

diately, and when we *will* come home. Although the report answers those questions in detail, I want to repeat concisely my answers:

- We went to Somalia because without us a million people would have died. We, uniquely, were in a position to save them, and other nations were ready to share the burden after our initial action.
- What the United States is doing there is providing, for a limited period of time, logistics support and security so that the humanitarian and political efforts of the United Nations, relief organizations, and others can have a reasonable chance of success. The United Nations, in turn, has a longer term political, security, and relief mission designed to minimize the likelihood that famine and anarchy will return when the United Nations leaves. The U.S. military mission is not now nor was it ever one of "nation building."
- We cannot leave immediately because the United Nations has not had an adequate chance to replace us, nor have the Somalis had a reasonable opportunity to end their strife. We want other nations to assume more of the burden of international peace. To have them do so, they must think that they can rely on our commitments when we make them. Moreover, having been brutally attacked, were American forces to leave now we would send a message to terrorists and other potential adversaries around the world that they can change our policies by killing our people. It would be open season on Americans.
- We will, however, leave no later than March 31, 1994, except for a few hundred support troops. That amount of time will permit the Somali people to make progress toward political reconciliation and allow the United States to fulfill our obligations properly, including the return of any Americans being detained. We went there for the right reasons and we will finish the job in the right way.

While U.S. forces are there, they will be fully protected with appropriate American military capability.

Any Americans detained will be the subject of the most complete and thorough efforts of which this Government is capable, with the unrelenting goal of returning them home and returning them to health.

I want to thank all those who have expressed their support for this approach during the last week. At difficult times such as these, when we face international challenges, bipartisan unity among our two branches of government is vital.

**William J. Clinton**

The White House,  
October 13, 1993.

### **Message to the Congress Transmitting Budget Deferrals**

*October 13, 1993*

*To the Congress of the United States:*

In accordance with the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, I herewith report eight deferrals of budget authority, totaling \$1.2 billion.

These deferrals affect International Security Assistance programs as well as programs of the Agency for International Development and the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, and State. The details of these deferrals are contained in the attached report.

**William J. Clinton**

The White House,  
October 13, 1993.

### **Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia-Herzegovina**

*October 13, 1993*

*Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)*

Six months ago I provided you with my initial report on the deployment of U.S. combat-equipped aircraft to support NATO's enforcement of the no-fly zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am now providing this follow-up report, consistent with the War Powers

Resolution, to keep Congress fully informed on our enforcement effort.

The United Nations Security Council has been actively addressing the humanitarian and ethnic crisis in the Balkans since adopting Resolution 713 on September 25, 1991. As a significant part of the extensive United Nations effort in the region, the Security Council acted through Resolutions 781 and 786 to establish a ban on all unauthorized flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina. In response to blatant violations of these Resolutions, the Security Council adopted Resolution 816, which authorized Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the no-fly zone. NATO and its North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to provide NATO air assets to enforce the declared no-fly zone.

As I stated in my April 13 report, this enforcement effort began on April 12, 1993. Since that time, the participating nations have conducted phased air operations to prevent flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina that are not authorized by the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR). The United States has played a major role by contributing combat-equipped fighter aircraft as well as electronic combat and supporting tanker aircraft to these operations in the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Militarily, enforcement of the no-fly zone has been effective. Since the operations pursuant to Resolution 816 began, we have seen no recurrence of air-to-ground bombing of villages or other air-to-ground combat activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although nearly 400 violations have occurred, most have been by rotary-wing aircraft. These flights are difficult to detect because they are of short duration and are flown slowly, at low altitudes, and in mountainous terrain. Consequently, such flights sometimes can complete missions after being detected but before being intercepted. In addition, the violators appear to have learned the limits of our rules of engagement (ROE) and have become adept at playing "cat-and-mouse" games with the interceptors. When intercepted, violators heed the warnings to land, but sometimes the flights continue after the interceptors depart.

These enforcement operations have been conducted safely, with no casualties to date. Consideration has been given to strengthening the ROE to enforce the no-fly zone more aggressively. Because the violations have been militarily insignificant, however, the ROE have not been changed.

The United States continues to make extensive and valuable contributions to the United Nations efforts in the former Yugoslavia. More than 50 U.S. aircraft are now available to NATO for the continued conduct of no-fly zone enforcement operations and possible provision of close air support to UNPROFOR in the future. In addition, U.S. airlift missions to Sarajevo have numbered more than 1,900, and we have completed nearly 1,000 airdrop missions to safe areas, including Mostar. U.S. medical and other support personnel are providing vital services in support of UNPROFOR, while our U.S. Army light infantry battalion deployed to Macedonia has become an integral part of the UNPROFOR monitoring operations there. Finally, U.S. naval forces have completed more than 14 months of enforcement operations as part of a multinational effort to implement the Security Council's mandate with respect to economic sanctions and the arms embargo covering the former Yugoslavia.

Although the no-fly zone enforcement operations have been militarily effective and have reduced potential air threats to our humanitarian airlift and airdrop flights, this is only part of a much larger, continuing effort to resolve the extremely difficult situation in the former Yugoslavia. I therefore am not able to indicate at this time how long our participation in no-fly zone enforcement operations will be necessary. I have continued the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces for these purposes pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief.

I am grateful for the continuing support of Congress for this important deployment, and I look forward to continued cooperation as we move forward toward attainment of our goals in this region.

Sincerely,

**William J. Clinton**

NOTE: Identical letters were sent to Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Robert C. Byrd, President pro tempore of the Senate.

### **Statement on the Withdrawal of Shirley Chisholm's Nomination To Be Ambassador to Jamaica**

*October 13, 1993*

I deeply regret that illness has forced Shirley Chisholm to ask that her nomination to be our country's Ambassador to Jamaica be withdrawn. As I said when I first announced my decision to nominate her, Shirley Chisholm is a true pioneer of American politics. Even before she ran for elective office, she had made her mark through her work teaching the children of New York and through the force of her remarkable personality. As the U.S. Ambassador to Jamaica, she would have been a powerful voice for cooperation and justice.

Hillary and I both wish Shirley Chisholm all the best at this difficult time. She is in our thoughts and in our prayers.

NOTE: The President's statement was included in a White House statement announcing the withdrawal of Shirley Chisholm's nomination to be Ambassador to Jamaica.

### **The President's News Conference**

*October 14, 1993*

**The President.** Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'm sorry I am a little late, but I just finally got through to Ambassador Oakley, and I wanted to have a chance to speak with him directly for a couple of minutes before I came out here.

I also spoke with Mrs. Durant this morning to congratulate her and to wish her well. Obviously, she is very happy. She has now had an extended conversation with her husband. And he is, as you know, in the U.N. field hospital in Mogadishu. But he will be going to Germany as soon as the doctors say that he can travel. And then, as soon as possible, he'll be back home with his family and his

friends. I welcome his release, and I want to express my deepest thanks to the African leaders who pressed hard for it and to Bob Oakley, the International Red Cross, and to the United Nations, to all who have worked on this for the last several days.

Over the past week, since the United States announced its intention to strengthen our forces in Somalia, as well as to revitalize the diplomatic initiative and send Bob Oakley back, we have seen some hopeful actions: the release of Michael Durant and the Nigerian peacekeeper, the cessation of attacks on the United States and U.N. peacekeepers. That demonstrates that we are moving in the right direction and that we are making progress.

Our firm position on holding Durant's captors responsible for his well-being and demanding his release, I think, sent a strong message that was obviously heard. Now we have to maintain our commitment to finishing the job we started. It's not our job to rebuild Somalia's society or its political structure. The Somalis have to do that for themselves. And I welcome the help of the African leaders who have expressed their commitment to working with us and with them. But we have to give them enough time to have a chance to do that, to have a chance not to see the situation revert to the way it was before the United States and the United Nations intervened to prevent the tragedy late last year.

I want to also emphasize that we made no deals to secure the release of Chief Warrant Officer Durant. We had strong resolve. We showed that we were willing to support the resumption of the peace process, and we showed that we were determined to protect our soldiers and to react when appropriate by strengthening our position there. I think the policy was plainly right. But there was no deal.

If you have any questions, I'll be glad to try to answer them.

### **Somalia**

**Q.** Mr. President, there's still a \$25,000 bounty on Mr. Aideed. Would you still like to see Mr. Aideed arrested? Do you think that's appropriate? And do you think that the