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SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
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JANUARY 30, 2007

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[There were no Questions submitted.]

SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, January 30, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Are all of our witnesses here?

Gentlemen, thank you for joining us.

Somebody shut the door, please.

Before I begin, I might again recommend to the witnesses that you confine your statements to four minutes. Automatically, without objection, your written testimony will be placed in the record.

The committee is doing a fine job of staying within the five-minute rule, so I compliment them and I thank them for that.

Yesterday, I returned from a trip to Kuwait, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Germany, as part of a delegation led by Speaker Pelosi. Along on this trip were other members who were chairmen of various committees or appropriations subcommittees that dealt with national security, including our very own Silvestre Reyes, who is, as you know, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee. Speaker Pelosi led the delegation and did a superb job in meeting with the heads of state of four of the five countries.

I greatly appreciate our meetings with Afghanistan's President Karzai, Pakistan's President Musharraf, and both the American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) senior commanders.

It is always wonderful to be with our fighting men and women who really were the highlight of our trip. These courageous men and women are serving on the front lines with a very critical mission of patriotism and devotion. We are truly grateful to them. We are grateful to their families for the sacrifices that they make.

The delegation left this country convinced that this has become the forgotten war. The war in Afghanistan is the forgotten war. I have been saying this for some time, and the trip confirmed this.

We must do more to secure Afghanistan while the effort there is still winnable. Reconstruction, governance, and an economic base that does not rely on primarily the narcotics trade will be the long-term effort.

But the Taliban, the enemy, the Taliban can be destroyed for good, and the Afghan people will have the hope that their future lies with a central government, and giving us the confidence that this country will not again become a harbor for terrorists.

But to do this, the commanders in Afghanistan must have the adequate troops and the right types of them, particularly through the spring and the summer months. I believe the recently announced increase in troops, strengthened by extending the third Brigade of the tenth Mountain Division in Afghanistan for four months will help. It will be a sacrifice for those troops and their families, but they can't do it alone.

While we should consider what else we need to do for Afghanistan, our NATO partners must do more as well. They have made commitments to this fight in Afghanistan, both in stabilizing the country, as well as reconstruction. They need to step up their efforts. Their commander, British General David Richards, told the delegation that the countries of the alliance must contribute more fighting forces. The whole world stands to gain if Afghanistan succeeds.

I am encouraged by reports of supplemental assistance for Afghanistan to be proposed in the Administration's budget package. Speaker Pelosi has made clear that Congress will expeditiously consider the proposal. We need to look carefully at what must be done next in terms of training and the equipping of the Afghan security forces, as well as reconstruction.

This committee and others will look at these issues quite carefully.

The challenges in Afghanistan continue to be great. Security in Afghanistan necessarily involves the border region with Pakistan and the development of competent security forces. Opium production is at a record level and, unless tackled more aggressively, could undermine all other efforts to stabilize the country. Corruption is also rampant, and much of the population remains illiterate and impoverished, without even the most basic services such as running water and electricity.

But I believe there is great reason to be optimistic about Afghanistan, if we put the right resources there and maintain a consistent commitment under a consistent long-term strategy that gives that country the attention that it deserves. It is the forgotten war.

So, gentlemen, I hope you can help us understand the way forward. This will be the first of several hearings we will hold on Afghanistan in the coming months, and you will help us set the stage. What are the key challenges facing the United States and coalition military operations, the Afghan government, the security forces, and counter-narcotics and reconstruction efforts? And how should these challenges be addressed?

I am pleased to have with us an exceptionally qualified panel of experts.

We have Ambassador James Dobbins, who served as the president's first envoy to Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks.

We have Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, who handled matters involving Afghanistan as the assistant secretary of state from 1997 to 2001.

We have the Honorable Ali Jalali, Afghanistan's interior minister until 2005.

We have Dr. Anthony Cordesman, an old friend, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who is another one of the country's top experts on Afghanistan.

Before your testimony, gentlemen, I turn to my good friend and my colleague from California, the gentleman from San Diego, Duncan Hunter, ranking member.

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for having this hearing, which is very timely.

I also welcome our guests today.

According to all accounts, the 2006 poppy crop was among the highest, if not the highest, ever produced in Afghanistan. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime stated that the amount of land that is now dedicated to poppy crops increased 61 percent from 2005 to 2006.

So poppy production in Afghanistan has increased now by more than 26 percent, and in the relatively violent provinces of Helmand and Oruzgan, production has increased 132 percent. In looking at recent planning, some Afghan officials predict that next year's yield could easily rival the 2006 crop.

Gentlemen, I know you are going to speak to this issue. I have talked to a number of our organizations which are involved in trying to offer that substitute economic base to the Afghan people who are involved right now in poppy production.

It looks to me like one of the most viable, and I would like you to talk to this, is orchard plantings—that is, almonds and other cash crops, which take a while to get up but nonetheless they have a certain permanence that I would think would provide an exclusion of poppy plantings in the future.

If a small farmer has a couple of acres on his little postage-stamp farms and puts them in orchards and gets the trees up to the point where they can produce something every year and make cash for that family, it is probably realistic to expect that they are not going to cut the trees down in a given year and put poppies in.

I would like you to talk to this plan, if you would.

I looked at our bureaucracy that is trying to put this in place, lots of great people, well-intentioned folks. Sometimes, I have come to the conclusion I get out in our farming areas around this country, and you see good old practical, smart, scientific American farmers with kind of a can-do attitude. I wonder if maybe the operations there, that are in charge of these substitute programs, substituting orchards for poppies, our bureaucracy might be better populated by some tough, old, practical farmers who grow lots of orchards, who are in that business, and perhaps insert them up front in the process.

Another aspect of this, I have been educated as to the loya jirgah, the traditions of Afghan society, and especially the way decisions are made on a local basis, where you have to make a sale of the substitution to local leadership, get them to buy in, give

them something of substance or a light at the end of the tunnel, a program that they have confidence in, to make the sale, and then immediately go to work.

I wonder if we are using that traditional system enough, or if we are simply putting in large contractors in Kabul who have a limited connection, if you will, with the people on the ground and the communities where the poppies are being produced in the largest numbers.

So if you could address that, this idea of substitution. Because, in the end, we are going to have to offer these folks an alternative. It looks to me, especially if you look at the small size of these farms, wheat, or other cash crops that are relatively low in value probably aren't going to pull the train, but orchards could. I know we have some orchard substitute operations going on out there.

The chairman mentioned that we have, in fact, now 21,000 U.S. service members now serving in Afghanistan, and that we have NATO leadership in Afghanistan. If you look at the nations especially who have decided not to participate in bearing the burden in Iraq, there are a lot of NATO nations with major assets who aren't deploying, aren't volunteering, aren't moving up in the Afghanistan program.

I once looked at the formula whereby NATO participants, NATO members participate in military operations. I looked to see if there was a formula for burden-sharing, where there is a certain goal, even if an informal goal, that the membership tries to reach, where everybody pulls their weight. I discovered there is none. It is basically a potluck, and that means each member of NATO brings what they volunteer. In many of these NATO operations, the United States brings the T-bone steaks and others bring the plastic forks.

In this case, there is a compelling interest of all the NATO nations to help carry that burden in Afghanistan. I would like to have your comments on whether or not you think that they are moving forth, that they are assuming that burden, or whether they are pushing away from it with a policy that says, "Let Uncle Sam do it. It is going to be expensive, it is going to be tough, it is going to be politically difficult back home. Let's let Uncle Sam carry that burden."

If you have any ideas on how we are able to better inspire our NATO allies to assume that burden, I would certainly be interested in hearing it.

So thank you for being with us today. I appreciate it.

And, Mr. Chairman, a very timely hearing that you have called, and I look forward to the statements.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hunter.

Again, if you could limit your presentation to four minutes, we would certainly appreciate it. Without objection, each of your full statements will go into the record.

Ambassador Dobbins.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES DOBBINS, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you.

Afghanistan has been in the midst of civil war for some 25 years now. The war waxes and wanes. At the moment, it is waxing, and it is worth asking why it is waxing at the moment.

I think there are two basic reasons. One could be called the sin of omission and the other a sin of commission.

The sin of omission was the failure of the United States, the Karzai government and the international community as a whole to take advantage of the lull in that conflict that followed the collapse of the Taliban in 2001, in order to strengthen the capacity of the new Afghan government to project its authority and to provide public services, including particularly security, to the population beyond Kabul.

The sin of commission arises from the fragmentation of the international coalition that the United States put together in late 2001 and the threat to Afghanistan arising from Pakistan.

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Taliban, the United States and the rest of the international community had a golden occasion to help the Afghans build an effective government, capable of providing its population with the most basic public services. We largely failed to seize this opportunity.

During those early years, the U.S. and international assistance was minimal. Blame for this failure can be widely shared, but this minimalist approach did reflect the American Administration's then early aversion to nation-building.

Well into 2003, the Administration was quite vocal in touting the merits of its low-profile, small-footprint alternative to the more robust nation-building efforts that the Clinton Administration had led in Bosnia and Kosovo. Top Administration officials argued that generous international assistance had caused those Balkan societies to become inordinately dependent on external funding and foreign troops, something that they wanted to avoid in Afghanistan and also in Iraq.

In pursuit of this severely limited vision of nation-building, the United States initially sought to minimize the size, the geographical scope and the functions of the International Security Assistance Force. Washington rejected pleas from Karzai and the United Nations (U.N.) to deploy these international peacekeepers outside Kabul. The Administration discouraged any role for NATO in Afghanistan. It also refused to assign peacekeeping functions to American forces operating throughout the country.

Economic assistance to Afghanistan was also commensurately low. In the first year following the collapse of the Taliban, the United States committed some $500 million in reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. Compare that figure to the $18 billion that the Administration requested for Iraq in the first year there, a country no bigger than Afghanistan, much richer and much less destroyed.

Now, by 2004, the Administration began to recognize that these efforts were inadequate and started to increase the size of its aid program and of its military forces. Those increases are continuing today.

Two vital years had been lost, however, years during which little progress had been made in extending effective governance in the countryside. As a result, when the Taliban threat did re-emerge, much of the population had no particular reason to risk their lives

for a government that could neither protect them nor advance their material well-being.

Now, this can explain why the population was somewhat receptive to a resurgent Taliban, but it doesn't explain why the Taliban resurgence occurred.

The current insurgency in Afghanistan does not arise from a profound disaffection among large elements of the Afghan population with their government. This insurgency has been raised in Pakistan by individuals resident in Pakistan, some of whom are refugees from Afghanistan, others of whom are native Pakistanis.

For tens of millions of Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of the border, the distinction between Afghanistan and Pakistan is indeed somewhat artificial, as they don't recognize the border. The degree of Pakistani complicity in this insurgency is a matter of some controversy.

Speaking privately, knowledgeable American, NATO, Afghan and U.N. officials are nearly unanimous in asserting that the Pakistani intelligence service continues to collaborate with the Taliban and other insurgent groups. For its part, the Pakistani government at the highest level denies any official sanction for these activities.

Now, the United States has complained loudly in recent months about Iranian support for sectarian support for sectarian violence in Iraq. At this point, lacking any access to intelligence data, it is difficult to fully assess the degree of official Iranian support for civil war in Iraq or official Pakistani support for civil war in Afghanistan.

What does seem indisputably clear, however, is that Pakistani citizens, residents, money and territory are playing a much greater role in the Afghan civil war than are Iranian citizens, residents, money or territory in the Iraqi civil war.

One hears that the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 diverted American manpower and money from Afghanistan. This may be true, but a more serious charge is that the conflict in Iraq has diverted American attention from the real central front in the war on terror, which is neither in Iraq nor Afghanistan, but in Pakistan.

Al Qaeda, after all, is headquartered in Pakistan. The Taliban is operating out of Pakistan, as are several other insurgent groups operating against American forces in Afghanistan. Bin Laden lives in Pakistan. Mullah Omar lives in Pakistan. It was Pakistan that assisted the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. Potential terrorists from Western societies still travel to Pakistan for inspiration, guidance, support, and direction.

Yet, if Pakistan is the central front on the war on terror, it is not one susceptible to a military response. We are not going to bomb Islamabad or invade Waziristan.

An increase in U.S. military manpower and money for Afghanistan, such as the Administration currently proposes, may well contain the renewed insurgency and prevent the Karzai government from being overthrown. But U.S. and NATO troops are likely to be required there indefinitely as long as the Taliban and other insurgent groups are able to recruit, train, raise funds, and organize their operations in Pakistan.

At present, NATO is manning the Afghan frontier but doing little or nothing to address the threat coming from across the other side of the border. This is bit akin to NATO having guarded the Fulda Gap throughout the Cold War for 40 years, but, having had no agreed policies for dealing with the Soviet Union, in fact, the opposite occurred. Consultation about the Soviet Union occupied 90 percent of every NATO ministerial and summit meeting for 40 years. It is time that consultations on Pakistan occupied a similarly central place in the transatlantic dialogue.

Now, as I have said, the problem of Pakistan is not one that is susceptible to a military solution. It is largely going to require much more positive incentives that persuade the Pakistanis to begin to assert control of their own society and prevent their territory and their population from being used against a neighboring state and against NATO and American forces that are operating there.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dobbins can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Inderfurth. Did I pronounce it correctly?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR KARL F. INDERFURTH, JOHN O. RANKIN PROFESSOR OF THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hunter, members of the committee, thank you very much for your invitation.

In my testimony, I will identify five challenges facing Afghanistan and make several recommendations, introduce three cautionary notes for your consideration, and then cite what I consider to be the most important opportunity the committee and the Congress have to ensure Afghanistan's long-term security and stability.

May I begin by calling attention to the first piece of legislation passed by the new House of Representatives on January 9, H.R. 1, the "Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007." That bill focused on the unfinished business of the 9/11 Commission recommendations, including Section 1441 on Afghanistan.

Let me remind you that the 9/11 Commission identified Afghanistan as the incubator for al Qaeda and for the 9/11 attacks, and recommended that the United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan.

The commission also warned that failed half-measures could be worse than useless. Five years after 9/11, half-measures in Afghanistan by the United States and the international community are failing to provide security, rebuild the country or combat the exploding drug trade. Afghanistan is still very much a nation at risk.

From the outset, the United States went about establishing a light footprint in Afghanistan. The recent report of the Iraq Study

Group identified one of the principal reasons, and I quote: "The huge focus of U.S. political, military, and economic support on Iraq has necessarily diverted attention from Afghanistan." But the international community also joined in that light footprint.

Today, Afghanistan is in need of full measures. The country must receive the priority, attention, and resources it deserves.

Now, let me briefly cite the five challenges facing Afghanistan today. I am, of course, prepared to elaborate on any of these in our discussion after our statements.

Challenge number one, providing greater security. More troops are needed. NATO's commanding general says he is 4,000 to 5,000 troops short. Last week, the Pentagon announced that it will keep 3,200 of its troops in Afghanistan for an extra 4 months. This is a positive response to the NATO troop shortfall, but it will not be sufficient.

At the upcoming NATO defense ministers' meeting in Seville, Secretary Gates should announce that the U.S. is prepared to add extra forces, but the U.S. should not bear this burden alone. Other NATO members must come forward with firm troop commitments and a willingness to join the fight.

Challenge number two, securing the Afghan-Pakistan border. As long as the Taliban have a safe haven in Pakistan, to use the recent words of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Director John Negroponte, "They can continue their insurgency indefinitely, making it virtually impossible to secure and provide a stable Afghanistan."

There are several steps, both short-term and long-term, which I believe can be taken to meet this objective. Secretary Rice should have this at the top of her agenda when she travels to Pakistan next month to meet with President Musharraf.

Challenge number three, building up the Afghan security forces. Greater priority must be given to standing up Afghanistan security forces, the Afghan National Army, the ANA, and especially the Afghan National Police, the ANP. The recent announcement by the Bush administration that it is going to request over a two-year period $8.6 billion in additional assistance for these forces is an important step forward and I believe should be supported.

Challenge number four, tackling the drug trade. Afghanistan is in danger of becoming a full-fledged narco-state. A multi-pronged approach is needed to combat it, including greater assistance from U.S. and NATO-led military forces. The Afghan army, police and counter-narcotics forces are not yet up to this job. Drug revenues are supporting the Taliban and helping fuel the growing insurgency, placing U.S. and NATO forces at greater risk.

Challenge number five, accelerating reconstruction. One year ago this month, more than 60 countries and international organizations gathered in London. That meeting provided the international community another opportunity to match its stated commitment to rebuild Afghanistan with the resources necessary to accomplish that task. Two previous donor conferences, in Tokyo in 2002 and Berlin in 2004, fell short. Unfortunately, so did London. Another opportunity will present itself in April, when Italy hosts the next international donors conference. Using Secretary Rice's words, we should redouble our efforts.

Now, quickly let me turn to three cautionary notes for the committee to consider.

Note number one, don't open an Afghan front against Iran. Pakistan is not the only neighbor that has a strong stake in Afghanistan, including religious, cultural, and economic ties. So does Iran.

According to recent news reports, the Bush administration is preparing more aggressive moves to undermine Iranian interests among Shiites in western Afghanistan. This would be ill-advised. Such a move by the U.S. would certainly complicate and likely prove counterproductive to President Karzai's efforts to normalize and stabilize relations with his western neighbor.

Cautionary note number two, Afghanistan is not Colombia. It was reported last week that on a trip to Colombia, General Peter Pace said that country could serve as a template for Afghan efforts to fight drug production. The U.S. approach in Colombia has invested heavily in chemical eradication of coca fields. Assistance to farmers to switch to growing legal crops has received far less attention or assistance.

President Karzai favors the exact opposite approach. He has opposed spraying the poppy fields with herbicides, believing that that would cause further hardship for Afghan farmers, generate a political backlash and undermine his authority.

Cautionary note number three, it is their country. As we examine the challenges facing Afghanistan today and consider what we can do about them, it is important to remind ourselves we must listen to and respect what the Afghans themselves see as their needs and priorities. It is, after all, their country and they know it best.

For that reason, I have attached to my testimony and would like to include in the record a copy of the report prepared by the government of Afghanistan for a meeting beginning today in Berlin with officials of the European Union. The paper is entitled, "Afghanistan: Challenges and the Way Ahead," remarkably similar to the topic for today's hearing.

Let me conclude with what I consider a most important opportunity this committee and the Congress have to ensure Afghanistan's long-term security and stability. It is this: You have the opportunity to make an important mid-course adjustment in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, to move away from the half-measures the 9/11 Commission warned against and to make Afghanistan a model—a model—of bipartisan cooperation.

From those terrible days just after the 9/11 attacks, the Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike, have supported our nation's military action and our commitment in Afghanistan. Just two days ago, Speaker Pelosi told President Karzai in Kabul that Afghanistan continues to have strong bipartisan support in Congress. Afghanistan's future is counting on it.

Thank you very much.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 93.]

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Inderfurth can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I should have also mentioned that on our trip, it was a bipartisan trip; a ranking member from an appropriations subcommittee was along with us.

And, Mr. Jalali, please.

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR ALI A. JALALI, NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Mr. JALALI. Thank you.

Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member Hunter, and members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to offer my evaluation of the security situation in Afghanistan. The assessment I offer today is based entirely on my own views and personal judgment.

Mr. Chairman, recently press guidelines on Afghanistan have been negative. The country is faced with a revitalized Taliban-led insurgency, a record rise in drug production, a deterioration of the rule of law, and a weakening grip of the national government over many districts in the south and southeast.

But, despite these troubling developments, there is also good news that unfortunately becomes no news.

Following the ouster of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan scored numerous achievements in its transition to democracy. Afghans are freer today than they were under the Taliban. Eight of ten Afghans, or 80 percent of Afghans, support the presence of the international force in Afghanistan. More than 80 percent prefer the current government, despite the problems, over the Taliban government.

While this progress is notable, the current troubles are immense, and they are the result of what was not done, rather than what was done.

The light footprint that was mentioned before by my colleagues was not a sufficient response to the immense destruction that Afghanistan suffered for many years. International engagement with Afghanistan was guided by two contradictory concepts. On the one hand, it was considered to be the main warfront on the war on terror. On the other hand, the involvement was a light-footprint engagement.

The Taliban were removed from power, but neither the potential to come back nor their extensive support was addressed. Competing demands for a response to immediate security needs and the requirements of long-term priorities were not balanced effectively, even though they were mutually reinforcing.

And inefficient use of insufficient funds, outside of Afghan government control, failed to create economic opportunities, good governance, and the rule of law.

The key to resolving these current problems in Afghanistan is doing what was not done. This includes ending the insurgency, creating effective governance and indigenous security capacity, establishing the rule of law, and fostering economic development that can replace the illicit drug trade with legal economic activities.

The process needs renewed international attention, more troops, sufficient funds, and international political backing of the Afghan government in making hard decisions to reform.

There are three major immediate challenges facing Afghanistan: ending the insurgency, building security capacity and the rule of law, and development.

The Taliban-led insurgency is not rooted in a popular ideology. The people of Afghanistan rejected the leadership, the ideology, and the political vision of the Taliban and their militant groups long ago, and it continues.

The insurgents have safe havens in Pakistan and enjoy technical and operational assistance from transnational extremist groups. They exploit the lack of development, insecurity, and the absence of the rule of law in the southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan. Ending the insurgency requires the removal of both domestic and external sources of violence.

The external sources of violence in Pakistan, which should be approached on the basis of regional strategy, which will include the legitimate concerns of all countries in the region, and also removal of sanctuaries of the Taliban-led insurgency in the Pakistani territory.

Although the insurgents are not yet capable to overthrow the Afghan government, they feel they are winning by not losing. On the other hand, the counter-insurgency operations can lose, but not win.

Although there is no military solution to the insurgency, military action is needed to provide a secure environment for development, good governance, and the rule of law.

Expecting heated fighting this spring, there is a need for enhanced military capability to face the threat. The need is not only for more troops, but also for the removal of operational restrictions imposed on some NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has laid the foundation of security institutions and the rule of law, but the process has been underfunded, slow, and uneven. The progress in building the use and support of the Afghan National Army (ANA) has been remarkable, but despite the use of donated vehicles, small arms, and other equipment, the ANA suffers from insufficient firepower, the lack of indigenous combat air support, and the absence of a self-sustaining operational budget. Therefore, it continues to depend on military support from International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and coalition forces.

With the main focus on fighting insurgency and militial violence, police capacity-building was not the pacing element in reform of the security sector, or nor were broader rule-of-law considerations. Little international attention has been paid to the development of the Afghan National Police.

A recent U.S. interagency assistance to Afghanistan police program indicates that the police readiness level to perform conventional police functions and carry out its internal security mission is far from adequate. The report suggests that long-term U.S. assistance in funding, at least beyond 2010, is required to institutionalize the police force and establish a self-sustaining program.

Afghanistan cannot achieve peace merely by fighting and killing the insurgents. Neither are development projects alone likely to win the hearts and minds of the people, as long as the threats emanating from militia commanders, drug traffickers, corrupt provin-

cial and district administrators, as well as government incompetence, remain.

So efforts to defeat the insurgents, build peace and development should be sought through the establishment of the rule of law that guarantees human security. This means that security operations by international forces and the Afghan army and police should be seen as a subset of the rule of law and not the other way around.

Security and peace are achieved through winning the hearts and minds of the people, and not only through military operations.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, today there is a feeling of disenchantment at two levels in Afghanistan that dangerously affects the stability in Afghanistan.

At one level, the Afghan government has doubts about the sustainability of foreign assistance and the capacity of the international community's commitment to face the rising threats and invest in long-term development of the country. This inhibits the government from acting decisively, as it becomes dependent on nonstatutory power-holders, self-serving opportunists and militia commanders.

At the second level, the public is disillusioned with the lack of government will and capacity to protect the people and deliver needed services. Such public opinion in the unstable south nourishes support for the Taliban.

Addressing the two levels of the disenchantment is the key to improving the situation. The international community must provide the Afghan government the means to foster security and development. The Afghan government needs to create an environment of human security in rural areas for regaining the hearts and minds of the public.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jalali can be found in the Appendix on page 73.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Minister, thank you so much for your testimony and for being with us.

Dr. Tony Cordesman. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DR. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A. BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. CORDESMAN. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you bring that a little closer, Tony?

Dr. CORDESMAN. Sorry.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today.

I would like to have my statement read into the record.

And, unfortunately, I also prepared a briefing which showed what is taking place in terms of changes in the threat, in terms of maps, public opinion polls and so on. We couldn't get that copied, but I would be grateful if it could be read into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Dr. CORDESMAN. And I say this because I have, I think, a much more negative view of how bad things are in Afghanistan and how

much effort is really needed to fix this situation than some of the previous witnesses.

My impressions, having been there, is we have years of very patient effort and expensive, dedicated effort to make this thing work.

The Afghan government is not ready at the center. It is not ready at the districts. It is not ready at the local level. There is no one there with qualifications, integrity and competence in far too many areas and far too many places. To build up what is needed is going to take a very serious aid effort, and it is going to take a lot more people in the field.

One key issue here is it is the quality of governance that people see in the province and at the local level that matters. The American obsession with elections and with human-rights legislation is irrelevant if it is not translated into activity and practical experience and services in the field. Today, those tests are not being met in rural areas and in much of the country. And it is going to take a long time to build this up.

I think one key test to the committee is, is there a credible five- to ten-year plan? Are there metrics of success? Can you show the resources are adequate in any given area?

And that is not money spent or buildings completed. It is, are you actually accomplishing something? And, far too often, the answer is: We are spending money without accomplishing things. We have people who are performing symbolic projects at local levels that do not reach the country. That is not a test of competence.

What will it take? When you look at a map of the effectiveness of economic aid projects, most of the country, most urban areas do not have people who see any impact from the aid. Seventy percent of this country is rural. We have never funded a program which can reach out to the villages, reach out to the farms. We are talking areas which have had drought for three years. This is partially relieved, but you do not have roads. Your irrigation systems have broken down.

You talk about replacing narcotics, but first, that is a relatively small percentage of the farmers, and second, it would take years to do it, and these people don't have years. They live in a matter of income based on months.

We do not have the beginning of an adequate Afghan police effort. The German effort collapsed in 2005. We are now attempting to create an Afghan police effort, and the core of the training program is in place. But, as other witnesses pointed out, we will need the money that has been requested by the Administration, and you will not have adequate police enter the field until 2008. That is something very clear from all of the reporting coming on the scene.

The Afghan army is a very weak early structure being rushed into the field and into completion. One unit I visited had 27 percent of its authorized manning. It had been in combat for three years. Much of its weaponry, its equipment, was not operational. The U.S. advisor estimated that about one person in five would reenlist at the end of the three-year term. That is not typical, but we should have no illusions about what is needed here.

Our troop presence is winning tactically. We do not have enough people on the ground to deter, to control, to occupy space, hold, and provide the opportunity for building. In the most threatened prov-

inces, the British presence is probably about 60 percent of what is needed, even with the Canadians. As Mr. Hunter pointed out, there are 37 countries involved here. Most of them have small contingents.

Let me say, the last thing on earth we need are more small contingents of unqualified forces without proper equipment and support. About half of the allies we have in Afghanistan consume resources without serving a purpose. The Italian, Spanish, French, and German forces are broadly referred to in Afghanistan as standaside forces. If we are going to do anything, they have to be committed, and they have to have aid in the areas that they are in charge of, adequate personnel, and adequate support.

The final point I would make is it is all very well, we all agree it would be nice to deny Pakistan as a sanctuary, to have it halt its support for the Taliban, to end the sanctuaries it provides for al Qaeda. Let me say the chances of that happening are about one in ten. We can't posture our way to victory in Afghanistan by pretending we can put pressure on Pakistan that will change its politics and its regional positions. We can't afford to. It is too vulnerable, and it is too delicate.

I think this all adds up to one final message. What bothers me about Afghanistan is what bothers me in Iraq: We don't have honest metrics of what is happening. We don't measure the effectiveness of our programs honestly. We have slogan after slogan, interesting idea after interesting idea, but you don't know where it works. You don't know how well it is working. You listen to people who are outside the country without investigating groups that really survey and measure what is happening on the ground.

We can't afford that. We can't afford what the State Department and the Department of Defense are doing. Part of the solution is oversight, and it is oversight that really asks, "Are these programs working?", and does more than ask, which goes there on the ground and demands the data you need to know.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cordesman can be found in the Appendix on page 80.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Dr. Cordesman.

As you know, under the rules and by tradition, the ranking member and I have unlimited time for asking questions. I will reserve my time until later, and I will yield five minutes to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz, and then I will call on Mr. Hunter for his unlimited time.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much.

I had a lot of questions, but most of the questions that I had were answered by your statements. They were very, very good.

One of the things that I am bothered with is the sanctuary provided on the Pakistani side. I was asking one of the staff members how long is the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. I guess it is several hundred miles, isn't it?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. It is 1,600 miles.

Mr. ORTIZ. And I know there are various mountains and rough terrain, but if that is the problem, would stationing some of our troops or a combination of NATO and our troops along the border,

would that help? Would that antagonize the Pakistani government? If this is a serious problem, we need to address this.

My question is, another problem we had during the Vietnam War is that when a lot of our soldiers came back, they were addicted to drugs. Is this causing another problem with our soldiers who are stationed there? Since the Afghanistan government says that it is going to hurt the farming community if we try to spray or get rid of the crop.

Maybe each of you can touch on those two questions, the sanctuary in Afghanistan, troops along the border, and whether we are having problems with our soldiers coming back with serious addiction problems.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Let me just say a bit about the border and let someone else take the drug problem.

The border is not just a physical problem. It is a political and social problem. The insurgency is a Pashtun insurgency. The Pashtuns represent 40 to 60 percent of the population of Afghanistan, but most Pashtuns live in Pakistan. Three-fifths of them live in Pakistan. They have always lived in Pakistan. They believe they have a hereditary right to rule Afghanistan. So the insurgency arises within this community.

Now, most Pashtuns don't support the insurgents, but all the insurgents virtually are from that community. The border is unrecognized. Pakistan has never recognized that border. It is in the odd position of insisting that Pakistan better police a border that Afghanistan doesn't recognize.

So we need programs that address the grievances, the aspirations of the Pashtun population on both sides of that border. It does little good to win the hearts and minds of the Pashtuns living in Afghanistan if we still face hostility on the part of the Pashtuns living in Pakistan, who can easily transit that border and sustain an insurgency indefinitely.

So it is partially a question of a political arrangement between Afghanistan and Pakistan that regularizes the border. It is partially a problem of social and economic development that begins to allow Pakistan to project governance and development into these border regions, which historically have been autonomous and largely ungoverned.

Dr. CORDESMAN. I have to add a point there.

I think, frankly, when you look at the border, there is no way you can waste people more effectively than deploying them into a border area this complex, this long, where, to get any kind of density of coverage, you would virtually have to strip the rest of the country of any military presence or you would need a vast reinforcement. We are talking three to four brigades, not a minor amount.

At the end of it, you would be in an area without roads, where they know the terrain, they know the ground. You couldn't have even Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) coverage to deal with it, and you would find yourself alienating the tribes in the border area, many of which cross the border, almost immediately.

Whatever is done there has to be done on a country-wide basis. I have seen plans to deal with this. The Pakistani government claims it is going to seal the major crossings. That will probably

be irrelevant, even if it done. All you have to do is look at the success of the border police in Iraq to also realize, if the Afghan police don't exist, if officials are corrupt, and we have people trying to secure a border that don't speak the language, have no area of expertise, and can't work with the tribes, even if we had the troop density and the technical assets, it couldn't work.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Congressman, your question about drug use. We have lost 350 Americans in Afghanistan to date, but I do not know of any that we have lost to drugs. I do not think, I have not heard any reports that we have that Vietnam problem that you referred to.

On the question of the security of the border, everything my colleagues have said I agree with.

There is one hopeful sign. Just recently a joint intelligence and operations center with Afghan, Pakistan, and NATO forces has been opened in Kabul. The only way to deal with the border area that is 1,600 miles and very rugged is to have better intelligence and better operations capabilities. And hopefully this tripartite commission that has been sent up and this operations center could provide that.

But we have to take practical steps to deal with it. Just stationing more troops there will not be the answer.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, for whatever time he may consume.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And following your decision to defer to our other members and give them more time, let me just ask one question, a quick question here, of the panel.

If you add up the 21,000 NATO troops, of which the U.S. comprises approximately 11,000, and the 10,000 additional American troops that are in Afghanistan that are not part of the NATO force, it appears that we, at this point, comprise a majority of the U.S.-NATO forces in Afghanistan.

Very quickly, could you gentlemen give us your best thoughts on whether the burden is being shared appropriately, whether it could be shared, whether the full range of NATO membership has the ability to field 10,000 or 20,000 more troops, which I would certainly think they should be able to do, and whether you think that the proportions are right, and what we should do if they are not right to induce the NATO partners to step up to the plate here?

Dr. CORDESMAN. Congressman, let me suggest that one thing people don't do is look at the map and look where those troops are. The heaviest burden right now is on the British and Canadian forces, simply because they are the most vulnerable. Quite frankly, if it wasn't for the air support they are getting from the U.S. out of the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) and other air support, they would be in deep trouble, and I am not sure they would have won tactically this year.

The German forces, the French forces, the Spanish and Italian forces essentially are stand-aside forces. They will react if they are attacked, but because they are in the north and the west and also because they are not properly equipped—the Canadians have been forced to import tanks into Afghanistan, and many of these forces use light-armored cars—they are not playing a role.

You look at the amount of manpower in those totals you quoted, and to get these tiny contingents of 150 to 300 people from a wide variety of countries for symbolic purposes, you see where they are. They are not doing anything. The problem here is whose order of battle is actually committed to combat.

Now, having worked in the NATO international staff, I have to say NATO has the theoretical ability to provide all the troops you mentioned. Will it? Can it actually deploy it with the helicopters, the armor, the sustainability? Are those units actually going to come in with the experience to fight in a mountainous area? Will they have the people with the language and area skills? Will they be interoperable and integrated into a NATO command?

The truth is, you have to build on the major national contingents you have there now. Simply going to a NATO ministerial and asking for more isn't going to do much. The Poles will be coming in larger numbers. That is about the only reinforcement I know.

The only country that really could credibly provide significant combat capability in addition to the ones fighting is France. For the British to deploy more, they have to move out of Iraq, which they seem to be planning to do, but the consequences of that I think are obvious.

Mr. HUNTER. What are the French capabilities that could be brought to play? And are you sure that the German capabilities are fully utilized at this time?

Dr. CORDESMAN. They are not being utilized at all, Congressman. Frankly, I see no chance that Germany will play a significant role. Their whole posture in Washington is that they are doing simply splendidly by having a human resource, a humanitarian effort, and that is where they want to stay.

I cite the French with this point. We are talking really about a large battalion, some special forces that did fight, but are not, I believe, committed at the moment.

The point is, the French have significant power projection capability of combat troops with the political history of actually fighting. If you take on the German troop issue and the stand-aside forces of Germany, you take on the German political system.

Mr. HUNTER. I take it that it is your feeling, Dr. Cordesman, that the German political system will not make a decision to deploy into what you would call true combat status.

Dr. CORDESMAN. To put it bluntly, they have seized the high moral ground, and they intend to hide there in safety.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Congressman, of the 26 NATO members, only four—the U.S., the U.K., Canada and the Netherlands—are actually fighting in Afghanistan, so that burden is not being shared. Some countries probably can't, but more should.

Also, the burden of numbers. Again, I think that we should go beyond extending the tour of duty of the tenth Mountain Division in Afghanistan, the four months. We should actually bring extra troops, but I think that the other countries need to step up, and with troops that have capability.

I think what Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said at a recent briefing on the package that was offered last week on Afghanistan is accurate. He said NATO needs to do more in the way

of troops and the way of money and the way of ridding itself of the restrictions on the uses of military forces.

So I hope that when Secretary Gates goes to the NATO ministerial meeting in Seville on February 8th and 9th that he will bring that message. We did not do very well in making that case at the last NATO meeting in Riga.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. Meehan, five minutes.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of the members of the panel for being here with us this morning.

I find it interesting that all of you cite almost identical statistics in your written testimony. You all point to the drastic increase in the number of suicide attacks, the number of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and the number of armed attacks from 2006 to 2007. And most of you have alluded to the expected spring offensive by the Taliban, which is expected to continue and escalate from the violence we saw in 2006.

All of you advocate for an increased troop presence in Afghanistan. Despite repeated protests by the Department of Defense that the escalation of our force in Iraq will not affect the situation in Afghanistan, I just find it hard to believe. There is no doubt to me that our military has been stretched to the breaking point, so I have a hard time believing that even the smallest tug in one direction won't affect our capabilities somewhere else along the line.

Ambassador Dobbins and Professor Cordesman, as the two people on the panel who might best be able to address this, do you believe that any troop increase in Iraq will have a detrimental effect on the prospects of being able to get more troops for Afghanistan?

Dr. CORDESMAN. Looking at what is going to happen, rotating the brigade for the tenth Mountain, buys you at most four months, and it isn't really a brigade. It is about a battalion-and-a-half you are plussing-up.

Now, the units we are going to send into Baghdad—and I think there has been some good unclassified reporting into this, the plus-up—cannot be properly equipped with up-armored Humvees or the vehicles they need. Yes, the force structure is under strain, but I think we need to be careful about this, because the kind of force you need in Baghdad and Iraq is not necessarily the kind of lighter force you need in Afghanistan.

But I think all of us who look at this realize there is going to be a growing problem because we have a major backlog of heavy-equipment repairs. We haven't reset combat units, active or reserve. We have over-deployed the men and women in the Army and the Marine Corps. And I think there are preliminary indications that there is going to be a really serious problem with retention on junior officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) beginning this year, although nobody can predict that. This is a force structure under strain.

Mr. MEEHAN. Ambassador.

Ambassador DOBBINS. I would agree with that. We are obviously scraping the bottom of the barrel. These troops are limited. They

are fungible. If they go one place, they can't go to the other place. Our capacity to respond in Afghanistan is, as a result, limited.

I also agree with Tony that flooding Afghanistan with American troops probably isn't the right response, although I support the increase that is being proposed. We need to make this a more multinational operation and a more Afghan operation.

As I have suggested, we need to pay more attention to, if not eliminating, the sanctuary and the threat from Pakistan, at least beginning to ameliorate it significantly.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Jalali, I am worried about the current situation, as well, along the Pakistan border. It seems to me the entire reason we went to war in 2001 was to destroy al Qaeda safe havens so that they could no longer project terror around the world. Despite all of our efforts, and the efforts of our allies from Afghanistan and around the world, it seems, as has been discussed here this morning, that we are on the verge of creating another such safe haven.

I don't pretend to know where bin Laden is, but he is probably somewhere along the border; I don't know which side. As you certainly know, the Pakistani government has entered into an agreement with the leaders of the region that gives al Qaeda an amount of security that they haven't had since October of 2001.

In your written testimony, you lay out some suggestions about how to get rid of this safe haven. Are there more drastic measures required basically that we destroy one base of terror and now have another one right next-door?

Mr. JALALI. Congressman, it is a very complex situation. Only sealing the border is not going to solve the problem because that is a tactical impact.

However, going to the source of the problem, I disagree with the notion that it is a Pashtun problem on both sides of the border, because Pashtuns are traditionally very secular and moderate people. Only they were radicalized during the war in the 1980's. So therefore, it was manipulated.

Now it can be by following a regional policy to address all questions in the region, not one. I think development on both sides of the border, economic development, and also integration of the Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) in the Pakistani administration is a question to be addressed. Otherwise, these FATA are outside the Pakistani control, and then since the radicalization of Pashtuns, for other war purposes, for other policy purposes, actually was a source of it.

So the source is not only sealing the border, or the cross-border attack. The sources, they are sponsoring in accepting and tolerating the presence of radical forces who can use the territory of Pakistan for transnational terrorist activity.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McHugh, five minutes.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, welcome.

As someone who has the honor of representing Fort Drum, the home of the tenth Mountain Division, I understand the chairman's point about this being called the forgotten war, but it sure hasn't been forgotten there. And the families that learned of this just a few days ago and those soldiers who actually redeployed and had

to get back on the plane and go back to Afghanistan understand the challenge and the importance. And I know they are all in our hearts and thoughts and prayers.

I don't know if we have an Iraq problem when it comes to Afghanistan. I would argue we certainly have an end-strength problem. I have been arguing that for a number of years now. I am pleased that Secretary Gates has decided that that is a challenge that needs to be met. Chairman Hunter, the Personnel Subcommittee and I will sit down this afternoon in a hearing and hear some more about end-strength challenges. And I think that is an important part of it.

But borders and the challenge that arise out of those borders almost become irrelevant if there is a reason to be concerned about the border. And the sanctuaries, it seems to me to be the issue here, not so much the border issue. And Mr. Jalali was making some comments, and I think helpful ones, about how you attack the question of sanctuary and the support that the Taliban and al Qaeda are finding, particularly in north Waziristan.

And I would be interested if perhaps our other witnesses could tell us or suggest to us some ways in which we can approach that, whether it is more pressure on Musharraf. I don't know if there is a national leader in the world who has had more attempts on his life than him. Do we facilitate some more, or other ways? Any suggestions as to how we get to the root cause of that sanctuary would be very helpful.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, Congressman, I would suggest four steps with respect to Pakistan.

First, I think the United States should intensify quiet efforts to encourage both India and Pakistan to resolve the differences over Kashmir. It is that issue, it is that dispute that is at the real root of radicalism in Pakistani society and of the Pakistani government's longstanding support for terrorism as an instrument of national policy. And resolving that particular dispute will go a long way toward de-radicalizing Pakistani society.

Second, our assistance programs need to address the economic and social needs of the Pashtun populations on both sides of the border.

Third, we need to encourage both Afghan and Pakistani governments to establish an agreed border regime and to legitimize the current frontier and to recognize it.

And finally, the U.S. should encourage Pakistan to move back toward civilian rule via free elections. Fundamentalist parties have never fared well in such elections in Pakistan, and they are unlikely to do so in the future.

It seems ironic that the U.S. has pushed for democratization in Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon, all places where the result was likely to intensify sectarian conflict, but has largely failed to do so in Pakistan, where the opposite result is more likely.

Dr. CORDESMAN. I think, Congressman, let me say that I would agree with what Ambassador Dobbins has said, but then my qualification would be the chances of success of some of these initiatives are maybe one in five, and the time to get them done is probably two to three years. And that is part of our problem.

The other difficulty is, how do you define a sanctuary? It can be a madrassa. It can be a refugee camp. It can be an area where they simply lower the profile of what they are doing, which now, often, is having Taliban people wearing Taliban insignia in Pakistan, as it is in parts of Afghanistan, and still be very active.

And I think we also need to be very careful about the support they are getting, because, looking at public opinion polls, it isn't just a sanctuary in Pakistan that counts. It is cross-border movements by groups who support the Taliban. According to an ABC-BBC poll done in November, if you look at the Paktika and Wardak provinces, support for the Taliban among the people polled was around 67 percent, some of it limited. When it came down to Helmand province, you were talking only about 34 percent.

But we should not simply say these people are an alien group. And they are only one of three of the Islamist groups operating there, all of which have sanctuary in Pakistan, not just the Taliban.

Mr. JALALI. Let me add to this, Congressman, that although in Afghanistan there are people who believe that they are short-changed from development and therefore they would somehow support the Taliban.

But the external basis of the assumption, you have economic decline in the north and the west, but you don't see the problems with the Taliban there. So therefore, unless you deal with the external sources of this transnational terrorism or insurgency, only resolving internal problems will not to the job.

Therefore, as I said, both external and internal sources of this insurgency ought to be addressed at the same time.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If you have written comments, Mr. Ambassador, I would appreciate those. But I think the chairman was going to cut off here.

Mr. REYES [presiding]. If you can take, like, 30 seconds, I will give you 30 seconds.

Mr. MCHUGH. Oh, we have a new regime here. Okay.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Pakistan is in something of a state of denial about officially recognizing that the Taliban are operating out of their territory. And we have to deal with that.

But we should also not be in denial ourselves of the fact that Pakistan is making an effort in those northern areas that they never get involved in. The writ of the government does not extend to the tribal areas. They have got 80,000 troops there. They have taken several hundred casualties dealing with this problem.

So while we press them, let's also recognize that an effort is being made there. They need to do more. We need to do more.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. REYES. I thank the gentleman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. I will take my time now.

One of the things that surprised me about your testimony here this morning and the written testimony, unless I missed it, because I, as the chairman said, was on the trip over the weekend to the region, which included Afghanistan and Pakistan. We spent a total of two and a half-hours-plus with President Karzai and about an hour-and-a-half with President Musharraf.

And one of the issues you did not address is this kind of public feud that is going on between the two presidents that does not help in trying to find a solution or solutions to the issue of the cross-border challenge that we face.

So I would ask you to comment on that, as well as the fact that while we are doing a lot of good things, which includes our troops in there, there are some challenges that we frankly are not doing a good job at. And I will mention just one, and I would ask you to comment on that as well.

If we are going to be able to transition them from growing poppies for the drug trade, which, as you all observed, makes it possible to get funding for the Taliban and the insurgency, we are going to have to find other crops for the farmers to work.

And in the whole country, we have got six people from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) assigned there. To me, and I mentioned this to our ambassador, that doesn't make sense to me.

So if you gentlemen can comment on those two points, the feud and also the poor job that we are doing in obvious areas that we need to focus on.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Let me say a word about the feud.

I think it is unfortunate that the burden of highlighting the role of Pakistani territory and Pakistani residents in the Afghan civil war falls largely on Karzai and his government. And that is in part because our government has been largely silent on it, which puts the burden on the Afghan officials to highlight this problem, and that exacerbates a poor relationship in unhelpful ways.

It is a bit like it is the good-cop-bad-cop. We are the good cop and they are the bad cop vis-a-vis Pakistan. But that is really the wrong balance because they are weak. Afghanistan is weak. It cannot sustain a confrontation with the much larger, more powerful Pakistan.

It would be a far better relationship if we were being more vocal and critical and the Afghans could be quiet and try to improve their relationship with their powerful neighbor. But as long as we are not saying something about this, I think Karzai feels its incumbent on him to say something about it.

Mr. REYES. Just to make sure I correct the record, we were, over the weekend, very vocal to both presidents that we have to work toward finding a solution to this one issue, because it undermines our ability to work cooperatively in that effort.

Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Well, I would like to, if I could, respond to your question about the number of USDA agents in Afghanistan. I could not agree with you more. And I am sorry that Congressman Hunter has left, because I wanted to address his question about the substituting orchards for poppies.

"Alternative livelihood" is the term of art used here, to find some ways to help the rural, poor farmers of Afghanistan have a livelihood. And right now poppy is the best way to accomplish that.

But alternative livelihood and incentives and assistance to create that is a key element of tackling the drug problem. I mean, that has to be multi-pronged, as I said. It is law enforcement. It is going after the drug lords. I think it is getting U.S. and NATO troops

more involved in that fight. But it is also about providing an alternative to the farmers for their poppy fields.

It can be done. Unfortunately, I don't think we are putting enough money into it. The recent announcement by the Bush Administration that it was increasing economic assistance to Afghanistan by two billion dollars over the next two years, if my calculations are correct, that is about what we have been doing on a yearly basis, about one billion dollars a year. That is not an increase. And I think we need to be doing more in that area.

I also wish that Congressman Hunter knew that in California there is a group called Seeds of Peace that is taking out landmines and putting in vines and orchards and all of that to try to deal with that. He should be aware that there are people out there trying to do exactly what he suggested in his remarks.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Congressman, I wonder if I might speak to that.

Mr. REYES. If you can, very quickly.

Dr. CORDESMAN. All right. There was a World Bank study done in November which should be a warning to every member of this committee.

I think a lot of this alternative-crop business is nonsense, just as eradication is. You are dealing with corruption. You are dealing with insecurity in many of these areas where you cannot send advisors out into the field. You are talking to people who are desperate simply to survive from month to month, who cannot count on government or aid programs to work them through a year in the field.

And if you look at a map of where the crops are grown and where you have to go and how many advisors have to be there, you need a plan, not a noble intention. These groups don't have plans. They just have a nice idea.

Mr. REYES. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your taking the tour that you just identified, of Kuwait and Baghdad and Islamabad and to Germany. We certainly appreciate you going, and I look forward to hearing a report.

I would like to thank all of you for being here today. It has been really interesting. I have visited Afghanistan twice. I had the privilege of meeting President Karzai when he was here. I have met members of the parliament here and also in Kabul. It is really inspiring to me, the efforts that I see being made.

Additionally, I have a personal interest. The 218th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the South Carolina Army National Guard is being mobilized, Professor Jalali, to go to Afghanistan to help train the Afghan army. This is the largest deployment of members of the South Carolina Army National Guard since World War II. I am particularly proud of the unit because I was a member of it for 25 years.

My question to you—and what a background you have, as the interior minister, as a former officer in the Afghan army, as a member, apparently, of the mujahedeen. Wow, what a background you have.

As I think of my friends and neighbors who are on their way to Afghanistan to train the Afghan army, what words do you have to

these guard members as to what should they expect and what can we do to truly help Afghanistan?

Mr. JALALI. Congressman, I think the problems of Afghanistan are very complex. You cannot focus on only one area and expect that to change the situation.

Building the national army is a major project, and I think it will help. However, in Afghanistan, you have to streamline all the development effects in other areas. If you do not have a good rule-of-law system in Afghanistan, only army is not going to help. I think we need to have an integrated approach in all areas.

Earlier, we discussed the drug problems. Drug problems are also complex, unless it is mainstream in the governance, security, development, and alternatives. Alternative livelihood should be a goal, not a means. Therefore, unless we streamline it in all these areas, it is not going to solve.

The army is a major impact. I think so far, Afghanistan National Army has done remarkable things. I think it is one area in the security-sector reform that has a very shining past record.

However, it is not only. I think with the army, if you do not build a good police force, it is not going to help. In many areas in Afghanistan, police are the front line of fighting the insurgents. It is on the border, the border police, on the highways, the streets of the major cities, and the other security force. They take the heat of the insurgent's attack first. In the past five years, I think police lost more men than army, than the ISAF and the coalition forces.

So therefore, you have to build a capacity, not only one element. I think the security capacity will come through development of the army, the police, the justice sector, and also other supporting elements that make these forces operate in a very effective way.

Mr. WILSON. And the information we have as to the army itself, there are currently 36,000 trained and equipped, and the goal is 70,000 in the next 3 years?

Mr. JALALI. Yes, 36,000 now.

However, the problems are not always in the numbers, whether it is foreign troops or—what is the capacity of it?

I think the equipment they have is not sufficient. Some of the equipment is from the old Soviet arsenal. And one officer told me that, "During the jihad I had better weapons than now in a battalion."

So therefore, they need equipment and also mobility. They do not have indigenous air force or air mobility power.

I think unless we provide this equipment and this capacity to our army, it will be fine, however it will not be as effective. It will not be used as an exit strategy for the international forces.

Mr. WILSON. Well, again, I appreciate your encouraging that.

A final point: When I was visiting, I was very impressed by the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). I visited one which was joint U.S.-Korean. I visited, another time, forward-operating Base Salerno. Again, extraordinary civil action projects.

And I yield——

Mr. JALALI. But still, if I may, the PRTs are not standard, not the same. It is also like the forces that different countries provide. They have different instructions. If you use the Coca-Cola language, and we have PRTs-Classic and PRTs-Lite. [Laughter.]

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. REYES. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Actually, I just had one question. I will direct it at Ambassador Dobbins, but if others of you want to add to that, it would be fine.

You had mentioned the problem of Pakistan in your opening remarks. And I apologize, I had to duck out for a meeting. You may well have addressed some of these issues.

I guess my simple question is, I agree completely with your analysis. What do we do about it? What do we do about Pakistan? How do we deal with the fact that al Qaeda has carved out what amounts to a safe haven, ironically, in the middle of what is supposedly one of our allies?

I am deeply concerned with the training bases that are going on there, that basically it is sort of a smaller, less comprehensive version of what they had in Afghanistan prior to 9/11.

We are doing what we can with Afghanistan, getting cooperation there, but certainly not getting it from the Pakistanis to the degree that we would like. So I am curious what your policy outlook is, in terms of how we approach it.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think, first of all, we have to recognize the centrality of the Pakistani challenge to the whole global effort against terrorism and not allow ourselves again to become distracted by secondary challenges.

Second, I think we need to raise the profile of the Pakistan issue internationally. That doesn't mean mounting a campaign to ostracize or penalize Pakistan. I think Pakistan needs both firm external pressures, but a good deal of help in solving its internal problems.

If we were spending one-tenth of what we spend every month in Iraq on the war, on improving the Pakistani educational system, we would probably be a lot further along in reducing support for international terrorism, and particularly for cross-border activity in Afghanistan.

So partially, it is raising the profile of the issue, consulting in NATO and in other forums with our allies, trying to get a concerted action plan, largely consisting of incentives, of carrots rather than sticks, to promote transformations in Pakistani society, to move away from the fundamentalism and the radicalism and the support for terrorism that have characterized its official policy over the last several decades.

Mr. SMITH. Excuse me for interrupting. What is exactly the split in the population?

There is no question that there is a great deal of violent extremism in Pakistan on both sides of the country and all points in between. On the other hand, it is not necessarily a majority of the population, and the assumption always is that if we put too much pressure on Musharraf and he falls, that he will be replaced by a radical Islamic state.

Is that really the case? Is the population more divided on that?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think it is a risk that one can't entirely ignore, but polling data in prior elections suggests that the radical and Islamist parties do not do particularly well, and that Pakistan,

in contrast to some of the other states where we pushed democratization, is one where a move back toward democratic rule would probably also be a move back toward more nonsectarian and moderate policies.

I will ask Ambassador Inderfurth, who was responsible for relations with Pakistan, to add a bit of depth to that answer.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. I am not sure I can add depth, but I could add to it.

I think, in terms of Pakistan, my written testimony has two suggestions here to deal with the fundamental issues.

One has already been referred to, and it is that we need to urge the two parties to agree to their border, the Durand line of 1893. Afghanistan does not accept this. Pakistan says, how can we patrol a border that is not even recognized? There are problems for President Karzai to do this, but I think the time has passed to get that border recognized, and I think that would be an important step.

Second, we need to urge Pakistan to try to integrate these tribal areas into the political mainstream. As I said earlier, the writ of the government has not extended there in the past. These are economically and politically backward. They have been a breeding ground area for the Taliban and a sanctuary for al Qaeda.

What we can do about this is to urge it and also to provide some funding, along with the World Bank and others, to assist in that effort to integrate these tribal areas into the Pakistan mainstream.

These are longer-term issues, but I think that they would go a long way.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much.

Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have two questions.

First, Ambassador Inderfurth, either in your remarks or your written testimony, you stated that we probably should deal differently with Iranian activity within Afghanistan than we plan to do now in Iraq, realizing that the president has said in Iraq we are going to end the policy of catch-and-release in regard to Iranian agents that are creating havoc in Iraq.

I want you to explain that to us and why you feel that we should treat them differently, accepting the old adage that the enemy of my enemy is a friend, and that whatever activity Iran is engaged in in western Afghanistan, it would be in their interest, I would think, to continue to create havoc in both countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, to divert our attention away, to bog us down, so that they can continue to progress with their nuclear program.

So, if you could answer that, I would appreciate it.

And then for my second question for any and all, if the time will permit: The minority leader, John Boehner, recommended to Ms. Pelosi in a recent letter, to Speaker Pelosi, that the formation of a bipartisan oversight commission, with Democrat and Republican members, obviously chaired by the Democratic majority, to look at the new way forward in Iraq and to have the president report to this bipartisan commission every 30 days on a series of benchmarks he also very specifically outlined.

I would like to know your opinion of that recommendation, particularly as it pertains to this new way forward or, as one of you mentioned, a mid-course adjustment in Afghanistan.

Certainly, I believe that we have a better opportunity, not just on this committee but in the House and in the Congress, to have bipartisan support of a new way forward or a mid-course correction in Afghanistan, and this type of commission recommended by Minority Leader Boehner I think would be a good thing. And I would like to know your opinion on that.

So those two questions. Thank you.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Congressman, thank you.

I am not surprised that there wouldn't be a follow-up to what I said about opening up an Afghan front against Iran there. As I said, Iran has interests in Afghanistan. It has interests particularly in the western part of the country, among the Shiite-Hazara population, longstanding cultural and economic ties.

I also said that President Karzai would not find it helpful, I think, to have us inject ourselves in doing what *The Washington Post* reported of preparing aggressive moves to undermine Iranian interests among the Shiites. He is trying to stabilize and normalize his relations with his western neighbor.

But let me add a point that I did not say in my oral testimony, which is I think that opening an Afghan front against Iran does not appear at this point either appropriate or necessary.

I say that because, as the Iraq Study Group pointed out, during the Taliban era, the United States and Iran cooperated in Afghanistan. The cooperation included strong opposition to the Taliban in the U.N. 6-Plus–2 forum, which I was a part of, quiet American support to Iran for its supply of military assistance to Ahmad Shah Massoud of the Northern Alliance.

Also, a joint recognition by our two countries of the need to combat the rising threat of drugs. Iran has been a victim of that and has taken strong measures to go after the drug traffickers. The two countries collaborated during the post-Taliban Bonn conference, something that Ambassador Dobbins can speak to. And more recently, Iran's involvement in Afghanistan has been described as one U.S. official as somewhere between helpful and benign.

So I don't think the case is there for us to take what we have as legitimate concerns about Iran's behavior and activities in Iraq, and transfer it to another front on Afghanistan.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Congressman, I wonder if I could pick up your second point. I think it would be absolutely vital to have a bipartisan effort to get useful measures of reporting, ones where the Congress could actually see what was happening. And, to be honest, it would force people who are generating these indicators to provide numbers that are meaningful.

For example, we just used a figure for trained and equipped people in the Afghan army. That isn't the number of people there. That is the number of people trained and equipped. Out of the 300,000 people in Iraq that are supposedly trained and equipped, maybe about 65 percent are actually left.

We have aid reports which are the number of projects started or the money is spent, but no reporting on the number accomplished.

If we had real reporting, we might have real solutions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Loretta Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, we have gone over some of these things already, but it seems to me that the lessons that we have learned from South America, in particular, with respect to drug eradication and counter-drug strategy, includes four pieces: the implementation of a long-term plan for training, equipping and deploying national and border police and counter-narcotics, to disrupt the higher-value targets like traffickers and processors; second, to stimulate economic growth so that we decrease the influence that the drug trafficking has on the total economy. That requires infrastructure development and economic aid.

Third, we need to develop an agricultural strategy that would link the farmers to domestic and to international markets for their products, or what one of you said, alternative livelihood. And four, foster political development with respect to the institutions, put in judiciary transparency, work on disarmament, integration of the militia.

In 2004, Karzai called for a jihad against the drug trade, but what we have seen lately is, of course, that opium has become really the economy of this arena.

So I have several questions, and any of you may answer since you all seem to be pretty up-to-speed on a lot of what is going on over there.

Where is our counter-drug strategy failing? In each of the above headings, the four things that I mentioned, how do we improve in those areas?

Third, do we need more military assets to do this counter-drug interdiction and eradication and what would that look like, in your opinion?

And fourth, what evidence, if any, is there between a Taliban or an al Qaeda link involving the drug trade or trafficking going on?

Dr. CORDESMAN. Let me, if I may, I really think the World Bank report done in November is a warning that this is not Latin America. When you look at where the areas are, where the drug trade is taking place, yes, it is one-third of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by its own calculations. It also is about five percent of the farming area, according to the World Bank and other studies. A lot of those are in mixed areas, not simply in the Taliban. Many are in the north and the west, where basically no one as yet is trying more than eradication.

We don't have the resources to have aid programs out into the field, and most of those are defined as high-risk areas, so you would need to have a civil-military effort to make it work. You also see, because of the problems in Afghanistan, a very sharp rise in popular support for drug growing just over the last year, because people need this.

My caution here is what we have now is an eradication strategy which virtually everyone in-country agrees is making the people involved hostile, without really affecting the crop. It is just shifting it around. Substitution requires honest people in the field and time and money to actually go to individual farmers. From our training program, the training program for the Afghan national police will

begin creation of effective counter-narcotics people for the police in the course of next year's training syllabus.

So there is very little to build on locally, and these are not my estimates. These come directly from the people who act as the advisory team for the ANP.

Mr. JALALI. In my dealings, Congresswoman, with Afghanistan, I find that the drug production and trafficking is a low-risk activity in a high-risk environment. You have to change the situation, reverse it, make it a high-risk activity in a low-risk environment, low-risk both in terms of law enforcement and also in economic opportunities for people.

The current strategy, which was depicted in the Afghanistan compact actually has four elements. That is, law enforcement going after traffickers who take most of the revenues from the drug trafficking; helping farmers, and at the same time institution building infrastructure, to make the alternative livelihood a goal, not a means.

And therefore, this is the kind of strategy that is not working because not enough investment is made in all these areas. As I said before, you have to mainstream in all these areas.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

As I recite the rationale for us going into Afghanistan in the first place, it was simply because they had become a base for terrorist activity. They harbored al Qaeda. In a sense, I think it is important for us to step back for a moment and ask ourselves why those things happened.

One of the principal goals we had going into Afghanistan, especially as we developed a success there, at least to overthrow the Taliban, was to leave a constitutional religious freedom context there that could create an internecine pressure against religious extremism, the Islamist groups that seem to be at the heart of a lot of the challenges that we face in Afghanistan and many other parts of the world related to terrorism.

Right now, the Afghan constitution doesn't really fully protect religious freedom. Have we looked at that carefully? Have we done enough?

In the opinion of anyone who would like to respond, do you think in terms of being able to create the will and the capacity, long-term, for free governments to ever exist, if there is any hope for it, that that shouldn't be a pretty significant emphasis for us?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think that the Afghan constitution, considering our agenda within Afghan society in the aftermath of a civil war, is a fairly liberal and progressive document, albeit one that does establish an Islamic state. The president has also recently replaced members of the supreme court with a more nonsectarian set of judges.

So at this point, I would not be particularly alarmed about the degree to which the Afghan state apparatus is subject to extremist or fundamentalist pressures. I think we have some a long way there.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Congressman, could I call your attention to the statement that I appended to my statement, the one prepared by the Afghan government for the meeting today in Berlin on challenges and the way ahead. I just want to read one line in here. It says their task, this is the Afghan speaking, is to build a pluralist Islamic state governed by the rule of law in which all Afghans have the opportunity to live in peace, fulfill their economic potential, and participate politically as full citizens.

We could write those words ourselves. I mean, that is what we would like to see. That is what they want to see.

Mr. FRANKS. It is tough to make it happen.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. But I think that President Karzai and those that I know in the Afghan government and others are committed to achieving that. But it will only be achieved if we stick with them during this difficult time.

Mr. FRANKS. I think that is a wise observation.

Mr. Chairman, my red light has been on since I began, so let me just ask——

The CHAIRMAN. The clock is going the other way, so we will call you. Five minutes.

Mr. FRANKS. Okay, I appreciate it. [Laughter.]

Every panel member here in some way or another has alluded to the importance of not only trying to stabilize Iraq, but preventing it from coming back as a base of operations for terrorism. That is the great challenge that we have.

Forgive me for any of those that I might be mischaracterizing here, but it seemed like everyone on the panel has in some manner emphasized stabilizing the existing government, suppressing the insurgency, increasing security, even having increased troops on the part of the United States to do those things and to try to maintain as much as possible, as much as it is possible in that area, a free society that can create hope for its citizens.

It seems to me that is almost exactly what some of us have been saying. It is not a challenge. Hopefully when you think about this, a lot of us have been saying the same thing about Iraq, that the idea of letting Iraq become a major base of terrorist operations, with the wealth of the Nation and the freedom that that could afford them, could threaten the entire human family.

If these things of troop increases and suppressing insurgency, increasing the security there, and doing what we can to stand up a government that can protect itself, were important in Afghanistan, why is that not important in Iraq? If I could, I would like to ask you to do that.

But, Ambassador Inderfurth, could you go first and then this gentleman here, Ambassador Dobbins?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. The situation in the two countries, I think, are similar to the extent that we have moved to bring our influence to bear in both.

The way we went to war in Afghanistan was I think quite different than the way we went to war in Iraq. In Afghanistan, we had the full support of the international community. We have been working with the United Nations. NATO was a part of this effort.

Fundamentally, the Afghan people have never seen us as occupiers. We have been seen as those coming to assist them. They wish

that we had been there many years before. In fact, when we had departed in 1989 after the Soviets withdrew and we departed, they feel that that led to what we later saw with the Taliban and al Qaeda and the rest basically taking the country.

I think the circumstances are different between the two. I think the one thing that I said in my comment was, this can be a model for bipartisanship. There are so many differences over Iraq, but on Afghanistan, I think we all agree. That is a place we need to be.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to all of you for being here. I certainly appreciate your testimony today.

Ambassador, you had just mentioned that the focus on Afghanistan can certainly be a bipartisan effort. I wanted just to say, and I don't have the quote here with me today, but, Mr. Chairman, just sitting here realizing that, about, I think it was last week, we heard some testimony that could suggest that, in fact, Iraq was not necessarily a distraction; that all the effort that we have put into Afghanistan, there were some restraints in having done a far more intensive job there, whether it was the terrain, whether it was Pakistan, whatever that might be.

There is still a lot of discussion about that. I don't know whether you want to comment on that particularly, but I think your testimony has perhaps signified some different direction or different steps that could have been taken there, certainly at the time that we chose to go into Iraq.

Is that something that you wanted to comment on directly, Ambassador?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. I am not exactly sure of the point. If you could?

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I think there was a sense that there were obstacles to have gone further in that mission in Afghanistan at the time. There is a contrast in the testimony today. I will go back and take a look at that, but I wasn't sure if you had had an opportunity to be aware of any of that testimony or wanted to comment on that.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. I think that we have all referred to the fact that although the decision taken to go to war in Afghanistan after 9/11 was absolutely supported by strong bipartisan support, that since that time we have witnessed a great degree of, as I put it from the 9/11 Commission, half-measures, a light footprint. We now have the opportunity to try to rectify that and have full measures, as opposed to half measures.

I think one contributing factor to that, and I mentioned it in my oral statement as well as in my written statement, is what was the diversion of our resources, time and attention, military and financial, from Afghanistan to Iraq. I think that all, including the Iraq Study Group, called attention to the fact that we simply could not do what we are doing in Afghanistan that we needed to do, because of the diversion of resources to Iraq.

Indeed, that report of the Iraq Study Group suggested that as we begin, which they recommended, bringing out our combat forces from Iraq in 2008, that we do see Afghanistan as a place to place some of those. So I trust that that addresses your question.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes, I appreciate that.

Let me just turn really quickly to a quote by Barnett Rubin in *Foreign Affairs*. He is referencing Afghanistan and says how a country that needs decentralized governance to provide services to its scattered and ethnically diverse population has one of the world's most centralized governments.

Could you comment on how that is a factor in whether or not our efforts there are going to be successful? And whether or not we are understanding, perhaps, that reality and could be doing some things differently to address it?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. As a former member and official of that government, perhaps Minister Jalali can address it.

Mr. JALALI. Traditionally, Afghanistan had a weak central government and a decentralization of power. But that was not because people wanted that. The geography, the culture, the power of the central government actually created that kind of situation.

However, it is a strong nation but weak state. After this war, the situation has changed. This was the will of the people of Afghanistan as expressed in the words of the constitution, the constitution of the loya jirgah. They wanted a strong central government to reunite the country, to undermine the regional power-holders who actually victimized people during the war. So therefore, this was I think the overwhelming majority of people during the constitution loya jirgah wanting a strong central government.

Of course, when the country has stabilized in the future and the people want to decentralize it, then that will be a different issue. However, even today I think there is a need for a balance between a strong central government and delegation of some development and financial power to the provinces.

Now, it is very strong in the center, but very weak in intervention in to the affairs or providing services——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes, is there anything that we can be doing?

I think my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor Jalali, I am most impressed by your resume. It indicates that you speak some seven or eight languages. I have a hard time just with English. That is pretty awe-inspiring.

Looking at your written testimony, if I could get you to clarify a couple of things that I don't understand fully. And I am just going to go ahead and read a few things which you can then comment on, if you don't mind.

You make reference to an over-focus on force protection at the expense of creating durable security. You also reference to an oversecuritization of the rule of law. This subordinates justice to security considerations and turns police into being primarily used in combating the insurgency instead of protecting law and justice.

You also say that this result, this process, what I just described—well, actually I am just reading your words—results in compromising the administration of justice, since the rule of law contributes to security in a major way. It sounds like you see a real

tension between applying appropriate concepts of justice and fairness and, at the same time, how we seek to obtain security.

And then you sort of tie this into force protection and over-securitization. I guess you are referring not to stocks, et cetera, but could you elaborate a little bit on that?

Mr. JALALI. This has been a problem, reconciling the response to immediate security concerns, fighting insurgency, and long-term priorities for nation-building and bringing stability has always been a problem in Afghanistan.

The international community's prime reason to go to Afghanistan was not nation-building. It was defeating the terrorism, the destruction of the terrorist network, and overthrowing the Taliban, who actually sponsored the terrorists.

And then afterward, of course, strategically building a stable state in Afghanistan was considered to be the means for a war on terror, would contribute to the war on terror. However, the initial motivation continues to cast a long shadow on every aspect of development, including the security.

The expectation of the people of Afghanistan after 9/11, or after the intervention in Afghanistan, was human security. That is a very modest expectation. It means freedom from fear, freedom from want. And that can be provided only by defeating the terrorists or insurgents.

Mr. MARSHALL. I have to interrupt. I have a very brief period of time here. I have read your testimony. I want to get back to trying to clarify those two points specifically.

You are talking about an over-emphasis on force protection and efforts to obtain security. I guess what you are suggesting is that in our interests and the allied force's interests in attacking the Taliban, we have caused problems.

Can you be very specific in terms of that, and very brief?

Mr. JALALI. For example, in the south, alliance with some groups in fighting the insurgency actually disappointed people, because those allies had a very bad record of human rights.

On the other hand, just in the name of security, unwarranted searches of peaceful villages and taking people in custody who had no relations to the insurgents create resentment in the area. There are some tribes in the south, in the Helmand, who were mistreated and they joined the Taliban.

Mr. MARSHALL. Is it your sense that in our efforts to have force protection we have caused problems?

Mr. JALALI. Yes.

Mr. MARSHALL. And how have we done that?

Mr. JALALI. Force protection—I mean, in some countries, particularly some NATO countries, they are over-concerned about force protection and that actually prevents them from intervening in legitimate security situations.

Mr. MARSHALL. Could I just real quickly here, in the Vietnam effort, one of our policies, which appeared to have a substantial amount of success until we disrupted it because we didn't really understand why it was having success, was this village pacification program. In essence, what we did was we encouraged locals to protect their own space.

I saw in today's Post Selig Harrison talking about a dispute between the British and the Americans now about whether or not in the southeastern part of Afghanistan we should defer to a tribal council that has basically come up with a peace agreement between our side and the Taliban. And the Americans are saying, no, shouldn't do that, it pays too little heed to the role of the central government. And the British are saying, no, realistically here, this is like—they are not using these terms—village pacification.

Mr. JALALI. Using jirgahs——

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman——

Mr. JALALI. —if I may, is important. However, it should not mean submission to the people who are the cause of the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I may be a little naive up here. Perhaps some things have been covered by the Armed Services Committee in the past that I was not privy to, since I just got here just a few weeks ago. But, at any rate, I do appreciate having this viewpoint presented to the American citizens.

And I want to, kind of, go back. I understand that, it is my recollection that when we went into Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, it was to, to put it nicely, immobilize Osama bin Laden and to prevent him from undertaking a similar attack in the future.

Three-thousand Americans killed, and he sat back and planned those attacks using his wealth. I believe he is worth about $300 million, a Saudi Arabian prince, if you will, a man with money, a man with organizational skills, a man with a vision to destroy America through terrorism.

And we went into Afghanistan to stop that, to immobilize that threat. Afghanistan was the place, I think you referred to it, Ambassador Dobbins, as an incubator, a place that spawned this terrorist activity, supported it, nurtured it, and it was the Taliban.

So American went in, routed the Taliban, closed down the incubator, if you will, and the incubator has now moved to another sovereign nation called Pakistan.

I believe you indicate, Ambassador Dobbins, in your statement that Pakistani intelligence services continue to collaborate with the Taliban and other insurgent groups, those insurgent groups including al Qaeda.

So, we have got governmental involvement in fostering those groups. They have not gone away. They have not been immobilized. I would imagine that Osama bin Laden is preparing for his next attack, a man who I believe had some kidney problems and was in need of constant and regular dialysis. I suppose by this point he has received a kidney transplant. But, at any rate, I am imagining that he is sitting up in a nicely appointed residence somewhere in Pakistan, not in the mountains, but in an urban setting, probably watching old videos of Whitney Houston and planning his next attack.

It seems that we have let him off the hook. We took the attention off of Afghanistan, and now are in a quagmire in Iraq with no plans of refocusing the attention on eradicating the threat of Osama bin Laden.

Is Osama bin Laden still a threat to the United States? If so, what should we do to eradicate that threat?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I agree, Congressman, with most of what you have said. Bin Laden is still a threat. Al Qaeda is still a threat. Bin Laden is located in Pakistan. Al Qaeda is headquartered in Pakistan.

I didn't want to imply that the Pakistani government was supporting al Qaeda. I think there are numerous reports that Pakistani intelligence continues to have relationships with al Qaeda, but Pakistan has been more aggressive in rounding up al Qaeda suspects. They haven't been entirely successful, but they have been more aggressive than they have vis-a-vis the Taliban.

I don't think there are any plausible reports that the Pakistani government is supporting or has a relationship with al Qaeda. Nevertheless, they have failed to locate bin Laden and to roll up what remains of the al Qaeda network in Pakistan.

Mr. JOHNSON. Dr. Cordesman, what is your response?

I think I have just been tabled.

The CHAIRMAN. Very quickly.

Dr. CORDESMAN. This is only one threat of a very complex set of movements. If we got rid of al Qaeda and we got rid of bin Laden tomorrow, 90 percent of the problem would still be there. We need to remember this every time we look at this issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

My question is directed toward Dr. Cordesman.

I was very, very concerned when you talked about the lack of NATO help and the fact that Germany took, I believe you said, the high moral ground on this issue. I wanted to ask you to expand on that.

Specifically, what I would like to know is, are they reluctant to get involved now because of the way the administration treated them at the onset of this war in Afghanistan? Does it also tie in with the belief of most European nations that we are in the wrong place in Iraq? And will the escalation in Iraq weaken NATO support and the European nation support for us in Afghanistan?

Dr. CORDESMAN. I suspect everybody at this table has a different view of how this got started.

Certainly, the people I talked to, who are German, when this began, were much more involved in the security sector than the diplomatic one. I think they had, at this point, the same feeling we did. We underestimated the resurgence, the level of violence that would occur. We didn't understand what the mission was going to be. We saw it as a relatively simple task in terms of nation-building, which we weren't going to commit large resources to. That was as true of us as the Germans.

When I watch what happens, when you talk to people in the German military or the German ministry of defense, they would make roughly the same criticisms of the German military position in Afghanistan that we would. This is not something coming out of people concerned with defense. When you talk to people on the civil side there who are German, you will get more mixed reactions.

But I think the truth is, most of this is driven internally. Germany simply is not prepared yet to use forces in combat. It is not prepared to commit people to the kind of nation-building task where there is a significant element where you have to use force. And you have a weak coalition government that has to deal with a very difficult internal political problem. So it is very easy to deploy as long as you don't have to use.

In different ways, you see the same problems for Italy and for Spain. Again, with France, special forces have been used. The French contingent is only about half the German.

But we do need to understand these problems are not ones dictated by Iraq. They are dictated by the fact people went into Afghanistan under wrong assumptions about what was going to happen. And politically for many of them, it is one thing to talk about power projection. It is another thing to become involved in an activity where you take casualties and really have to pay the costs.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

Ambassador Inderfurth, do you think there is any way that we can get NATO to step up to the plate and be more involved there? I know that we have what I think you call the standby countries that don't want to be in the military part of it. But do you think they recognize the long-range effects of the instability of Afghanistan and that region? And is there another way to involve them more in the process?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. I think we can get more assistance from NATO. I think that we will see more fighting troops take part.

Again, the numbers needed, according to the NATO commander, are not that large. Our NATO friends, our European friends are very aware of what is taking place in what I agree is still the central front in the war on terrorism, that Afghan-Pakistan border and where bin Laden is.

They also are bearing the brunt of the drug problem. Most of the drug trade that comes out of Afghanistan, which produces 92 percent of the world's opium supply, goes to Europe. So they understand the stakes.

I think that we can get more assistance from them, both in terms of troops and in terms of money, reconstruction assistance, and in terms of their support for all the broad range of activities that need to be done there.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I am greatly concerned about what is happening in Afghanistan. I think it is a place where we can win. I think it is a place where we can stabilize the country and allow them to flourish.

I guess what I am asking is, does NATO see that as well? Or do they fear that our war with Iraq is also going to somehow entangle them if they get more involved in Afghanistan?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. I don't think that they are going to be looking at their commitment in Afghanistan based on what we do in Iraq. We had a question earlier, which I don't think I answered that well, about well, if we are doing this in Afghanistan, what about Iraq? I think they do separate these out. They see the real war, the real need in Afghanistan.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady, Ms. Gillibrand.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Hi. I would like you to address what the current status of women in Afghanistan is today and what we should be doing as Americans to improve it.

Mr. JALALI. One of the major achievements in Afghanistan during the past five years was improvement in the women's status in Afghanistan. I think if you look at the constitution of Afghanistan, I think you see many areas and many provisions in that constitution that support the participation of women in all aspects of life in Afghanistan.

Today, the constitution guarantees 25 percent of the parliament members to be women. However, during the election they did better than that, 27 percent are women in the Afghanistan parliament, both in the national parliament and also in the provisional councils.

During the Taliban, women and girls were not allowed to go to school. Today, 35 percent, about 5.5 million children going to school are women. And women also are doing well in other areas.

However, this country is a conservative country. I think it will take a long time for the society to provide favorable conditions for the equal participation of women, and that depends on the development, economic, political and social development, and also the development of civil society. Women are also involved today in the media, in the free media. There are four or five private T.V. stations in Afghanistan, and women play a major part in those areas.

However, further development, again, depends on development in all the other aspects of life in the country.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Could I just add, again, looking at the paper prepared by the Afghan government, there is a section in here on women. It says, "While women's rights in Afghanistan have made huge strides since 2001, much more needs to be done. We urge the international community to continue to work with us to strengthen the voice, capacity, education and above all the leadership of women in Afghanistan."

I traveled to Afghanistan during the Taliban era. The draconian measures taken against women were despicable, as my boss, Madeleine Albright, said as secretary of state. They have changed, but it is a conservative society. It is not going to be as open and as free as we see.

But there is so much that they are committed to doing to deal with women's issues in Afghanistan. The government of President Karzai is committed to that. And there are things that we can do.

Mr. JALALI. One of my achievements as minister of interior was to appoint the first woman governor in Afghanistan. She is still the governor of Bamiyan province, and she is doing very well.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. The resurgence of the Taliban, what impact is it having on the progress that has been made? Is there backlash?

Mr. JALALI. I think in the areas where Talibans are active, in the south and southeast, yes, there are some negative impact on the women's situation.

However, it is affecting every other aspect of life of the people. It is part of the human security there. So therefore, it does not mean that there is going to be reverse. This is only kind of a reflection of the security situation in that area.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Part of that is education. The Taliban has targeted schools and teachers. And they have closed down schools where girls are finally going back. So this is having a broad impact across all sectors of society.

Dr. CORDESMAN. One point I would raise is the intelligence maps, which have been declassified, of what is happening. It shows that there is a more than four-fold area of increase in Taliban influence in Afghanistan in one year.

What is equally important is what are called high-crime areas. In most high-crime areas there also are problems, in terms of schools, the functioning of government, and women. And those areas are sharply increasing.

And they are largely because the aid in the civil effort is simply not large enough to reach out into the areas, particularly the rural areas where 70 percent of the population is. It isn't a matter of passing the right laws. It is having the resources to help the Afghans make the right transition.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Gillibrand.

Ms. Castor.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to the panel for your expert testimony.

I would like to focus, again, on Pakistan. And could you all summarize for me the types of military assistance the United States has provided in the past to Pakistan, support for their intelligence agencies, other types of diplomatic aid?

Especially in the context of the Pakistani prime minister's comments recently. Mr. Aziz commented last week that people sympathetic to the Taliban were active in the frontier region near the border, but he insisted that the root of the problem was in Afghanistan and not in Pakistan. He said that three million Afghan refugees were crowded into Quetta, Peshawar, and other Pakistani cities close to the border of the country. And he said that refugee population remains a recruiting pool for the Taliban insurgency.

But questions were raised about the role of the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). He said that it was ridiculous that elements of Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI, might be acting independently in support of the Taliban. Even though there have been many other reports, evidence that the Pakistani intelligence agencies were encouraging the insurgency in Afghanistan.

I would like you to meld those concepts, the assistance that the United States has provided to the ISI and to the government. Are they different? Are they at odds? Because it would be a cruel irony that the United States was supporting an intelligence agency that was encouraging the Taliban.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Let me talk about the ISI briefly. I think that you would find most people who have worked on this issue would say it is a somewhat divided organization, and some elements have tried to deal with this problem more realistically than others. But that senior officials in the ISI, and particularly retired members of the ISI, remain a major issue. They have ties not only to the Taliban and other Islamist parties that have Afghan ties, but to Islamist hardline parties inside Pakistan.

I think that this has not been an area where the United States military assistance program has had a major impact. One does need to be careful when one talks about sharing intelligence. You have to share some intelligence with an organization like this if you want them to act. You simply cannot put pressure on them.

But this is an organization which, like the intelligence services of a number of countries in this region, has political clout and leverage very different from the intelligence community in the United States. It doesn't need our aid or money to have that power and function in the way that it is functioning. It hasn't been built up by us. You can go back to Field Marshal Zia; you can go back to the growth of the ISI at the time the Russians were there. It is a problem, but I don't think we can be accused of aiding them in ways which have helped this problem grow.

Mr. JALALI. Pakistan is an ally in the war on terrorism. However, Pakistan looks at it in the context of regional interests.

Pakistan has been very active in going after al Qaeda members in Pakistan and arrested them in Pakistan, many of them, hundreds of them. However, they fail to contain the Taliban the same way. Pakistan does not know whether Afghanistan will stabilize, whether the international community will be in Afghanistan forever. So it keeps its options open.

On the other hand, there is a huge infrastructure of religious parties in Pakistan who are supporting the Taliban. And then for Pakistan, it is more convenient to deal with them in a way not only in Afghanistan but to support other options or other, you know, issues of this foreign policy, as long as the Kashmir issue is there.

So therefore, Pakistan looks at it in the context of the regional interests. Therefore, as I suggested, this issue has to be approached in the context of regional strategy from the United States as well. And the solution should be sought through regional approach, rather than dealing separately with Pakistan, separately with Afghanistan and other countries.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. A quick answer on assistance. After 9/11 and all sanctions were removed from Pakistan, President Bush announced a three billion dollars, five-year package of economic and military assistance to Pakistan, divided equally over that period. We have also proceeded with the sale of F–16 aircraft. So we have positive leverage there to use with Pakistan—positive leverage.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

As I mentioned before, I reserved my questions. And I would like to ask each of you a question.

Ambassador Dobbins, in your opinion, what needs to be done to head off the so-called anticipated spring insurgency?

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think, in the short term, the measures that the Administration is proposing, an increase in the U.S. troop strength, an effort to get NATO to increase its troop strength and increase in the levels of economic assistance to the country, are probably the right moves to head off or, if not head off, at least deal adequately with this anticipated spring offensive.

As I have suggested, I think we are going to be doing this every year for a long time, unless we can also better address the situation on the other side of the frontier.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Minister Jalali, the Afghan National Army has a good number of problems. How do we strengthen that army? Is there a relationship to the way we are doing things in Iraq to what we may or may not be doing with the Afghan army?

Mr. JALALI. Mr. Chairman, building a national army in Afghanistan is a very difficult challenge. This is the fourth time in 150 years that Afghanistan is rebuilding its national army after a period of instability.

The current army was actually started in 2002. It was expected by now that we would have about 60,000 or up to 70,000 in the army. However, several reasons, you know, several factors contributed to a slow progress of the national army.

First, the long period of war, factionalism in Afghanistan. And, therefore, local loyalties as opposed to national loyalty has been a problem in the beginning. Of course, today, the Afghanistan National Army is a multi-ethnic army.

However, the other issue is incentives, the pay system. Although Afghan soldiers are paid better than police, better than other, you know, common Afghans; however, it is not an incentive that will keep many soldiers in the force. So, desertion is rampant in many areas.

Third, the other thing is training. The training has not been adequate in the beginning. Six weeks or eight weeks of training and later on with the improvement of coaching and better training, I think it improved somehow. But still, in some areas, this is a problem.

And third, the equipment. They are not equipped and armed with effective weapons, and also protection. So therefore, they are not as effective as it used to be. When they are not effective, this increases the rates of desertion.

On the other hand, mobility. They cannot move quickly from place to place.

And the fifth one is the ownership, Afghan ownership. Since the embedded trainers from the United States and other countries are there, the deployment of Afghan army is not solely the decision of the minister of defense of Afghanistan or the general staff. It has to be coordinated with the coalition forces. Therefore, sometimes this lack of Afghan ownership causes problems.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Inderfurth, I was intrigued when you earlier said that the Afghan people have never seen us as occupiers, as obviously is not the case in Iraq. Would you explain to us why that is correct?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. I will do that. Could I add just one comment about what Minister Jalali just said?

The Afghan police are in worse shape than the army. And there is a great deal that needs to be done to make sure that they get the kind of equipment, training to do their job in the field, which is probably, right now, more important for security.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they a local——

Ambassador INDERFURTH. National army——

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, no, no. The police.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. They are local.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. They are the cops on the beat.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. And a lot of them are corrupt, and they are causing more insecurity than security for the Afghan people, which is turning them against the government.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. All right.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. On the question of non-occupiers, I mean, the history of Afghanistan is one in which any foreign nation that has tried to exert its control, whether it be the British or the Soviets or others, bringing in troops, have been repulsed. That has not happened to our involvement after 9/11, and we are still not seen as occupiers.

Sometimes, when things go wrong, including on military strikes that have civilian casualties, that is going to impact that. But the Afghan people still appreciate and still speak of the assistance that we provided them during the Soviet occupation. We did more through our assistance to the mujahedeen to help liberate their country from the Soviets. They still appreciate that.

And they appreciate what we are doing now. And, if anything, they want us to make sure to stay and that we don't walk away from Afghanistan again, as we did in 1989 after the Soviets left.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Cordesman, yesterday at lunch I had the opportunity to ask a question of President Karzai, and I will ask a similar question of you: What does it take to rout out the heroin and drug problem?

I told him that if there is any one issue that has the potential of turning the American people against our involvement in Afghanistan, it is the growing of the poppy. And it hasn't reached that, of course, at the present time, but I think I am correct that, over a period of time, if it is not addressed successfully, I think it could be a major problem toward American public opinion.

Doctor.

Dr. CORDESMAN. You know, I am very reluctant to answer that question, because I have watched the war on drugs in various forms since it was started and I was working for the Senate Armed Services Committee staff. And it has been a very, very popular thing in Congress.

Its impact on the street price of drugs has been virtually nonexistent. The number of seizures has often gone up; it has sometimes gone down.

When you talk about eradicating narcotics in Afghanistan, you may reduce the volume, you may shift people to other crops, but it is too isolated, too complex a society to eliminate this. And the idea that you can, in this country with this level of rural growing, lack of central authority, ever achieve a business where you do more than somewhat reduce the supply within the near future is simply not practical.

I know that is an answer no one in the Congress wants to hear, but we really need to be honest about what has happened in our

own counter-narcotics programs and the similar ones in Latin America.

And here we are two years away from the new police program producing a significant output of people trying to counter narcotics. We are years away from getting effective aid programs into the field at the rural level which actually get to the areas which can change the crops. And most of those require honesty and integrity we haven't got.

There are areas in the border areas where it would take so many troops to actually have eradication that we already have seen these efforts fail and simply end up alienating tribes without reducing production.

So, to be perfectly honest, yes, this will be unpopular. Yes, even though if we got a 50-percent reduction in output in 5 years, which would be an amazing real-world achievement, it also wouldn't make much of a difference.

The CHAIRMAN. Recently, I think yesterday, maybe the day before, the Administration appears to be holding the Colombia, in its decades-long struggle against narcotic traffickers and insurgences, as a model for the Afghan government today.

Dr. Cordesman, do you agree with that?

Dr. CORDESMAN. A model of what? As far as I know, if you go down to northeast Washington, you can get it cheaper than you could ten years ago in constant dollars.

I find this is sort of like these narcotics seizures where everybody suddenly says the street price is worth all this vast amount of money, but these kinds of losses are part of the cost of doing business.

And let me note that, in Europe, which is the main market for Afghan drugs, what has happened is you have seen heroin displace the sharp growth of synthetics, which were being produced in Europe. If you solve the Afghan problem, you are not going to solve the European problem. You will just push them back toward synthetics.

This is a demand-driven problem, not a supply-driven. And, yes, politically, everybody claims we have made progress in cutting supply. They have been making it ever since the rise of drugs in the 1960's, but we all only have to look around to know what the reality is here, the United States, and all over the world.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there was a war in China known as the opium war. Am I not correct?

Dr. CORDESMAN. That is right. And opium won. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Well, gentlemen, you have been a—oh, excuse me.

Jim Cooper, I did not see you come in. Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to you and the witnesses to have to be in and out, because I had three simultaneous hearings today.

But I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman. It is wonderful to see our committee return to real hearings. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you for your kindness.

Mr. COOPER. It is an excellent panel.

I was struck by Ambassador Dobbins's testimony, on page 7, when he says, "Afghanistan has never been a self-sufficient state,

and it probably never will be. It is simply too poor to be able to raise the revenues necessary to provide security and effective governance."

That is the sort of breath-taking clarity that we just heard from Tony Cordesman on the drug question, but it is something that people don't want to acknowledge.

There is a functioning warlord system there, so at least in discrete areas they seem to be able to govern, at least in the warlord fashion. Have we ever had a relationship with a country without a central government, where we just dealt systematically with warlords in a successful fashion?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I can't think of one in which we dealt in a successful fashion. I mean, Somalia would be an even more extreme case.

I don't want my statement to suggest that the situation in Afghanistan is hopeless. Afghanistan is going to be a recipient of external assistance indefinitely, and it is going to require it. It has required it for several hundred years. But in a benign environment in which all of its neighbors see a common interest in supporting a moderate, nonthreatening government, I think we have the prospect of helping Afghanistan along and reducing the prospect of conflict, both within it and in its broader region.

There is an impression that the United States formed a coalition and liberated Afghanistan, whereas the fact is we joined a coalition that had been fighting the Taliban for a decade, which consisted of Iran, Russia, India and the Northern Alliance. And with the addition of American airpower and the subtraction of Pakistani support for the Taliban, that coalition prevailed.

And in the Bonn conference, we were able to build on that coalition and bring all of those neighboring states into the process of nation-building in Afghanistan in a benign and positive way. And we need to recreate that.

The major outlier and problem, in this case, is not Iran; it is Pakistan. And if we can recreate a sense of common endeavor with respect to Afghanistan, then I think the prospects are positive.

Mr. COOPER. I like your focus on Pakistan. And it made me wonder that we shouldn't concentrate on nation-building, but not so much in Afghanistan as in Pakistan, your focus on the Kashmir problem and those situations. It is difficult to call Pakistan an ally when there are so many ambiguities and troubles and problems.

Dr. Cordesman pointed out how popular the Taliban and several other Islamic groups are in Paktika province, for example. I visited there a year or so ago, and it is difficult for Americans to comprehend the remoteness. And we were told that it is the size of New Hampshire, and in the entire area, there is about one mile of paved road. That is incomprehensible to the average American.

And with 67 percent popularity for the Taliban in that region, you know, what can you do about it? And, you know, with a safe haven offered right across the border by the Pakistanis.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Congressman, if I may suggest, I think that if you look at the plans that the aid people have that they would like to be able to implement, we are often talking things like dams, simple gravel roads, maybe the odd generator, maybe a school

building or a clinic in a given area. We are not talking vast expenditures.

What we are talking about is something that just isn't there at all yet. You don't have the presence in the field. We have been concentrating in other areas; we haven't had the resources. In areas like this, it would take time, but it would make a tremendous difference if you could do very, very little.

And, in many cases, the Afghans can do it themselves if somebody can get them the material, set up the conditions that allow them to operate. There simply isn't the structure of governance, there isn't the security presence yet to do it.

So I believe, in most of the areas where the Taliban has grown and gained support, a partnership with the Afghan government, with Afghan groups, and very, very limited resources could have a tremendous impact. The difficulty is there is almost nothing now, just showpiece projects in a few isolated areas, not a campaign, not a systematic effort.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Congressman, you talked about the relationship between the United States and Pakistan, and you asked whether or not we are allies. I want to call your attention to the best book on the U.S. history of diplomatic relations with Pakistan. It is entitled, *Disenchanted Allies.* It goes back over our 60-year period.

And we are in another disenchanted period, unfortunately, because of what is happening along that border. And we need Pakistan's assistance. And I hope that we can turn this around.

Mr. COOPER. At some point, back to Dr. Cordesman's point, we have been in Afghanistan for four or five years. We have troops operating, at least in Paktika. I don't know about the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. For the Taliban to be 67 percent popular there today, after 5 years of U.S. presence, indicates 5 years of, perhaps, wasted effort. Maybe we would have been even less popular if we hadn't done the few show projects that we have done.

But we hear that the road from Kabul to Kandahar is being supplied with asphalt from a plant in Pakistan, so the truck has to drive over the Khyber Pass to produce the asphalt, because there is not even an asphalt plant. You know, that sounds to the average American taxpayer like a ridiculous expenditure.

I see that my time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

And Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Sirs, I apologize. I left after the first hour to go to another hearing.

I was on the ground in Afghanistan about two months after the war began, and then brought a carrier battle group back, because we flew over it, and then came back and was on the ground again for a short period of time, 18 months after my first visit.

To some degree, on the first visit, because it was just 60 days after the war began, over Christmas time, I saw what needed to be done, I thought. And when I came back and spoke with the general 18 months later, I can remember the comment of, "We are keeping our finger in the dike," as civil affairs units and special forces had been placed into a different war in Iraq.

The chairman has taken us, and is taking us, through certain set pieces on our security environment. Afghanistan is today; before, Iraq; and I am sure there will be other set pieces.

And since most of the questions duly were probably asked, my question for you all is: Having seen Afghanistan become prey to terrorists and the Taliban come back into the southern provinces, and watching what has occurred in Iraq, are we more secure in our strategic security environment today because of these two pieces? And, if not, what is the right approach?

And, Mr. Ambassador, if you didn't mind starting?

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think that, clearly, al Qaeda, bin Laden have more difficulty operating from their sanctuaries in Pakistan than they did from their much more unrestrained sanctuaries in Afghanistan. And so, in that sense, we have dispersed them, we have made operations more difficult, we have put them under pressure, and of course we have destroyed some of their leadership.

So, in a narrow sense, the situation is better than it was prior to 9/11.

The situation is also better for the Afghans. There is a civil war under way in Afghanistan, but there was a civil war under way in Afghanistan before 9/11. It was a civil war in which the Taliban were in Kabul and the rebels were in the northern part of the country. But the country has been in civil war for 25 years.

So, again, the situation now is probably better than it was for the Afghans prior to 9/11.

I suspect you are asking a larger question on whether——

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, on a strategic security environment. Because I think that is where the chairman is taking us in these set pieces. And you had addressed these issues in the previous questions.

Ambassador DOBBINS. I mean, you know, again, moving beyond those narrower judgments, the level of hostility to the United States in Muslim society has risen significantly and creates a pool from which terrorists can draw support, acquiescence and even recruits that is extremely large.

This has not occurred because of our intervention in Afghanistan or our inadequate nation-building efforts in Afghanistan, which are, broadly speaking, popular in the Muslim world, but largely as the result of the intervention in Iraq and the mishandling of the post-conflict reconstruction there.

Mr. SESTAK. But, in a strategic sense, are we, in this global war on terror, more secure there?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I would say, on balance, that there has been exponential growth in the number and variety of terrorist groups who are inclined to target American interests and assets.

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. I would simply put it this way: that we have taken Afghanistan off the table as a base for al Qaeda. But I believe that our strategic security environment has worsened overall as a result of our involvement in Iraq.

Mr. SESTAK. Sir?

Mr. JALALI. I agree with both ambassadors that, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, the situation is better than before. How-

ever, the other threats are not related closely with Afghanistan. Therefore, there are many other reasons that causes threats to the security in the United States, including Iraq.

Mr. SESTAK. Dr. Cordesman.

Dr. CORDESMAN. I think one of our great problems is that we focus on the two countries we see, Iraq and Afghanistan, but this was a major cultural, political and ideological problem in some 60 to 80 countries before 9/11. It is going to be an enduring problem for at least another 10 to 15 years, almost regardless of what happens in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a reason people call this a long war. And we have to accept it, just as we did the Cold War, as an enduring security issue.

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, sir, but I was building off your comment earlier, that we need metrics——

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. I assume there are no additional questions of this panel.

Yes? You have an answer to a question that hasn't been asked. Go ahead, Mr. Ambassador. [Laughter.]

Ambassador INDERFURTH. May I have a 30-second correct-the-record remark?

The CHAIRMAN. You bet.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. When we were talking, going back to Congressman Hunter's substituting orchards for poppies, I mentioned a group called Seeds of Peace. It is actually Roots of Peace, in California. That is an important alternative livelihood.

But I also would like just to associate myself with something that Dr. Cordesman said, that this will take years of effort to make this effort. Five years in, we have another decade to go.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

This has been a very impressive panel. And, gentlemen, we appreciate your expertise and your time, your being with us. Needless to say, this is a very challenging issue for our country.

It was a thrill to be with Speaker Pelosi yesterday in Afghanistan and with the long discussion, as well as the long luncheon with Ambassador Karzai as well as other leaders within the parliament. And I came away, frankly, with a more positive impression than I had had before. I guess, in ordinary terms, I felt there was some light at the end of the tunnel.

But there are challenges, as you have so aptly pointed out today, each of you, that we face, different challenges than we face in Iraq. And it is particularly heartening to know that we are not looked upon as occupiers. And the attitude there that I felt toward us was a positive one.

Well, gentlemen, thank you very, very much for this very enlightening and excellent hearing.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

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TESTIMONY

Ending Afghanistan's Civil War

JAMES DOBBINS

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Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee on January 30, 2007

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1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050
4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213
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James Dobbins[1]
The RAND Corporation

Ending Afghanistan's Civil War

Before the Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives

January 30, 2007

The resurgence of civil war in Afghanistan can be attributed to two fundamental causes. One is the failure of the United States, the Karzai government, and the international community as a whole to take advantage of the lull in that conflict that followed the collapse of the Taleban regime in late 2001 to strengthen the capacity of the new Afghan government to project its authority and provide public services, including security, to the population beyond Kabul. The second cause is the fragmentation of the international coalition that the United States put together in late 2001 to stabilize and reconstruct. Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has experienced civil war since the late 1970's. Unlike the conflict that raged in Yugoslavia in the 1990's, or the one underway in Iraq today, both of which principally derive from deep seated hostility among their constituent religious, ethnic and linguistic communities, Afghanistan's war has largely been the product of external influences. In the 1980s the Soviet Union and the United States chose Afghanistan as a battleground in their global competition. In the 1990s Pakistan, India, Russia and Iran supported competing Afghan factions in order to protect and extend their influence in the region. Relations among Afghanistan's various ethnic, religious and linguistic communities have become much more difficult as the conflict progressed, but these tensions are more the result of civil war than its cause.

American's tend to recall that, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration formed a multinational coalition that drove the Taleban from power. It is more accurate, however, to state that in late 2001, the United States joined an existing coalition that had been fighting the Taleban for half a decade. That coalition consisted of Russia, India, Iran, and the Northern Alliance. With the addition of American airpower, and the withdrawal of Pakistani support for their opponent, that coalition prevailed. Northern Alliance troops, who had been equipped, trained and paid by Russia, India and Iran, occupied most of the country.

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If credit for America's military victory in Afghanistan needs to be shared with this unlikely coalition, so must America's diplomatic achievement in rapidly installing a broadly based successor regime. When named as the American envoy to the Afghan opposition October of 2001, I quickly concluded that the United States could not succeed in halting civil war in Afghanistan, however successful we might be in ousting the Taleban, without the support of the very governments responsible for that war in the first place. This belief stemmed from my own experience a few years earlier in the Balkans, and in particular from observation of the success Richard Holbrooke had achieved in 1995 in orchestrating the Dayton negotiations that ended the civil war in Bosnia. That war had been the product of Serbian and Croatian ambitions. Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman had been personally guilty of the genocide we were trying to stop. Only by engaging them, bringing them to the conference table, and making them partners in the peace process were we able to persuade all the Bosnian factions to lay down their arms. I believed that something similar would be needed to achieve a comparable result in Afghanistan.

By November of 2001 we were working with the United Nations to bring all factions of the Afghan opposition together in Bonn, where we hoped they would agree upon an interim constitution and the membership of a new government. The UN's initial inclination had been to tightly sequester the Afghan representatives from all outside contacts in order to prevent foreign government from exerting malign influence over their deliberations. I made the opposite case, arguing that it was only by bringing governments like Iran, Pakistan, India and Russia into the process that we had some chance of securing a positive outcome. In my view the Afghans would only reconcile their differences if they were subjected to convergent pressures from all their foreign sponsors and supporters.

And this was, in fact, exactly how it worked out. Each of those governments, and particularly Russia and Iran, played positive and essential roles in forging the compromises upon which the Afghans ultimately agreed.

Pakistan was also present at the Bonn Conference. This meeting was, in large measure, a gathering of its former adversaries, which made the Pakistani position at Bonn rather uncomfortable. Nevertheless, Pakistan's acquiescence in the process, and support for the result was essential to its prospects for longevity.

In the aftermath of this collective achievement, the United States and the rest of the international community had a golden occasion to help Afghans build an effective government capable of providing its population with the most basic public services. Al Qaeda was smashed, its remnants

in hiding. The Taleban was discredited in Afghanistan and dispersed in Pakistan. Neither was capable of posing an immediate threat to the new regime in Kabul.

We failed to seize this opportunity. During those early years US and international assistance was minimal. Blame for this failure must be widely shared, but the minimalist approach did reflect the American Administrations early aversion to nation building. Well into 2003 the Administration was quite vocal in touting the merits of its "low profile, small footprint" alternative to the more robust nation building efforts that the Clinton Administration had led in Bosnia and Kosovo. Top Administration officials argued that generous international assistance had caused those Balkan societies to become inordinately dependent upon external funding and foreign troops, something the new U.S. Administration intended to avoid in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

In pursuit of this severely limited vision of nation building, the United States initially sought to minimize the size, geographical scope and functions of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Washington rejected pleas from Karzai and the UN to deploy these international peacekeepers outside Kabul. The Administration discouraged any role for NATO in Afghanistan. It also refused to assign peacekeeping functions American forces operating throughout the country. Security for the Afghan population was to remain the responsibility of regional warlords until a new Afghan national army could be recruited, trained and deployed, a process which would necessarily take years complete.

Economic assistance to Afghanistan was also commensurately low. In the first year following the collapse of the Taleban, the United States committed some $500 million in reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. Compare that figure to the $18 billion in economic assistance the Administration requested for Iraq, a country of comparable size, much greater wealth, and much less damaged, in 2003. The rest of the international community did not do much better. Counting all sources, the average Afghan received about $50 in foreign aid in each of the first two years following the installation of the Kazai regime. By comparison, the average Kosovar had received ten times more assistance and the average Bosnian twelve times more assistance over a comparable period.

As is indicated in the chart below, showing troop and financial commitments to fifteen US and UN led nation building operations over the past sixty years, Afghanistan was the least resourced of any major American led nation building operation since the end of WWII.



[2]

Not surprisingly, when one invests low levels of military manpower and economic assistance in post-conflict reconstruction, what one gets is low levels of security and economic growth. This was the experience in Afghanistan. In major combat operations it has proved possible to substitute firepower and technology for manpower, enabling smaller, more agile forces to very rapidly prevail over much larger, less advanced adversaries. This defense transformation paradigm yields very unsatisfactory results when applied to the next stage of operations, however. Experience has also shown that in stabilization and reconstruction operations, there is no substitute for manpower, money, and time.

By 2004, the Administration begun to recognize these realities and started to increase its aid and military manning levels accordingly. US assistance climbed steeply. So did US troop levels. NATO was invited to take over the ISAF mission. International peacekeepers were at last dispatched to the provinces.

[2] *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, Dobbins et al, RAND, 2005

Two vital years had been lost however, years during which little progress had been made in extending effective governance to the countryside. As a result, when the Taleban and other anti regime elements again began to mount attacks into Afghanistan, the population in the affected areas had been given little incentive to risk their lives on behalf of a government that could neither protect them nor advance their material well being.

This history explains why anti-regime insurgents have found some receptivity among the local population to their efforts to overturn the Karzai regime and expel the international presence. It does not explain why this threat has reemerged. The current insurgency in Afghanistan does not arise from a profound disaffection among large elements of the Afghan population with their government. This insurgency has been raised in Pakistan, but individuals resident in Pakistan, some of whom are refugees from Afghanistan, others of whom are native Pakistanis. For the tens of millions of Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of the current border, the distinction between Afghan and Pakistani is, indeed, of little import, as neither they, nor the government of Afghanistan, for that matter, recognize the current border between the two countries as legitimate.

Most Afghan Pashtuns do not support the insurgency, but nearly all insurgents are Pashtuns. The insurgency is organized, funded, trained and directed from Pakistan, where most Pashtuns live, and where most Pashtuns have always lived. Pashtuns believe themselves to represent a majority of the Afghan population, and claim a predominant role in that countries government.

Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, the senior U.S. commander in Afghanistan, reported in early 2007 that the number of suicide attacks had increased by more than 400 percent from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006. Remotely detonated bombings had more than doubled from 783 to 1,677, and armed attacks nearly tripled from 1,558 to 4,542. This violence led to more than 4,000 deaths in Afghanistan last year. Last year was by far the bloodiest year in the country since 2001. Today, the Taliban has infiltrated villages in the south and east of Afghanistan, and are expected to mount major operations in Kandahar, Helmand, and other provinces this spring. Their ability to use Pakistan as a sanctuary has been critical. Interviews with U.S., NATO, and UN officials indicate that the Taliban regularly ship arms, ammunition, and supplies into Afghanistan from Pakistan. Most suicide bombers came from Afghan refugee camps located in Pakistan. Components for improvised explosive devices are often smuggled across the Afghan-Pakistan border and assemble at safe houses in such provinces as Kandahar

The degree of official Pakistani complicity in this insurgency is a matter of some controversy. Speaking in private, knowledgeable US, NATO, Afghan and UN officials are nearly unanimous in

asserting that the Pakistani intelligence service continues to collaborate with the Taleban and other insurgent groups operating out of its border regions. For its part, the Pakistani government, at the highest levels, denies any official sanction for these activities, suggesting that, at most, these reports reflect the activity of former members of its intelligence service acting independently and against government policy.

The U.S. Administration has complained loudly about Iranian support for sectarian violence in Iraq. At this point, lacking access to the intelligence data, it is difficult to fully assess the degree of official Iranian support for civil war in Iraq, or official Pakistani support for civil war in Afghanistan. What seems indisputably clear, however, is that Pakistani citizens, residents, money and territory are playing a much greater role in the Afghan civil war than are Iranian citizens, residents, money or territory in the Iraqi civil war.

The RAND Corporation has conducted a several studies on nation building and counterinsurgency drawing on the experience from dozens of American and non-American led operations over the past century. Among the principal conclusions that can be drawn from these historical surveys is the extreme difficulty in putting together broken societies without the support of neighboring states, and the near impossibility of suppressing well established insurgencies that enjoy external support and neighboring sanctuary. The validity of this lesson is evident today both in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Pakistan has both geopolitical and domestic political incentives for destabilizing its neighbor. Geopolitically, Pakistan fears an independent Afghan state aligned with India. Domestically, Pakistani elites would prefer to seen Pashtun ambitions externalized, in the pursuit of power in Afghanistan, rather than turned inward, in the pursuit of greater autonomy, or even independence for Pashtunistan. Even if these considerations do not lead Pakistani officials to actually foment civil war in Afghanistan, they can diminish that government's commitment to helping suppress such activities. The United States and the rest of the international community therefore need to work to offset these incentives with a more persuasive array of counter-incentives designed to lead Pakistan to assert effective control over its own territory and population and prevent either from being used against its neighbor.

Often one hears that the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 diverted American manpower and money from Afghanistan. This may be true. But a more serious charge is that the conflict in Iraq has diverted American attention from the real central front in the war on terror, which neither in Iraq or Afghanistan, but in Pakistan. Al Qaeda, after all, is headquartered in Pakistan. The Taleban is operating out of Pakistan, as are several other insurgent and terrorist groups seeking to expel

international forces from Afghanistan. Ben Laden lives in Pakistan. Mullah Omar lives in Pakistan. It was Pakistan that assisted the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. Potential terrorists in Western societies still travel to Pakistan for inspiration, guidance, support and direction.

Yet if Pakistan is the central front in the war on terror, it is not one susceptible to a military response. We are not going to bomb Islamabad or invade Waziristan. An increase in US military manpower and money for Afghanistan may contain the renewed insurgency and prevent the Karzai government from being overthrown. But the US and NATO troops are likely to be required there indefinitely as long at the Taleban and the other insurgent groups are able to recruit, train, raise funds and organize their operations in Pakistan.

Afghanistan has never been a self sufficient state, and it probably never will be. It is simply too poor to be able to raise the revenues necessary to provide security and effective governance to a large and dispersed population. So unless the Pakistani government can be persuaded to abandon its relationship with extremist elements within its society, halt its support for terrorism, provide its youth an educational alternative to fundamentalist madrasas, extend effective governance into its border provinces, and curtail their use by insurgent movements, the United States and its allies are going to be compelled to patrol Afghanistan's Southeast Frontier indefinitely, just Great Britain was compelled to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign along that same frontier, from the other side, throughout much of the 19th century.

As I have noted, Pakistan is not a problem susceptible to a military solution. Therefore other sources of influence will need to be used. First the United States should intensify quite efforts to encourage both India and Pakistan to resolve their differences over Kashmir, that dispute being the root cause of radicalization in Pakistani society and governments use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Second, our assistance programs need to address the economic and social needs of the Pashtun populations on both sides of the border, not just in Afghanistan. There is only limited benefit in winning the hearts and minds of Pashtuns resident in Afghanistan if the larger number of Pashtuns living in Pakistan remain hostile and ungoverned. Third, we need to encourage both the Afghan and Pakistani governments to establish an agreed border regime and legitimize the current frontier. And finally, the U.S. should encourage Pakistan to move back toward civilian rule via free elections. Fundamentalist parties have never fared well in such elections in Pakistan, and are unlikely to do so in the future. It seems ironic that the U.S. has pushed for democratization in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon, all places where the result was likely to intensify sectarian conflict, but has largely failed to do so in Pakistan, where the opposite result is more likely.

American efforts alone, no matter how intense and skillful, will not be sufficient to achieve any of these objectives. Washington therefore needs to raise the profile of the Pakistan problem internationally, in order to secure a much wider array of pressures upon and of assistance to Pakistan in undertaking these transformations.

At present NATO is manning the Afghan frontier, but doing nothing to address the threat emerging from its other side. This is akin to NATO's guarding the Fulda Gap throughout the Cold War, but having no agreed policies for dealing with the Soviet Union. In fact, consultations about the Soviet Union occupied 90% of the every NATO Ministerial and Summit for 40 years. Its time consultations on Pakistan occupied a similarly central place in the transatlantic dialogue.

The recent announcement that the Administration intends to increase its troop and financial commitment to Afghanistan should be welcomed. These steps come five years late, but perhaps not too late. American commitments now need to be supported by similar contributions from other NATO countries. Some countries, such as Canada and Britain, have been willing to fight against Taliban strongholds in such provinces as Kandahar and Helmand. But most NATO countries continue to have national caveats that severely restrict their ability to fight. In addition, several coalition countries lack adequate enabler forces—including attack and lift helicopters, smart munitions, intelligence, engineers, medical, logistics, and digital command and control—to fully leverage and sustain their ground combat power.

The Afghan people desperately want peace, and they continue to hope that their freely elected government, the United States and NATO can bring it to them. We continue to be welcome in Afghanistan in a way we are not in Iraq. But public support for Karzai, his government, and our presence is diminishing. These additional commitments should be able to reverse, or at least slow this negative trend. The more American money and manpower is committed to Afghanistan, however, the more important it become to address the principal source of the ongoing civil war, which remains, as it has for most of the past 20 years, largely external, and in present circumstances, largely in Pakistan.

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THE ELLIOTT SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

STATEMENT BY

AMB. KARL F. INDERFURTH

**John O. Rankin Professor of the Practice
of International Affairs
The Elliott School of International Affairs
The George Washington University**

**Former Assistant Secretary of State
for South Asian Affairs (1997-2001)**

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

"Security and Stability in Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities"

JANUARY 30, 2007

Statement by Amb. Karl F. Inderfurth
House Armed Services Committee
January 30, 2007

"Security and Stability in Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities"

Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member Hunter, Members of the Committee:

Thank you very much for your invitation to address the challenges and opportunities facing Afghanistan. In my testimony I will identify five of these challenges and make several recommendations, introduce three cautionary notes for your consideration, and then cite what I consider to be the most important opportunity this Committee and the Congress have to ensure Afghanistan's long-term security and stability.

OPENING

May I begin by calling attention to the very first piece of legislation passed by the new House of Representatives on January 9. H.R. 1, the "Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007," contained many important anti-terrorism measures, including those found in Section 1441 on Afghanistan and Section 1442 on Pakistan.

The passage of H.R. 1 and its focus on the unfinished business of the 9/11 Commission recommendations provides an excellent point of departure for my testimony because there is much unfinished business that we and the international community must tend to in Afghanistan.

Let me remind you that in its final report, the 9/11 Commission identified Afghanistan as "the incubator for al Qaeda and for the 9/11 attacks" and made this recommendation to safeguard America against future acts of terrorism:

> "The United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan... Afghanistan must not again become a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism."

The Commission went on to say that this "ambitious recommendation" would require a "redoubled effort to secure the country" and warned that "failed half-measures could be worse than useless."

More than two years after that 9/11 Commission recommendation was made, "half-measures" in Afghanistan by the United States and the international community are failing to provide security, rebuild the country or combat the

exploding drug trade. They are also threatening to undo what progress has been made since U.S.-led military forces toppled the Taliban from power in late 2001.

Indeed much has been accomplished since the Taliban were overthrown. President Hamid Karzai is justifiably proud in saying that Afghanistan "now has a constitution, a president, a Parliament and a nation fully participating in its destiny."

But is also true that Afghanistan is still very much at risk. The Taliban and their extremist allies have made a powerful comeback, especially in the eastern and southern parts of the country. Afghanistan remains the world's leading drug supplier of opium. Corruption is on the rise. And many Afghans are asking, five years after the international community arrived, where are the promised roads, the schools, the health clinics, the electricity, the water?

From the outset, the United States went about establishing a "light footprint" in Afghanistan. The recent report of the Iraq Study Group identified one of the principal reasons: "The huge focus of U.S. political, military and economic support on Iraq has necessarily diverted attention from Afghanistan." But the international community also joined in that "light footprint," failing to fully provide either the manpower or the funding needed to deal with what was then and, in my opinion, remains the central front in the "war on terrorism."

Today we see the price being paid for "half-measures" in Afghanistan. Afghanistan must receive the priority, attention and resources it deserves. A successful plan will include moving on many fronts simultaneously, and in close cooperation with our partners in the international community and, a point I will underscore at the end of my statement, the Afghan government itself.

AFGHANISTAN CHALLENGES

Challenge Number 1: Security, Security, and Security

US and NATO officials are predicting "heavy fighting" in the spring and say that Afghanistan is facing "a bloody year" in 2007. Violence is four times more intense than it was a year ago, killing an estimated 4000 people, the deadliest year since 2001. Deteriorating security has also set back Afghanistan's development efforts. Aid and reconstruction workers are targeted; immunization programs have been halted; scores of Afghan schools have been threatened or burned.

More troops are needed. The current level of 34,000 NATO soldiers in Afghanistan represents about 85 percent of what military commanders say they need. British General David Richards, the NATO commander, estimates that he is 4,000 to 5,000 troops short. Outgoing U.S. coalition commander General Karl Eikenberry has also called for reinforcements.

The U.S. contributes 12,000 troops to the NATO mission and has another 12,000 personnel operating in the country under independent command. Last week the Pentagon announced that it will keep 3,200 of its troops -- from the Army's 10th Mountain Division -- in Afghanistan for an extra four months to bolster NATO forces through the spring.

This is a positive response to the NATO troop shortfall, but it will not be sufficient to address Afghanistan's security needs over the next year.

At the upcoming February 8-9 NATO defense minister's meeting in Seville, Spain, Secretary Gates should announce that the U.S. is prepared to further expand the number of American troops in Afghanistan with extra forces. This would coincide with the United States assuming command from the British of the NATO mission in Afghanistan. It would also reinforce the message Gates took earlier this month on his first visit to NATO headquarters: "Success in Afghanistan is our top priority."

But it must also be the top priority of NATO's other 25 members. The day after the Defense Department announced plans to extend the tour of US soldiers in Afghanistan, the top NATO commander in Afghanistan, British General David Richards, said that he anticipates "at least another brigade of combat troops from ISAF nations would be coming here shortly and more after that."

Seville should be the occasion for contributions for that new combat brigade to be finalized and announced. The U.S. should not bear the burden alone of increasing military forces in Afghanistan. In the words of Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns: "NATO needs to do more in the way of troops, in the way of money, in the way of ridding itself of the restrictions on the use of military forces" in Afghanistan. NATO should also encourage its partners in the NATO Mediterranean dialogue, especially Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, to offer troops to help stabilize Afghanistan.

Challenge Number 2: The Afghan-Pakistan Border

Providing security to Afghanistan cannot be accomplished without doing more to secure the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The Taliban can lose every firefight with superior NATO, U.S. and Afghan National Army forces and still turn southern and eastern Afghanistan into a "no development" zone and stir insecurity in Kabul and elsewhere. As long as the Taliban have a "safe haven" in Pakistan -- to use the recent words of Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte -- they can continue their insurgency indefinitely, making it virtually impossible for Afghanistan to become a country at peace with itself and its neighbors.

Washington and NATO must continue to work with Pakistan for a more concerted effort to disrupt the Taliban leadership and its revived command and control structure operating on Pakistani territory. This should be a top priority for Secretary Rice on her planned visit to Pakistan next month. While it is true that Islamabad cannot prevent individual Talibs and small groups from crossing the porous, 1,600-mile frontier, it can do a much better job of making its territory less hospitable for them.

The key to securing the Afghan-Pakistan border is to improve the troubled relations between the two neighboring and improve their level of cooperation. The recent establishment of the first Afghan, Pakistan and NATO intelligence and operation center in Kabul is a hopeful step in this direction. But more fundamental steps are required.

Washington and other capitals should urge Afghanistan to officially accept the so-called Durand Line of 1893 as the border with Pakistan. Although President Karzai does not publicly dispute this border, his government has been reluctant to accept it officially lest this cause internal political trouble. A comprehensive settlement to secure Afghanistan's border with Pakistan is long overdue.

Washington should urge Pakistan to integrate the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into the country's political, economic and legal mainstream. These areas along the Afghan-Pakistan border remain economically, socially and politically backward. A traditional bastion of conservative Islam, the FATA have in recent years become a breeding ground for the Taliban and a sanctuary for al-Qaeda remnants. To make it easier for Islamabad to undertake costly reforms needed to integrate the tribal areas, the United States, the World Bank and other donors should provide Pakistan with additional economic assistance.

Cautionary Note No. 1: Don't Open an Afghan Front Against Iran

Pakistan is not the only neighbor that has a strong interest and stake -- including religious, cultural and economic ties -- with Afghanistan. So does Iran, particularly in the western part of the country and among the Shiite (Hazara) population.

According to recent news reports, as part of the Bush administration's decision to authorize a "kill or capture" policy for Iranian operatives inside Iraq, US officials are also preparing "more aggressive moves...to undermine Iranian interests among Shiites in western Afghanistan."

This would be ill-advised. Such a move by the US would certainly complicate and likely prove counter-productive to President Karzai's efforts to normalize and stabilize relations with his western neighbor.

Moreover, opening an Afghan front against Iran does not appear appropriate or necessary. As the Iraq Study Group pointed out, during the Taliban era "The United States and Iran cooperated in Afghanistan." This cooperation included opposition to the Taliban in the UN "6 plus 2" forum, quiet support to Iran for its supply of military assistance to Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Masood, and a joint recognition of the need to combat the rising threat of the Afghan drug trade. The two countries collaborated during the post-Taliban Bonn Conference. More recently, Iran's involvement in Afghanistan has been described by one US official as somewhere between "helpful and benign."

Challenge Number 3: Afghan Security Forces

A greater priority must be given to standing up the Afghanistan's security forces -- the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). Today there are 36,000 soldiers in the army, with a projected end strength of 70,000 by 2009. There are about 50,000 police with a goal of a 82,000 man force, again by 2009. Both security forces are badly under-resourced.

A report by retired General Barry R. McCaffrey (who traveled to Afghanistan last summer) stated: "There seems to be neither U.S. resources nor political will" to equip the Afghan army to allow it to become a first line counter-insurgency force. McCaffrey recommended that the U.S. government provide $1.2 billion annually to training and equipping the Afghan army and sustain it for ten years.

Greater assistance is urgently needed for the Afghan police. They are vital in establishing order in urban and rural areas, but are often more the source of insecurity than security for local residents. According to McCaffrey, they are in a "disastrous condition: badly equipped, corrupt, incompetent, poorly led and trained, riddled by drug use and lacking any semblance of a national police infrastructure." A December report by the Departments of State and Defense states that "long-term U.S. assistance and funding, at least beyond 2010, is required to institutionalize the police force and establish a self-sustaining program."

Given this background, the recent announcement by the Bush administration that it is going to request from Congress, over a two year period, $8.6 billion in additional assistance for the Afghan national security forces is an important step forward and should be supported. Accelerating the training and equipping of the ANA and ANP will enable them to play a greater role sooner in defeating the Taliban and become a longer-term provider of security and stability in Afghanistan.

Challenge Number 4: The Drug Trade

Afghanistan is in danger of becoming a full fledged narco-state. The UN reports that the country's opium harvest has reached the highest levels ever recorded,

accounting for about 92 percent of the world's supply. Today nearly half of Afghanistan's economy is dependent on the illegal drug trade.

Combating that drug trade will require a multi-pronged approach, including cross-border interdiction; aggressive law enforcement that goes after drug lords (and their heroin laboratories) and corrupt officials; more intensive manual eradication which the Afghan government intends to accelerate this year; and greater economic incentives to small farmers to destroy their poppy fields and pursue alternative livelihoods.

To date U.S. and NATO-led forces have been reluctant to take part in combating the Afghan drug trafficking network. That issue should be examined again. The Afghan army, police and counter-narcotics forces are not yet adequate to the job. Drug proceeds are supporting the Taliban and helping fuel the growing insurgency, placing U.S. and NATO forces at greater risk. NATO should assume a counter-drug mission.

Cautionary Note No. 2: Afghanistan is Not Columbia

It was reported last week that on a trip to Bogotá, General Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that U.S.-backed anti-drug and counterinsurgent operations in Colombia could serve as a template for Afghan efforts to fight drug production.

Colombian police and anti-drug experts have already helped train Afghan police and advise Kabul. But caution would be advised in trying to duplicate the U.S. approach toward Colombia's "war against drugs" in Afghanistan. That approach has invested heavily in the chemical eradication of coca fields. Assistance to programs to encourage poor farmers to switch to growing legal crops has received far less financial aid.

This is the exact opposite approach favored by the government of President Karzai, which has strongly opposed ground spraying with herbicides or aerial eradication of Afghanistan's poppy fields. Karzai believes that would cause further hardship for Afghanistan's farmers and cause a backlash that would rebound to the benefit of the insurgents trying to undermine his authority.

It is for that reason that a statement recently made by Undersecretary Burns should be adhered to: "The Afghan government is sovereign and so Pres. Karzai and his ministers will make the decisions as to how these counter narcotics programs are carried out."

Challenge Number 5: Reconstruction

One year ago this month in London, more than 60 countries and international organizations gathered to adopt a new, post-Bonn framework for cooperation and

partnership with Afghanistan. A document known as the Afghanistan Compact set out benchmarks and timetables to achieve specific goals in security, governance and development over the next five years.

The conference also provided the international community another opportunity to match its stated commitment to see Afghanistan rebuild with the resources necessary to accomplish that task. Two previous donor conferences - in Tokyo in 2002 and Berlin in 2004 - fell short. So has London.

The Afghanistan Compact promised a five-year, $10.5 billion development program for Afghanistan, but the slow delivery of Western aid continues. Under funded to begin with, there have been huge delays in starting reconstruction and development programs. Corruption is on the rise. Many Afghans say their lives are no better today than they were five years ago. President Karzai's popularity and support have suffered as a consequence.

As part of its latest package of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, the Bush administration announced that it would ask Congress for $2 billion in reconstruction and economic aid. But that would be over a two year period, meaning that it appears the level of US development aid would remain at about the same level it has for several years and fall short of Secretary Rice's statement that "We want to and we should redouble our efforts."

A U.S. official was quoted as saying last week that "We've got to kick up our investment. The U.S. is going to do that and we'd like to see our allies do that. 2007 is a year in which we can make a profound difference." Secretary Rice will have the opportunity to make that case to our allies at the next international donors' conference for Afghanistan, now scheduled for April in Rome.

Cautionary Note No. 3: It's Their Country

As we and the international community continue to examine how we can assist Afghanistan address the many challenges it faces in the days ahead, it is important to remind ourselves that, first and foremost, we must listen to and respect what the Afghans themselves see as their needs and priorities. It is, after all, their country and they, not we, know it best. The United States has strong national security interests in Afghanistan, but we will be most successful in addressing these by working with the Afghans themselves.

In this regard I would like to submit for the hearing record a copy of the report prepared by the Government of Afghanistan for the meeting beginning today in Berlin with officials of the European Union troika. The talks will focus on assessing the developments in Afghanistan over the past year. The paper prepared by the Afghan Government is entitled "Afghanistan: Challenges & The Way Ahead." It is remarkably similar to -- and highly relevant to -- the subject of today's hearing, from the perspective of those who know their challenges best.

CLOSING

I mentioned at the beginning of my testimony that I would conclude with citing what I consider to be the most important opportunity this Committee and the Congress have to ensure Afghanistan's long-term security and stability.

It is this. You have the opportunity to make an important mid-course adjustment in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan -- to move away from the "half measures" the 9/11 Commission warned against -- and to make Afghanistan a model of bipartisan cooperation.

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there was broad, bipartisan agreement that our first response must be in Afghanistan -- against al Qaeda and those providing it safe haven, the Taliban. Since that time there has been no disagreement that we must "stay the course" in Afghanistan, with our troops and our aid. Strong support for this approach has been offered by two bipartisan panels -- the 9/11 Commission and more recently the Iraq Study Group. And just two days ago Speaker Pelosi delivered this message to President Karzai in Kabul -- Afghanistan has strong bipartisan support in Congress.

As for the Executive branch, I would hope that President Bush would institute regular meetings with Congressional leaders during his remaining two years in office to brief and consult on the U.S. mission in Afghanistan and what needs to be done. I would also encourage Secretaries Rice and Gates to include bipartisan Congressional observers as part of their delegations to key international conferences dealing with Afghanistan.

And on these occasions I would urge the Executive branch and the Congress to continue to make the case that the United States is committed to Afghanistan over the long-run. This investment in the security and development of Afghanistan is not only important for Afghanistan, but for the long-term national security interests of the United States.

Thank you very much.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 109th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Karl F Inderfurth

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

✓ Individual

___ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:_____

FISCAL YEAR 2007

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
None			

FISCAL YEAR 2006

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
None			

FISCAL YEAR 2005

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
None			

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Testimony of
Distinguished Professor Ali Jalali
Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies
National Defense University
Washington, DC

Before the
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
30 January 2007

House Armed Services Committee

Security and Stability in Afghanistan: Opportunities and Challenges

30 January 2007

Testimony by Ali A. Jalali

Chairman Skelton,

Members of the Armed Services Committee:

Thank you for the invitation to offer my evaluation of the security situation in Afghanistan. The assessment I offer today is based entirely on my own views and personal judgment.

Mr. Chairman:

Recently, press headlines on Afghanistan have been negative. Reports of terrorists' raids, suicide attacks, roadside bombings, burning schools and attacks on civilian targets abound. The country is faced with a revitalized Taliban-led insurgency, a record rise in drug production, a deterioration of the rule of law and a weakening grip of the national government over many districts in the south and south-east. But, despite these troubling developments there is also good news that unfortunately becomes "no news."

Following the ouster of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan scored numerous achievements in its transition to democracy; notably, rebuilding its state institutions - including adopting a modern constitution, holding peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections, creating national security institutions, improving women's rights, and expanding education institutions. Afghans are freer today than they were under the Taliban.

While this progress is notable, the current troubles are immense and they are a result of what was not done rather than what was done. The Taliban were removed from power, but neither their potential to come back nor their external support was addressed. Alliances of convenience with warlords perpetuated the influence of the most notorious human rights violators. Competing demands for a response to immediate security needs and the requirements of long-term priorities were not balanced effectively even though they are mutually reinforcing. Failure to adopt a comprehensive and integrated approach to combating narcotics led to record increases in illicit drug production, which fuels corruption and funds terrorism and criminality. And inefficient use of insufficient funds, mostly outside of Afghan government control, failed to create economic opportunities, good governance and the rule of law.

The key to resolving current problems in Afghanistan is "doing" what was not "done." This includes ending the insurgency, creating effective governance capable of establishing the rule of law, providing human security and public services, and fostering economic development that can replace the illicit drug trade with legal economic activities.

The most critical challenges facing the country today are building indigenous security capacity, fighting insurgency and establishing the rule of law.

Building Indigenous Security Capacity

While the central Afghan government has extensive constitutional authority over the provinces, Kabul's limited ability to intervene, and its accommodation of local power brokers have left factional chiefs and militia commanders in control of local governments. Over the past three years, Kabul has successfully reduced the power of regional strongmen by reassigning them away from their geographic power base; however, their networks continue to influence provincial administration. Meanwhile, former factional commanders who are appointed to positions in the police and civil administration have loaded their offices with their unqualified supporters and corrupt cronies.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been the flagship of the international engagement in rebuilding Afghanistan's security forces and law enforcement. The five pillars of SSR (army, police, counter-narcotics, DDR, justice) are supported by different donor nations. While the pillars are inter-connected, the approach has been marked by a lack of close coordination, an imbalance in the level of committed resources and the absence of a unified developmental concept. Therefore SSR has developed unevenly.

The progress in building the U.S.-supported Afghan National Army (ANA) has been remarkable. The ANA's strength has reached 35,000 (December 2006) and it is expected to attain its goal of 70,000 by 2009. Despite the U.S. donated vehicles, small arms and other equipment in 2005-2006, the ANA suffers from insufficient fire power, the lack of indigenous combat air support and the absence of a self-sustaining operational budget. Therefore it continues to depend on military support from ISAF and Coalition forces.

The essential mission of building indigenous civilian police capacity in Afghanistan has been difficult. The national police had virtually ceased to exist after years of grinding civil war. With a main focus on fighting insurgency and militia-led violence, police capacity-building was not the pacing element in reform of the security sector, nor were broader Rule of Law considerations. Little international attention has been paid to the development of the Afghan National Police (ANP). Political decisions to reintegrate demobilized former factional combatants into the police force have further undermined ANP development. Moreover, the nature of police functions makes it difficult to train policemen as units like army battalions and then deploy them where they are needed. The police need to be trained, deployed and coached at the same time. The dominance of local loyalty and links with corrupt networks along with poor training, low pay and a residual culture of corruption contribute to endemic corruption in the police force.

A recent U.S. interagency assessment of Afghanistan's police program indicates that the ANP readiness level to perform conventional police functions and carry out its internal security mission is "far from adequate." The report suggests that long-term U.S. assistance and funding, at least beyond 2010, is required to institutionalize the police force and establish a self sustaining program.

Reform of the justice sector reform suffers from a very low level of human resources and infrastructure capacity. The court structure is outdated, many judicial personnel are unqualified and corruption is deep-rooted. The period of violence in the country has destroyed the institutional integrity of the justice system and left a patchwork of contradictory and overlapping laws. Although some progress has been made, particularly in law reform, no major investment has been made in rebuilding the system.

Ending the Insurgency

Afghanistan has faced a continuous rising of insurgency since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001. In 2006, attacks by a resurgent Taliban and acts of suicide terrorism took the lives of more than 4,000 people which signify a three-fold increase in just one year.

The Taliban-led insurgency is not rooted in a popular ideology. The people of Afghanistan rejected the leadership, the ideology and the political vision of the Taliban and other militant groups long ago. The new Taliban-led insurgents are an assortment of ideologically motivated Afghan and foreign militants, disillusioned tribal communities, foreign intelligence operatives, drug traffickers, opportunist militia commanders, disenchanted and unemployed youth, and self-interested spoilers. It is more of a political alliance of convenience than an ideological front.

The insurgents have safe havens in Pakistan and enjoy technical and operational assistance from transnational extremist groups. They exploit the lack of development, misrule, insecurity, and the absence of the rule of law in the southern and eastern provinces. Ending the insurgency requires removal of both domestic and external sources of violence. However, dismantling Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan is a prerequisite.

Although a U.S. ally in fighting terrorism and extremism, Pakistan views the challenge in the context of its regional interests. Afghanistan and the international community see Pakistan's cooperation as inadequate. Pakistan has significantly contributed to fighting al-Qaeda militants on its territory. However, despite the deployment of thousands of Pakistani military force in the border region, primarily in Waziristan tribal area, Pakistan has done little to contain the Taliban. The peace deal between the Pakistani government and the pro-Taliban militants in the South and North Waziristan (2005-2006) border area has led to a major increase in militants' cross-border attacks. Pakistan's idea of fencing and mining the border to stem militants cross border movements has been opposed by Afghanistan on the grounds that it can not stop the militants, but separates people on either side of the Durand line. Even under the most favorable conditions fighting infiltration leads merely to tactical shifts which might not change the strategic situation unless the militants infrastructure in Pakistan, including their command and control system, financial sources, logistics and training/educational facilities are disrupted.

In a testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on 11 January, 2007, U.S. National Intelligence Director John Negroponte named Pakistan as the center of the al-Qaeda web that radiated out to the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. He stated that eliminating the safe haven that the Taliban and other extremists have found in Pakistan's tribal area is necessary to end the insurgency in Afghanistan.

Removal of the sources of insurgency in the area requires a regional approach involving not only Afghanistan and Pakistan but all actors engaged in the region including the United States, the European Union, NATO and other countries in the neighborhood. The new approach should address several issues to include the legitimate concerns of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the development of the least educated and not urbanized tribal areas on both sides of the Durand line, the promotion of democratic changes in Pakistan, enhancing governance capacity in Afghanistan, and finally integration of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into the state administration. In the larger picture reducing the sources of transnational militancy and religious extremism in South Asia and economic integration in the region needs to be part of the new approach.

Although the insurgents are not yet capable to overthrow the Afghan government, they feel they are winning by not losing. On the other hand the counter insurgency operations can lose by not winning. Increased violence creates a sense of insecurity, hinders economic reconstruction, and weakens government influence in remote areas. This may eventually lead to a much stronger insurgency capable of challenging the government. In many districts, the resurgence of Taliban violence is caused more by the lack of government presence than the ability of the insurgents.

Certainly there is no military solution to the insurgency. But, military action is needed to provide a secure environment for development, good governance and the rule of law. The long absence of sufficient international military troops in Southern Afghanistan inspired the Taliban to fill the vacuum. NATO's assumption of security responsibility for all of Afghanistan last year was a major shift. However restrictions placed on the militaries of certain NATO nations reduce NATO's actual capacity. Expecting heavier fighting this spring (2007), U.S. military commanders as well as the NATO Command ask for more troops to boost the current 24,000 U.S. and about 20,000 allied forces in the country. The need is not only for more troops but also for the removal of operational restrictions imposed on German, French and Italian forces deployed in Afghanistan.

The Rule of Law and Human Security

Afghanistan can not achieve peace merely by fighting and killing the insurgents. Neither are development projects alone likely to win the hearts and minds of the people as long as the threats emanating from militia commanders, drug traffickers, corrupt provincial and district administrators, as well as government incompetence remain. This also applies to the operations of Coalition forces and ISAF in fighting terrorism and insurgency. Over-focus on force protection at the expense of creating durable security, picking and choosing discredited allies in fighting terrorism, and indiscriminate and unwarranted searches of peaceful villages without consideration for local culture, or detaining inhabitants who have no known connection with hostile armed groups provokes resentment and indignant protests that hinders the stabilization effort.

So efforts to defeat the insurgents, build peace and development should be sought through the establishment of the rule of law that guarantees human security. This means that security operations by international forces, and the Afghan army and police should be seen as a subset of the rule of law and not the other way around. Security and peace are achieved through wining the hearts of the people and not only through military operations.

Insecurity in Afghanistan is not only a question of physical safety but also of deprivation and restricted access to health and education facilities, legal and political rights, and social opportunities. The real security challenge is to provide services and jobs and protect human rights – especially in rural areas. Freedom from "fear" and freedom from "want" lead to human security and they require more than building the state security forces.

The rule of law is the heart of government legitimacy and a prerequisite for human security that involves protection and empowerment of the citizenry. The dominance of security demands in an unstable environment has led to an over-securitization of the rule of law. This subordinates justice to security considerations and turns police into a tool primarily used in combating insurgency instead of protecting law and justice. Obviously in

conflict-ridden conditions there is a need to deal with security threats in a forceful way; however, the approach should not result in compromising the administration of justice since the rule of law contributes to security in a major way.

Consequently today, there is a feeling of disenchantment at two levels that dangerously affects the stability in Afghanistan. At one level the Afghan government has doubts about the sustainability of foreign assistance and the capacity of the international community's commitment to face the rising threats and invest in long-term development of the country. This inhibits the government from acting decisively as it becomes dependent on non-statuary power holders, self-serving opportunists and militia commanders. At the second level, the public is disillusioned with the lack of government will and capacity to protect the people and deliver needed services. Such public opinion in the unstable South nourishes support for the Taliban.

Addressing the two levels of disenchantment is the key to improving the situation. The international community must provide the Afghan government the means to foster security and development. The Afghan government needs to create an environment of human security in rural areas for regaining the hearts and minds of the public.

Conclusion

The challenges facing Afghanistan are enormous. They are all interlinked and need to be dealt with through a comprehensive and integrated strategy. More troops are needed to defeat the insurgency in the country but military action without development does not lead to peace. Likewise, economic development without the establishment of the rule of law will not ensure human security and political stability in Afghanistan. And, finally the rule of law can not be achieved without an effective counter-narcotic program.

Afghanistan has experienced a long period of instability and violence. In such an environment the line between conflict and post-conflict phases is indistinct. A post-conflict situation can develop into a conflict situation if not managed well. World Bank research shows that failure in post-conflict societies begins when international attention that culminates at the time of political settlement starts an early decline accompanied by reduction of aid. Then the expectation of people from a peace dividend turns into disappointment, frustration and antagonism if it is not met within a reasonable timeframe. These two contradictory trends would cross a point where a fragile peace collapses, some time before five years. I hope this will not happen to Afghanistan.

So responding to the security challenges in Afghanistan requires a long-term commitment by the international community to invest in addressing both short- and long-term needs of the country. As an Afghan proverb says "construction takes much longer time than does the destruction." Afghanistan suffered destruction for more than two decades. Its recovery takes time, patience and perseverance.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

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1. TO: CHIEF, OFFICE OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND SECURITY REVIEW	2. DATE 24 January 2007

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Draft testimony of NESA Center Distinguished Professor Ali Jalali.

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Ali Jalali

5. COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE

House Armed Services Committee

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Center for Strategic and International Studies
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006
Phone: 1 (202) 775-3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457-8746
Email: BurkeChair@csis.org

Winning in Afghanistan: The Need for a New Strategy

Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee

Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
acordesman@aol.com

January 29, 2007

No one can return from visiting the front in Afghanistan without realizing there is a very real risk that the US and NATO could lose their war with Al Qa'ida, the Taliban, and the other Islamist movements fighting the Afghan government. We are still winning tactically, but we may well be losing strategically.

The facts on the ground are not simple. The appendix to this briefing lays out these facts in far more detail, along with evidence of critical shifts in Afghan public opinion that show the war is still winnable, but there has been a serious deterioration in the situation. It also shows there are no simple solutions that can work. Winning will take more resources, more forces, more patience, and at least 5-10 more years of persistent effort.

The key steps the US and its allies must take, however, are clear. They involve major changes in strategy, aid, and military levels that require the following efforts:

- Building up Afghan capabilities and fighting corruption requires slow, patient efforts on a national, provincial, and local basis
- Improving the quality of governance, security, and economic development needs priority over politics.
- Accepting the reality that development of effective government and economy will take 5-10 years; that no instant success is possible; and aid plans must be long term plans providing consistently high levels of resources.
- Increasing economic aid at levels 3-4 times the 2006 level on a sustained basis at the national, provincial, and local level.
- Ensuring that security and aid reach ordinary Afghans in rural areas, particularly in South and Northeast.
- Taking a new approach to counter narcotics that emphasizes dealing with high-level traffickers, time, incentives, anti-corruption, and counterinsurgency.
- Raising US and NATO force levels by 10-25% for at least several years.
- Restructuring allied national efforts to create a truly unified and effective NATO effort.
- Providing major additional aid and advisory resources to develop security: Afghan Nation al Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP).
- Dealing with Pakistan to end its status as "sanctuary," and contain Iran.

The Growing Threat

The US and NATO may win tactical battles, but the Taliban and other Islamist forces seem to be starting to win the critical strategic battle for political and economic space. Declassified intelligence made available during my trip showed that major Al Qa'ida,

Taliban, Haqqani Network (HQN), and Hezb-e Islami Gulbiddein (HiG) sanctuaries exist in Pakistan and that the areas they operate in within Afghanistan increased by more than four times between 2005 and 2006.

Suicide attacks increase from 18 in the first 11 months of 2005 to 116 in the first 11 months o f 2006. Direct fire attacks increased from 1,347 to 3,824, IEDs from 530 to 1,297, and other attacks from 269 to 479. The number of attacks on Afghan forces increased from 713 to 2,892, attacks on coalition forces increased from 919 to 2,496, and attacks on Afghan government officials increased by 2.5 times.

Only the massive use of US precision air power and intelligence assets allowed the US to win tactically in the east, and the British position in the south is so weak that Britain has had to allow a major increase in the Taliban presence to compensate for its military weakness.

The good news is that popular support for the US and NATO is still relatively strong and can be rebuilt. The US and NATO teams in country have created core programs for strengthening governance, Afghan military and police forces, and the Afghan economy that can succeed if they only get the resources required. The present aid efforts are largely sound and well managed, and can make effective use of immediate increases in funding.

The Need for a New US, Allied, and Afghan Approach

The challenges in Afghanistan are very different than those in Iraq. The threat is still weak, and the key problems are resources, patience, and time. The Afghan government will take years to become effective, reduce corruption to acceptable levels, and replace a narcotics-based economy. As one Afghan Deputy Minister put it to me during my trip, "Now we are all corrupt. Until we change and serve the people, we will fail."

Afghanistan is going to need large amounts of military and economic aid, much of it managed from the outside in ways that ensure it actually gets to Afghans throughout the country -- particularly in the local areas where the threat is greatest. Our present nation building effort is badly under resourced, and does not reach more ordinary Afghans, over 70% of which live in rural areas that currently receive minimal or no aid.

The maps of actual and proposed projects that aid teams show a visitor make it all too clear that the progress to date is real, but only covers a small part of the country. Even a short visit to some of the districts in the southeast makes it clear that most local districts have not seen progress. Drought adds to the problem in many areas and much of the old irrigation system has visibly collapsed. Roads are little more than paths, the government cannot offer hope, and local officials and police cannot compete with drug loans and income.

The US has grossly underfunded such economic aid efforts and left far too much of the country without visible aid activity. Country team plans call for a $2.3 billion program,

but unless at least $1.1 billion comes immediately as an FY 2007 supplemental, the aid program will lag far beyond need during next year. Moreover, a well-planned and funded five-year plan is needed to provide continuity and effectiveness. America's NATO allies are falling far short of providing what is needed, particularly France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Major increases in aid are needed from each NATO ally. The US is carrying far too much of the burden and cannot be everywhere. Every NATO country needs to make a major local aid effort.

This means the US needs to make major increases in its economic aid, as do our NATO allies. They need to make such increases immediately if new projects and meaningful actions are to begin in the field by the end of the winter season and as new Taliban and Islamist offensives begin in 2007.

The good news is that such a program will be cheap by the standards of aid to Iraq. The projects needed are simple and ones Afghanis can largely carry out. People need roads and water, and schools and medical services to a lesser degree. They need emergency aid to meet local needs and win heats and minds.

The Need for More US and Allied Military Forces

There are roughly 33,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan, plus some 12,000 remaining US troops that still operate independently as part of Operation Enduring Freedom and advisors; versus a total of 162,000 Coalition troops in Iraq. Afghanistan, however, has a population of over 31 million versus some 27 million in Iraq, its territory is 50% larger, and its transportation and communications infrastructure is far more primitive. The threat in Iraq has no major sanctuary outside the country; Al Qa'ida, Taliban, Haqqani Network (HQN), and Hezb-e Islami Gulbiddein (HiG) all have de facto sanctuaries exist in Waziristan in eastern Pakistan.

The present level of US military forces is too weak to do the job in the areas where the US has military responsibility, and current plans to surge elements of the US 10th Mountain Division offer only a temporary solution. The US does not have economy of force, it has inadequacy of force. Competing demands in Iraq have led to a military climate where US forces plan for what they can get and not what they need.

The US needs to adopt a success-oriented strategy, not a resource-limited strategy. The 10th Mountain division has asked for one more infantry brigade. This badly understates need even if Polish forces help the US in the east. The US needs forces strong enough to hold and build as well as win. It needs at least two, and increases in Special Forces as well. These force increases are a tiny by comparison with US forces in Iraq, but they can make all of the difference.

The force contributions of our NATO allies present major resource problems as well. Allied countries need to provide stronger and better-equipped forces. Above all, provide forces that will joint the fight and go where they are most needed.

The British fight well but have only 50% to 75% of the forces they need. Canada and the Netherlands are in the fight. The Danes, Estonians, and Romanians have done some fighting. The Poles are coming without adequate equipment but willing to fight. France, Spain, Turkey, Germany, and Italy are not in the fight because of political constraints and rules of engagement. Only French Special Forces have played any role and they depart in January.

The Need to Reform National Contributions to NATO

NATO needs to be able to exercise effective central command and allocate all forces according to NATO's command needs and rules of engagement. It cannot win with politically constrained forces that cannot perform the missions that a truly needed. NATO's current forces would be inadequate even if all of the NATO countries were fully in the fight.

Furthermore, only US, Canadian, British, Danes, Estonians, and Dutch forces are now really in the fight. Key NATO partners like France, Germany, Spain, Turkey and Italy are "stand aside" countries that do not provide fighting forces, except for French Special Forces. Roughly a quarter of NATO's strength uses a political rationale to seize the high moral ground and hide there in safety.

Elsewhere, British weakness in the south has forced a political compromise that has allowed allow a major increase in the Taliban presence. Britain needs substantial additional forces to hold the south, and prevent the slow growth of a Taliban presence that could end in taking Kandahar. Much of Helmand and Kandahar Provinces are already at risk. Canada, the Netherlands, and Romania play an important role in combat, and Poland is coming.

All these forces need heavier equipment and weapons. In fact, Canada is already in the process of being the first country to introduce main battle tanks. US commanders recognize that US troop strength is too weak in the east.

Studies by the International Security Force (ISAF,) the NATO command in Afghanistan, indicate that the total NATO force needs 6 more battalions -- especially another battalion in the south; a rapid expansion of military trainers for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police; and additional troops and specialists in other areas of what NATO calls the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR).

NATO needs integrated operations with common rules of engagement. It needs a true integrated command with suitable continuity of service, and adequate tour lengths. Countries need to provide to provide adequate member country armor, artillery, tactical mobility, and air. More efforts are needed to integrate US advanced IS&R assets into common NATO and Afghan operations. NATO also needs an integrated structure for using advanced US air and IS&R assets in the Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC) in Qatar, and to develop a comprehensive, workable strategy for dealing with battlefield detainees

Dealing with Pakistan

NATO needs to put collective pressure on Pakistan to end the sanctuary if gives to the enemy. It did not address the weakness of the Afghan government and the scale of the problems created by a near to mid term dependence on a narco-economy. It will be years before the central government in Kabul can create an effective presence and services in most local area, particularly those under threat.

The Need to Restructure Efforts to Develop the Afghan Army and Police

The US and NATO have repeated many of the same mistakes in developing effective Afghan army and police forces made in Iraq. The force development effort has rushed unready forces into combat. The manning of key Afghan army battalions is sometimes below 25% and the police units are often unpaid and hollow forces. Corruption and pay problems are still endemic. Equipment and facilities are inadequate. Overall funding has been about 20% of the real-world requirement, and talks with Afghan and NATO officials made it brutally clear that German effort to create a police force was a disaster that wasted years NATO did not have to waste on trying to create a conventional police force rather than the mix of paramilitary and local police forces Afghanistan really needs.

All NATO countries need to make a commitment to provide sustained military and economic aid at the required levels. NATO must also unite to make stronger efforts to create effective military and police forces. The present Afghan army is just beginning to be effective and has major pay, equipment, and morale problems. Some key battalions have less than 25% of authorized strength, and retention is low. Germany wasted years training the wrong kind of police at inadequate levels. Effective police now have to be created virtually from the ground up, and NATO/ISAF aid is needed to build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior and in training, equipping and basing the Afghan National Police.

The good news is that there is no a new realism in the US and NATO effort. The planning, training effort, and much of the necessary base has been built up during the last year. Effective plans exist and NATO staffs and US now exist to help implement them.

The bad news is the same crippling lack of resources that affect every part of the US and NATO efforts affect the development of the Army and police. In one visit to an older Army battalion, it was all too clear that it had less than a quarter of its authorized manpower, and only one man in five was expect ed to reenlist when their time came up this fall. A visit to a police unit revealed its men police were supposed to be paid on a quarterly basis, but sometimes were not paid at all. Such police have no choice other than to extort a living. In one case, ethnic tension had led the officer in charge of pay to not even fill out forms because he had been passed over for promotion. Both Afghans and their advisors make it clear that many good leaders and good units are being used up by being rushed into combat and excessive duties without adequate equipment, facilities, and support.

The Narcotics Issue

At the same time, NATO needs to restructure counter narcotics effort to focus on near term economic development, anti-corruption, and high pay-off law enforcement; eradication phased over time. It needs to broaden its aid efforts to support the government, and help provide education, clinics, and other local services.

Persistence, Patience, and Time

Patience and persistence, will be as critical as more troops, resources, and advisors. No matter what the outside world does, political, military, and economic progress will take time. The present central government will be weak and partly ineffective for at least two to three years, and be incapable of providing the presence and services in the field that Afghan's desperately need and demand.

The past focus on democracy and the political process in Kabul, rather than on the quality of governance, and services, has left many areas angry and open to Taliban and hostile influence and control. Creating new efforts that really work at the national scale, and especially in troubled areas , will take more than a year to begin, much less accomplish.

Paying for victory now, however, will be far cheaper than waiting until a crisis occurs, and far, far cheaper that defeat. Other US and allied failures to honestly address the problems in the field, to be realistic about resource needs, to create effective long term aid and force development plans, and to emphasize governance over services may well have brought defeat in Iraq. The US and its allies cannot afford to lose two wars. If they do not act now, they will.

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 109th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Anthony H. Cordesman

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

X Individual

___Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:_____

FISCAL YEAR 2007

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
None			

FISCAL YEAR 2006

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
None			

FISCAL YEAR 2005

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
None			

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007): N/A;
Fiscal year 2006: ;
Fiscal year 2005: .

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2007): N/A;
Fiscal year 2006: ;
Fiscal year 2005: .

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007): N/A;
Fiscal year 2006: ;
Fiscal year 2005: .

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2007): N/A;
Fiscal year 2006: ;
Fiscal year 2005: .

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007): N/A;
Fiscal year 2006: _____;
Fiscal year 2005: _____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2007): N/A;
Fiscal year 2006: _____;
Fiscal year 2005: _____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007): N/A;
Fiscal year 2006: _____;
Fiscal year 2005: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2007): N/A;
Fiscal year 2006: _____;
Fiscal year 2005: _____.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JANUARY 30, 2007

(JCMB)

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH
THE MOST MERCIFUL, THE MOST COMPASSIONATE

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

AFGHANISTAN: CHALLENGES & THE WAY AHEAD

Position Paper presented by the Government of Afghanistan at the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board meeting in Berlin

January 30-31, 2007

Afghanistan emerged in late 2001 as a state that had been devastated like no other in modern history. The extent of destruction of our physical, institutional, human and social capital left us and our international partners with a staggering task: to build a pluralist Islamic state governed by the rule of law, in which all Afghans have the opportunity to live in peace, fulfill their economic potential and participate politically as full citizens.

Five years later, we have yet to achieve this vision, and we have jointly underestimated the depth of our challenges and the length of time required. As a consequence, we have failed to invest adequately in our security, our economic recovery and our political stability. Since we met together in London a year ago, we are facing greater challenges in insecurity, narcotics, and corruption, while the perennial challenges of poverty and unemployment remain with us. This year, as the Afghan people suffer through another harsh winter, they are looking towards all of us for support. They are asking whether this new year will deliver real change in their lives, or return them to the despair of conflict and poverty that they know so well.

In its short life, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) has proven to be a powerful forum for tackling some of our challenges. We must commit ourselves to further strengthening the JCMB as Afghanistan's main political forum for engaging the international community. The JCMB is the key mechanism for all of us to use our strategic partnership to address the totality of the security, political and development challenges facing Afghanistan. In this JCMB meeting, we aim to discuss some of our main priorities and agree on the way ahead.

Security

In 2006, there was a significant rise in terrorist attacks in the South and Southeast, cross-border attacks, poppy cultivation, and growing security concerns amongst the Afghan people. We have agreed in the Compact that these challenges cannot be overcome by military means alone--we also need economic development. But it is increasingly clear that we need to rethink our military strategies in Afghanistan, as well strengthen our relations with Pakistan.

We all know that international security forces will not stay in Afghanistan forever. Ultimately, we Afghans have to defend our country. However, we are not ready to take on this task, financially, technologically or operationally. At this meeting, we want your commitment to helping Afghans lead the defense of our nation. In this effort we will need international support for many years to come. With your training, logistical support, technology and unshakable political resolve behind us, we can face our enemies directly and are prepared to accept the sacrifices this entails.

The "Afghanization" of our security response is easier said than done and will require comprehensive security sector reform; a new division of labor between the international security forces and the Afghan National Army (ANA); a reassessment of the design, composition and size of our army; accelerated training for our officers; and an intensified national recruitment drive. We will also require your sustained financial support so that we do not have to make devastating trade-offs between our development and security strategies. In the long-term, this approach will prove more effective, both in terms of cost and lasting security.

A strong national police force is just as vital as our army. For that reason, since the last JCMB, we have accelerated our reforms of the Ministry of Interior. The Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) will help in the short-run. However, we do not have enough Afghan National Police (ANP) to enforce the rule of law in the long-term, nor are they adequately trained or equipped. We need multi-year commitments to our Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA), so that we can develop and support an adequately-sized, professional and accountable police force.

All our internal security and development efforts will not work without support from our neighbors. A secure Afghanistan in a stable region is in all our best interests. With our international partners, we need to work with our neighbors for an effective diplomatic solution to our security challenges. We want (i) concerted diplomatic pressure at different levels against the safe havens enjoyed by terrorist groups outside of our borders; (ii) coordinated and effective measures for strengthening border and

cross-border security; (iii) support for the ambitious programs agreed in recent regional cooperation conferences; and (iv) a further strengthening of the Tri-partite Commission to dialogue with Pakistan on substantial issues in our relationship. We also call on you to support the Peace Jirga, which is gaining momentum with people on both sides of the border, as well as the Independent National Commission on Strengthening Peace, which allows honorable combatants who renounce violence to rejoin their communities.

Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights

Our governance agenda is dependent on international support for addressing three major challenges: pervasive corruption, low public sector capacity and human rights deprivations for girls and women in Afghanistan.

Corruption is exacerbated by endemic poverty, lack of support for our public institutions and our justice sector in particular, the weaknesses and complexity of the aid process and the power of the narcotics trade. The Government has set up a General Independent High Commission on Anti-Corruption who will lead our National Anti-Corruption Strategy, which aims to put the major drug lords and bigger perpetrators of official corruption behind bars. At the same time, we will continue to strengthen our justice sector, reform our courts and police and put in place the checks and balances to root out lower level corruption. It is also critical that we work together to tackle corruption at the provincial level and strengthen the accountability of provincial governors, councils and development committees, so we can continue to strengthen the trust of the public. We need the full support of the international community in our anti-corruption efforts if we are to succeed.

Despite the many millions of dollars that have been spent on capacity development, the results are disappointing. The proliferation of high-cost technical assistance, the delivery of assistance outside government structures and the lack of attention to the continuity and sustainability of capacity building programs has held back the Afghan public sector. Capacities at provincial and district levels are particularly weak, posing a serious threat to national unity, peace, and development outside of Kabul.

While the Government recognizes that capacity development takes time, we are not on the right path in Afghanistan. We need to import more capacity immediately, particularly by attracting Afghan expatriates to return, and through South-South co-operation. We particularly need help in line ministries in the areas of financial management, policy and strategy development, and procurement. We also need to change how technical assistance works, so that it supports Afghan leadership more effectively and leaves behind lasting management capacity in Afghanistan. By the Afghanistan Development Forum, we aim to have a comprehensive Capacity Development Framework for which we expect your full support.

Beyond the public sector, we need to create capacity in areas with likely employment opportunities, particularly in project management. In all our programs, we need to move from arbitrary training programs to allowing Afghans to learn on the job.

While women's rights in Afghanistan have made huge strides since 2001, much more needs to be done. Our National Assembly, which is increasingly growing in effectiveness, is now more gender balanced than many parliaments around the world, and our female parliamentarians are influencing powerfully the direction of our country. However, we must do more to ensure that the voice of women is heard at the highest levels of policy making. We urge the international community to continue to work with us to strengthen the voice, capacity, education and above all leadership of women in Afghanistan in the years to come. We consider gender equity a cross-cutting issue that needs to be mainstreamed in all sectors of our national strategy.

Economic and Social Development

Building a healthy economy will take time, particularly with rising insecurity. The Government aims to play a facilitating role in the economy for the generation of equitable growth. The initiative of the private sector, particularly in agriculture where the majority of people work, will determine the pace of development.

We need more international investment in: (i) energy; (ii) agriculture and irrigation, including water resource management; (iii) health; (iv) education; and (v) physical infrastructure. We must make concrete progress on all fronts simultaneously. We also need to determine the "minimum" levels of investment needed in each of these areas and mobilize resources accordingly through our Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). We appreciate that international resources are not unlimited, but if we are forced to make trade-offs that prohibit us meeting those minimum levels, we will fail on all fronts.

One of our most pressing challenges is to address the acute need of the Afghan people for productive employment, which is not just an economic problem but a security concern. Our entire economic strategy rests on our ability to create jobs for our people. Through an extensive national program, therefore, we aim to lay the foundations for the private sector to create jobs. The public sector will provide the institutional framework and conditions for promoting employment opportunities in the private sector, but we need accelerated investment from our international partners in employment generating activities.

The agriculture and rural economy is at the heart of our development strategy, linking jobs, production and markets. Therefore, we need to reach out to our provinces and bring together our agriculture, road, trade and irrigation investments in a coherent national program. For this to succeed, we need international expertise to help us increase the productivity of perennial horticulture, our land and our farmers, and strengthen forward and backward market linkages. Once this program is in place, we will also need your help to encourage the international private sector to invest in our rural economy. In the urban sector, our major source of productive employment in the coming years will continue to be construction, as much of our urban infrastructure remains devastated and most cities face an acute shortage of housing, especially in Kabul.

To induce the foreign private sector to invest in both urban development and our rural sector, donor governments should look at innovative instruments for providing investment guarantees to reduce the risks of investing in Afghanistan, while the Afghan Government executes the reforms necessary to create an enabling environment for private sector investment.

Finally, the international security strategy in Afghanistan should be redesigned to strengthen our economic recovery. From the billions of security dollars spent on Afghanistan each year, more economic benefits should be channeled to tackle our unemployment and underemployment problems. We need to direct more of the procurement by international military forces into the Afghan economy, creating jobs and spurring our domestic private sector.

Counter Narcotics

Counter Narcotics remains the most important cross-cutting issue for us, and it needs to be mainstreamed across all sectors. Despite the combined efforts of the Government and the international community, poppy cultivation and trafficking have continued to increase. Narcotics producers have compensated for crop eradication in some provinces by expanding poppy cultivation throughout the country. Ongoing alternative livelihood programs have failed to convince farmers to abandon poppy cultivation, and no major drug dealers have been brought to justice.

Let us be clear: if we do not defeat this menace, our joint vision for Afghanistan will never be realized. Our government will be corrupted by a criminal economy, our security will be threatened by narco-terrorism, and our formal economy will be devastated.

We all underestimated the scale of the narcotics problem and, more importantly, the breadth and depth of the response required. This year, we intend to accelerate intensive manual eradication. If this does not deliver results, we will consider all alternatives in the years to come, including spraying. However, if we are to avoid the destabilizing effects of spraying, we must make urgent progress on other fronts by tracking down and prosecuting the drug lords who feed off this deadly industry and ensuring our agriculture, rural development, alternative livelihoods and other investment programs offer poppy farmers a real choice to feed their families legally. In any event, as we eliminate drugs from our economy, we must have clear strategies to offset a potentially disastrous contraction of our economy and the political destabilization of our state. We can do this, together, if the international community fully embraces and supports our National Drug Control Strategy.

Conclusion

In order for us to go from the "Compact to Impact", we need to accelerate implementation of national programs and priority projects across all sectors, while jointly managing the expectations of the Afghan people. We also need to find new

ways to design and implement national programs in priority investment areas, urgently address the main government capacity constraints that are impeding progress, and simplify the aid process.

Many of these projects and programs not only require significant additional funding to get going, but they will impose recurrent costs on our national budget. We are concerned by how we achieve fiscal sustainability and meet our Compact benchmarks, particularly in the security sector. We call on donors to work with us to find solutions to meet the requirements of their legislatures, overcome the implementation bottlenecks in national programs and meet the needs of Afghans at a more accelerated but sustainable pace. At the same time, we need your commitment for the long-term to ensure that, by addressing our current needs, we do not impose unsustainable financial burdens on our economy.

In this regard, through our ANDS, we will develop prioritized and costed sector strategies which will increase Afghan ownership of our development agenda and lay out the specific programs and projects that require ongoing international support, if we are to make a minimum level of progress across all sectors. By engaging in this process early and often, we expect our international partners to align and adjust their own strategies with ours. Your ongoing support of the ANDS process is helping to ensure the quality of our strategies, and the full implementation of the Afghanistan Compact.

The Way Ahead

The Government calls upon the international community to:

- Remain committed to the security and development of Afghanistan for the long run and ensure this through predictable long-term financial commitments in alignment with the ANDS. This commitment should be reinforced through annual JCMB meetings in a donor capital.

- Explicitly commit to addressing the interrelated problems of insecurity, narcotics, corruption and extensive unemployment without forcing Afghanistan to make trade-offs between addressing these essential challenges to lasting stability and economic growth.

- Commit to increased efforts to "Afghanize" our security response through the ANA, ANP and ANAP. In turn, the Afghan people are willing to defend their country. We urge donors to recognize that the fiscal sustainability of the ANA and ANP is a long-term issue that is dependent on how the security situation evolves, and how economic development proceeds.

- Support an effective diplomatic solution to our security challenges, particularly with Pakistan. We want (i) concerted diplomatic pressure at different levels against the safe havens enjoyed by terrorist groups outside of our borders; (ii) coordinated and effective measures for strengthening border and cross-border security; (iii) support for the ambitious programs agreed in

recent regional cooperation conferences, and (iv) further strengthening of the Tri-partite Commission to dialogue with Pakistan on substantial issues in our relationship.

- Increase investments in the growth-producing sectors of energy, agriculture and irrigation (including water resource management), health, education, rural infrastructure and urban infrastructure. The Government urges donors not to look at these investments in terms of trade-offs for either the budget or their aid assistance. Instead, our ANDS aims to establish what should be "minimum" levels of investment needed to lay the foundation for improving the well-being of Afghans in the near future, so as to contribute to security and peace in the region. In this regard, the Government will seek support for key National Programs and priority projects.

- Provide the private sector, particularly from the region, with investment guarantees funded through donor assistance.

- Provide technical assistance to meet our urgent capacity constraints, particularly in line ministries in the areas of financial management, policy and strategy development, and procurement. Where there is a need to bring in external capacity, priority should be given to attracting Afghan expatriates to return.

- Every effort should be made to fully embrace and support our National Drug Control Strategy; assist the Government to intensify manual eradication of poppy; track down and prosecute the drug lords who feed off this deadly industry; and ensure our agriculture, rural development, alternative livelihoods and other investment programs offer poppy farmers a real choice to feed their families legally.

- Assist the Government to mainstream its other cross-cutting priorities, in particular by supporting the Government's efforts to confront corruption and increase gender equity in all sectors.

- Align and adjust your strategies with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and, in so doing, help to ensure the full implementation of the Afghanistan Compact.

Taking Afghanistan from devastation to just and sustainable development demands that we tackle all our key challenges simultaneously. Our efforts to do so are constrained by the insufficient size, uneven distribution, poor delivery, and unpredictability of our available resources. In this regard, we need our international partners to work with the Afghan Government to find solutions for improving the cost effectiveness of aid, to improve coordination and, above all, to accelerate implementation of key projects and programs.

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