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SECURITY CHALLENGES INVOLVING PAKISTAN AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 10, 2007

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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, October 10, 2007, Security Challenges Involving Pakistan and Policy Implications for the Department of Defense 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, October 10, 2007 45

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 2007

SECURITY CHALLENGES INVOLVING PAKISTAN AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services 1

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services 1

WITNESSES

Curtis, Lisa, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, the Heritage Foundation 12

Haqqani, Husain, Director, Center for International Relations, Boston University, and Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute 9

Schaffer, Ambassador Teresita C., Director, South Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies 5

Weinbaum, Dr. Marvin G., Scholar-in-Residence, Middle East Institute 7

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Curtis, Lisa 88

Haqqani, Husain 72

Hunter, Hon. Duncan 49

Schaffer, Ambassador Teresita C. 55

Weinbaum, Dr. Marvin G. 64

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Questions submitted.]

SECURITY CHALLENGES INVOLVING PAKISTAN AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 10, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, the hearing will come to order. I wish the staff will note that the gavel comes down now as opposed to a few moments ago when we made the announcement that it would be delayed a few minutes.

First, I would be remiss if I did not mention our late colleague and our friend, the gentlelady from Virginia, Jo Ann Davis. She was a loyal member of this committee, a good friend to us, one who represented her district and cared for those in uniform so well, a strong advocate for shipbuilding, which was the centerpiece for the district she represented, and her loss is a loss to not just this committee or Congress, but to our country. We are very sad about this, but we all know she did fight the good fight over a good period of months and caused us to have great admiration for her, and she will be missed. As you know, the memorial services will be held tomorrow at her home in Virginia.

I would yield at this moment to my friend from California and the Ranking Member, Duncan Hunter, for any comments he might have regarding Jo Ann Davis.

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, it is a sad time when we mourn the death of a colleague, and when you think about Jo Ann Davis, I think about two things. I think about her as a person who was a tireless and a faithful fighter for her constituents, and as somebody who was extremely tough in a political fight, but always straight ahead, always with strong principles, strong views and an intense loyalty to her allies and to the principles that she believed in, and also was a very compassionate person toward those who she felt needed help. And I have always thought of Jo Ann as the consummate sup-

porter of the underdog, the person who would take a position and fight that position out, even if she were the only vote in the room for that particular position, because of her principles.

And, you know, people leave a lasting impression on you here in this committee, and perhaps the relationships and the friendships that we have are the most important part of serving on this great Armed Services Committee. This was a gentlelady who loved the people, who wore the uniform of the United States and served them and served her constituents, had maybe that character that we all aspire to of being a faithful servant.

Mr. Chairman, this is a very sad time for us, and I know that the House leadership has announced that there will be a number of Members going down to the services, and so I would recommend to everybody that everyone avails themselves of that information and, in the least, perhaps will send a card to Chuck—to Jo Ann's husband—and let him know how very, very much we appreciated her.

And I know there are hundreds of thousands of people in her district who appreciated her so much because of how she served them, but I want to let you know that I really—and I am sure all of the members on this committee appreciated her great and sparkling personality, her adherence to principle, and her vitality and all of the energy that she brought to the political contest in this great forum every day. So, again, I urge all members to jot down a letter, if you can, or a note.

Mr. Chairman, I wonder if any members of the Virginia delegation would like to make a statement at this time. I know they are all very much impacted by this loss.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The gentlelady from Virginia.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity to talk about a dear friend of mine, Jo Ann Davis.

I think all of you who participate in this committee, who watch this committee, know that Jo Ann was a person of great faith, great courage, great principle, and she cared very much about other people. And I believe that it was never Jo Ann's intent to end up in the greatest legislative body in the world, but it was her life's work of caring about other people, that the people of her district trusted her and sent her here, and that there is one thing you would say about Jo Ann Davis: Every single thing that she did was based on her principles, her belief system, and she was absolutely willing to stand up and fight.

She confided in me that she believed she would beat this cancer—she did the first time around—but that she felt she was going through this in order to help other people and to raise awareness and to make sure that other women did put things aside and have the treatment they needed. That is so Jo Ann Davis.

So we all mourn her loss. We extend our sympathy to her family, and I know this committee will greatly, greatly miss her.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The Members will note that there was a resolution honoring the memory of Jo Ann Davis yesterday, and I know some here participated in addressing that.

We have a new member of our committee, a gentleman from Colorado, who has been approved by the Republican Conference, and

I would like for him to be welcomed: Doug Lamborn from the great State of Colorado.

Stand up, so we will see who you are.

Thank you so much for joining us, and we know that there will be a lot of work ahead of you. We welcome you.

There is also a temporary member who will be with us from time to time. Jim Langevin, who is a former permanent member of this committee, will join us from time to time.

Ladies and gentlemen, we meet today to address security challenges involving Pakistan. This is an important hearing, and it could not be more timely.

For too long, Iraq has been preoccupying us away from evolving security concerns and potential conflicts in other parts of the world that are vital to us. We must have a broader strategic focus and a stable democratic and prosperous Pakistan actively working to counter terrorism, and we must have Islamist militants who could be extremely valuable as a partner. Yet the country still faces serious security challenges that demand our active attention and engagement.

I am concerned that our policy toward Pakistan has not been as comprehensive as it should be, that we may be unprepared to handle any repercussions if events in Pakistan continue to move as rapidly as they have in recent years. Recent testimony before this committee on global threats and a substantial unclassified national intelligence effort confirmed that al Qaeda has become progressively active in western Pakistan, where they are determined to be enjoying a safe haven. Bin Laden's lieutenants are still believed to be in that region.

Moreover, the U.S. Commander for Counterterrorism Operations in Afghanistan, Major General David Rodriguez, recently blamed a growing al Qaeda presence in Pakistan for an estimated 50 to 60 percent increase in foreign fighters infiltrating into Afghanistan. At the same time, internal instability in that country has been on the rise since 2007, fueled by the lethal attacks within the country from Islamist militants and the political crisis surrounding President Musharraf's run for reelection. Americans have provided Pakistan with about $10 billion in assistance since 9/11, yet many experts argue that such assistance has not been well targeted.

I am pleased to have some of the country's top experts with us today: Ambassador Teresita Schaffer from the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Dr. Marvin Weinbaum from the Middle East Institute; Lisa Curtis with the Heritage Institute; and the gentleman, who evidently is caught in traffic, Husain Haqqani with Boston University. He, hopefully, will join us momentarily.

We welcome you. We thank you for your expertise in sharing your thoughts with us today. This is a very, very important hearing for us, and we thank you for being with us.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for calling this very important hearing today. It is one that is critical to America's efforts in a very, very important part of the world.

Before I make my comments on the hearing, Mr. Chairman, let me just also thank you for welcoming Doug Lamborn, and I am joining your welcome to our new member, and I will remind my col-

leagues that he comes from that 5th District in Colorado that was held by our great colleague Joel Hefley. And he has big shoes to fill, but I know that he will do a great job in filling those shoes.

He served in the Colorado state legislature, in the house and in the senate, and he comes to us with lots of legislative experience and with a strong advocacy of our men and women in uniform. That is very important to him, so it is absolutely appropriate that he serves on this committee.

Mr. Chairman, also, he is married to Jeanie, and they have raised five children, including one daughter who recently married, and they have four sons. And so I would like to also join in welcoming our newest colleague, Doug Lamborn.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, let me just say to our guests, I thank them for being with us on this very important issue.

You know, since September 11th, President Musharraf's decision to join the United States in the war on terror was very welcomed. Pakistan has been a key ally of the U.S., a very valuable strategic partner, and today it supports U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led military operations in Afghanistan and makes a lot of contributions and some sacrifices against extremism and militancy. These efforts have resulted, we all know, in a number of al Qaeda and Taliban leaders killed or captured in Pakistan.

In addition to its counterterrorism efforts, Pakistan has made progress on its eastern border with India. Tensions between the two countries have noticeably decreased due to confidence-building measures, and Pakistan and India are both committed to taking steps toward resolving the historical animosity that exists over Kashmir.

I am interested in your thoughts, incidentally—to our guests—regarding the U.S. role in the Indo-Pakistani dialogue process, and although we have had a lot of positive dividends during the last six years, I think we also have to recognize that we have had some troubling developments.

In July, this committee heard from intelligence officials who assessed that the al Qaeda terrorist network had become progressively active in western Pakistan, where they have what has been called a "safe haven." For the last eight months, I have expressed my concerns over such developments and the internal challenges facing Pakistan's leaders, military, and people.

Today I would like to get your views on the following: One, on the security front, al Qaeda's exploitation of the September 2006 Tribal Peace Agreement in Waziristan, which allowed some of the top al Qaeda leadership to hide out, operate, and plan to the status of Taliban entrenched along the Afghanistan-Pakistani border and Balukistan regions; the impact on military operations in Afghanistan; and three, the status of the safety and the security of Pakistan's nuclear materials and technologies.

On the political front, the current and evolving political environment from the recent reelection of President Musharraf on Saturday and the surrounding circumstances; and, two, the likelihood that the political power equation in Pakistan will change and what that could mean for the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship.

So, if you could talk about that a little bit, we would certainly appreciate it. Although we on the Armed Services Committee are reviewing and understanding this political dynamic, reviewing this with you will help us assess how it relates to the willingness, capacity, and capabilities of the Pakistan government to address the extremism that resides on its soil as well as other strategic challenges it deals with in the region.

I think it is important to recognize that, weeks after the July release of the U.S. National Intelligence Assessment on terrorist threats to the homeland and the storming of Islamabad's Red Mosque, President Musharraf increased pressure on the extremists residing in the tribal areas and declared that Pakistan will not tolerate the al Qaeda sanctuary by moving two Pakistani army divisions into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the so-called FATA, and one of those divisions, I believe, coming off the Indian border. There are now approximately 100,000 troops from the Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Also, folks, if you could speak to the posture of that corps, because there has been information that I have seen to the effect that most of that corps resides in garrison, and it is not undertaking what one might call "aggressive operations."

President Musharraf is also committed to increasing development assistance to complement this military offensive. So we are interested in your assessments of these operations.

So thank you for being with us today. I know you have got a lot of territory to cover, so I will submit the rest of my statement for the record.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the discussion. It is absolutely timely, and I want to thank our witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman, and the balance is accepted without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

The CHAIRMAN. We welcome you. Our panel is complete. We appreciate your being with us so much. I hope you can do your best, as witnesses, to condense your testimony. It does not have to quite be in 25 words or less, but as you see, we have a large turnout of members, and I know folks do wish to ask questions, and we are bound by the 5-minute rule here, and if you could do your best to summarize, that would be quite helpful. So we welcome you.

Ambassador Schaffer, we will start with you, please.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR TERESITA C. SCHAFFER, DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for inviting me to testify this morning.

I am sure every witness who has spoken to you about Pakistan in the past six years has used the words "critical time." I am not going to break that pattern. It is a critical time in a country that matters profoundly to U.S. security.

In the past six months, President Musharraf has been seriously weakened. The major non-religious political figures, in my view,

have been diminished, and the U.S. has been publicly involved in the dealmaking leading to Pakistan's next government. The biggest security challenge for the United States, however, comes from the newly emboldened violent extremists who are challenging the authority of the Pakistani state. U.S. policy needs to address both the decline in political legitimacy and the problems posed by violent extremists.

I expect that Musharraf's election last weekend will eventually be confirmed by the Supreme Court and that legislative elections will be held in January. The government that follows these elections is likely to be an uneasy one. Musharraf will be one power center. He believes in unity of command, as he has often told us, and is not particularly interested in power sharing. Both his political party and, perhaps, the army will be strongly tempted to manipulate the election to minimize Ms. Bhutto's claim on power. If she does participate in government, she will strongly defend her turf, and assuming that Musharraf retires from the army, that institution will be under new leadership and will be a distinct power center no matter how careful Musharraf has been to promote officers loyal to himself.

I want to focus on the government's biggest challenge, a nasty and violent campaign by extremists, both those connected with the Afghan Taliban and homegrown movements that had been brazenly defying the government's authority last summer at the Islamabad Red Mosque. The death toll since July is at least several hundred. State authority looks weak, and the army, I regret to say, looks inept.

An effective response to this kind of campaign requires a canny mixture of military and political tools. In the past year we have seen no evidence that the Pakistan army has adequate counterinsurgency skills. One expert whom I respect very much claims that the way they are trained is almost the opposite of how one needs to operate in a counterinsurgency environment, nor have we seen any indication of the government's having the political tools needed to integrate the tribal areas into Pakistan.

I support the Administration's request for development funds for the tribal areas, but this will be the work of a generation, and in the meantime, the Pakistan government and army will probably hedge their bets, a tactic that, I doubt, can work. In other words, where the U.S. is hoping for boldness, I fear it may get caution.

The position of the U.S. in Pakistan makes this particularly dangerous. The U.S. has become a symbol of opposition to Musharraf, and people are talking about Afghanistan as "America's war." This is a fundamentally wrong-headed notion, but the thing that is dangerous for us is that it sets the U.S. up to be blamed for all of the shortcomings of this next government. We urgently need to reposition the United States so that this government and its eventual successor can work with the United States without risking its political life. How can we do this?

I would start with forthright support for genuinely free and fair elections. Do not make excuses for the repressive actions of the government, which, I fear, may increase over the coming months. Give high priority to economic assistance, and use it in ways that benefit people. The greatest boost to our national standing in Paki-

stan in recent years came when the United States responded with such speed and dedication to the earthquake in Kashmir. The military played a critical role there. The watchword should be that the United States wants a relationship with Pakistan that can continue from one set of leaders to another.

The second big recommendation is to work with the military on military issues, including whatever help we can provide to beef up their shortcomings in counterinsurgency, but do not build up its political role, and emphasize the primacy of civilian leadership.

Finally, I believe the United States needs to give top priority to developing a common strategy with Pakistan on Afghanistan. This is needed not just for Afghanistan, but also for the stability of Pakistan, which is fundamental to our long-term interests in the region.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Schaffer can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Weinbaum, please.

STATEMENT OF DR. MARVIN G. WEINBAUM, SCHOLAR-IN-RESIDENCE, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

Dr. WEINBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Members, if I had appeared before you a number of months ago and had said that most of us who look at Pakistan believe at this point in time that Pakistan has in the Northwest Frontier Province, the Northwest Frontier area, lost the battle against extremism and terrorism, I think I might have raised some eyebrows. Given the media coverage and some of the comments that Ambassador Schaffer has made, I am sure now, however, that there is a great deal of credibility in that, and the consequences, as we have recognized here, are quite considerable for the United States, for our success in dealing with the insurgency in Afghanistan, in stabilizing that country and, of course, in uprooting the al Qaeda network.

The spread of Islamic extremism in Pakistan and, I might mention, the consequences, as you have already heard, for Pakistan, its stability, its integrity, are really tied up with what happens in that tribal region. My written statement suggests how we got to this point and indicates how this has been an evolving situation, in fact, beginning in the 1980's. What I want to stress here today are some of the options in policies that we might and Pakistan might follow.

Clearly, now, at this point, I think we have come to see, as the situation has worsened in Afghanistan, that we have put additional pressure on President Musharraf. Let me suggest, however, that increasingly this pressure has been counterproductive. Actions taken by President Musharraf have not only fallen short, but have had the double-barreled effect of intensifying opposition within the frontier region and also eroding his political support in the country. We have seen now, additionally, the political problems of President Musharraf's during this year, and that has distracted him further from dealing with the great challenges that the frontier presents.

I might mention also that it is very interesting to see in this election period, as this election gamesmanship has been going on, how

little attention is being paid to extremism. Indeed, most of the political parties have dodged the issue.

Well, let me suggest that there are very few good options here, at least in the short term, but let me indicate that, of course, one option for Pakistan is to revive its military effort, to commit itself to a more aggressive approach. The recent setbacks that the military has suffered might, you would imagine, have stiffened the resolve of the Pakistan military; after all, it is a very proud military. And as to the fact that they have been humiliated consistently here, most recently with the kidnapping of several hundred of their troops, possible desertions as well, this should have a positive effect in getting them, as I say, to take a more aggressive position.

The imminent new head of the military, General Kiani, is known as a very forthright general, and certainly he may step up to it, up to the task. But let me say that, for a more effective military posture, we are basically dealing with the fundamental weakness that the Pakistan military faces—a weakness of training, a weakness of equipment, and, yes, a weakness of motivation. This is not going to be overturned easily or soon. And, of course, I should mention this connection of the difficulty, as well, when it comes to the fact that so much of what this is going to require here is going to require a different public mood in Pakistan. At the moment, although there are many in Pakistan who certainly do not accept the militants' extremist views and their actions against the army, nevertheless, that distinction here has not been made strong enough that, in fact, this is their war and not a war carried on on the behalf of the Americans.

A second approach here is to negotiate a settlement here, and ultimately this is what we are going to come to. There is going to be some kind of agreement. It may not be an agreement that we would particularly find desirable, because, I think, the point that has to be made here is that this struggle which is going on in the frontier is not really on our behalf. This is a struggle because the Pakistan state has been challenged. It has been challenged, and, as I say, it is a very serious challenge. So what we are seeing here is an ineffective response, for the moment, to this challenge. It has very little impact, unfortunately, on what is going on in Afghanistan. I want to come back to that.

Also, as my written testimony demonstrates, we have to accept the fact that the agreement is going to be made out of weakness, not out of strength, and, in fact, the people we are negotiating with are not the traditional leaders. Those leaders are, by and large, gone. They have been killed. They have run away. So, although this ultimately is going to be what is the result of this campaign, nevertheless, it is not necessarily going to be in our good interest.

I think, also, another way to deal with this would be for a delivery of social services, justice and security for the people of the FATA, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a channeling of development, and, as you have heard, the United States has now committed itself to $750 million for this purpose. Unfortunately, I think, if it is not too little, it certainly is too late. The Pakistanis asked for this kind of support in 2002, and we were too wrapped up with the notion here that the only thing at issue here was counterterrorism, and we failed to do it. Now we are doing it, but

the difficulty is obviously in delivery. At this point in time, without a more secure security situation, it is doubtful that that can be delivered.

A fourth way of going about this would be to build a national mandate in Pakistan for directly confronting extremism. Right now that mandate does not exist. As you have heard, the people of Pakistan really think that, for the most part, what is going on there is Pakistani killing Pakistani, and again, as I mentioned before, it failed to recognize how much this is something that is critical to the future of the Pakistan state, a state which is already a weak nation.

The view here is that extremism can be best faced through democracy, and I certainly subscribe to that. I believe this is necessary on its own basis, regardless of whether there was a military challenge in the frontier, but I think we also have to look at this soberly to recognize that a coalition government may not be in a better position, itself, to deal with the challenges militarily that are presented in the frontier. It is ultimately going to take the military's willing capacity together with, of course, the kind of development I have been speaking about.

Finally, here in—the possible options here—and that is working more closely with the United States. We suggested publicly not too long ago that perhaps what we ought to do is to now, perhaps, unilaterally intervene where we feel that we have targets to attack. This has not played well in Pakistan. We had better recognize this and that this, in fact, could make the situation politically even worse for President Musharraf.

Now, finally, then, what I want to say is that we have no really short-term answers here, but we have, I am afraid, only one good option, and that is to use our own efforts here to interdict the infiltrators, the people who are the suicide bombers who are bringing in the explosive devices into Afghanistan. What I am getting at here is that our only option here is to fortify ourselves to redeploy a larger number of troops into the frontier area on the Afghanistan side. This is, I am afraid, in the short and medium term, going to be our only possible option. This has got to go along, however, at the same time, in that there is no simple military solution in Afghanistan either, with accelerated development, with better governance, and, of course, with a more realistic strategy in dealing with the poppy crop. In this, Pakistan will continue to have a role, but I guess where I come out on all of this is that the U.S. is going to have to readjust its expectations about what Pakistan is willing and is able to accomplish for us in this already explosive tribal frontier.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Doctor.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Weinbaum can be found in the Appendix on page 64.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Haqqani, please.

STATEMENT OF HUSAIN HAQQANI, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY, AND SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE

Mr. HAQQANI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As a Pakistani currently living and teaching in the United States, I bring to this committee a deep commitment to close and friendly relations between Pakistan and the United States.

The first point I would like to make is that U.S.-Pakistan relations have usually been cyclical in nature. They have started with great hopes, and they have ended in great disappointment. During the period of great hope, the United States has invested large sums of money in terms of aid, and then in the period of disappointment, on the American side, the attitude has been, We spent so much money; what did we get for it? On the Pakistani side, the feeling has been that the United States is about to walk away from us once again. I think that the current situation is one in which the first thing we should all be clear about is that that cyclical pattern needs to be broken.

Since 1954, the United States has given large amounts of aid to Pakistan off and on, and the bulk of that aid has gone to the Pakistani military. The assumption always has been that the aid that goes to Pakistan buys the United States influence with the most influential institution in Pakistan, namely, the Pakistani army. Just the statistics would give an idea to this committee that, since 1954, almost $21 billion has been given to Pakistan in aid, including the amount that has not yet been disbursed but that has been budgeted for 2008. Of these, $17.7 billion was given under military rule, and only $3.4 billion was given to Pakistan under civilian governments.

As Pakistan moves toward some civilianization of its government, it is important to bear that in mind that this identity of the United States with military rule should now end, and if assistance has to be provided to Pakistan, assistance should continue under civilian rule as much as there has been under military rule. If we have failed in getting our objectives to the military government under General Musharraf, we should recognize our mistakes but not penalize the people of Pakistan under a civilian government for doing that. On average, the United States has given Pakistan $559 million for each year that Pakistan has been under military rule, and it has given Pakistan only $181 million for each year it has been under civilian rule. This is, of course, not to say that the civilian governments have been more competent than the military regimes. The question of which form of government has suited Pakistan better is something that Pakistanis debate on a daily basis, but from the U.S. point of view, Pakistan now is at a point where the long-term issues of the Pakistani state's effectiveness need to be addressed.

The reason why the Pakistani army is failing in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is because the Pakistani state no longer has the level of effectiveness that a state of that size should have in dealing with problems like an insurgency, with non-state actors like al Qaeda having greater influence in some parts of the tribal areas than the state of Pakistan does. I think that the U.S. policy should be one of nuanced engagement with Pakistan. The engagement should continue. The U.S. should ensure that the leverage that it has bought is put to good use.

What should it be put to use for? It should be put to use for a strong military effort backed by civilian support. What has been

lacking so far is civilian support. General Musharraf has totally failed in mobilizing civilian support for the war against terrorism in Pakistan. Pakistani civilian support for the war is absolutely necessary. It may not come overnight, but I think the U.S. needs to identify civilian partners who will be able to provide that support.

At the same time, it is also important for the United States to use the leverage it has built with the Pakistani military, not to just consistently praise the Pakistani military and in the process reinforce the prejudices of the Pakistani military that have led them to take part in four military coups in Pakistan's short history of 60 years. Instead, every interaction, whether at the civilian diplomatic level or at the military-to-military level, should be used to convince the Pakistani military that it is as much part of the problem as it is part of the solution.

On the specifics that are of concern to this committee, the problems in the Northwest Frontier Province and the problems in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, I believe that the Pakistani military is facing a serious crisis not just of training, equipment, and motivation, but of morale. These large numbers of troops who are virtually surrendering themselves to the insurgents in Waziristan without putting up a fight would not have done so if they were not conflicted within themselves, and that conflict comes from a belief system after years of having been told that the Jihadists represent a force for good. Now that they are being told to fight them, some of them are not able to make that transition as quickly as General Musharraf was able to make after 9/11 with a phone call from Washington, D.C.

I think, there, a major input needs to be made not only of development funds, but of a major initiative to try and persuade people in the tribal areas that the Jihadists do not represent a force for good for them or for Pakistan.

Last but not least, as Pakistan's transition becomes apparent, the U.S. must make sure that General Musharraf does not wiggle out of his promises about shedding his uniform. The new vice chief of army staff, who is likely to become the next chief of army staff, is a person who is absolutely committed to the notion of civilian control over military matters. He does not like the military being involved in politics. At least, that is his stated position.

I think that the United States has a role to play in ensuring that General Musharraf adheres to the promises he has made to the Supreme Court of Pakistan and to Pakistan's largest political party in the negotiating process that has taken place between General Musharraf and the Pakistan People's Party, and the process of national reconciliation that is set to have been started should now expand to include other groups, including the Pakistan Muslim League led by Mr. Nawaz Sharif, so that Pakistan civilians and Pakistan's military are not at loggerheads with each other, but actually work together. Just as we all know, no military can actually wage a successful military effort without the backing of the nation. If the Nation is conflicted, the military effort suffers, and the same is happening in Pakistan right now.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Haqqani can be found in the Appendix on page 72.]

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Curtis.

STATEMENT OF LISA CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Ms. CURTIS. Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to appear today. It is an honor to testify on a topic of such immense importance to our country.

Pursuing a strong and stable relationship with Pakistan will be one of America's most important foreign policy objectives for several years to come. The range and complexity of issues involved in our relations require focused and sustained U.S. attention. Recent developments, however, are threatening to create misunderstanding between our two countries and to derail this critical partnership.

Pakistani failure to control a burgeoning terrorist safe haven in its tribal areas bordering Afghanistan is causing alarm in Washington, while recently passed U.S. legislation conditioning military assistance to Pakistan is causing doubts about the U.S. as a reliable long-term partner.

In order to sustain the U.S.-Pakistan partnership over the long-term, we need to better align our strategic perspectives of the region. We should not repeat mistakes of the past. A second breach in the relationship, like that caused by the Pressler Amendment that cut off U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990, would seriously jeopardize U.S. interests in South Asia and would have severe implications on the global fight against terrorism.

Pakistan is in the midst of an historical political transition that will determine the core direction of the country at a time when extremists are seeking to provoke an Islamic revolution. Washington should welcome the transition to civilian democratic rule.

Pakistani frustration with prolonged military rule and the perception that Washington is more interested in preserving Musharraf's rule than in restoring democracy is eroding popular support for the broader fight against terrorism. A recent poll taken by the U.S. organization Terror Free Tomorrow shows that an overwhelming majority of the Pakistanis do not view the fight against terrorism as benefiting their country, nor do they see defeating al Qaeda as a priority for their leaders. Instead, they blame the recent violence in Pakistan on its counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S., and they increasingly question the benefits of continuing to support U.S. efforts that, in their opinion, rely too heavily on military force.

In what may prove to be a major blow to the terrorists in the region, Pakistan reported killing possibly 200 militants in clashes this past weekend in North Waziristan. The capture of over 240 Pakistani soldiers in late August, as Marv pointed out, demonstrates, however, the complexity in dealing with the terrorists in the border areas where the local populations share a Pashtun identity with about 30 percent of the Pakistan army.

Washington and Islamabad need to work more closely in joint efforts that bring U.S. resources and military strength to bear on the

situation in North and South Waziristan. They need to employ a combination of targeted military operations and economic assistance programs that drive a wedge between the Pashtun tribal communities and the international terrorists. Washington's pledge of $750 million over the next 5 years to develop the tribal areas is certainly welcomed, but Pakistan will have to restore the writ of the government before the aid is disbursed, to ensure it does not fall into the wrong hands. The Reconstruction Opportunity Zone Initiative is also an integral part of our overall strategy to uproot terrorism from the border areas. The Administration and Congress should work together to launch this project as soon as possible.

Another obstacle to dealing with the terrorist safe haven in the tribal areas is Washington's and Islamabad's differing perspectives on Afghanistan. Pakistan and the U.S. share the overall goal of bringing stability in Afghanistan, and they agree that the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan would have a blow-back effect in Pakistan. However, for a variety of reasons, including Pakistani doubts about the U.S. long-term commitment to the region and Islamabad distrust of the Karzai government, Islamabad is reluctant to crack down fully on the Taliban and the other extremists operating from its territory. This means that the U.S. will have to take a more proactive role in promoting better Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and prod both countries to cooperate in areas such as border monitoring and trade, but also address longstanding political tensions. The Afghanistan Freedom and Security Support Act of 2007 that passed the House and is now before the Senate acknowledges this and authorizes the President to appoint a special envoy to promote closer Pakistan-Afghanistan cooperation.

It is also critical that India and Pakistan maintain momentum in their peace process. One reason for continued Pakistani ambivalence toward the Taliban stems from the concern that India is trying to encircle it by giving influence in Afghanistan.

Last, I believe that conditioning U.S. assistance to Pakistan sends a negative signal at a time when we need to demonstrate that the fight against terrorism is a joint endeavor that benefits Pakistan as much as it does the U.S., as well as the global community. The abrupt cutoff of the U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990 convinced Pakistanis that the U.S. is a fickle partner and uncommitted to the region. Conditioning assistance now only fuels that perception, as well as the idea that Pakistan is fighting terrorism under coercion, rather than to protect its own citizens.

That concludes my remarks. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis can be found in the Appendix on page 88.]

The CHAIRMAN. Can anyone tell me how the Pakistani army or military is recruited? Do they have a draft, or is it all volunteer?

Dr. WEINBAUM. Volunteer.

Ambassador SCHAFFER. It is an all-volunteer force, sir. It is recruited—much, though not all of it, is recruited from certain parts of the country, particularly the central part of the province of Punjab, and it has become kind of its own little world. They have got their own education system, a lot of economic facilities. They have an extraordinarily high standard for——

The CHAIRMAN. How large is the army?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Hmm?

The CHAIRMAN. How large is it?

Dr. WEINBAUM. About 600,000.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just one question, and any one of you can answer it.

What are the implications of President Musharraf's planned resignation from his military post? Anybody.

Mr. HAQQANI. The implications, of course, would be, on the one hand, it would strengthen the civilians' role in government, and it may actually bring to an end or at least diminish the opposition that General Musharraf attracts by virtue of having both positions.

The succession in the Pakistan army is going to follow a clearly defined structure, because the army is an institution that is very structured, and it might actually enable a new commander to take over who will be closer in age and, in terms of training, have better interaction with his other commanders, because one of the biggest problems that is emerging from General Musharraf's hanging in there for so long is that the gap between the military academy course that General Musharraf attended and the military academy course that his lieutenant generals and major generals attended has been increasing, and that gap also, usually, translates into ineffective relationships or relationships that are not necessarily built together while having been in the army in the chain of command at the same time. So I think it would probably be a good thing for both the Pakistan army and Pakistan's political development.

Dr. WEINBAUM. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add one remark.

The CHAIRMAN. You bet.

Dr. WEINBAUM. I think that—I certainly agree with Professor Haqqani.

We have a problem, though, in that not immediately, but there were 10 years in which there was no military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, and with that generation of people who did not have the contacts with us that General Musharraf had with British—in this case, with Kiani, with the United States, we are going to be seeing, very shortly, those people rising to positions of importance. This is an unfortunate consequence of having turned our back on Pakistan in 1990.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, if one of you could describe to me—we had a series of briefings on this, and it is still a little bit unclear as to the insurgents, the terrorists, who are now ensconced in this safe haven and as to what their real relationship is with the tribes. Is it one of an intimidation nature, like the Montagnards in the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in the Central Highlands? Is it one of a common affiliation or a friendly partnership, or is it a business?

Mr. HAQQANI. It is a mixture of all, sir. It goes back to the anti-Soviet war during which this entire area was the place from which the operations against the Soviets were launched inside Afghanistan. So, at that time, of course, several jihadi organizers came from all over the world, including some from the Arab world. Some

of them intermarried with the local tribespeople, and so now, for example, we have a situation where the number two in al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, actually has a local wife and, therefore, is related to one particular tribe through marriage. So it is a 20-year/30-year relationship.

There are economic interests that work together. These tribes are generally very poor. They do not have very good agrarian land. The literary rate, for example, for women in the entire tribal belt is 3 percent, and for men it is about 17 percent. So, therefore, there are not really that many economic opportunities. There is no industry. The agriculture is insignificant. Most major facilities do not exist, and there, the ability, especially of the international terrorist networks like al Qaeda, to raise funds globally and bring them to the people is another incentive.

So it is business. It is family. It is ideological ties built over the last two to three decades, and it is tribal pride in the case of those who feel that their matters have to be resolved by them, themselves, rather than by outsiders, because we must understand that the bulk of the officers corps of Pakistan's army comes from regions that are not necessarily Pashtun and, certainly, not from the tribal areas.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, if the relationship between the extremists and the locals is that strong, why do you think—you have discussed the idea of the United States trying to utilize resources in terms of putting money in, development, all the things that sometimes accompany a military operation where you are trying to bring about the friendship of the population. That sounds to me like you have got some pretty strong elements that will be very difficult to turn aside with a couple of water projects or to change or to cleave.

Ambassador SCHAFFER. That is why, sir, I described this as the work of a generation.

What the Pakistani state basically has to do through some combination of political, economic, and other means is to make the tribal leaders in those areas feel that their future depends on Pakistan, and that they should not look on the Pakistani leadership as outsiders, but, as you said yourself, this does not happen quickly or easily.

Mr. HUNTER. Yes. Go ahead.

Dr. WEINBAUM. If I might just add to that, what we are dealing with here is a different leadership. Previously the way the British earlier and then the Pakistan government dealt with this leadership was through political agents who offered bribes and also threats.

What we have now, increasingly, in radicalized laws and in young men who are unemployed and who are getting some of the funds that Mr. Haqqani had mentioned—what we are getting now are people who are ideologically bent, and these individuals have mostly as their mission the Islamitization and, indeed, the Talibanization of their own country, and so their agenda is not one that you can easily buy off.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, then, the last question, Mr. Chairman.

Give me the relationship of the army—of these 100,000 folks who are compromised somewhat by the frontier force and, to some de-

gree, by the regular Pakistani army—their relationship with these tribal communities.

As they come in searching—presumably searching for the enemy, do the tribes take up arms against them? Do they stand by? Do they try to help in subtle ways the terrorist community there? What is the relationship?

Dr. WEINBAUM. You know, some tribes—and we should really talk about subtribes and smaller units—do side with the military. Others, clearly, are working against the military. So it is hard to generalize about this, but for the most part, the military does not engage in the kind of door-to-door operations that we are familiar with.

For example, in southern Afghanistan, the military, for the most part, has not taken the initiative in the tribal area recently. The other day, the 200 or so who were killed were killed by aerial bombardment. So there is not really a strong relationship here.

Let me just sum up by saying what the military has done with some success. Until the Red Mosque affair took place, it has tried to use that old method of divide and rule. It has tried to support some factions against other factions, and that for a while did work. But now we see that that original agreement of September 2006 has been broken by virtually all of the tribes in the Waziristan area.

Ms. CURTIS. Can I just emphasize Ambassador Schaffer's point about this taking a long period of time, and we have to have a certain amount of patience?

It is economic development in the first instance, but it is about changing the ideology. As Professor Haqqani pointed out, there are the links going back to the Afghan war. In many ways these people are stuck in the 1980's, the 1990's. They have not absorbed the changes that have been brought by 9/11. So part of this is ideological, and it does start with socioeconomic development, but it does take a long time.

Just to point out, as to the idea of sort of dividing and conquering and the fact that these tribes do have different loyalties, and the Pakistan government has tried to use that in order to get tactical gains, should we say, in the long run, I do not think that that kind of strategy is going to be effective. There has to be an all-out, comprehensive effort that does include politically integrating these areas into Pakistan, and there have been efforts in this regard by some of the Pakistani political parties who argue that if you do bring those areas into the broader Pakistani political framework, you are likely to get at this problem of extremism, because then there will not be so much power going to the mosques and these unofficial links, and you will have the areas being part of the overall Pakistani system.

Mr. HAQQANI. If I may just say one word.

There will be some people who will be diehard, ideologically committed extremists, and they can be dealt with militarily. Then there are those who are in it because this is their livelihood. They facilitate the jihad, and so that is their livelihood. I think that the government of Pakistan's desire is to at least get these people out of that mix and give them an alternative livelihood rather than just being the facilitators of extremists who get funds from outside and,

therefore, are influential through their ability to provide resources to the locals.

So it is two parallel tracks. I mean, of course, if Osama bin Laden marries into a tribe and, therefore, buys that loyalty to that marriage, that tribe will have to be dealt with differently than the tribe that is there only because it is getting money to be able to allow people safe passage through the mountains and the hills and the caves that that tribe controls.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you all for your excellent presentations and testimony.

I think it was you, Mr. Haqqani, who said that the Musharraf government and the army tend to draw a distinction between the Taliban and al Qaeda.

Number one, how do they distinguish the two? How do they identify one as opposed to the other? How do they justify that distinction?

Mr. HAQQANI. Sir, first of all, the Taliban are exclusively Pashtun. They are either Afghans, and now, increasingly, they are Pakistanis, so they speak the Pashtun language. They are from the area.

What the Musharraf government describes as al Qaeda are essentially those who are of non-local origin—for example, Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens, even people from the Xinjiang province of China—who have all assembled there and who are led primarily by the ideology as well as the organizational structure of Osama bin Laden. I personally feel that——

Mr. SPRATT. So the al Qaeda are identifiable? They are distinguishable from the Taliban and any other extremists?

Mr. HAQQANI. Yes, they are. My only comment would be that, in some cases, there are Taliban groups that have actually placed themselves virtually under the control of al Qaeda, and that is a reality that the government of Pakistan has been very reluctant to admit, but it is a reality that people like me have been pointing out for three or four years, that there are at least some Taliban who are not just local; they are essentially integrated into the al Qaeda command structure and should, therefore, be treated just like al Qaeda should be treated or is treated.

Mr. SPRATT. Well, you say that the army really does not appear to have a plan for going after al Qaeda, but if they know their safe havens and the places where they live can distinguish them from other extremist elements, what is holding them back and preventing them from taking that initiative? Is it Musharraf, himself, or his government?

Mr. HAQQANI. Sir, making a distinction between the two as individuals or groups is not necessarily the same thing as saying that they actually know the different safe havens, because in some cases the Taliban provides a safe haven for al Qaeda. So, if the al Qaeda people were actually to come out and a Pakistan army person were to be confronted with an Arab from al Qaeda and a Pashtun Taliban, he would be able to make the distinction, but if you are

flying over, you do not necessarily make a distinction, because both dress alike.

In the end, the Pakistani government's intelligence capability and the U.S. intelligence capability in this matter is not something that is shared with people like myself who are outside of government, but if they do have the intelligence and they do not go after them, the only explanation for that would be that people in the government of Pakistan feel that they do not need to solve this problem right now.

Mr. SPRATT. All of you seem to suggest that Musharraf has his faults and his shortcomings, for sure, but it begs the question: Is there anyone better who would take his place if he were deposed or somehow defeated?

In particular, I have been told that, in the army, the junior officers tend to be much more fundamentalists in Islam and ideological than do the senior officers, who are more like the British for that matter. They are more worldly and less ideological. Is that a correct observation that the junior officers in the army are apt to be worse?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. That I cannot tell you, sir.

There has been an increase in public piety in Pakistan over the past 10, 20 years, and I am sure the army has participated in that, but like other organizations, it tends to recruit officers like the old ones. So I suspect that there is not a stark difference between the generations.

I would urge you, though, not just to think in terms of this individual or that individual. You have got a government structure in Pakistan where institutions historically have become weaker, and that is one of the big problems we are dealing with. Musharraf today is not the same guy that we have been working with for the past six weeks. His power and ability to control things in Pakistan have significantly diminished in the past six months. He has shown a need and a willingness to reach for repressive measures when politically challenged, and I think what you are going to deal with in the future is a more brittle Musharraf without, unfortunately, the buildup of institutions that can help moderate this, and that, I think, is the most urgent need for our long-term policy in Pakistan.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Pakistan currently is believed to have enough fissile material, mainly enriched uranium, for maybe 90 nuclear weapons and is assumed to have the capability to deliver them over significant distances. Officially, the United States continues to urge Pakistan to join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and offers no official recognition of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability, which certainly exists in spite of this policy of not recognizing it.

I have a staff-prepared document in front of me which says the obvious, I think, that internal instability has been on the rise in Pakistan since mid–2007. Now, there has been essentially no discussion of the nuclear issue relative to Pakistan, although they could have as many as 90 weapons, with internal instability; and we are near-hysterical over the possibility that Iran may obtain a nuclear weapon or two.

Are we too little concerned about the nuclear issue in Pakistan, too much concerned about the nuclear issue in Iran? What are your thoughts?

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I think that the army, as an institution, has firm control—command and control over the nuclear weapons; and I don't think there is any reason to be unduly concerned, with this political transition that we are in, that something could happen with the command of those nuclear weapons.

Our issue with Pakistan's assets is more long-term. Certainly, the U.S. needs to make it a priority, the security and safety of Pakistan's nuclear assets, and I will talk about a particular case that happened shortly after 9/11 in which some senior retired Pakistani nuclear scientists actually met with al Qaeda leaders—I think Osama bin Laden himself. And this is something that we need to be concerned about, retired officials who still have links to jihadists, particularly al Qaeda, and their willingness to associate and communicate with them.

I think it is the penetration of the nuclear establishment that the U.S. should be most concerned about, and so that means we need to work with Pakistanis in ensuring nuclear safety and security. This is difficult to do because, as you said, Pakistan has not signed NPT, and U.S. law prohibits any cooperation that might enhance Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. So this is certainly a sensitive issue, but is one that we need to forge through and we need to continue pursuing.

Mr. HAQQANI. If I may make a short comment, sir, nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia and non-proliferation concerns relating to Pakistan have simply not been on the agenda of the U.S. Government for the last couple of years, and I think that they need to be brought back on the agenda. That is not to say that Pakistan's nuclear weapons pose a threat to international security right away. But to the extent that we want to control nuclear proliferation all over the world, I think that the U.S. Government should start taking an active interest in ensuring that South Asia, as a region—and that applies to both India and Pakistan—that the nuclear capabilities are brought under some international regime because, right now, both countries are non-signatories of the Non-proliferation Treaty, and none of the international obligations apply to either of them at the moment.

Mr. BARTLETT. The international rules for nuclear non-proliferation seem to be pretty clear. You can't have a nuclear weapon until you have them, and then it is okay. Is that going to obtain to Iran as well?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I am sure that the U.S. does not wish it to obtain to Iran, but more importantly, I am sure the U.S. would like not to find out, because they don't want Iran to develop the things in the first place.

I think, in the case of Pakistan, the U.S. has had, historically, two big worries about its nuclear arsenal: one, that it not be used in the most obvious cases—that would be a hypothetical war with India; two, that it not be exported. And on that score, as you know, there have been some lapses, particularly the network run by A.Q. Kahn. And Lisa said, the security of the existing arsenal is as good or as bad as the security of the Pakistan army.

I would say, right at the moment, probably pretty good, but certainly nothing one can be complacent about.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would try to see if I could understand.

I think Mr. Haqqani mentioned that President Musharraf has not been able to mobilize civilian support, but he is able to win an election. Normally, at least here in the United States, if somebody is able to win an election, you can normally try to mobilize civilian support. So what is the missing ingredient here? How come he can't do that if he is able to win an election?

Mr. HAQQANI. If I may explain the Pakistani system, sir, he hasn't been elected like the President of the United States is elected. The people did not vote. He was elected by the parliament, so—he had an election for parliament in 2002, which was described by the State Department and all international observers as seriously flawed.

And now there is a parliamentary election, and in principle, he should have waited for the next parliament to elect the next president. But to ensure that he will be president, he asked the current parliament to vote on him. And because he already had a majority, he had the deck stacked there. He won. So read in the newspaper: He got 98 percent of the votes cast. Basically, you are talking about some 300-odd people voting for him out of parliament. All the opposition parties boycotted the election. The major opposition party, led by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, decided to abstain from the election but did not resign from the parliament.

So it is more the technical victory. It gives him legal cover to remain president for the next five years. It is not a legitimate election.

As far as popularity is concerned, the same poll that Ms. Curtis quoted from Terror Free Tomorrow shows us that Osama bin Laden right now has more favorable ratings in Pakistan in opinion polls than General Musharraf does.

Mr. ORTIZ. So what problems would be created once the courts come out and certify him, that he has won the election? What problems do you anticipate would happen when that happens?

Mr. HAQQANI. The problems that are most likely to happen are that the Pakistani political parties and the loyalists who have been campaigning against General Musharraf will continue to campaign against him. The only way it may be averted is if a parliamentary election is held and the parliamentary election is genuinely free and fair; and the people feel that now Musharraf is a transitional figure so let us accept him as a transitional figure.

My fears are that General Musharraf is too used to being an absolute ruler. But if he is willing to give up absolute power and share it with whoever wins the parliamentary election and allows them to become prime minister with full powers under the constitution, then we could actually see a transition in which the fact that he is unpopular does not matter. It would be a bit like Chile and Pinochet in the end game; when Pinochet is withdrawing and

the elections are held and a new government is coming in, his shadow is still there, but it is a shadow, not full power.

That is the scenario that would be a good scenario.

The bad scenario would be that General Musharraf insists on saying, "Now that I have been elected, the election has been certified, I am the boss and I am going to continue business as usual." If that happens, we will see a lot of friction and conflict in Pakistan; and for the purposes of the members of this committee, it will be a major, major distraction from the war against terror, because while the president and his main advisers are busy trying to control the government and survive in office, there is no likelihood that an effective war can be waged against the terrorists.

Mr. ORTIZ. One of the things—and I know there is a lot of dealmaking between our government and the Pakistani government. But I think one of the things that we—at least that I see missing is that we are not going to the Pakistani people. But how do you do that? I mean, how can we engage the masses of Pakistani people?

I think that is a mistake that we have made, not only in Pakistan, but in many places; that instead of going to the people, we go to, of course, the politicians and other government officials. Is there a way to do that more effectively?

Dr. WEINBAUM. Sir, the Pakistani people, by and large, view the partnership with the United States as one with the army and Musharraf. We failed here by the way in which we have used our assistance, as you have heard. Some 80 percent of all the assistance that we have given over the years has gone for the military or for security. The people of Pakistan have viewed this relationship, therefore, as not necessarily in their interests.

As you have also heard, there was a bright moment, back two years ago just now, when we demonstrated to the Pakistan people, through our support when the earthquake took place, our willingness to move our military in and to assist in the relief efforts, which was so significant, because what it said for that brief time was, here was the United States military operating for the people of Pakistan, something which was not going to benefit directly the army or Musharraf.

I think generally what we have with President Musharraf is someone who—for lack of, indeed, thinking about plan B, we have thrown our lot in with President Musharraf and lavished praise on him over a long period of time and not recognized the way in which this was being interpreted in Pakistan society. The more we have done it of late, the more we have only reinforced the idea that somehow this is a relationship with him.

We failed also to—only quite belatedly did we suggest to push him, in a sense, toward a partnership, in this case with Benazir Bhutto. But that came very late in the game and was so transparent that now most people in Pakistan view that as, again, something which was orchestrated here in Washington. It serves neither President Musharraf nor, for that matter, Madam Bhutto.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much.

Mr. SPRATT [presiding]. Mr. Jones of North Carolina.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And I want to say to the panel, this has been fascinating. What I have heard is of great concern to me. It truly is. And I am sure it is to many people like myself who are not experts in this area.

Ambassador Schaffer, your comments about—and you certainly explained it—a critical time. I was really just taken aback when the professor said that bin Laden was the most popular figure in Ms. Curtis' poll.

Ms. Curtis, would you go back briefly and explain the poll, the couple of questions that you might have asked the people of Pakistan, as it related to the image of America in and around that area and, also, how you asked the question about bin Laden.

Just curiosity more than anything, the reason I am asking.

Ms. CURTIS. What the Terror Free Tomorrow poll showed, which I think was about a month ago, was that the Pakistani people do not see the fight against terrorism as their fight; they see what is happening as being done largely at the U.S.'s behest, even though the terrorists certainly threaten the Pakistani state.

And we saw Osama bin Laden, in a recent video, call on Pakistanis to rise up and overturn the regime. So clearly there is an extremist threat, but for several different reasons the Pakistanis themselves are not seeing it that way. They are not digesting it the way, I think, we in America view the situation. And so this is a problem, and we do have to work on improving perceptions of America in Pakistan.

Our credibility is at an all-time low. I think we were slow to recognize the ferment for democracy in that country. We have recently adopted a policy that is promoting democracy, but I think that it may be too little too late. I think it is very important that President Musharraf remove his military uniform because of the problems with the election that Professor Haqqani pointed out with the Presidential election.

And there are challenges within the Supreme Court to that election as we speak that have still not been decided upon. If the Supreme Court legitimizes that election, I think it is incumbent on President Musharraf to step down from his position as Chief of Army staff. He has already promised the Court this. He reneged on this pledge in 2004; if he does it again, there will certainly be political unrest.

And so this is a key issue that I think the U.S. can help on.

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Sir, I think that there are two other aspects of that poll that are important. One is the fact that it took place at a time when General Musharraf's popularity was really tanking for reasons that had essentially nothing to do with the United States. But he has been in power for eight years; and Pakistan is a tough country to govern, so that even if he had no flaws at all, it seems logical that his popularity would have fallen. And, of course, with the tug of war he was conducting with the Supreme Court, that certainly intensified it.

The other important factor is Iraq. And the United States in the public mind in Pakistan has become so associated with this attack on Muslims, as it is seen, that this very much intensifies the unpopularity of the United States.

I served in Pakistan 30 years ago. I traveled all over the place without worrying about my security. My kids spoke Urdu and chat-

ted up all the neighbors and the villagers across the way. It was a very different country then.

Mr. HAQQANI. And if I could just explain, the question that was asked in the poll was, "Do you approve or disapprove of the following?" And it listed several people. So Ms. Bhutto, for example, had a 63 percent approval rating, and Mr. Nawaz Sharif, the former Prime Minister, had 56; Osama bin Laden had 44 and General Musharraf had 33. So Osama bin Laden is not the most popular person in Pakistan; it is just that he has a higher favorable rating than General Musharraf does.

Dr. WEINBAUM. Sir, there is another poll, and that is by the Pew Organization, which indicated a favorable view of the United States by approximately 17 percent of the Pakistan public.

I think that the real tragedy here is that Pakistan's alternatives have been so dismal that it has—even on the Democratic Front here, it has choices here that even many of the Pakistan people in the parties themselves would say, "It is sad that this is really the menu that we have politically to choose from."

And much of President Musharraf's strength over the last few years has been by default, that there has been no one who has been able to step up. And I think it is unfortunate now that because Benazir Bhutto has chosen to negotiate with him, the fact that she has produced up to this point so little in the way of concessions from him, I fear that she, who represents perhaps the most progressive elements in Pakistan, now has lost so much credibility that even that point of view may have suffered.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I agree with your analysis wholeheartedly, about the box that we are in and perhaps how we got there. I wonder if you could address sort of the counterargument and the reason our Administration has pursued this path, is that the fear that while—if it is not Musharraf, then the extremists take over and we don't have control; we can't risk moving away from him because there is no alternative.

It seems to me that we would have been better served and we would even be better served now to push for democracy, because we may have Musharraf, but we are losing the population. And, ultimately, as we lose the Pakistani population, their support for the U.S., even their support for the notion that the extremists in their midst, like al Qaeda, are a profound threat to them. When they see us as the cause of that, we are really undermining our policy.

So, two questions: What is the specific way back from that? How do we get the population of Pakistan to—and I don't even think we should focus on getting them necessarily to be more sympathetic to the U.S. I think we need to get them to the point where they see al Qaeda, the Taliban, and that group of extremists as a threat to them that they need to confront. That would be my goal.

But what is the way back to that? And what is the risk along the way of those people gaining more electoral power if we try to move off of Musharraf? How do we get the former without falling into the latter?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I think you are talking fundamentally about the message that Pakistani leaders who are seeking popular election will be delivering or won't be delivering as the case may be. Where the U.S., I think, missed a number of opportunities was that our support for the democratic process in Pakistan has been, at best, anemic. And if we had been having this conversation a few years ago, there were lots of alternatives, none of them perfect, but several of them, with people that we had in fact worked in the past. So it is not as if it was just Musharraf and the crazies.

You now have the possibility of a government emerging from the next elections that will include Musharraf's people and Benazir Bhutto's people, all of them having lost something in credibility and political popularity in the process of getting there. They have an opportunity to recast the struggle against the extremists as Pakistan's struggle. If they don't do that, I would submit to you they are in trouble, because there has been violence in Pakistan in the past three months on a scale that I can't remember.

Mr. SMITH. Can I focus in on that point?

As you mentioned earlier, a lot of the Pakistani people have said it is because of Musharraf's policies, his alliance with the U.S., what we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. There has got to be a piece of it that, "Gosh, these extremists are a threat to us." So I would imagine there is some balance in the public opinion.

Can you help me out with your greater knowledge of how the Pakistani people look at that?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I can't help you out at the level of the man on the street or the man in the wheat fields, because there are an awful lot of them; it is a country of 160 million people. But if you are talking about the opinion of elite, educated people, there is widespread recognition that extremists, particularly those that are prepared to use violence, pose a real threat to the integrity of the state.

Lisa and I were at a meeting last weekend with a number of distinguished Pakistani representatives who made the most impassioned plea to that effect that I can remember hearing in a long time.

So it is really a question of how you articulate and how you envision the battle for self-preservation that I think the Pakistani state has to undertake. And this is something that is taking place not just in the frontier areas, but also in what Pakistanis call the "settled areas." The Red Mosque, after all, was in downtown Islamabad, which is a sleepy, suburban-feeling capital.

Mr. SMITH. I am about out of time. I want to ask one final question.

Isn't there a certain wisdom at this point in stepping back a little bit on our part as the U.S. and saying, "We believe in democracy enough to accept its outcome in Pakistan, and we don't feel the need to manipulate it?"

Or is the risk in doing that greater than the rewards?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. There is a risk in everything. I would agree with that statement.

Dr. WEINBAUM. One of the problems that we have now is that our credibility has fallen so low that virtually anything we do is misinterpreted.

For example, just a few weeks ago Secretary Rice initiated a phone call at apparently two in the morning which—I don't think we decided that. But there was a great deal of disagreement within the elite itself, within the establishment itself, whether going to emergency rule was really in the best interest of the country, or the military for that matter. Secretary Rice, I think, changed the balance here or the feeling and he did not go ahead.

What happened in Pakistan is that rather than getting the credit for salvaging democracy in this case, we got the blame for interfering in their politics, so that this is a situation that we face here that, I agree with you, it is perhaps necessary to step back.

Let me add one thing. There is a distinction in the public in Pakistan between al Qaeda and the Taliban. Al Qaeda are viewed as foreigners; here, I think a lot, a majority in Pakistan, are willing to see them as a source of terrorism and recognize that.

But we have to realize that a large part of the country, particularly the Pashtun area of the country, does not see the Taliban, the Afghan Taliban as the enemy. They view them as one and the same kind of people. They share many cultural values together. They also believe that what they are doing in Afghanistan is supporting the Pashtun people in Afghanistan.

So there is a great deal of difference there, and it is important, because it limits what the Pakistan government can actually do in dealing with the Afghan Taliban.

Again, making another distinction, the Pakistani Taliban, their agenda is the kind of agenda we have been hearing, and that is to spread this Talibanization inside Pakistan.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia, Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

It seems to me the discussion this morning about the region is a fear that we are developing a policy of a circular firing squad, ultimately, and I think about the fact that we have supported—and I think you pointed out that most of our support has gone to Pakistan over the last many years on the military side—F–16s, as an example, other weapons systems technology.

And now, more recently, of course, we are involved with India in trying to cooperate with them on a civilian nuclear program as they attest it to be. And I just wonder how we can reconcile the two areas of support of these two countries who are—there is a constant conflict between them not over just the Kashmir region. But how do we reconcile what we are doing in Pakistan with our policy in India?

And the second part of the question is, what can we do to try to help these two countries get along better with each other?

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I think the answer is to continue doing what we have been doing. We have come a long way in terms of encouraging an Indo-Pak peace process, which of course was launched in January 2004. The Pakistani leadership has, for obvious reasons, been distracted, and those talks have not moved forward very far in the last few months, which is quite understandable. However, I will note that the two countries do have meetings in New Delhi—next week, as a matter of fact—to talk about nuclear confidence

building as well as a joint counterterrorism mechanism. So I think there is interest in continuing the peace process.

But certainly the U.S. should not put this issue on the back burner. It needs to continue to focus on pushing this process forward, because it is fundamental to overall security in the region.

And in terms of what we are doing with each side, the U.S. has chosen to dehyphenate its relations with Pakistan, with India, no longer seeing the relationships through the lens of their dispute over Kashmir or their dispute—overall animosity with each other. And I think this is the correct policy, because India is an emerging country with an economy that is moving forward. It is playing an increasing role in Asia. So what we are doing with India has more to do with its role in Asia and our interests there, whereas with Pakistan, clearly we need to have a long-term relationship that works toward promoting democracy, stability, counterterrorism, et cetera. So both relationships are incredibly important, but for very different reasons.

But I agree with you. The Indo-Pak peace process is fundamental to overall regional stability, and it impacts the situation even in Afghanistan. So, for that reason, we can't take our eye off the ball in continuing to encourage those talks.

Dr. GINGREY. I would like some of the other panelists to comment on that, too.

But how many attempts have been made on Musharraf's life? Three or four or so. And he is not going to be there forever, even though he says he is there for another five years. Something is going to happen, the possibility of something happening. And what kind of rogue regime is going to be there then with our military technology? I mentioned the F–16s, and I have got great concerns about that.

Ambassador SCHAFFER. That is just one of the reasons that I think it is essential with the United States to maintain contact with the range of leaders in Pakistan—with the army, with the political opposition. And to put its support behind an open democratic process that has, I would suggest to you, a better chance of producing leadership in Pakistan that wants to be part of the world rather than withdrawing from it.

There aren't any easy answers, and Pakistan is going to be a deeply troubled country, I think, for some time. But I see that as the best way of trying to muddle through.

Mr. HAQQANI. Sir, I would say that it is not necessarily—this is a Cold War attitude we have had. There was a time when there was competition between India and Pakistan, and the United States thought that it could get advantage by giving weapons to Pakistan and ultimately to India. I think that that attitude needs to change. I think Pakistan needs schools, sanitation, health care. I think that Pakistan's—this attitude that every time the Pakistani military comes to power and comes to Washington, D.C., asking for new weapons systems, we think that that is what is going to buy America leverage there. I think that has been proven wrong in the past.

I think that the real leverage for the United States will come through a vibrant Pakistan in which the 160 million people of Pakistan feel they have a stake in their country and its relation-

ships with the rest of the world, a process that is happening in some of the countries.

So there are two types of people in Pakistan: Those who want to see Pakistan as the next Korea, South Korea, or the next Taiwan or the next Japan; and there are those whose vision is that Pakistan should be a militarized state that should be able to fight with India; and at the same time, there are those within the militarized state vision who actually want a jihadist vision.

I think it is time to encourage the vision of Pakistan that is about globalization and joining the rest of the world, rather than just thinking in terms of what new weapons systems can we sell them next year.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Andrews from New Jersey.

Mr. ANDREWS. I would like to thank the chairman for calling this hearing. I think it is very timely. I also thank the panel for great testimony.

I think we have the right to be hopeful about this relationship, but we have the duty to be pessimistic and a duty to be sober. And let me spin out a very sobering series of events and ask whomever on the panel to comment.

Ambassador Schaffer talked about the likelihood that whoever wins the new round of elections won't have a lot of credibility. I think that is self-evident.

Let us assume that that government fails to make the war against the terrorists a national mission, and they get overwhelmed by the lack of support for what is going on. And let us assume that things further fall apart, and the violence that the ambassador made reference to rises, and there is a chaotic situation, and the jihadist vision that Mr. Haqqani just referenced a minute ago comes to pass.

Given today's circumstances, what probability would each of the panelists put on the likelihood that that vision of a fundamentalist government taking over in Pakistan would occur? Given where we are today, how would you assess the probability of us winding up shortly down the road with an Islamic fundamentalist government running things in Pakistan?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Given a halfway decent performance by the next government, I would assess it relatively low.

Mr. ANDREWS. What if the performance fails?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. If the performance is bad and seen to be bad, by which I mean trouble in the streets, tapering off of economic growth, visible and obvious reverses by the army in dealing with the frontier areas, then I have a real concern that a hybrid government of the sort that now seems to be a possibility would tarnish all the participants in it and would set the stage, possibly, for the religious parties to do better than they historically have.

Now, let me distinguish between the religious parties and the militants. The religious parties are participants in the political process; they are not themselves people who take up arms. They include their share, some would say more than their share, of people who are in it for the patronage. The militants are people who are prepared to use violence.

But there is some overlap between the two groups.

Mr. ANDREWS. So how would you assess the probability the militants would ascend?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. The only way I can see that happening would be if they made common cause with somebody in the army.

Mr. ANDREWS. Dr. Weinbaum, what is your assessment?

Dr. WEINBAUM. I would add to what Ambassador Schaffer has said. It really depends on what happens with the mainstream of Pakistan's politics. I think the great hope here, based on the past, is that most Pakistanis really do support moderate, mainstream politics.

These parties are not programmatic parties, as such, but they have dominated. As you have heard this figure so many times, the religious parties, at best, get 11 percent of the vote.

The great fear would be that if a military government—and Musharraf has been doing this—if it continues here to sideline the moderate parties, that if it encumbers the moderate parties, there will be effectively a vacuum, and so then that the alternative to the military will be a solution which is promulgated by the religious parties.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Haqqani, remember my question, the premise of it was that we had a failed credibility of the new government. So what happens if that happens?

Mr. HAQQANI. In case of the failed credibility of the government, the Pakistan army will still have residual strength to be able to keep things under control for maybe another five, seven years. But ten years down the road, unless Pakistan's internal crises are addressed and there are multiple crises—there are the tribal areas, there are the economic injustices——

Mr. ANDREWS. You think it is high?

Mr. HAQQANI. I think in ten years it could be very high unless those crises are addressed.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you.

Ms. Curtis, what do you think?

Ms. CURTIS. Well, first, I think your scenario—I think the chances are very low so long as a general election is held and is perceived as credible. I think the scenario that you spell out is more likely in the event that we don't move forward with a political process in returning to civilian democratic rule.

Mr. ANDREWS. Why would you favor conditioning U.S. aid on at least holding a general election then? Because you said there shouldn't be any condition on U.S. aid. Wouldn't it make sense then? Just say, we don't care about the outcome? Just say, you have to have the election?

Ms. CURTIS. I think it is complex, and I think we need to encourage elections. But we can do that diplomatically. Our statements mean a lot. When we call on the government to release opposition politicians, it matters.

So I think our statements mean a lot, but conditioning the assistance sends the wrong signal.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think—Mr. Haqqani?

Mr. HAQQANI. I just wanted to make a quick comment.

As long as it is not seen as a return to Pressler, meaning legislation that will automatically come into effect and therefore will hurt

Pakistan and will therefore be seen as Uncle Sam dictating to Pakistan, I think that some pressure from both Congress and the executive branch for a free and fair election, because Pakistan has a track record of being able to hold elections. Whether they are free or fair is a different matter.

So I think that a free and fair election which is inclusive and allows everybody a level playing field, I think, is something that is in the interest of Pakistan and in the interest of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship; and anything you do in favor of it is welcome.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to try to squeeze a couple more members in, and then we have four votes, one 15-minute and three 5-minute votes. But subject to the witnesses being able to stay with us, we will return, because it is a very, very important hearing.

Mr. Akin, to be followed by Ms. Davis.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You might have commented on this earlier.

In terms of the overall instability that is introduced in Pakistan, what percent do the, particularly, Saudi-funded madrasah—how much element of trouble is that?

Because my visit to Pakistan a couple years ago was at a heady time where relations had just been improved with India. There was no more fighting. We stood at the border where you would have been shot two months before. A lot of things looked like they were going the right way.

But on the other hand, there was no public school system, and Saudi oil money was being used to basically train up a new generation of crazies.

Could you comment on, how does that affect the overall? Is that a big thing, or is that just something that over time becomes a problem?

Mr. HAQQANI. Sir, I attended a madrasah, sir, in the 1960's at a time when Pakistan had only a handful of madrasahs, and I assure you that I haven't grown up to be a crazy.

But something has changed. There are more than 10,000 madrasahs now, and they are producing crazies. And what has changed is that my madrasah was locally funded; it was funded by the community. It was a traditionalist seminary. It taught us the Koran, and it taught us traditional Islamist learning and did not necessarily teach us to hate anybody. Things have changed since then.

I think that one of the impacts of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan was that General Zia ul-Haq invited the Saudis—both private individuals, by the way, and the royal family. So it is not just the royal family; it is also private charities from Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries that have now established madrasahs. Even if only a small fraction of them are used as recruitment centers for radicals, it is a disturbing problem.

The government of Pakistan says it is trying to address the problem, but many of the cast of characters in Pakistan's radical movement come from the same schools. And when people who are engaged in militancy are coming from the same set of schools, then there is definitely a connection; and those schools are a problem, and I think that that needs to be addressed.

But at the same time, the public school system in Pakistan has virtually broken down. Pakistan invests less than two percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) in education, notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan has a very young population. And for that young population, schools need to be built.

And Pakistan's public school system needs to be mended, because a lot of families do not intend to send their children to madrasahs to make them radicals. They send them because they need these kids to go somewhere to study something. So if there is a viable public school system which absorbs a large number of young people, then I think that the significance of the madrasahs in relative terms will diminish.

At the same time, the radical madrasahs need to be shut down.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis, and then we will break for the four votes. I hope you can return for the completion of the hearing.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the hearing. I think it is very important.

And I want to thank all of you for being here.

Could you go back to the reference that you all have made in one way or another to U.S. policy and the issue of conditioning, whether it is Department of Defense (DOD) assistance or other assistance, to the fight against terrorism? I think I heard from all of you that you felt that that conditioning issue is not a good idea and that, in fact, it goes back to the 1990 concern about our fickleness. But could you flesh that out some more in terms of what—specifically, what other leverage you believe that the U.S. should be utilizing that it hasn't used?

And if there is some contribution in there to the—you referenced retraining of the military, looking at it differently in terms of whether it is able to act more like a counterinsurgency. What—where is the U.S.? What should the U.S. position be? And how can we influence that in a way—being a partner as opposed to being in some different kind of relationship?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I lived through Pressler as a government official. It was always looked on as the heavy hand of the United States. I would estimate that it probably brought us two, three years of delay on Pakistan's nuclear program. It obviously did not prevent Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons, as it had been intended to do. So that gives me a somewhat jaundiced eye on the effectiveness of legislatively mandated conditions.

I believe that it would be completely appropriate, however, for the Administration, as a matter of policy and perhaps with some encouragement from the Congress, to calibrate our military sales and our military assistance to Pakistan's policies.

I have argued in my testimony that we needed to find some way of encouraging the Pakistan army in developing expertise in the military tools of counterinsurgency. I don't know whether the United States is the best source of that expertise, but if we aren't, we ought to help them find who is.

I think that doing this as a matter of policy can probably have quite a lot of impact without having quite the same PR disaster as a legislatively mandated cutoff.

Ms. CURTIS. I think that given the importance of our relationship with Pakistan, the fact that U.S. credibility is so low, they are facing threats from extremists, we have seen the violence increase dramatically over the last few months—it is a very dicey situation, and when the U.S. comes in and announces, "Well, we are going to condition our assistance," as happened with House Resolution (H.R.) 1, implementing the 9/11 legislation act, we just don't help our cause.

If we are trying to bring the Pakistani people along in the fight against terrorism, promoting economic development, moderation, democracy, I just don't think that we help our cause when we publicly condition.

Now, I think there is much more room to use more savvy diplomacy, if you will. I think it is incumbent upon our diplomats to find ways to pressure, to hold the Pakistanis' feet to the fire, in other words, on some of these issues, and to look at it more from a strategic perspective.

I mean, certainly Pakistan, it has had three wars with its neighbor India. Relations are tense with Afghanistan. You know, there is a need for support in terms of managing the strategic challenges that they face. So I think the U.S. would be better served by dealing more holistically, rather than coming in and conditioning, on one particular occasion, the assistance.

Mr. HAQQANI. My quick response would be that there are many tools between the sledgehammer of sanctions and the indulgence of constant praise that we have heaped on General Musharraf in the last few years. I think that every time the United States engages with Pakistani officials and makes its concerns known, it does have an effect.

When Secretary of State Rice called General Musharraf and told him an emergency was not acceptable, we didn't see emergency. It worked. Similarly, when the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad said that she was recently concerned with the arrests, guess what? Everybody arrested was released in 48 hours.

I think a little more forthright talk is needed. Maybe it is time to tell them that they have been making mistakes.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We will break momentarily. We shall return.

The hearing will resume.

The gentleman from Texas is recognized.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be back.

One of two questions. One, the briefing document made a comment that President Musharraf and Ms. Bhutto, while viewed as pro-Western and had been pro-Western, are viewed as unrepresentative of the priorities of most Pakistani people. So I would like your comments on that.

The other thing is you are talking about how to deal with the ungoverned areas of the tribal areas. You talked about economic development and jobs and those kinds of things. In September, I had the chance to fly along the Afghani-Pakistan border on the Af-

ghanistan side. That area appears to be, for lack of a better phrase, a moonscape.

You have already said agriculture is limited. Are there hard minerals that can be mined? Is there an opportunity for economic development in that section of Pakistan that would realistically make sense, in terms of trying to prevent their radicalization of folks in that particular area?

So comments on either of those questions.

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I will tackle the pro-Western part of it.

The United States has worked with Musharraf for the past six years—actually, for the past eight years. He certainly sees Pakistan's future in engagement with the West and with the United States. He certainly sees Pakistan's economic future as most promising if you get that kind of engagement going. I would describe him as a Pakistani nationalist but in that context.

Benazir Bhutto is an educated woman. She went to Harvard. She went to Oxford. She has worked with the United States also.

Pro-Western does not necessarily equate to support for the full range of U.S. foreign policy, and of course, Iraq is a big exception there. It does, in both cases, mean that they are not interested in the Taliban's vision of Pakistani society. They would like to see Pakistan as a modern society. The word "secular" translates badly into Urdu, but the way we think of "secular," that is what they have in mind.

Mr. CONAWAY. Could you focus more on the lack of identification with the Pakistanis' priorities for their own country? That particular comment, is that accurate?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Well, I think, for most Pakistanis, there are very gut-level economic issues that are the top priorities and that are probably greater priorities than the degree of religiosity that is or is not present in the society. Most Pakistanis are religiously conservative but not radical. Neither one of these people is a farmer. They have never had to make their living on two and a half acres of growing wheat or whatever, so it requires an effort of mind for them to relate to that level of economics. I think it is one they are perfectly capable of, but they do come from a different background, and there is a kind of instinctive difference there.

Whereas, a lot of Pakistanis assume that whoever talks the most Islamic language is sympathetic. For either Musharraf or Benazir Bhutto, there is a weariness of the too-passionate sides of religion, because they have seen the abuses it can lead to. What this means is that, if you want to infuse in people the idea that religious extremism is dangerous, you have to find a way of articulating it that does not make it sound like you are anti-religion. I think there are people who have done this in Pakistan. I am not sure that has been very effectively done in the past few years, however.

Dr. WEINBAUM. On the economic side, if you are talking about the great mass of Pakistanis, there are economic issues—above all, inflation. This is something that we, obviously, cannot contribute to helping them on. They also talk about corruption. Here, again, this is not something we can directly assist them with.

As far as the frontier is concerned, you are absolutely right. This is desolate. I, too, have flown over that area, and not only are there

innumerable places to hide; there are very few places to grow anything that is economically feasible.

However, we should recognize the major source of income. If you are not talking about smuggling, there is remittances—that is, to send abroad your population to send back funds—and this is really where a great deal of it takes place. Now, that does not mean that they cannot be building roads and schools, but as long as they have in that area an ideological agenda, many of these people do not want schools, and they are afraid of roads because they know that is the road that the army is going to take to come at them.

So we have a very difficult job, but a large part of it is that you have to recognize that, for all of these years, that area has been treated as a stepchild. It has never been developed. They have allowed it to fester as a backwood area because it suited the government's purposes. That way, they could keep these people at some distance, and they would not be troublemakers. The British started with it, and we have seen the Pakistanis continue with it.

So it is a real uphill. There is not going to be a single crop—there is not going to be a single industry which is somehow going to turn this around.

Mr. HAQQANI. Without disagreeing with Ambassador Schaffer and Professor Weinbaum, let me just add one point—that the distinction needs to be made between General Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto.

Benazir Bhutto, being a politician who does need votes and has engaged in electoral politics even though she has been in exile now for about eight years, does have the same exercise here. You know that you have to actually talk to the people. You have to get in touch with them. So, once she gets back, she will become aware of the concerns of the average man very quickly.

On the economic side, it is the estimate of a very senior Pakistani economist that 65 million people in Pakistan live below the poverty line, which is they live on less than $1 a day; 65 million live just above the poverty line; and 30 million can be described as well-to-do, which is the whole range from lower-middle class to the upper-middle classes and the very, very rich, the guys who actually flaunt their Rolls Royces and their Porsches.

In that, Ms. Bhutto's party, the Pakistani People's Party (PPP), traditionally has found a base amongst the poor, even though she does not personally live the same lifestyle as that of her electorate. So the PPP—because, as a party, it is still intact—if she can somehow connect the concerns about extremism with the concerns of her base with economic injustices, then there is hope that she will be able to succeed a little bit better than General Musharraf in being able to bring the people on the agenda of anti-extremism.

In the tribal areas, among other things, maybe irrigation systems, nurturing whatever water sources already exist; finding alternative means of employment, not necessarily in large-scale industry, but in cottage industry; creating new opportunities for people to get the skills that will get them into the remittance pool—but as skilled rather, than as unskilled workers—those are the things that are the options for changing the economy and the face of that region.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to focus for a minute on the security along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. There was a trip a number of us made back in May, talking to some of the NATO troops, describing Taliban terrorists coming to and fro across the border, and there being almost a dysfunctional relationship between the Pakistan army, NATO, and Afghanistan's—whatever troops they have there. I mean, it seemed like there were not even communication systems established to talk about tracking people who were moving back and forth.

Given the amount of money we are investing in Pakistan's military and, obviously, the commitment in Afghanistan, it just seems like there should be a better security arrangement with the Pakistani government about tracking what people are seeing with their own eyes coming over the borders.

Dr. WEINBAUM. You know, sir, there is a tripartite arrangement of the three militaries—the Afghan military, the U.S. forces operating on the border, as well as the Pakistanis—and there has been some success with this in sorting out differences here.

But what you are talking about here is tracking across the border, and I think that that can only come about when, on both sides of the border, there is a much more effective security arrangement. There are innumerable places along that border where one can infiltrate, so that I do not think there is any way in which, even with the best of intentions, that the governments involved here are going to be able to stop that. You have to stop it from within. Once they get to the border, they are going to get across.

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, it certainly seemed that the Afghanistan officials that we met with expressed a lot of frustration in terms of their interaction with the Pakistan government. So I get your point, but it just also seems that, you know, government to government, there should be a better arrangement than what exists right now.

Ambassador SCHAFFER. You will hear frustration on both sides of the line. This whole issue could not be more difficult for both the Pakistanis and the Afghans, and they have tended to blame each other, rather than to focus together on how to fix the problem.

This is one of the reasons that I urged in my testimony that the U.S. start trying to develop with Pakistan and with Afghanistan at least some elements of a common strategy for stabilizing the government in Afghanistan. Because, if you could start to fix the rather poisonous relationship between the two leaders, then you would have a much better basis for trying to find ways of cooperating across a porous border.

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, I mean the arrests that took place in Germany this summer of the three terrorists who were clearly being trained in some part of Pakistan suggests that, again, all of the long-term economic development and all of the things that you have talked about here today obviously are important elements to the strategy, but, clearly, we have an immediate security issue here. I mean, if those guys were trained in Iraq, the political fallout from that would have been, I think, just overwhelming. I mean, for some reason, the fact that it was not in Iraq and was in a dif-

ferent part of the world seemed to get sort of brushed a little bit aside.

The fact is, I mean, to me, it just seems like, in terms of the U.S. national security interests, the threat of being hit either here or in Europe emanates from the tribal areas of Pakistan. And it just does not seem like, with all of the money we are spending over there, it is too much to ask our government to be a little bit better, in terms of trying to get these security arrangements more functional.

Mr. HAQQANI. Sir, if I may say so, one of the things that the U.S. Government is not investing enough in is in building the civilian law enforcement capability of Pakistan.

You see, the thing is that, to catch the kind of people you are talking about, the three people who are trained, you need law enforcement, rather than an Air Force with F–16 aircraft. I mean, you know, we have given them F–16 aircraft, but that is not going to solve this problem. This problem is going to be with gumshoes and local police work. And I think that that is an area that Congress could focus on, building Pakistan's law enforcement capability and making it better, so that people can be intercepted before they get out of Pakistan and while they are training there.

To the extent that there are elements within the government of Pakistan who are either tolerant of or supportive of the extremists, I think a lot more straight talk is needed between the United States intelligence service, the Pakistani intelligence service, and the Afghan intelligence service. So far, the process of intelligence-sharing is one in which action does not always materialize on time.

Ms. CURTIS. I think you are absolutely right. There needs to be better coordination between NATO and the Pakistan government. I think that seems quite obvious, so I wholly endorse what you have said.

I think part of the problem in dealing with Pakistan on these issues is that so much of it is sort of under the radar, and what is useful in terms of countering the terrorist threat may be politically unpopular. So there is a tendency to want to keep these issues below the radar, and on some of the issues where we do find Pakistani cooperation, perhaps it is not touted publicly.

So this makes it very difficult, I think, to get to the heart of the matter. But I think you certainly have hit on something very important and something that should be pursued.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here today.

I am really very appreciative of Pakistan as a longtime ally of the United States. I am very appreciative because, two weeks ago, I was at the Khyber Pass and saw the truck traffic into Afghanistan at Jalalabad. It is impressive to me to see the commerce that is going on. I am also very pleased that soon, if it has not already occurred, there will be truck traffic between India and Pakistan for the first time in decades. And as the co-chair of the India Caucus, I really want to see a stable, economically growing, and positive Pakistan.

I have had the privilege in my service of seeing some of the good. Now, I visited with the earthquake relief several years in

Muzaffarabad. It was so inspiring to see the young U.S. Marines. As Pakistani-Americans, they were speaking Urdu with the people, in providing relief.

But in my last visit, I was there with Congressman Courtney, and I was reading some of the newspapers. And not to infringe on the freedom of speech, but we need to get a message out, because I was appalled that these newspapers that look very modern and progressive contained outright lies about our troops, about the United States—anti-American propaganda. It was so absurd that there was a column by Fidel Castro. That was just a joke, the thought that a totalitarian dinosaur would be resurrected to write absolute garbage about the American people.

Again, not to infringe on the freedom of speech, but we really need to get information out. I have seen it firsthand. My National Guard unit, the 218th, is currently operating 1,600 troops in Afghanistan, training the Afghan police, providing for humanitarian relief. There are great stories of helping provide health clinics, by opening schools, by providing wells, by helping develop roads, by helping develop crops. All of this is such a positive story.

So, Mr. Haqqani, how can we get this message out and counteract Fidel Castro?

Mr. HAQQANI. Congressman, when I was a child growing up in Pakistan, I was somebody who used to go to the American library. That is where I learned my English. That is where I learned my major ideas. I came from a poor family. I could not afford a very expensive English school, elite school. I grew up reading the biographies of America's Founding Fathers. I knew the Declaration of Independence by the time I was 15. And the first time I came to the United States was because I beat the entire American Embassy staff at a game of Trivial Pursuit about American history, and the ambassador decided that I was the appropriate person to be sent here under the International Visitor Program.

The point I am trying to make is that the U.S. Government, despite complaining and feeling that this is not happening, is no longer investing in those kinds of programs with the same kind of vehemence as it used to do during the Cold War. For security reasons, the American libraries no longer exist. The United States information service was dismantled.

So, as far as the Pakistani media is concerned, Fidel Castro and his embassy manage to get his speech or his article to the newspaper. Most of these newspapers in Pakistan—now that there is complete press freedom in Pakistan, there is a lot of diversity. They do not have the resources to find the materials. If we had the means to get more and more ideas and materials out and if more Pakistani journalists had access to all of you, they would be able to get more ideas that are different from the ideas that are being spread there.

Security has become a concern. Most American diplomats do not get out of the embassy compound or outside of Islamabad. They do not do the small town. The day went when Ambassador Schaffer, as an officer of the U.S. embassy, could actually go to a small town and speak to the local school. Those days are gone, so we need to create some kind of mechanism.

And this is not just for Pakistan. It would apply to Afghanistan. It would apply to Iraq. It would apply to other Muslim countries, as well.

Mr. WILSON. Well, I just want to thank all of you for being here. And as time concludes, we need to get the positive message out of what we are proposing to do and doing in Afghanistan and what we hope to be positive for the people of Pakistan.

Thank you very much.

I yield the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here.

Ms. Curtis, my question has to do with a comment you made earlier in the hearing. You said India was trying to gain influence in Afghanistan, or it was the Pakistani perception that they were trying to do that, that they were being encircled.

Could you please elaborate on that?

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. I think, if we are going to be able to stabilize Afghanistan and to ensure that the Taliban does not again gain influence in the country, we are going to have to look at the issue, to a certain extent, from Pakistan's perspective and understand their security perceptions of the region and understand their historical animosity with India.

Where they want a stable Afghanistan, they are seeking a government that is not anti-Pakistan either, so they become very sensitive to issues with India's opening consulates and pursuing development activities, which are, obviously, legitimate activities.

I would argue from the U.S. perspective that India's role can be quite positive. Being a democracy, they provide a good example for Afghanistan, which is trying to develop itself into a democracy.

I am saying that we need to understand where Pakistan is coming from if we are going to get them on board with our strategic perception of the region. That is really what we have to do. We have to get ourselves on the same sheet of music, in terms of the importance of stabilizing Afghanistan and the fact that the Taliban will not be allowed to have influence in the government.

And we need the Pakistanis to take a more proactive role in undermining Taliban ideology. We can argue back and forth about who somebody in the government might be supporting or who they are not, but if we actually saw Pakistan take steps to actively undermine the ideology itself, then we, I think, could be more assured that they were, in fact, on the same sheet of music as us.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Can you tell me what India is doing, exactly? You said they are opening up consulates and they are working on some development projects. By the invitation of Afghanistan or under what auspices?

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. They have pledged funding for the new parliament building. They are involved in the construction of a highway. And this is all at the invitation of the Karzai government. There is a new program where they offered to educate 1,000 Afghans, to provide them scholarships to Indian universities. Now, Pakistan came forward with the same offer, and the Karzai government refused it.

So, yes, I think we have a situation where there is some insecurity on Pakistan's part about the relationship between the Indian government and the Karzai government, and that we just need to understand it more fully.

And that is why I have argued extensively in my written testimony that the U.S. needs to get more proactively involved in facilitating better overall relations between Pakistan/Afghanistan at the same time as Pakistan/India and start to encourage regional initiatives where each country has a different strategic perception of the region based on economic cooperation, political reconciliation, and stability, so that we get out of this 1990's mentality of vying for political influence in Afghanistan or the dispute over Kashmir. It is a very ambitious effort, but I think we really need to start pursuing it.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

I do have another question, please.

Dr. Weinbaum, or anybody who would like to answer this, how much is the U.S. involved? And in terms of building up and assisting the kinds of programs that we just heard Ms. Curtis mention, are we doing the same kind of work, and is it the same level that we have done before in the past for Afghanistan and for Pakistan?

We were talking about how much involvement there is in Pakistan, for example, with the American libraries. What are we doing now to help them? And do we have non-governmental organizations there and very visible to the Pakistanis, as well?

Dr. WEINBAUM. With respect to your last comment, there are non-governmental organizations working there, but the situation has reached such a point where even the best of the non-governmental organizations are viewed with suspicion.

For example, we have to be very careful in that, as we come in to support education, that this is not viewed, as it is in some parts of Pakistan, as an effort on the part of the United States to take them away from Islam, to perhaps impose on them our Western values. So, much of what we do in our assistance has to be calibrated very carefully. It has to be very sensitive to the fact that it is easy, under this particular environment, to have it misconstrued.

We do have an accelerated program here of helping in the educational field. As I said, we have to be very careful about that. We also have moved rather recently to help in the health field. It is essentially, though, a problem in that, whatever we are doing, somehow it is never registered the way it should be.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. We need to be more visible as we do these things?

Dr. WEINBAUM. That was the beauty of the earthquake, because there it was; it was visible, it was upfront, and it received a lot of publicity.

Coming back to this question about the Pakistan newspapers, the problem is that the papers are reflecting what is going on in the rest of the society. They are, by and large, perpetuating some of these myths that are going on about the United States. And this can happen with free press.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I might announce that the members-only top-secret briefing that is scheduled in this room for 2 o'clock has been delayed until 2:30 this afternoon, and members should be advised.

Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate you all's very in-depth discussion today.

The American people, I believe, care deeply about the people of Pakistan and their aspirations to raise families, to develop economically, and to be secure. They have every right to be a player in the neighborhood and to be a proud nation. We express that will through our elections, which we have coming up next year.

So I want you to go ahead to November 15th of 2008. Your phone rings, and it is the President-elect, and they say, "I saw you on C–SPAN some time ago, and I want you to tell me the top three, four, or five things that I need to be thinking about in these next few weeks, as I put together my Administration and personnel and the foreign policy objectives we need to take for Pakistan."

If we could start with you, Ms. Curtis. I am the last person standing between the chairman and lunch, so try to be brief if you could. Ms. Curtis, I know you have a list of things, but if you could, prioritize the kinds of things that you would tell the President-elect about what they ought to pursue.

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I would hope that the problem in the tribal areas that we have discussed, hopefully in a year, has been—at least we have begun to see some changes, in terms of there not being the dangerous safe haven that we see there today. However, if that issue is still there, I think that has to be at the top of our agenda, ensuring that this is not a safe haven, and we have to convince the Pakistanis to work with us in cooperative efforts.

You know, obviously, the Pakistanis have gone back on the military offensive in the region, and they are taking actions. But I do not think this alone is going to deal with the seriousness of the problem that we face. And it has to be a cooperative effort, where we understand that the persistence of a terrorist safe haven in that region does not benefit either one of us.

You know, I would encourage Indo-Pakistani dialogue. I would highlight how fundamental that is to ensuring our overall goals in South Asia. Again, I would highlight the need to encourage Pakistan to take a proactive effort in undermining the ideology of the Taliban. There seem to still be differences between the U.S. position and the Pakistan position over the future of Afghanistan and what role the Taliban would play. The Pakistanis seem to hold out the position that the Taliban will play some kind of a role in a future Afghanistan, and I think we have to make it clear that the extremist ideology that the senior Taliban leadership holds does not have a place in Afghanistan; we are encouraging a pluralistic democracy. And there have to be efforts to peel away some of the local, you know, guns-for-hire that may be with the Taliban for money but who do not necessarily subscribe to the ideology.

You know, getting those elements to peel off and become part of the political process, sort of a bottom-up approach, I think, is the direction we need to go. But giving power to the senior Taliban or somehow thinking that through negotiations we can make them

part of the system, I think, is naive and is not something that should be pursued.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Mr. Haqqani.

Mr. HAQQANI. I think the first thing would be to assure the Pakistani leadership that the United States is a long-term partner of Pakistan and that Pakistanis do not need to create or keep alive problems simply to get American attention.

Second, after having convinced them that the U.S. is our partner and that "we are there for the long haul for you" and "do not worry" and "do not think, if the Taliban is over, then your relationship with us is over," help us finish them off, help us finish off al Qaeda. Then focus on the elimination of terrorism and terrorist safe havens, because these are interlinked. As long as the Pakistanis feel insecure about having a long-term commitment from the U.S., they also will have an interest in keeping alive the problem, so that then they can be the ones who will help the United States in solving the problem. And that becomes a self-perpetuating cycle.

Third, democracy and civilian control over the military matters. The United States, historically, has had an attitude that, "It does not matter to us whether you are ruled by them. We would like you to be democratic, but if you cannot get there, well, we will deal with the military, and we will keep pumping money into a military regime to bolster it." I think it is important that Pakistan's internal dynamic changes, and the only way Pakistan's internal dynamic is going to change is if Pakistan becomes a functioning democracy with full civilian control over the military, rather than the military being an institution totally on a tangent, working on its own agenda.

The fourth is Pakistan's regional problems. I think——

Dr. SNYDER. I am sorry. Pakistan's what?

Mr. HAQQANI. Pakistan's regional ambitions and problems. I think that the United States has a role to play in bringing Pakistan and Afghanistan closer and also in ensuring that Pakistan and India continue along the road of mutual dialogue, especially in the Pakistan-Afghanistan equation.

Now that they have one government that is close to the United States and that is supported by the United States, I think more needs to be done than the famous one-time meeting between President Karzai and General Musharraf that was sponsored by President Bush. I think the next President of the United States should do something more, and whoever is leading Pakistan in November 2008 and whoever is leading Afghanistan in 2008 should actually be brought together in a process that reassures Pakistan that Afghanistan is not going to become part of a movement against Pakistan in collusion with India, that Afghanistan has its own aspirations, and has a right to those aspirations and that Pakistan and Afghanistan can be very close friends and neighbors.

If we do that, then maybe the interest inside Pakistan to keep alive extremism as a state policy will diminish, and then the few extremists who are alive and surviving can be dealt with through a mixture of military force, law enforcement, and incentives to buy them off.

Thank you, sir.

Dr. WEINBAUM. I believe that the priorities have already been very nicely laid out here.

I would also stress, as Professor Haqqani has, the need to establish our reliability. So much of the thinking in Pakistan dwells on the fact that, as soon as our interests in the region are somehow satisfied, that we will, as we have in the past, be off. And therefore, what they must do, and particularly with regard to Afghanistan, is they must have a reserve strategy. And this is the heart of a lot of the problem here that the Afghans have and the belief that somehow Pakistan, especially if the United States demonstrates that it has a short-term interest in Afghanistan and that the United States and the international community will be out of there—that, therefore, Pakistan has to establish some kind of buffer zone with Afghanistan. It is very important that they be disabused of that idea.

I also would agree that democracy is something we have to convince them we really care about. And as Professor Haqqani and Ms. Curtis have indicated, they do not believe that now, but it is worth our interest, because this is the one place in the Muslim world where I would put my money on democracy. You do not have to teach them what democracy is. Now, they have not experienced much of it, but it is remarkable how the Pakistani people really aspire to what we would call a democracy. And it will not be exactly like ours, of course, but it is something that we recognize as being something we could praise.

I want to say also—and this is something that the new President, whoever that individual might be, has to recognize—that there used to be a time when Pakistan was very much focused on its own interests. Today, Pakistan knows—everyone, practically, in Pakistan, because of the media; there are so many television channels—they know what is going on in the region and in the rest of the world. Our policy, as it plays out in the rest of the world, will have influence on what happens, whether it is the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Iraq, wherever. We are going to be judged by what we do elsewhere, not only by what we do in Pakistan, and that is a change.

So I think that, whoever this new President is going to be, we do know this, that our relationship with Pakistan is going to be critical to our future security. They cannot do very well without us; we cannot manage without them.

The CHAIRMAN. Following through on a thought of Dr. Snyder's a moment ago, below the surface, what is the animosity between the leadership of Afghanistan and the leadership of Pakistan?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. There has been historically a bad relationship between the two, basically for two reasons.

One is Afghanistan has kind of an ambiguous place in Pakistan's ethnic politics. The ethnic group that has historically dominated in Afghanistan has close relatives on the Pakistani side who have felt themselves kind of out in left field, with respect to the rest of Pakistan. And so there has been sort of a built-in tension there.

The other and probably the more compelling reason is that, historically, Afghanistan has had a very close relationship with India. If you look at a map, you can see why this has left generations of

Pakistanis, especially in the army, feeling like they are in the middle of a squeeze play.

At the moment, you have something else that has been added to that. Hamid Karzai, who is the President of Afghanistan, is a man who, before 2001, had reasonably decent relationships in Pakistan, but he came to power as part of the implosion of the Pashtun-dominated Taliban, and he came to power with the people who had been referred to as the "Northern Alliance," who had strong support from India and from Russia during the years when the Taliban were in control of Afghanistan. So, right off the bat, anyone who had them as his allies was going to be looked on with enormous suspicion in Pakistan, and Karzai was no exception.

When you then got into the actual business of governing Afghanistan, he had a very tough agenda. He started out with, basically, no instruments of power. He did not have an army; he is starting to develop one now. He did not have roads that he could use to get foreign aid out into the boondocks. And he had many vulnerabilities.

And as the insurgency gained force—and the insurgency was spearheaded by people who had been Pakistan's allies for many years—he came to look on Pakistan as responsible for his problems. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, came to look on him as a totally feckless leader who could not get his act together in Afghanistan.

So this, coupled with a difficult history, meant that each of the leaders felt he had lots of reason to blame the other for his problems. And it is always easier to blame somebody else.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one last question. I am quite interested in professional military education, particularly for our war colleges, both intermediate and senior, here in our country. Would you assess for us the IMET program toward Pakistan? That is International Military Education and Training. I think we picked it up when we went several years without inviting them to our intermediate and senior war colleges, but they are attending now, is my understanding.

Could you assess that for us, please?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I am going to give you a political take on it, because I cannot get into details about what courses they have taken. But from a point of view of our overall relations with Pakistan and with the Pakistan military, this is one of the most important contact points that we have had. It has been professional, military to military. The U.S. training institutions have provided training that the Pakistani military value enormously.

The CHAIRMAN. Those of us, Ambassador, who are interested in professional military education draw a distinction between training and education. I just thought I would throw that in.

Go ahead.

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I would argue that both of those are very valid distinctions, but both of those have been essential in building up the professional respect, understanding, and sense of a common professional cause that exists between the United States and the Pakistani military.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you increase the IMET program?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Yes, I would, because I think this is exactly the kind of contact that is constructive in terms of the mili-

tary role of the Pakistan military but does not encourage them to expand their political role.

Mr. HAQQANI. Sir, I have been looking at this for a while, and I think that the program, as it is structured right now, is more in the direction of training than in the direction of education. For example, I have spoken at the Army War College——

The CHAIRMAN. You have spoken where?

Mr. HAQQANI. I have been invited to speak at the Army War College.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. That would be Carlyle.

Mr. HAQQANI. Carlyle.

The CHAIRMAN. You bet.

Mr. HAQQANI. I have been there twice in the last two years. There is always one Pakistani military officer there.

I think, in fact, given the situation and the importance of Pakistan, perhaps the positions for Pakistan available for that level of education need to be increased, as does—the head of SOCOM, I know, has been talking about increasing educational exchanges. And I think that that would be something that would be—SOCOM is the Special Operations, and they would like to do that.

I think that the other educational facilities need to be expanded, both in terms of the number of positions available for Pakistanis and the level at which they come. Because, you know, one person coming a year does not solve the problem, given the size of the Pakistani military and the significance and the importance of it.

The CHAIRMAN. If you do that, would you have to invite a comparable number from India?

Mr. HAQQANI. You may have to do that, but that may not be a bad thing either, because, after all, India is also an increasingly important country. And it may be in the interest of the United States to have four generals in the Indian Army who have been trained in the United States, as opposed to one—and the same goes for the Pakistani side—trained and educated.

Dr. WEINBAUM. Sir, let me just add that there is a reciprocal to this, as well, and that is having American officers serve or attend educational institutions in Pakistan. The Staff College at Quetta, for example, has been a place where we have sent people in the past. Obviously, it was also suspended for a long time. We have just started now to send people over there. This is very important because the possibility of having Americans there at this point is a way of spreading what we are about to many, many more Pakistanis who would otherwise not be able to have the exposure to the United States. So there ought to be a reciprocal element to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate that. I am very familiar with the international program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which, of course, is the intermediate war college for majors and their comparable ranks. And I am very appreciative of your thoughts.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your patience and for your excellent testimony and for your expertise. We are most appreciative.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

October 10, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

OCTOBER 10, 2007

OPENING REMARKS OF RANKING MEMBER
DUNCAN HUNTER
Security Challenges Involving Pakistan and

Policy Implications for the Department of Defense

October 10, 2007

Thank you to our Chairman, Ike Skelton, for holding a timely hearing on the security challenges involving Pakistan and policy implications for the Department of Defense – a topic of critical importance. Second, I would like to welcome our witnesses – all outside experts who have examined the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship.

Your testimony is welcome as it will help to inform this Committee about the current and future U.S. partnership with Pakistan, specifically how the United States can maintain a strong and lasting defense relationship which supports our common interests in fighting the war on terror and contributes to security and stability in the region.

Since the September 11th terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland and President Musharraf's decision to join the United States in the war on terror, Pakistan has been a key ally of the United States and a valuable strategic partner. Today, it supports U.S. and NATO-led military operations in Afghanistan and makes significant contributions and immense sacrifices against extremism and militancy. These efforts have resulted in a number of al Qaeda and Taliban leaders killed or captured in Pakistan.

In addition to its counterterrorism efforts, Pakistan has made progress on its eastern border with India – tensions between the two nations have noticeably decreased due to confidence-building measures and Pakistan and India are both committed to taking steps toward resolving the historical animosity that exists over Kashmir. I am interested in your thoughts regarding the United States' role in the Indo-Pakistani dialogue process.

Although their have been many positive dividends during the last six years, we must also recognize that there have been some

troubling developments. In July, this Committee heard from intelligence officials who assessed that the al Qaeda terrorist network had become progressively active in Western Pakistan, where they have "safe haven."

For the last eight months, I have expressed my concerns over such developments and the internal challenges facing Pakistan's leaders – military – and – people. Today I would like to get your views on the following:

On the security front: 1) al Qaeda's exploitation of the September 2006 tribal peace agreement in Waziristan, which allowed some of the top al Qaeda leadership to hide-out, operate, and plot and plan; 2) the status of Taliban entrenched along the Afghan-Pakistani border and Baluchistan regions and the impact on military operations in Afghanistan, and 3) the status of the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear materials and technologies.

On the political front: 1) the current and evolving political environment – from the recent reelection of President Musharraf on Saturday and the surrounding circumstances; and 2) the likelihood that the political power equation in Pakistan will change and what that could mean for the U.S. – Pakistan's security relationship.

Although we are the Armed Services Committee, reviewing and understanding this political dynamic helps us assess how it relates to the willingness, capacity, and capabilities of the Pakistan government to address the extremism that resides on its soil as well as other strategic challenges it deals with in the region.

I think it is important to recognize that weeks after the July release of the U.S. *National Intelligence Assessment* on terrorists threats to the U.S. homeland and the storming of Islamabad's Red Mosque, President Musharraf increased pressure on the extremists residing in the tribal areas and decalred that Pakistan will not tolerate al Qaeda sanctuary by moving two Pakistani army divisions in to the federally administered tribal area (FATA). There are now

approximately 100,000 troops from the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps conducting counterinsurgency operations. President Musharraf has also committed to increased development assistance to compliment this military offensive. I am interested in your assessment of these ongoing operations.

These renewed operations have not gone without a challenge from the militants. Security forces face resistance and increased pressure. These are reported casualties resulting from suicide bombings and the soldiers seized in the South Waziristan region at the end of August have yet to be released.

It is my view that the United States should continue to support Pakistan's increased efforts to pursue and defeat al-Qaeda and Taliban inside Pakistan. We can do this by maintaining our commitment to deliver robust military assistance as required and as requested, especially for enhancing its counterterrorism capabilities. It is also equally important that the we ensure Pakistan's

government, military, and people that the United States is committed to the region, and will be for the long run.

Pakistan stands as an important and central nation in a critical region. Pakistan should continue to follow a trajectory of stability and prosperity – achieving this end not only benefits the Pakistan government and its people but it helps bolster security and stability in the broader South Asia region; the United States and the rest of the world.

I look forward to the testimony from our panel of outside experts and the discussion today's hearing offers.

Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

Security Challenges involving Pakistan:
Policy Implications for the Department of Defense

Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee
October 10, 2007

Teresita C. Schaffer
Director, South Asia Program

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify this morning. I'm sure every witness who has spoken to you about Pakistan in the past six years has used the words "critical time." I'm not going to break that pattern: it is a critical time in a country that matters profoundly to U.S. security.

In the past six months, Musharraf has been seriously weakened, the major non-religious political figures have been diminished, and the U.S. has been publicly involved in the deal-making leading to Pakistan's next government. The biggest security challenge for the U.S., however, comes from the newly emboldened violent extremists who are challenging the authority of the Pakistani state have been emboldened. U.S. policy needs to address both the decline in political legitimacy and the problems posed by violent extremists.

Musharraf's ill-advised decision six months ago to try to fire the Chief Justice unleashed strong pent-up frustration. The most positive feature of this turbulent period was the surge in courage by the Pakistani judiciary, which has so often bent under pressure from the executive. Musharraf's response, a series of repressive measures, left him significantly weaker than before. His decision to throw thousands of political opponents into jail suggests that his approach to government will be very different from what we've seen the past few years.

His opposition is divided. His bitterest opponent, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, returned to Pakistan only to be re-exiled to Saudi Arabia, a move that made clear Musharraf's willingness to ignore judicial rulings but also effectively removed Sharif from the election process. The other major non-religious leader, former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, has been negotiating an understanding with Musharraf and plans to return to Pakistan next week. The "understanding" has apparently given her far less than her supporters thought reasonable, and has in the process tarnished her political leadership.

I expect that Musharraf's election will eventually be confirmed by the Supreme Court, and that legislative elections will be held in January. The government that follows these elections is likely to be an uneasy one. Musharraf will be one power center. He believes in "unity of command," and is not interested in power sharing. Both his political party and perhaps the army will be strongly tempted to manipulate the election to minimize Bhutto's claim on power. If Bhutto does participate in government, she will strongly defend her turf. And assuming that Musharraf does retire from the army, that

institution will be under new leadership, and will be a distinct power center no matter how careful Musharraf has been to promote officers loyal to him.

The government's biggest challenge will be a nasty and violent campaign by extremists, both those connected with the Afghan Taliban and home-grown movements that had been brazenly defying the government's authority last summer in Islamabad's Red Mosque. This campaign has involved both military engagements, like the clashes in the Tribal Areas last weekend, and a rash of suicide bombings and other attacks all over Pakistan that have specifically targeted the army. The death toll since July is at least several hundred. State authority looks weak, and the army looks inept.

An effective response to this kind of campaign requires a canny mixture of military and political tools. In the past year, we have seen no evidence that the Pakistan army has adequate counter-insurgency skills, or that the government has the political tools needed to integrate the tribal areas into Pakistan. I support the administration's request for development funds for the tribal areas, but this will be the work of a generation. In the meantime, the Pakistan government and army will probably use their traditional approach: maintaining relations with the extremists while trying to keep them under control. Musharraf may see this hedging tactic as a way to keep some sympathy from the religious parties. In other words, where the U.S. has hoped for boldness, we may find a newly cautious Musharraf. I don't believe that hedging can work.

What makes this heady mix of political turmoil and extremist challenge particularly dangerous is the change in the U.S. position in Pakistan. On my last two trips to Pakistan, I was struck by the number of people who called the campaign in Afghanistan "America's war." During the past six months, Musharraf's opponents have

made the U.S. a symbol of opposition to him. And the deep U.S. involvement in Musharraf's effort to work out a political understanding with Benazir Bhutto has reinforced the perception that the United States is choosing Pakistan's government with no regard for the wishes of the Pakistani people. We have set ourselves up to be blamed for all the shortcomings of Pakistan's government – and have set the stage for a successor government to use anti-Americanism as a rallying cry at a time when the U.S. needs more than ever to make a common front against terror with the governments in both Kabul and Islamabad.

We urgently need to re-position ourselves so that this government and an eventual successor can work with the United States without risking its political life.

How can we do this? Start with forthright support for genuinely free and fair elections. Don't make excuses for the repressive actions of the government. Give high priority to our economic assistance, and use it in ways that benefit people. The greatest boost to our national standing in Pakistan in recent years came when the United States responded with such speed and dedication to the earthquake in Kashmir. The watchword should be that the United States wants a relationship with Pakistan that can continue from one set of leaders to another.

Second, work with the army on military issues – including helping it address its shortcomings in counter-insurgency – but do not build up its political role. Emphasize the primacy of civilian leadership.

Third, the United States needs to give top priority to developing a common strategy with Pakistan on Afghanistan. This is critical for our anti-terrorism goals, but it is also critical to the effort to stabilize Pakistan, as I've been discussing. The continuing

insurgency in Afghanistan and its ability to find shelter in Pakistan feeds the extremist threat within Pakistan.

We have a number of tripartite U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan institutions already. I am arguing for raising the level of these tripartite consultations, and working together to build up a credible government in Afghanistan, not just improve border control. In the final analysis, a stable Afghan government would be the best thing that could happen to Pakistan's security. If we can begin now to establish the structures and relationships through which Pakistan and Afghanistan could cooperate in this endeavor, possible future governments will have a foundation on which they can build, to everyone's benefit.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name:_____**Teresita C. Schaffer**_____

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

xxx___Individual

___Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:_____

FISCAL YEAR 2007

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Honorarium for participating in game 4/27/2007	Intelligence community	Under $1000	Pakistan
Moderating seminar 7/2/2007	State Dept	Under 500	Pakistan

FISCAL YEAR 2006

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Honorarium for talk on Pakistan 10/31/2005	State	$200	Pakistan

FISCAL YEAR 2005

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Participation in simulation on Pakistan 2/23-4/2005	Intelligence community	$3000	Pakistan
Talk at NESA Center, 7/19/2005	DOD	Under $500	Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;

Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Counterterrorism, Regional Security, and Pakistan's Afghan Frontier

Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum
Scholar-in-Residence, Middle East Institute

Success in defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan and stabilizing the country will be largely determined by events taking place along the Pakistan-Afghan border. Uprooting Al Qaeda's network and reversing the spread of Islamic extremism in Pakistan and the region also strongly hinge on developments in the tribal frontier regions. With so much at stake, we cannot ignore the fact that across much of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, Islamabad has, for now, lost the battle to fight militancy and terrorism. This harsh reality carries serious consequences for the kind of cooperation that the United States has sought in its strategic partnership with Pakistan.

Pakistan has seen growing challenges in recent years to its legitimacy and authority from a surge in militant Islamism, mounting provincial and tribal unrest, and the weakening of the institutional capacity of the state. All three are apparent in Pakistan's western border areas, and can be traced in large measure to its Afghan policies. By indulging and supporting extremists as a tool to retain and hold influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan has introduced changes that undermined its ability to maintain its writ within its own borders. Three decades of Islamabad's policies, sometimes using excessive force, other times appeasement, have altered traditional power structures in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and created fertile ground for challenges to the stability and integrity of Pakistan.

The State of Affairs in the Borderlands

Pakistan's FATA has historically been lightly governed. But today the Pakistan state has virtually ceded North and South Waziristan to powerful radical forces. Justice, education and social policies are in the hands of the Pakistani militants who practice a strongly conservative form of Islam. Other tribal agencies and districts in the neighboring "settled areas" have to some degree similarly fallen outside the government's writ. A large area of northern Baluchistan bordering Afghanistan is also mostly a no-go area for the Pakistan army.

It is generally acknowledged that anti-Kabul militants led by Taliban chief Mullah Omar, and former mujahideen leaders Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbudin Hekmatyar succeeded after 2001 in regrouping, establishing command centers, and launching insurgents into Afghanistan. Their presence along with Al Qaeda has also inspired and assisted in the radicalization of Pakistanis throughout the tribal region. Madressas (or madaris) have played a central role in helping to revitalize the Afghan Taliban and their allies, and in the creation of a Pakistani Taliban. By 2005, these religious schools had become a prime source for recruiting suicide bombers attacking within both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Elements of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) are increasingly accused of facilitating if not directly supporting these militants. Although the ISI is

known to work with U.S. intelligence operatives in Pakistan, many of its officers are suspected of harboring strong Islamist sympathies.

The decision by President Pervez Musharraf to deploy large numbers of regular and paramilitary forces to the FATA beginning in 2003 has been very costly in terms of casualties and hurt pride. The Pakistan army has demonstrated that it is seriously incapable of engaging in a mission of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Despite the presence of between 80,000 and 90,000 regular and paramilitary forces, the army has shown its inability to mount a sustained campaign against either tribal militants or resident foreign fighters. The army's often-cited lack of aggressiveness in the frontier does not result from a lack of courage. Instead, its troops, trained to fight a conventional war with India, lack training, equipment and, very frequently, motivation.

Anxious to salvage something from their long, unpopular campaign, in September 2006, government negotiators concluded a truce, the North Waziristan accord. Islamabad portrayed the accord as a step towards peace and stability in the region. In return for the curtailing military operations and removing most army checkpoints, Islamabad was promised restraints on foreign militants (Arabs, Chechens, and Uzbeks, among others) and an end to cross-border infiltration by Afghan insurgents. The agreement also called for the local Taliban to refrain from spreading their vision of Islam and cultural demands outside of their tribal lands. But it was a deal struck largely on the militants' terms. They were handsomely "compensated" for their losses and allowed to retain weapons. The accord, supposedly approved by tribal elders, was in reality negotiated with the Pakistani militants and their representatives, and allegedly approved by Al Qaeda. By 2006, most pro-government traditional leaders had either fled or had been killed. Reportedly, in the past year alone more than 100 pro-Islamabad tribal elders have been assassinated.

From all available evidence, the military's withdrawal allowed militants to regroup, train, and arm. Border crossing by Afghan insurgents increased, as did violence inside Afghanistan. The Pakistani Taliban also failed to keep their word about not imposing their views of Islam on the nearby settled areas. In fact, their influence has been felt across the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), notably in the northern districts of Swat and Malakand. The extent of the militant Islamist influence well beyond the tribal areas became apparent in the standoff and defiance of state authority that brought the army's July 2007 assault against Islamabad's Lal Masjid (Red Mosque).

The Pakistan army had hoped to use the 2006 agreement to neutralize those groups with an anti-government agenda. In a strategy of divide and control, it sought to turn rivalries among tribal leaders and resentment against resident foreign groups to assert influence over the area. With money and arms as further incentives, the army was making some progress until the entire strategy fell apart following the army's massive assault on the Red Mosque. Islamist extremists in Waziristan and the NWFP sought retribution for the Lal Masjid crackdown by renouncing the North Waziristan accord and an earlier one in South Waziristan. Over the last few months the militants have effectively taken the fight to the army with suicide and other bombings, both in the frontier and across the country. With its reputation seemingly at stake, Pakistan's proud

army initially reacted with renewed aggressiveness against the militants. But this did not last long, and the army, suffering new humiliations, has again assumed a defensive posture. There has been a virtual collapse of the army's campaign in North and South Waziristan, including the refusal to fight compatriots. The surrender of nearly 300 regular and paramilitary troops last month struck a devastating blow. There have been other less publicized kidnappings of soldiers by tribal militants. Desertions have increased, unusual for a Pakistan army known for its professionalism.

It is impossible to explain the military's failures without recognizing that it has never had the support of Pakistan's public for its military actions in the frontier. Because Washington conflates most conflicts across the Middle East and Afghanistan as part of the "global war on terrorism," Pakistanis see it as a U.S.-led war against Islam, and thus not their war. Similarly, the Pakistanis have overwhelmingly refused to view the American-led efforts to defeat the Taliban and its allies in Afghanistan as its wars. The Pakistan Taliban are not considered enemies nor, for that matter, are their Afghan counterparts. The government's unpopular, failed militarization of the tribal agencies is generally seen as having been undertaken at the behest of the U.S.

The Antecedents

The loss of the frontier has been coming for some time. The practice of light governance inherited from the colonial era had always been a practical concession to the existence of unruly tribes in a difficult terrain over which to assert authority. Rules and regulations that had applied under the British were carried forward, and the seven tribal agencies, all but one straddling the border, were never politically integrated into the rest of Pakistan. Denied development assistance, the tribal agencies remained economically and socially backward. Control by traditional leaders began to weaken in the tribal areas with the presence of mujahideen commanders during the anti-communist jihad of the 1980s, and further declined during the 1990s with mullahs taking on increasing importance in a Talibanizing Afghanistan. The ceding of authority to local extremists in several critical tribal agencies accelerated following US armed intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11. The ability of Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda to find sanctuary across the border, and finally the Pakistan army's failed militarization of tribal lands beginning in 2004 virtually completed the process. The old and largely secular system of governance in place in the FATA had become Islamicized.

Behind these changes is the dismantling of a system of political control through the gradual destruction of legitimate political structures. Previously, the *malik*—the secular leader of the village or tribe—was the local political authority. He was elected by a *jirga* in the village and through an Islamabad-appointed political agent received government funds and handled relations with the state. The *mullah*—the local religious authority— was clearly subordinate, and in most cases completely apolitical. However, from the regime of General Zia ul-Haq onward, the state started to fund the mullahs directly, giving them financial independence. Over the years the mullahs took on an enhanced political role in the tribal community and gradually became more powerful than the malik. With new resources and status, the local religious figures were able to emerge

as key political brokers and, very often, promoters of militancy. Empowering the mullahs made these border areas more hospitable to radicalized local tribesmen. With the malik significantly weakened it became harder if not impossible for disgruntled citizens to protest the presence of the Afghan fighters and foreigners.

Radical Islamic mullahs in the tribal belt and NWFP were valued for recruiting the Afghan mujahideen during the jihad. Economic and social deprivation of young Afghan refugees made their camps in Pakistan fertile ground for recruiting Afghan insurgents and imposing the doctrines of the Islamists. The Islamabad government, financed by the US and Saudi Arabia, poured money and arms into the border regions, further empowering the mullahs and their young militant followers. Opposition to the changes was difficult since the Afghan anti-Soviet insurgency and Taliban movement carried religious sanction, and had the backing of the Zia regime. Pakistan's support for the Taliban regime in the 1990s resulted in the further usurpation by Islamist militants of traditional tribal leadership.

This gradual change in the power structure from the malik to the mullah that united the tribals under the banner of Islam gave less prominence to national and ethnic allegiances. It has coincided with a period of history that has seen a global Islamic awakening, in which the struggles in Afghanistan have played a key role. Pakistan's mullahs have been able to benefit from this "larger cause" for which they fought. They connected with a network of militants from all corners of the Islamic world who provided the assertive Islamists in Pakistan's frontier areas with additional financial resources and military know-how.

The local Islamist leaders and their often youthful followers established contacts with foreign fighters who had taken refuge in the tribal agencies after 2001 as well as jihadi organizations in Pakistan and offshoots of the country's main religious parties. A symbiotic relationship developed among the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, Al Qaeda, and domestic extremist organizations. They have somewhat different priorities and can be bitterly competitive. Their relationships with Pakistan's intelligence services and security forces also vary. They are in agreement, however, over supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan that aims to drive out international forces and topple the Karzai government. They also share a disdain for Musharraf's rule and Pakistan's partnership with the United States.

Yet serving as patron to Islamist elements has long served the Pakistan military's strategic purposes. Beginning in the 1980s, successive governments in Pakistan have concluded that supporting Pashtun mujahideen and Taliban Islamists in Afghanistan and their ethnic cousins in Pakistan is pivotal to acquiring strategic depth in the event of an armed conflict with India. That policy also calls for efforts to ensure a friendly regime in Kabul. Even in recent years when Pakistan's nuclear deterrence would appear to make the concept of strategic depth outmoded, supporting Afghan Pashtuns seems warranted. That conclusion rests on the assumption that Pakistan may be confronted in the not too distant future with a disintegrating post-American, post-NATO Afghanistan. In that event, Russia, through its Central Asian surrogates, and Iran, both with close ties to India,

can be expected to carve out their geographic spheres of influence in Afghanistan. Non-nationalist, Islamist Pashtuns are then seen as serving Pakistan's interests as a proxy force in helping to create a buffer zone for Pakistan in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Pakistan, however, pays a heavy political and social price in its tribal frontier for adopting a Pashtun reserve strategy.

Options and Policies

As the insurgency in Afghanistan has worsened, the US and Kabul governments have understandably called publicly on Musharraf and his army to do more to block infiltration routes and eliminate sanctuaries in Pakistan. These demands have been largely counterproductive, however. Actions taken by Musharraf to satisfy his external critics have not only fallen short but have had the double-barreled effect of intensifying opposition to the government in the tribal areas and further eroding Musharraf's political support throughout the country. Additionally, Musharraf's political problems during 2007 have served as a strong distraction from the problems posed in the tribal agencies and further limited his willingness to take political risks. Least of all is he prepared to take strong action against the Taliban. And despite the looming challenge of religious extremism and militancy countrywide, Pakistan's political elites are consumed by electoral gamesmanship.

The Islamabad government finds few good options in meeting the challenges presented to the Pakistan state by Islamic extremists and militants in the tribal regions. Among those that have been tried or considered over the last year are strategies that:

- Revive a military effort that commits the army to an aggressive approach toward the Pakistani Taliban and the foreign militants among them. Recent setbacks challenging the honor of the army could stiffen the resolve of the senior military to show greater resolve in confronting the extremists. Although there are continuing reports of a withdrawal of troops, with General Ashfaq Kayani soon expected to assume command of the army, there could be a reassessment of the military's offensive posture in the Waziristans and elsewhere in the border region. Even then, the fundamental weaknesses of Pakistan's armed forces operating in the area, as already described, will not be overcome easily or soon. Moreover, the government in Islamabad, whatever its composition, will still be reluctant to undertake a military campaign that has so little popular political support in the country.

- Concede that a military solution is unlikely and renegotiate agreements with local centers of power. The regular army would again presumably disengage from regular contact with the local population, and restrict operations of the paramilitary Frontier Corps. In exchange, the Islamic militants would agree, as before, to restrain cross-border activity, keep foreigners in check, and refrain from Talibanizing the settled areas. But there is no more certainty that the Pakistani Taliban and their allies would hold to an agreement than previously. As earlier, the government will be negotiating from a position of weakness. Reaching a

modus vivendi with the tribal forces offers little promise of weakening the insurgency in Afghanistan. It will at best be a policy of containment against domestic extremists. Government plans to retain some authority by rebuilding the malik-political agent structure is a long-term, uphill policy. The old system that thrived on bribes and threats fits poorly with a new leadership over much of the tribal region that has an ideological agenda aimed at changing Pakistan's society.

- Create incentives for cooperation by the delivery of social services, justice and security to the people of the FATA. Plans call for channeling development assistance to the tribal agencies and promising their fuller integration into Pakistan's political system. Political reforms would lift the prevailing ban on political party activity and revise the region's archaic criminal code. $750 million in funds over five years from USAID are slated for major physical infrastructure improvements in an aid program targeting the education and health sectors as well. Local economies are supposed to receive a boost by creation of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. But there are serious doubts about the deliverability of US-sponsored aid programs or the payoff from political reforms. The sad fact is that it is probably too late to make a difference. Had development begun and political changes been instituted soon after 2001, they might have strengthened remaining traditional leaders. Instead of heeding pleas from the Islamabad government for a development program for FATA, the US insisted that the focus of both countries be solely on counterterrorism objectives.

- Change the political landscape in Pakistan in order to build a national mandate to oppose extremism in the tribal areas and elsewhere in Pakistan. Many observers have seen these actions as requiring a more open political system in which mainstream moderate parties can compete and form the government. It would allow the military to avoid forming electoral alliances with the religious parties sympathetic to the extremists. This approach is based on an arguable proposition that Islamic extremism can be discouraged through more democracy. It remains unproven that an elected, likely coalition government is better suited to deal with the challenges posed by militancy in the tribal frontier. Success against extremists will still turn on the military's will and capacity to take on these elements.

- Work closely together with the US, inviting/allowing the US greater leeway to pursue and target terrorists in Pakistan. In fact, American cross-border operations have been quietly going on for some time, as has intelligence sharing. Stronger cooperation could increase their effectiveness. However, recent public rhetoric in the US calling for possible unilateral action against high-profile targets has probably set back operations. Pakistanis regardless of political persuasion take great umbrage at the idea of violations of their territorial sovereignty. This sensitivity makes covert military actions more difficult. The problem has been compounded with the Congress's passage of legislation putting Pakistan on notice of a determination to have future aid judged by the extent of its cooperation against terrorism.

All of these approaches either have not worked or offer the prospect of success only over the long term. Consequentially, US and NATO forces in Afghanistan may be left for the time being with but one good option: to strengthen their own efforts to interdict insurgent forces. This will require substantially larger force levels on the Afghan side of the border with Pakistan as well as in contentious areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan. It is commonly believed that counterinsurgency forces should be in a ratio to the civilian population of 1:6 whereas in Afghanistan they are closer to 1:200. Moreover, as is now widely appreciated, improved and sustained security in Afghanistan cannot occur without accelerated development, better governance, and more realistic strategies for eliminating opium poppy production. Pakistan will continue to have a critical contribution to several of these goals. The US must adjust its expectations about what Pakistan is willing and able to accomplish on its increasingly restive, possibly explosive tribal frontier with Afghanistan

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Witness name: Marvin G. Weinbaum

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

✓ Individual

___Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:_____

FISCAL YEAR 2007

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

FISCAL YEAR 2006

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

Security Challenges Involving Pakistan and Policy Implications for the Department of Defense

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF

HUSAIN HAQQANI

DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY
AND SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES

COMMITTEE

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 10, 2007

Mr. Chairman,

I am grateful to you and the members of the House Armed Services committee for inviting me to appear before you today. As a Pakistani currently living and teaching in the United States, I have a deep commitment to close and friendly ties between Pakistan and the United States. The two countries share common interests, of which the elimination of the scourge of global terrorism is currently most important. As I understand it, the purpose of this hearing is to assess the means of ensuring meaningful and productive American engagement with Pakistan. It is an honor for me to testify before this committee and to share my views, formed over a lifetime of love for Pakistan and affection for the United States.

At the outset, let me begin by saying that Pakistan has been a partner of the United States since the 1950s and the relationship has endured despite periodic differences in perspectives and expectations. Close relations between Pakistan and the United States are in the interest of both nations. The United States currently needs the friendship of a stable and democratic Pakistan in its struggle against global extremism and terrorism. Pakistan would benefit enormously from alliance with the world's sole superpower and first democracy. But the relationship between the two countries must be nuanced beyond the exchange of aid and policy concessions that has characterized their interaction over the last sixty years.

Pakistan has been an ally of the United States during the cold war, in the war of resistance against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and currently in the global war against terror. Each period of close U.S.-Pakistan ties began with great hopes and ended up in tremendous disappointment for both sides. The U.S. provided large amounts of aid and showered praise on Pakistan's military rulers during the phase of strategic cooperation, only to turn off the flow of aid when circumstances changed. Pakistan's military rulers failed to keep their own end of the bargain in most cases and failed to tell the Pakistani people the truth about why the quid pro quo came to an end, leading ordinary Pakistanis to hate the United States notwithstanding the significant amounts of economic and military aid previously disbursed.

During the Eisenhower administration, Pakistan was referred to as "the most allied ally of America in Asia." But then, during much of the 1990s, Pakistan ended up as "America's most sanctioned ally" when Congress imposed sanctions over a range of issues ranging from acquisition of nuclear weapons to human rights violations and lack of democracy. It should be the objective of U.S. policy to ensure that a similar cycle of massive aid followed by excessive criticism and sanctions is not followed.

U.S. policy makers believe that aid to Pakistan acquires leverage for the U.S. with Pakistan's most important institution, the military. American lawmakers must exercise oversight over the executive branch of government to ensure that the leverage is used to the mutual benefit of the two countries and U.S. good will is not squandered through overt threats or unproductive application of sanctions. Pakistanis are a proud people. Instead of hurting their pride by creating the impression that the U.S. looks upon them as

supplicants who can be coerced at will, diplomatic tools should be used to influence the behavior of Pakistan's rulers.

Since 9/11, the focus of U.S. policy towards Pakistan has been a replay of previous periods of engagement. Once again, large amounts of U.S. economic and military assistance, and covert aid, are flowing into Pakistan because the country's military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, gave up support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and chose to become an American ally. The policy has had some benefits. Pakistani support was crucial in the U.S. effort to oust the Taliban from Kabul and most senior Al-Qaeda figures now in U.S. custody were also arrested and handed over by Pakistan's security services. But Pakistan plays a contradictory role in the struggle against global Islamist terrorism –it is considered both part of the solution and part of the problem.

Pakistan's problem with Islamist militancy is, in part, blowback from years of support for armed militias as a means of extending Pakistani influence in Afghanistan and the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. In case of Afghanistan, the United States supported and encouraged 'Mujahideen' or Holy Warriors fighting Soviet occupation during the 1980s. While the U.S. disengaged from the region in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the ideologically motivated Jihadists persisted with their activities. Tolerance, and in some cases active support, by the Pakistani state enabled the Jihadists to create deep-rooted local networks that are now proving difficult to uproot.

As we speak, Pakistan's military and para-military forces are engaged in fierce battles with Taliban and Al-Qaeda supporters in parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan. Pakistani forces have suffered heavy casualties during these military operations, which are cited as evidence by Pakistani officials of Pakistan's commitment to uprooting the terrorists from what U.S. intelligence estimates have described as their safe haven. Pakistani public opinion is deeply divided about the use of massive force against Pakistani tribesmen sympathetic to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Critics argue that the United States could leave the region once again but Pakistan would be stuck with a restive and hostile tribal population for years to come. It is important that the United States government assure the Pakistani people of a long-term commitment to Pakistan's security and integrity, to ensure that fears about future American disengagement do not weaken Pakistan's resolve to eliminate the terrorist networks.

Until recently, most discussion in Washington focused on General Musharraf rather than the Pakistani nation as the lynchpin of American policy in the region. Actual and budgeted amounts of U.S. aid for Pakistan during the period 2001-2008 total $ 9.8 billion, most of them going to Pakistan's military. Reimbursements for Pakistan's costs in Operation Enduring Freedom and the Global War on Terror, as well as covert transfers of funds to Pakistan's army and intelligence services remain a subject of speculation and criticism by Pakistan's civilian leaders who see U.S. policy as bolstering military domination in a nation with clear democratic aspiration.

Since March 2007, when General Musharraf's decision to remove Pakistan's Chief Justice resulted in massive protests by opposition political parties and civil society organizations, U.S. policy has been somewhat modified. The U.S. government now appears to be encouraging Musharraf in compromising with the country's civilian democratic leaders, notably the pro-US exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. A tentative agreement between Musharraf and Bhutto, who heads Pakistan largest political party the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), could pave the way for relatively less controversial parliamentary elections by the end of the year or in January 2008.

If Musharraf fulfils his promise of stepping down as head of Pakistan's army, Pakistan could move along the road to a gradual transition to civilian democratic government. This could be strengthen Pakistan's capacity in dealing with the terrorist threat by reducing the sharp divisions within Pakistani society that have so far undermined a concerted anti-terror effort. Given Musharraf's past record, however, it cannot be said with certainty that a smooth transition will indeed take place.

It is important that the United States end the personalization of relations and move away from looking upon Musharraf as Pakistan's savior for the U.S. Relations between the world's sole superpower and a nuclear-armed nation of 150-million people should depend upon acknowledging Pakistan's diversity and the U.S. should expand its interaction with other leaders and major political actors in Pakistan. It is true that Pakistan's army is its single most powerful and significant institution. But the objective of U.S. policy must not be to reinforce the prejudices of Pakistan's generals against Pakistan's civilians.

The U.S. must use every opportunity of diplomatic and military-to-military interaction to advise Pakistan's military leadership that the Pakistani model of military domination neither makes Pakistan secure nor does it fulfil even the short-term purpose of securing Pakistan's cooperation in the global war against terrorism.

Pakistan continues to be a major center for Islamist militancy, the legacy of the country's projection of itself as an Islamic ideological state and a bastion of religion- based opposition to communism during the cold war. Radical Islamists who came from all over the world to fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan went on to become allies of Pakistan's military intelligence apparatus, which used them to fight Indian control over the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir as well as to expand Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan. Musharraf's efforts, under U.S. pressure, to contain the Islamist radicals have consistently fallen short, leading to a resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and a revitalization of Al-Qaeda in the rugged region constituting the Pakistan-Afghan border.

For six years, the U.S. accepted on face value Musharraf's assertion says that he is a leader dedicated to changing Pakistan's course from being an Islamic ideological state to a moderate Muslim country. But the imbalance between Pakistan's perceived external importance and proven internal weakness has raised fundamental questions about the dysfunction of the Pakistani state. Careful examination indicates that Musharraf's eclectic policies have been aimed less at changing Pakistan's direction and were more

part of an effort to salvage a critical policy paradigm adopted by Pakistan's military-led oligarchy since the country's early days.

Musharraf recently named a new Vice Chief of Army Staff who is likely to succeed him as commander of the army when Musharraf retires from service and transforms himself into a civilian president. The new VCOAS, General Pervez Ashfaq Kiyani, is known for his commitment to reorienting civil-military relations and reverting Pakistan's military to its professional functions. The United States should ensure that Musharraf keeps his promise of stepping down as army chief and it should be a clearly stated U.S. objective that Pakistan's government in future should work on the democratic principle of civilian control over security policy rather than Pakistan's historic pattern of the military insinuating itself into all aspects of civilian life.

Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the Tribal Areas

In the years since 9/11, Musharraf's critics have attributed his failure in rooting out Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to a deliberate policy decision. Musharraf has time and again made a distinction between anti-US terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaeda, who need to be eliminated or fought, and local Islamist insurgents (whether Afghan, Pakistani or Kashmiri) who can be engaged in dialogue. India and Afghanistan have both repeatedly accused Pakistan of continuing to support terrorists targeting the two neighbors with whom Pakistan has had disputes since emerging as an independent country from the 1947 partition of British India.

As violence spiraled in Kabul and the Afghan countryside at the end of 2006, Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai stepped up his criticism of Pakistan's role in supporting a resurgent Taliban. "Pakistan hopes to make slaves out of us, but we will not surrender," Karzai declared in a statement that marked the end of quiet diplomacy between two American allies and the beginning of more public condemnation of Pakistan by Afghanistan.

Under U.S. pressure, Pakistan has intermittently applied military force against pro-Taliban and pro-Al-Qaeda Pashtun tribesmen living along the Afghan border. But the tribesmen managed to inflict heavy casualties on the Pakistan military and in the end the government agreed to a ceasefire under a deal that restored the tribes' autonomy in return for a commitment that they would not provide sanctuary to enemies of Pakistan. The deal would have been fine if it had helped in rooting out the Taliban or Al-Qaeda but instead it simply perpetuated their influence in parts of the federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Musharraf's deals with the tribal leaders have proven ineffective in ending militancy and terrorism. The Taliban stepped up their attacks inside Afghanistan and suicide bombings in Pakistan reached an all-time high within the first two months of 2007. Several press reports based on leaks by American and British intelligence sources spoke of Al-Qaeda's reorganization in Pakistan and tacit Pakistani backing for the Taliban.

The former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Ryan Crocker, attempted to resolve the apparent contradiction between Washington's publicly stated view of Musharraf as a critical U.S. ally in the war against terrorism and the persistent intelligence that terrorists operate and train in Pakistan with relative impunity. "Pakistan has been fighting terrorists for several years and its commitment to counterterrorism remains firm," Mr. Crocker told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the hearing on his nomination as U.S. ambassador to Iraq. The challenge faced by Pakistan in coming to terms with Taliban fighters along its border with Afghanistan, he explained, lies in a lack of capacity.

A compilation of published figures of terrorism-related casualties indicates that 1471 people were killed in Pakistan during 2006, up from 648 terrorism-related fatalities in the preceding year. Of these, 608 were civilians, 325 security personnel and 538 terrorists. In 2005, 430 civilians and 137 terrorists were reported killed but the number of security forces losses were a relatively low 81. But 2007 has been the worst year for terrorist activity in Pakistan and more people have died in terrorist violence during the first ten months of this year than in preceding years. So far the number of reported fatalities stands at 1890 total casualties, which includes 651 civilians, 352 security forces, 887 terrorists. The number of suicide bombings in Pakistan is also on the rise.

Amid widespread lawlessness and the emboldening of terrorist groups, Pakistan successfully continues to expand its conventional, nuclear and missile capability primarily against military threats from arch-rival India. The United States, too, tends to indulge Pakistan's requests for military hardware making it one of the biggest beneficiaries of U.S. Foreign Military Sales. Considering that India, too, is now a strategic partner of the United States and a major buyer of U.S. military equipment, members of this committee may want to consider whether it is in the interest of the United States to encourage an arms race on the South Asian subcontinent.

The direct consequence for Pakistan of relentless military competition with India has been the internal weakening of the country. Pakistan's supposed ability to externally project its power is not matched with the strength of an effective state at home. In the process of building extensive military capabilities, Pakistan's successive rulers have allowed the degradation of essential internal attributes of statehood.

An important attribute of a state is its ability to maintain monopoly, or at least the preponderance, of public coercion. The proliferation of insurgents, militias, Mafiosi and high ordinary criminality reflect the state's weakness in this key area. There are too many non-state actors in Pakistan –ranging from religious vigilantes to criminals – who possess coercive power in varying degrees. In some instances, such as the case of the madrasa students' sit-in at the Islamabad library, the threat of non-state coercion in the form of suicide bombings weakens the state machinery's ability to deal with the challenge to its authority.

Domestic Political Change and Its Security Implications

General Musharraf was recently "elected" president by the parliament and provincial legislatures that were elected in the tainted 2002 elections just as their term enters its last days. Most opposition parties, except Bhutto's PPP, resigned from parliament to protest the election, the results of which are pending as the Supreme Court reviews the legality of a serving general securing elected office. Unless the Supreme Court rules against him, Musharraf is likely to be deemed "elected" for a five year term as President. Legal challenges, street protests, political deals and international maneuvers that preceded the vote will most likely continue as Musharraf tries to legitimize his power. But the only way for Musharraf to gain acceptance at home would be to keep his promise of retiring from his army command before November 15 and accepting to preside over a transition to civilian rule. If the transition to democracy is not effected, Pakistan will not be able to focus its energies on fighting terrorism and will continue to be torn by domestic politics.

Legislative elections are scheduled to be held before January 2008 and current opinion polls indicate that Musharraf's supporters are unlikely to win in significant numbers. According to a poll conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in July, 32 percent of those polled would vote for Bhutto's PPP, up ten percent from September 2006. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) would get 19 percent of the vote nationwide, up 5 percent since last year. Musharraf's PML (Q) party has lost support to PPP and PML (N) and its support stands at 23 percent, down from 27 percent in the previous poll. The Islamist MMA would get no more than 5 percent of the votes though the concentration of its support in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) bordering Afghanistan remains an important factor.

After talks with Bhutto, General Musharraf has announced a plan for national reconciliation that offers hope for diminishing some of the extreme polarization characterizing Pakistani politics of the last several decades. The first step in this process is a tentative arrangement between Musharraf's military regime and Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which has borne the brunt of military repression since its founding in 1967. Until now, Musharraf and Pakistan's military have seen the PPP and other democratic parties as their enemy.

Recently the government announced an end to corruption prosecutions against Bhutto, her husband and her colleagues that have not matured into convictions or confessions after pending for many years, in some cases over a decade. This has been done through a law called the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which is being challenged in court by anti-Bhutto hardliners. Other elements of the Musharraf-Bhutto agreement relate to assurances of a free and fair parliamentary election and an end to the ubiquitous role of the military-intelligence machinery in the political arena.

While remaining an opposition party, the PPP is reciprocating Musharraf's gesture with steps that could defuse the volatile political situation created by street protests and violent demonstrations. PPP legislators did not join the rest of Musharraf's opposition in resigning in protest over Musharraf's recent "election" though they did not vote for him

either. The stage is now set for Ms Bhutto's return to Pakistan, and the rejuvenation of the PPP which is already Pakistan's largest political party. Although Ms Bhutto is considered a polarizing figure by some, her clear stand against religious extremism and the terrorists can only strengthen Pakistan's resolve in dealing with this menace. The United States should continue, through diplomatic means, to encourage reconciliation between Musharraf and the politically popular Bhutto. The national reconciliation process should also be extended to include Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf overthrew and who was recently sent back into exile in Saudi Arabia.

The U.S. government should also take an active behind-the-scenes interest in ensuring that Bhutto is provided sufficient security upon her return to Pakistan, given the threats against her life publicly pronounced by Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders within the past one week.

Given Pakistan's strategic significance, its domestic developments are of great importance to the United States. Discreetly sharing concerns and advising a government that depends heavily on support from the United States should not be construed as interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. Given the overall atmosphere of anti-Americanism in Pakistan, US officials should remain cautious against attracting charges of intervention in domestic politics while at the same time making American preferences well known.

Pakistan's next parliamentary elections should be a step towards transforming the country into a democracy and to return it to civilian rule. Political reform in Pakistan should be a critical element of US policy toward Pakistan. Pakistan has still not been able to evolve into a democracy 60 years after being carved out of British India essentially because many of the country's leaders, including Musharraf, assumed that the army has the rightful authority to run Pakistan. If there is a common thread running through Pakistan's checkered history, it is the army's perception of itself as the country's only viable institution and its deep-rooted suspicion of civilian political processes.

The United States is viewed by most Pakistanis as being firmly behind the army. The three periods of significant flow of U.S. aid to Pakistan have all coincided with military rule in Pakistan. According to figures provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) since 1954 the United States has committed $ 21.2 billion in economic and military aid for Pakistan. This includes the budgeted figure for 2008. Of these $ 17.7 billion were given during 32 years of military rule while only $ 3.4 billion were provided to civilian regimes covering 19 years. On average, US aid to Pakistan amounts to $ 559.9 million for each year the country has been under military rule compared with only $ 181.2 million per annum under civilian leadership.

The Islamist Surge

For years, the international community has been concerned more about the rising influence of Pakistan's Islamists, who made their strongest showing in a general election

during the 2002 parliamentary polls. The Islamists secured only 11.1 percent of the popular vote but carried 20 percent of the seats in the lower house of parliament. Since then, they have pressed for Taliban-style Islamization in the Northwest Frontier Province bordering Afghanistan, where they control the provincial administration. In recent months, Taliban-style movements have manifested throughout Pakistan, spreading far beyond the tribal areas of Waziristan and Bajaur where they first started.

Several districts in NWFP including Lakki Marwat, Malakand, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank and Bannu have seen an erosion of the state's control in the face of Taliban vigilantism. Beheadings, recorded on videotapes that are later distributed widely to spread terror as well as to seek new recruits, have been reported with increasing frequency. Not long ago, Taliban supporters raised their head at the Red Mosque in Pakistan's capital Islamabad. Although the military forcefully put down the Taliban threat at the Red Mosque after postponing military action for over sic months, the event served as a reminder of the rising influence of the extremist movement.

Musharraf's government has continued to make a distinction between 'terrorists' (a term applied to members of Al-Qaeda members, mainly of foreign origin) and 'freedom fighters' (the officially preferred label in Pakistan for Kashmiri militants). Authorities have remained tolerant of remnants of Afghanistan's Taliban regime, hoping to use them in resuscitating Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan in case the U.S.-installed Karzai regime falters.

This duality in Pakistani policy is a structural problem, rooted in history and a result of consistent State policy. It is not just the inadvertent outcome of decisions by some governments (beginning with that of General Ziaul Haq in 1977), as is widely believed. Pakistan's leaders have played upon religious sentiment as an instrument of strengthening Pakistan's identity since the country's inception. As any Pakistani elementary school student knows, Pakistan is an 'ideological state' and its ideology is Islam.

Pakistan's alliance with the United States has been an important part of the Pakistani ruling elite's strategy for building the Pakistani state. If Islam was the cement that would unite the disparate ethnic and linguistic groups within Pakistan, the United States was seen as the source of funding for a country that inherited only 17 percent of British India's revenue sources at its independence in 1947. The U.S.-Pakistan alliance was initiated when Pakistan's first indigenous military commander, General Ayub Khan visited Washington in 1953 and sought a "deal whereby Pakistan could -- for the right price—serve as the West's eastern anchor in an Asian alliance structure."

An analysis of Pakistan's 60-year history shows that it is the Pakistani military's desire to dominate the political system and define Pakistan's national security priorities that has been the most significant though by no means the only factor in encouraging an Islamic ideological model for Pakistan. By putting all its weight behind the Pakistani military, the U.S. has inadvertently reinforced Pakistan's ideological model.

Pakistan's military has historically been willing to adjust its priorities to fit within the parameters of immediate U.S. global concerns. The purpose has been to ensure the flow of military and economic aid from the United States, which Pakistan considers necessary for its struggle for survival and its competition with India. Pakistan's relations with the U.S. were part of the Pakistani military's policy tripod that emphasized Islam as a national unifier, rivalry with India as the principal objective of the state's foreign policy, and an alliance with the United States as a means to defray the costs of Pakistan's massive military expenditures.

An important component of Pakistan's state ideology is fear and hatred of India, which is also the justification for Pakistan's continuous efforts to militarily equal India including the development of nuclear weapons. On each occasion that Pakistan's path has diverged from the one jointly charted with the United States, competition with India has been one of the factors. Containing Indian influence is one of the justifications given within Pakistan for tolerating the Taliban and Islamist militants continue to be seen by some members of the Pakistani ruling elite as an unconventional counterweight to India's preponderant power. Although the Musharraf regime has begun a process of mending fences with India, Pakistan's fundamental fears and concerns about India have not been addressed

Pakistan's rulers have traditionally attempted to "manage" militant Islamism, trying to calibrate it so that it serves the state's nation-building function without destabilizing internal politics or relations with Western countries. The alliance between mosque and military in Pakistan helps maintain, and sometimes exaggerates, the psycho-political fears about national identity and security that help both, the Islamists and the generals, in their exercise of political power.

The past patterns of U.S. economic and military assistance have allowed Pakistan's military leaders to believe that they can compete with India as long as they can make themselves useful to the United States. U.S. assistance should be calibrated to transform Pakistan from a military-dominated state to a democratic one instead of being the source of the delusions of grandeur of Pakistan's unaccountable generals.

Conclusion

The United States made a critical mistake in putting faith in one man –General Pervez Musharraf –and one institution –the Pakistani military – as instruments of the US policy to eliminate terrorism and bring stability to the Southwest and South Asia. A robust U.S. policy of engagement with Pakistan that helps in building civilian institutions, including law enforcement capability, and eventually results in reverting Pakistan's military to its security functions would be a more effective way of strengthening Pakistan and protecting United States policy interests there.

U.S. support for the Pakistan military should not reinforce the Pakistan army's view of itself as the country's only savior –a mindset that has prevented the emergence of other national and state institutions. The U.S. must seek an orderly transition from military to

civilian rule based on civilian, rather than military, ascendancy. The new civilian government must then be fully supported in (1) developing a comprehensive strategy of isolating and marginalizing ideological supporters of Islamist extremism; (2) Deploying the military to eliminate terrorist safe havens; and (3) Implementing a program of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration for the thousands of young Pakistanis who have been inducted over the years into Jihadist organizations (often with State acquiescence).

Since 9/11, Musharraf has invoked three principal arguments to secure international backing and to justify his continuation in power. Developments over the last year or so have diminished each of these arguments.

The first reason given for accepting Musharraf in power is his status as an ally in the global war against terrorism. Musharraf's efficacy as a bulwark against terrorism has been exposed as parts of Pakistan slip further under the influence of Islamist extremists and reports emerge of Al-Qaeda's safe haven in remote regions of the country.

Taliban sympathizers virtually control several districts in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province bordering Afghanistan. Reports of beheadings, targeting alleged American spies and "loose" women, filter through almost on a weekly basis. Terrorist bombings, including suicide attacks, have claimed more lives in Pakistan during the past two years than in several preceding years.

Musharraf appears to have no plan for a sustained war with the terrorists. He alternately compromises with extremist sympathizers and pushes his army to fight high profile battles that inflame passions but do little to eliminate terrorist strongholds. When radical clerics used Islamabad's red mosque to Talibanize the Pakistani capital earlier this year, Musharraf waited for several months before using force against them. In the process, he strengthened the resolve of the terrorists and gained little except a tactical victory when he finally used special operations forces to flush out the radicals from the mosque.

Political distractions have prevented Pakistani intelligence from even doing the one thing they did regularly to appease the United States. In the first few years since 2001, several leading Al-Qaeda members were arrested in Pakistan. There have been no significant arrests of Al-Qaeda leadership figures in Pakistan for over a year.

Musharraf's second claim to legitimacy rested on the notion that he is good for Pakistan's stability mainly because the country's economy has grown at a rate of 6-8 percent annually under military rule. This rapid economic growth, however, is the result of macroeconomic restructuring, capital inflows and privatization of state enterprises and banks. It is not based on major expansion in manufacturing or agriculture, the areas that affect the lives of a majority of Pakistanis. As a result, it has benefited only a small group with ties to Pakistan's military and civilian oligarchy.

There is virtually little trickledown. As Pakistanis riot periodically and violent extremists broaden their recruitment base, it is becoming increasingly clear that Musharraf's much touted economic achievements are somewhat limited in impact and will not be enough to stabilize the world's only majority Muslim nuclear armed nation.

Musharraf's supporters have often invoked a third argument in his favor, that of him being not repressive like other military dictators. Pakistan has had a succession of flawed civilian and military rulers, the argument goes, and it is more important for the country to have an effective helmsman than a democratically elected one. A former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan once went to the extent of asserting that Musharraf should not even be called a dictator because of his acceptance of a relatively free media.

But Musharraf has always been selectively repressive and repression is rising as threats to Musharraf's continuing in power increase. The media, too, is now under attack as exemplified in the recent beating up of journalists by police in Islamabad. The Musharraf regime has used the justification of the war against terror to orchestrate the disappearance of some Islamic activists and many members of political parties opposed to military rule.

Beginning with his botched decision to remove Pakistan's Chief Justice in March, Musharraf has exposed his darker side. For example, armed Musharraf supporters shot and killed opposition activists and attacked media organizations in Karachi on May 12 to prevent the Chief Justice from addressing a rally in Musharraf's hometown. Musharraf stopped law enforcement agencies from investigating the killings even though some of the shootings were recorded and shown on television. More recently, television images of police brutality against lawyers demonstrating peacefully and journalists covering these demonstrations have totally erased the impression of Musharraf as a benign dictator.

Normalization of relations between India and Pakistan and Pakistan's return to democracy is most likely the key to the withdrawal of the military from the political arena as well as to Pakistan's long term stability. Pakistan's minority Islamists would lose credibility and legitimacy if democratic institutions operate successfully and are dominated, through free and fair elections, by secularists and moderates.

Instead of thinking only in terms of the extremes of showering Pakistan, mainly its military, with aid or of cutting that aid off, U.S. policy makers should look at the totality of the picture in Pakistan. A policy of nuanced engagement, in which U.S. officials – including senior military commanders --frankly share their concerns with Pakistan's rulers and the people, would be a better way of shoring up Pakistan as a frontline state in the war against terror.

It is my view that the U.S. Congress, as well as the Executive Branch, should take measures that demonstrate convincingly an international interest in Pakistan's return to democracy with full participation of all major representative political personalities and parties. These measures could include funding for full monitoring of the forthcoming

elections and a willingness of the executive branch to ensure that Musharraf abides by his commitment to a democratic transition.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: **Husain Haqqani**

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

X Individual

___Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:_____

FISCAL YEAR 2007 **None**

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

FISCAL YEAR 2006 **None**

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

FISCAL YEAR 2005 None

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007): **None**
Fiscal year 2006: **None**;
Fiscal year 2005: **None**.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

"Security Challenges Involving Pakistan and Policy Implications for the Department of Defense"

Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, the Heritage Foundation

Before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives

October 10, 2007

Pursuing a strong and stable relationship with Pakistan will continue to be one of America's most important foreign policy objectives for several years to come. The range and complexity of issues involved in our relations – eliminating global terrorist networks, countering the rising tide of Islamic radicalism in Pakistan, securing and safeguarding Pakistan's nuclear assets, and facilitating the transition to civilian-led democracy – require focused and sustained U.S. attention and deft diplomacy.[1]

Recent developments in Pakistan and the U.S., however, are threatening to create misunderstandings between our two countries and to derail this critical partnership. Pakistan's inability to control a burgeoning terrorist safe haven in its tribal areas bordering Afghanistan is causing frustration in Washington, while recently-passed U.S. legislation that conditions military assistance to Pakistan is causing doubts about the U.S. as a reliable long-term partner. Washington and Islamabad each have high expectations of the relationship. In order to sustain the U.S.-Pakistan partnership over the long-term, we need to manage these expectations and seek to align our strategic perspectives of the region more closely. We should not repeat the mistakes of the past by allowing our ties to Islamabad to founder. A second breach in the relationship, like that caused by the Pressler Amendment that cut off U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990, would seriously jeopardize U.S. interests in South Asia and have severe implications for the global fight against terrorism.

Political Transition

Pakistan is in the midst of an historical political transition that will determine the core direction of the country at a time when extremists are seeking to provoke an Islamic revolution. We have seen dramatic developments in recent weeks and the final outcome of the political

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[1] The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and educational organization operating under Section 501(C) (3). It is privately supported, and receives no funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any government or other contract work. The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United States. During 2006, it had more than 283,000 individual, foundation, and corporate supporters representing every state in the U.S. Its 2006 income came from the following sources: individuals 64%; foundations 19%; corporations 3%; investment income 14%; and publication sales and other 0%. The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 1.3% of its 2006 income. The Heritage Foundation's books are audited annually by the national accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche. A list of major donors is available from The Heritage Foundation upon request. Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their own independent research. The views expressed are their own, and do not reflect an institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees.

changes are still uncertain. Washington should welcome the transition to civilian democratic rule without backing any particular individuals or political parties. Given the perception that the U.S. has favored military over civilian rule in Pakistan in order to pursue its own counterterrorism objectives over the last six years, Washington will have difficulty convincing Pakistanis that it supports genuine democracy in Pakistan now. Unequivocal U.S. support for the democratic transition, such as recent U.S. statements criticizing the arrest of opposition politicians as well as U.S. discouragement of declaration of emergency rule in Pakistan, is necessary to try to defuse the increasingly shrill anti-Americanism that is gripping Pakistani civil society.

If the Supreme Court this week rules in Musharraf's favor on the cases before it challenging his eligibility for re-lection to another five-year term, he will officially become president and all eyes will begin to shift to the 2008 general election. To lay a foundation for a credible election process, Musharraf will need to resign from the Chief of Army position. His lawyer has already announced to the Supreme Court that he will shed the military uniform before taking a new oath of office, and he has little choice but to follow through on the commitment. A second attempt to renege on his pledge, like he did in 2004, would meet with a domestic backlash and strong international condemnation. His recent announcement of a successor Chief of the Army signals that he is serious about resigning his military post.

Other preparations for a free and fair election are also necessary. The Election Commission must work with the political opposition and international observers to correct voter rolls, which apparently fail to list millions of voters. Additionally, the government must give all political parties a chance to participate fully in the process. Any attempt to manipulate the elections in favor of a particular political party would backfire and undermine the credibility of the entire process, fueling further political unrest.

Rising Extremist Violence

The increase in attacks in Pakistan over the last three months that have killed over 300 civilians and security personnel appear to be retaliation for the July 10th military operation at the Red Mosque but also seem aimed at taking advantage of the political unrest. Pakistan is now second only to Iraq with regard to the number of suicide attacks in the country during the last few months.

The attacks on government forces have mainly taken place in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where the Pakistan military has resumed operations against militants. Last week a suicide bomber killed 15 when he blew himself up near a police checkpoint in the town of Bannu in the NWFP. Pakistan has reported killing 150 militants in clashes over the weekend in North Waziristan. Support within the Pakistan Army itself to continue fighting in the tribal areas may be eroding, though. Circumstances surrounding the capture of over 240 Pakistani soldiers by Taliban fighters on August 30 are mysterious and some observers speculate the soldiers may have surrendered.

Despite the rising violence, Pakistanis are generally ambivalent about taking on the extremist threat directly. A recent poll taken by the U.S. nongovernmental organization Terror Free Tomorrow shows that an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis do not view the fight against terrorism as benefiting Pakistan nor do they see defeating al Qaeda as a priority for their leaders.

Instead they appear to blame the recent violence on Pakistani counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S. and increasingly question the benefits of continuing to support U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts in the region that, in their opinion, rely too heavily on military force.

Harmonizing U.S.-Pakistan Counterterrorism Efforts

The U.S. and Pakistan differ on how to achieve counterterrorism objectives. Our two countries share the overall goals of bringing stability to Afghanistan and preventing the rise of extremism in Pakistan. Moreover, we are in agreement that the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan would have a blowback effect in Pakistan. However, for a variety of reasons, including fears of creating greater instability in the country, Pakistani doubts about the U.S. long-term commitment to the region, and Islamabad's distrust of the Karzai government, Islamabad is reluctant to crack down fully on the Taliban and other extremists operating from its territory.

Also contributing to broader U.S.-Pakistan misunderstanding on counterterrorism issues is the complex political and societal dynamics in Pakistan that prevent Islamabad from taking credit for some of its counterterrorism successes. Given the Pakistani public's opposition to the war in Afghanistan and pockets of sympathy for the Taliban, Islamabad has refrained from highlighting its recent contributions in targeting senior Taliban leaders. With the assistance of Pakistan, senior Taliban military commander Mullah Akhtar Osmani was killed last December in an air strike in Afghanistan and Mullah Dadullah was killed in May in Helmand province, Afghanistan. The Pakistanis also arrested Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Obaidullah earlier in the year and eliminated key Pakistani Taliban leader Abdullah Masood in Baluchistan province in July. [2]

To garner the full counterterrorism cooperation the U.S. requires from Islamabad, Washington must develop a realistic and hard-nosed policy that takes on Pakistan's ambivalence toward going head-to-head with the extremists. Despite Pakistan having been one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid over the last six years — receiving well over $10 billion – the terrorist threat emanating from Pakistan is as dangerous as ever: many of those involved in recently foiled terrorist plots across the globe received training and inspiration at terrorist training camps in Pakistan and a recent United Nations report says that 80 percent of suicide bombers that have conducted attacks in Afghanistan from 2001 – 2007 were recruited, received training, or stayed in safe houses located in the North and South Waziristan agencies of Pakistan's tribal areas.[3]

Pakistan believes the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan relies too heavily on military operations that result in collateral damage that further alienates the local population. Furthermore, Islamabad believes it is possible to negotiate with the Taliban in order to bring them into the political process. In his remarks at the closing ceremony of the August Peace Jirga

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[2] "Briefing on Pakistan," Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Washington, DC, July 17, 2007 at http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/88582.htm.

[3] "Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan," United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, September 9, 2007, pages 67 – 68.

in Kabul, Musharraf said the Taliban are part of Afghan society and can be brought into the political mainstream. While promoting an inclusive political system that provides adequate representation of Pashtuns is important to stabilizing the country, there should be no doubt about the international commitment to preventing the Taliban from again gaining influence in the country. Advocating a Taliban role affirms extremism as an acceptable ideology and undermines the establishment of pluralistic democracy in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a recent UN reports asserts that overall support for the Taliban in Afghanistan remains "astonishingly low."[4]

Some observers believe Pakistan prefers to allow the Taliban to undermine the current dispensation in Afghanistan since the success of Karzai – perceived as a close ally of India – would be detrimental to Pakistani security interests.[5] At the same time, however, the recent wave of terrorist attacks in retaliation for the Pakistan military's action against extremists at the Red Mosque in Islamabad on July 10th have led to the death of over 300 Pakistani civilians and security officials, demonstrating that the Taliban can be as threatening to the Pakistani state as it is to the Karzai government.

While hard core Taliban elements with links to al-Qaeda will have to be defeated militarily in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, Washington, Kabul, and Islamabad should devise together a strategy to siphon off "guns-for-hire" that would be willing to become part of civilian society. According to the British House of Commons Defense Committee Report on "United Kingdom Operations in Afghanistan," released in July, British commanders in Helmand province reported that there were two levels of Taliban fighters: "tier one" fighters who are religious fundamentalists who would never accept a compromise with government and "tier two" fighters whose allegiance was not based on ideology but who were in effect hired guns and more amenable to reconciliation.[6]

Pakistani Tribal Areas. Perhaps the greatest challenge in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is to develop an effective strategy to root out the terrorists from the Tribal Areas. Senior U.S. intelligence officials revealed over the summer that the Pakistani peace deals in the FATA have not achieved the desired objectives and, in fact, have allowed the region to develop into an al-Qaeda stronghold. Pakistani extremists also took advantage of the decreased military pressure by attempting to institute strict Islamic edicts in the region--the same tactics employed by the Taliban in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The extremists have sought to close down girls' schools, barbershops, and video stores, and are increasingly challenging the writ of the government, even in some of the settled areas of the Northwest Frontier Province.

While focusing greater attention to combating this problem, it is important to acknowledge the tremendous losses the Pakistan Army has suffered in these areas over the last five years. The peace deals were implemented because of these losses as well as the growing disillusionment among military cadre over fighting their own citizens. Part of the government's plan in initiating the peace deals was to restore the traditional form of governance in the region

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[4] "Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan," page 12.
[5] Ejaz Haider, "Reconciling with ground realities," *The Friday Times*, www.thefridaytimes.com/17082007/page7.shtml on 8/20/2007.
[6] British House of Commons Defense Committee Report on "United Kingdom Operations in Afghanistan," Thirteenth Report of session 2006-07, July 18, 2007, page 28.

and to co-opt the tribal elders and political representatives through an infusion of economic assistance for new roads, hospitals, and schools.

The U.S. revelations about al-Qaeda's safe haven in the border areas coincided with the Pakistan military's July 10th storming of the Red Mosque in Islamabad, which left at least 100 dead. Reports indicate that there were links between the leadership of the Red Mosque and al-Qaeda elements in the Tribal Areas. The combination of events led Pakistan to send fresh military reinforcements to the region, reactivate military checkpoints, and resume limited military operations.

While Pakistan's willingness to go back on the military offensive in the tribal areas is welcome, Islamabad's efforts alone are unlikely to address the serious threat from the region. U.S. and Afghan forces repeatedly have pursued insurgents to the border, but are banned from crossing into Pakistan in hot pursuit. Senior Pakistani military officials do not support the extremists in the tribal areas, yet they do not view the situation with the same urgency as the U.S. They also are reluctant to engage in a full-out confrontation with the extremists in these areas because of the risk that it would destabilize Pakistan.[7]

Washington must convince Islamabad to work more closely in joint operations that bring U.S. resources and military strength to bear on the situation and employ a combination of targeted military operations and economic assistance that drives a wedge between the Pashtun tribal communities and the international terrorists. A large-scale U.S. troop invasion of Pakistan's Tribal Areas would have disastrous consequences for the Pakistani state and would not provide a lasting solution to the problem. A more effective strategy involves working cooperatively with Pakistan's military to assert state authority over the areas and once they are secure, provide substantial assistance to build up the economy and social infrastructure. The Administration already is moving in this direction with a pledge of $750 million over five years to develop the tribal areas.

Over the longer term, U.S. assistance should encourage political reform that incorporates the institutions of the tribal lands fully into the Pakistani system. Some have argued that the Pakistan military is loath to implement political reform in these areas and that only the democratic parties would move in this direction. In late July Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Benazir Bhutto filed a petition with the Supreme Court, seeking enforcement of the Political Parties Act in the FATA that would extend Pakistan election laws to the region and encourage political activity. Political parties currently are prohibited from functioning in the FATA, although there are 12 seats reserved for FATA members in the National Assembly (lower house of parliament) and eight in the Senate. The petition claims that since the political parties are not allowed to field candidates for elections, the mosques and madrassahs (religious schools) have been able to assert undue political influence in the region.[8]

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[7] Moeed Yusuf, "Tackling Pakistan's Extremists: Who Dictates, Us or Them?" The Brookings Institution, September 6, 2007 at http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/yusuf20070906.htm.
[8] "BB moves SC for politicking in FATA," *Daily Times*, July 31, 2007.

Washington should also prioritize development of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) that would build up industrial zones in the Northwest Frontier Province and other areas that would produce textile goods receiving preferential access in the U.S. The ROZ initiative is an integral component to our overall strategy to develop the FATA and uproot terrorism from the border areas. The Bush Administration first announced this initiative over 18 months ago. The U.S. Administration and Congress should work together expeditiously to get this critical project off the ground.

Pakistani Regional Relationships

Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations. Our ability to defeat al-Qaeda's capabilities and ideology rests on a strategy that integrates our diplomatic and security efforts toward Afghanistan and Pakistan and that focuses more intently on improving these two key countries' relations with each other. The Afghanistan Freedom and Security Support Act of 2007 that is now before the U.S. Senate acknowledges this linkage and authorizes the President to appoint a special envoy to promote closer Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation. This is an important initiative and should be taken up as quickly as possible.

This senior envoy would need to take a pro-active role in mediating disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, prodding both countries to develop a fresh strategic perception of the region based on economic integration, political reconciliation, and respect for territorial boundaries. To achieve stability in the region, Pakistan will have to root out Taliban ideology from its own society and close down madrassahs and training camps that perpetuate the Taliban insurgency. For its part, Afghanistan will have to acknowledge the sanctity of the border dividing Pashtun populations between the two countries and ensure adequate representation of Pashtuns in the Afghan government.

Pashtuns in Afghanistan number about 12 million, making up 42 percent of the Afghanistan population, while the Pashtun population in Pakistan stands at about 25 million, constituting around 15 percent of the total Pakistani population. British colonialists had purposely divided the ethnic Pashtun tribes in 1893 with the Durand Line, which now constitutes the 1,600-mile porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.[9] Afghanistan at one time claimed Pashtun tribal areas in Pakistan and has never officially recognized the Durand Line. Pakistan in the past has countered Pashtun nationalism within its own orders by promoting pan-Islamic extremism in Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan peace jirga that was held in early August in Kabul was a first step in bringing local leaders together from both sides of the border in face-to-face talks. While no one expected immediate breakthroughs, the gathering represented an important step in beginning to build confidence between the hostile neighbors. Pakistani and Afghan delegates, numbering around 700, focused on terrorism as a joint threat to the two nations and urged their governments to make the war on terror an integral part of their national policies and security strategies.

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[9] Congressional Research Services Report for Congress, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations," Order Code RL33489, K. Alan Kronstadt, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, August 24, 2007, p. 16.

One highlight of the jirga was President Musharraf's admission during the closing ceremonies that Afghan militants received support from within Pakistan. His statements represented a welcome departure from past rhetorical barbs blaming Afghanistan's woes entirely on President Karzai. Musharraf's remarks demonstrate that the two sides have made some limited progress in improving relations since the historic tripartite meeting hosted by President Bush in September 2006.

Pakistan-India Relations. India and Pakistan have achieved tangible progress in the peace talks that started in January 2004. They have held dozens of official meetings, increased people-to-people exchanges, increased annual bilateral trade to over $1 billion, launched several cross-border buses and train services, and liberalized visa regimes to encourage travel between the two countries. During a meeting in September 2006—just two months after the Mumbai commuter train blasts that killed nearly 200—Prime Minister Singh and President Musharraf established a joint terrorism mechanism and agreed to expedite resolution of disputes over the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek, a narrow strip of marshland separating the province of Sindh in Pakistan and the state of Gujarat in India.

Perhaps the most significant progress has been the narrowing of differences over how to address the seemingly intractable issue of Kashmir. President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh are beginning to craft their statements on Kashmir in ways that narrow the gap between their countries' long-held official positions on the disputed territory. President Musharraf declared last December in an Indian television interview that Pakistan would give up its claim to Kashmir if India agreed to a four-part solution that involves keeping the current boundaries intact and making the Line of Control (LOC) that divides Kashmir irrelevant, demilitarizing both sides of the LOC, developing a plan for self-governance of Kashmir, and instituting a mechanism for India and Pakistan to jointly supervise the region. In 2003, Musharraf dropped Islamabad's long-held insistence on a United Nations plebiscite to determine the status of Kashmir.

It is critical that the two sides maintain momentum in the peace process, since the state of Pakistan-India ties will be a major determinant of overall regional stability. The peace process has understandably slowed due to the recent political instability in Pakistan. In a welcome development, Indian and Pakistani officials have agreed to meet next week in New Delhi to discuss nuclear confidence building and expand on their counterterrorism joint mechanism. If, as expected, Pakistan holds general elections early next year, the peace process could become vulnerable, if new leaders fail to express commitment to the peace talks early on in their administration.

One reason for continued Pakistani ambivalence toward the Taliban stems from the concern that India is trying to encircle it by gaining influence in Afghanistan. In this context, the Taliban offers the best chance for countering India's regional influence. Pakistan believes ethnic Tajiks in the Afghan government receive support from New Delhi. India, in cooperation with Russia and Iran, supported the Afghan Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the late 1990s and almost certainly retains links to Northern Alliance elements now in the Afghan government. Pakistan also complains that the Indian consulates in the border cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar are involved in fomenting insurgency in its Baluchistan province.

Because of the regional rivalry between Pakistan and India, Islamabad has been reluctant to allow Indian trans-shipment of goods across its territory into Afghanistan. The U.S. should encourage India and Pakistan to work toward greater economic cooperation in Afghanistan as a way to defuse their tensions. Participants in unofficial talks on improving Indo-Pakistani ties have suggested that the two countries add Afghanistan as an agenda item in their formal dialogue.[10]

Pakistan–China Relations. Pakistan and China have had long-standing strategic ties. China is Pakistan's largest defense supplier and the Chinese view Pakistan as a useful counterweight to Indian power in the region. In the run-up to Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Pakistan last November, media reports speculated that Beijing would sign a major nuclear energy cooperation agreement with Pakistan.[11] In the end, however, the Chinese leader provided a general pledge of support to Pakistan's nuclear energy program but refrained from announcing plans to supply new nuclear reactors. China has helped Pakistan build two nuclear reactors at the Chasma site in the Punjab Province and has provided Pakistan with nuclear technology as far back as the 1970s. China also is helping Pakistan develop a deep-sea port at Gwadar in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, near the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

One source of tension between Beijing and Islamabad that has surfaced in the past has been over the issue of rising Islamic extremism in Pakistan and the ability of Chinese Uighur separatists to receive sanctuary and training among other radical Islamist groups on Pakistani territory. To mollify China's concerns, Pakistan in recent years has begun to clamp down on Uighur settlements and on religious schools used as training grounds for militant Islamists.[12] Their tensions over Islamic extremism flared earlier this year when Islamic vigilantes from the Red Mosque kidnapped several Chinese citizens they accused of running a brothel in Islamabad. Many believe Islamabad's decision to use military force against the extremists at the Red Mosque stemmed largely from the incident with the Chinese citizens, which greatly embarrassed the Musharraf regime.

Pakistan–Iran Relations. Pakistan's relations with Iran have been far from smooth over the last three decades. Relations soured following the 1979 Iranian Revolution due to Pakistani President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq's previous support of the Shah's regime and his encouragement of Sunni militant organizations that pushed a strict Sunni interpretation of Islam and targeted the minority Shiia population in Pakistan. Iran, in turn, began to export to Pakistan Shiia militants to counter the Sunni extremists. Sectarian violence has ebbed and flowed over the last fifteen years in Pakistan and continues to have a chilling impact on Iranian–Pakistani relations.

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[10] Chandan Mitra, "J & K: Out of the box," *The Pioneer*, September 13, 2007 at http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnist1.asp?main_variable=Columnist&file_name=mitra%2Fmitra265.txt&writer=mitra.

[11] Jo Johnson, Farhan Bokhari, and Edward Luce, "U.S. Fears China–Pakistan Nuclear Deal," *The Financial Times*, November 16, 2006, at *www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0bcea362-75e1-11db-aea1-0000779e2340.html*, (September 12, 2007).

[12] Ziad Haider, "Clearing Clouds Over the Karakoram Pass," *YaleGlobal Online*, March 29, 2004, at *http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3603&page=2* (September 12, 2007).

Pakistan's support of the Sunni Taliban in the mid-1990s significantly raised tensions between Tehran and Islamabad. These tensions climaxed in August 1998 when the Taliban killed several Iranian diplomats in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif. Iran responded by amassing its military along the border with Afghanistan. If fighting had broken out between Iranian forces and the Taliban, Pakistan would have likely been drawn into the conflict in support of the Taliban. It is difficult to imagine Pakistan would have officially sanctioned nuclear cooperation with such an unsteady neighbor, although some analysts believe the bulk of the nuclear cooperation occurred in the early 1990s before the Taliban had emerged and shortly after the U.S. had cut off assistance to Pakistan.

Pakistan's halt to official support for the Taliban following 9/11 has helped to improve Pakistani– Iranian ties, and both countries are actively engaged in talks on developing an Iran–Pakistan–India oil and gas pipeline.

Nuclear Issues

Preventing Pakistan's nuclear weapons and technology from falling into the hands of terrorists is a top priority for the U.S. President Musharraf recently made a series of promotions to key Army posts aimed at ensuring continuity in Army policies during the political transition. The round of promotions is critical to maintaining the professionalism and institutional integrity of the Army and reassuring the international community that the military remains committed to the fight against terrorism and protection of the country's nuclear assets.

While there is no immediate threat to the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons during the current political transition, Washington will need to be diligent in pursuing policies that promote the safety and security of Islamabad's nuclear assets. The results of investigations into Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear black market and proliferation network demonstrate the devastating consequences of nuclear proliferation by individuals with access to state-controlled nuclear programs.

Although A.Q. Khan avoided engaging al-Qaeda on nuclear issues, earlier revelations about a group of former Pakistani military officials and nuclear scientists who met with Osama bin Laden around the time of 9/11 reminds us of the continuing threat of the intersection of terrorism and nuclear weapons in Pakistan. On October 23, 2001, acting on an American request, Pakistani authorities detained Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed, two retired Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) officials. Since their retirement from the PAEC in 1999 they had been involved in relief work in Afghanistan through a non-governmental organization they established called Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN). In November 2001, the coalition forces found documents in Afghanistan relating to UTN's interest in biological weapons. This prompted Pakistani security forces to arrest seven members of UTN's board, most of whom were retired Pakistani Army officials and nuclear scientists.[13]

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[13] Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 154 – 155.

Former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet speculates in his memoirs that UTN's contacts with the Taliban and al-Qaeda may have been supported by some elements within the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment. Tenet says Pakistani interrogations of the seven board members were initially insufficient. He further notes that despite CIA warnings to Pakistani officials about UTN's activities before 9/11, it was only when President George W. Bush dispatched him to Pakistan in November 2001, following revelations of a meeting between bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and UTN leaders, that Musharraf took serious action.[14]

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

Washington is unlikely to succeed in stabilizing Afghanistan and preventing the Taliban from regaining influence in the country unless it addresses Pakistani stakes in Afghanistan and integrates U.S. security and diplomatic policies toward these two key countries. In this regard, the U.S. should follow through with suggestions to establish a senior envoy to focus solely on working with both Pakistani and Afghan officials to address their political and historical tensions and encourage greater security and economic cooperation. As part of this effort, the U.S. will need to spur Pakistan to adjust its security perceptions of the region and demonstrate U.S. sensitivity to Pakistan's core security interests and willingness to use influence with both Kabul and New Delhi to address these concerns. Washington should continue and expand the Pakistan-Afghanistan jirga process as a way to bring together local leaders from both sides of the border.

Washington should encourage New Delhi and Islamabad to engage directly with one another on the issue of Afghanistan and help identify regional economic or political initiatives on which the two can cooperate. Pakistan should not expect the U.S. to discourage India from having a role in Afghanistan, since Washington views New Delhi's example as a pluralistic democracy as a positive influence in helping Afghanistan develop itself into a stable democracy. Washington should consider fostering regional trade cooperation initiatives among Pakistan-India-Afghanistan that would encourage Pakistan to allow India to transship goods destined for Afghanistan reconstruction programs through its territory as stipulated in H.R. 2446. The U.S. could support a high-profile regional trade initiative with Indian, Pakistani, and Afghan representatives somewhere in the region that also involves participation by U.S. companies currently involved in the Afghan reconstruction effort.

The U.S. will need to build up Pakistan's capacity to take on the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the Tribal Areas and focus substantial attention on developing these areas economically. Washington must convince Islamabad to work more closely in joint efforts that bring U.S. resources and military strength to bear on the situation in North and South Waziristan and employ a combination of targeted military operations and economic assistance programs that drives a wedge between the Pashtun tribal communities and the international terrorists. A large-scale U.S. troop invasion of Pakistan's Tribal Areas could have disastrous consequences for the Pakistani state and would not provide a lasting solution to the problem. A more effective strategy involves working cooperatively with Pakistan's military to assert state authority over the areas and once they are secure, provide substantial assistance to build up the economy and social infrastructure. Washington's pledge of $750 million to develop the tribal areas over the next five

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[14] George Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), p. 286.

years is welcome but the aid should not be delivered until it is clear the Pakistani authorities have the upper hand in the region and can ensure the aid does not fall into the wrong hands. This will require U.S. access to the region and a clear commitment from the Pakistan government to counter Taliban ideology.

USAID has implemented assistance programs in the FATA for several years, including road building and school construction, and through opium cultivation eradication programs that were successful in the 1980s. Although the U.S. will have to provide aid initially through Pakistani government channels, USAID should seek out potential NGOs that could work in these areas so that eventually it can work through them rather than relying solely on the local administration.

The U.S. should conduct counterinsurgency training programs for the Pakistan military, especially the Frontier Corps, whose troops know the terrain of the FATA, but have little counterinsurgency training. This training will both build trust and stronger ties between the U.S. military and its Pakistani counterparts as well as better prepare the Pakistan Army to fight al-Qaeda in the Tribal Areas.

To address rising Islamic extremism, Washington should encourage the Pakistan government to enforce the rule of law against militants who use the threat of violence to enforce Taliban-style edicts and close down madrassahs that are teaching hatred against the West that leads to terrorism. Washington, in coordination with the United Kingdom and European allies, should make clear to Pakistan that the Taliban do not have a place in any future government in Afghanistan and that only those who firmly renounce violence and participate in the current political process will have a say in running the country.

The U.S. should refrain from conditioning assistance to Pakistan as it sends a wrong signal at a time when we need to demonstrate that the fight against terrorism is a joint endeavor that benefits Pakistan as much as it does the U.S. and global community. Given the abrupt cut-off of U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990 because of nuclear concerns, the U.S. lost valuable leverage with Pakistani leaders and created a feeling of mistrust between our two countries that still plagues the relationship. Because of the 1990 aid cut-off, Pakistan views the U.S. as a fickle partner that could exit the region at any time. This lack of faith in U.S. commitment to the region hurts our ability to garner the kind of counterterrorism cooperation we require from the Pakistani government. Pakistani soldiers are dying in the battle against terrorism and average Pakistanis are beginning to question whether these sacrifices are being made solely at the behest of the U.S. rather than to protect their own country. Conditioning assistance only fuels the idea that Pakistan is taking action to fight terrorism under coercion, rather than to protect its own citizens.

The U.S. should encourage the current transition to civilian-led democratic rule, yet not try to micro-manage it from Washington. The Pakistani people by and large do not support extremist policies and would likely vote into power one of the secular democratic parties so long as they have a range of political choices and perceive the elections as transparent and free.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name:_____**Lisa Curtis**_____

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

X___Individual

___Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:_____

FISCAL YEAR 2007

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
honorarium	State Dept.	$250.00	Participant in a conference on Pakistan, July 2, 2007

FISCAL YEAR 2006

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

FISCAL YEAR 2005

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

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