

I believe that it is essential that cooperation between the United States and EURATOM continue, and likewise, that we work closely with our allies to counter the threat of proliferation of nuclear explosives. Not only would a disruption of nuclear cooperation with EURATOM eliminate any chance of progress in our negotiations with that organization related to our agreements, it would also cause serious problems in our overall relationships. Accordingly, I have determined that failure to continue peaceful nuclear cooperation with EURATOM would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives and would jeopardize the common defense and security of the United States. I therefore intend to sign an Executive order to extend the waiver of the application of the relevant export criterion of the Atomic Energy Act until the current agreements expire on December 31, 1995.

William J. Clinton

The White House,
March 9, 1995.

**Letter to Congressional Leaders
Transmitting a Report on
International Agreements**

March 9, 1995

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. Chairman:)

Pursuant to subsection (b) of the Case-Zablocki Act (1 U.S.C. 112b(b)), I hereby transmit a report prepared by the Department of State concerning international agreements.

Sincerely,

William J. Clinton

NOTE: Identical letters were sent to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Jesse Helms, chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

**Message to the Congress on the
Financial Crisis in Mexico**

March 9, 1995

To the Congress of the United States:

On January 31, 1995, I determined pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5302(b) that the economic

crisis in Mexico posed "unique and emergency circumstances" that justified the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) to provide loans and credits with maturities of greater than 6 months to the Government of Mexico and the Bank of Mexico. Consistent with the requirements of 31 U.S.C. 5302(b), I am hereby notifying the Congress of that determination. The congressional leadership issued a joint statement with me on January 31, 1995, in which we all agreed that such use of the ESF was a necessary and appropriate response to the Mexican financial crisis and in the United States' vital national interest.

On February 21, 1995, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Mexican Secretary of Finance and Public Credit signed four agreements that provide the framework and specific legal arrangements under which up to \$20 billion in support will be made available from the ESF to the Government of Mexico and the Bank of Mexico. Under these agreements, the United States will provide three forms of support to Mexico: short-term swaps through which Mexico borrows dollars for 90 days and that can be rolled over for up to 1 year; medium-term swaps through which Mexico can borrow dollars for up to 5 years; and securities guarantees having maturities of up to 10 years.

Repayment of these loans and guarantees is backed by revenues from the export of crude oil and petroleum products formalized in an agreement signed by the United States, the Government of Mexico, and the Mexican government's oil company. In addition, as added protection in the unlikely event of default, the United States is requiring Mexico to maintain the value of the pesos it deposits with the United States in connection with the medium-term swaps. Therefore, should the rate of exchange of the peso against the U.S. dollar drop during the time the United States holds pesos, Mexico would be required to provide the United States with enough additional pesos to reflect the rate of exchange prevailing at the conclusion of the swap.

I am enclosing a Fact Sheet prepared by the Department of the Treasury that provides greater details concerning the terms of the four agreements. I am also enclosing a summary of the economic policy actions that