[H.A.S.C. No. 110–9]

EXAMINATION OF THE FORCE REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

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EXAMINATION OF THE FORCE REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, January 30, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for being here. We are going to go ahead and get started.

In the spirit of brevity, I have decided that I generally look smarter if I read somebody else's words, so I am going to read two things about why we are here today.

One of them was written by Mr. Higgins in this very good document that he gave us here in which you talk about what are the objectives of the hearing. And he listed three: examine and understand the process by which the active Army and active Marine Corps determine their force requirements; examine the basis for the increase in end-strengths that accompanied the President's proposal to increase troop strengths in Iraq; understand the perspectives of an outside agency about the effectiveness of the force requirements determination processes used by the active Army and active Marine Corps.

And the reason we are doing that—I am going to lift a paragraph from our Government Accountability Office (GAO) folks today, who, on page 15 of their written statement, say, "In evaluating DOD's proposal to permanently increase active Army and Marine Corps personnel levels by 92,000 over the next 5 years, Congress should carefully weigh the long-term costs and benefits.

"It is clear that Army and Marine Corps forces are experiencing a high pace of operations due to both the war in Iraq and broader demands imposed by the global war on terror that may provide a basis for DOD to consider permanent increases in military personnel levels. However, it is also clear that increasing personnel levels will entail significant costs that must be weighed against other priorities."

I think those two paragraphs summarize pretty much why we are here. We can all talk about an increase, as members of this committee have for several years, about why we think increases are necessary. There are some benefits to that. But there are also

costs. And the purpose today is to get at how we arrived at those numbers.

And, Mr. McHugh, opening statement or comments?

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to follow your lead with brevity. I do have a more verbose——

Dr. SNYDER. We will enter that in the record at your request.

Mr. MCHUGH [continuing]. Written statement. Thank you. I appreciate that.

And let me, first of all, restate something I tried to convey with probably a decided lack of eloquence in our organizational meeting, and that is, I wish to congratulate you on assumption of the chair.

I am sorry I don't have a gavel to give you. I notice we are absent one. I don't know if we stole it at the time of the turnover or not. [Laughter.]

Dr. SNYDER. Oh, here it is.

Mr. MCHUGH. Oh, there you go. But use it in good health.

And, as I said at our previous meeting, I can't think of an individual who has been more involved, more concerned, and more proactive and productive on these matters than you. And I hope to be able to serve you in the role of ranking half as well as you served all of us in your previous stint. So I wish you the best.

This is an important hearing. As you noted, Mr. Chairman, we have talked, and have acted actually, on this subcommittee and the full committee for some time on the question of end-strength. It cannot be an issue taken in a vacuum. There are costs and benefits that have to be analyzed.

And, as much as the final number, I would like to think today we can talk a bit about the process that is used to try to determine what the proper distribution of end-strength may be.

And so I commend you for calling this hearing, and I look forward to the input of the witnesses.

I welcome them all, thank them for their service and for their presence here today.

And with that, I would yield back to you and look forward to the rest of the day.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McHugh can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.

Let us get right to our witnesses.

Our panel today is Major General Richard Formica, the director of Force Management and deputy chief of staff (G3) for the United States Army; Major General Stephen Johnson, the deputy commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Mr. Michael Applegate, the director of the Manpower Plans and Policy, Manpower and Reserve Affairs Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; and then, what was referred to as the outside agency, Ms. Janet St. Laurent, director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team, United States GAO.

We appreciate you all for being here.

Let us start with you, General Formica, with your opening statements.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RICHARD P. FORMICA, DIRECTOR OF FORCE MANAGEMENT, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G3, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY; MAJ. GEN. STEPHEN T. JOHNSON, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS; MICHAEL F. APPLEGATE, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER PLANS AND POLICY, MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS; JANET A. ST. LAURENT, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RICHARD P. FORMICA

General FORMICA. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, good afternoon. As introduced, I am Major General Dick Formica, and I am the director of force management on the Army staff. As such, I am responsible for managing the Army's force structure and for supervising the Army's force-sizing process to make recommendations to our senior leaders.

On behalf of the secretary of the Army, Dr. Francis Harvey, and the chief of staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, I welcome the opportunity to meet with you and to discuss our process to determine Army force requirements and to examine the basis for the recently proposed increase in the size of the Army.

Before I begin, I would like to express the deep appreciation of our Army for your sustained support of our soldiers and civilians and their families.

The chief of staff of the Army has testified that we are in a dangerous and uncertain time and that we face challenges that exceed the strategy that was envisioned in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Recent decisions by the President and the Secretary of Defense to propose growth in the armed forces would allow the Army to increase our capabilities to maintain the Nation's security and to sustain the all-volunteer force.

The Army's force-sizing process is dictated by strategy as promulgated in the national security strategy and through various planning documents from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, and including the QDR.

Now, our process is also informed by current operational demands and lessons learned, to include rotational requirements, the employment of high-demand, low-density capabilities, and combatant commander requirements identified through the global force management process.

Now, the cornerstone of our force-sizing process is called Total Army Analysis (TAA). And for your benefit, to my left and your right, at the front is a chart which describes the Total Army Analysis that you may be able to refer to.

It is normally conducted every other year. And we translate the required capabilities into force structure across all three components, in the active, in the Army National Guard, and in the

United States Army Reserve, for submission in the Army's Program Objective Memorandum or the POM.

It is conducted in two phases. First, there is a force structure requirements determination phase, and second, a force structure resourcing phase.

And the requirements phase, as I said, is determined by the strategy, and as a result of that strategy between the OSD and the services, we are given a directed number of brigade combat teams. And then in TAA, through modeling, we determine the total force structure required to support those brigade combat teams. The modeling is based on defense planning scenarios and considers requirements for smaller-scale contingencies.

Once those force structure requirements are determined, then we conduct the force structure resourcing phase. In this phase, we compare the existing force in all three components against those requirements that we determined. We match capabilities to those requirements.

And, in that way, we identify capabilities that we may no longer project to need in the future, and we identify new capabilities that are now required. We then identify opportunities to rebalance our structure to eliminate capability gaps.

The result is what we call our programmed or resourced force and is the force structure basis, as I said, for the POM submission.

Next we conduct the feasibility review. The force must be feasible. That is, it must be within our authorized end-strength. We must be able to man, equip, train, station and sustain that force over the program.

In QDR 2006, the Army was required to be able to provide 18 to 19 brigade combat teams (BCT) to meet global demands, and to do so, this required 70 brigade combat teams, 42 in the active and 28 in the Army National Guard. In TAA, we identified an operational force of 790,000—again, across all three components, active, guard and reserve—which we determined to be sufficient to support the 70 brigade combat teams and to meet global commitments.

This past fall, the Department of Defense (DOD) reassessed the global strategic brigade combat team requirements needed for the long war and determined that the Army's enduring requirement would be upwards of 23 BCTs to meet global strategic demand. To meet that enduring requirement, we would need 76 brigade combat teams.

To grow six brigade combat teams, and the requisite supporting forces, the Army proposes to grow by 65,000 in the active component and 9,000 in the reserve components. This growth, combined with our ongoing rebalance initiatives, will build strategic depth, reduce stress on the all-volunteer force over the long term, and meet our global strategic requirements for the long war.

Again, I thank you for your support. And I look forward to taking your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Formica can be found in the Appendix on page 46.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Formica.

General Johnson.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. STEPHEN T. JOHNSON

General JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member McHugh, distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon to discuss the Marine Corps's force requirements determination process.

We know that the members of this subcommittee deeply support our men and women in the military, and we Marines are grateful to you for the effective efforts that you have made on our behalf. Your support of our warfighters and their families is vital to our success and our continued readiness.

Today is a dynamic period in the history of our country and of your Marine Corps. Currently, Marines are heavily engaged in the early battles of a long war against terrorism. Moreover, we believe that in the future, our Nation's security will be subject to a much broader range of emerging threats and challenges.

Given the dynamic nature of today's times and the future demands on the Marines, force requirements determination claims a significant amount of attention and effort in the Marine Corps. Careful and timely planning ensures that our heavily committed forces are effectively organized, trained and equipped to meet the demands of the current warfight. Similarly, accurate force requirements determinations are extremely important to the Corps to meet the future force needs of the combatant commanders with ready, balanced, capable Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF).

The commandant of the Marine Corps determines and manages his force requirements primarily through the deputy commandant for Combat Development and the deputy commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Today, senior executive Mike Applegate and I, representing those two deputy commandants, are prepared to review the Marine Corps's force requirements process with you.

Some of the key aspects of that process I want to hit up front.

First, our force requirements are derived from a top-down strategic guidance and also from bottom-up feed from our commanders who are eyeball to eyeball with Marines and missions in the operating forces.

Our force requirements are balanced across the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, ensuring each element—air, ground, logistics, and command and control—are considered in every force requirement decision.

Our total force structure process specifies clear responsibilities for planning, coordination and integration of our force requirements. In other words, everybody has input, and things are coordinated across the warfighting functions of the Marine Corps for our doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, the facilities, and our personnel.

Our process includes some modeling and computer analysis, but complements that analytical rigor with subject matter expert examination of our requirements—a Marine in the loop, if you will, to bring combat experience and operational judgment into the equation.

Our process requires us to formally look at the Marine Corps biennially, but the system and the process is flexible enough to per-

mit us to address force requirements based on changing guidance, commander requirements, and changing enemy circumstances. In reality, our process is continuous.

I don't have to tell you that the requirements determination process is simply a process. But it is really about the people and the tools that we need in order to accomplish our missions.

We are prepared to answer your questions about our people, their role in our process, and how we manage and care for them to meet the missions before us. We have submitted a statement for the record, and I request that it be admitted.

Mr. Applegate and I look forward to answering your questions about this important business.

Thank you.

[The joint prepared statement of General Johnson and Mr. Applegate can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. All the written statements will be made a part of the record.

And, Mr. Applegate, it is my understanding you don't have a verbal statement at this time?

Mr. APPLEGATE. That is right, Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Ms. St. Laurent.

STATEMENT OF JANET A. ST. LAURENT

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's observations on (DOD) and service processes for determining force structure and military personnel requirements.

The high pace of military operations in Iraq and elsewhere in the world have raised questions about whether the Army and Marine Corps are appropriately sized to meet the demands of the new security environment.

My remarks today are based on a wide range of GAO studies and will address first the processes used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services to assess requirements; second, new demands on the services resulting from the new security environment; and third, whether the department provides adequate information to support and explain military personnel requests.

Now I would like to quickly summarize our observations.

First, both OSD and the services play key roles in determining force structure requirements and managing resources. Decisions reached by OSD in the Quadrennial Defense Review and in budget and planning guidance often set the parameters within which the services can then determine their force requirements.

The Army and Marine Corps have their own processes to assess force structure, but these generally follow the parameters set by OSD. For example, the 2006 QDR determined that the Army would have 42 active combat brigades and about 482,000 active military personnel. These numbers are a given in the Army's force structure biennial review.

A key purpose of the Army's biennial process is to determine the number and types of support forces and institutional forces, such as training units, that the Army needs to support its combat brigades. If total requirements exceed the number of authorized per-

sonnel, the Army determines which units to resource and where it may need to accept risk.

Although past Army analyses identified shortfalls ranging from about 40,000 to 70,000 positions, the Army's most recent review completed in 2006 indicated that the Army's total requirements and available military personnel in the active and reserve components were about equal.

The Marine Corps also has a process to periodically assess force structure needs that identifies gaps in its capabilities to perform new missions, make adjustments in its forces, and determine where to accept risk if all requirements cannot be fully met.

We have not yet seen any detailed analyses supporting the need to increase the active Army and Marine Corps. However, we have discussed the proposed increases with service officials and obtained their perspectives on why the Secretary of Defense and the service chiefs are now seeking personnel increases, when recently completed analyses, such as the QDR, concluded that the Army and Marine Corps force structure was "about right."

Based on our discussions with service officials and our prior work, it appears that there are a couple of key reasons why the services' prior analyses did not identify a significant mismatch between requirements and available personnel.

First, as noted earlier, the services' prior analyses were completed based on guidance about end-strengths provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and combat forces, as well. They indicated the number of brigades, for example.

Second, the Army and Marine Corps's earlier analyses did not fully consider the extent of real-world demands or the forces that the services are currently experiencing as a result of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, the Army's formal biennial review concluded that the Army would be able to provide about 18 to 19 brigades at any one time, including 14 active and 4 to 5 national guard brigades, while the Army's actual global demand is currently about 23 brigades, according to the Army.

Third, the Army's most recent biennial analysis did not yet fully consider the impact of converting from a division-based force consisting of 33 active brigades organized around 10 divisions to a new force consisting of 42 active modular brigades. This represents a significant transformation, and our prior reports have questioned whether the Army would be able to fully staff its new modular brigades and achieve planned efficiencies in the institutional forces within an active end-strength of 482,000 personnel.

Finally, GAO's prior work has shown that DOD has not always provided a clear and transparent basis for its military personnel requests that demonstrates how they are linked to the defense strategy. For example, DOD's annual reports and budget justification documents have not provided specific information to explain the basis for requested end-strength levels or particularly when changes are requested by the Department. Also, DOD's 2006 QDR report did not provide significant insight into the basis for its conclusion that the size of today's force is appropriate to meet current and projected demands.

Looking forward, we believe it will be increasingly important for DOD to demonstrate a clearer link between military personnel re-

quests and the military strategy, particularly as Congress and the Department need to weigh tradeoffs within the defense budget.

Moreover, with regard to the current proposals to increase the Army and Marine Corps, we believe that DOD needs to be able to provide answers to a number of key questions, such as why the increase is needed to implement the defense strategy; what it will cost in the near-term and longer-term to pay for both personnel, equipment, training and facilities; and how the services plan to manage potential challenges in recruiting new personnel and equipping and training units.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I will be happy to respond to any questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. St. Laurent can be found in the Appendix on page 65.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for your opening comments.

Mr. McHugh and I have sat through many hearings by this time that the opening statements from the chairman and ranking member weren't even done, so we are doing very well here today. [Laughter.]

I want to formally welcome our three new members, not only to this subcommittee but to the Congress.

Ms. Boyda, Mr. Murphy, and Ms. Shea-Porter, we appreciate you all being here with your experience and ideas, and look forward to working with you as time goes by.

What I am going to do is ask questions for a few minutes. We will then go to Mr. McHugh. After that, we will be on the five-minute clock. And I would anticipate that we will go around more than one time here this afternoon, depending on the staying power of the committee members.

I want to ask, to put in perspective, both Secretary Gates when he was before our committee a couple of weeks ago and then the President the other night used the number 92,000, specifically talking about a 65,000 increase in the end-strength for the active component of the Army and a 27,000 increase in the active component end-strength for the Marine Corps.

But in terms of where are we at today, I think when most Americans hear that, they think that means that the number in the Army and the Marine Corps today is going to go up by a total of 92,000 from where we are at today.

Isn't it more accurate to say that we are, you know, reasonably far along with those numbers already? Where are we at today with regard—of those 92,000, how many are already in the Marine Corps and the Army on a temporary basis?

General Formica.

General Johnson.

General FORMICA. Sir, I will respond for the Army.

The 65,000 of growth that the President and Secretary referred to in the active component is measured from the programmed force of 482,000 that was referred to earlier, and that 65,000, added to the 482,000, would get you to 547,000 active component end-strength.

Where we are today is currently sitting at about 504,000. As you know, the chief of staff of the Army had requested a 30,000 increase, and Congress had authorized that. And we have been able

to grow the Army given that temporary increase, and we are currently at about 504,000 today, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. It is my understanding that means of that 65,000, as of today, the faces in uniform, we have about 23,000 of that 65,000 in uniform today?

General FORMICA. That is correct.

Dr. SNYDER. Correct.

General FORMICA. In the Army, in the active component of the Army. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. In the active component.

General Johnson, my understanding is the number for you is about 5,400 Marines in uniform today that are going to be part of that 27,000. Is that the number you have?

Mr. APPLEGATE. Mr. Chairman, I will take that question.

We ended fiscal year 2006 at about 180,416 end-strength, and we expected to end fiscal year 2007 at 181,000, before any talk of this end-strength increase. So our historic point is from the 180,000 that we ended fiscal year 2006.

Part of the other issue is that we are only appropriated for 175,000, so when we see a total of a 22,000 Marine end-strength increase from 180,000, that we are currently at, to 202,000, and then until the money catches up, we need the appropriations amount to come from the 175,000 all the way up finally to the 202,000, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. But just for the sake of repetition, if nothing else. As of today, you have a little over 5,000 of the 27,000 Marines that Secretary Gates talked about are already in uniform under a temporary increase in end-strength?

Mr. APPLEGATE. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Great, great.

One of the issues that came up—Ms. St. Laurent talked about it and, of course, Members of Congress have talked about it some. I would like to hear from General Formica and General Johnson.

What occurred that your approach now is different than it was for your respective services 12 months ago?

Ms. St. Laurent gave some reasons why she thinks the numbers are different. Because this is a different picture of end-strength needs than we heard 12, 18, 24 months ago from both the Army and the Marine Corps.

General Formica, would you start with that?

General FORMICA. Yes, sir, I will.

As was stated, we came out of the Quadrennial Defense Review with a recognition that the Army would need to be able to provide a rotational supply of 18 to 19 brigade combat teams on any given year. And in order to be able to do that, 70 brigade combat teams, 42 in the active and 28 in the Army National Guard, would enable you to do that, with about 14 on any given year coming from the active component and 4 to 5 in the Army National Guard on a rotational basis. And 482,000 active component soldiers and the remaining part of the operating force in the Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve was determined by the Army to be adequate or sufficient to be able to support those 70 brigade combat teams, coming out of QDR.

What changed is, in the fall there was a reassessment within DOD, initiated by the Joint Staff, as part of the global force management process that recognized an increased enduring requirement of upwards of 23 BCTs on a rotational basis for the Army. And that increase in BCTs required us to add or to propose the growth of six active component BCTs to be able to grow and continue rebalancing combat support brigade maneuver enhancement in the Army National Guard in order to be able to meet the requirements of the 23 BCTs.

Dr. SNYDER. And, General Johnson, if you will briefly answer that question, we will move to Mr. McHugh.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

The Marine Corps looked this past fall—or last spring and summer, actually, we had a capabilities assessment session in which we brought a lot of folks in from across the Marine Corps. And we looked at what was going to be required to meet the threats of the future. Particularly, looking at our ability to balance our MAGTFs not only internally, air-ground logistics and command and control, but balance them across the Marine Corps.

We also looked at what the combatant commanders were going to be facing with respect to the irregular warfare in the future and looked at the guidance contained in the national security strategy, defense strategy, and so forth, QDR, and looked for ways to recommend to the commandant how we could improve the Corps in the future.

This fall, when the requests were made for us to identify what we thought we would need in the future, some of the findings that we had recommended to the commandant were available to him to draw on. We looked at primarily our role, our capability to provide balanced capability to the combatant commanders in the future and also the desire to take a look at the deployment to dwell ratio that we currently are experiencing.

Those were the two key things that have changed and enabled us to go forward and make the recommendation that we did for an increase of 27,000.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Johnson.

We have had several hearings so far this year already on the situation in Iraq and others, and I think hands-down the award for most insightful questions goes to my partner, Mr. McHugh. [Laughter.]

So, Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, that string will probably end right here, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

But I appreciate the comment.

I would like to look at the QDR a little bit differently, and numbers are obviously important. But when we come down to the final analysis, the issue really is how many feet and how many boots do we have on the ground out there, particularly for you two gentlemen.

But when the Members of Congress and, I think, the general public talk about QDR and defense strategy, they tend to talk about missions more than numbers.

Is my recollection correct that when we talked about the 2006 QDR the missions objective was to be able to fight an Operation

Enduring Freedom-Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF–OIF)-type engagement with a near-simultaneous regime change? Is that correct?

General FORMICA. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MCHUGH. Looking at the fact that we are now engaged in an OEF–OIF engagement, and we are not at the present time engaged in a near-simultaneous regime change, how do we justify this new plus-up as being adequate to the QDR?

General FORMICA. Sir, our assessment in the Army is that the requirements that we currently are required to meet and anticipate having to meet in the future, based on our lessons learned during the OIF and OEF, is that we cannot meet the current dwell times with the force that we have now, and the projected force that came out of the TAA and the 70 brigade combat teams that was projected in QDR to be able to meet the mission was inadequate.

Mr. MCHUGH. Once you are through the 7,000-a-year projected increase to the Army and—I believe the Marine Corps is 5,000?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCHUGH. Will you be able to meet the 2006 QDR and meet dwell times in the United States Army?

General FORMICA. Sir, we believe——

Mr. MCHUGH. Under current projections.

General FORMICA. Under the current projection with 76 brigade combat teams and growth in combat support brigades maneuver enhancements in the Army National Guard, it is our projection that we will be able to get dwell times approaching a 1:2 in the active component BCTs.

Mr. MCHUGH. Approaching?

General FORMICA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCHUGH. How far are we approaching it?

General FORMICA. I don't have exact numbers.

Mr. MCHUGH. Ballpark.

General FORMICA. Just short of 1:2. Just short of.

Mr. MCHUGH. Okay.

General Johnson.

General JOHNSON. We believe that the increase, if approved, over the course of the 5 years would enable us to reach a 1:2 dwell time. It would give us the capability to have time for our forces to be able to adequately rest and also train, to be able to focus more on some of the missions that are not—training that is not being done now as a result of this constant flow to the counterinsurgency fight.

And we believe that the initial—the way we would lay out the growth would be so that the units that are most hard-pressed would be the first in 2007 and 2008 to be the ones that we would seek to apply forces to.

Mr. MCHUGH. I don't want to put words in the report or the mouth of Ms. St. Laurent and the work that GAO did, but I believe what I heard her say is that, as you go through your process of determining force structure and ultimately end-strength, the guidance from OSD is highly determinative. That is a reality of budget. I understand that.

As I listened to you respond to the chairman's question about what changed, I almost got the impression that the combatant commanders all of a sudden realized something they didn't realize in 2006.

In the new estimates were the combatant commanders' requests and projections far greater than what was determinative of the 7, and then 70, now 76 brigades before that?

General FORMICA. Sir, I——

Mr. MCHUGH. I am trying to understand how determinative OSD is, and how much the budget plays here, and how much risk we are buying or not buying actually, I guess.

General FORMICA. Sir, I would like to start by clarifying my last comment——

Mr. MCHUGH. Sure.

General FORMICA [continuing]. And my previous answer to your question.

With the addition of combat support brigades in the Army National Guard, we believe we will reach a 1:2 dwell for brigades to meet that requirement.

Mr. MCHUGH. After five years.

General FORMICA. And I wanted to clarify that answer.

Mr. MCHUGH. Okay. Thank you, General.

General FORMICA. Sir, there was a reassessment done, as I said, in the fall as part of the global force management process that identified that the enduring requirement was going to be 23 BCTs——

Mr. MCHUGH. I don't mean to be rude, but I want to get to my colleagues, and I have used far too much time.

I understand the process. Well, I am not so sure I do. [Laughter.]

But I recognize the structure of the process. But I am interested in what the different, if any, calculations were of the combatant commanders that produced that change.

General FORMICA. Sir, I can't speak to the assumptions of the combatant commanders. I can only report that in the global force management board there was recognition that the requirements on the Army for brigade combat teams was an enduring requirement and that assumptions that it was going to be reduced changed.

Mr. MCHUGH. So I just want to make sure I understood you. You have no information as to what the combatant commander request was in that process.

General FORMICA. Sir, I know what the total requirement was for the Army from the combatant commanders, but I did not participate in the process with——

Mr. MCHUGH. Okay. Thanks.

General FORMICA [continuing]. From each combatant commander.

Mr. MCHUGH. I appreciate it.

General.

General JOHNSON. Well, the QDR results put us at an end-strength of 175,000. And we believed at the time that it needed to be a greater end-strength. And when the opportunity was presented this fall to come back with another assessment, I believe the assessment was that we could do a better job for the combatant commanders.

Not that their requirements had changed, because I think those were fairly well understood. But as some of the 7,500 plan evolved, as part of the emerging theater security cooperation planning evolved, we believed that a larger force, more balanced MAGTF

could provide them better capability than we had indicated previously.

Mr. MCHUGH. You Marines had a somewhat different starting point on that I recall, so I appreciate that. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.

Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen and lady, for being here.

General Johnson, it is nice to be with somebody who is a graduate of those fine institutions of higher education, Amphibious Warfare School and the Army War College, so you are starting at sort of a different plane here.

I am going to get to the Army in just a second, but let me start with the Marine Corps.

When you are making these plans, we are talking about, in the case of the Marine Corps, an increase in the end-strength of the active Marine Corps. How much in this force generation did you count on the participation of the Marine Corps Reserve?

General JOHNSON. The end-strength request that we have made is focused on the active force, as you know.

Mr. KLINE. Right.

General JOHNSON. And we are looking at the reserve now. The reserve end-strength is 39,600, and we are looking at it.

We haven't made recommendations to the commandant yet about changing the Marine Corps Reserve. Our goal is to have a 1:5 deployment dwell ratio with the reserve. And we feel that they continue to demonstrate that they reinforce and augment our active forces effectively.

So I don't have an answer for you, Congressman, as far as where it will go. We think it is about right, but we are still taking a look at it.

Mr. KLINE. All right. It is a very different concept than what the Army uses with the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve so, if time allows, I may come back. But I want to turn to the Army now.

When you were doing your force modeling and force projection and force computations, you purposely and actively included the Army National Guard. When you start telling us about how many brigade combat teams we have, we will have, we won't have in the active reserve, you have already factored in to the employment of the United States Army use of the Army National Guard.

General FORMICA. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KLINE. Is that right? And you reached that, at one point it was 14 and 4, I think——

General FORMICA. Yes, sir, if I may?

Mr. KLINE. Yes, please.

General FORMICA. It is 14 in the active, and that is 1 deployment and 2 turns back——

Mr. KLINE. Right.

General FORMICA [continuing]. At 42 gets you the 14 per rotation and the Army National Guard factored at 1 deployment and 5 turns back gets you about 4 to 5 at 28.

Mr. KLINE. And 14 and 4, is that the model we are moving to or that is——

General FORMICA. Sir, that was where we came out of——

Mr. KLINE. All right. So what are we going to now?

General FORMICA. It would be 48 in the active component and 28 in the Army National Guard to get your 76 brigade combat teams, plus we will continue the rebalance effort that we have in the Army National Guard with the brigade combat teams to the combat support brigades designed for maneuver enhancement with infantry units assigned. And we will grow those in the Army National Guard, as well.

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you.

Just as a matter of comment and opinion, I still think that the United States Army is relying too heavily on the reserve component. I think that is a trend that we have seen throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom certainly. And it concerns me a little bit that we still have what I think is a heavy reliance, programmed right in, to deployment of the reserve component.

I am happy to see that it is at least a one to five, but I would argue that really changing the nature of the Army National Guard and Reserve component by this factoring in automatically national guard brigade combat teams as we go forward, as part of the force structure to be actively employed—I understand I am using a little mixed language here, but you are planning to actively employ members of the national guard in your mix.

And so, back, if I could, to you, General Johnson.

When you are computing the force structure for the Marine Corps, how much are you factoring in the active employment, if you will, of the Marine Corps Reserve, like the Army does? When you figure out how many MAGTFs we need, how much are you relying on the Marine Corps Reserve?

General JOHNSON. Well, our reliance on the reserve, as you know, is to augment and reinforce, and the structure of the reserve mirrors our active structure. And so we have always had the capability to reinforce and augment kind of on a mirror-image basis.

Mr. KLINE. Right.

General JOHNSON. But we have learned a lot, of course, out of the current fight. And we want to try to minimize some of the activations of reservists where we possibly can, where they have been unnecessary—or may have proved to have been unnecessary.

But we pretty much try to stay with a mirror image of our active forces.

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you.

I see I am about to run out of time, Mr. Chairman.

I think, General Johnson, maybe we can meet offline and talk about that. I am not sure I am getting—I am probably not phrasing the question accurately to understand how much the Marine Corps is relying on activation of the reserves.

So, I am sorry. I yield back.

Dr. SNYDER. No, Mr. Kline. I think it is a good question, and we will come back to it in our next round.

Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I do think that is a good question, by the way, Mr. Kline. And as somebody who is from California who has seen a lot

of their reservists and national guard people be in the mix, it is an important question to our people.

Thank you, first of all, for being before us today.

I have a question. I am sorry because I didn't read all the material, and I usually do. But I am at a little disadvantage, and I apologize for not having done my homework ahead of time.

Over what time period will this increase take effect, both from the Army and from the Marines standpoint? That is a quick question.

General FORMICA. Yes, ma'am. We begin the growth immediately, as the chairman already indicated, because some of those soldiers are already on active duty. And then the growth would be programmed out through fiscal year 2012, ma'am.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay.

And for the Marines?

Mr. APPLEGATE. Yes, ma'am. The intent for the Marine Corps is to achieve the 202,000 on the active force by the end of fiscal year 2011.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay.

Mr. APPLEGATE. And we want to do that by trying to hit 184,000 at the end of fiscal year 2007, and then going up by increments of 5 until we top out at 202,000. So in 2008 the goal would be 189,000, then 194,000 in 2009, et cetera.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Now, I am assuming, as you are increasing—I think before, when we had General Clark, retired at the time, come before our committee, he mentioned something of a two-to-one factor. Is that still true for this, so the breakdown we would see is a two-to-one breakdown on these? Or, what types of troops are you looking at?

General FORMICA. Yes, ma'am. In the Army, the growth is predominantly in the operational force. It is the brigade combat teams and combat support and combat service support soldiers that provide necessary enablers, and then there is a small amount that will be about 5,000 that will go to the generating force or the institutional army to sustain a growing force, and the rest of those are accommodated in what we call our individuals account.

We are going to continue to reduce our institutional Army and grow our operating force, but about 5,000 of this structure will go to the institutional Army.

Ms. SANCHEZ. So what you are saying is the marginal troops that you are bringing in are going to be at less than the 2:1 ratio.

General FORMICA. The bulk——

Ms. SANCHEZ. Two people supporting one person in the field.

General FORMICA. Ma'am, the bulk of the forces we are bringing in are operational forces, either in the brigade combat teams or the combat support and combat service support soldiers that are in the field supporting and fighting with them.

Our percentage of the operating force, the institutional Army, will stay about the same. It is a roughly about 25 percent institutional Army and about 75 percent operating force. And that will stay about the same as we grow the force.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Thank you.

And in the Marines?

General JOHNSON. The increase that we are looking at, ma'am, or the recommended increase that we are looking at was 75 percent to the operating forces and 25 percent to the supporting establishment.

Ms. SANCHEZ. If that is the indication—you just gave me a ratio, and you said you would bring in more operational troops than you would, for whatever intents and purposes, staffing troops or what have you, how is the existing soldier going to see that? What is the impact that this is going to have on the services received to the existing soldier?

I mean, in other words, will medical care be affected? Will waits and whatever be affected, if you are actually bringing in more operational troops, but you are leaving, to a large extent, the same infrastructure, if you will, of the other troops?

General FORMICA. Yes, ma'am. And for the Army, again, about 5,000 of that growth will be applied to that infrastructure, as you refer to it, in the institutional Army. That will enable us to put more recruiters, trainers, drill sergeants, instructors, and medical personnel out in the generating force to provide the support that you asked for.

Ms. SANCHEZ. So you think, then, an existing soldier will see no difference?

General FORMICA. I think that we will continue to provide the quality supports in the institutional Army, ma'am, yes. And we will continue to fund military-civilian conversions in order to provide that quality support with both military and civilian personnel.

Ms. SANCHEZ. What about equipping these troops? I mean, today in *The Washington Post*, "Equipment for Added Troops is Lacking." I am sure you saw this article. This is with respect to the troops that we are sending out to Iraq.

What about being able to equip them over this time period that you have? Or do you feel strongly that you are going to be able to equip them correctly?

And given the fact that equipment used to follow the particular person, and now we changed to equipment is left behind, and new troops come in and troops are finding no equipment or there is a lack of equipment in places we are, like in Iraq, for example—and, oh, by the way, we haven't figured out, nor do we know the impact of what we have to replace yet.

How do you all feel about having the right equipment for these troops if we can get them in?

General FORMICA. Ma'am, of course, first of all, the Army is committed to deploying across the berm into Iraq and Afghanistan only those units that are manned, trained and equipped to the task for which they have been assigned.

We currently are experiencing, as you know, equipping challenges that apply mostly in the units back in the training base, in the reset training phase of our force generation model. And we are doing a combination of sourcing units with their organic equipment, with equipment provided in theater, with equipment that is provided to them in the reset, and through some cross-balancing from other units in order for them to train before they deploy.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for being here today.

My predecessor, the late Congressman Floyd Spence, was a strong supporter of greater end-strength, and so I know he would be pleased to see the recommendations that are coming forth.

In looking at this, as to recruiting and retention, is there anything that we in Congress need to do to assist—and I have a particular interest at the recruiting school as at Fort Jackson for the Army. Is there anything that we need to do to assist in terms of recruiting and retention?

General FORMICA. Sir, first, thank you for your comment and for your support and for the offer of continued support.

We believe that with aggressive recruiting goals and retention goals that we will be able to achieve the end-strength that we have envisioned. As you well know, that will require continued support from Congress for the incentive packages that we would want to offer for both recruiting and retention. And we thank you, in advance, for that support.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. I would like to also offer a comment on the recruiting issue, and that is, in addition to just being able to recruit the aggregate numbers, I think both the Army and the Marine Corps will potentially have some challenges in trying to recruit individuals with the correct skills.

We have done some reports on recruiting and have found out that there are some imbalances, where the services have not been able to fill certain occupational specialties and have overfilled others.

So I think a good management plan to manage the increase, if approved, would be necessary. And the services will both have to look at the kinds of incentives, in terms of recruiting and retention bonuses and incentives that they are providing.

Mr. APPLEGATE. Congressman Wilson, for the——

Mr. WILSON. Yes.

Mr. APPLEGATE [continuing]. Marine Corps, we are looking at a number of things. One, we are in the process of increasing our recruiter force by 600 nationwide. We will need your continued support for access to high schools. That is going to be an important part of this.

Our enlistment bonus program is going to need to be funded because we are greatly going to need to increase that, along with our advertising dollars for our recruiting command, sir.

Mr. WILSON. And I am always impressed at the recruiting because it is so difficult. The number of young people who, due to health requirements, it is a small percentage actually of those who apply that can finally be fully recruited and trained.

Additionally, how about the facilities? Do we have sufficient facilities at Fort Jackson, at Parris Island, Pendleton? Do we feel like the facilities for the recruits is sufficient?

General FORMICA. Again, sir, a great question and one that we are—our current military construction (MILCON) program which, when passed, will provide increased capabilities, both in our operational force but also in our recruiting base. And I do believe that we will have adequate barrack space, not only at Fort Jackson, but in all of our basic training centers.

Mr. WILSON. Right.

Mr. APPLEGATE. And, Congressman, for the Marine Corps, we are doing a DOTMILPF process, and I am not sure if you are all familiar with that acronym. But that looks at doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities for every aspect of the operating force and the supporting establishment for the end-strength increase. And for the recruiting command and for our instructors in our training command, that is all part of this.

So we are looking at, do we need more MILCON or facilities equipment at the boot camps, throughout the recruiting stations and at the recruiting school, and those sorts of things. And those are all being wrapped up into our final assessment on what the costs are going to be and what the requirements are going to be, and the timelines, and where the long poles in the tent are for our ability to achieve the end-strength increase.

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate Ms. Sanchez bringing up about the equipment for the active duty. But there was a report yesterday, and I don't know if you have jurisdiction, the shortfalls in equipment for national guard units, particularly in the event of a state call-up.

What is the status on adjusting for that?

General FORMICA. Sir, I don't have jurisdiction over equipment. And I would prefer to take that question for the record and have the right folks come back and provide that response.

Mr. WILSON. Fine.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. I can provide some comments on that. That report——

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sure.

Ms. ST. LAURENT [continuing]. That you are mentioning is one that GAO is issuing, will be coming out today publicly.

But we took a look at how the Department of the Army and the National Guard are trying to manage equipment for both homeland security and overseas missions, and there are some significant challenges. We know the Army is aware of those. But because the national guard has been so heavily engaged overseas, there are very significant shortfalls in the guard.

The Army is trying now to identify about 300 or so items that will be useful for homeland security purposes, as well as overseas missions, and try to manage those. But it is going to be a long process before I think the level of equipping in the guard units is increased significantly. And, for the time being, it is a risk that needs to be considered.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you very much.

And thank you for being here today. I have a couple of questions.

I am very concerned about the role of the national guard, the way you have projected it. Could you tell me, please, how many national guard troops, again, are you expecting to add in what timeframe?

General FORMICA. Yes, ma'am. In the proposed growth, we would grow about 8,200 of Army National Guard, again over the same timeframe; about 1,500 a year.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. I am concerned about some of the problems that they are already facing in the civilian sector when they leave their jobs for extended periods of time.

Do you have some program to address that with civilian employers? Because I can't imagine it would be very attractive to, you know, potential national guard members knowing the difficulties right now.

General FORMICA. Ma'am, I can't speak to specific programs with employers in the communities, but I can tell you that, as you know, the Secretary of Defense has recently announced a new mobilization policy. The Army embraces that mobilization policy.

And, first of all, we believe it will help in the long run to enable us with recurrent assured access to the guard and to the reserve. But it also establishes a 12-month mobilization period.

And so, by increasing pre-mobilization training, we can optimize the time that they are called on to active duty and guarantee them a 12-months mobilization time, as opposed to the more extended periods that they have experienced in the past few years.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I would suggest that, in order to meet those recruitment goals, that we are really going to have to coordinate better, because what I have been hearing out of my district is a great deal of stress and strain on the families and a reluctance to enroll at this point because of those problems that haven't been addressed.

I also wanted to ask you about stop-loss. I know that has recently been changed again, and they are going to try not to use the stop-loss. But will that be something that you might have to utilize again if you don't reach those goals?

General FORMICA. Ma'am, it is my understanding, first of all, we will, I believe, continue to rely on stop-loss in the near-term, as we provide trained and ready, cohesive units.

But we did receive guidance from the Secretary of Defense to look at how we will reduce and eliminate stop-loss in the future, and the Army is assessing its stop-loss program and has a responsibility to go back to the Secretary some time next month to report how we are going to do that. So we are looking at that now, ma'am.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. And a couple other questions, please.

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), does it have a role? Are you trying to expand that to bring soldiers in?

General FORMICA. We will obviously need to have increased accessions in ROTC. I can't speak to the specific numbers that we will need as part of growing the force, but increased accessions in the officer corps, as well as in the enlisted ranks, will be required in order to sustain a growth to 547,000 in the active.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. And, once again, I am trying to project what will happen to these soldiers that come in and then eventually leave the military and become veterans. Is there any kind of coordination, any long-term plan looking at what their needs will be after they retire, in terms of the extra costs for the Veterans Administration (VA)?

You know, maybe there isn't any linkage at all between the agencies, but I think it would be helpful because they will be utilizing services at the other end. And I think it would help people at the

beginning, before they entered the military, if they knew that there would be a continuation of care after.

General FORMICA. Ma'am, I agree. If there is a direct linkage that is going on right now today, I am not aware of it. But, of course, we do appreciate the continued support of the American people and the benefits that our veterans receive. But I do agree with you.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I really would like to see some plan long-term for that, and I don't even know—I am not putting it on your shoulders. I just wanted to bring it up as an issue, that I think this is where we fall down, you know, through taking care of them at the end.

And my last question is I am very concerned about the training time, and the stories that we are sending soldiers into the field unprepared. And I wanted you to address that, if you would, please. My understanding is they are not getting enough training, in particular national guard and reserve units, and they are being put into battle without enough training time.

General FORMICA. Ma'am, the Army remains absolutely committed to sending into Iraq and Afghanistan, into any theater of operations, soldiers and units who are manned, trained and equipped for the task for which they are going to perform. We have got an extensive post-mobilization training program run by our U.S. Army Forces Command and First Army, and we do extensive post-mobilization training that is geared to the mission that the unit has been assigned.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. So you are saying that every national guard unit has had proper training, they have had the equipment to train with, before they have gone into Iraq and into any kind of——

General FORMICA. Trained, equipped and certified before they deploy.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. I would, if I could, make a comment on that issue.

I would agree that the units going into Iraq are all certified and do receive training. But I think there are some challenges that we have seen as we have looked at the mobilization process, and that includes units not necessarily getting the equipment at the time they would like and prefer, so they do experience some delays. They eventually get most of it at the mobilization station, but sometimes they get additional equipment in theater and have to train there.

So ideally one would want to make some improvements to that process.

Dr. SNYDER. Ms. Davis.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here.

I wanted to direct my questions, if I may, to you, Ms. St. Laurent. Am I saying that right? Because I think that some of the issues that you raise, I wonder if you could give us a little more background about.

You mentioned the transparency and the hope, I think, that the process would be more transparent in the future and that it would be based more on reliable data as opposed to individual judgments.

Could you expand on that a little bit and just give us an example of, in fact, where that transparency has not been obvious to you? And what drives that? How can we do a better job with that?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. There are a couple of issues from my perspective, and I will—again with the analyses that are done at the DOD-wide level. One of the principle ones is the Quadrennial Defense Review, and we think that the study itself has merits. It encourages a review of the defense strategy and new initiatives come forward. But it also makes some decisions about force structure.

Our view is that it does not necessarily provide much insight into how those conclusions were reached. In fact, in the past we have recommended that the Department consider providing Congress with a classified addendum or annex that would better explain the kinds of assumptions and scenarios that were used to reach the conclusions about force structure. And we still think that is a good idea. So there is an area where they could improve.

Also, with the military personnel end-strength requests, we think that perhaps the Department could create a better display to show how they are allocating end-strength to their key missions, and how much of it is in combat forces, how much of it is in support forces, and how much is it in the institutional, or generating, force that includes the training base and other things. And then, from year to year, they could show how they are changing.

The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps are proposing increases, but the other services are also proposing to decrease.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Can I ask you, on that first point, is that a proposal that has been made to the Pentagon, to the DOD essentially? And has it gone through a process? Have people been able to weigh in on that? Have any of you heard of that, and would you have a response to that? How does that filter up or down?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Certainly. We generally make these suggestions through our reports, by including specific recommendations to the Secretary of Defense or to the services, where appropriate.

So, in the case of our recommendation about the QDR, we have made a number of recommendations for improving that process, to include preparing a classified annex. And DOD has agreed, I think, in concept, but has not taken specific action to implement it.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. So there is not a formal response to that.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. They have to respond both to the Congress and to GAO in a letter responding to our report. And we then do follow-up to see whether they are making the changes. But, to date, they have not really implemented some of the recommendations we have made in the past.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And is that a proposal for this last QDR or was that proposal made in the former QDR?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. It was a proposal made based on our study of the 2001 QDR. We are currently putting together a report that will be commenting on the 2006 QDR. And we will have some recommendations in that, as well.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate that.

I am not suggesting necessarily that all those recommendations should be taken. But I think part of our frustration is that we have been hearing from GAO recently that, you know, there are many proposals that are made and, generally speaking, they are not necessarily responded to. And so we end up making the same—not necessarily the same mistake, but we are not really responding to the real-world situations as best we could.

And I wonder, any thoughts about that? Is there enough of that that filters to the services? And are you asked to respond and to weigh in on those issues at all?

General JOHNSON. Well, I can't speak specifically to these suggestions, whether we—I don't know if we have been. Certainly, if we are asked, we will respond.

I think that the request by OSD for us to look at our strength and come back to them with proposals recently is an indication that they do listen to us, and that they have opened up that avenue in this case.

So, in answer to your questions, if GAO asks us for something, we will respond. And we think that this is an opportunity that we have had to do so.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. And I would like to add that we have reviewed the Army's Total Army Analysis force structure development process several times, in fact, and we have made a number of recommendations. And the Army has been responsive on many of the recommendations we have made in that area.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Great. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Applegate, what is the amount of the advertising budget for recruitment for the Marine Corps?

Mr. APPLEGATE. Sir, I believe the 2007 advertising budget is in the $120 million range, but I think we will have to get back with you on the specifics for that. And I am not sure how much more it is going to go up in the 2008 budget, sir.

Mr. JONES. Major General, how much is the advertising budget for the Army?

General FORMICA. Sir, I don't know. If you would permit, I could ask my colleague to the rear and see if he has brought that with him. If not, I will take the question for the record.

Mr. JONES. Okay.

General FORMICA. He reports to me that it is about $280 million in the base budget.

Mr. JONES. Okay. How much is the recruitment bonus for the Marine Corps and the Army? Is it the same, or is there a difference in the recruitment bonus?

Mr. APPLEGATE. Sir, in 2007, we have a $54 million enlistment bonus, and that would be going up substantially in 2008 and out, sir.

Mr. JONES. Okay. I guess a couple points.

Some of my colleagues on both sides—the national guard in the state of North Carolina, which I have the privilege to serve the 3rd District, it really has been so stressed. I guess my question is about the recruitment, not per se about North Carolina.

But I am finding more and more in the guard—and God knows, they really have done a great job working with the active duty forces, and they need to be all of them applauded, reserve, guard, and active duty, for the magnificent job they have done in Afghanistan and Iraq—but I am finding more in the guard to be concerned.

And the gentlelady—and I am sorry, I didn't bring my glasses. I couldn't see the name. I apologize for that.

But the point about the fact that it appears that—I know that we are trying to increase the end-strength. I know that is an ongoing process. But it seems in the short term that I am finding more and more guardsmen and reserve, Navy primarily, that are really beginning to feel the stress family-wise and the stress with their jobs.

Are you beginning to feel this or to hear this or to sense this? That there is a stress that seems to be at a level that many in the guard primarily are saying, "I don't know how much more of this I can take"? And it has nothing to do with the policy, whether they are for being in Iraq or not being in Iraq, but it is just the stress on the family, the individual.

Are you all having to cope with this more now than ever before? I mean, I am hearing it more now.

General FORMICA. Sir, if I could make a couple comments.

First, I share your observation that we are getting tremendous service from the soldiers in the active, the Army National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve. And it is my observation that we are more integrated today than we have been during any time in my career. And so we appreciate and depend on the sustained participation and integration of the United States Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.

I know that there is increased strain in all three components as we meet the demands of the global war on terror. And, as you suggest, I am not surprised that you would hear anecdotes of that in the Army National Guard in your home state.

But it is encouraging that we met our recruiting and retention goals in the components in fiscal year 2006, and we anticipate continuing to meet those recruiting and retention goals. And so while there is obviously family and individual strain associated with deployments, the signs are encouraging that the units and the soldiers are able to weather that.

Mr. JONES. General.

General JOHNSON. I can't certainly speak for the guard, but I can speak to certainly the Marines. Indicators are that we aren't having a lot of stress on the force. Some of the key indicators that we would look at: abuse, divorce, things along those lines. Those are fairly stable, and our recruiting and retention remains stable.

But we do see some signs of stress on the folks, particularly on the families. As the commandant gets around to the Marine Corps and speaks with families and Marines, there are stressors out there: fathers who have been deployed multiple times and so forth. There are stresses that are not necessarily visible. But we are concerned about them, and we are watching them very closely.

Mr. JONES. I know recently, Mr. Chairman, I think it was our subcommittee, Personnel, we had the wife of a colonel and the wife

of a gunnery sergeant, and I tell you the truth. And then we had a staff sergeant, I believe, in the Army who himself who came.

And I will be real quick because my time is up.

I truthfully don't think we can do enough for the quality of life, whether it be the reserve or active duty. And not get into the policy, but I continue—we had a hearing today in the full committee, and I think it was General Cordesman. Is that the way you say his name? Tony——

Mr. MURPHY. Tony Cordesman, sir——

Mr. JONES. Thank you. I apologize for that.

But, I mean, when you hear the fact that we are in a situation in Afghanistan that we are going to have to, you know, up-tempo, increase the numbers, that we in this country and we in this Congress, we have really got to really, I think, make the right decisions for that family because it does break your heart.

Yesterday, Brian Bilbray and I went to Walter Reed, which every Member of Congress has done. And I never will forget a lady that we just happened to see sitting with her—it turned out to be her daughter. And for some reason, Brian and I just decided we wanted to go up and introduce ourselves and tell her how much—we didn't know about her family, but her daughter was having her leg amputated yesterday.

And so my point is, Mr. Chairman, I thank this committee for the good that we do. I thank the Congress for what we do. But God bless you all. That is all I got to say.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I would like to echo Mr. Jones's comments about what you do for our country, and I appreciate it.

And, Mr. Applegate, I know you are from Toms River, New Jersey. I was commissioned in the Army with a guy from Toms River, New Jersey. So thanks for your service to the Marine Corps, and welcome to the civilian world, like I am, as well.

Mr. APPLEGATE. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I would just like to state that I don't think it is controversial to say that the force requirement determination process that we talked about today and the budget process is tied together. And I think one of the main themes that we should take away from this hearing today is that we should be wary of too much political influence over the process.

And that brings me to my point here. That the troubling effect of off-budgeting and relying on supplemental appropriations, approaches that are overly political, hamper our ability to recruit and retain forces, and thus, ultimately hurt our ability to hit our end-strength goals.

So my first question is given what appears to be an in-depth and deliberative determination about what our force goal should be, why are we leaving the bulk of recruitment and retention funding to the supplementals budgets that we have?

General FORMICA. I would defer to Mr. Applegate.

Mr. APPLEGATE. I know in the Marine Corps we are trying to plow all of the funds into the baseline. I am not sure if that is going to be in 2008. It is definitely our goal is to get it in by 2009.

But our intent is to get all the funding requirements into the baseline budget as early as possible. Hopefully, that will be 2008. If it is not, we are definitely trying to get it in for 2009.

General FORMICA. And I would just add, sir, for the Army that one of the obvious advantages of this recommended permanent growth is that we would make permanent first that temporary end-strength that has been authorized by the Congress and enable us—and we are working this into the budget process with OSD—to get as much into the base budget as possible.

Mr. MURPHY. And your plan is to do that in 2008?

General FORMICA. I am not sure. They are working that now as part of the budget process, and I am sure that that will become available once those decisions are made.

Mr. MURPHY. Okay. And I just need to crunch the numbers, and the chairman made sure that we did our homework, so. You are looking at the numbers. Fiscal year 2006, the Army active and reserve spent $4.2 billion in recruiting programs.

And, you know, I used to do recruiting when I was a professor at West Point. Go down along the side for the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps. Go down at New York colleges and universities, and that was a proud moment. I was proud to serve in the military. I still am proud of it. It was the greatest thing I have ever done.

But, you know, you look at overview, and, you know, our job now is controlling the people's purse here. And you look at, you know, at this point, $3.6 billion has been budgeted for recruiting in 2007. Clearly, the services are relying on—we are looking at $500 million to $700 million coming from this emerging supplemental, which is going to come on our plate in a couple months.

And, you know, in fiscal year 2006 the Army spent $1.8 billion on retention bonuses. But this year, in fiscal year 2007, we are looking at $1.1 million. So a decreased amount of retention bonuses that we have that we are planning on.

And, you know, I know you all are hurting, and is there a plan, you know, with the budget supplementals here, I mean, to really hit us with the retention bonuses I would assume? Or should we assume?

General FORMICA. Mr. Murphy, I can't speak to the specifics of the budget requirements. I will be happy to take that question for the record and come back to you.

If I may add, I would like to thank you for your service, and I may be so bold as to tell you that we would welcome your continued recruiting efforts in your current capacity.

Mr. MURPHY. I will go in any commercial you want me to be on. [Laughter.]

I didn't like the fact that we changed it to an Army of one, but that is beside the point. That is not for this hearing, but——

General FORMICA. Army strong.

Mr. MURPHY. Army strong. That is right. I am glad that we changed that.

Mr. APPLEGATE. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. APPLEGATE. If I may, for the Marine Corps? I know that we are plowing the enlistment bonus, selective re-enlistment bonus into the budget, and again, our goal is to get it in 2008.

It is not really up to us, because we got the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense who will make the call. But we are definitely ready to move all of those funds into the baseline.

Mr. MURPHY. And I think, I mean, for the record, I know that many members of this subcommittee and Armed Services, which I can't speak to, but we have showed our wishes that we put this back into the regular budget process just so we can do our responsibility of the proper oversight, what you need in these programs if we could help you out, as well, so.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Higgins, start the clock again, and we will head back around on a five-minute rule.

Folks, I want to play devil's advocate a little bit and get into this issue of—I want to talk about your chart. Ms. St. Laurent's report talks about DOD needs to provide a better link—their words, or the GAO's words—a better link between its defense strategy and military personnel requirements.

When I look at your chart, General Formica, on the left side.

General JOHNSON. Sir, that is our chart.

Dr. SNYDER. That is the Marine Corps chart? Total——

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Oh, there is that little—all right, I have no excuse. But we will talk about—see, now, I should just say I know, but I want General Formica to explain it. [Laughter.]

But I am not going to do that. [Laughter.]

General FORMICA. Can I take that for the record? [Laughter.]

Dr. SNYDER. All right. We will go right below the anchor there.

You know, I have heard people, when we have looked at this issue over the last few weeks trying to sort this all out, because this issue has tremendous ramifications both for the military in achieving your mission, but also on long-range costs in our defense budget.

And so, Ms. St. Laurent, talks about a better link. But I have heard this left side of it, what you call the input. And you have got strategy document on top of strategy document, and then you have op plans, and you have got commanders' requests.

I mean, the reality is, if I took all those documents and put them together, I could find something in there that probably justified any level of troop strength for the Marine Corps or the Army. I could justify a 300,000 increase in the Army. I could justify status quo, I will bet. If you give me those documents, I will find stuff in there that can back up any level.

And so I will give Ms. St. Laurent's comment on this. But I have heard that described—I describe it as it is like an amorphous cloud. And then I had one of the staff members say, "Well, no. It is more like Jell-O." And using your metaphor, Ms. St. Laurent, it is hard to link into either Jell-O or an amorphous cloud. [Laughter.]

And so, you know, we have gone one whole round here. And I have read all the written stuff. I still don't have a sense, okay. How did we get to 92,000? How did we get to 92,000?

I think that what Mr. Kline, if I understood what he was saying, I think he said it very well.

Somewhere in all that stuff on the left side, whether it is in General Formica's mind or General Johnson's chart, somebody made some assumptions that sent to you all that said, hey, you are going to rely on the guard for this many of the troops. You know, it is going to be this many, at this rotation requirement. Then how does that affect what comes out through your throughput, through your output, to the other side?

But we are having trouble—I can't get my hands around, you know, how do I go back now, when we are at full committee or to my folks back home in Arkansas, and say I sat through this hearing, and I now understand the Jell-O? And here is why 92,000 is the correct number. But I haven't heard anything here today that helps me understand why that is the correct number, other than you have assured me that you have the Total Army Analysis process.

And I don't doubt your integrity on this. I am playing devil's advocate here. But I don't see anything to hook that link into. And Ms. St. Laurent, in her comments, I think, in her report are acknowledging that Mr. Kline and the others are on to something here.

So would you respond?

Well, let me go to Ms. St. Laurent first, and then we will have our two services respond.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. I would like to take a stab at trying to explain why I think now we are seeing the Army and Marine Corps and the Secretary of Defense supporting a different requirement. And that is we have looked at force structure planning for probably the past 15, 20 years.

And the scenarios that the Department uses to do its force structure planning have evolved considerably. And before it used to be, let us do a detailed analysis of a couple of major combat operations, and it would all be focused on offensive combat operations. And that was the way it was done for many, many years.

Over the past ten years, the department has expanded the kinds of scenarios that get looked at, and that has led us to some different requirements. We look at major war requirements, but they also look at stability operations and contingency requirements. They are starting to look at homeland defense requirements.

And there is a couple of ways of looking at this.

The Army, based on my discussions with them, does one set of analysis that looks at the Army's worst day. What if we had to do a number of operations simultaneously, including major wars?

And then, now, though, what has changed, I think, over the past couple of years for the Department is that all the services are needing to pay more attention to stability operations, regular warfare, and having to sustain involvement in contingency operations over a number of years. And that has required all the services to go back and take a look at their rotation force needs.

What if you have to do something for four, five, six, seven, eight years and need to provide a constant flow of forces? Now, one can argue about the size of that. And I think one of the things we have seen is that the QDR assumptions about the size of those contingency operations may not be the same, and I don't think they are

the same, as the real-world demands that the services are currently facing.

So that is my take on why I think that we are now seeing some different requirements being articulated.

Dr. SNYDER. Generals.

General FORMICA. Sir, if I may, just to Ms. St. Laurent's comments.

The strategies that you talked about are translated in our requirements phase through the scenarios that she refers to. And they are OSD-approved scenarios that we then enter into our modeling portion, where we do analysis on the type and amount of forces that are required to meet those scenarios.

The scenarios in the particular case of TAA–0813, the most recent TAA we did, were not directly related to Iraq and Afghanistan. But the scenarios that we have used in the past, and have adjusted since, are the scenarios that get us to the force that we have today.

To assure you on the 65,000 and the linkage of the 65,000 of growth in the active component, again, it was based on the need to grow six brigade combat teams in the active component, the combat support and combat service support, and enabling requirements that are needed to support those brigade combat teams, based on our TAA analysis and modeling, that is what—and then the slight increase, the 5,000, as I said, that we would add to the generating force, that is what gets us to 65,000 in the active.

Dr. SNYDER. General Johnson.

General JOHNSON. I can't refute what you said about it being a Jell-O-like process. I believe that the evolution of the task conditions and standards that we derive from those plans and from the scenario analysis, there is a great degree of subjectivity to it.

But we believe that those are the kinds of capabilities that we need to build as a corps—we look for the capabilities that we need to build as a corps to be able to provide to the combatant commanders to meet those kinds of scenarios and to meet our requirements in the op plans.

We have more gaps than we do solutions for those gaps. So we are constrained in a number of different ways, not only by end-strength, but our dollars, even by technology, in the sense that some things that we need don't even exist.

But the process that we try to go through gets us the capabilities that we think the combatant commanders will need.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. I need to go to LensCrafters. [Laughter.]

My eyesight is not quite what it should be here.

But I assume somewhere in there you are assuming a certain amount of risk. We can't buy all eventualities and cover all potentials. Is that true?

General JOHNSON. That is correct.

Mr. MCHUGH. How does this new force structure proposal risk compare to the 2006 QDR?

General JOHNSON. Well, for the Marine Corps I think that we reduce risk by being able to build a more balanced force. We are able to build a more balanced MAGTF concept. Right now, we have two Marine expeditionary forces that are approximately the same size,

and one that is a lesser size. And much of this increase will allow us to build the forces that will balance us across three MAGTFs.

We also believe that we reduce the risk by being able to—that gives us a greater ability to provide more forces to the combatant commanders to enable their 7,500 planning, to enable their TSC—theater security cooperation planning, and also to be able to meet the requirements of a major combat operation.

So we believe we reduce the risks by increasing the force over what we were told that we needed to be in the QDR.

General FORMICA. And if I could echo General Johnson's comments, as we grow brigade combat teams and the combat support and combat service support, that would provide a greater balance to our force to enable us to provide strategic depth and reduced dwell time and to meet the needs of the combatant commanders in the future.

We also, in this growth, are able to reduce risk by providing some key enablers and to reduce the amount of high-demand, low-density types of units that we have in the Army.

Particularly, we propose growth, for instance, for two Patriot battalions, for increased amount of explosive ordnance detachment soldiers, improved maintenance for our striker systems, small arms maintainers, more military intelligence, military personnel (MP) and engineers, and in growing those kinds of capabilities, better enable us to provide the kind of force we need, not only to meet the current operational demands of Iraq and Afghanistan, but for the type of force that we think we need for the future.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you.

General Johnson, you heard a comment earlier, I believe it was in response to Ms. Sanchez's question, about the Army's efforts to balance its distribution of the forces amongst the various categories of need. The Marine Corps relies, if not exclusively, very heavily on Navy personnel for medical.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCHUGH. The Navy is the service that is kind of going the other way in terms of end-strength. They are growing down.

What calculation, if any, has been made into this request for—obviously, you have more Marines potentially engaged in more theaters of action, more casualties, more wounded. Is there any provision on the Navy side for medical personnel?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. We have identified our end-strength growth to the Navy, and the Navy will take a look at our requirements for corpsmen and doctors and chaplains and will coordinate a commensurate—will support us in that regard.

Mr. MCHUGH. But it isn't factored on a numbers basis into your request? This is all Marine structure.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. The end-strength growth request that we have made is all Marines, active component Marines.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Maybe we can go to somebody else before——

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Johnson, the requirements for Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC), those are completely included in your end-strength increase?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLINE. You talked about balancing the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF). As I recall, one of those MEFs is heavily concentrated overseas.

General JOHNSON. That is correct.

Mr. KLINE. And are you anticipating an increase of basing overseas or a part of that MEF going to be state-side? I don't know if we are going to step into classification here, but it appears there wasn't a whole lot of room over there to grow that MEF in Okinawa and Japan, even with the addition of Guam.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. You are correct. We have not gotten to the point where we are ready to say exactly where all these units will be. We believe that you can have a MEF in a number of different locations.

Mr. KLINE. Okay.

General JOHNSON. So it will be spread out——

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Another time I would like to talk about where they might actually go.

And then, very quickly, I can't restrain myself, try as I might, having been in the programming business and the requirements business for a long time in the Marine Corps, that I just offer the opinion that the requirements system is pretty badly broken and lags too much. And this force generation is just an example of it.

It was, if I dare say, intuitively obvious to virtually everybody on this committee, not just this subcommittee but the Armed Services Committee, that we needed to grow the end-strength of the active Army and the active Marine Corps. We were putting too much stress.

And now it is 2007, and a good four years after we were calling for this end-strength increase, because it seemed readily apparent to us that we were overusing the reserve component, particularly in the case of the Army Guard and Reserve. And now we have got a requirements process on force generation that kind of catches up to where we were four or five years ago.

So I am not even going to ask for comment, because we have been called to vote, but it really concerns me that this model and the Army model are just lagging too badly. It bothers me that that has happened to us.

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Dr. SNYDER. Ms. Sanchez, I think, would like to yield her time to Mr. Murphy.

Ms. SANCHEZ. That is correct.

I just want to put in for the record that even though some of us thought that we were going to have to grow the end-strength, I mean, we, you know, we kept being told also that we were going to be out of Iraq by now.

So, you know, I get very worried when we are growing the end-strength now because it is an indication to me that we may be in Iraq for an even longer time or maybe some other situations that we don't really want to be in. So it is a real concern.

Just wanted to put that on the record, and I would like to yield my time.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Murphy, she has yielded the remainder of her time.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. You have 4 minutes and 30 seconds.

Mr. MURPHY. Roger. Thank you, Chairman.

I think one of the—during my time on the Armed Services Committee and the Select Intelligence Committee is that right now the President obviously is asking for the surge, and I am very skeptical on his requests with that. But I think it is relevant, because when you look at what the surge—I think this is the first of many surges. I think the reality of it is the majority, 75 percent, of those troops are going to Baghdad.

Is it necessary for the Army, and particularly the Army, to start planning for continued surges beside just Baghdad, in Iraq specifically?

General FORMICA. I think first will be required a determination from the combatant commander on the ground as to the length and duration of this surge. The Army, of course, is beginning to anticipate what happens on the back end of this initial surge; what kind of rotational forces will be required when the surge ends, and when those soldiers come back home.

Mr. MURPHY. So it is possible that the Pentagon might come back and ask for even more troops than the 92,000, or is that within the equation?

General FORMICA. Sir, that is not what I said.

The request for 65,000 in the Army, while clearly related to the global war on terror and enable us to engage in that global war on terror, is not directly linked to the surge. The surge is an immediate requirement in fiscal year 2007. And the Army will respond to that surge by providing units that are manned, trained and equipped.

The growth is really about providing capacity for the Army and for the Marine Corps to have strategic depth for the long term. And, as the chief of staff has testified and as many of you have alluded to, this is really the continuation of the growth that began a few years ago by taking advantage of the 30,000 temporary increase that the chief had asked for and that was authorized by Congress.

Mr. MURPHY. Even at the last hearing with General Schoomaker, he indicated that the continued escalation would cause serious doubt about the ability for our military to go to the 1:2 deployment ratio.

What do you think about the current up-tempo of both the Army and the Marine Corps? Can you give me a percentage of what do you think that would be right now if we continue to——

General FORMICA. I think in the near term the Army is going to sustain, at least in the active component, an up-tempo of about 1:1, and it is our intent, and obviously to grow capacity and to get in, as we continue to build our forces, to implement our Army force generation model and to take advantage of the recurrent assured access to the guard and reserve to improve dwell times in all three components.

Mr. MURPHY. And could I just follow up real quick?

General, you say short term. How short-term? What are we talking about there, 12 months?

General FORMICA. No. I think we will be at 1:1 in the Army at least for another rotation or two, if not longer, for some units.

Mr. MURPHY. Those units, particularly active duty units or——

General FORMICA. Active duty brigade combat teams. When I talk 1:1, I am talking active component units and not to the guard and reserve.

General JOHNSON. We have many units that are 1:1, some that are below 1:1, and some are running somewhere less than 1:2. We will do whatever is required for the surge, but that will exacerbate our existing ratio, and——

Mr. MURPHY. Is there a way that we can get a status on when you talk about some are less, some are more? Could we get a status of those brigade combat teams? I mean, I can tell you, I mean, I was in Second Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq the first time, and they are already going—you know, since I have left——

General FORMICA. Right.

Mr. MURPHY [continuing]. In 2004, they went to Afghanistan. They went home. Now they are back in Iraq. So this is the third deployment we are talking in less than three years, so.

General FORMICA. And that is the 1:1. If you would like us to come back with a specific lay down of brigade combat——

Mr. MURPHY. Of the brigade combat teams. Roger.

General FORMICA. We can provide that.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate that.

Can I get that for the Marine Corps, sir, as well?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.

Thank you, Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.

Folks, we have just about six minutes left or so on votes, so we are all going to have to vote and dash.

I wanted to make a couple final closing comments.

Mr. McHugh said he had no further questions.

But first of all, General Johnson, in your written statement you refer on page seven and eight to, I think you say, "More and more we are going to need to outthink our enemies and find our advantages and victories in the human factors. This intimate killing ground where the enemy has chosen to fight his wars among the people requires tactical cunning and intangible factors to include cultural and language skills, plus brilliance in the basics of small unit soldiering," which I think is a great comment to make.

And I know at least one member of the full committee has great doubts about this 92,000 and thinks that we should be really focusing on developing those kinds of skills in a lot of the troops we already have. I guess it is the model of what somebody referred to as the Lawrence of Arabia model; that it is not just a numbers game, but finding those kinds of language skills and cultural sensitivity.

So I appreciate you making that comment.

I am sorry that we have to go. I would really like to pursue the Jell-O cloud more. [Laughter.]

Because I don't think that we have grappled with that.

And I am not saying that 92,000 is too high a number. I mean, there have been people for years that have been saying—you know, Norm Sisisky was talking years ago about that this was not going to go well for the military. And he has been long deceased now, a lovely man, a great member of this committee. But he turned out to be right.

I mean, maybe when we got to the cloud and can sort it all out, the number ought to be 180,000. I mean, I don't know. But you need to prepare the future witnesses coming before this committee and the full committee.

I think there is going to be members that are going to try to sort this out because this has big ramifications for both the military but on budget issues. And we don't have either the better link that Ms. St. Laurent has called for or an understanding of this what you all call input, General Johnson, I am calling the Jell-O cloud. Because it is really hard to justify right now, based on the information we have, a strong defense of those specific numbers you all are citing.

But thank you all for your time. We are sorry we don't have more time to continue this discussion.

General JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General FORMICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressmen.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JANUARY 30, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JANUARY 30, 2007

Opening Statement Chairman Snyder
Hearing on the Force Requirements Determination Process
January 30, 2007

This is the first hearing of the Military Personnel Subcommittee in the 110th Congress. Among those veteran members of the Committee on Armed Services joining us on the Military Personnel Subcommittee this Congress we are fortunate to have Members who have strongly supported military personnel programs and have taken an active interest in the welfare of service members and their families. I also want to welcome the new members. Ms. Boyda, Mr. Murphy, and Ms. Shea-Porter, I believe you will find your service on the Military Personnel Subcommittee a rewarding experience.

Our first hearing will provide the Members the opportunity to learn more about the force requirements determination processes employed by the services to calculate (1) the force structure—the units and capabilities—and (2) end strength— the people—they require to carry out the operational requirements assigned to the service.

Given the recent proposal to increase the end strength of the active Army and the active Marine Corps by 92,000 initiated by the Secretary of Defense and supported by the President in his State of the Union speech, the Subcommittee can expect end strength to be an important issue during the 110th Congress. Today's hearing will focus on the requirements processes operated by the Army and the Marine Corps since they carry the primary burden of the ground war in Iraq and Afghanistan and are the proposed recipients of the additional end strength.

Mr. McHugh, did you have a statement you would like to make?

I would like to welcome our panel:

Major General Richard P. Formica, USA
Director of Force Management, Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, Headquarters, United States Army

Major General Stephen T. Johnson
Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Mr. Michael F. Applegate
Director, Manpower Plans and Policy, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

Ms. Janet St. Laurent
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team, United States Government Accountability Office

General Formica, please begin.

Opening Remarks – Rep. John M. McHugh
Military Personnel Subcommittee Hearing
Army and Marine Corps
Force Structuring Process
January 30, 2007

Mr. Chairman, there certainly is value in understanding better the process by which the Army and Marine Corps force structure requirements are determined and how end strengths relate to those force structure requirements.

Given the long-standing disagreement between the Congress and the Department of Defense over the issue of the proper size of the Army and Marine Corps, we ought to know the process by which the Secretary of Defense recently reached two conclusions: 1) That the Army and Marine Corps end strengths needed to be substantially increased, and 2) That an Army sized at 547,000 and a Marine Corps sized at 202,000 were appropriately sized.

As you know, this subcommittee has long believed that the Army and Marine Corps end strengths were too small for the missions given those services. As early as May 2002, this subcommittee recommended and the House adopted an increase in end strength of 4,800 for the Army and 2,400 for the Marine Corps. Since that time, we have continued to assert the need for a larger military. The committee is on record that for fiscal year 2008 and 2009 the active Army end strength should be at least 532,400, and the active Marine Corps end strength should be at least 184,000 – levels substantially higher than what had been proposed in the annual Department of Defense budget requests.

Beyond the questions of end strength, we need to understand more about the process used to develop force structure requirements. I say that because in just a very short period, with no seeming change to this Member in the mission requirements, conditions, or

challenges facing the Army and Marine Corps, the processes within the Department of Defense for determining the Army and Marine Corps force structures have come up with substantially different numbers. For example, the Quadrennial Defense Review, which was issued about a year ago, recommended no increase in the size or force structure of the Marine Corps or the Army. Today, the recommendation is for a 15 per cent increase in Marine Corps end strength and at least a 12.5 per cent increase in infantry battalions.

The Army process would appear even more inconsistent. As late as September 2005, the Army was briefing Congress that it required 77 brigade combat teams, including, 43 of which were in the active component. Even prior to the QDR, the Army revised its force structure requirements to 70 brigade combat teams, including 42 in the active component. Now, under the Secretary of Defense's recently announced

increases, the Army plans 76 brigade combat teams, including 48 in the active component. What drove such changes is not readily apparent.

So Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the witnesses' testimony today to help us understand more completely a process that to me seems to be extremely variable in its outcomes and, at times, geared more towards providing the minimum affordable military forces rather than the forces that this nation requires.

STATEMENT BY

MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD P. FORMICA
DIRECTOR OF FORCE MANAGEMENT
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

ON THE ARMY'S PROCESS TO DOCUMENT FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS

JANUARY 30, 2007

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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STATEMENT BY
MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD P. FORMICA
DIRECTOR OF FORCE MANAGEMENT, ARMY

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of this sub-committee, on behalf of our Secretary, Dr. Francis Harvey, the Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker and the more than one million Active, Guard and Reserve Soldiers, and civilians of the United States Army, serving around the globe – I welcome the opportunity to discuss the process the Army uses to determine its force structure requirements and the basis for growth in Army end strength to increase strategic depth, improve readiness of the next deployers, and rebalance capabilities to meet the strategic demands of the long war.

As the Chief of Staff of the Army has testified, we are in a dangerous, uncertain, and unpredictable time and we face challenges that exceed the level of demand envisioned in the Quadrennial Defense Review. Recent decisions announced by the President and the Secretary of Defense will allow the Army to increase our capabilities in order to ensure our nation's future security and maintain the integrity of the all volunteer force.

The strategic environment is dynamic and we do not always control the conditions that underpin the demand. As a result, the Army's force sizing process must be adaptable to meet the requirements of that strategic environment. The Army has a mature process to develop force structure based on analysis of Secretary of Defense Approved Planning Scenarios. The art of this process is the ability to anticipate future challenges and resource our force structure with those capabilities that posture the Army to meet strategic demands. Our force sizing process, while grounded in analytics,

is periodically reviewed to ensure that it is adaptable to a changing strategic environment.

The cornerstone of the Army's analytical force sizing process is the Total Army Analysis. Conducted biennially, it translates capability requirements for the Operational Force (the warfighting element of the Army) and the Institutional Force (the generating and support element of the Army) into force structure for the Army's Program Objective Memorandum submission.

The National Security Strategy, National Defense and National Military Strategies, Strategic Planning Guidance and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan dictate the baseline assumptions that we use in Total Army Analysis. The Army responds to changes in the strategic environment by considering the actual demand and lessons learned from current operations in the War on Terror, as well as requirements from the Combatant Commanders.

TAA consists of a Force Structure Requirements Generation Phase and a Force Structure Resourcing Phase. The Force Structure Requirements Phase begins by assessing the number of directed combat formations (Division Headquarters and Brigade Combat Teams) required to achieve the strategy. These formations are modeled for Major Combat Operations to determine the requisite support units (Echelons Above Brigade Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support units) needed to sustain the directed force. These support requirements are based on doctrine that is updated annually to reflect force modernization and the most current application of tactics, techniques and procedures, and joint concepts.

Requirements also are derived from the Army's assessments to support a variety of Small Scale Contingencies to include Counter Insurgency, Humanitarian Assistance, and Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations. The force structure derived from this analysis emanates from established doctrine, strategic demands, and military judgment.

The Force Structure Requirements Phase has recently been updated to consider the impacts of enduring rotational commitments. The Army now models rotational force requirements over time based on operational demand. We had not done so in the past. The resulting rotational requirement is compared against the peak force requirement generated from the analysis of Major Combat Operations and Small Scale Contingencies. Where differences occur, additional force requirements bridge the gap. For instance, if peak Major Combat Operations demand requires a total of 150 Combat Support Military Police Companies, but the enduring rotational requirement calls for 177, then the difference of 27 Military Police Companies are added to the overall requirement to bridge the gap.

In the Force Structure Resourcing Phase, Total Army Analysis reconciles existing force structure against the newly generated requirements. Capability gaps are identified when force structure requirements exceed the current force structure. The Army adjusts the force structure and rebalances capabilities within and across the three components; resourcing those requirements that Senior Army leadership has determined to be most critical to meet the strategy. The resulting resourced force becomes the basis for the Army's Program Objective Memorandum. This resourced

force is then evaluated in a Force Feasibility Review to determine if it can be manned, equipped, trained, sustained and stationed within the program.

Given the strategic environment identified in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense review, Total Army Analysis 2008-2013 generated a requirement for the Operational Force of 822, 000. Within the approved End Strength program, the Army was able to resource 790, 000 against those requirements. This resourced force would provide an annual rotational capacity of 18-19 Brigade Combat Teams across all three components available for deployment to meet the Quadrennial Defense Review strategy. However, as the Chief of Staff of the Army has stated in testimony this rotational capacity falls short of the growing global force demands. This increasing demand on the force, and a decreasing contribution from the Reserve Components, has driven Active Component dwell time to well below the surge goal of one year deployed and two years back. Some units will soon approach a rotation rate of one year deployed with only one year back.

In order to provide the capacity to meet the increasing strategic demand, build force depth, mitigate key capability shortfalls, and increase dwell time, the Army will grow 74,200 Soldiers by FY 2013 across all three components. This plan grows the Active Component to 547, 400 by FY 2012. By 2013, it grows the Army National Guard to 358,200 (an increase of 8,200); and grows the United States Army Reserve to 206,000 (an increase of 1,000). Given current operational demand, this growth in end strength, combined with ongoing rebalance efforts in all three components and mobilization policy decisions outlined by the Secretary of Defense, will reduce the stress

on the force and improve Active Component dwell ratios toward one year deployed with two years back at home by Fiscal Year 2013.

I look forward to answering your questions on the process the Army uses to determine its force structure requirements and working with this committee and Congress to maintain the readiness of your All Volunteer Army.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

MAJOR GENERAL STEPHEN T. JOHNSON
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL
MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

AND

MR. MICHAEL F. APPLEGATE
DIRECTOR, MANPOWER PLANS AND POLICY
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

ON

THE FORCE REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS

JANUARY 30, 2007

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Major General Stephen T. Johnson
Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command



Major General Stephen T. Johnson was promoted to Major General in February 2003 and is currently assigned as the Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

Major General Johnson was commissioned in 1972 upon graduation from Monmouth College, Monmouth, Illinois. After completing The Basic School, he served as a rifle platoon commander, executive officer, logistics officer, and company commander in the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions. As a Captain and a Major respectively, he commanded a rifle company and served as the Operations Officer in 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. From 1992 to 1995, as a Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel, he served as the Executive Officer, 2d Marines and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 2d Marine Division. He commanded 4th Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division from August 1995 to June 1997. From June 1997, until his promotion to Brigadier General in July 1998, he served as the G-3, III Marine Expeditionary Force.

From July 1998 to May 2000, Major General Johnson served in a joint assignment with U.S. Central Command, initially as the Inspector General, and later as the Deputy Director, Plans and Policy Directorate. During this assignment, Major General Johnson deployed as the Joint Task Force Commander of JTF Resolute Response in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. In May 2000 he was reassigned as Director, Manpower Plans and Policy Division, HQMC, serving in that capacity until June 2003. In June 2003 he assumed command of the Second Marine Division, serving as the Commanding General until 2004. In November 2004 he took command of II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), deploying to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom 04-06 until January 2006.

He has been assigned independent duty as an Officer Selection Officer in Oklahoma City. He has served as a staff officer in the Programs and Budgeting Section, Manpower Plans and Policy Division, HQMC and in the G-3 section, Fleet Marine Force Europe (Designate), London, England. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger School, the Amphibious Warfare School, the Defense Language Institute, the Spanish Naval War College, and the U.S. Army War College.

Michael F. Applegate
Director, Manpower Plans and Policies Division

Mr. Applegate graduated from Toms River North High School in 1972, received a B.A. in History from Baldwin Wallace College, Berea, Ohio in 1976, and a Masters Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies as a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College in 1992. He retired from the Marine Corps as a Colonel and assumed his current position as the Director, Manpower Plans and Policy Division in November 2005.

He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant and attended The Basic School in July 1976, and then served as a Platoon Commander and Company Executive Officer in Company A, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, 2d Marine Division, from February 1977 through March 1980. During this tour he also attended and was the honor graduate of the Assault Amphibian Vehicle Officer Course. He was next assigned to the G-5 in 3d Marine Division in April 1980.

In April 1981, Mr. Applegate was reassigned to 2d Marine Division, and was the Company Commander, H&S Company, and then Bravo Company, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion. In 1983 he served in M&RA, HQMC, as an enlisted monitor in MMEA, and in 1986 was assigned to Quantico as a Mechanized Infantry, Tank, and Light Armored Vehicle Instructor at Supporting Arms Instruction Division, MCCDC.

From August 1989 to July 1992, Mr. Applegate served as the Company Commander, Company D, 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Marine Air Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, California. He deployed to Saudi Arabia and participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm with 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Task Force RIPPER.

After attending the U.S. Navy Command and Staff College in Newport, Rhode Island, he served as the 2d Marine Division G-4A, and then as the Commanding Officer, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, from July 1993 to July 1995, and then attended the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Mr. Applegate served in US Central Command as the Africa, Jordan and Pakistan Branch Head, Exercise Division, J-3, from July 1996 to August 1998. He was then reassigned to Washington, DC and served as the Executive Assistant, N-85, OPNAV Staff, from August 1998 until December 1999.

In December 1999, Mr. Applegate was assigned as the Commanding Officer, Security Battalion, MCB, Quantico until May 2001. Mr. Applegate was assigned to M&RA, HQMC where he served as the MPP Branch Head, MP Division from May 2001 to November 2005.

Mr. Applegate's personal decorations include the Legion of Merit with Gold Star, Bronze Star with Combat "V," Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Navy & Marine Corps Commendation Medal with Gold Star, Navy & Marine Corps Achievement Medal with Gold Star, and the Combat Action Ribbon.

I. Introduction

Chairman Snyder, Congressman McHugh, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Marine Corps Force Requirements Determination process. As a Corps, we remain true to our congressionally-mandated mission "to be most ready when the Nation is least ready;" thus providing the Nation a two-fisted capability—adept at counterinsurgency as well as major contingency force operations. On behalf of all Marines, we thank the Committee for your continued support and commitment to the health of your Marine Corps. Your support has made us more effective in the fight, saved lives, and helped us prepare for an uncertain future.

II. Right-size our Corps

Our Commandant has articulated the importance of being able to adapt to broad strategic conditions and wide-ranging threats. To meet the demands of the Long War and remain prepared for the inevitable contingencies that will arise, our Corps must be sufficiently manned, effectively trained, and properly equipped. Like the Cold War, the Long War is a continuing struggle that will not be measured by the number of near-term deployments or rotations. The Corps' personnel policies, organizational construct, and training must be correctly sized and resourced for three main reasons. First, to alleviate strain on the individual by ensuring our structure supports adequate homestation dwell time for our Marines. Second, to alleviate strain on units by allowing adequate time for training and maintenance. And third, to ensure Marine Air Ground Task Forces are prepared to support Combatant Commanders' efforts to fight both irregular and conventional future threats.

A. Strain on our Individual Marines

Despite an unparalleled Personnel Tempo, the morale of our Marines and their families remains high. However, the Marine Corps is concerned about the impact of a continued high tempo, and the associated stress, on our individual Marines. To avoid an adverse toll on our Marines and their families, and to prevent a decrease in readiness, we established a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio goal for all Active Component forces. The goal is for every seven

months a Marine is deployed, he or she will be back at home station for fourteen months—providing needed rest, family time, and the opportunity to train for an assortment of missions.

B. Strain on the Institution

Current wartime deployments dictate a singular focus to prepare units for their next rotations and the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. This focus and the current 1:1 deployment-to-dwell ratio of many units threatens the individual / unit skills needed for Marine Corps missions such as combined-arms maneuver, mountain warfare, amphibious, and jungle operations. To fulfill our mandate as the Nation's Force in Readiness, our deployment cycles must not only support training for irregular warfare, but also provide sufficient time for recovery and maintenance as well as for training for other contingency missions. By increasing the dwell time for our units, we can accomplish the more comprehensive training needed for the sophisticated skill sets that have enabled Marine Air Ground Task Forces to consistently achieve success in all types of battle. Our goal is to increase dwell time and achieve a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio for our active forces.

III. Force Requirements Determination

A. Methodology

The Marine Corps uses the Total Force Structure Process (TFSP) to transform strategic guidance, policy constraints, and commander-generated recommendations into the integrated capabilities required to execute Marine Corps missions. The TFSP relies on a detailed, integrated examination of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF), ensuring that no aspect of the enterprise is ignored when new requirements for the Corps are identified—either from the top-down or from the bottom-up. Figure (1) is a pictorial representation of the process:



Figure (1)

Strategic, or top-down, guidance is introduced to the process through in-depth analysis of documents such as the current National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, Joint vision, and Commandant of the Marine Corps guidance. A functional area analysis of this guidance produces tasks, conditions, and standards that must be met for the Marine Corps to successfully accomplish its missions in support of national security. The next step in the TFSP is a functional needs analysis, identifying the gaps created when tasks, conditions, and standards are not satisfied by existing Marine Corps force structure. After we identify these gaps, subject matter experts, representing a cross-section of the Marine Air Ground Task Force, analyze the DOTMLPF implications of the gaps and recommend possible non-materiel or materiel solutions to fill the identified gaps.

If a functional gap can be satisfied by addition or deletion of force structure, we examine that force structure requirement through the DOTMLPF process. Authorized endstrength, modeled against the new structural requirement, provides leadership a picture of the human resource cost of the initiative. This proposal is then presented, against other competing priorities, to the Commandant's Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MROC). It is the responsibility of this body of leadership to either accept the risks of manning the force structure at current

levels, make internal Marine Corps priority adjustments to satisfy the requirement, or to ask for more resources.

Similarly, operational commanders are encouraged to influence the Corps' force structure requirements determination process. Commanders provide the bottom-up input to the Commandant based on their constant assessment of operational and supporting establishment units. Our commanders' recommended changes come in two forms—compensated and uncompensated. The former is a recommendation for which the commander offers up force structure compensation from his own unit, or another unit, to support his new requirement. The latter is a recommendation for which the Commandant, through the MROC, decides if the change in manning levels due to the uncompensated growth is acceptable. Compensated and uncompensated organizational change requests flow upwards through the chain of command to the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration where DOTMLPF analysis is conducted prior to decisions being made by the senior leadership of the Corps. The balance between strategic changes to force structure, the needs of Marines in combat, and policy constraints produce the Corps integrated capabilities captured in its table of organization and equipment. This product becomes the basis for all resource decisions.

While this process may appear linear, we never hesitate to look at ourselves in the mirror "mid-stream" and ensure that our organizational construct is in tune with strategic direction. Changing circumstances, new administrations, new Combatant Commanders, combined with the changing face of our enemy, requires that we have a capability to inject changes into this process easily. Recent history provides two examples of this. The 2004 Force Structure Review Group (FSRG) used endstrength cap as its policy constraint to shape the Marine Corps to meet the higher operational tempo that accompanied Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The 2006 Capabilities Assessment Group (CAG) still utilized endstrength as its constraint, but looked beyond the Long War and made recommendations to the Commandant about future force constructs to defend this nation in a rapidly changing global environment. Both the FSRG and the CAG brought together a cross-section of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, outside the normal "cycle," to look through the DOTMLPF lens at the operational needs of our Corps. Both contributed ideas that are in implementation today. This flexibility has been, and continues to be, the hallmark of America's force in readiness.

The TFSP has been key to the Commandant in determining the Corps' evolving force requirements and in articulating to the President the most recent endstrength increase request. As is the hallmark of the TFSP, the product of this most recent analysis was a fusion of top-down guidance and bottom-up recommendations. Strategic guidance from the administration was combined with operational requirements from the Combatant Commanders and guided by the Department of Defense's 1:2 unit deployment-to-dwell ratio policy. For example, guidance contained in the National Defense Strategy and the 2005 Quadrenial Defense Report emphasized the nation's defense is now subject to a broader range of emerging threats. This top-down guidance requires the Marine Corps to ensure it is fully prepared to support the Combatant Commanders in preventing and responding to future challenges in the Long War and other emerging threats. In addition to the Defense Department's guidance to maintain a 1:2 unit deployment-to-dwell ratio policy, Marine commanders have indicated their concern with the stress being placed on individuals and units by the current fight. Moreover, the Commandant recognized that the demands of the current fight preclude commanders from training in core competencies that will prepare Marines to meet the future demands of the Long War and unique challenges of irregular warfare. Accordingly, we have utilized the TFSP, with its reliance on DOTMLPF integration and assessment, to determine Marine Corps force requirements for balancing the need to improve the 1:2 dwell-deployment ratio with our need to train in our core competencies to ensure we are ready to meet the challenges of the future. It is this process that leads us to determine that a Marine Corps of 202,000 Marines is right for the nation and to ensure success in the war on terror.

B. Process Output

Figure (2) shows how we will apply the proposed endstrength increase fixing those units most stressed by a high deployment tempo, and how this application will increase the 'tooth' of the Marine Corps by placing more capacity in the Operating forces. We are planning to allocate relief across the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, since our habitually high-operational tempo units do not reside exclusively within the Ground Combat Element. Note also that the Supporting Establishment has not been ignored, with increases being applied primarily to our recruiting and training commands.



Figure (2)

C. Training

Marine training is built along a continuum that is well defined, well structured, and of which we are extremely proud. During 2005, the Marine Corps established the Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP) to train Marine Air Ground Task Forces bound for Iraq and Afghanistan. The Training and Education Continuum for Marines deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan begins with entry level training, ascends through formal schools, home station training, Professional Military Education, and culminates with a final unit PTP exercise / assessment such as Mojave Viper, Desert Talon, or Mountain Warrior. This ascending-levels-of-competency approach is fully integrated with the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System to ensure a rapid infusion of emerging tactics, techniques and procedures and ensures Marines of all ranks are trained to standard on the right tasks, at the right level, at the right time, and the right place.

More and more we are going to need to out-think our enemies, and find our advantages and victories in the human factors. This intimate killing ground where the enemy has chosen to

fight his wars -- among the people -- requires tactical cunning and intangible factors, to include cultural and language skills, plus brilliance in the basics of small unit soldiering.

The Marine Corps will maintain these high standards for training as we grow in endstrength. To ensure our ability to meet these demanding standards, we have identified a requirement for over 1200 additional Marines in the training establishment as part of our endstrength increase. These additional trainers, along with physical improvements to some of our training facilities, will ensure we meet the increased training requirement associated with growing the Marine Corps without lowering our standards.

D. Materiel and Facilities

1. Equipment

In order to best equip proposed endstrength increases, the Marine Corps has a phased approach across Fiscal Year 2008-11 that is synchronized with increases in personnel. We have conducted the necessary analysis in order to procure high demand and long lead time items early in the process. While the vast majority of required equipment will be the procurement of additional existing weapon systems, when it makes sense, we will procure next generation equipment to keep pace with technological improvements.

2. Facilities

Recent decisions to stand up MARSOC, reinvest in aging infrastructure, and realign structure to better support the operating forces have maximized the use of existing facility capacity at our bases and stations. We have worked through a number of challenges to provide the necessary facilities for a 202,000 force structure. Based upon the composition of the additional units, we first determined the bed down locations and rate at which we would phase in this manpower. Using these results, we generated standard planning estimates for the types and sizes of additional facilities needed to support these forces, estimating timelines for completing necessary environmental documentation, planning, design and construction to develop budget requirements. Finally, given the expectation that in many locations Marines will arrive before final construction is complete, we planned for and defined resources to provide interim support facilities via lease/rental/purchase of temporary facilities. Because of this rapid, but rigorous planning process, we have developed a plan and budget that will ensure adequate facilities are available to support the phase-in and Final Operating Capability of a 202,000 Marine Corps.

E. Personnel

1. Recruiting

An important factor in sustaining a viable force is continuing to recruit qualified young men and women with the right character, commitment, and drive to become Marines. With over 70 percent of the proposed Marine Corps end strength increase comprised of first-term Marines, recruiting efforts will be challenging. A major part of this effort will involve increased funding for the Enlistment Bonus Programs and advertising. We will need the strong support of Congress to achieve continued success.

While maintaining Department of Defense quality standards, we continue to recruit the best of America into our ranks—in Fiscal Year 2006, the Marine Corps achieved over 100 percent of our Active Component accession goal. The Marine Corps Reserve also achieved 100 percent of its recruiting goals, but reserve officer numbers remain challenging because our primary accession source is from officers who leave active duty. We appreciate the continued authorization for a Selected Reserve Officer Affiliation Bonus in the Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act—it continues to contribute in this critical area.

We forecast that both active and reserve recruiting will remain challenging in Fiscal Year 2007, particularly when viewed through the lens of new accession missions to meet the increased end strength of the Marine Corps. We appreciate the continued support of Congress for strong enlistment bonuses and other recruiting programs, such as advertising, which are essential for us to continue meeting these growth challenges.

2. Retention

Retention is the other important part of building and sustaining your Marine Corps. I am pleased to report that in Fiscal Year 2006, the Marine Corps achieved 101.9% of its First Term retention goal and an impressive 115.8% for the Career Force. We achieved both goals in June 2006, three months before the end of the fiscal year.

For Fiscal Year 2007, we expect to exceed our retention goals again. Our continuing success can be largely attributed to two important enduring themes: Marines want to stay Marines because of the superb leadership in our officer and staff noncommissioned officer ranks, and Marines desire to remain part of a 'band of brothers.' In addition, the Marine Corps makes wise use of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), funding for which Congress provides us.

3. Reserve Component End Strength

Our efforts in the Long War have been a Total Force effort, with our Reserves once again performing with grit and determination. Recent policy changes within the Department of Defense will allow us to access the Reserve forces as they were structured to be employed—to augment and reinforce our Active Component forces. To this end, our goal is to sustain a 1:5 deployment-to-dwell ratio within our Reserve Component. Our Reserve Component end strength of 39,600 is under review to ensure that the right capabilities continue to reside within the Marine Forces Reserve units and the Individual Mobilization Augmentee program. As our active force increases in size, the reduced reliance on our reserve forces should allow us even more "buffer" as we work to maintain the proper deployment-to-dwell ratio for our Reserves.

IV. Conclusion

Thank you for the opportunity to report to you on behalf of the valiant men and women of your Corps. They remain committed to their mission and know that the American people and its government support them in their endeavor. Your Corps stands ready to serve in any clime and place, but your continued support remains a vital and appreciated foundation to this Service.

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST
Tuesday, January 30, 2007

MILITARY PERSONNEL

DOD Needs to Provide a Better Link between Its Defense Strategy and Military Personnel Requirements

Statement of Janet A. St. Laurent, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management



GAO-07-397T

January 30, 2007

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Highlights

Highlights of GAO-07-397T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

MILITARY PERSONNEL

DOD Needs to Provide a Better Link between Its Defense Strategy and Military Personnel Requirements

Why GAO Did This Study

The war in Iraq along with other overseas operations have led to significant stress on U.S. ground forces and raised questions about whether those forces are appropriately sized and structured. In 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) agreed with GAO's recommendation that it review military personnel requirements. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) concluded in its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that the number of active personnel in the Army and Marine Corps should not change. However, the Secretary of Defense recently announced plans to increase these services' active end strength by 92,000 troops. Given the long-term costs associated with this increase, it is important that Congress understand how DOD determines military personnel requirements and the extent of its analysis.

GAO has issued a number of reports on DOD's force structure and the impact of ongoing operations on military personnel, equipment, training, and related funding. This statement, which draws on that prior work, focuses on (1) the processes and analyses OSD and the services use to assess force structure and military personnel levels; (2) the extent to which the services' requirements analyses reflect new demands as a result of the changed security environment; and (3) the extent of information DOD has provided to Congress to support requests for military personnel.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-397T.

To view the full product, click on the link above. For more information, contact Janet A. St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found

Both OSD and the military services play key roles in determining force structure and military personnel requirements and rely on a number of complex and interrelated analyses. Decisions reached by OSD during the QDR and the budget process about planning scenarios, required combat forces, and military personnel levels set the parameters within which the services can determine their own requirements for units and allocate military positions. Using OSD guidance and scenarios, the Army's most recent biennial analysis, completed in 2006, indicated that the Army's total requirements and available end strength were about equal. The Marine Corps' most recent assessment led to an adjustment in the composition and mix of its units.

Both the Army and Marine Corps are coping with additional demands that may not have been fully reflected in OSD guidance, the QDR, or in recent service analyses. First, the Army's analysis did not fully consider the impact of converting from a division-based force to modular units, partly because modular units are a new concept and partly because the Army made some optimistic assumptions about its ability to achieve efficiencies and staff modular units within the QDR-directed active military personnel level of 482,400. Second, the Army's analysis assumed that the Army would be able to provide 18 to 19 brigades at any one time to support worldwide operations. However, the Army's global operational demand for forces is currently 23 brigades and Army officials believe this demand will continue for the foreseeable future. The Marine Corps' analyses reflected some new missions resulting from the new security environment. However, the Commandant initiated a new study following the 2006 QDR partly to assess the impact of requirements for a Special Operation Command.

Prior GAO work has shown that DOD has not provided a clear and transparent basis for military personnel requests that demonstrates how they are linked to the defense strategy. GAO believes it will become increasingly important to demonstrate a clear linkage as Congress confronts looming fiscal challenges facing the nation and DOD attempts to balance competing priorities for resources. In evaluating DOD's proposal to permanently increase active Army and Marine Corps personnel levels by 92,000 over the next 5 years, Congress should carefully weigh the long-term costs and benefits. To help illuminate the basis for its request, DOD will need to provide answers to the following questions: What analysis has been done to demonstrate how the proposed increases are linked to the defense strategy? How will the additional personnel be allocated to combat units, support forces, and institutional personnel, for functions such as training and acquisition? What are the initial and long-term costs to increase the size of the force and how does DOD plan to fund this increase? Do the services have detailed implementation plans to manage potential challenges such as recruiting additional personnel, providing facilities, and procuring new equipment?

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD) processes for determining force structure and military personnel requirements for the Army and Marine Corps. The war in Iraq, along with continuing operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world, have led to significant stress on U.S. ground forces and have raised questions about whether they are appropriately sized and structured to meet the demands of the new security environment. Units are being tasked to stay in theater longer than anticipated, and some personnel are now embarking on their third overseas deployment since 2001. Although the department's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) concluded that the Army and Marine Corps should plan to stabilize at a level of 482,400 and 175,000 active military personnel respectively, the Secretary of Defense recently announced plans to permanently increase the size of the active Army and Marine Corps by a total of 92,000 troops over the next 5 years. Given the significant long- term costs associated with such an increase, it is important to understand how DOD determines military personnel requirements and the extent to which requirements are based on rigorous analysis. As our prior work has shown, valid and reliable data about the number of personnel required to meet an agency's needs are critical because human capital shortfalls can threaten an organization's ability to perform missions efficiently and effectively. This is particularly true for the DOD, where the lack of rigorous analysis of requirements could have significant consequences for military personnel called upon to execute military missions or, alternatively, could lead to inefficiencies in allocating funds within the defense budget.

My testimony today will focus on three issues: (1) the processes and analyses used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Army and Marine Corps to assess force structure and military personnel levels; (2) the extent to which the services' recently completed requirements analyses reflect new demands resulting from the changed security environment; and (3) the extent of information provided to Congress to support the department's requests for military personnel. In light of the recent proposal to permanently increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps, my comments will focus largely on requirements for active personnel, although the service requirements process I will be discussing apply to both the active and reserve components, and our prior work has shown that ongoing operations have taken a toll on the reserve components as well. A congressionally-mandated commission has been tasked to conduct a comprehensive examination of how the National

Guard and Reserve are used in national defense. This commission's work is still ongoing.

My testimony today is based primarily on our past work on Army and Marine Corps force structure and military personnel issues as well as our work on human capital and military personnel issues defensewide. A list of our past reports can be found in the Related GAO Products section at the end of this statement. We updated some of our information during recent discussions with Army and Marine Corps officials. To obtain these updates we interviewed officials and obtained documents from Headquarters, Department of the Army; the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis; Headquarters Marine Corps, Manpower and Reserve Affairs; and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. To assess the processes and analyses used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army and Marine Corps to assess force structure and military personnel levels, we relied on our past reports on these subjects, as well as updated information from Total Army Analysis 08-13 and Marine Corps force structure plans from the sources noted. To assess the extent to which the services' recently completed requirements analyses reflect new demands resulting from the changed security environment, we relied on our past work, DOD's February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report, the Secretary of Defense's congressional testimony announcing his proposal to increase Army and Marine Corps force levels, and Total Army Analysis 08-13 and Marine Corps force structure plans. To assess the extent of information provided to Congress to support the department's requests for military personnel, we relied on our past reporting on human capital and end strength issues.

Summary

Both OSD and the military services play key roles in determining force structure and military personnel requirements and rely on a number of complex and interrelated processes and analyses—rather than one clearly documented process. Decisions reached by OSD in the QDR, and in budget and planning guidance, often set the parameters within which the services can determine their own force structure requirements and allocate military personnel to meet operational and institutional needs. For example, the 2006 QDR determined that the Army would have 42 active combat brigades and 482,400 active military personnel, and these numbers are a "given" in the Army's biennial force structure analysis. A major purpose of the Army's biennial analysis is to determine the number and types of support forces, such as transportation companies and military police units, to support combat forces. Also, if total support force requirements exceed available military personnel levels approved by OSD, the process helps the

Army determine where to accept risk. The Army's most recent biennial force structure analysis indicated that its total requirements and available military personnel levels (for all components) were about equal, although the Army decided to reallocate many positions to create more high-demand units, such as military police, and reduce numbers of lesser needed units. Similarly, the Marine Corps uses a number of modeling, simulation, and other analytical tools to identify gaps in its capabilities to perform its missions, to identify the personnel and skills needed to provide the capabilities using professional judgment, and to assess where to accept risk. The Marine Corps has also made changes to the composition and mix of its units as a result of its analyses.

Both the Army and Marine Corps are coping with additional demands that may not have been fully reflected in the 2006 QDR or in recent service analyses that were based on OSD guidance. These analyses predate the Secretary of Defense's recent announcement to increase Army and Marine Corps forces by 92,000. However, some of this work, and our own assessments, are only months old and should provide a useful baseline for helping the committee understand what has changed since the 2006 QDR and service analyses were completed. First, the Army's most recent analysis did not fully consider the impact of converting from a division-based force to modular brigades. The Army's recent analysis recognized that modular units would require greater numbers of combat forces than its prior division-based force and assumed this could be accomplished by reducing military positions in the Army's institutional forces, such as its command headquarters and training base, rather than increasing the size of the active force. In September 2006, we questioned whether the Army could reduce sufficient numbers of military positions in the institutional force and meet all of its modular force requirements with the QDR-directed active end strength of 482,400. Second, the Army's analysis assumed that the Army would be able to provide 18 to 19 brigades at any one time (including 14 active and 4 to 5 National Guard brigades) to support worldwide operations. However, the Army's global operational demand for forces is currently 23 brigades and Army officials believe this demand will continue for the foreseeable future. The Marine Corps is also supporting a high pace of operations that may not have been fully reflected in its recent analyses. For example, the 2006 QDR directed the Marine Corps to stand up a Special Operations Command requiring about 2,600 military personnel, but did not increase the size of the Marine Corps to reflect this new requirement. The Marines also are experiencing a higher operational tempo than anticipated and standing up specialized units to train Iraqi forces, which may not have been fully envisioned in their earlier analyses.

Our past work has also shown that DOD has not provided a clear and transparent basis for its military personnel requests to Congress that demonstrates how these requests are linked to the defense strategy. We believe that it will become increasingly important to demonstrate a clear linkage as Congress confronts looming fiscal challenges facing the nation and DOD attempts to balance competing priorities for resources in personnel, operations, and investments accounts. DOD's February QDR 2006 report did not provide much insight into the basis for its conclusion that the size of today's forces is appropriate to meet current and projected operational demands. Further, the Marine Corps' decision to initiate a new study to assess its active military requirements shortly after the QDR report was issued is an indication that the QDR did not achieve consensus on required military personnel levels. In evaluating DOD's proposal to permanently increase active Army and Marine Corps personnel levels by 92,000 over the next 5 years, Congress should carefully weigh the long-term costs and benefits. While the Army and Marine Corps are currently experiencing a high operating tempo, increasing personnel levels will entail billions of dollars for both start-up and recurring costs, not just for the personnel added to the force, but for related equipment and training. Given the significant implications of this request, DOD should be prepared to fully explain and document the basis for the proposed increases and how the additional positions will be used. To help illuminate the basis for DOD's request, Congress may wish to consider requiring DOD to answer the following questions: What analysis has been done to demonstrate how the proposed increases are linked to the defense strategy? How will the additional personnel be allocated to combat units, support forces, and institutional personnel, for functions such as training and acquisition? What are the initial and long-term costs to increase the size of the force and how does DOD plan to fund this increase? Do the services have detailed implementation plans to manage potential challenges, such as recruiting additional personnel, providing facilities, and procuring new equipment? Our prior work on recruiting and retention challenges, along with our prior reports on challenges in equipping modular units, identify some potential challenges that could arise in implementing an increase in the size of the Army and Marine Corps at a time when the services are supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Background

The 2005 National Defense Strategy provided the strategic foundation for the 2006 QDR and identified an array of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges that threaten U.S. interests. To operationalize the defense strategy, the 2006 QDR identified four priority areas for further examination: defeating terrorist networks, defending the homeland,

shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing hostile state and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. These areas illustrated the types of capabilities and forces needed to address the challenges identified in the defense strategy and helped DOD to assess that strategy and review its force planning construct. Changes in the security environment and the force planning construct may require DOD and the services to reassess force structure requirements—how many units and of what type are needed to carry out the national defense strategy. Likewise, changing force structure requirements may create a need to reassess active end strength—the number of military personnel annually authorized by Congress which each service can have at the end of a given fiscal year.

The services allocate their congressionally authorized end strength among operational force requirements (e.g., combat and support force units), institutional requirements, and requirements for personnel who are temporarily unavailable for assignment. Operational forces are the forces the services provide to combatant commanders to meet mission requirements, such as ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Institutional forces include command headquarters, doctrine writers, and a cadre of acquisition personnel, which are needed to prepare forces for combat operations. Personnel who are temporarily unavailable for assignment include transients, transfers, holdees, and students.

The Secretary of Defense's recent proposal to permanently increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps represents a significant shift in DOD's plans, as reflected in the 2006 QDR. In fiscal year 2004, the Army's authorized end strength was 482,400 active military personnel. Since that time, the Army has been granted authority to increase its end strength by 30,000 in order to provide flexibility to implement its transformation to a modular force while continuing to deploy forces to overseas operations. Rather than return the Army to the 482,400 level by fiscal year 2011, as decided in the 2006 QDR, DOD's new proposal would increase the Army's permanent end strength level to 547,000 over a period of 5 years. DOD's plans for Marine Corps end strength have also changed. In fiscal year 2004, the Marine Corps' was authorized to have 175,000 active military personnel. For the current fiscal year, Marine Corps end strength was authorized at 180,000, although DOD's 2006 QDR planned to stabilize the Marine Corps at the 175,000 level by fiscal year 2011. The Secretary's new proposal would increase permanent Marine Corps end strength to a level of 202,000 over the next 5 years. In terms of funding, DOD is currently authorized to pay for end strength above 482,400 and 175,000 for the Army and Marine Corps, respectively, with emergency contingency reserve

funds or from supplemental funds used to finance operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Until Congress receives the President's budget request, it is unclear how DOD plans to fund the proposed increases.

In 2004, the Army began its modular force transformation to restructure itself from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force—an undertaking it considers the most extensive reorganization of its force since World War II. This initiative, according to Army estimates, will require an investment exceeding $52 billion through fiscal year 2011. The foundation of the modular force is the creation of standardized modular combat brigades in both the active component and National Guard. The new modular brigades are designed to be self-sufficient units that are more rapidly deployable and better able to conduct joint and expeditionary operations than their larger division-based predecessors. The Army planned to achieve its modular restructuring without permanently increasing its active component end strength above 482,400, in accordance with a decision reached during the 2006 QDR. The February 2006 QDR also specified that the Army would create 70 active modular combat brigades in its active component and National Guard.

According to the Army, the modular force will enable it to generate both active and reserve component forces in a rotational manner. To do this, the Army is developing plans for a force rotation model in which units will rotate through a structured progression of increased unit readiness over time. For example, the Army's plan is for active service members to be at home for 2 years following each deployment of up to 1 year.

Determination of Force Structure and Military Personnel Requirements Is A Complex Process Involving Both OSD And The Services

Both OSD and the military services play key roles in determining force structure and military personnel requirements and rely on a number of complex and interrelated process and analyses—rather than on one clearly documented process. Decisions made by OSD can have a ripple effect on the analyses that are conducted at the service level, as I will explain later.

OSD is responsible for the QDR—the official strategic plan of DOD—and provides policy and budget guidance to the services on the number of active personnel. The QDR determines the size of each services' operational combat forces based on an analysis of the forces needed to meet the requirements of the National Defense Strategy. For example, the 2006 QDR specified the Army's operational force structure would include 42 active Brigade Combat Teams and that the Army should plan for an active force totaling 482,400 personnel by fiscal year 2011. The QDR also

directed the Marine Corps to add a Special Operations Command and plan for an active force totaling 175,000 military personnel by fiscal year 2011.

In order to provide a military perspective on the decisions reached in the QDR, Congress required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct an assessment of the review including an assessment of risk. In his assessment of the 2006 QDR, the Chairman concluded that the Armed Forces of the United States stood "fully capable of accomplishing all the objectives of the National Defense Strategy." In his risk assessment, he noted that the review had carefully balanced those areas where risk might best be taken in order to provide the needed resources for areas requiring new or additional investment.

Another area where the Office of the Secretary of Defense plays an important role is in developing various planning scenarios that describe the type of missions the services may face in the future. These scenarios are included in planning guidance that the Office of the Secretary of Defense provides the services to assist them in making more specific decisions on how to allocate their resources to accomplish the national defense strategy. For example, these scenarios would include major combat operations, stability operations, domestic support operations, and humanitarian assistance operations.

GAO examined whether DOD had established a solid foundation for determining military personnel requirements. While we are currently reviewing the plans and analyses of the 2006 QDR, our February 2005 assessment of DOD's processes identified several concerns that, if left uncorrected, could have hampered DOD's QDR analysis.[1] First, we found that DOD had not conducted a comprehensive, data-driven analysis to assess the number of active personnel needed to implement the defense strategy. Second, OSD does not specifically review the services' requirements processes to ensure that decisions about personnel levels are linked to the defense strategy. Last, a key reason why OSD had not conducted a comprehensive analysis was that it has sought to limit personnel costs to fund competing priorities such as transformation.

[1] GAO, *Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Conduct a Data-Driven Analysis of Active Military Personnel Levels Required to Implement the Defense Strategy*, GAO-05-200 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005).

The Army Has a Biennial Process to Assess Force Structure and Allocate Military Personnel Positions to Units

The Army uses a biennial, scenario-based requirements process to estimate the number and types of operational and institutional forces needed to execute Army missions. This process involves first determining the number and type of forces needed to execute the National Military Strategy based on OSD guidance, comparing this requirement with the Army's present force structure, and finally reallocating military positions to minimize the risks associated with any identified shortfalls. Taken together, this process is known as "Total Army Analysis." The Army has conducted this analysis for many years and has a good track record for updating and improving its modeling, assumptions, and related processes over time, as we noted in our last detailed analysis of the Army's process.[2] Active and reserve forces are included in this analysis in order to provide a total look at Army requirements and the total end strength available to resource those requirements. Also, the number of combat brigades is specified by OSD in the QDR and is essentially a "given" in the Army's requirements process. The Army's process is primarily intended to assess the support force structure needed to meet the requirements of the planning scenarios, and to provide senior leadership a basis for better balancing the force.

In the first phase of the Army's requirements determination process, the Army uses several models, such as a model to simulate warfights using the scenarios provided by OSD and the number of brigades OSD plans to use in each scenario. The outcomes of the warfighting analyses are used in further modeling to generate the number and specific types of units the Army would need to support its brigade combat teams. For example, for a prolonged major war, the Army needs more truck companies to deliver supplies and fuel to front line units. For other types of contingencies, the Army may use historical experience for similar operations to determine requirements since models are not available for all contingencies. The Army also examines requirements for the Army's institutional force, such as the Army's training base, in order to obtain a total bottom line requirement for all the Army's missions.

In the second phase of the Army's process—known as the "resourcing phase"— the Army makes decisions on how to best allocate the active and reserve military personnel levels established by OSD against these requirements. In order to provide the best match, the Army will develop a

[2] GAO, *Force Structure: Projected Requirements for Some Army Forces Not Well Established*, GAO-01-485 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2001).

detailed plan to eliminate lower priority units, and stand up new units it believes are essential to address capability gaps and meet future mission needs. For example, in recent years, the Army has made an effort to increase units needed for military police, civil affairs, engineers, and special operations forces. These decisions are implemented over the multiple years contained in DOD's Future Years Defense Program. For example, the intent of the Army's most recent analysis was used to help develop the Army's budget plans for fiscal years 2008–2013.

Historically, the Army has had some mismatches between the requirements it estimated and its available military personnel levels. When shortfalls exist, the Army has chosen to fully resource its active combat brigades and accept risk among it support units, many of which are in the reserve component.

The Marine Corps Conducts a Variety of Analyses to Assess Force Structure and Military Personnel Requirements

The Marine Corps uses a number of modeling, simulations, spreadsheet analyses, and other analytical tools to periodically identify gaps in its capabilities to perform its missions, and identify the personnel and skills needed to provide the capabilities based largely on the professional judgment of manpower experts and subject-matter experts. The results are summarized in a manpower document, updated as needed, which is used to allocate positions and personnel to meet mission priorities. This document is an assessment of what core capabilities can and cannot be supported within the authorized end strength, which may fall short of the needed actual personnel requirements. For example, in 2005, we reported that the Marine Corps analysis for fiscal year 2004 indicated that to execute its assigned missions, the Corps would need about 9,600 more personnel than it had on hand. At the time of this analysis, OSD fiscal guidance directed the Marine Corps to plan for an end strength of 175,000 in the service's budget submission.

New Demands on Services Have Not Been Fully Reflected In Recent Requirements Analyses

Both the Army and Marine Corps are coping with additional demands that may not have been fully reflected in the QDR or their own service requirements analyses, which have been based on OSD guidance. While the Army's most recent analysis, completed in 2006, concluded that Army requirements were about equal to available forces for all three components, this analysis did not fully reflect the effects of establishing modular brigades—the most significant restructuring of the Army's operational force structure since World War II. In addition, OSD-directed planning scenarios used by the Army in its analysis to help assess rotational demands on the force may not have reflected real-world

conditions such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the requirements phase of the Army's analysis, completed in the mid-2005 time frame, may have been based on the best information available at the time, the Army's transformation concepts have continued to evolve and the mismatch between the planning scenarios and actual operations are now more apparent. The Marine Corps is also undergoing a high pace of operations, as well as QDR-directed changes in force structure. This has caused the Marine Corps to initiate a new post-QDR analysis of its force structure requirements.

The service analyses I am about to discuss all preceded the Secretary of Defense's announcement of his intention to increase Army and Marine Corps end strength by 92,000. However, some of GAO's reporting on these plans is only months old and should provide a baseline to help the committee understand what has changed since the 2006 QDR and service analyses were completed.

Army's Most Recent Biennial Analysis Did Not Fully Consider Requirements for Modular Units and Force Rotation Demands

The Army's most recent requirements analysis, which examined force structure and military personnel needs for fiscal years 2008 through 2013, considered some of the Army's new transformation concepts, such as the Army's conversion to a modular force. However, the Army did not consider the full impact of this transformation in its analysis, in part because these initiatives were relatively new at the time the analysis was conducted. The Army's recent analysis recognized that modular units would require greater numbers of combat forces than its prior division-based force and assumed this could be accomplished by reducing military positions in the Army's institutional forces, such as its command headquarters and training base, rather than increasing the size of the active force. However, in our September 2006 report discussing the Army's progress in converting to a modular force, we questioned whether the Army could meet all of its modular force requirements with a QDR-directed, active component end strength of 482,400.[3] Under its new modular force, the Army will have 42 active brigades compared with 33 brigades in its division-based force. In total, these brigades will require more military personnel than the Army's prior division-based combat units. Therefore, as figure 1 illustrates, the Army planned to increase its

[3] GAO, *Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans*, GAO-06-745 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).

active component operational force—that is, its combat forces—from 315,000 to 355,000 personnel to fully staff 42 active modular brigade combat teams. To accomplish this with an active end strength level of 482,400, the Army had hoped to substantially reduce the size of its active component institutional force—that is, its training base, acquisition workforce, and major command headquarters—from 102,000 to 75,000 military personnel. The Army also planned to reduce the number of active Army personnel in a temporary status at any given time, known as transients, transfers, holdees, and students, or TTHS. In fiscal year 2000, this portion of the force consisted of 63,000 active military personnel and the Army planned to reduce its size to 52,400.

Figure 1: A Comparison of Active Army End Strength Allocations before and after the Modular Force Conversion



Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

While the Army has several initiatives under way to reduce active military personnel in its institutional force, our report questioned whether those initiatives could be fully achieved as planned. The Army had made some progress in converting some military positions to civilian positions, but Army officials believed additional conversions to achieve planned reductions in the noncombat force would be significantly more challenging to achieve and could lead to difficult trade-offs. In addition, cutting the institutional force at a time when the Army is fully engaged in training forces for overseas operations may entail additional risk not fully

anticipated at the time the initiatives were proposed. Last, we noted that the Army is still assessing its modular unit concepts based on lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and other analyses led by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, and the impact on force structure requirements may not yet be fully known.

We should note that, at the time of our report, the Army did not agree with our assessment of its personnel initiatives. In written comments on a draft of our report, the Army disagreed with our analysis of the challenges it faced in implementing its initiatives to increase the size of the operational force within existing end strength, noting that GAO focused inappropriate attention on these challenges. The Army only partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a report on the status of its personnel initiatives, including executable milestones for realigning and reducing its noncombat forces. The Army stated that this action was already occurring on a regular basis and another report on this issue would be duplicative and irrelevant. However, the reports the Army cited in its response were internal to the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The comments did not address the oversight needs of Congress. We stated in our report that we believe that it is important for the Secretary of Defense and Congress to have a clear and transparent picture of the personnel challenges the Army faces in order to fully achieve the goals of modular restructuring and make informed decisions on resources and authorized end strength.

Another factor to consider is that the Army's most recent requirements analysis was linked to planning scenarios directed by OSD and did not fully reflect current operational demands for Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army's analysis assumed that the Army would be able to provide 18 to 19 brigades at any one time (including 14 active and 4 to 5 National Guard brigades) to support worldwide operations. However, the Army's global operational demand for forces is currently 23 brigades and Army officials believe this demand will continue for the foreseeable future.

The Marine Corps Is Also Facing New Demands That May Not Have Been Fully Reflected in Recent Requirements Analyses

The Marine Corps is also experiencing new missions and demands as a result of the Global War on Terrorism. However, these new requirements do not appear to have been fully addressed in its requirements analyses. The following is a summary of the principal analyses that were undertaken to address Marine Corps force structure personnel requirements in the past few years.

- In 2004, the Marine Corps established a Force Structure Review Group to evaluate what changes in active and reserve capabilities needed to be created, reduced, or deactivated in light of personnel tempo trends and the types of units in high demand since the Global War on Terrorism. As a result of this review, the Marine Corps approved a number of force structure changes including increases in the active component's infantry, reconnaissance, and gunfire capabilities and decreases in the active component's small-craft company and low-altitude air defense positions. However, this review was based on the assumption that the Marine Corps would need to plan for an end strength of 175,000 active personnel. As a result, the Marine Corps' 2004 review focused mostly on rebalancing the core capabilities of the active and reserve component rather than a bottom-up review of total personnel requirements to meet all 21st century challenges.
- In March 2006, shortly after the QDR was issued, the Marine Corps Commandant formed a Capabilities Assessment Group to assess requirements for active Marine Corps military personnel. One of the group's key tasks was to determine how and whether the Marine Corps could meet its ongoing requirements while supporting the QDR decision to establish a 2,600 personnel Marine Corps Special Operations Command. The group was also charged with identifying what core capabilities could be provided at a higher end strength level of 180,000. We received some initial briefings on the scope of the group's work. Moreover, Marine Corps officials told us that the group completed its analysis in June 2006. However, as of September 2006 when we completed our work, the Marine Corps had not released the results of its analysis. Therefore, it is not clear whether and to what extent this review formed the basis for the President's recent announcement to permanently expand the size of the active Marine Corps.

DOD Has Not Clearly Demonstrated the Basis For Military Personnel Requests

Our past work has also shown that DOD has not provided a clear and transparent basis for its military personnel requests to Congress, requests that demonstrate a clear link to military strategy. Ensuring that the department provides a sound basis for military personnel requests and can demonstrate how they are linked to the military strategy will become increasingly important as Congress confronts looming fiscal challenges facing the nation. During the next decade, Congress will be faced with making difficult trade-offs among defense and nondefense-related spending. Within the defense budget, it will need to allocate resources among the services and their respective personnel, operations, and investment accounts while faced with multiple competing priorities for funds. DOD will need to ensure that each service manages personnel levels efficiently since personnel costs have been rising significantly over the

past decade. We have previously reported that the average cost of compensation (including cash, non-cash, and deferred benefits) for enlisted members and officers was about $112,000 in fiscal year 2004.[4] The growth in military personnel costs has been fueled in part by increases in basic pay, housing allowances, recruitment and retention bonuses, incentive pay and allowances, and other special pay. Furthermore, DOD's costs to provide benefits, such as health care, have continued to spiral upward.

As noted earlier, we have found that valid and reliable data about the number of personnel required to meet an agency's needs are critical because human capital shortfalls can threaten an agency's ability to perform its missions efficiently and effectively. Data-driven decisionmaking is one of the critical factors in successful strategic workforce management. High-performing organizations routinely use current, valid, and reliable data to inform decisions about current and future workforce needs. In addition, they stay alert to emerging mission demands and remain open to reevaluating their human capital practices. In addition, federal agencies have a responsibility to provide sufficient transparency over significant decisions affecting requirements for federal dollars so that Congress can effectively evaluate the benefits, costs, and risks.

DOD's record in providing a transparent basis for requested military personnel levels can be improved. We previously reported that DOD's annual report to Congress on manpower requirements for fiscal year 2005 broadly stated a justification for DOD's requested active military personnel, but did not provide specific analyses to support the justification. In addition, DOD's 2006 QDR report did not provide significant insight into the basis for its conclusion that the size of today's forces—both the active and reserve components across all four military services—is appropriate to meet current and projected operational demands. Moreover, the Marine Corps' decision to initiate a new study to assess active military personnel requirements shortly after the 2006 QDR was completed is an indication that the QDR did not achieve consensus in required end strength levels.

[4] GAO, *Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Improve the Transparency and Reassess the Reasonableness, Appropriateness, Affordability, and Sustainability of its Military Compensation System*, GAO-05-798 (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2005).

In evaluating DOD's proposal to permanently increase active Army and Marine Corps personnel levels by 92,000 over the next 5 years, Congress should carefully weigh the long-term costs and benefits. It is clear that Army and Marine Corps forces are experiencing a high pace of operations due to both the war in Iraq and broader demands imposed by the Global War on Terrorism that may provide a basis for DOD to consider permanent increases in military personnel levels. However, it is also clear that increasing personnel levels will entail significant costs that must be weighed against other priorities. The Army has previously stated that it costs about $1.2 billion per year to increase active military personnel levels by 10,000. Moreover, equipping and training new units will require billions of additional dollars for startup and recurring costs.

DOD has not yet provided a detailed analysis to support its proposal to permanently increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps. Given the significant implications for the nation's ability to carry out its defense strategy along with the significant costs involved, additional information will be needed to fully evaluate the Secretary of Defense's proposal.

To help illuminate the basis for its request, DOD will need to provide answers to the following questions:

- What analysis has been done to demonstrate how the proposed increases are linked to the defense strategy? To what extent are the proposed military personnel increases based on supporting operations in Iraq versus an assessment of longer-term requirements?
- How will the additional personnel be allocated to combat units, support forces, and institutional personnel, for functions such as training and acquisition?
- What are the initial and long-term costs to increase the size of the force and how does the department plan to fund this increase?
- Do the services have detailed implementation plans to manage potential challenges such as recruiting additional personnel, providing facilities, and procuring new equipment?

Our prior work on recruiting and retention challenges, along with our prior reports on challenges in equipping modular units, identify some potential challenges that could arise in implementing an increase in the size of the Army and Marine Corps at a time when the services are supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, we have reported that 19 percent of DOD's occupational specialties for enlisted personnel were consistently overfilled while other occupational specialties were underfilled by 41 percent for fiscal years 2000 through

2005.[5] In addition, we have reported that the Army is experiencing numerous challenges in equipping modular brigades on schedule, in part due to the demands associated with meeting the equipment needs of units deploying overseas.[6] Such challenges will need to be carefully managed if Congress approves the Secretary of Defense's proposal.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Contacts and Acknowledgments

For questions about this statement, please contact Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402. Other individuals making key contributions to this statement include: Gwendolyn Jaffe, Assistant Director; Kelly Baumgartner; J. Andrew Walker; Margaret Morgan; Deborah Colantonio; Harold Reich; Aisha Cabrer; Susan Ditto; Julie Matta; and Terry Richardson.

[5] GAO, *Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges*, GAO-06-134 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005).

[6] GAO-06-745.

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JANUARY 30, 2007

Active Component Deployment Lay-down

BCT	TYPE	1st Deploymen	2nd Deployment		3rd Deployment		4th Deployment	
		Away Month	Home Month	Away Month	Home Month	Away Month	Home Month	Away Month
1st Brigade, 1st Armor DIV	HBCT	15	18	14				
2nd Brigade, 1st Armor DIV	HBCT	14	17	12				
3rd Brigade, 1st Armor DIV	HBCT	12	10	12				
1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry DIV	HBCT	12	20	Deployed				
2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry DIV	HBCT	14	20	Deployed				
3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry DIV	HBCT	12	18	Deployed				
4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry DIV	HBCT	Deployed						
1st Brigade, 1st Infantry DIV	HBCT	12						
2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry DIV	HBCT	12	19	Deployed				
3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry DIV	IBCT	12						
4th Brigade, 1st Infantry DIV	IBCT	Deployed						
1st Brigade, 10th Mountain DIV	IBCT	10	15	12				
2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain DIV	IBCT	4	14	6	6	12	12	Deployed
3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain DIV	IBCT	Deployed						
4th Brigade, 10th Mountain DIV	IBCT							
1st Brigade, 101st Airborne DIV	IBCT	12	20	12				
2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne DIV	IBCT	12	20	12				
3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne DIV	IBCT	6	8	11	20	12		
4th Brigade, 101st Airborne DIV	IBCT	12						
1st Brigade, 2nd Infantry DIV	HBCT							
2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry DIV	IBCT	12	15	Deployed				
3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry DIV	SBCT	12	20	Deployed				
4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry DIV	SBCT	Deployed						
1st Brigade, 25th Infantry DIV	SBCT	12	21	Deployed				
2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry DIV	SBCT	14						
3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry DIV	IBCT	12	16	Deployed				
4th Brigade, 25th Infantry DIV	IBCT	Deployed						
1st Brigade, 2rd Infantry DIV	HBCT	7	17	12	13	Deployed		
2nd Brigade, 2rd Infantry DIV	HBCT	11	18	12	17	Deployed		
3rd Brigade, 2rd Infantry DIV	HBCT	7	3	6	19	12	14	Deployed
4th Brigade, 2rd Infantry DIV	HBCT	12						
1st Brigade, 4th Infantry DIV	HBCT	12	21	12				
2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry DIV	HBCT	12	20	12				
3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry DIV	HBCT	12	20	12				
4th Brigade, 4th Infantry DIV	HBCT	12						
1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne DIV	IBCT	8	5	3	13	12		
2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne DIV	IBCT	12	35	Deployed				
3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne DIV	IBCT	6	7	9	27	Deployed		
4th Brigade, 82nd Airborne DIV	IBCT	Deployed						
172 Infantry Brigade	SBCT	16						
173 Airborne Brigade	IBCT	12	13	11				
2nd Cavalry Regiment	SBCT	15						
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment	HBCT	13	10	12				
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	HBCT	12						

≤ 12 Month	≥ 24 Month
> 12 Month	≥ 12 and < 2
	< 12 Month

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JANUARY 30, 2007

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. SNYDER. How much of the force requirements determination process is based on subjective judgments?

General FORMICA. Subjective judgments occur at three key decision points in the Army's force generation process. Two of those decision points occur during the development of requirements; the third occurrence is when resource priorities and levels of risk are decided. The Army uses quantitative and qualitative analysis and the application of sound doctrine and approved force designs in the generation of force requirements. These requirements are based upon the Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD) scenarios approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to support the Analytic Agenda. With guidance from OSD, to include The National Security Strategy, National Defense and National Military Strategies, Strategic Planning Guidance and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, subjective judgments are made to determine which MSFD scenarios should be modeled to address the needs of the Combatant Commanders and priorities established by the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the Army makes subjective judgments concerning the assessments of force requirements to meet Homeland Defense/Homeland Security missions and to resolve lessons learned from operational requirements that may not be addressed in the analytical modeling results. Finally, subjective judgment is applied in identifying the mix of capabilities (combat, combat support, and combat service support), the balance of those capabilities across the Active and Reserve components, as well as levels of acceptable risk within approved resources.

Dr. SNYDER. Have there been any initiatives to increase the role of data driven analyses in the requirements process and make the process more transparent to the Congress?

General FORMICA. Quantitative and qualitative data is central to the Army's force generation process. A key initiative undertaken by the Army is the adaptation of its Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to respond to the Global Force Demand and to improve visibility of its analytical underpinnings. With input from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for warfighting analysis, as well as approved scenarios from the Analytic Agenda, the Army continues to refine its analysis in generating force requirements. In particular, the assessment of operational requirements on force rotation demands, as well as the needs of Combatant Commanders, generates force capabilities to meet the Global Force Demand strategy. The results of these assessments are submitted periodically to Congress as part of the President's Budget and the Future Year Defense Program. Other publications by the Army that outline its force generation requirements are annual updates such as The Army Posture Statement and the Army Campaign Plan. Additionally, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducts periodic validation reviews and publishes audit reports that assess the analytical basis and results of the Army's force generation process. The Army continues to improve on these initiatives to ensure timely and accurate information is available to Congress concerning its force generation process.

Dr. SNYDER. Has the Office of the Secretary of Defense initiated a review to validate the force requirements determination processes used in the Army and the Marine Corps?

General FORMICA. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff have conducted Operational Availability (OA) studies, to include the work during the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006, to validate the Services force requirements determination process. Using OSD-approved scenarios, current operational demands, and realistic deployment timelines, OSD validates the Army's force generation process during periodic program and budget review cycles. The results are adjudicated and adjustments are made to ensure Army force requirements comply with OSD strategy, the needs of the Combatant Commanders, and priorities established by the Secretary of Defense.

Dr. SNYDER. Do you believe the services should be required to include an assessment of military requirements unconstrained by DoD policy and fiscal guidelines?

General FORMICA. Requirements generated by the Army only are constrained by the National Military Strategy and the Analytic Agenda scenarios approved by the

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The force generation process, based on Army doctrine and approved force designs, is then unconstrained in determining force capabilities needed to meet that strategy. Once those requirements are approved, constraints are addressed based on fiscal reality and resources available to man, equip, train, station and sustain those generated forces across all three components. No assessment should be necessary in the requirements phase as long as the strategic demands are defined. The assessment of risk, as currently provided by the Services in program and budget review cycles, addresses shortfalls in resources and time to adequately generate force capabilities to meet that strategy.

Dr. SNYDER. Would an unconstrained requirements process yield a much different result from the processes currently being used?

General FORMICA. The requirements process used today is based on strategic guidance and policies set to support the Analytic Agenda. It is a disciplined approach to analyzing force requirements given approved scenarios and requirements of the Combatant Commanders within the priorities of the National Military Strategy, Strategic Planning Guidance and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD) scenarios approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), used as the basis for determining requirements, do set force sizing constraints based on threat and the concept of operations. Changes in the timing and duration of these scenarios in modeling force requirements provide differing results while maintaining synchronization across the Services to optimize capabilities and to mitigate risk. Unconstrained limits in determining requirements could undermine that synchronization and place undue pressure on each Service to balance its force capabilities within limited resources.

Dr. SNYDER. How would the 2006 QDR been different if the services had been free to include an assessment of their unfunded manpower requirements?

General FORMICA. The results of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) would not have changed substantially given the strategic environment known at the time of its publication and the level of resources programmed in the Army. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was based on strategic guidance resulting in the Army's plan to resource a 1,037.4k end-strength across all three components (482.4K in the Active, 350K in the Army National Guard, and 205K in the U.S. Army Reserve). Additionally, the Army was operating under a temporary 30K end-strength increase to meet operational demands while transforming to a modular force. Given the level of Global Force Demand anticipated in the 2006 QDR, the Army had balanced its force capabilities and accepted some level of risk in its combat support and combat service support structure. As the strategic environment changed after the 2006 QDR report, the Army began to address the impacts on force capabilities based on the increasing levels of Global Force Demand. The Army provided OSD its assessment of force capability shortfalls and proposed an end-strength growth across all three components to meet the increasing operational demand. The Army will continue to adapt its force generation process to provide timely assessments of force requirements, available resources, and capability shortfalls as changes in the strategic environment evolve.

Dr. SNYDER. Does DoD prescribe the end-strengths that the services requirements process must achieve?

General FORMICA. The Army's end-strength is set and approved by Congress. During the requirements phase of the force generation process, the Department of Defense (DoD) does prescribe force levels for each Service in the development of the Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD) scenarios for the Analytic Agenda. These approved scenarios are the basis for the Army's quantitative and qualitative analysis of force requirements. During the resourcing phase of the force generation process, the Army then balances force capabilities across all three components within the end-strength approved by Congress.

Dr. SNYDER. Can you give examples of other assumptions that DoD requires the services to consider in their requirements process and how they influence the outcome?

General FORMICA. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff, with support from the services, utilize an iterative process to develop a set of Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) and Multi Service Force Deployment (MSFD) vignettes. These scenarios and vignettes make up the OSD Analytic Agenda. Also, DoD and the Joint Staff generate Operational Availability (OA) studies to determine demand of Service capabilities to meet combinations of the scenarios and vignettes over time. Additionally, the Army assesses the capability requirements to meet Homeland Defense/Homeland Security missions and the rotational requirements to sustain operational demands. The Analytic Agenda scenarios and vignettes, along with operational demands, are quantitatively transformed into the directed and support force structure requirements in the Army's Total Army Analysis process. The

results are used to identify and balance force capabilities across the three components to meet the strategic requirements, provide rotational depth, and man, equip, train, station, and sustain the force within approved resources.

Dr. SNYDER. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have included assessments of unfunded manpower requirements in prior force structure requirements processes. Why did you not include those assessments in the 2006 QDR?

General FORMICA. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) strategic environment was based on a different level of demand than what the Army faces today. The Army generated force capabilities based on the war fight requirements, Homeland Defense/Homeland Security missions, and operational requirements of the then approved Global Force Demand. Additionally, the Army was operating under a temporary 30K increase in end-strength to meet those strategic requirements while transforming to a modular force. Based on the 2006 QDR strategy, the Army did assume some risk in certain combat support and combat service support structure.

Dr. SNYDER. What portion of the additional end-strength increase will be used to fill manpower gaps in the existing modular brigades and how much of the additional end-strength will be used to create new combat capability?

General FORMICA. The 74.2K of end-strength growth (65K in the Active, 8.2K in the Army National Guard and 1K in the U. S. Army Reserve) will build new capabilities, to include six additional brigade combat teams and thirteen multi-functional and functional support brigades, to meet the increasing Global Force Demand. These new brigades will be manned at near 100 percent in the Available and Ready Phases of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. Additionally, the Reserve Components will rebalance and right-size Institutional structure and Individuals Accounts to re-invest in combat capabilities (6K in the Army National Guard and 16K in the U.S. Army Reserve). With the growth, rebalance, and right-sizing initiatives, the Army's combat capability in its Operating Force will grow by over 80K (49.4K in the Active, 14.2K in the Army National Guard and 17K in the U.S. Army Reserve).

Dr. SNYDER. How much of the force requirements determination process is based on subjective judgments?

General JOHNSON. It is difficult to assign a percentage of subjective versus objective judgments to our Total Force Structure Process (TFSP). The Marine Corps uses the TFSP to transform strategic guidance, policy constraints, and commander-generated recommendations into the integrated capabilities required to execute Marine Corps missions. This process relies on a partially subjective, yet detailed, integrated analysis of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF), ensuring that no aspect of the enterprise is ignored when new requirements for the Corps are identified—either from the top-down or from the bottom-up.

Assessments regarding small unit activations are much more subjective than assessments associated with the force requirement development necessary to support major theaters of war. The determination of how many Marines it takes to support two simultaneous Major Contingency Operations contains a great deal of analytical rigor, as these requirements are based upon detailed staff work and utilization of OSD and Joint staff approved planning scenarios and modeling tools.

Dr. SNYDER. Have there been any initiatives to increase the role of data driven analyses in the requirements process and make the process more transparent to the Congress?

General JOHNSON. Yes, the current Defense Planning Scenarios development process and planned force sufficiency analyses, based on the new Force Planning Construct, will increase the role of data driven analyses.

In addition to this, Our Commandant recently stated that deployment cycles must not only support training for irregular warfare, they must also provide sufficient time for recovery and maintenance as well as training for other contingency missions. Resultantly, we have begun work on the following initiatives:

- Development of a predictive modeling tool that will allow us to determine appropriate structure and manning requirements to meet a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio for sustained combat operations across the operating forces.

- Examination of our requirements for recruiters, trainers, infrastructure, material and equipment to both support manning at a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ration and training across the spectrum of warfare.

- Assessment of the impact of a 1:5 deployment-to-dwell ratio for the Reserve component and how the Total Force can best be employed to support a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio for active forces.

Dr. SNYDER. Has the Office of the Secretary of Defense initiated a review to validate the force requirements determination processes used in the Army and the Marine Corps?

General JOHNSON. Presently, the Marine Corps is not aware of any initiatives by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to review or validate the Marine Corps' requirements determination processes.

Dr. SNYDER. Do you believe the services should be required to include an assessment of military requirements unconstrained by DoD policy and fiscal guidelines?

General JOHNSON. No. Fiscal and policy constraints allow the Services to bound the requirements, facilitate prioritization of requirements, and introduce the concept of risk earlier in the process, thereby saving valuable resources (time, money and manpower).

Dr. SNYDER. Would an unconstrained requirements process yield a much different result from the processes currently being used?

General JOHNSON. Yes, in an unconstrained process, the force requirement would be much greater/costlier. In a constrained requirements process, a certain level of risk is assumed in determining requirements.

Dr. SNYDER. How would the 2006 QDR been different if the services had been free to include an assessment of their unfunded manpower requirements?

General JOHNSON. All planning is based upon assumptions; a change in an assumption therefore leads to a change in the plan. At the time of the 2006 QDR, the Marine Corps considered an end-strength increase; however the resulting guidance stabilized USMC end-strength at 175,000 Active Component and 39,000 Reserve Component by Fiscal Year 2011. The 2006 QDR initial guidance approved by the Department of Defense's senior leadership assumed that while the size of the joint force was about right, the mix of capabilities within the force needed to change to address current and emerging national security challenges. Given different starting assumptions, the results of the 2006 QDR may have been quite different. However, without an understanding of these assumptions, we cannot adequately predict what those results would have been.

Dr. SNYDER. Does DoD prescribe the end-strengths that the services requirements process must achieve?

General JOHNSON. No. The DoD has, in the past, provided the Marine Corps with end-strength constraints such as during the 2006 QDR; and these constraints have spurred Total Force Structure exercises such as the 2004 Total Force Structure Review Group or the 2006 Capabilities Assessment Group. However, the Marine Corps Total Force Structure Process cycle produces total requirements regardless of any constraints or force caps that result in structure recommendations.

Dr. SNYDER. Can you give examples of other assumptions that DoD requires the services to consider in their requirements process and how they influence the outcome?

General JOHNSON. Force requirements are based on demands determined by the DoD. For the 2006 QDR and associated Operational Availability 2006 study, these demands were provided in the Baseline Security Posture (BSP). The BSP specified both the frequency and duration of events as well as force caps for each individual event. Based on historical levels of commitment for Marine Corps units, the BSP projected lower levels of demand for theater security cooperation and other non-combat commitments. It also projected future force levels for OIF/OEF significantly below current levels. Since the force demands determine the projected force requirements, it is possible that the constraints imposed by the BSP caused the Marine Corps force requirements to be underestimated.

Another example is the 2006 QDR replacement of the "1-4-2-1" force planning construct. The "1-4-2-1" construct consisted of the military defending the U.S. homeland; projecting forces to deter conflict in four regions around the globe; swiftly defeating aggression in two overlapping major conflicts; and maintaining a capability for "decisive victory" in one of the two major conflicts, possibly to include regime change or occupation. The new guidance is a force-planning construct that puts increased emphasis on defending against terrorist threats which requires less force capacity as well as a different capability set.

Dr. SNYDER. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have included assessments of unfunded manpower requirements in prior force structure requirements processes. Why did you not include those assessments in the 2006 QDR?

General JOHNSON. The QDR is a Secretary of Defense document to which the Services each provide manpower requirement inputs. The Office of the Secretary of Defense determines the final output and content of the Report. At the time of the 2006 QDR, the Marine Corps considered an end-strength increase. However, the 2006 QDR initial guidance approved by the Department of Defense's senior leadership assumed that while the size of the joint force was about right, the mix of capa-

bilities within the force needed to change to address current and emerging national security challenges, and it included a Marine Corps force cap limitation of 175,000 Marines in the Active Component. All QDR analysis was subsequently based upon that guidance; therefore, the result was no identified unfunded manpower requirements.

Dr. SNYDER. What portion of the additional end-strength increase will be used to fill manpower gaps in existing Marine Corps units and how much of the additional end-strength will be used to create new combat capability?

General JOHNSON. The growth in end-strength from 175K to 180K was used to fill shortfalls and to establish the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC). Additionally, we have used military to civilian conversion structure and other realignments to help mitigate other shortfalls. Some of the increase also went to increase personnel in critical MOSs with shortfalls such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and intelligence. The 202,000 end-strength will create additional units to reduce the deployment to dwell issue and allow for additional training of Marine Units in our traditional missions across the warfare spectrum of the MAGTF.

The Marine Corps' 22K increase is divided into 17,000 Marines in the operating forces and 5,000 in the supporting establishment. The 17,000 Marines in the operating forces all provide new unit capabilities while the 5,000 allocated to the supporting establishment provide additional recruiters (600), instructors (1,200) and transients (injured Marines/patients, Marines in training pipeline, Marines between duty stations) to support the increase. None of the growth will be used to fill manning shortfalls in current Marine Corps units.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

Mr. WILSON. I appreciate Ms. Sanchez bringing up about the equipment for the active duty. But there was a report yesterday, and I don't know if you have jurisdiction, the shortfalls in equipment for national guard units, particularly in the event of a state call-up.

What is the status on adjusting for that?

General FORMICA. The Army National Guard (ARNG) is in the process of converting from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Force. As a Strategic Reserve, the Army assumed risk when equipping the ARNG because there would be sufficient lead-time to equip the deploying force. We can no longer afford to take that risk. We are committed to fully equipping the ARNG to 100% of its requirement. In the Fiscal Year (FY) 2009–13 Program Objective Memorandum (POM), we are "fencing $21 billion as a down payment on fully equipping and modernizing the ARNG." This effort will require our attention and steadfastness for several years after FY 2013 to properly equip and modernize the ARNG to be fully interoperable and identical to active component units, having the ability to perform any mission in support of full spectrum operations.

In the short term, we are fully committed to ensure the ARNG is sufficiently equipped to perform its Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities (HLD/DSCA) mission. The ARNG has identified 342 critical dual use items of equipment that are useful for both war and HLD/DSCA. These items were vetted through the states and the Army and validated as the HLD/DSCA requirement. We, as an Army, are providing equipment to the hurricane prone states, just as we did last year. Some new equipment is being diverted to these states; some depot RESET/Recap equipment is being redirected; some equipment is being loaned to the ARNG; and the ARNG is cross-leveling some equipment among the states. We are taking great care to ensure that each state has equipment on hand to respond to state missions and are ready to move equipment into non-hurricane states, if required. The states have also negotiated Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) to provide capabilities to each other if requested. Although the Army is strapped for equipment, in the short term, all components, working in concert, will support the ARNG in its mission of aiding/assisting the states in responding to natural disasters or other state missions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES

Mr. JONES. Mr. Applegate, what is the amount of the advertising budget for recruitment for the Marine Corps?

Mr. APPLEGATE. The FY07 budget includes the following funding for recruiting and advertising included $112.23M ($107.4M in the Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps appropriation—OMMC—and $4.8M in the Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve appropriation—OMMCR).

The FY08 request includes $146.67M ($141.38M in OMMC, $5.29M in OMMCR).

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MURPHY

Mr. MURPHY. You look at, you know, at this point, $3.6 billion has been budgeted for recruiting in 2007. Clearly, the services are relying on—we are looking at $500 million to $700 million coming from this emerging supplemental, which is going to come on our plate in a couple months.

And, you know, in fiscal year 2006 the Army spent $1.8 billion on retention bonuses. But this year, in fiscal year 2007, we are looking at $1.1 million. So a decreased amount of retention bonuses that we have that we are planning on.

And, you know, I know you all are hurting, and is there a plan, you know, with the budget supplementals here, I mean, to really hit us with the retention bonuses I would assume? Or should we assume?

General FORMICA. Retention bonuses went from 1.2B in FY06 to $1B in FY07 including the Supplemental. Below are the details based on the PB08, in thousands of dollars.

	FY06	FY07	FY07 Supp (not PB08)
From PB08			
AC SRB:	736,943	181,537	410,516
AC CSRB:	0	0	24,850
AC Officer:	0	0	62,000
ARNG 3yr	40,484	14,282	0
ARNG 6yr	267,470	92,125	153,780
USAR AGR	10,240	5,000	7,440
USAR REUP	129,816	37,951	49,421
USAR AGR CSRB	0	2,405	2,410
USAR UNIT REUP	44,084	425	30,770
Total	1,229,037	333,725	741,187
			FY07 Total: 1,074,912

Above data exclude retention bonuses for medical officers, which approximate $180 million per year.

Mr. MURPHY. Is there a way that we can get a status on when you talk about some are less, some are more? Could we get a status of those brigade combat teams?

General FORMICA. The attached chart at Tab A depicts the Active Component Brigade Combat Teams that have been deployed or are available for scheduled deployments through Fiscal Year 2007. Sourcing has not been approved by the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Year 2008 and beyond, and is not included. Of the Brigade Combat Teams listed on the attached chart, 15 have deployed once. Many of these brigades are new builds, or are fulfilling other mission requirements such as Training and Transition Teams. Three have never deployed: 1st Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division is Forward Stationed in Korea; 4th Brigade, 10th Mountain Division has not deployed as a Brigade Combat Team, but has deployed battalions; and the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division is a new build. Of the Brigade Combat Teams listed on the chart, seven have deployed with less than 12 months at home between deployments. Twenty seven have deployed with less than 24 months, but more than 12 months between deployments (average of 17.7 months). Two had greater than 24 months between deployments, however they deployed Battalion sized organizations in the interim. Twenty Brigade Combat Teams are currently deployed.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 89.]

Mr. MURPHY. Is there a way that we can get a status on when you talk about some are less, some are more? Could we get a status of those brigade combat teams?

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

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