

High Speed Vessel Two participated in a 2003 exercise with West African nations. The follow-on Joint High Speed Vehicle (J-HSV) is a joint experiment between the Navy, Marines, Army and Special Operations Command utilizing a modified high speed, lightweight commercial ferry produced in Australia for potential U.S. military usage. Future variants of the J-HSV will provide a capability to transport significant ground forces at high speeds into shallow water ports without modern unloading equipment.

#### Managing Joint Task Assignments

Effective governance is facilitated by the clear alignment of authority, responsibility and resources at the management level. Some of the most difficult challenges in governance

arise when joint management arrangements cut across the traditional and often statutory authority structure of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. The establishment of the Combatant Commands created new sources of demand for joint capabilities separate from the organizations with responsibility to supply them.

For example, when a program or mission is identified as a priority area, the Secretary may choose to direct an organization to manage or resource the joint effort for the Department. In the past, this has been accomplished by designating a component or activity as the “Executive Agent” – a term the meaning of which varies widely from one arrangement to the next. When the responsibilities for joint management activities are not clearly defined or strategically aligned, implementation is problematic and resources are used less efficiently.

This QDR underscores the need for a better way to organize and manage joint activities to ensure that mission assignment is accompanied by the authorities, resources and clear performance expectations necessary for mission success. Consequently, the Department is implementing a disciplined process for assigning joint missions and tasks and evaluating their resource priority. The Joint Task Assignment Process will centrally assign and oversee joint management arrangements to ensure joint activities are aligned to the Department’s strategic objectives; designated with the proper authorities, responsibilities and resources; effectively structured to minimize overlaps and gaps; established with clear lines of accountability; and

continually assessed for performance and need.

#### Driving Business Transformation

The Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) was established to improve governance of the Department’s business transformation effort. The DBSMC is a top-level, single point-of-decision mechanism that brings together senior leaders from across the enterprise to drive business process change and improve support to the joint warfighter. The Department also developed an Enterprise Transition Plan and associated Architecture to guide transformation of the Department’s business operations. The DBSMC will govern execution of the Enterprise Transition Plan by ensuring accountability and increasing senior leadership direction.

To ensure alignment with the business transformation strategy, the Department has created Investment Review Boards to evaluate programs of record against the Enterprise Architecture. Funds cannot be obligated for any business system investment not certified by the appropriate official and approved by the DBSMC to be in compliance with the Department’s architecture.

More recently, the Defense Business Transformation Agency (BTA) was created to integrate and oversee corporate-level business systems and initiatives. The BTA is the management link responsible for integrating work across the Department in areas such as human resources, financial management, acquisition, and logistics. It is accountable to the DBSMC governing body for results.

### Managing Risks and Measuring Performance Across the Enterprise

In the 2001 QDR, the Department introduced a risk management framework to enable the Department's senior leadership to better balance near-term demands against preparations for the future. This balanced risk approach has been successfully implemented in a number of organizations throughout the Department to guide strategic planning and day-to-day management. The Department is now taking advantage of lessons learned from this initial implementation phase to refine and develop a more robust framework to enable decision-making.

The Department will reevaluate its enterprise-wide outcome goals to maintain strategic alignment and ensure the Department's objectives are clearly set forth. The Department will also evaluate and develop or refine the metrics to measure efforts to implement the strategy to provide useful information to senior leadership. Improved metrics will allow senior leaders at the governance level to manage by exception—monitoring the overall health of the organization and focusing attention on areas needing top-level direction and support. Each level of the enterprise is accountable for measuring performance and delivering results that support the Department-wide strategy. Organizations must have the autonomy needed to perform within guidance, but with adequate oversight to ensure strategic alignment.

### Additional Governance Reforms

The Department is considering additional initiatives aimed at improving governance in each of the five corporate focus areas. These include the following:

- Designating a single lead advocate for the future joint warfighter in order to improve the Department's long-range, joint perspective on the requirements, acquisition and resource allocation processes.
- Creating new horizontal organizations to better integrate the Department's activities in key areas, including strategic communication and human capital strategy.
- Migrating toward a shared services model for support functions, such as administration, management and computer support.

Although reforms cannot occur overnight, the course is clear. The complex strategic environment demands that our structure and processes be streamlined and integrated to better support the President and joint warfighter. The Department is committed to doing so.

### Management and Work Reforms

Beyond governance, this QDR identified opportunities for continued transformation of acquisition and logistics processes.

### Improving Defense Acquisition Performance

There is a growing and deep concern in the Department of Defense's senior leadership and

in the Congress about the acquisition processes. This lack of confidence results from an inability to determine accurately the true state of major acquisition programs when measured by cost, schedule and performance. The unpredictable nature of Defense programs can be traced to instabilities in the broader acquisition system. Fundamentally reshaping that system should make the state of the Department's major acquisition programs more predictable and result in better stewardship of the U.S. tax dollar. There are several ongoing reviews of defense acquisition improvements being conducted both within and outside the Department in an effort to address these issues. Their results will inform the Department's efforts to reshape defense acquisition into a truly 21<sup>st</sup> century process that is responsive to the joint warfighter.

The Department of Defense is focusing on bringing the needed capabilities to the joint force more rapidly, by fashioning a much more effective acquisition system and associated set of processes. The Department is considering adopting a risk-based source selection process in place of the current cost-based approach. Source selection decisions would not use cost as the sole criteria but rather would be based on technical and management risk. Effectively balancing cost, technical risk and management realities would require closer integration of the Department's joint capabilities identification, resource allocation and acquisition processes, with clear responsibilities defined for each.

In an effort to ensure needed capabilities are fielded rapidly, acquisition development and

procurement programs will shift to a time-certain approach. Early in program development, senior leaders will make the key trade-offs necessary to balance performance, time and available resources. Upgrades and improvements can be added in subsequent spirals based on the maturity of the technology. Combining time-certain development and procurement of capability with a risk-based approach to source selection should provide much greater stability in the acquisition system. Stability should allow for more predictable acquisition programs measured by cost, schedule and performance.

#### Managing Supply Chain Logistics

In response to the 2001 QDR, the Department undertook a number of initiatives to improve the effectiveness and efficiency with which the Department moves and sustains military forces. These initiatives included efforts to improve the deployment process and reduce the logistics footprint and its associated costs. The




Photo by Specialist Preston Cheeks, U.S. Army.

A C-130 drops supplies during an operation intended to prevent reemergence of terrorist activities in Afghanistan. U.S. and partner forces remain vigilant in combating any new terrorist extremist forces.

Department also worked to provide standing joint force headquarters with an integrated logistics picture and accelerated the creation and use of logistics decision-support tools. In the past four years, the Department has markedly increased the integration of field exercises and experimentation with the processes for determining logistics systems, doctrine and force structure requirements. In addition, as noted earlier, the Department is changing its logistics processes and procedures as dictated by the needs of current operations.

As a result of these initiatives, the Department has made significant strides in migrating to a capabilities-based logistics approach. In this QDR, the Department focused on improving visibility into supply chain logistics costs and performance and on building a foundation for continuous improvements in performance. The strategy for achieving these objectives starts by linking resources to supply chain logistics activities in order to understand the costs they entail. The Department must also assess commercial supply chain metrics as potential performance targets to bring down the costs and to speed the delivery of needed items. Promising ongoing initiatives, such as the single deployment process owner, must be continually improved and accelerated. Lastly, there is a need to develop realistic and defensible strategic performance targets for focused logistics capabilities to guide both capital investment and process improvement.

The Department is implementing a number of specific initiatives aimed at meeting supply chain objectives. For example, the use of active and

passive Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technologies will play a key role in achieving the Department's vision for implementing knowledge-enabled logistics support to the warfighter through automated asset visibility and management. RFID is designed to enable the sharing, integration and synchronizing of data from the strategic to the tactical level, informing every node in the supply chain network. This information should provide greater insight into the cause-and-effect relationship between resources and readiness. Such fact-based insights, coupled with the implementation of continuous process improvement tools like Lean, Six Sigma and Performance Based Logistics, will help optimize the productive output of the overall Department of Defense supply chain.

#### Transforming the Medical Health System (MHS)

New breakthroughs in science and health, and new innovations in prevention and wellness, offer the opportunity to develop a 21<sup>st</sup> century Military Health System that will improve health and save both lives and money. This transformation in health and healthcare parallels other transformations in the Department of Defense. It is the Department's goal to have a lifetime relationship with the entire Department of Defense family which maximizes prevention, wellness and personal choices and responsibility. As with other areas related to the Department enterprise, the QDR recommends aligning medical support with emerging joint force employment concepts. Building on recent improvements in new purchased care contracts and the streamlining of regional TRICARE

management structures, the QDR recommends continuing to shift toward a market-driven, performance-based investment program. It also recommends improving planning processes and the transparency of information, while leveraging the recent launch of the Department's electronic health record system. This new system is needed to effectively manage MHS by adopting a more flexible financing process. Above all, the Department's military and civilian senior leaders endorse the need to modernize the TRICARE benefit structure for those customers who are not on Active Duty. The intent is to promote longer and healthier retirement lives by encouraging self-responsibility for their own and their family's health and the use of health resources to achieve the longest, healthiest lives at the lowest cost. Doing so will require changes in legislation and rules to adjust TRICARE cost-sharing features so that they restore the balance Congress created in establishing the TRICARE program in the 1990's and also to seek authority for Health Savings Accounts.

### Summary

Without a doubt, reshaping the defense enterprise is difficult. The structures and processes developed over the past half-century were forged in the Cold War and strengthened by success in it. However, the strategic landscape of the 21<sup>st</sup> century demands excellence across a much broader set of national security challenges. With change comes turmoil, and achieving a desired vision requires determination and perseverance within the Department and, importantly, cooperation with the Congress. As

we emphasize agility, flexibility, responsiveness and effectiveness in the operational forces, so too must the Department's organizations, processes and practices embody these characteristics if they are to support the joint warfighter and our Commander in Chief.

## DEVELOPING A 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY TOTAL FORCE

The Department of Defense is the world's largest employer, directly employing more than three million people. The Department's Total Force – its active and reserve military components, its civil servants, and its contractors – constitutes its warfighting capability and capacity. Members of the Total Force serve in thousands of locations around the world, performing a vast array of duties to accomplish critical missions.

No prudent military commander wants a fair fight, seeking instead to “overmatch” adversaries in cunning, capability and commitment. The selfless service and heroism of the men and women of the well-trained all-volunteer Total Force has been a primary source of U.S. strategic overmatch in confronting the wide range of threats we face and a key to successful military operations over the past several decades. The Total Force must continue to adapt to different operating environments, develop new skills and rebalance its capabilities and people if it is to

remain prepared for the new challenges of an uncertain future.

Recent operational experiences highlight capabilities and capacities that the Department must instill in the Total Force to prevail in a long, irregular war while deterring a broad array of challenges. The future force must be more finely tailored, more accessible to the joint commander and better configured to operate with other agencies and international partners in complex operations. It must have far greater endurance. It must be trained, ready to operate and able to make decisions in traditionally non-military areas, such as disaster response and stabilization. Increasing the adaptability of the Total Force while also reducing stress on military personnel and their families is a top priority for the Department. These imperatives require a new strategy for shaping the Department's Total Force, one that will adjust policies and authorities while introducing education and training initiatives to equip civilian and military warfighters to overmatch any future opponent.

The Department and Military Services must carefully distribute skills among the four elements of the Total Force (Active Component, Reserve Component, civilians and contractors) to optimize their contributions across the range of military operations, from peace to war. In a reconfigured Total Force, a new balance of skills must be coupled with greater accessibility to people so that the right forces are available at the right time. Both uniformed and civilian personnel must be readily available to joint commanders.

Photo by Photographer's Mate, 1st Class  
Richard J. Meier, U.S. Navy.



An officer assigned to Navy hospital ship USNS Mercy explains her rank insignia to Indonesian military and civilian nurses after instructing them in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). USNS Mercy operated off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, providing assistance to international relief organizations; it hosted medical teams operating ashore in areas affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami.



Photo by Captain Dave Hayslett, U.S. Air Force.

A Department of Defense contractor (left) and U.S. Air Force personnel (right) provide first aid to an Afghan girl at the Bagrami Village refugee camp in Kabul, Afghanistan. Providing essential aid is a critical part of the reconstruction effort and employs all elements of the Total Force.

This operational Total Force must remain prepared for complex operations at home or abroad, including working with other U.S. agencies, allies, partners and non-governmental organizations. Routine integration with foreign and domestic counterparts requires new forms of advanced joint training and education.

Finally, the Department must effectively compete with the civilian sector for high-quality personnel. The transformation of the Total Force will require updated, appropriate authorities and tools from Congress to shape it and improve its sustainability. Two key enablers of this transformation will be a new *Human Capital Strategy* for the Department, and the application of the new National Security Personnel System to manage the Department's civilian personnel.

### Reconfiguring the Total Force

Recent operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the need to rebalance military skills between and within the Active

and Reserve Components. Accordingly, over the past several years, the Military Departments are rebalancing – shifting, transferring or eliminating – approximately 70,000 positions within or between the Active and Reserve Components. The Department plans to rebalance an additional 55,000 military personnel by 2010. The Military Departments are applying this same scrutiny across the Total Force to ensure that the right skills reside inside each element. The Military Departments and Combatant Commanders will continually assess the force to ensure it remains responsive to meet future demands. U.S. Joint Forces Command (U.S. JFCOM), as the joint force provider, is aiding the effort by ensuring the appropriate global distribution of ready forces and competencies. The Department plans to introduce a new methodology and review process to establish a baseline for personnel policy, including the development of joint metrics and a common lexicon to link the Defense Strategy to Service-level rebalancing decisions. This process will help synchronize rebalancing efforts across the Department.

### A Continuum of Service

The traditional, visible distinction between war and peace is less clear at the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In a long war, the United States expects to face large and small contingencies at unpredictable intervals. To fight the long war and conduct other future contingency operations, joint force commanders need to have more immediate access to the Total Force. In particular, the Reserve Component must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today. During

the Cold War, the Reserve Component was used, appropriately, as a “strategic reserve,” to provide support to Active Component forces during major combat operations. In today’s global context, this concept is less relevant. As a result, the Department will:

- Pursue authorities for increased access to the Reserve Component: to increase the period authorized for Presidential Reserve Call-up from 270 to 365 days.
- Better focus the use of the Reserve Components’ competencies for homeland defense and civil support operations, and seek changes to authorities to improve access to Guard and reserve consequence management capabilities and capacity in support of civil authorities.
- Achieve revision of Presidential Reserve Call-Up authorities to allow activation of Military Department Reserve Components for natural disasters in order to smooth the process for meeting specific needs without relying solely on volunteers.
- Allow individuals who volunteer for activation on short notice to serve for long periods on major headquarters staffs as individual augmentees.
- Develop select reserve units that train more intensively and require shorter notice for deployment.

Additionally, the Military Departments will explore the creation of all-volunteer reserve units with high-demand capabilities, and the Military

Departments and Combatant Commanders will expand the concept of contracted volunteers.

### **Building the Right Skills**

Maintaining the capabilities required to conduct effective multi-dimensional joint operations is fundamental to the U.S. military’s ability to overmatch adversaries. Both battlefield integration with interagency partners and combined operations – the integration of the joint force and coalition forces – will be standard features in future operations. The combination of joint, combined and interagency capabilities in modern warfare represents the next step in the evolution of joint warfighting and places new demands on the Department’s training and education processes.

#### Joint Training

The QDR assessed and compared the joint training capabilities of each of the Military Departments. Although the Military Departments have established operationally proven processes and standards, it is clear that further advances in joint training and education are urgently needed to prepare for complex, multinational and interagency operations in the future. Toward this end, the Department will:

- Develop a Joint Training Strategy to address new mission areas, gaps and continuous training transformation.
- Revise its Training Transformation Plan to incorporate irregular warfare, complex stabilization operations, combating WMD and

information operations.

- Expand the Training Transformation Business Model to consolidate joint training, prioritize new and emerging missions and exploit virtual and constructive technologies.




Photo by Staff Sergeant Sway L. Pesadi, U.S. Air Force.

U.S. Marines conduct urban training. The number of U.S. training facilities for urban operations and the depth of instruction have increased significantly since 2002.


#### Language and Cultural Skills

Developing broader linguistic capability and cultural understanding is also critical to prevail in the long war and to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges. The Department must dramatically increase the number of personnel proficient in key languages such as Arabic, Farsi and Chinese and make these languages available at all levels of action and decision – from the strategic to the tactical. The Department must foster a level of understanding and cultural intelligence about the Middle East and Asia comparable to that developed about the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Current

and emerging challenges highlight the increasing importance of Foreign Area Officers, who provide Combatant Commanders with political-military analysis, critical language skills and cultural adeptness. The Military Departments will increase the number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers seconded to foreign military services, in part by expanding their Foreign Area Officer programs. This action will foster professional relationships with foreign militaries, develop in-depth regional expertise, and increase unity of effort among the United States, its allies and partners. Foreign Area Officers will also be aligned with lower echelons of command to apply their knowledge at the tactical level.

To further these language and culture goals, the Department will:

- Increase funding for the Army's pilot linguist program to recruit and train native and heritage speakers to serve as translators in the Active and Reserve Components.



DoD Photo

This heritage speaker receives the Purple Heart medal after being wounded in Iraq. His commander stated that he was essential to all his missions. He joined the U.S. Army at 17 years of age and deployed one month after turning 18. His younger brother (age 17) also plans on enlisting to become a heritage speaker.

- Require language training for Service Academy and Reserve Officer Training Corps scholarship students and expand immersion programs, semester abroad study opportunities and inter-academy foreign exchanges.
- Increase military special pay for foreign language proficiency.
- Increase National Security Education Program (NSEP) grants to American elementary, secondary and post-secondary education programs to expand non-European language instruction.
- Establish a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, composed of approximately 1,000 people, as an on-call cadre of high-proficiency, civilian language professionals to support the Department's evolving operational needs.
- Modify tactical and operational plans to improve language and regional training prior to deployments and develop country and language familiarization packages and operationally-focused language instruction modules for deploying forces.




Photo by Major Sergeant James M. Bowman, U.S. Air Force.

A U.S. Army Captain from the 17th Field Artillery Brigade reviews the Arabic language with local Iraqi boys at the Al-Dawaya School. The Brigade restored the Al-Dawaya School during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

#### Training and Educating Personnel to Strengthen Interagency Operations

The ability to integrate the Total Force with personnel from other Federal Agencies will be important to reach many U.S. objectives. Accordingly, the Department supports the creation of a National Security Officer (NSO) corps – an interagency cadre of senior military and civilian professionals able to effectively integrate and orchestrate the contributions of individual government agencies on behalf of larger national security interests.

Much as the Goldwater-Nichols requirement that senior officers complete a joint duty assignment has contributed to integrating the different cultures of the Military Departments into a more effective joint force, the QDR recommends creating incentives for senior Department and non-Department personnel to develop skills suited to the integrated interagency environment.

The Department will also transform the National Defense University, the Department's premier educational institution, into a true National Security University. Acknowledging the complexity of the 21st century security environment, this new institution will be tailored to support the educational needs of the broader U.S. national security profession. Participation from interagency partners will be increased and the curriculum will be reshaped in ways that are consistent with a unified U.S. Government approach to national security missions, and greater interagency participation will be encouraged.

### Designing an Information Age Human Capital Strategy

To compete effectively with the civilian sector for highly-qualified personnel to build the Total Force, the Department must possess both a modern *Human Capital Strategy* and the authorities required to recruit, shape and sustain the force it needs.

The new *Human Capital Strategy* focuses on developing the right mix of people and skills across the Total Force. The Department's *Human Capital Strategy* may be considered "competency-focused" and "performance-based." It is based on an in-depth study of the competencies U.S. forces require and the performance standards to which they must be developed. Each of the Military Departments will map the array of competencies and performance criteria that constitute its forces and also evaluate and improve personnel development processes to achieve those standards. Advancements, awards and compensation may then be linked to an individual's performance rather than to longevity or time-in-grade. This will better align incentives to outputs and reward excellence.

To execute the *Human Capital Strategy*, the Department will establish a single Program Executive Office responsible for the consolidated Personnel Reporting/Management System and management of the Strategy as a major defense program. Once implemented, the *Human Capital Strategy* will be integrated into a consolidated personnel tracking and management system capable of linking all Department competencies

to manpower, training and education.

The Department also needs to ensure suitable promotion and development opportunities are available to attract and retain the best and brightest military and civilian personnel. The Department's career advancement philosophy should foster innovation by encouraging career patterns that develop the unique skills needed to meet new missions such as irregular warfare. New career patterns might include seconding young officers, non-commissioned officers and civil servants to work within allied and partners' militaries or ministries of defense or to serve on long-term assignments in key strategic regions of the world rather than assuming the traditional career path of multiple, short-term assignments. The Department will provide further incentives and improve advancement opportunities in key career fields, including Foreign Area Officers, trainers, advisors and linguists, as well as in other mission areas that are taking on greater importance, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and information and space operations. In addition to providing incentives for strong performance and continued service, the *Human Capital Strategy's* shaping tools must also enable discrete, necessary force reductions as well as selective accessions when a specific skill is called for and not available within the joint force.

#### National Security Personnel System

The Department's civilians are unique in the U.S. Government because they are an integral part of a military organization. Consequently, like the military workforce, the Department's civilians must adapt to changing mission needs. The new

National Security Personnel System (NSPS) is designed to facilitate the effective management of the Department's 650,000 civilian personnel in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The NSPS addresses three major personnel issues the Department faces: staffing the enterprise to support 21<sup>st</sup> century missions; using compensation to compete more effectively in the broader labor market; and providing civilian support to contingency operations. The NSPS will incorporate a labor relations system that recognizes the Department's national security mission and the need to act swiftly to execute that mission while preserving the collective bargaining rights of employees. The Department will begin its transition to the new system by training personnel to implement the new procedures. The NSPS also recognizes the importance of defense civilians and the support they provide for contingency operations. It enables civilians to perform inherently governmental functions, freeing military personnel to perform inherently military functions.

Similarly, implementing the new Department of Defense Instruction *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany U.S. Armed Forces* is another step toward integrating contractors into the Total Force. The Department's policy now directs that performance of commercial activities by contractors, including contingency contractors and any proposed contractor logistics support arrangements, shall be included in operational plans and orders. By factoring contractors into their planning, Combatant Commanders can better determine their mission needs.

Taken together, measures to reconfigure the Total

Force, provide a continuum of service, build the right skills and design an information-age human capital strategy will yield a Total Force that is better able to meet the diverse challenges the United States will face in coming years.



Photo by Lance Corporal Leslie J. Hewitt, U.S. Marine Corps.

Homecoming for pilots from Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 533 after participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

## ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT

The Department of Defense cannot meet today's complex challenges alone. Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. Government to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad. During the QDR, senior leaders considered the changes needed to enable the Department to contribute better to such unified efforts. Just as the Second World War posed immense challenges that spurred joint and combined operations within the military, today's environment demands that all agencies of government become adept at integrating their efforts into a unified strategy.

This requires much more than mere coordination: the Department must work hand in glove with other agencies to execute the National Security Strategy. Interagency and international combined operations truly are the new Joint operations. Supporting and enabling other agencies, working toward common objectives, and building the capacity of partners are indispensable elements of the Department's new missions.

### Why a New Approach is Essential

The United States' experience in the Cold War still profoundly influences the way that the Department of Defense is organized and executes its mission. But, the Cold War was a struggle between nation-states, requiring state-based responses to most political problems and kinetic responses to most military problems. The Department was optimized for conventional,

large-scale warfighting against the regular, uniformed armed forces of hostile states.

Today, warfare is increasingly characterized by intra-state violence rather than conflict between states. Many of the United States' principal adversaries are informal networks of non-state actors that are less vulnerable to Cold War-style approaches. At the same time, many partner nations face internal rather than external threats. Defeating unconventional enemies requires unconventional approaches. The ability to wage irregular and unconventional warfare and the skills needed for counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction, "military diplomacy" and complex interagency coalition operations are essential – but in many cases require new and more flexible authorities from the Congress.

Authorities developed before the age of the Internet and globalization have not kept pace with trans-national threats from geographically



Photo by Staff Sergeant Alice Johnson, U.S. Army.

From left, Honorable Zalmay Khalizad, American ambassador to Iraq; U.S. Army General George Casey Jr., commanding general Multi-National Force-Iraq; and an Iraqi dignitary gather for the formal transfer of authority of Forward Operating Base Danger from U.S. forces to the Iraqi government in 2005. All elements of the U.S. Government are working in concert to bring stability to Iraq.

dispersed non-state terrorist and criminal networks. Authorities designed during the Cold War unduly limit the ability to assist police forces or interior ministries and are now less applicable. Adversaries' use of new technologies and methods has outstripped traditional concepts of national and international security. Traditional mechanisms for creating and sustaining international cooperation are not sufficiently agile to disaggregate and defeat adversary networks at the global, regional and local levels simultaneously.

Supporting the rule of law and building civil societies where they do not exist today, or where they are in their infancy, is fundamental to winning the long war. In this sense, today's environment resembles a challenge that is different in kind, but similar in scale, to the Cold War – a challenge so immense that it requires major shifts in strategic concepts for national security and the role of military power. Therefore, the United States needs to develop new concepts and methods for interagency and international cooperation.

#### Strategic and Operational Frameworks

Unity of effort requires that strategies, plans and operations be closely coordinated with partners. At the operational level, the United States must be able to prevent or disrupt adversaries' ability to plan and execute operations rather than being forced to respond to attacks after they have occurred. Adversaries using asymmetric tactics are global, adaptive and fleeting, thus analyses, decisions and actions to defeat them must also be swift. But for swift action to be fashioned and

effective, it must occur within well-coordinated strategic and operational frameworks. Authorities, procedures and practices must permit the seamless integration of Federal, state and local capabilities at home and among allies, partners and non-governmental organizations abroad.

Drawing on operational experience and lessons learned over the last four years, the QDR examined changes within and beyond the Department to strengthen unity of effort. Improved interagency and international planning, preparation and execution will allow faster and more effective action in dealing with 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges. New modes of cooperation can enhance agility and effectiveness with traditional allies and engage new partners in a common cause. Initiating efforts to better understand and engage those who support the murderous ideology of terrorists and the evolution of states at strategic crossroads will be critical.

#### **Strengthening Interagency Operations**

Increasing unity of effort to achieve the nation's security policy priorities across the agencies of the Federal Government is essential. Only with coherent, leveraged U.S. Government action can the nation achieve true unity of effort with international partners. To address more effectively many security challenges, the Department is continuing to shift its emphasis from Department-centric approaches toward interagency solutions. Cooperation across the Federal Government begins in the field with the development of shared perspectives and

a better understanding of each agency's role, missions and capabilities. This will complement better understanding and closer cooperation in Washington, and will extend to execution of complex operations. To that end, the Department supports improvements to strategy development and planning within the Department and with its interagency partners.

The QDR recommends the creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities. The planning guidance would set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies. It would help Federal Departments and Agencies better align their strategy, budget and planning functions with national objectives. Stronger linkages among planners in the Military Departments, the Combatant Commands and the Joint Staff, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with other Departments should ensure that operations better reflect the President's National Security Strategy and country's policy goals.

#### Learning from the Field

Closer relationships between parent agencies in Washington and elsewhere support increased collaboration in the field. Solutions developed in the field often have applicability to interagency cooperation at the strategic and policy levels. Long experience shows that operators, regardless of parent agency, collaborate closely when faced with common challenges in the field: they often resolve interagency concerns quickly and

seamlessly to achieve team objectives.

For the Department, joint warfighters – the Combatant Commanders and leaders of deployed joint task forces – are the primary level at which unity of effort develops. For most other agencies, the U.S. Chief of Mission in a specific country, leading an interagency Country Team, has an important field leadership role. Creating opportunities to help enable Combatant Commanders (whose purview extends across many countries) to work more collaboratively with Chiefs of Mission (who focus on only one country) is one objective. Currently, personnel in the Department of State and Department of Defense must expend considerable effort, on a case-by-case basis, to act together in support of operations. The result is that Commanders and Chiefs of Mission lose agility in the face of an adaptive adversary, fleeting targets are missed, and risks to U.S. interests and those of our partners increase.



Rescue personnel from the Los Angeles, California Fire Department, working with U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Army personnel, search for victims of Hurricane Katrina in flooded neighborhoods in New Orleans, Louisiana.

Photo by Laurenceau/Reuters, Major for  
Clas Robert McCall, U.S. Army.

#### Complex Interagency Operations Abroad

The President's National Security Presidential Directive designating the Secretary of State to

improve overall U.S. Government stabilization and reconstruction efforts recognizes the challenges of achieving unity of effort for complex overseas contingencies. Although many U.S. Government organizations possess knowledge and skills needed to perform tasks critical to complex operations, they are often not chartered or resourced to maintain deployable capabilities. Thus, the Department has tended to become the default responder during many contingencies. This is a short-term necessity, but the Defense Department supports legislation to enable other agencies to strengthen their capabilities so that balanced interagency operations become more feasible – recognizing that other agencies' capabilities and performance often play a critical role in allowing the Department of Defense to achieve its mission.

Recognizing that stability, security and transition operations can be critical to the long war on terrorism, the Department issued guidance in 2005 to place stability operations on par with major combat operations within the Department. The directive calls for improving the Department's ability to work with interagency partners, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and others to increase capacities to participate in complex operations abroad. When implemented, the Department will be able to provide better support to civilian-led missions, or to lead stabilization operations when appropriate.

The QDR supports efforts to expand the expeditionary capacity of agency partners. In addition, increased coordination between

geographic Combatant Commands and interagency partners in the field will increase overall effectiveness. The Department proposes a number of policy and legislative initiatives to improve unity of effort for complex interagency operations abroad, providing greater Presidential flexibility in responding to security challenges. The Department will:

- Support substantially increased resources for the Department of State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability and State's associated proposal to establish a deployable Civilian Reserve Corps and a Conflict Response Fund.
- Support broader Presidential authorities to redirect resources and task the best-situated agencies to respond, recognizing that other government agencies may be best suited to provide necessary support in overseas emergencies. This new authority would enable the U.S. Government to capitalize on inherent competencies of individual agencies to tailor a more effective immediate response.
- Strengthen internal Department mechanisms for interagency coordination.
- Improve the Department's ability to assess the relative benefits of security cooperation activities to enable better resource allocation decisions.
- Strengthen the Department's regional centers to become U.S. Government assets in support of government outreach to regional opinion-makers.

Complex Interagency Operations at Home.

Unified interagency efforts are no less important at home. The Department must work as part of a unified interagency effort with the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal, state and local agencies to address threats to the U.S. homeland. Moreover, the response to Hurricane Katrina vividly illustrated the need for the Department to support other agencies in the context of complex interagency operations at home.

The QDR recommends several actions to improve unity of effort with other Federal agencies, state and local governments to improve homeland defense and homeland security. The Department will:

- In partnership with Department of Homeland Security, develop a National Homeland Security Plan clarifying the optimum distribution of effort among Federal agencies for prevention, preparation and response.
- Expand training programs to accommodate planners from other agencies and, working with the Department of Homeland Security and other interagency partners, offer assistance to develop new courses on developing and implementing strategic-level plans for disaster assistance, consequence management and catastrophic events.
- Partner with the Department of Homeland Security to design and facilitate full-scope interagency homeland defense and civil support exercises, leveraging the Defense Department's

experience in planning and training. The exercises will be conducted in near-real-world conditions, with civilian and military participation from national, state and local government agencies. These exercises should help to yield common understandings of assigned roles and responsibilities, and shared practice in complex planning and operations.

- At the request of the Department of Homeland Security, organize and sponsor homeland defense tabletop exercises, in which senior leaders from civilian and military agencies practice responses to disaster scenarios.
- Continue consultations with our neighbors to address security and defense issues of common concern, while ensuring coordination with the Department of Homeland Security.

**Working with International Allies and Partners**

Long-standing alliance relationships will continue to underpin unified efforts to address 21<sup>st</sup> century security challenges. These established relationships continue to evolve, ensuring their



U.S. and Mexican forces worked together distributing relief supplies at D'Iberville Elementary School in Mississippi following Hurricane Katrina.

relevance even as new challenges emerge. The ability of the United States and its allies to work together to influence the global environment is fundamental to defeating terrorist networks. Wherever possible, the United States works with or through others: enabling allied and partner capabilities, building their capacity and developing mechanisms to share the risks and responsibilities of today's complex challenges.

The nation's alliances provide a foundation for working to address common security challenges. NATO remains the cornerstone of transatlantic security and makes manifest the strategic solidarity of democratic states in Europe and North America. NATO is evolving through the addition of seven new allies, the Partnership for Peace Program, the creation of the NATO Response Force, the establishment of the new Allied Command Transformation, the Alliance's leadership of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq. In many European allied states, however, aging and shrinking populations are curbing defense spending on capabilities they need for conducting operations effectively alongside U.S. forces. In the Pacific, alliances with Japan, Australia, Korea and others promote bilateral and multi-lateral engagement in the region and cooperative actions to address common security threats. India is also emerging as a great power and a key strategic partner. Close cooperation with these partners in the long war on terrorism, as well as in efforts to counter WMD proliferation and other non-traditional threats, ensures the continuing need for these alliances and for improving their capabilities.



Defense Ministers attend a NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting during a NATO conference in Brussels, Belgium. NATO remains a key alliance as the United States faces traditional and emerging challenges.

Photo by: Michael Yezhov/  
Cherie A. Healy, U.S. Air Force

The Department will continue to strengthen traditional allied operations, with increased emphasis on collective capabilities to plan and conduct stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction operations. In particular, the Department supports efforts to create a NATO stabilization and reconstruction capability and a European constabulary force. The United States will work to strengthen allied capabilities for the long war and countering WMD. The United States, in concert with allies, will promote the aim of tailoring national military contributions to best employ the unique capabilities and characteristics of each ally, achieving a unified effort greater than the sum of its parts.

Consistent with the President's emphasis on the need to prevent, rather than be forced to respond to, attacks, the Department recommends that the United States continue to work with its allies to develop approaches, consistent with their domestic laws and applicable international law, to disrupt and defeat transnational threats before they mature. Concepts and constructs enabling unity of effort with more than 70 supporting

nations under the Proliferation Security Initiative should be extended to domains other than WMD proliferation, including cyberspace, as a priority.

To prevent terrorist attacks or disrupt their networks, to deny them sanctuary anywhere in the world, to separate terrorists from host populations and ultimately to defeat them, the United States must also work with new international partners in less familiar areas of the world.



Photo by Lance Corporal  
Mark Moore Jr., U.S. Marine Corps.

U.S. civil affairs officers assist residents of Ramadi with registering to vote in Anbar Province, Iraq, in August 2005. Iraqis have exercised their right to democracy in increasing numbers throughout 2004 and 2005.

This means the Department must be prepared to develop a new team of leaders and operators who are comfortable working in remote regions of the world, dealing with local and tribal communities, adapting to foreign languages and cultures and working with local networks to further U.S. and partner interests through personal engagement, persuasion and quiet influence – rather than through military force alone. To support this effort, new authorities are needed. During the Cold War the legal authorities for military action, intelligence, foreign military assistance

and cooperation with foreign police and security services were separately defined and segregated from each other. Today, there is a need for U.S. forces to transition rapidly between these types of authorities in an agile and flexible manner, to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Based on operational experiences of the last four years, the QDR recommends that Congress provide considerably greater flexibility in the U.S. Government's ability to partner directly with nations in fighting terrorists. For some nations, this begins with training, equipping and advising their security forces to generate stability and security within their own borders. For others, it may entail providing some assistance with logistics support, equipment, training and transport to allow them to participate as members of coalitions with the United States or its allies in stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations around the globe.

Recent legislative changes remove some of the impediments to helping partners engaged in their own defense, but greater flexibility is urgently needed. The Department will seek to:

- Establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to fund and, as appropriate, stockpile routine defense articles such as helmets, body armor and night vision devices for use by coalition partners.
- Expand Department authority to provide logistics support, supplies and services to allies and coalition partners, without reimbursement as necessary, to enable coalition

operations with U.S. forces.

- Expand Department authority to lease or lend equipment to allies and coalition partners for use in military operations in which they are participating with U.S. forces.
- Expand the authorities of the Departments of State and Defense to train and equip foreign security forces best suited to internal counterterrorism and counter-insurgency operations. These may be non-military law enforcement or other security forces of the government in some nations.

The Department will continue to support initiatives, such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative, to increase the capacity of international organizations so that they can contribute more effectively to the improvement of governance and the expansion of civil society in the world. In this regard, the Department supports the African Union's development of a humanitarian crisis intervention capability, which is a good example of an international organization stepping up to the challenge of regional stabilization missions. The Department stands ready to increase its assistance to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations in areas of the Department's expertise such as doctrine, training, strategic planning and management.

#### Transforming Foreign Assistance

Foreign military assistance missions during the Cold War were largely designed to shore up friendly regimes against external threats. Today, the aim is for partners to govern and police

themselves effectively. Assistance in today's environment relies on the ability to improve states' governance, administration, internal security and the rule of law in order to build partner governments' legitimacy in the eyes of their own people and thereby inoculate societies against terrorism, insurgency and non-state threats. In partnership with the State Department and others, the Department must become as adept at working with foreign constabularies as it is with externally-focused armed forces, and as adept at working with interior ministries as it is with defense ministries – a substantial shift of emphasis that demands broader and more flexible legal authorities and cooperative mechanisms.

Bringing all the elements of U.S. power to bear to win the long war requires overhauling traditional foreign assistance and export control activities and laws. These include foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, foreign police training, International Military Education and Training (IMET) and, where necessary, providing advanced military technologies to foreign allies and partners. In particular, winning the long war




Photo by Cheryl Moore, Sergeant  
Diana Sulzberger, U.S. Air Force

U.S. Captain John Hart (right) instructs members of the Royal Thai Air Force on the instrument panel of an F-16 Fighting Falcon as part of the International Military Education and Training program.

requires strengthening the Department's ability to train and educate current and future foreign military leaders at institutions in the United States. Doing so is critical to strengthening partnerships and building personal relationships. In all cases, they are integral to successful irregular warfare operations.

For example, quick action to relieve civilian suffering, train security forces to maintain civil order and restore critical civilian infrastructure denies the enemy opportunities to capitalize on the disorder immediately following military operations and sets more favorable conditions for longer term stabilization, transition and reconstruction. Full integration of allied and coalition capabilities ensures unity of effort for rapidly evolving counterinsurgency operations. Similarly, foreign leaders who receive U.S. education and training help their governments understand U.S. values and interests, fostering willingness to unite in a common cause.

The QDR found that, with the exception of legislation applicable only to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, existing authorities governing planning, financing and use of these instruments for shaping international partnerships do not accommodate the dynamic foreign policy demands of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Based on recent operational experience, the Department seeks a continuum of authorities from Congress balancing the need to act quickly in the war on terrorism with the need to integrate military power to meet long-term, enduring foreign policy objectives.

The Department recommends a number of important legislative changes in the near term, while also working in close partnership with the Department of State and the Congress to enable better alignment of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act with today's security challenges. In addition to expanding coalition management authorities, the Department seeks to:

- Institutionalize OIF/OEF authorities to conduct Humanitarian Assistance and Stability Operations.
- Significantly improve and increase IMET-like opportunities targeted at shaping relationships and developing future foreign leaders.
- Consider whether the restrictions on the American Service Members Protection Act (ASPA) on IMET and other foreign assistance programs pertaining to security and the war on terror necessitate adjustment as we continue to advance the aims of the ASPA.
- Expand the Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program beyond its current focus on senior-level government officials and national strategic issues. Combatant Commanders and U.S. Chiefs of Mission, in consultation with regional partners, will develop education programs to improve regional counter-terrorism campaigns and crisis response planning at the operational level.

### Strategic Communication

Victory in the long war ultimately depends

on strategic communication by the United States and its international partners. Effective communication must build and maintain credibility and trust with friends and foes alike, through an emphasis on consistency, veracity and transparency both in words and deeds. Such credibility is essential to building trusted networks that counter ideological support for terrorism.

Responsibility for strategic communication must be government-wide and the QDR supports efforts led by the Department of State to improve integration of this vital element of national power into strategies across the Federal Government. The Department must instill communication assessments and processes into its culture, developing programs, plans, policy, information and themes to support Combatant Commanders that reflect the U.S. Government's overall strategic objectives. To this end, the Department will work to integrate communications efforts horizontally across the enterprise to link information and communication issues with broader policies, plans and actions.

The QDR identified capability gaps in each of the primary supporting capabilities of Public Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, Military Diplomacy and Information Operations, including Psychological Operations. To close those gaps, the Department will focus on properly organizing, training, equipping and resourcing the key communication capabilities. This effort will include developing new tools and processes for assessing, analyzing and delivering information to key audiences as well as improving linguistic

skills and cultural competence. These primary supporting communication capabilities will be developed with the goal of achieving a seamless communication across the U.S. Government.



U.S. soldiers with the Parwan Provincial Reconstruction Team discuss future quality of life improvements with village elders during a humanitarian aid mission to Jegdalek, Afghanistan.

## Summary

The United States will not win the war on terrorism or achieve other crucial national security objectives discussed in this Report by military means alone. Instead, the application of unified statecraft, at the Federal level and in concert with allies and international partners, is critical. In addition to coalition- and partner-supported combat and preventive operations, simultaneous effective interaction with civilian populations will be essential to achieve success. Authorities that permit nimble and adaptive policies, processes and institutions – domestic and international – are essential adjuncts to the military capability needed to address the rapidly evolving security challenges around the globe.



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Chairman's Assessment of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review

1. In accordance with title 10, United States Code, Section 118, I forward my assessment of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review for inclusion in the report.
2. This review was strengthened by an open and inclusive approach, which resulted in comprehensive and insightful recommendations that will guide our efforts in the coming years.

*VR Peter Pace*  
PETER PACE  
General, United States Marine Corps  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment  
As Stated

## Chairman's Assessment of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review

### Introduction

The Department of Defense conducted the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) during a demanding time for our Armed Forces. We are fighting a War on Terrorism of long duration while helping to foster fledgling democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, we are engaging nations around the world to build relationships, enhance regional stability, and strengthen deterrence – all while fundamentally transforming our military forces to defeat dangerous threats that may emerge in the decades ahead.

These concurrent challenges shaped a QDR process that balanced the needs of the ongoing struggle with longer term requirements to enhance security in a rapidly changing world. The report provides specific recommendations to transform the Department, its processes, and its forces, to meet this challenge. Success in this effort was due to the sustained leadership of senior civilians and uniformed officers, and the hard work of thousands of men and women in the Department of Defense, who together created an open, collaborative environment that permitted diversity of input, discussion, and analysis.

### The QDR Process

The 2006 QDR was the first contemporary defense review to coincide with an ongoing major conflict. This compelled the Department to recast its view of future warfare through the lens of long duration conflict with its extended stabilization campaign. As a consequence, this review required a judicious balance between present needs and future capabilities. The aim was a review that was strategy driven, capabilities focused, and budget disciplined.

Benefiting from legislative relief granted by the Congress, the Department enjoyed additional time to organize, deliberate on, and craft the review. The Secretary, recognizing the opportunity for a broader spectrum of participation, directed an open and collaborative review from the beginning, soliciting input from across the Department and the interagency, as well as diverse perspectives from a variety of independent study groups. Consequently, the thoroughness, the scope of issues considered, and the level of senior leader involvement proved unprecedented.

### Assessment

Any attempt to predict the future security environment of 2025 is inherently difficult. Consider the challenge in 1985 of trying to characterize the security environment that would exist in 2006. Given the dynamics of change over time, we must develop a mix of agile and flexible capabilities to mitigate uncertainty.

This review articulates a vision for the transformed force fully consistent with the demands of the anticipated security environment in 2025. To meet the key challenges in this period, we must: shape and sustain our Armed Forces to most effectively fight the War on Terrorism, transform “in stride” during wartime, strengthen our joint warfighting, and improve the quality of life of our Service members and their families.

The varied recommendations of the QDR promise to more effectively and efficiently align strategy and resources. The report outlines a force more capable of engaging in irregular warfare, and special operations forces more focused on those tasks they are best suited to perform. It foresees the need to establish long range and long loiter capabilities for strike and surveillance as well as increased littoral and undersea warfare capabilities. Finally, it strengthens deterrence options and enhances the capability to respond to catastrophic events in the homeland, whether man made or natural.

### Winning the War on Terrorism

The QDR properly focuses on the War on Terrorism as our first priority. We will enhance our expeditionary combat power and shape the Services to be lighter, yet more lethal, more sustainable and more agile. We will train additional Special Operations Forces and enable traditional ground forces to conduct foreign training and security missions in addition to combat operations. This expansion allows SOF to undertake longer duration, high intensity tasks and augments the irregular warfare capability of the entire force.

A renewed emphasis on Human Intelligence, increased airborne surveillance and airlift capacity, and specialized naval forces configured for coastal and riverine operations further complement irregular warfare capacity. Additionally, the QDR recognizes Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) as a U.S. government wide mission of increasing importance and identifies military support to SSTR as a core mission.

Finally, by emphasizing greater cultural awareness and language skills, the QDR acknowledges that victory in this long war depends on information, perception, and how and what we communicate

as much as application of kinetic effects. These cultural and language capabilities also enhance effectiveness in a coalition setting during conventional operations.

### Accelerating Transformation

The QDR identifies many areas and technologies that promise to revolutionize the future force. However, transformation is as much a mindset and culture as it is a technology or a platform. The QDR recognizes that we maximize the impact of our military power through closer coordination within the Department of Defense and with our interagency and international partners. Building partnership capacity invigorates our efforts and acknowledges that future challenges can be met only through the integrated use of all of the instruments of national power and through the relevant contributions of our international partners. The proposed National Security Planning Guidance promises to significantly improve national and international efforts to prevent, as well as respond to, crises at home and abroad.

The QDR takes positive steps to posture the Department's contribution to our national Homeland Defense effort. For example, several QDR initiatives dramatically improve our ability to detect threats in the approaches and interdict them at a distance. Moreover, military assistance to civil authorities, such as the response to a natural disaster, proved instrumental in shaping several QDR decisions.

Finally, the QDR envisions a wide range of initiatives that augment our capacity to shape the behavior of potential adversaries and to react to dangerous WMD related contingencies. These initiatives include acquiring more flexible conventional deterrence capabilities, solidifying the Department's WMD command and control structure, increasing the number of forces available for overseas nuclear render safe operations, and shortening their response time.

### Strengthening Joint Warfighting

Integrating advanced capabilities to improve joint war fighting is at the heart of the QDR effort. We will measure resource related decisions against that goal, as we transition from an interoperable to an interdependent force, whose diverse capabilities are rapidly integrated to achieve desired effects. This applies to the full range of combat tasks as well as to evolving roles and missions in Homeland Defense, Humanitarian Assistance, and military support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction operations.

Change must extend beyond the forces in the field to include command and control headquarters. Key is the initiative to organize, man, train, and equip selected Service headquarters to make them Joint Task Force (JTF) capable, available and ready to command and control designated Joint force

missions. The existence of a trained and ready pool of JTF capable headquarters will assure a wider range of military response options.

Finally, the Defense enterprise must be reformed to create and leverage the same agility as the force it enables. QDR recommendations to implement a comprehensive Human Capital Strategy, develop more integrated and streamlined acquisition processes, and improve Strategic Communication reflect the necessary enterprise approach to building a more effective and efficient organization, freeing resources for other transformational efforts.

#### **Improve the Quality of Life of our Service Members and our Families**

Superbly trained, equipped, and highly dedicated people have always been America's ultimate advantage. Our foremost duty, and that which this QDR acknowledged in every recommendation, is the imperative of supporting our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines by giving them the finest equipment and training, so that they can achieve victory and return home safely.

Achieving that goal requires the proper shaping of the Total Force to sustain the Global War on Terrorism with enough force depth and critical skills to allow sufficient time for rest and refit between combat assignments. It also means more fully integrating support systems to deliver first class administrative services, supplies, and support programs for our professionals and their families.

Finally, improving the quality of life of our service members means that we will provide educational opportunities to our people, to help them realize their professional goals and personal aspirations. When their time of uniformed service is over, they will return home as outstanding citizens and role models, ready to serve our society in new and different ways.

#### **Assessment of Risk**

We cannot accurately characterize the security environment of 2025; therefore, we must hedge against this uncertainty by identifying and developing a broad range of capabilities. Further, we must organize and arrange our forces to create the agility and flexibility to deal with unknowns and surprises in the coming decades. This review has carefully balanced those areas where risk might best be taken in order to provide the needed resources for areas requiring new or additional investment.

Today, the Armed Forces of the United States stand fully capable of accomplishing all the objectives of the National Defense Strategy: securing the United States from direct attack, securing strategic access and retaining global freedom of action, strengthening alliances and partnerships, and establishing favorable security conditions. The recommendations contained in this report provide future capability, capacity, and flexibility to execute these assigned missions, while hedging against the unknown threats of 2025.

#### Assessment of Roles and Missions

The Department continues to refine and improve the way capabilities are developed, fielded, and integrated, in order to execute the full range of missions the Armed Forces may be called on to perform. The 2006 QDR stresses an integrated approach with interagency and international partners. This review examined the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and the responsibilities of our Armed Forces in meeting them, and found roles and missions to be fundamentally sound. I concur with this assessment.

#### Moving Forward

We are at a critical time in the history of this great country and find ourselves challenged in ways we did not expect. We face a ruthless enemy intent on destroying our way of life and an uncertain future security environment. The War on Terrorism – a war of long duration – differs from the kind of conflict for which the Department traditionally prepared. Our focus is increasingly on the search for small cells of terrorists and on building the capacity of our partners. However, we must also retain the capability to conduct sustained conventional combat operations and to protect the homeland.

*We must prevail now while we prepare for the future.* This demands a wide range of military capabilities, superbly trained forces, and increased Joint, interagency, and coalition integration.

The recommendations of this report address the current fight and the full range of missions prescribed in the National Defense Strategy, while hedging against an uncertain future. The 2006 QDR tackles the most pressing needs of the Department in a strategically sound and fiscally responsible manner. As a result our Armed Forces stand ready to protect the United States, prevent conflict and surprise attack, and prevail against adversaries wherever they may be found.

I appreciate the efforts of all who were involved in this process. I endorse the 2006 QDR and its vision of a future force – more agile and more flexible, better prepared to deal with a dynamic security environment. Our challenges are many, but the course is clear.

Chairman WARNER. We will adjourn to room SR-222 for a classified continuation of this hearing.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

ACQUISITION REFORM

1. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary England, one of the recommendations of the recently released Defense Acquisition Program Assessment (DAPA) report, is to establish a new acquisition command lead by a four-star general or flag officer for each Service, who would report to the Service Chief and Senior Acquisition Executive of the military department.

I would like to hear your thoughts regarding the recommendations of the DAPA panel, especially on the recommendation to create this new general or flag officer position.

Secretary ENGLAND. Our focus must always be on delivering capability to warfighters and the entire Department of Defense (DOD) is looking at how to improve our ability to do that right now. I think it's important, however, to first take on policy, process, and resource issues before deciding what the most effective organizational structure might be. Deciding on the organization first might presuppose a non-optimal solution.

2. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary England, the Service Chiefs now have responsibility for the budgets and requirements generation process; how will adding the Service Chiefs into the acquisition process improve the process?

Secretary ENGLAND. When I was Secretary of the Navy, I certainly felt the Department of the Navy budget was my responsibility subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense; though I did rely on the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commandant. I also think that Goldwater-Nichols got it right in providing for civilian service acquisition executives with a clear acquisition reporting chain and, as I just mentioned, we're looking at ways to make it work even better.

3. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary England, another panel recommendation seeks to set the tenure of the top acquisition civilian to two fixed 5-year terms. What are your impressions on the DAPA panel recommendation to fix the service acquisition executive at a two-term or 10-year position?

Secretary ENGLAND. I understand the intent of the recommendation was to provide stability at the senior decisionmaker level. But I also have concerns that lengthy guaranteed fixed terms could actually lessen the acquisition executive's accountability for performance. What's more important to me is stability at the program execution level, and I'm talking about program managers. I think their Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) prescribed terms—4 years or the next major milestone—provide the right mix of stability and infusion of new management styles and ideas.

4. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Giambastiani, one of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommendations to improve the acquisition system is to integrate the combatant commanders more fully into the acquisition process. What are your thoughts regarding the increased role of combatant commanders in the acquisition process?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I agree that the combatant commanders should be fully integrated into the acquisition process. To facilitate full combatant commander integration, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was modified to provide a means of direct input from the combatant commanders to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) on their warfighting capability needs. The main vehicle for combatant commander input is the Joint Capabilities Document (JCD). Once a JCD is validated by the JROC, it is used to task the Services and Defense agencies to develop capabilities required by the combatant commanders. In addition, the combatant commanders are invited to comment on all JROC program capability proposals and to fully participate in formal JROC meetings, either in person or via video teleconferencing.

5. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Giambastiani, what are your recommendations of how the DOD should develop and address joint requirements?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The JCIDS was developed to specifically address joint requirements as guided by national strategic policy as well as a set of joint operational

concepts developed by the combatant commanders and approved by the Secretary of Defense. We continue to evaluate the sufficiency of information provided to the JROC in order to improve our ability to develop and field joint requirements. In particular, we are studying the implementation and use of key performance parameters (KPPs) to ensure we are specifying the right performance characteristics to deliver an effective capability, as well as having programs identify cost drivers to the JROC. This study will give the JROC better insight into whether the KPPs are driving costs or if some other aspect of the system has the potential to drive cost. We are also establishing a set of triggers that will require programs to come back to the JROC if their cost, performance, or schedules fall outside a set of limits. This will give the JROC the opportunity to reengage on a program early enough in the process to direct change or determine trade-space.

In addition, we continue to look for ways to improve the joint requirements process by evaluating recommendations made by various studies, including those from the QDR, the Defense Science Board (DSB), and the DAPA panel. As we identify improvements that will make the JCIDS process more effective, we will implement those improvements.

6. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Giambastiani, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Claude Bolton, characterized the 76 percent increase (to \$162 billion) in the cost of Future Combat Systems (FCS) as the result of requirements creep. Whose responsibility is it to control requirements creep and thus keep program costs in check?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The JROC provides validation and oversight for operational requirements. Each of the Executive Agents and Program Managers are responsible for maintaining cost, schedule, and performance given the approved requirements and programmatic parameters. Specifically with regard to FCS, the JROC, in fulfillment of its charter, has reviewed the FCS's Operational Requirements Document (ORD) every year since May 2003. The results of this review validate that FCS operational requirements are stable, while refining the level of detail to assist the program as it translates requirements into engineering-level specifications.

The 2004 FCS program restructure resulted in a November 2005 adjustment to the acquisition program baseline. That restructure actually accelerated the delivery of select FCS capabilities to our forces in "spin-outs" planned every 2 years from 2010–2014. The operational requirements for those spinout systems were already documented in the original ORD. In fact, within the base ORD, the only change to FCS requirements has been the addition of the congressionally-mandated key performance parameters for force protection and survivability. The growth in the FCS program cost is directly attributable to the programmatic changes in the 2004 restructure, and is not classified as a cost overrun as reviewed by the Department.

The FCS program is within its acquisition program baseline approved by the Defense Acquisition Executive in November 2005, for cost, schedule, and performance. My staff receives reports, such as the Selected Acquisition Report and the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary, that track changes to the FCS program. In addition, the program is presently undergoing a JROC review for the original ORD and a Capability Development Document Annex that describes Spin-Out #1 capabilities. We are confident that the Army is managing the program within the guidance it receives. The current FCS program has adequate risk management measures in place and the technology development approach is consistent with DOD acquisition policy.

As the Chairman of the JROC and Co-chair of the Defense Acquisition Board, we are currently making a series of changes to ensure that the Department has disciplined management controls and review processes in place to ensure programs meet cost, schedule, and performance milestones.

7. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Giambastiani, does the JROC approve the ORD?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, the JROC approves the ORD or the Capabilities Development Document (CDD); the CDD being the replacement document for the ORD in the revised JCIDS process. The JROC also validates a program's KPPs contained in these documents. The KPPs are those system performance attributes considered critical to the delivery of an effective warfighting capability. To ensure the delivery of a required capability, the JROC maintains change control over the KPPs for the life of an acquisition program.

8. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Giambastiani, what steps are you taking to ensure that we control requirements creep and thus enormous cost increases and program delays?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The JROC validates the KPPs of every program's CDD. The KPPs are those system performance attributes considered critical to the delivery of the desired warfighting capability. To ensure the delivery of an effective capability, the JROC maintains change control over the KPPs for the life of an acquisition program. The non-KPPs are those system attributes not considered critical to meeting required capability, and the JROC normally delegates control over those attributes to the acquiring Service or Defense agency. These non-KPP system attributes form the performance trade-space for program managers in developing the system. There have been cases—for example, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite system—where the system is so essential that the JROC does not delegate non-KPP change authority. In these cases, the JROC maintains change control over all of the system requirements.

In addition, we are having programs identify their cost drivers to the JROC. This will give the JROC better insight on whether the KPPs are driving costs or if some other aspect of the system has the potential to drive cost. We are also establishing a set of triggers that will require programs to come back to the JROC if their cost, performance, or schedule falls outside a set of limits. This will give the JROC the opportunity to reengage on the program early enough in the process to direct change or determine tradespace, thus mitigating the effects of requirements creep.

9. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Giambastiani, reports have described the Boeing 767 tanker deal as the most corrupt acquisition deal in more than 35 years. A key finding in the DOD Inspector General report was that the JROC process failed to recognize that an Air Force officer (Lieutenant Colonel Lepanta) lied to the JROC (a \$30 billion misrepresentation) on whether the tanker ORD was tailored to the Boeing 767. This officer's action makes a mockery of the joint requirements process and highlights the importance of the JROC process to be above reproach. What steps are you prepared to take to ensure that this does not happen again?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. When creating the JCIDS, one of the early shortfalls we recognized was the lack of an independent assessment on programs coming before the JROC. To address this shortfall, the Functional Capabilities Boards (FCBs) were created. The FCBs are co-chaired by a Joint Flag Officer and a senior representative from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The FCBs have a permanently assigned staff and representation from the Services, combatant commands, and OSD. The role of FCBs is to assess each program that comes before the JROC, providing an independent assessment and recommendation that identifies key issues for the JROC. This independent assessment process is helping us avoid future occurrences akin to the issues experienced with the Tanker ORD. We are continually identifying ways to improve the effectiveness of the JCIDS/JROC process in making program decisions and will press ahead to implement changes as necessary.

#### STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

10. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary England, Air Force leadership has voiced alternatives to the President's budget and in contradiction to the QDR position with regard to C-17s and C-5s. The Air Force alternative plan would retire the fleet of C-5As (60 total aircraft) in order to free up money to buy more Light Cargo Aircraft and create the compelling need for more C-17s to fill the capability gap created by retiring the C-5As. This is a direct contradiction to guidance provided in the QDR and is not in keeping with the President's budget request.

The QDR calls for the Air Force to finish its purchase of 180 C-17s and refurbish its C-5s. Has there been any other guidance given to Air Force officials with respect to the procurement of greater than 180 C-17s and/or the retirement vice modernization of C-5As?

Secretary ENGLAND. No official guidance has been given to the Air Force to retire C-5As. The UPL request for 7 additional C-17s is independent of the C-5A. The Air Force position and program of record in the fiscal year 2007 President's budget is 180 C-17s and 112 modernized C-5s. This fulfills the MCS minimum of 292 inter-theater airlift aircraft.

11. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary England, if reports are true and the Air Force is advocating the retirement of C-5As in order to purchase more C-17s would it or would it not be in direct contradiction to the guidance provided by the QDR?

Secretary ENGLAND. The QDR position of 180 C-17s and 112 modernized C-5s supports intertheater lift requirements with acceptable risk. Additional C-17s to offset increased utilization requirements, intratheater airlift support, and/or attrition reserves, not addressed in the QDR, may be warranted. However, no official guidance has been given to the AF to retire C-5As and purchase more than 180 C-17s.

#### QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW TIMING

12. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary England, a new version of the National Security Strategy will be released later this year, and will lay out the administration's overarching security policy. It seems to follow that a subordinate planning document, like the QDR, would follow from this overall vision. In fact, legislation requires that the QDR be . . . "consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy". Yet the QDR is being released before the new National Security Strategy. This has happened because current law requires the QDR be submitted not later than the President's budget for the next fiscal year. A change in the law would be needed to require the submission of the National Security Strategy prior to the QDR.

How can the Department plan its future defense posture and programs if the administration has not yet determined the latest version of its overall strategy?

Secretary ENGLAND. We have reviewed drafts of the National Security Strategy, and the two documents are fully consistent with each other. The strategic thought associated with this QDR began immediately after the November 2004 election and went on for the past 18 months. It is a continuation of the overall strategy as articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy published in March 2005. The QDR provides a vital input to the forthcoming National Security Strategy.

13. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary England, do you think current law should be changed, requiring that the National Security Strategy be submitted prior to the QDR?

Secretary ENGLAND. I do not think the current law should be changed. In the situation where there is a change of administration as occurred in 2001, the work of the QDR is an important input to the formulation of the National Security Strategy and is captured in the document. In situations like this QDR there is a continuation of strategic thought that is reflected in the strategic documents and the QDR and does not need to await the publication of a newer National Security Strategy.

#### END STRENGTH

14. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Giambastiani, the QDR calls for stabilizing the Army's end strength at 482,400 Active and 533,000 Reserve component personnel by fiscal year 2011. The Army has recently agreed to support a National Guard of 350,000 personnel but it is unclear whether the proper funding will be made available. It also calls for stabilizing the Marine Corps' end strength at 175,000 Active and 39,000 Reserve component personnel by fiscal year 2011.

In the QDR, under the heading "Reconfiguring the Total Force", DOD plans on cutting 55,000 servicemembers over the next 3 years. Worldwide deployments and disaster relief missions here at home continue to tax the Service. Yet the QDR and the current budget request recommend reduction in end strength Department-wide. Please explain this rationale.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The proposed end strength numbers are consistent with the QDR theme of getting to the right mix of capabilities in the Total Force. The QDR examined the size and shape of the force needed to meet our strategy and concluded that it was relatively accurate, but the mix of the force could be improved in that the Total Force needs to be more accessible. The QDR also recognized that there is considerable progress underway with respect to the modularity of forces. When the Army modularization is complete, there will be a more resident warfighting capability in smaller, more agile brigade combat teams.

The force reshaping efforts over the next 3 years are proposed to come from units that were not considered high-demand forces in comparison to others. In fact, the number of operational ground forces will grow in size, especially in critical high-demand areas such as special operations, civil affairs, and military police.

Many of the proposed cuts are also an effort to continue military-to-civilian conversion and other improvements of cost and efficiency. The Army, for example, is using the military-to-civilian conversions to make room for growing the size of the operational ground forces. The Air Force, through optimization of maintenance and support billets, as well as military-to-civilian conversions, will decrease its end

strength and restructure to provide better tools for the combatant commanders, such as increased special operations forces, unmanned aerial vehicle personnel, and cyberspace protection assets.

The Navy's end strength goals reflect a commitment to correctly sizing the fleet through initiatives such as "Sea Swap" rotational crews, the decommissioning of older more manpower intensive platforms, improved technology to reduce shipboard manning and training, and the military-to-civilian conversions mainly in Military Sealift Command and medical facilities ashore.

The Marine Corps is realigning within its end strength to ensure continued readiness and combat capability, primarily through utilizing Marine Corps Reserve units and individual augmentees.

15. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Giambastiani, please explain why the Army has utilized stop-loss on more than 50,000 soldiers while the QDR and the budget plan to draw down the Reserve component.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Stop-loss is a temporary Service management tool that is designed to maintain unit integrity and readiness. Stop-loss does not permanently affect end strength and is not related to determining potential reductions in authorized troop end strength for the Reserve components.

The stop-loss program has been used at various times by the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. More recently, the Army has used it in support of the global war on terrorism. The Army's mission is to deliver trained, ready, and cohesive units to combatant commanders. Random and continuing losses caused by separations, retirements, and replacement policies have the potential to adversely impact readiness in the deploying units. Accordingly, to mitigate those losses, the Army will continue to use stop-loss on a limited basis in support of its commitment to pursue the long war and to provide combatant commanders the ready forces they need to decisively defeat the enemy.

As of February 28, 2006, there were 13,814 soldiers (Active, Guard, and Reserve) affected by stop-loss. None of the other Services are currently using the program.

#### SPECIAL FORCES

16. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Giambastiani, the QDR calls for a significant increase in Special Operation Forces (SOFs) capability and capacity. "DOD will increase SOFs by 15 percent and increase the number of Special Force Battalions by one-third. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) will establish the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC). The Air Force will establish an unmanned aerial vehicle squadron under U.S. SOCOM. The Navy will support a U.S. SOCOM increase in SEAL team manning and will develop a riverine warfare capability." The QDR recognizes a need for the increase of SOF personnel and their capability. It is unclear where the resources required for this very important area will come from.

Will funding for a new MARSOC and Riverine Warfare Squadron come out of the Navy's budget—thus reducing the ability to fund naval aviation and ship procurement?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The Department of the Navy (DON) has requested, via the fiscal year 2006 Emergency Supplemental for Defense, initial funding for both the MARSOC and Navy riverine warfare. Out-year funding is programmed in the President's fiscal year 2007–2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) budget submission. In addition, the DON has reprogrammed personnel to MARSOC and riverine warfare within fiscal year 2006 mandated end strengths.

The DON is equally committed to funding MARSOC and Navy riverine warfare squadrons as well as the planned programming to fund ship and aircraft procurement. The DON investment strategy for shipbuilding, aircraft procurement, MARSOC, and riverine warfare is balanced and provides an essential capability mix. This capability mix is vital in the execution of the global war on terrorism, but is also leveraged to provide capabilities against future threats.

17. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Giambastiani, will the funds required by the Army to increase their SOF battalions come out of the FCS program?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The Army realigned funding from across its entire budget in order to fund the increase in special forces battalions. I am not aware of funds being reduced from the FCS program to offset these increases in special forces battalions.

18. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Giambastiani, are resources being diverted from some other area of DOD to fund this aggressive increase in our SOF capabilities?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. In order to begin the necessary increases in SOF capabilities called for in the 2006 QDR, funding to U.S. Special Operations Command came from a myriad of sources, and across all the Services. All of the sources were carefully vetted and should not affect any Service's ability to execute our national defense strategy.

#### RESERVE COMPONENTS

19. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary England and Admiral Giambastiani, the QDR recommends increasing Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) from 270 to 365 days. It seeks legislation to improve access to Guard and Reserve in support of civil authorities and it seeks legislative relief of PRC statute to activate reservists for natural disasters. It also recommends developing Reserve units that train more intensively and require shorter notice for deployment.

We are already hearing from many reservists and their employers about deployments which are neither periodic nor predictable. Are these policies in the best interests of our Total Force?

Secretary ENGLAND. The QDR recommendations you mentioned (increasing PRC from 270 to 365 days, improving access to Guard and Reserve in support of civil authorities, obtaining legislative relief in the PRC statute to activate reservists for natural disaster, and recommending the development of Reserve units that train more intensively and require shorter notice for deployment) are all elements that support the transition of the Reserve components to an "Operational Reserve."

Implementation of these changes, if legislation is approved, will enable the Department to not only employ the Reserve Forces more effectively, but also provide a much greater degree of predictability for reservists, families, and employers. The change to the PRC authority to allow for a call-up for 365 days will enable the Services to effectively use the one-in-six planning factor for involuntary service and the change to provide full access to the Reserve Forces for natural disasters will enhance response capability for events such as Katrina (a lesson learned from that unfortunate event). Employing units that train more intensively and require shorter notice for deployment is a way to maximize the use of volunteers—those who are willing and able to make that commitment. This is consistent with our expectation management plan in which we are providing information to all affected individuals (Reserve component members, their families, and their employers) of the duties, obligations, and opportunities of service in the Guard or Reserve—we plan to develop expectations first. These changes are part of the transition to a more operational Reserve, while retaining the fundamental nature of the citizen-soldier.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, these policies are most definitely in the best interest to our Total Force. The global war on terrorism and recent natural disasters have reinforced the way we view and employ our Reserve components. They are no longer a strategic Reserve performing Homeland missions as they were during the Cold War. Instead, they now operate as both a strategic and an operational Reserve. As such, the Reserve component is integral to the planning process at every level of warfare and must be considered in each contingency operation and/or deployment. We believe these policy changes will add to the predictability that our Reserve Forces and their civilian employers expect and deserve.

In addition to improving predictability of deployments, increasing PRC authority from 270 to 365 days will help to align with the operational rotation cycles currently used by the Active Army and Marine Corps. These rotation cycles vary from 6 to 12 months "boots on the ground," which are deemed to be the most efficient and effective tour length for their respective Services. A maximum duration equal to 270 days does not readily support those cycles when pre-deployment training and post-deployment deactivation are taken into account. Expanding that duration to 365 days will facilitate greater "boots on the ground" time for Reserve component deployments. As the Army Force Generation model matures through the 6-year cycle, we believe that more efficiency will be gained.

Moreover, granting the President the authority to employ Reserve Forces for use in natural disasters would simply give the Commander in Chief the power to use all available assets in times of domestic need. The President cannot use the existing PRC to call up the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), U.S. Navy Reserve (USNR), U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR), or the U.S. Air Force Reserve (USAFR) for situations such as Hurricane Katrina. In a world without partial mobilization, the ability to support Katrina-like scenarios with Reserve Forces would be critical and revision

of the PRC would enable the President to use all available DOD resources to accomplish that mission.

Finally, in regards to the development of Reserve units that train more intensively and require shorter notice for deployment, this too is an initiative that will add to the predictability of schedules and increase the readiness of the unit and the entire Reserve component. While the current construct of 1 weekend per month and 2 weeks of annual training per year is still viable, incorporating more productive, intense periods of training into the Reserve components is vital to mission proficiency and execution.

As we fight this long war and plan for the future, we must change the way we employ and plan for the use of our Reserve components. With the support of Congress, we can find the efficiencies we need and provide more predictability to our Reserve component forces and their employers.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE

##### INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

20. Senator DOLE. Secretary England, on February 7, General Pace testified before the SASC on the importance of interagency coordination and cooperation in the global war on terrorism. The QDR addresses interagency operations and notes that National Security Presidential Directive 44 designates the Secretary of State to improve overall U.S. Government stabilization and reconstruction efforts. In 2005, the DOD issued guidance to place stability operations on par with major combat operations. Given these seemingly contradictory policies, what functions in the war on terrorism should the DOD also be preparing for with its interagency partners?

Secretary ENGLAND. There is no contradiction between National Security Presidential Directive 44 designating the Secretary of State to improve overall U.S. Government stabilization and reconstruction efforts and DOD guidance to place stability operations on par with major combat operations. In fact, they are fully consistent, and together they support our vision of unity of effort to build broad national solutions for complex issues such as stability operations. There are critical elements to any stability operation that we must be preparing with our interagency partners: intelligence collection and fusion, command and control arrangements, and planning/gaming/exercising are some examples.

21. Senator DOLE. Secretary England, is the coordination between agencies currently where it needs to be when it comes to reconstruction and stability operations in Iraq?

Secretary ENGLAND. There are two levels to interagency coordination on Iraq reconstruction and stability issues: strategic guidance in Washington and implementation and execution of U.S. policy of stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq.

- At the strategic level in Washington, the Iraq Policy Operations Group (IPOG) is a mechanism for interagency coordination. The IPOG, a sub-Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC), is chaired by the National Security Council (NSC) and has representatives from all U.S. agencies. It has several subgroups that cover Iraq reconstruction issues, such as economics and job creation, security, rule of law, and politics and governance. It is proving to be a strong mechanism for agency stakeholders to define issues, identify potential resources, and develop guidance.
- In Iraq, the U.S. Embassy and Multi-National Force—Iraq are responsible for implementation and execution of U.S. policy of reconstruction and stability operations in Iraq.
- There are difficulties occasionally in coordination between agencies at these levels due to numerous reasons, such as resource constraints and security. The Department and the IPOG are, however, constantly evaluating ways to improve interagency efforts in Baghdad and the provinces to achieve the U.S. goals in Iraq.

##### DEFENSE LANGUAGE TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE

22. Senator DOLE. Secretary England, in 2004, the DOD launched its Defense Language Transformation Initiative in an effort to improve the ability of the Armed Forces to work more effectively with international partners. This is echoed throughout the QDR, which states that, “recent operations have reinforced the need for U.S. forces to have greater language skills and cultural awareness.” In order to overcome this legacy of a limited emphasis on languages and improve the overall linguistic

capabilities of the U.S. military, there must be a comprehensive and intensive language program. I applaud the recommendation for the future establishment of the Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, but what is the Department's plan to recruit language professionals and native speakers of Arabic, Farsi, and Chinese into the U.S. military?

Secretary ENGLAND. The Department has a multi-pronged approach to recruit from the Nation's heritage communities about the opportunities to serve in the United States military. Targeted recruiting into the Nation's heritage communities is a vital part of Defense Language Transformation.

- *Recruiting Enlisted Members:* Each Service has built a plan for recruiting from our Nation's heritage communities. These recruiting plans reflect the unique mission and culture of each Service, however, each Service plan does include: interim recruiting goals, target population centers, using recruiters who speak the language of the community, and using the direct approach, advertisements, and cyber recruiting to penetrate the market.
- *Recruiting Commissioned Officers:* To recruit commissioned officers, the Department will target universities that have students with foreign language skills such as Arabic, Chinese, and Farsi. To ensure oversight and focus of Service recruiting efforts, the Defense Language Office and the Military Personnel Accession Policy established a joint Service working group to evaluate, share, and coordinate best practices and lessons learned as we recruit enlisted and commissioned officers for the Department.
- *Reserve Component Recruiting:* To address immediate needs for translators and interpreters to support forces in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq, the Army established the 09L Translator Aide program in 2003 to recruit Arabic, Dari, and Pashtu speakers directly into the Individual Ready Reserve. Over the past 3 years, the program recruited 515 Arabic and Afghan speakers into the force and received outstanding ratings from commanders of deployed forces who employed these members. Based on the success of the pilot program, the Army expanded to include Kurdish and Farsi speakers and recommended that the program be institutionalized. In January 2006, the Army established the Translator Aide as a new military occupational specialty. As a military occupational specialty, the 09L Translator Aide soldier now has a viable career path and the Army can retain their language skills. The Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard will each have 104 Translator Aide billets. The 2006 QDR provides \$50 million for fiscal years 2007–2011 for this program.

A very successful and effective targeted recruiting initiative is the Army's Language Advocate Program. The program was established in 1999 to reach into select ethnic communities to recruit members with language skills into the Military Intelligence (MI) occupational specialty. Under the program, select MI soldiers with specific foreign language skills, are assigned to the United States Army Recruiting Command. These MI soldiers work with recruiters in select ethnic communities. The primary focus is to recruit personnel to fill the Army's enlisted intelligence specialties; however, if the MI soldier identifies an individual who might not be able to obtain a high level security clearance, the potential recruit is advised of non-intelligence specialties that require language skills. During the first year of the program, the Army estimated that 12 enlistment contracts for heritage speaking recruits saved 586 weeks of training time. For fiscal year 2006, the 8 Language Advocates assigned to Recruiting Command have a goal of 111 accessions.

A strong multi-pronged approach that is joint in nature, shares best practices, and lessons learned is essential to successfully recruiting from our Nation's rich heritage communities. The initiatives outlined above reflect the actions that will assist us to meet our goal of successful recruiting from our Nation's heritage communities.

#### NATIONAL GUARD

23. Senator DOLE. Secretary England, the QDR's first sentence states that "The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war." A theme throughout the document is developing a "Total Force" for the 21st century. The role the National Guard has played in disaster response; their heroic war efforts; and now the QDR's recommendations calling for even increased Guard participation in the form of Weapon of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD CSTs) and Enhanced Response Force packages certainly reflect its integral role in our national defense. Yet we have seen numerous attempts to not only reduce this essential force's end strength, but more importantly, its force structure. In my view, a National Guard

that is called upon to perform so many widely varied missions deserves to be funded and equipped properly. Given these facts, will you detail for me how you view the National Guard's role in the long war?

Secretary ENGLAND. The National Guard plays a critical role in the defense of this country, providing warfighting capabilities around the world, and at home, establishing security and rebuilding areas damaged by natural disasters. The National Guard will continue to play a vital role in the defense of this country, both at home and abroad. The Army National Guard is structured, manned, trained, and equipped to provide the operational depth required for large scale or long term combat and joint operations. The National Guard also provides critical defense support to civil authorities to include the employment of the WMD CSTs and Enhanced Response Force packages.

Dual missioned, the National Guard will continue to be modularized, manned, and equipped to support the missions called upon to defend this country. As part of its rebalancing efforts, the Army has committed to the Army National Guard (ARNG) force structure. Rebalancing the force will require the conversion of some ARNG brigades from combat formations to combat support or combat service support units to support sustained combat or post-combat operations. This effort will be enhanced by a significant investment in ARNG equipment. Personnel numbers will reflect the ARNG's success in recruiting—and the Army is committed to funding up to the presently authorized end strength of 350,000 in fiscal year 2007.

The American people and the Department will continue to rely on the National Guard to provide the capability to defeat our adversaries around the world and to protect our communities at home as a key component of the Total Force.

24. Senator DOLE. Secretary England, will you fund and equip the National Guard at levels that allow them to perform the missions we ask them to perform as part of the "Total Force" in this war?

Secretary ENGLAND. The DOD's goal is to ensure that each National Guard unit is fully equipped with the most technologically advanced and capable equipment prior to deployment to an area of operation. Since September 11, 2001, the Department has invested over \$10 billion on Guard equipment. The fiscal year 2007 budget requests a total of \$2.75 billion for new Guard equipment, including:

- \$348 million for armored Humvees and other tactical vehicles;
- \$218 million for Stryker vehicles;
- \$90 million for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems;
- \$87 million for Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems;
- \$343 million for modifications to aircraft such as E-8s, F-16s, and C-130s; and,
- \$439 million for missiles and other munitions.

Over the fiscal years 2005–2011 time period, the Department plans to invest over \$27 billion for new National Guard equipment to ensure units are equipped to perform as part of the "Total Force."

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

##### RISK ASSESSMENT

25. Senator LEVIN. Admiral Giambastiani, the law lays out as one of the principal aims of the QDR as "to identify the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that National Defense Strategy at a low to moderate risk. . . ." It also provides that "The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman's assessment of the review, including the Chairman's assessment of risk."

Please provide the Chairman's assessment of the level of risk associated with the QDR as low, moderate, or high, and identify the nature and magnitude of the political, strategic, and military risks involved.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. As required by law, the QDR identifies a plan that will allow us to accomplish the full range of missions called for in the National Defense Strategy at a "low-to-moderate" level of risk.

As the Chairman mentions in his assessment of the QDR, any attempt to predict the nature of the future security environment is difficult. Therefore, the QDR recommends investing toward a fully transformed force that will be best prepared to meet the political, strategic, and military challenges we may face over the next 20 years. General Pace and all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically dis-

cussed this issue and all agree that the level of risk associated with the QDR is “low-to-moderate.”

Today, the Armed Forces of the United States stand fully capable of accomplishing all the objectives of the National Defense Strategy. We must prevail now in the global war on terrorism while we also prepare for the future. The recommendations of the QDR will allow us to accomplish these vital goals.

#### BUDGET-DRIVEN QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

26. Senator LEVIN. Secretary England, in his Chairman’s Assessment of the QDR, General Pace states that “The aim was a review that was strategy driven, capabilities focused, and budget disciplined.” He also notes that “The 2006 QDR tackles the most pressing needs of the Department in a strategically sound and fiscally responsible manner.” However, the Conference Report to the DOD National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, which made permanent the requirement for a QDR, stated that “A successful review, the conferees believe, should be driven first by the demands of strategy, not by any presupposition about the size of the defense budget.”

Given this direction from Congress, why was the QDR “budget disciplined?”

Secretary ENGLAND. From the outset of the QDR, there was no presumption about the size of the Defense budget. At the start, the QDR team and senior leadership explored the following questions: what is the nature of the threats the nation faces, and what forces and capabilities does the nation need to deal with that range of threats, regardless of who would provide the capability and at what cost. Accordingly, senior leadership spent an incredible amount of time thinking through the four focus areas—defeating terrorist networks, defending the homeland in depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing hostile states and non-actors from acquiring or using WMD—associated threats and capabilities irrespective of cost. Once these issues were laid out, we had to reconcile how to achieve the needed capabilities. This process involved tradeoffs. Leading edge investments were made and reallocation will continue over time.

#### SPECIAL OPERATIONS AUTHORITIES

27. Senator LEVIN. Secretary England, on page 29 of the QDR is an assertion that to prevent terrorist attacks and disrupt terrorist networks “the Department must be prepared to develop a new team of leaders and operators who are comfortable working in remote regions of the world, dealing with local and tribal communities, adapting to foreign languages and cultures, and working with local networks to further U.S. and partner interests through personal engagement, persuasion, and quiet influence—rather than through military force alone. To support this effort, new authorities are needed.”

SOFs already do this—they work all over the world with local partners to exercise influence. What authority do they not currently have that you would request and are you planning to seek further authority for clandestine operations or covert operations?

Secretary ENGLAND. You are absolutely correct that SOFs possess the authorities necessary to prevent terrorist attacks and disrupt terrorism networks. The QDR emphasis is to bring these authorities more broadly available to greater segments of the Department; not to diminish SOF authorities.

#### RESERVE CALL-UP AUTHORITY

28. Senator LEVIN. Secretary England, the QDR (pages 76–77) report states that “the Reserve component must be operationalized, so that select reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today.” The QDR goes on to state that DOD will “Pursue authorities for increased access to the Reserve component” to increase the period authorized for Presidential Reserve call-up from 270 to 365 days.

Under current law, the President has authority to order up to 200,000 members of the Reserve component to Active-Duty for up to 270 days when it is necessary to augment the Active Forces for any operational mission. This is commonly referred to as the PRC authority. If this authority is not sufficient, the President has separate authority to declare a national emergency and order up to 1 million reservists to Active-Duty for up to 24 consecutive months. This authority is commonly referred to as partial mobilization authority and is currently being used in OIF and OEF. Finally, if even more authority is required and Congress declares a national emer-

gency, members of the Reserves can be ordered to Active-Duty for the duration of the national emergency plus 6 months.

It is unclear why it is necessary or desirable to increase the Presidential Reserve call-up authority from 270 days to a year. Current law already provides means of gaining access to the Reserves for more than 270 days when it is necessary.

Why does the QDR recommend increasing the Presidential Reserve call-up authority to a year?

Secretary ENGLAND. The Total Force has changed significantly over the past 2 decades with the Reserve components becoming an integral and critical part of the force. Certain capabilities have been designed into the Reserve structure and most military operations require some elements of Reserve support. Many recent operations have not been of the magnitude requiring a declaration of war or national emergency. We have learned that these operations, similar to those PRCs for Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Southwest Asia, may require certain types of Reserve Forces to be in a deployed status for 6 to 9 months for both reasonable and optimal efficiency. Adding pre-operation training time and post-operation administration time, 270 days would be insufficient.

Similarly, the world has changed significantly since the hierarchical Reserve call-up authorities were established in law. Generally, we can no longer assume that military operations will be phased events leading to successively larger operations that can be supported with a phased growth in the size of the employed Reserve Force, i.e., PRC, to partial mobilization, to full mobilization. Flexibility in the legal authorities to independently support these operations in the future is necessary, especially as we transition to an Operational Reserve.

29. Senator LEVIN. Secretary England, why is the President's partial mobilization authority to order members to Active-Duty for 2 years not sufficient?

Secretary ENGLAND. The President's partial mobilization authority, contained in section 12304 of title 10, United States Code, to order Reserve component members to Active-Duty support for 2 years, is sufficient. The President determines the appropriate mobilization authority that is best suited for the circumstance involved and invokes that authority through a subsequent executive order.

30. Senator LEVIN. Secretary England, if the Presidential Reserve call-up authority is increased to a year, how does the Department plan to use it?

Secretary ENGLAND. We would use the new authority similarly to how we have used the current PRC authority for Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Southwest Asia. This new authority is designed for those specific Reserve Forces that would need to be in a deployed status for up to 9 months. Adding pre-operation training time and post-operation administration time would render the current 270 days insufficient.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN

##### QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

31. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary England, the QDR was widely touted as an opportunity for a revolutionary document, given that this was the second QDR for the DOD under Secretary Rumsfeld, and the first QDR developed after September 11, 2001. However, most reports find the prescriptions in the QDR as lacking in boldness. The reason for this description is that many experts do not believe any hard choices were made in this document. Even though we are moving from a focus on conventional threats to a more complicated scenario involving asymmetric and irregular threats, we have continued to escalate funding for all of our current weapons systems. The problem is that history demonstrates that it is likely the United States will see a decrease or leveling off in defense spending in the near future, leaving less for new, needed capabilities. The QDR is supposed to serve as the venue for serving up these difficult decisions. Why did the DOD avoid these tough choices?

Secretary ENGLAND. We believe a proper "metric" for assessing the QDR is whether or not the QDR sets the right vector for long-term change in the Department, both in terms of military capabilities for the range of 21st century challenges our Nation will face, and in terms of revamping and modernizing the defense enterprise. In this sense, we believe the QDR is indeed a bold document. Consistent with the strategic vector of the QDR, there are indeed significant recommendations for programmatic changes, as well as proposals for leading-edge changes in key selected capabilities such as Special Operations, intelligence, biological defenses, and WMD elimination.

32. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary England, it is my understanding that a Pentagon-commissioned “red team” proposed a number of changes for the U.S. military, including canceling the Navy’s DDX destroyer, building more nuclear submarines, and reexamining the Army’s FCS. What happened to the recommendations offered by the “red team?”

Secretary ENGLAND. In fact, a number of outside teams informed the thinking of the Department’s senior leaders during the QDR. The “red team” recommendations, along with consultation with the major Department Boards, such as the DSB and Defense Policy Board, informed the process. QDR analytical teams examined all of their recommendations and forwarded many of them to the QDR Group of 12 (co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for review. Those consistent with the QDR focus areas, such as increasing unmanned aerial vehicle capability and production, are reflected as leading edge investments in the fiscal year 2007 President’s budget request or will be included in the fiscal year 2008 request.

33. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary England, was there a conscious decision to scale back the ambitious goals of the QDR and if so, why did this occur?

Secretary ENGLAND. The ambitious goals you claim were not scaled back. The QDR establishes the strategic vector for the Department and emphasizes four critical areas for the Department: defeating terrorist networks, defending the Homeland in depth, shaping the choices of countries at a strategic crossroads, and preventing the acquisition or use of WMDs by hostile actors. Omission of reference to a specific weapon system or program in the QDR report does not constitute scaling back goals. The QDR Execution Roadmaps continue to work the substance of the strategic vector.

#### CHINA

34. Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Giambastiani, according to the QDR, China has the “greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies.” Although United States foreign policy continues to encourage China to choose a path towards political liberalization and economic partnership, we must face the reality that China continues to invest heavily in their military. In particular, it is estimated that by 2010, China will possess a submarine fleet of over 50 boats. According to a February 2006 Congressional Research Service report, there is no slowdown of Chinese submarine production in sight. The QDR does recognize the importance of increasing our submarine production, and that’s a good thing. However, the current plan is to increase production to two submarines a year in 2012. Quite simply, this acceleration of production comes too late in the game. If we wait until 2012, we risk allowing China a window of opportunity in which there is an escalated threat to Taiwan’s independence. Furthermore, we also put our domestic submarine manufacturing base in serious jeopardy. Building submarines requires a highly skilled workforce, and if we do not sustain these workers, we cannot make them magically reappear in 2012. Did the QDR raise any concerns about our maritime capability in light of the growth of China’s undersea warfare capability?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The QDR raised numerous concerns regarding the military capabilities of several countries, including China, as part of the QDR’s evaluation of countries at “strategic crossroads.” This discussion was also balanced by the additional focus of other equally pressing considerations, such as defeating terrorist networks, defending the Homeland, and preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD. During QDR deliberations, it became clear that we needed to maintain our capability to build quality submarines and to continue our technological advantage against an increasingly capable country, and thus we rejected proposals of fewer submarines in favor of maintaining our submarine production and returning to steady-state production of two attack submarines per year by 2012.

35. Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Giambastiani, with the submarine fleet we have now, and continuing at the rate of production of only one boat a year until 2012, is the United States able to counter effectively the increasing number of submarines the Chinese put to sea?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The QDR included a thorough review of our submarine force structure requirements and determined that a production rate of one boat per year through 2011 is an acceptable level of risk. We understand the QDR is a point-in-time document in a very dynamic process, so we will continually assess our total

force capabilities against both current and future threats to our national interests. While submarines remain a key element of the Total Force, they are only one component of our anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. With the help of Congress, the Department has invested resources in ASW platforms, sensors, and training so our overall capability in this challenging warfighting area continues to keep pace with the threat.

36. Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Giambastiani, can you describe the intelligence risk we will sustain if this inequality of production continues?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. China's submarine modernization effort is producing a substantially more modern and capable submarine force than its predecessors. We expect the Chinese submarine force to constitute a key element of their anti-access strategy to deny U.S. naval force access during conflict. While both the size and sophistication of the Chinese force is a concern, potential negative aspects of build rate inequalities may be ameliorated through employment of a diverse array of intelligence collection and anti-submarine warfare platforms, including distributed sensors, unmanned vehicles, submarines, surface ships, helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft.

#### RUSSIA

37. Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Giambastiani, Russia retains a significant submarine force. What is the global operational risk the Russians exhibit?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Russia continues to operate some highly capable SSNs, SSBNs, and diesel submarines, and continues to build sophisticated submarines (albeit at a greatly decreased rate since the Cold War). Russian deployments have also tapered off significantly since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Russians appear to be focusing on maintaining combat readiness rather than conducting sustained at-sea operations.

The proliferation of very capable Russian weapons systems, including submarines and submarine technology, is a part of today's global environment. The sale of Russian submarines to third parties increases the threat that U.S. naval forces will need to engage more advanced weapons systems during operational missions.

Nevertheless, the United States still enjoys a significant tactical advantage in submarine platforms, sensors, weapons, and, most importantly, crew training. The United States also enjoys an asymmetric advantage in the experience gained from operations around the world.

#### NEW LONDON

38. Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Giambastiani, the QDR dictates that 60 percent of the United States' submarine fleet should be located in the Pacific. To comply with this requirement, the Navy has decided recently to move submarines from New London to their new locations in the Pacific. The decision to move three submarines from New London, rather than another location, does not reflect the current threat environment. Submarines based in New London are positioned to operate in the Atlantic, and can also reach the Pacific quickly via the polar route. It makes sense that if the United States wants to increase its Pacific presence, it should keep the submarine fleet in New London strong. Furthermore, the repositioning of submarines to the Pacific suggests we need to expand our undersea warfare capability as soon as possible if we want to keep risks associated with undersea warfare at a manageable level. Can you justify the decision to move submarines from the strategically advantaged position of New London?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The New London Submarine Base is a vital component of the United States Atlantic Fleet. Submarines from east coast bases play a significant role in forward deployed Navy missions.

The 2006 QDR directed "The fleet will have greater presence in the Pacific Ocean, consistent with the global shift of trade and transport. Accordingly, the Navy plans to adjust its force structure and basing—including 60 percent of its submarines in the Pacific to support engagement, presence, and deterrence."

To comply with the QDR the Navy has decided to move three submarines from New London and two submarines from Norfolk over the next 3 years to bases in the Pacific. Of the New London submarines, two are *Seawolf* class submarines that due to their stealth, speed, and payload are best utilized for Pacific Theater Commander requirements.

The Navy plans to maintain the 60–40 percent Pacific and Atlantic fleet balance of submarines by assigning the new *Virginia* class ships to Pearl Harbor and New

London as required to maintain the correct percentage. New London will continue to be an important Navy submarine homeport well into the future.

#### TYPES OF THREATS

39. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary England, the QDR outlines four types of threats: traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. As I read the QDR, the decisions which were made did a good job matching up our irregular risks with necessary programmatic changes. On the other hand, I saw very little in resource allocation that reflected the threats posed by catastrophic and disruptive challenges. Why were these two components of the threat assessment largely ignored in the re-orientation of capabilities and forces? In particular, an outline of our future military capabilities addressing Homeland defense was, at best, inadequate. Can you explain why the QDR failed to address these important areas?

Secretary ENGLAND. The QDR takes a comprehensive approach to building military capabilities: instead of trying to “pigeonhole” specific capabilities with specific threats, we recommend building a portfolio of capabilities that can help us to overcome multiple challenges, be they associated with traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive threats. By focusing on four critical areas for assessing our military capabilities, we believe the QDR sets the stage for balancing risks to our Nation across the spectrum of challenges you describe.

#### RISK ASSESSMENT

40. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary England, when particular decisions about weapons systems and force structure were made for the QDR, these choices generated a certain level of strategic risk. For example, continuing to support all of the conventional weapons systems generates some level of risk for the other three categories of challenges (catastrophic, irregular, disruptive) outlined in the QDR. However, in the QDR, I could not find a substantial discussion of risk assessment. There is always some level of risk in the military decisions we make, but I saw no evaluation or analysis of risk in the document. Can you comment on why risk assessment was not included in the QDR?

Secretary ENGLAND. The Department constantly referenced the QDR 2001 risk areas: Operational Risk, Force Management Risk, Future Challenges Risk, and Institutional Risk during this QDR. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s assessment of the 2006 QDR found at Annex A of the report does specifically address risk assessment finding “The recommendations contained in this report provide future capability, capacity, and flexibility to execute these assigned missions, while hedging against the unknown threats of 2025.”

#### STRATEGIC POSTURE

41. Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Giambastiani, how does the possibility of a civil war in Iraq challenge the strategic posture of the U.S. military?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Our national objectives for developing a unity government that is representative of all Iraqi citizens, and that is at peace with itself and its neighbors, are even more important today than before and the Iraqis understand this. Although the possibility for civil war remains, we will do everything we can to prevent it. Our presence in many areas is stabilizing and prevents further violence, regardless of whether it is motivated by sectarianism, terrorism, or rejectionism.

We will continue our mission of security and stability in Iraq. This mission challenges our strategic posture, but the challenge is manageable. We will continue to support the development of a responsive, inclusive government as well as accountable, self-reliant security forces. These actions are ultimately the best approach to preventing civil war. In the end, Iraqis must prevent a civil war.

42. Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Giambastiani, a civil war poses different risks than asymmetric, counter-insurgency warfare. It seems to me that a civil war is actually a category of warfare not covered in the QDR. As we look at the QDR with regards to the immediate future in Iraq, what are our military options?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The QDR is very comprehensive and includes sustaining U.S. military capabilities along the entire spectrum of warfare, of which civil war is a part. Military capabilities are flexible and can be used from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping to major combat operations. The QDR does have added growth in the development in irregular warfare capabilities. However, civil war as

a category can include major combat operations as well as irregular forms of warfare, and is defined by the fact that it is internal to a nation-state and not between nation-states. Civil war is not defined by a particular method of warfare. Our military is prepared for any kind of warfighting, both internal and external to Iraq, and this is included in the QDR.

43. Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Giambastiani, how will we handle the challenge if neighboring countries entered the fight in Iraq?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. We have a U.N.-mandated responsibility to protect the integrity of Iraq and its borders and we will fulfill this mandate in partnership with the Iraqi government and our coalition partners. We view the likelihood of any such overt military involvement by a neighbor of Iraq as very low.

#### ARMY END STRENGTH

44. Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Giambastiani, at a February 28 SASC hearing on worldwide threats, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, stated that in Iraq, “the insurgency is emboldened and will remain active throughout 2006.” As I understand it, part of the justification for decreasing the Army’s end strength in the QDR is based upon the assumption that the United States will be drawing down our troops in Iraq. Do the recent events in Iraq call into question the QDR’s call for a decrease in Army end strength?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The current troop level in Iraq was not an assumption used in QDR deliberations regarding the Total Force and the stabilization of Army end strength. The QDR endorses the Army’s move to modularize its force, which actually calls for an increase in the number of operational forces and increases the number and lethality of BCTs. These BCTs will be more capable and more agile—which will be more effective in the long war.

45. Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Giambastiani, if the United States continues to engage in irregular warfare beyond Iraq, at or above that level of deployment, what is the correct ratio of brigades that must support deployed units?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Ongoing analysis will continue to assess how to better optimize balance between modular BCT and support brigades. Army’s shift to modular brigades already includes reduction in support forces, and better integration of those forces with modular BCTs. As planned, the ratio of operational to support brigades will be:

Regular Army: 42 BCTs/75 support brigades;  
 Army National Guard: 28 BCTs/78 support brigades;  
 United States Army Reserves: 58 support brigades.

This represents a 46-percent increase in readily available combat power and better balances between combat and support forces. Ongoing operational availability studies will continue to assess the sufficiency of both operational and support units to inform future decisions regarding operational to support ratios.

#### DEFENSE ACQUISITION

46. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Henry, the acquisitions process was not addressed extensively in the QDR, even though the defense acquisitions process is often expensive and cumbersome which rarely meets the timeframes initially promised. There is an extensive discussion of process in the document, which describes the new streamlined organizational structure of DOD. It may be that the new organizational structure of DOD is supposed to help solve some of the problems of defense acquisitions, but from reading the QDR, I’m unsure about the connection. Can you tell me how the QDR addresses the problems facing defense acquisitions?

Secretary ENGLAND. QDR Integrated Product Team #5, Business Practices and Processes had a specific working group looking at acquisition and support and another examining joint governance. Throughout the QDR process the Department recognized there were some initiatives that could not be adequately addressed even in a year-long review. The QDR Execution Roadmaps are designed to continue the analysis and discussion for a select number of QDR efforts. One of these is the Institutional Governance and Reform Roadmap led by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Director of the Joint Staff. This effort is specifically addressing defense acquisition and culminating the work of the early working groups.

## QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW DEVELOPMENT

47. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary England, when I sponsored legislation in 1997 with Senator Dan Coats to create the QDR process, I viewed it as an opportunity for Congress to gain a comprehensive oversight of DOD. Also, the QDR was designed to provide DOD with an opportunity to reassess the military's strategic threats and make sure our resources and future weapons development match those threats. Ideally, the budget should not drive the process. Instead, the intent of our legislation was to enable the strategic threat posture to drive the decisions outlined in the QDR. The future direction of our U.S. military should flow from the strategic risks we face. To this end, can you describe the process in which this QDR was developed and was it formulated in a top-down manner with the strategic threats and risks driving the recommendations for operations? Or, is it more accurate to say that it was developed concurrently with the fiscal year 2007 budget?

Secretary ENGLAND. The 2006 QDR Report was released concurrently with the fiscal year 2007 President's budget but the strategic thought and top-down formulation was ongoing for the previous 15 months. The phases of the 2006 QDR demonstrate an absolute commitment to the letter and the spirit of the legislation you cosponsored in 1997. QDR began with a number of senior leader sessions to review the strategic environment and provide top-down guidance. This phase reviewed the National Defense Strategy published in March 2005 and culminated in the publication of the Terms of Reference for the QDR, which provided internal departmental guidance for conducting the review. The Terms of Reference reviewed the strategic challenges and identified four focus areas for the 2006 QDR and these four areas provide the framework for all subsequent QDR work. A series of senior roundtables with interagency partners gave specific guidance on the capabilities for review within these focus areas. The next phase of QDR involved the formation of the six Integrated Product Teams and their working groups. Once again top-down strategic thought guided these efforts as each team was led concurrently by a senior uniformed officer and civilian. The results of the Integrated Product Teams were reported to the senior leadership in the next phase through the creation of the Group of 12 co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Strategic threats and risk assessment discussions were continuously reviewed in the 50+ Group of 12 meetings. Throughout the QDR in-progress reviews were presented to the Senior Leadership Review Group and the Senior Planning Council to reinforce the top-down nature of this QDR. As the fiscal year 2007 budget request was developed in the fall 2005, the strategic thought and risk assessment associated with the QDR provided the measure stick for assessing the Department's program and budget.

## EDUCATION

48. Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Giambastiani, there is copious discussion of the needs of the "21st century Total Force" in the QDR. Besides language training, I do not see how the military transformation outlined in the QDR can develop the skills of the modern warfighter. What do your educational and training plans for transformation entail? Specifically, who will receive the training (enlisted, officers) and what new curriculum will be used?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Per a task levied upon the Secretary of Defense in the NDAA 2005, the Department will soon forward a "Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education" for congressional consideration. The development of this plan was largely based on the CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development published in November 2005. The vision posits the requirement to identify and inculcate a set of joint leader competencies and skills based on the enduring values and future missions of the Joint Force. Our intent is to produce the leaders we need for the "future force" by linking our professional military school curricula to a defined set of enduring leader competencies that are under development now.

I am also pleased to inform you that we recently published our first Joint Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy to address the educational needs of our enlisted personnel. The policy provides guidance to the Services regarding joint learning objectives that must be incorporated into Service education programs. This brings the enlisted program in line with our officer education system and creates a "private through lieutenant general" holistic approach to joint education.

Lastly, the QDR identified a number of areas that "21st century warfighters" must be competent in beyond language training. Parallel work is being done to expand our capabilities and skills in irregular warfare, interagency operations, stability operations, information operations, combating WMD, and improved regional

and cultural expertise. In this regard, we are thoroughly assessing how well our education and training programs will prepare our officer and enlisted warfighters to meet these future challenges. After our assessment is complete, we will adjust existing officer and enlisted curricula or create new curricula to fill any gaps in our existing programs.

49. Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Giambastiani, how is this educational and retraining priority reflected in DOD's fiscal year 2007 budget?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. We have increased our commitment to this critical area. Our fiscal year 2007 budget reflects an increase of \$149 million over fiscal year 2006 and stands at \$181 million. Of this total, \$130 million will fund QDR endorsed initiatives and \$51 million will continue to support the proficiency enhancement program at the Defense Language Institute. Over the FYDP, resourcing will consist of \$760 million to equip our forces with the language and cultural skills they will need for 21st century missions. The budget provides the resources to: increase the language competency of general forces in languages like Arabic and others; expand language training for Special Operations and intelligence units; and increase pay and recruitment of native speakers to serve as translators and interpreters for operational forces.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

##### SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

50. Senator REED. Secretary England, the QDR mentions the need for "sustaining America's scientific and technological advantage over potential competitors." What detailed strategy has been developed or is being developed to ensure this occurs?

Secretary ENGLAND. The Director, Defense Research and Engineering is developing a Research and Engineering Strategy to be published in the near future. The strategy establishes a framework for strategic planning activities for the Services and agencies, and guides future science and technology investments.

51. Senator REED. Secretary England, the previous QDR set a goal of investment of 3 percent of the Defense budget in science and technology programs. Was any such goal analyzed for this QDR and why was no specific target set for science and technology programs?

Secretary ENGLAND. This QDR reviewed the 3 percent goal of investment in science and technology programs and found it satisfactory. There were discussions about emphasizing specific types of science and technology, such as advanced biological defenses.

##### INDUSTRIAL BASE

52. Senator REED. Secretary England, the QDR states that there should be a shift in the Department's emphasis from "broad-based industrial mobilization—to targeted commercial solutions." Please elaborate on this statement and describe any policy and programmatic initiatives in place that are supportive of it. Are there some technologies and systems that DOD will depend on that cannot be addressed with commercial solutions?

Secretary ENGLAND. During the Cold War, the Department planned to mobilize domestic production to fight a prolonged land war in Europe against the Soviet Union and its allies. Today, instead of planning to mobilize the entire U.S. industrial base to fight a prolonged, high intensity conflict, the Department primarily plans to fight lower intensity conflicts using available defense materiel (for example, planes, ships, armored ground vehicles, telecommunications systems, and surveillance platforms). Nevertheless, DOD components have developed targeted industrial preparedness measures to accelerate production of defense-unique items like precision munitions, critical troop support items, and spares.

There are, however, cases in which the Department should rely on primarily-commercial industry segments in which it is a relatively minor player. For instance, commercial information technology (IT) and products represent the state-of-the-art in 21st century communications. They are produced globally and commercial suppliers are the best in the world in many market segments. The global commercial IT market dwarfs the defense IT market and the Department's leverage over that market is limited. Whereas U.S. defense spending accounts for roughly half the world's defense spending, U.S. defense IT spending accounts for only about one percent of the world IT market. Although there are risks associated with employing

commercial technologies (uncertain strategic technology direction, uncontrolled technology access and dissemination, obsolescence) commercial IT products offer a number of benefits. The technology is the most current and advanced available, development costs are amortized over the broader commercial business base, and there are numerous competitive suppliers. Accordingly, commercial IT products frequently offer better performance and are less expensive than technology procured solely for DOD applications. To the extent that the Department can utilize commercial IT, it does.

Other industry segments with strong commercial market focus offer similar benefits. The Department must increasingly leverage state-of-the-art commercial technologies and products, and manage the risks accordingly.

53. Senator REED. Secretary England, did any QDR analyses look at the preservation of these militarily-unique portions of the industrial base and what were their recommendations?

Secretary ENGLAND. During QDR discussions on the focus area “defending the Homeland in depth” there was a great deal of senior leader discussion about preserving the military-unique portions of the industrial base especially those associated with critical infrastructure protection. Additionally, munitions, shipbuilding, and aerospace industries were considered. The specific recommendations were not all captured in the QDR report and continue to inform the fiscal years 2008–2013 program development.

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

